G.R. No.
155336 November 25, 2004 expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its President,
MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Can the Commission on Human Rights lawfully implement an
upgrading and reclassification of personnel positions without
the prior approval of the Department of Budget and
Management?
Before this Court is a petition for review filed by petitioner
Commission on Human Rights Employees' Association
(CHREA) challenging the Decision1 dated 29 November 2001
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59678 affirming the
Resolutions2 dated 16 December 1999 and 09 June 2000 of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC), which sustained the
validity of the upgrading and reclassification of certain
personnel positions in the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) despite the disapproval thereof by the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM). Also assailed is the
resolution dated 11 September 2002 of the Court of Appeals
denying the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.
The antecedent facts which spawned the present controversy
are as follows:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No.
8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of
1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last
portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR.
These special provisions state:
1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding and within the limits of their respective
appropriations as authorized in this Act, the Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices, to fix and determine the
salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and
whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their
personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the
transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective
offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose
positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments
shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in
accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of
their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and
Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are hereby authorized to use
savings in their respective appropriations for: (a) printing and/or
publication of decisions, resolutions, and training information
materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central
and regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of
books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary
casual employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and
miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation and
transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials
and employees as may be authorized by law; and (f) other
official purposes, subject to accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. (Emphases supplied)
on the strength of these special provisions, the CHR, through
its then Chairperson Aurora P. Navarette-Reciña and
Commissioners Nasser A. Marohomsalic, Mercedes V.
Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and Jorge R. Coquia,
promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04 September 1998,
adopting an upgrading and reclassification scheme among
selected positions in the Commission, to wit:
WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No.
8522 has provided special provisions applicable to all
Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy, particularly on
organizational structures and authorizes the same to formulate
and implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other
benefits of their personnel and whenever public interest so
requires, make adjustments in the personnel services
itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of item or
creation of new positions in their respective offices:
PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are
affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be
granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance
with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpanded balance of, or savings in the appropriations of
their respective offices;
Whereas, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of
the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) and on July
24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved Joint Resolution No. 49
adopting internal rules implementing the special provisions
heretoforth mentioned;
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal
autonomy hereby approves and authorizes the upgrading and
augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from
savings under Personal Services to support the implementation
of this resolution effective Calendar Year 1998;
Let the Human Resources Development Division (HRDD)
prepare the necessary Notice of Salary Adjustment and other
appropriate documents to implement this resolution; . . .
.3 (Emphasis supplied)
Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten
additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position,
with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four
Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process
Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the
Commissioners. 4
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-
0555 providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grades of
the following positions in the Commission:
Number Position Salary Total Salary
of Grade Requirements
1
 Positions Title … Based on the evaluations made the request was not
favorably considered as it effectively involved the elevation of
From To From To the field units from divisions to services.
12 Attorney VI Director IV 26 28 P229,104.00
(In the
Regional The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12)
Field positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28. This
Offices) would elevate the field units to a bureau or regional office, a
4 Director III Director IV 27 28 38,928.00 level even higher than the one previously denied.
1 Financial & Director IV 24 28 36,744.00
Management The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III,
Officer II SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office in effect
1 Budget Budget 18 24 51,756.00 would elevate the services to Office and change the context
Officer III Officer IV from support to substantive without actual change in functions.
1 Accountant Chief 18 24 51,756.00
III Accountant In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be
1 Cashier III Cashier V 18 24 51,756.00 used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a
1 Information Director IV 24 28 36,744.006 bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, we
Officer V reiterate our previous stand denying the upgrading of the
twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-
27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the Field Operations Office (FOO)
It, likewise, provided for the creation and upgrading of the
and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in the
following positions:
Central Office.

A. Creation
As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum
to the DBM Secretary dated 10 December 1997, directing the
Number of Position Title Salary Grade Total Salary latter to increase the number of Plantilla positions in the CHR
Positions Requirements both Central and Regional Offices to implement the Philippine
4 Security Officer II 15 684,780.00 Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine
(Coterminous) Human Rights Plan and Barangay Rights Actions Center in
accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis in the original)

B. Upgrading
Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no organizational
Number Position Title Salary Total Salary unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless
of Grade Requirements provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation
Positions of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office
From To From To cannot be given favorable recommendation.
1 Attorney V Director 25 28 P28,092.00
IV Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758,
otherwise known as the Compensation Standardization Law,
2 Security Security 11 15 57,456.00 the Department of Budget and Management is directed to
Officer I Officer II establish and administer a unified compensation and position
---------------- classification system in the government. The Supreme Court
Total 3 P 85,548.007 ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this Department has
the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation
To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in and position classification system of the National Government.
the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a
commensurate amount generated from savings under
Personnel Services. Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest
the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create
positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998, the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the
the CHR "collapsed" the vacant positions in the body to provide organizational structures of their respective offices and
additional source of funding for said staffing modification. determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority
Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of
Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System
Clerk III, and one Accounting Clerk II.8 established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading previous stand on the matter.9 (Emphases supplied)
scheme to the DBM with a request for its approval, but the then
DBM secretary Benjamin Diokno denied the request on the In light of the DBM's disapproval of the proposed personnel
following justification: modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999, recommended
to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
2
rejected owing to the DBM's disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHREA, in representation
of the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-
Central Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the
DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated
by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request in a
Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
upgrading scheme be censured. The decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V.
Ruiz, Flordeliza A. Briones, George Q. Dumlao [and], Corazon
A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.10
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central
Office denied the same on 09 June 2000.
Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the
CSC, petitioner CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of
the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the
upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on
the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR's
fiscal autonomy. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision
provides:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
ordered DISMISSED and the questioned Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated December 16,
1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June 9, 2000, are hereby
AFFIRMED. No cost.11
Unperturbed, petitioner filed this petition in this Court
contending that:
A.
…THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT
HELD THAT UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL
AUTONOMY.
B.
…THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8522 (THE
GENERAL APPROPRIATIONS ACT FOR THE FISCAL YEAR
1998) DESPITE ITS BEING IN SHARP CONFLICT WITH THE
1987 CONSTITUTION AND THE STATUTE ITSELF.
C.
…THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRAVELY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE VALIDITY OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION RESOLUTION NOS. 992800 AND
001354 AS WELL AS THAT OF THE OPINION OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN STATING THAT THE
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ENJOYS FISCAL
AUTONOMY UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND THAT
THIS FISCAL AUTONOMY INCLUDES THE ACTION TAKEN
BY IT IN COLLAPSING, UPGRADING AND
RECLASSIFICATION OF POSITIONS THEREIN.12
The central question we must answer in order to resolve this
case is: Can the Commission on Human Rights validly
implement an upgrading, reclassification, creation, and
collapsing of plantilla positions in the Commission without the
prior approval of the Department of Budget and Management?
Petitioner CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the
CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the CHR's
alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify, and create
positions inasmuch as the approval of the DBM relative to such
scheme is still indispensable. Petitioner bewails that the CSC
and the Court of Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR
enjoys fiscal autonomy insofar as financial matters are
concerned, particularly with regard to the upgrading and
reclassification of positions therein.
Respondent CHR sharply retorts that petitioner has no locus
standi considering that there exists no official written record in
the Commission recognizing petitioner as a bona fide
organization of its employees nor is there anything in the
records to show that its president, Marcial A. Sanchez, Jr., has
the authority to sue the CHR. The CHR contends that it has the
authority to cause the upgrading, reclassification, plantilla
creation, and collapsing scheme sans the approval of the DBM
because it enjoys fiscal autonomy.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments of both parties
and an assiduous scrutiny of the records in the case at bar, it is
the Court's opinion that the present petition is imbued with
merit.
On petitioner's personality to bring this suit, we held in a
multitude of cases that a proper party is one who has sustained
or is in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of
the act complained of.13 Here, petitioner, which consists of rank
and file employees of respondent CHR, protests that the
upgrading and collapsing of positions benefited only a select
few in the upper level positions in the Commission resulting to
the demoralization of the rank and file employees. This
sufficiently meets the injury test. Indeed, the CHR's upgrading
scheme, if found to be valid, potentially entails eating up the
Commission's savings or that portion of its budgetary pie
otherwise allocated for Personnel Services, from which the
benefits of the employees, including those in the rank and file,
are derived.
Further, the personality of petitioner to file this case was
recognized by the CSC when it took cognizance of the
CHREA's request to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
National Capital Region Office. CHREA's personality to bring
the suit was a non-issue in the Court of Appeals when it
passed upon the merits of this case. Thus, neither should our
hands be tied by this technical concern. Indeed, it is settled
jurisprudence that an issue that was neither raised in the
complaint nor in the court below cannot be raised for the first
3
time on appeal, as to do so would be offensive to the basic
rules of fair play, justice, and due process.14
We now delve into the main issue of whether or not the
approval by the DBM is a condition precedent to the enactment
of an upgrading, reclassification, creation and collapsing of
plantilla positions in the CHR.
Germane to our discussion is Rep. Act No. 6758, An Act
Prescribing a Revised Compensation and Position
Classification System in the Government and For Other
Purposes, or the Salary Standardization Law, dated 01 July
1989, which provides in Sections 2 and 4 thereof that it is the
DBM that shall establish and administer a unified
Compensation and Position Classification System. Thus:
SEC. 2. Statement of Policy. -- It is hereby declared the policy
of the State to provide equal pay for substantially equal work
and to base differences in pay upon substantive differences in
duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of
the positions. In determining rates of pay, due regard shall be
given to, among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for
comparable work. For this purpose, the Department of Budget
and Management (DBM) is hereby directed to establish and
administer a unified Compensation and Position Classification
System, hereinafter referred to as the System as provided for
in Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended, that shall be
applied for all government entities, as mandated by the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 4. Coverage. – The Compensation and Position
Classification System herein provided shall apply to all
positions, appointive or elective, on full or part-time basis, now
existing or hereafter created in the government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and government
financial institutions.
The term "government" refers to the Executive, the Legislative
and the Judicial Branches and the Constitutional Commissions
and shall include all, but shall not be limited to, departments,
bureaus, offices, boards, commissions, courts, tribunals,
councils, authorities, administrations, centers, institutes, state
colleges and universities, local government units, and the
armed forces. The term "government-owned or controlled
corporations and financial institutions" shall include all
corporations and financial institutions owned or controlled by
the National Government, whether such corporations and
financial institutions perform governmental or proprietary
functions. (Emphasis supplied.)
The disputation of the Court of Appeals that the CHR is exempt
from the long arm of the Salary Standardization Law is flawed
considering that the coverage thereof, as defined above,
encompasses the entire gamut of government offices, sans
qualification.
This power to "administer" is not purely ministerial in character
as erroneously held by the Court of Appeals. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of others; to
direct or superintend the execution, application or conduct of;
and to manage or conduct public affairs, as to administer the
government of the state.15
The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of compensation
is encrypted not only in law, but in jurisprudence as well. In the
recent case of Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA) v.
Jesusito L. Buñag,16 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice
Reynato Puno, ruled that compensation, allowances, and other
benefits received by PRA officials and employees without the
requisite approval or authority of the DBM are unauthorized
and irregular. In the words of the Court –
Despite the power granted to the Board of Directors of PRA to
establish and fix a compensation and benefits scheme for its
employees, the same is subject to the review of the
Department of Budget and Management. However, in view of
the express powers granted to PRA under its charter, the
extent of the review authority of the Department of Budget and
Management is limited. As stated in Intia, the task of the
Department of Budget and Management is simply to review the
compensation and benefits plan of the government agency or
entity concerned and determine if the same complies with the
prescribed policies and guidelines issued in this regard. The
role of the Department of Budget and Management is
supervisorial in nature, its main duty being to ascertain that the
proposed compensation, benefits and other incentives to be
given to PRA officials and employees adhere to the policies
and guidelines issued in accordance with applicable laws.
In Victorina Cruz v. Court of Appeals,17 we held that the DBM
has the sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the national
government.
In Intia, Jr. v. Commission on Audit,18 the Court held that
although the charter19 of the Philippine Postal Corporation
(PPC) grants it the power to fix the compensation and benefits
of its employees and exempts PPC from the coverage of the
rules and regulations of the Compensation and Position
Classification Office, by virtue of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1597,
the compensation system established by the PPC is,
nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM. This Court
intoned:
It should be emphasized that the review by the DBM of any
PPC resolution affecting the compensation structure of its
personnel should not be interpreted to mean that the DBM can
dictate upon the PPC Board of Directors and deprive the latter
of its discretion on the matter. Rather, the DBM's function is
merely to ensure that the action taken by the Board of
Directors complies with the requirements of the law,
specifically, that PPC's compensation system "conforms as
closely as possible with that provided for under R.A. No. 6758."
(Emphasis supplied.)
As measured by the foregoing legal and jurisprudential
yardsticks, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior
to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of
positions in government. This is consonant to the mandate of
the DBM under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987,
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – The Department of Budget
and Management shall assist the President in the preparation
of a national resources and expenditures budget, preparation,
execution and control of the National Budget, preparation and
maintenance of accounting systems essential to the budgetary
4
process, achievement of more economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations, administration of
compensation and position classification systems, assessment
of organizational effectiveness and review and evaluation of
legislative proposals having budgetary or organizational
implications. (Emphasis supplied.)
Irrefragably, it is within the turf of the DBM Secretary to
disallow the upgrading, reclassification, and creation of
additional plantilla positions in the CHR based on its finding
that such scheme lacks legal justification.
Notably, the CHR itself recognizes the authority of the DBM to
deny or approve the proposed reclassification of positions as
evidenced by its three letters to the DBM requesting approval
thereof. As such, it is now estopped from now claiming that the
nod of approval it has previously sought from the DBM is a
superfluity.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly relied on the pronouncement
of the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy.20
Palpably, the Court of Appeals' Decision was based on the
mistaken premise that the CHR belongs to the species of
constitutional commissions. But, Article IX of the Constitution
states in no uncertain terms that only the CSC, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit shall
be tagged as Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant
right to fiscal autonomy. Thus:
Sec. 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be
independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
Along the same vein, the Administrative Code, in Chapter 5,
Sections 24 and 26 of Book II on Distribution of Powers of
Government, the constitutional commissions shall include only
the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections,
and the Commission on Audit, which are granted
independence and fiscal autonomy. In contrast, Chapter 5,
Section 29 thereof, is silent on the grant of similar powers to
the other bodies including the CHR. Thus:
SEC. 24. Constitutional Commissions. – The Constitutional
Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the
Commission on Audit.
SEC. 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The Constitutional Commissions
shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released.
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance with
the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a Commission
on Human Rights, and independent central monetary authority,
and a national police commission. Likewise, as provided in the
Constitution, Congress may establish an independent
economic and planning agency. (Emphasis ours.)
From the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative Code, it is
abundantly clear that the CHR is not among the class of
Constitutional Commissions. As expressed in the oft-repeated
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the express
mention of one person, thing, act or consequence excludes all
others. Stated otherwise, expressium facit cessare tacitum –
what is expressed puts an end to what is implied.21
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention that the
CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy. In essence, fiscal autonomy
entails freedom from outside control and limitations, other than
those provided by law. It is the freedom to allocate and utilize
funds granted by law, in accordance with law, and pursuant to
the wisdom and dispatch its needs may require from time to
time.22 In Blaquera v. Alcala and Bengzon v. Drilon,23 it is
understood that it is only the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on
Elections, and the Office of the Ombudsman, which enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Thus, in Bengzon,24 we explained:
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed
by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the
Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power
and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by
law for compensation and pay plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The
imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the
independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the
Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of
the independence and separation of powers upon which the
entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the
interest of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, [the]
Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman have so far
limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree
with the petitioners that this grant of autonomy should cease to
be a meaningless provision. (Emphasis supplied.)
Neither does the fact that the CHR was admitted as a member
by the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) ipso
facto clothed it with fiscal autonomy. Fiscal autonomy is a
constitutional grant, not a tag obtainable by membership.
We note with interest that the special provision under Rep. Act
No. 8522, while cited under the heading of the CHR, did not
specifically mention CHR as among those offices to which the
special provision to formulate and implement organizational
structures apply, but merely states its coverage to include
Constitutional Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal
autonomy. In contrast, the Special Provision Applicable to the
Judiciary under Article XXVIII of the General Appropriations Act
of 1998 specifically mentions that such special provision
applies to the judiciary and had categorically authorized the
5
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to formulate and implement
the organizational structure of the Judiciary, to wit:
1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding and within the limits of their respective
appropriations authorized in this Act, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court is authorized to formulate and implement
organizational structure of the Judiciary, to fix and determine
the salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel,
and whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in
the personal services itemization including, but not limited to,
the transfer of item or creation of new positions in the Judiciary;
PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are
affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be
granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance
with existing law, which shall be payable from any unexpended
balance of, or savings in the appropriations of their respective
offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the implementation
hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates, allowances and
other benefits authorized under compensation standardization
laws. (Emphasis supplied.)
All told, the CHR, although admittedly a constitutional creation
is, nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices accorded
fiscal autonomy by constitutional or legislative fiat.
Even assuming en arguendo that the CHR enjoys fiscal
autonomy, we share the stance of the DBM that the grant of
fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government offices must,
all the same, kowtow to the Salary Standardization Law. We
are of the same mind with the DBM on its standpoint, thus-
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest
the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create
positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of
the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority
is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of
the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law.25 (Emphasis supplied.)
The most lucid argument against the stand of respondent,
however, is the provision of Rep. Act No. 8522 "that the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws."26
Indeed, the law upon which respondent heavily anchors its
case upon has expressly provided that any form of adjustment
in the organizational structure must be within the parameters of
the Salary Standardization Law.
The Salary Standardization Law has gained impetus in
addressing one of the basic causes of discontent of many civil
servants.27 For this purpose, Congress has delegated to the
DBM the power to administer the Salary Standardization Law
and to ensure that the spirit behind it is observed. This power is
part of the system of checks and balances or system of
restraints in our government. The DBM's exercise of such
authority is not in itself an arrogation inasmuch as it is pursuant
to the paramount law of the land, the Salary Standardization
Law and the Administrative Code.
In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the
Salary Standardization Law of "providing equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions," the DBM, in the
case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme
proposed by the CHR lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the general provisions
of the General Appropriations Act FY 1998, which the CHR
heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification scheme,
explicitly provides that "no organizational unit or changes in
key positions shall be authorized unless provided by law or
directed by the President." Here, the DBM discerned that there
is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance Management
Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR. Anent CHR's
proposal to upgrade twelve positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to
Director IV, SG-28, and four positions of Director III, SG-27 to
Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office, the DBM denied the
same as this would change the context from support to
substantive without actual change in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law's designated body to
implement and administer a unified compensation system, is
beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative
government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction
of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of
Appeals,28 we echoed the basic rule that the courts will not
interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the
nation's coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the President's
alter ego, knows from where he speaks inasmuch as he has
the front seat view of the adverse effects of an unwarranted
upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in particular and
in the entire government in general.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated
29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59678 and its Resolution dated 11 September 2002 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29 March 1999
of the Civil Service Commision-National Capital Region is
REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights Resolution
No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution No. A98-
055 dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No. A98-062 dated
17 November 1998 without the approval of the Department of
Budget and Management are disallowed. No pronouncement
as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155336 July 21, 2006
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS EMPLOYEES'
ASSOCIATION (CHREA) Represented by its President,
MARCIAL A. SANCHEZ, JR., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS, respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
6
On 25 November 2004, the Court promulgated its Decision 1 in
the above-entitled case, ruling in favor of the petitioner. The
dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision dated
29 November 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
59678 and its Resolution dated 11 September 2002 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ruling dated 29
March 1999 of the Civil Service Commission-National Capital
Region is REINSTATED. The Commission on Human Rights
Resolution No. A98-047 dated 04 September 1998, Resolution
No. A98-055 dated 19 October 1998 and Resolution No. A98-
062 dated 17 November 1998 without the approval of the
Department of Budget and Management are disallowed. No
pronouncement as to costs.2
A Motion for Reconsideration3 was consequently filed by the
respondent to which petitioner filed an Opposition. 4
In its Motion, respondent prays in the main that this Court
reconsiders its ruling that respondent is not among the
constitutional bodies clothed with fiscal autonomy.
To recall, the facts5 of the case are as follows:
On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act No.
8522, otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of
1998. It provided for Special Provisions Applicable to All
Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. The last
portion of Article XXXIII covers the appropriations of the CHR.
These special provisions state:
1. Organizational Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding and within the limits of their respective
appropriations as authorized in this Act, the Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices, to fix and determine the
salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and
whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in their
personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the
transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective
offices: PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose
positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments
shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in
accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of
their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and
Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are hereby authorized to use
savings in their respective appropriations for: (a) printing and/or
publication of decisions, resolutions, and training information
materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central
and regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of
books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary
expenses for the employment of temporary, contractual and
casual employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and
miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation and
transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials
and employees as may be authorized by law; and (f) other
official purposes, subject to accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied)
on the strength of this special provisions, the Commission on
Human Rights [or CHR], through its then Chairperson Aurora
P. Navarette-Reciña and Commissioners Nasser A.
Marohomsalic, Mercedes V. Contreras, Vicente P. Sibulo, and
Jorge R. Coquia, promulgated Resolution No. A98-047 on 04
September 1998, adopting an upgrading and reclassification
scheme among selected positions in the Commission, to wit:
WHEREAS, the General Appropriations Act, FY 1998, R.A. No.
8522 has provided special provisions applicable to all
Constitutional Offices enjoying Fiscal Autonomy, particularly on
organizational structures and authorizes the same to formulate
and implement the organizational structures of their respective
offices to fix and determine the salaries, allowances and other
benefits of their respective personnel and whenever public
interest so requires, make adjustments in the personnel
services itemization including, but not limited to, the transfer of
item or creation of new positions in their respective offices:
PROVIDED, That officers and employees whose positions are
affected by such reorganization or adjustments shall be
granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in accordance
with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpanded balance of, or savings in the appropriations of
their respective offices;
Whereas, the Commission on Human Rights is a member of
the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG) and on July
24, 1998, CFAG passed an approved Joint Resolution No. 49
adopting internal rules implementing the special provisions
heretoforth mentioned;
NOW THEREFORE, the Commission by virtue of its fiscal
autonomy hereby approves and authorizes the upgrading and
augmentation of the commensurate amount generated from
savings under Personal Services to support the implementation
of this resolution effective Calendar Year 1998;
Let the Human Resources Development Division (HRDD)
prepare the necessary Notice of Salary Adjustment and other
appropriate documents to implement this resolution; x x x
(Emphasis supplied).
Annexed to said resolution is the proposed creation of ten
additional plantilla positions, namely: one Director IV position,
with Salary Grade 28 for the Caraga Regional Office, four
Security Officer II with Salary Grade 15, and five Process
Servers, with Salary Grade 5 under the Office of the
Commissioners.
On 19 October 1998, CHR issued Resolution No. A98-055
providing for the upgrading or raising of salary grade of the
following positions in the Commission:
xxxx
To support the implementation of such scheme, the CHR, in
the same resolution, authorized the augmentation of a
commensurate amount generated from savings under
Personnel Services.
7
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 dated 17 November 1998,
the CHR "collapsed" the vacant positions in the body to provide
additional source of funding for said staffing modification.
Among the positions collapsed were: one Attorney III, four
Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three Special Investigator I, one
Clerk III, and one accounting Clerk II.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and upgrading
scheme to the Department of Budget and Management [DBM]
with a request for its approval, but the DBM secretary Benjamin
Diokno denied the request on the following justification:
. . . Based on the evaluations made the request was not
favorably considered as it effectively involved the elevation of
the field units from divisions to services.
The present proposal seeks further to upgrade the twelve (12)
positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director IV, SG-28. This
would elevate the field units to a bureau or regional office, a
level even higher than the one previously denied.
The request to upgrade the three (3) positions of Director III,
SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in the Central Office in effect
would elevate the services to Office and change the context
from support to substantive without actual change in functions.
In the absence of a specific provision of law which may be
used as a legal basis to elevate the level of divisions to a
bureau or regional office, and the services to offices, we
reiterate our previous stand denying the upgrading of the
twelve (12) positions of Attorney VI, SG-26 to Director III, SG-
27 or Director IV, SG-28, in the Field Operations Office (FOO)
and three (3) Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28 in the
Central Office.
As represented, President Ramos then issued a Memorandum
to the DBM Secretary dated 10 December 1997, directing the
latter to increase the number of Plantilla positions in the CHR
both Central and Regional Offices to implement the Philippine
Decade Plan on Human Rights Education, the Philippine
Human Rights Plan and Barangay Rights Actions Center in
accordance with existing laws. (Emphasis in the original)
Pursuant to Section 78 of the General Provisions of the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) FY 1998, no organizational
unit or changes in key positions shall be authorized unless
provided by law or directed by the President, thus, the creation
of a Finance Management Office and a Public Affairs Office
cannot be given favorable recommendation.
Moreover, as provided under Section 2 of RA No. 6758,
otherwise known as the Compensation Standardization Law,
the Department of Budget and Management is directed to
establish and administer a unified compensation and position
classification system in the government. The Supreme Court
ruled in the case of Victorina Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 119155, dated January 30, 1996, that this Department has
the sole power and discretion to administer the compensation
and position classification system of the National Government.
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest
the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create
positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of
the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such authority
is not absolute and must be exercised within the parameters of
the Unified Position Classification and Compensation System
established under RA 6758 more popularly known as the
Compensation Standardization Law. We therefore reiterate our
previous stand on the matter. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the DBM's disapproval of the proposed personnel
modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,
through a memorandum dated 29 March 1999 recommended
to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments be
rejected owing to the DBM's disapproval of the plantilla
reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner Commission on Human
Rights Employees' Association [CHREA], in representation of
the rank and file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-
Central office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that the
DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority mandated
by law to evaluate and approve matters of reclassification and
upgrading, as well as creation of positions.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA's request in a
Resolution dated 16 December 1999, and reversed the
recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the
upgrading scheme be censured. The decretal portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the request of Ronnie N. Rosero, Hubert V.
Ruiz, Flordeliza A. Briones, George Q. Dumlao [and], Corazon
A. Santos-Tiu, is hereby denied.
CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CSC-Central
Office denied the same on 09 June 2000.
Given the cacophony of judgments between the DBM and the
CSC, petitioner CHREA elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the pronouncement of
the CSC-Central Office and upheld the validity of the
upgrading, retitling, and reclassification scheme in the CHR on
the justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR's
fiscal autonomy. The fallo of the Court of Appeals decision
provides:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
ordered DISMISSED and the questioned Civil Service
Commission Resolution No. 99-2800 dated December 16,
1999 as well as No. 001354 dated June 9, 2000, are hereby
AFFIRMED. No cost.
Unfazed, the petitioner elevated its case to this Court and
successfully obtained the favorable action in its Decision dated
25 November 2004. In its Motion for Reconsideration of the
said Decision, the respondent defined the assignment of
errors6 for resolution, namely:
I. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT GRAVELY AND
SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO
8
LEGAL BASIS TO SUPPORT THE CONTENTION THAT THE
CHR ENJOYS FISCAL AUTONOMY.
II. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN STATING
THAT THE SPECIAL PROVISION OF THE REP. ACT. (SIC)
NO. 8522 DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION CHR AS
AMONG THOSE OFFICES TO WHICH THE SPECIAL
PROVISION TO FORMULATE AND IMPLEMENT
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES APPLY, BUT MERELY
STATES ITS COVERAGE TO INCLUDE CONSTITUTIONAL
COMMISSIONS AND OFFICES ENJOYING FISCAL
AUTONOMY;
III. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE CHR ALTHOUGH ADMITTEDLY A
CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION IS NONETHELESS NOT
INCLUDED IN THE GENUS OF THE OFFICES ACCORDED
FISCAL AUTONOMY BY CONSTITUTIONAL OR
LEGISLATIVE FIAT.
IV. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DECIDING
TO REINSTATE THE RULING DATED 29 MARCH 1999 OF
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION – NATIONAL CAPITAL
REGION;
V. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE SECOND DIVISION OF
THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT ERRED IN DECIDING
TO DISALLOW THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
RESOLUTION NO. A98-047 DATED SEPTEMBER 04, 1998,
RESOLUTION NO. A98-055 DATED 19 OCTOBER 1998 AND
RESOLUTION NO. A98-062 DATED 17 NOVEMBER 1998
WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT.
Although this Court may have been persuaded to take a
second look at this case and partly modify the assailed
Decision, such modification shall not materially affect the
dispositive portion thereof.
As already settled in the assailed Decision of this Court, the
creation of respondent may be constitutionally mandated, but it
is not, in the strict sense, a constitutional commission. Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution, plainly entitled "Constitutional
Commissions," identifies only the Civil Service Commission,
the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit.
The mandate for the creation of the respondent is found in
Section 17 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution on Human
Rights, which reads that –
Sec. 17. (1) There is hereby created an independent office
called the Commission on Human Rights.
Thus, the respondent cannot invoke provisions under Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution on constitutional commissions for its
benefit. It must be able to present constitutional and/or
statutory basis particularly pertaining to it to support its claim of
fiscal autonomy.
The 1987 Constitution expressly and unambiguously grants
fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman.
The 1987 Constitution recognizes the fiscal autonomy of the
Judiciary in Article VIII, Section 3, reproduced below –
Sec. 3. The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.
Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the
legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly
released.
Constitutional commissions are granted fiscal autonomy by the
1987 Constitution in Article IX, Part A, Section 5, a provision
applied in common to all constitutional commissions, to wit –
Sec. 5. The Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
The Office of the Ombudsman enjoys fiscal autonomy by virtue
of Article XI, Section 14, of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides that –
Sec. 14. The Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy. Its approved annual appropriations shall be
automatically and regularly released.
Each of the afore-quoted provisions consists of two sentences
stating that: (1) The government entity shall enjoy fiscal
autonomy; and (2) its approved annual appropriation shall be
automatically and regularly released. The respondent anchors
its claim to fiscal autonomy on the fourth paragraph of Article
XIII, Section 17, according to which –
Sec. 17. x x x
xxxx
(4) The approved annual appropriations of the Commission
shall be automatically and regularly released.
As compared to the previously quoted Article VIII, Section 3;
Article IX, Part A, Section 5; and Article XI, Section 14 of the
1987 Constitution on the Judiciary, the constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman, respectively,
Article XIII, Section 17(4) on the Commission of Human Rights
(CHR) evidently does not contain the first sentence on the
express grant of fiscal autonomy, and reproduces only the
second sentence on the automatic and regular release of its
approved annual appropriations. Question now arises as to the
significance of such a difference in the way the said provisions
are worded.
To settle this ambiguity, a perusal of the records of the
Constitutional Commission (ConCom) is enlightening.
During the drafting of Article XIII, Section 17(4), of the 1987
Constitution, the ConCom members had the following
discussion7 –
9
MR. BENGZON. I have another paragraph, Madam President.
This could be a separate section or another paragraph
depending on what the committee desires and what the
Committee on Style would wish: "THE COMMISSION SHALL
ENJOY FISCAL AUTONOMY. THE APPROVED ANNUAL
APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED." It will
align this Human Rights Commission with other commissions
that we have created in the Constitution in order to further
insure the independence of the Human Rights Commission.
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I introduced that particular amendment
yesterday, but there was a proposed modification presented by
Commissioner Maambong to delete the first sentence. I am in
favor of the modification presented earlier. So, may I propose
that the particular amendment should not carry the first
sentence, only the second sentence which reads: "THE
APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE
COMMISSION SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND
REGULARLY RELEASED."
MR. BENGZON. Why do we want to delete the sentence which
says "THE COMMISSION SHALL ENJOY FISCAL
AUTONOMY"?
MR. DAVIDE. That would be a surplusage because the
autonomy actually intended is the automatic release of
these appropriations.
MR. BENGZON. If that is the case, then maybe we should also
delete such sentence in the other articles that we have
approved. I will just leave it up to the Committee on Style, as
long as it is in the record that that is the sense of the
Commission, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does the committee say on this point?
MR. SARMIENTO. Accepted, Madam President. We leave it to
the Committee on Style, so long as the intent is there.
MR. BENGZON. In other words, what we are really saying is
that if the Committee on Style feels that it would be more
elegant and it is a surplusage to include the first sentence, then
so be it as long as it is recorded in the Journal that it is the
sense of the Commission that the Human Rights Commission
will enjoy fiscal autonomy.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. May I respectfully invite the attention of the
honorable Commissioners that there are two committees that
are tasked with the same work and, therefore, reference can
be made not only to the Committee on Style but also to the
Sponsorship Committee.
Thank you, Madam President.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Monsod is recognized.
MR. MONSOD. Maybe we should just say that the minimum
condition that the committee agrees to is: "THE APPROVED
ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL
BE AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED." That
is a minimum condition and we just allow the committees to
add the first sentence if they wish. But with the second
sentence, the sense is already there.
MR. BENGZON. No problem, Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. This was taken up yesterday.
MR. BENGZON. But it was deferred, I understand, Madam
President. So if we approve this now, then it will be firmly
included.
THE PRESIDENT. So, will the Commissioner please read it
now as it is?
MR. BENGZON. I will read the amendment as accepted. "THE
APPROVED ANNUAL APPROPRIATIONS OF THE
COMMISSION SHALL BE AUTOMATICALLY AND
REGULARLY RELEASED."
THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to this proposed
amendment which has been accepted by the committee?
MR. PADILLA. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Padilla is recognized.
MR. PADILLA. The wording reminds me of the provisions
under the judiciary and the constitutional commissions. Is the
intention to elevate the position of this proposed commission
which is only investigative and recommendatory to the high
dignity of a constitutional commission, as well as the
independence of the judiciary, by making a positive statement
in the Constitution that its appropriation shall be released
automatically and so forth? It seems that we are complicating
and also reiterating several provisions that would make our
Constitution not only too long but too complicated. I wonder if
that is the purpose because even other bodies with semi-
judicial functions do not enjoy such kind of constitutional
guarantee. It is just an inquiry.
MR. BENGZON. It is not so much the fact that we want to
elevate this into a constitutional commission as it is more of an
insurance that the independence of the Human Rights
Commission, even though it is not considered as a
constitutional commission as contemplated and as compared
to the Civil Service Commission, the COMELEC and COA, is
maintained. And this is as elegant as the other sentences. So,
we submit the same to the body.
10
MR. SARMIENTO. The proposed amendment has been
accepted by the committee, but we have this objection from
Commissioner Padilla. So, may we throw the issue to the
body?
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, just for clarification. Does
the amendment of the honorable Commissioner Bengzon refer
only to the release? I was thinking that although I am very, very
strongly in favor of this commission and would give it one of the
top priorities, there are other top priorities that we may want to
address ourselves to. For example, in the Committee on
Human Resources, we would like to give top priority to
education; therefore, if this does not refer only to an automatic
and regular release but would refer to the matter of priorities in
the preparation of the budget, then I am afraid that we might
already be curtailing too much the discretion on the part of both
the legislature and the executive to determine the priorities that
should be given at a given time.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the sentence means
what it says and it is clear.
THE PRESIDENT. Will the Commissioner please read.
MR. BENGZON. It only refers to the release which should
be automatic and regular.
THE PRESIDENT. Please state it again so that we will be
clarified before we take a vote.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you, Madam President.
MR. BENGZON. It will read: "THE APPROVED ANNUAL
APPROPRIATIONS OF THE COMMISSION SHALL BE
AUTOMATICALLY AND REGULARLY RELEASED."
VOTING
THE PRESIDENT. As many as are in favor of this particular
section, please raise their hand. (Several Members raised their
hand.)
As many as are against, please raise their hand. (Few
Members raised their hand.)
As many as are abstaining, please raise their hand. (Two
Members raised their hand.)
The results show 26 votes in favor, 4 against and 2
abstentions; the amendment is approved. (Emphases
supplied.)
The respondent relies on the statement of then Constitutional
Commissioner Hilario G. Davide, Jr. that the first sentence on
the express grant of fiscal autonomy to the respondent was
deleted from Article XIII, Section 17(4) of the 1987 Constitution
because it was a surplusage. Respondent posits that the
second sentence, directing the automatic and regular release
of its approved annual appropriations, has the same essence
as the express grant of fiscal autonomy, thus rendering the first
sentence redundant and unnecessary.
This Court, however, believes otherwise. The statement of then
Constitutional Commissioner Davide should be read in full.
Referring to the deletion of the first sentence on the express
grant of fiscal autonomy, he explained that the first sentence
"would be a surplusage because the autonomy actually
intended is the automatic release of these appropriations.8"
(Emphasis supplied.)
Even in the latter discussion between Constitutional
Commissioners Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and Serafin V.C.
Guingona, wherein Constitutional Commissioner Guingona
asked for clarification whether respondent shall also be
extended priorities in the preparation of the national budget,
Constitutional Commissioner Bengzon replied that "x x x the
sentence means what it says and it is clear,"9 and that "[i]t only
refers to the release which should be automatic and regular."10
Therefore, after reviewing the deliberations of the ConCom on
Article XIII, Section 17(4), of the 1987 Constitution, in its
entirety, not just bits and pieces thereof, this Court is convinced
that the ConCom had intended to grant to the respondent the
privilege of having its approved annual appropriations
automatically and regularly released, but nothing more. While it
may be conceded that the automatic and regular release of
approved annual appropriations is an aspect of fiscal
autonomy, it is just one of many others.
This Court has already defined the scope and extent of fiscal
autonomy in the case of Bengzon v. Drilon,11 as follows –
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed
by the Judiciary, the Civil Service Commission, the
Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the
Office of the Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee of full
flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the wisdom
and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power
and authority to levy, assess and collect fees, fix rates of
compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by
law for compensation and pay plans of the government and
allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their
functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. x x x
The foregoing excerpt sufficiently elucidates that the grant of
fiscal autonomy is more extensive than the mere automatic and
regular release of approved annual appropriations of the
government entity. It is also worth stressing herein that
in Bengzon v. Drilon, this Court, ruling En Banc, only
recognized the fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary; the
constitutional commissions, namely, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, and the Commission
on Elections; and the Office of the Ombudsman. Respondent is
conspicuously left out of the enumeration.
Moreover, the ConCom had the following deliberations 12 on the
meaning of the fiscal autonomy extended to the constitutional
commissions in what is to become later Article IX, Part A,
Section 5, of the 1987 Constitution –
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). Commissioner de
Castro is recognized.
11
MR. DE CASTRO: Thank you.
This morning, I asked the proponent of this resolution what is
included in the term "fiscal autonomy." The answer I got is that
it is for the automatic release of the budget. I propose that the
sentence "The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy" be
deleted but the second sentence shall remain. The reason is
that it is already redundant. Fiscal autonomy means the
automatic release of appropriations.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, may we answer the
honorable Commissioner.
I think the answer of the Chairman of our Committee this
morning was that it would involve the automatic and
regular release of the funds once approved. In addition, we
are suggesting that fiscal autonomy include the
nonimposition of any other procedures, for example, a
preaudit system in the commissions or bodies that enjoy
fiscal autonomy. So, actually, the definition of fiscal
autonomy would be a bit broader than just the automatic
release.
MR. DE CASTRO. Does the Commissioner mean that these
commissions will not be subjected to preaudit?
MR. MONSOD. Our proposal actually in the provisions on the
Commission on Audit is that they be subjected to
comprehensive postaudit procedures and where their internal
control system is inadequate, in the opinion of the Commission
on Audit, then the commission may also take such measures
as are necessary to correct the inadequacies which might
include special preaudit systems.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). The Chair
understands, therefore, that the proposed amendment of
Commissioner de Castro is not acceptable to the Committee?
MR. DE CASTRO. Not yet, Mr. Presiding Officer, because we
are still on the answer to me this morning, which stated – the
record will bear me out – that fiscal autonomy means the
automatic release of appropriations. It means the automatic
release and nothing more. We were in the same Committee
and when we asked the COA about this, they insisted that
there must be preaudit. If fiscal autonomy means that there will
be no preaudit, I do not know what will happen to this.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). So, what is the
stand of the Committee insofar as the proposed amendment of
Commissioner de Castro is concerned?
MR. DE CASTRO. May I just say one sentence, Mr. Presiding
Officer? If the Committee's stand is that fiscal autonomy means
the automatic release of the appropriations, then I say that the
first sentence – "The Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy"
-- should be deleted because it is a repetition of the second
sentence.
Thank you.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, the position of the
Committee is that fiscal autonomy may include other
things than just the automatic and regular release of the
funds.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Treñas). With that
explanation, what is the pleasure of Commissioner de Castro?
Does he insist on his amendment?
MR. DE CASTRO. Is the Chairman changing his answer from
this morning's question? If he does, I will ask some more
questions about fiscal autonomy.
MR. MONSOD. Mr. Presiding Officer, I think at the beginning of
this exchange, we already told the honorable Commissioner
that the Chairman of the Committee had not meant to make it
an all-inclusive definition. And if he was misled into thinking of
another meaning, we apologize for it. But our position is that
fiscal autonomy would include other rights than just
merely automatic and regular disbursement.
MR. DE CASTRO. Does it include exception from preaudit?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it would include the imposition of certain
preaudit requirements for release, because if the preaudit
requirements are inserted into the process of release, it would
defeat the objective of automatic and regular release.
Based on the preceding exchange, it can be derived that the
first sentence of Article IX, Part A, Section 5, of the 1987
Constitution, expressly granting fiscal autonomy to
constitutional commissions, does not have the same meaning
as the second sentence, directing the automatic and regular
release of their approved annual appropriations, hence, the
resistance of Constitutional Commissioner Christian S. Monsod
to the suggested amendment of Constitutional Commissioner
Crispino M. De Castro to just delete the first sentence.
In addition, the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG),
to which respondent avers membership, defined the term
"fiscal autonomy" in its Joint Resolution No. 49, dated 24 July
1998, as follows –
IV. Definition of Terms:
1. Fiscal Autonomy shall mean independence or freedom
regarding financial matters from outside control and is
characterized by self direction or self determination. It does
not mean mere automatic and regular release of approved
appropriations to agencies vested with such power in a very
real sense, the fiscal autonomy contemplated in the
constitution is enjoyed even before and, with more reasons,
after the release of the appropriations. Fiscal autonomy
encompasses, among others, budget preparation and
implementation, flexibility in fund utilization of approved
appropriations, use of savings and disposition of receipts. x x x
(Emphasis supplied.)
While the assailed Decision and the present Resolution may
render the status of respondent's membership in CFAG
uncertain, the then Chairperson of respondent, Aurora P.
Navarrete-Recina, duly signed CFAG Joint Resolution No. 49,
and respondent should be held bound by the definition of fiscal
autonomy therein. CFAG Joint Resolution No. 49 categorically
declares that fiscal autonomy means more than just the
12
automatic and regular release of approved appropriation, and
also encompasses, among other things: (1) budget preparation
and implementation; (2) flexibility in fund utilization of approved
appropriations; and (3) use of savings and disposition of
receipts. Having agreed to such a definition of fiscal autonomy,
respondent has done a complete turn-about herein and is now
contradicting itself by arguing that the automatic and regular
release of its approved annual appropriations is already
tantamount to fiscal autonomy.
Consequently, this Court concludes that the 1987 Constitution
extends to respondent a certain degree of fiscal autonomy
through the privilege of having its approved annual
appropriations released automatically and regularly. However,
it withholds from respondent fiscal autonomy, in its broad or
extensive sense, as granted to the Judiciary, constitutional
commissions, and the Office of the Ombudsman. Operative
herein is the rule of statutory construction, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, wherein the express mention of one person,
thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.13 The
rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature (or in this
case, the ConCom) would not have made specific
enumerations in a statute (or the Constitution) had the intention
not been to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.14
The provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987, on the fiscal autonomy of
constitutional commissions, the Office of the Ombudsman, and
the respondent, merely follow the phraseology used in the
corresponding provisions of the 1987 Constitution, thus –
Book II, Chapter 5, Section 26. Fiscal Autonomy. – The
Constitutional Commissions shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. The
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
Book V, Title II, Subtitle B, Section 4. Fiscal Autonomy. – The
Office of the Ombudsman shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Its
approved annual appropriations shall be automatically and
regularly released.
Book V, Title II, Subtitle A, Section 6. Annual Appropriations. –
The approved annual appropriations of the Commission on
Human Rights shall be automatically and regularly released.
While the Administrative Code of 1987 has no reference to the
fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary, it does have provisions on the
fiscal autonomy of the constitutional commissions and the
Office of the Ombudsman. It is very interesting to note that
while Book II, Chapter 5, Section 26 (on constitutional
commissions) and Book V, Title 2, Subtitle B, Section 4 (on the
Office of the Ombudsman) of the Code are entitled "Fiscal
Autonomy," Book V, Title 2, Subtitle A, Section 6 (on
respondent) bears the title "Annual Appropriations." Further,
the provisions on the constitutional commissions and the Office
of the Ombudsman in the Administrative Code of 1987, just like
in the 1987 Constitution, are composed of two sentences: (1)
The government entity shall enjoy fiscal autonomy; and (2) Its
approved annual appropriation shall be automatically and
regularly released. The provision on respondent in the same
Code is limited only to the second sentence.
Respondent asserts that it is granted fiscal autonomy by Book
VI, Chapter 1, Section 1, paragraph 9, of the Administrative
Code of 1987, which reads –
SEC. 1. Constitutional Policies on the Budget. –
xxxx
(9) Fiscal autonomy shall be enjoyed by the Judiciary,
Constitutional Commissions, Office of the Ombudsman, Local
Government and Commission on Human Rights.
As its title suggests, the afore-cited provision is supposed to
merely re-state the policies on budget as declared by the 1987
Constitution and, therefore, cannot grant or extend to the
respondent a privilege not found in the 1987 Constitution. Book
VI of the Administrative Code of 1987, under which the said
provision is found, pertains to National Government Budgeting.
Respondent may have been included in the enumeration of
fiscally autonomous government entities because it does enjoy
an aspect of fiscal autonomy, that of the automatic and regular
release of its approved annual appropriations from the national
budget. The general declaration of fiscal autonomy of the
respondent in Section 1, paragraph 9, of Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 on National Government
Budgeting, must be qualified and limited by Section 6 of Book
V, Title II, Subtitle A of the same Code specifically pertaining to
respondent. It should be borne in mind that the general rule is
that a word, phrase or provision should not be construed in
isolation, but must be interpreted in relation to other provisions
of the law.15
To reiterate, under the Constitution, as well as the
Administrative Code of 1987, respondent enjoys fiscal
autonomy only to the extent that its approved annual
appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released,
but nothing more.
On the main issue of whether or not the approval by the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is a condition
precedent to the enactment of an upgrading, reclassification,
creation and collapsing of plantilla positions in the CHR, this
Court staunchly holds that as prescinding from the legal and
jurisprudential yardsticks discussed in length in the assailed
Decision, the imprimatur of the DBM must first be sought prior
to implementation of any reclassification or upgrading of
positions in government.
Regardless of whether or not respondent enjoys fiscal
autonomy, this Court shares the stance of the DBM that the
grant of fiscal autonomy notwithstanding, all government
offices must, all the same, kowtow to the Salary
Standardization Law. This Court is of the same mind with the
DBM16 on its standpoint, thus –
Being a member of the fiscal autonomy group does not vest
the agency with the authority to reclassify, upgrade, and create
positions without approval of the DBM. While the members of
the Group are authorized to formulate and implement the
organizational structures of their respective offices and
determine the compensation of their personnel, such
authority is not absolute and must be exercised within the
parameters of the Unified Position Classification and
Compensation System established under RA 6758 more
13
popularly known as the Compensation Standardization Law. x
x x (Emphasis supplied).
To drive home this point, in the special provision covering the
Judiciary as quoted above, the judiciary was not vested with
the power to formulate and implement organizational
structures beyond the salary rates, allowances and other
benefits under the compensation standardization laws. Stated
differently, although the Judiciary is allowed to reorganize, any
such reorganization must, nevertheless, be in strict adherence
to the Salary Standardization Law. Ergo, any reorganization
therein must be with the conformity of the DBM inasmuch as it
is the government arm tasked by law to implement the Salary
Standardization Law.
In Republic Act No. 9227, or "An Act Granting Additional
Compensation in the Form of Special Allowances for Justices,
Judges and All Other Positions in the Judiciary with the
Equivalent Rank of Justices of the Court of Appeals and
Judges of the Regional Trial Court, and for Other Purposes,"
the grant of Special Allowances to members of the Judiciary
did not operate to exempt members thereof from the Salary
Standardization Law. In Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9227,
the Supreme Court and the DBM were specifically tasked to
issue the necessary guidelines for the proper implementation
of this Act in respect to funds coming from the National
Treasury.17 Resultantly, the Supreme Court and the DBM
issued Joint Circular No. 2004-1 on 13 January 2004 which
provided guidelines on the funding source for the grant of this
special allowance. Thus, although Administrative Order No.
137, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 27
December 2005, extended to the Chairman and
Commissioners or Members of the CHR the same benefits and
privileges enjoyed by members of constitutional commissions
and the Judiciary in the matter of rationalized rate of
allowances and liberalized computation of retirement benefits
and accumulated leave credits, it still does not exempt
respondent from the Salary Standardization Law.
If the judiciary, a co-equal branch of government, which was
expressly granted by the Constitution with fiscal autonomy, is
required to conform to the Salary Standardization Law and is
subject to the scrutiny of the DBM, sagaciously, the respondent
cannot be deemed to enjoy a better position than the Judiciary.
The respondent must, likewise, toe the line.
This Court shall no longer belabor the point it has already
delved upon in length in its Decision that Congress has
delegated to the DBM the power to administer the Salary
Standardization Law, which power is part of the system of
checks and balances or system of restraints in the Philippine
government. This Court, thus, reiterates the point that the
DBM's exercise of such authority is not in itself an arrogation
inasmuch as it is pursuant to the 1987 Constitution, the
paramount law of the land; the Salary Standardization Law;
and the Administrative Code of 1987.
In line with its role to breathe life into the policy behind the
Salary Standardization Law of "providing equal pay for
substantially equal work and to base differences in pay upon
substantive differences in duties and responsibilities, and
qualification requirements of the positions," the DBM, in the
case under review, made a determination, after a thorough
evaluation, that the reclassification and upgrading scheme
proposed by the respondent lacks legal rationalization.
The DBM expounded that Section 78 of the General Provisions
of the General Appropriations Act (GAA), FY 1998, which the
respondent heavily relies upon to justify its reclassification
scheme, explicitly provides that "no organizational unit or
changes in key positions shall be authorized unless provided
by law or directed by the President." Here, the DBM discerned
that there is no law authorizing the creation of a Finance
Management Office and a Public Affairs Office in the CHR.
Anent respondent's proposal to upgrade twelve (12) positions
of Attorney VI, SG-28 to Director IV, SG-28, and three (3)
positions of Director III, SG-27 to Director IV, SG-28, in its
Central Office, the DBM denied the same as this would change
the context from support to substantive without actual change
in functions.
This view of the DBM, as the law's designated body
to implement and administer a unified compensation system, is
beyond cavil. The interpretation of an administrative
government agency, which is tasked to implement a statute, is
accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction
of the courts. In Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of
Appeals,18 the Court echoed the basic rule that the courts will
not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the
regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.
To be sure, considering his expertise on matters affecting the
nation's coffers, the Secretary of the DBM, as the
President's alter ego, knows from where he speaks inasmuch
as he has the front seat view of the adverse effects of an
unwarranted upgrading or creation of positions in the CHR in
particular and in the entire government in general.
As the final thrust, given this Court's previous pronouncement
in the present Resolution that the fiscal autonomy granted to
the respondent by the 1987 Constitution and the Administrative
Code of 1987 shall be limited only to the automatic and regular
release of its approved annual appropriations, respondent is
precluded from invoking the Special Provisions Applicable to
All Constitutional Offices Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy in the 1998
GAA. The said Special Provisions read –
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy
1. Organization Structure. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding and within the limits of their respective
appropriations as authorized in this Act, the Constitutional
Commissions and Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are
authorized to formulate and implement the organizational
structures of their respective offices, to fix and determine the
salaries, allowances, and other benefits of their personnel, and
whenever public interest so requires, make adjustments in the
personal services itemization including, but not limited to, the
transfer of item or creation of new positions in their respective
offices: PROVIDED, That the officers and employees whose
positions are affected by such reorganization or adjustments
shall be granted retirement gratuities and separation pay in
accordance with existing laws, which shall be payable from any
unexpended balance of, or savings in the appropriations of
their respective offices: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the
implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary rates,
allowances and other benefits authorized under compensation
standardization laws.
14
2. Use of Savings. The Constitutional Commissions and
Offices enjoying fiscal autonomy are hereby authorized to use
savings in their respective appropriations for; (a) printing and/or
publication of decisions, resolutions, and training information
materials; (b) repair, maintenance and improvement of central
and regional offices, facilities and equipment; (c) purchase of
books, journals, periodicals and equipment; (d) necessary
expenses for the employment or temporary, contractual and
casual employees; (e) payment of extraordinary and
miscellaneous expenses, commutable representation and
transportation allowances, and fringe benefits for their officials
and employees as may be authorized by law; and (f) other
official purposes, subject to accounting and auditing rules and
regulations.
It is unequivocal that the afore-quoted Special Provisions of the
1998 GAA refer to the broad and extensive concept of fiscal
autonomy. They already go beyond ensuring the automatic and
regular release of the approved annual appropriations, but
already enumerate the ways by which the named government
entities can use their appropriations to effect changes in their
organizational structure and their savings for certain official
purposes. Even assuming arguendo that the said Special
Provisions are applicable to respondent, it should be noted that
the last sentence in paragraph 1 qualifies the power of a
fiscally autonomous government entity to formulate and
implement changes in its organizational structure so that, "x x x
the implementation hereof shall be in accordance with salary
rates, allowances and other benefits authorized under
compensation standardization laws." And, as exhaustively
expounded in the assailed Decision and the herein Resolution,
only the DBM has the authority and the technical expertise to
determine compliance by respondent to the provisions of the
Salary Standardization Law.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The assailed decision of this Court dated 25
November 2004 is hereby MODIFIED, declaring the
respondent CHR as a constitutional body enjoying limitedfiscal
autonomy, in the sense that it is entitled to the automatic and
regular release of its approved annual appropriations;
nonetheless, it is still required to conform to the Salary
Standardization Law. Accordingly, its entire reclassification
scheme remains subject to the approval of the DBM. No
pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158791 February 10, 2006
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, Petitioner, vs. DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Before this Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of
respondent Department of Budget and Management (DBM)
praying that this Court reconsider its Decision dated July 22,
2005 (the Decision) granting the subject petition.
The DBM assails this Court’s interpretation of Article IX (A)
Section 5 of the Constitution, Sections 62, 63, and 64 of the FY
2002 General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 9162), and the
Resolution of this Court in A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC
(Constitutional Mandate on the Judiciary’s Fiscal Autonomy)
dated June 3, 1993.
The DBM posits that this Court’s ruling that fiscal autonomy
means preference in terms of cash allocation is not supported
by the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
particularly the discussions on the draft article on the Judiciary
where the concept of fiscal autonomy was, by its claim,
introduced.
The DBM cites the comments of then Commissioner Blas Ople
expressing concern over "the propensity throughout this Article
in its various provisions to accord the Supreme Court, the
lower courts and the judicial system as a whole, a whole
plethora of privileges and immunities that are denied the rest of
the government of the Republic of the Philippines." 1
A close reading of Commissioner Ople’s comments shows,
however, that he was not questioning nor seeking to qualify the
concepts of "fiscal autonomy" and "automatic release" as
provided for in what is now Article VIII Section 3 of the
Constitution.2 What was then under consideration was the
original draft article on the Judiciary which, with regard to
appropriations, provided as follows:
Section 15. An amount equivalent to not less than two percent
of the national budget shall be automatically appropriated and
regularly released for the judiciary. (Underscoring supplied)
What the original draft thus provided for was automatic
appropriation, which is not the same as automatic release of
appropriations. The power to appropriate belongs to Congress,
while the responsibility of releasing appropriations belongs to
the DBM. Commissioner Ople objected to automatic
appropriation, it bears emphasis, not to automatic release of
appropriations.
It was Commissioner Christian Monsod who proposed the
substitute provision that is now Article VIII Section 3 providing
for "fiscal autonomy" and for automatic and regular release of
appropriations.
In support of its position, the DBM also cites Commissioner
Monsod’s explanation that "[t]he whole purpose of that
provision is to protect the independence of the judiciary while
at the same time not giving the judiciary what we call a position
of privilege by an automatic percentage." Again, what
Commissioner Monsod objected to was automatic
appropriation for the judiciary, not automatic release of
appropriations once approved. The following statement of
Commissioner Monsod, read in its context, does not in any way
support the position taken by the DBM.
The Commissioner will recall that when the provision giving
fiscal autonomy to the judiciary was presented to the body, we
were the ones who denied to it the percentage of the
budget because, precisely, we wanted the judiciary to go
through the process of budget-making to justify its budget and
to go through the legislature for that justification. But we also
said that after having gone through this process, it should
have fiscal autonomy so that there will bean automatic and
regular release of such funds. The whole purpose of that
provision is to protect the independence of the
judiciary while at the same time not giving the judiciary what
we call a position of privilege by an automatic
percentage.3 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
15
The DBM further claims that the constitutional mandate to
automatically and regularly release funds does not preclude
the implementation of a cash payment schedule for all
agencies, including those belonging to the constitutional fiscal
autonomous group (CFAG). It explains the meaning of "cash
payment schedule" in the context of the budgetary process,
from the enactment of the general appropriations law to the
release of appropriations, thus.
After the General Appropriations Act (GAA) is signed into law,
this Department, in coordination with the agency concerned,
prepares the financial plan for the year in accordance with its
appropriations under the GAA. The result of this exercise is
embodied in the Agency Budget Matrix or ABM which
reflects the individual obligation authority ceilings of the
agency, called the allotment. An allotment allows the agency
to enter into a contract or otherwise obligate funds although
cash has not yet been received by said agency. Simply put,
allotments serve as a guarantee that the national government
will look for cash to support the agency’s obligations.
Therefore, the closer the allotment is to the amount of its
appropriation, the better.
The approved allotment of an ordinary agency does not cover
its full appropriations, while those for entities vested with fiscal
autonomy always cover the full amount of its
appropriations. For instance, allotments for Personal Service of
an ordinary agency only cover those for filled positions. In
contrast, the Personal Service allotments of agencies enjoying
fiscal autonomy are comprehensively released, including those
for positions that are admittedly vacant. At the end of the year,
whatever is unspent for Personal Services, particularly for
unfilled positions, translates to savings, which may be used to
augment other items of appropriations.
As emphasized, the ABM of an ordinary agency is
disaggregated into those Needing Clearance and Not Needing
Clearance. Pursuant to Budget Execution Guidelines no. 2000-
12 dated August 29, 2000 x x x, the full allotment of entities
belonging to the CFAG is placed under the Not Needing
Clearance column.
Finally, items under the Not Needing Column of an ordinary
agency is further disaggregated to "this release" which
represents the initial allotment authorized under the ABM, and
"for later release" which represents the amount to be released
after the conduct of the agency performance review. In
contrast, the total appropriation and allotment of entities
belonging to the CFAG are all placed under "this release" since
no agency performance review is conducted by the DBM on
these entities.
xxxx
Thus, in order to ensure that the budgets of agencies vested
with fiscal autonomy are released in full, the DBM in a
ministerial capacity, ensures that the allotments of agencies
belonging to the CFAG (i) cover the full amount of their annual
appropriations, and (ii) are not subject to any condition. In other
words, budgets of fiscal autonomous agencies occupy the
highest category in terms of allotment.
xxxx
After the ABMs are issued, the Notices of Cash Allocations
(NCAs) are issued every month to support approved
allotments with cash.
Ideally, the NCA should cover in full the monthly allotment
of the agency. The reality, however, is that every national
budget is based on revenue projections, and that there is
an ever present risk that these revenue targets are not met
in full during the course of the budget year. Last FYs 2001
and 2002, for instance, revenue shortfall was at 7.16% and
9.16%, respectively, as shown below under Table 2.
xxxx
Further, not all revenue collections are received at the start of
the budget year. The cash flow of the national government, like
most other public institutions, has its highs and lows depending
on the tax calendar. Thus, not all of the projected revenues are
available for spending at the start of the budget year.
It thus becomes imperative for the Executive Department,
through the DBM, to manage the release of funds through
implementation of cash payment schedules. For instance, if
collections for a given month meet the monthly revenue target,
then the NCA for that month shall cover 100% of the allotment.
If, however, collections do not meet the monthly revenue
target, then the NCA to be released may not cover 100% of the
allotment. Add a few more variables, such as amount of deficit
and total disbursement of agencies, then one gets a cash
payment schedule that varies on a monthly basis.4 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The DBM goes on to emphasize that it has no discretion on
how much cash enters petitioner’s coffers, as cash payment
schedules are "dictated by the amount of revenue collection,
borrowings, deficit ceilings and total disbursement program of
the national government"5 ; and if the cash payment schedule
prescribes that the total cash to be released for a given month
is 85% of allotment, then a Notice of Cash Allocation
amounting to 85% of each agency’s allotment is released
for all agencies. It thus contends that this equality in treatment
does not violate the fiscal autonomy of the agencies belonging
to the CFAG, for "since approved allotments of agencies
belonging to the CFAG are higher than ordinary agencies,
they automatically get higher cash allocations."6
The DBM’s protestation that it has no discretion on the amount
of funds released to agencies with fiscal autonomy fails. The
Court finds that the DBM, in fact, exercised discretion denied it
by the constitutional mandate to automatically release such
funds. Understandably, a shortfall in revenue in a given year
would constrain the DBM not to release the total amount
appropriated by the GAA for the government as a whole during
that year. However, the DBM is certainly not compelled by
such circumstance to proportionately reduce the funds
appropriated for each and every agency. Given a revenue
shortfall, it is still very possible for the DBM to release the full
amount appropriated for the agencies with fiscal autonomy,
especially since, as noted in the Decision, the total
appropriation for such agencies in recent years does not even
reach 3% of the national budget.7 That the full amount is, in
fact, not fully released during a given fiscal year is plainly
due to a policy decision of the DBM. Such a decision,
whether it goes by the label of "cash payment schedule" or any
16
other term, cannot be reconciled with the constitutional
mandate that the release to these agencies should be
automatic.
Respecting this Court’s observation that Sections 62, 63 and
64 of the General Provisions of the FY2002 GAA reflect the
legislative intent to except entities with fiscal autonomy from
the possibility of retention or reduction of funds in the event of
an unmanageable budget deficit, the DBM comments as
follows:
Unfortunately, the sponsorship speech of Cong. Rolando G.
Andaya, Jr. Chairman of the House Committee on
Appropriations in justifying the introduction of Sections 63 and
64 (sic) in the FY 2002 GAA, belies such contention.x x x In his
speech, he states that the incorporation of Section 62 is due to
concerns raised by Congressmen on the general impoundment
powers of the President, without distinguishing as to the two
types of public institutions. More revealing is his explanation in
introducing Section 63, which defines unmanageable national
government deficit. He states that in order to discourage the
Executive Department from reducing the Internal Revenue
Allotment of local government units, there is need to define the
legal parameters of "unmanageable deficit". Reference to local
government units, which likewise enjoy fiscal autonomy
according to the pronouncements of this Honorable
Court [Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 at 218
(2000)], reveal the true intent of Congress to cover both
agencies vested with fiscal autonomy and those without. x x
x"8 (Underscoring supplied)
The Court, however, has examined the speech of
Congressman Andaya and finds nothing therein that detracts
from its ruling. It bears emphasis that this Court explicitly
observed that Sections 62 and 63 refer to government
agenciesin general, while Section 64 applies specifically to
agencies with fiscal autonomy. It is in these three
provisions read together, and not in reading each one in
isolation, that the distinction intended by the legislature
becomes evident.
When Congressman Andaya introduced Sections 62 and 63,
he was thus speaking of government agencies in general. If he
did not then expressly distinguish between agencies with fiscal
autonomy and those without, it was because there was no
pressing need for him to do so. Particularly with regard to
Section 62, his speech would reveal that his attention was on a
matter that did not call for such distinction, namely, the "deep
concern, frustration and despair" expressed by numerous
members of Congress "over the impoundment of
appropriations by the Department of Budget and
Management and the Office of the President" which, he
explained, provided the reason behind Section 62 of the GAA.
As for the mention of local governments in Congressman
Andaya’s introduction of Section 63, the same does not imply
that said provision was meant to include the agencies
belonging to the CFAG. In fact, his speech even suggests that
Section 63, rather than itself being an authorization to the DBM
to withhold or reduce appropriations, was merely intended to
set a guiding principle for the DBM in those cases where it
already has authority to withhold or reduce such
appropriations.
In the case of LGUs, the Congressman explicitly referred to
"the provisions of the Local Government Code, R.A.
7160 which authorizes the reduction of the IRA in the event
that there is an ‘unmanageable deficit’ of the National
Government."9 He then stated that Section 63 was prompted
by the need to set parameters in determining the existence of
an "unmanageable deficit."
On the other hand, there is no similar authorization for such
reduction in the case of agencies belonging to the CFAG – not
even during an "unmanageable deficit" – either in the
Constitution or in statute. Thus, notwithstanding the inclusion of
LGUs, there is no basis for supposing that the agencies
belonging to the CFAG are also covered by Section 63 of the
GAA.
The DBM furthermore argues that this Court’s Resolution of
June 3, 1993 in A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC10 (the Resolution)
reading:
After approval by Congress, the appropriations for the Judiciary
shall be automatically and regularly released subject to
availability of funds. (Underscoring supplied)
means that fund releases may still be subject to a cash release
program.
In support of this argument, the DBM cites a letter dated May
18, 1993 of then Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Antonio T.
Carpio (now a member of this Court) to the Secretary of
Budget and Management, regarding A.M. No. 92-9-029-SC
then pending with this Court.
The letter quotes then Chief Justice Narvasa’s summary of this
Court’s position on the controversy, which summary
states, inter alia:
"4) the Court will look to releases by the DBM of funds against
the approved budget of the Judiciary, in the full amount sought
and promptly upon notice; it is willing to consider and pass
upon suggestions by the DBM for scheduling of releases; x x
x"(Underscoring supplied)
In the same letter, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, after
considering the Court’s position, opined that one of the
principles by which the constitutional mandate on judicial fiscal
autonomy can be achieved is that "[a]fter approval by
Congress, the appropriations for the judiciary shall be
automatically and regularly released subject to availability of
funds" – which opinion, the DBM alleges, is the position
adopted by this Court.
Instead of supporting the DBM’s position, however, this letter
only shows the consistency of this Court in interpreting
"automatic release" as requiring the full release of
appropriations. The Court’s willingness to pass upon
suggestions for scheduling of releases in no way implies that it
was assenting to an incomplete or delayed release of funds.
Rather, it was a recognition by this Court that scheduling of
releases, as such, does not violate the Constitution and is, in
fact, presupposed in the phrase "automatically and
regularly released."
17
The phrase "subject to availability of funds" must thus be
understood in harmony with the constitutional mandate to
automatically release funds as the same has been consistently
interpreted by this Court. It is not an authority for the DBM to
implement a policy which, although labeled "cash payment
schedule," actually goes beyond mere scheduling of releases
and
effects a withholding and reduction of the approved
appropriations, as it did in the present case against petitioner
Civil Service Commission.
Finally, while acknowledging the unconstitutionality of imposing
a "no report, no release" policy on agencies clothed with fiscal
autonomy, the DBM prays for a clarification that such agencies
are still responsible for the timely submission to it of financial
reports. The Court considers it sufficient to echo the following
statements in the Separate Opinion of former Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr.:
This is not to say that agencies vested with fiscal autonomy
have no reporting responsibility at all to the DBM. This is
precisely the reason why guideline No. 5 under the Resolution
of 3 June [1993 states that the Supreme Court, or
constitutional commissions clothed with fiscal autonomy for
that matter, may submit reports relative to its appropriation "for
records purposes only." The word "may" is permissive [Dizon v.
Encarnacion, 119 Phil. 20, 22 (1963)], as it is an auxiliary verb
manifesting "opportunity or possibility" and, under ordinary
circumstances, "implies the possible existence of something."
[Supangan, Jr. v. Santos, G.R. No. 84663, 24 August 1990 x x
x Interdependence will work only if it is undertaken within the
parameters of the Constitution."
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent
Department of Budget and Management is DENIED. SO
ORDERED.
A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA September 25, 2009
RE: FURTHER CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
SET-UP OF THE PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL ACADEMY.
PERALTA, J.:
The present administrative matter arose from a letter dated
June 17, 2009 of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor of the
Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), addressed to Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno, Chairperson of the PHILJA Board of
Trustees, requesting the Court’s approval of the following
amendments in the PHILJA’s staffing pattern, solely referring to
the Chancellor’s Office. Thus:
We refer your Honor to the Court En Banc Resolution dated 23
September 2008, in Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA,
(Further Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational
Structure and Administrative Set-up of the Philippine Judicial
Academy), which approved PHILJA’s staffing pattern, hereto
attached as Annex "A."
In reference to the abovementioned Resolution, may we
respectfully request the Court’s approval of the following
amendments solely referring to the Chancellor’s Office.
1) To convert the position of PHILJA Attorney VI, salary grade
27, to Judicial Staff Head with the same salary grade 27, and
change it from permanent to coterminous.
The conversion of the position will accord the Chancellor the
discretion to hire a non-lawyer for the position when necessary.
2) To revert the status of the following positions from
permanent to coterminous:
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer SG 25 Judicial
Staff Officer III SG 18 Records Officer II
SG 14 Judicial Staff Assistant III SG 10
Under the Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, the status of
the above-mentioned positions were changed from
coterminous to permanent status.
In view of the nature of work required by the Chancellor for the
staff under the Office of the Chancellor, there is a need to
appoint such personnel of trust and confidence of the
Chancellor.
May we respectfully request that the permanent status of these
positions be reverted to coterminous status.
For the Chief Justice’s consideration and approval.1
In the Resolution dated June 23, 2009, the Court referred the
matter to the Office of Administrative Services for comment
thereon within ten (10) days from notice thereof.
In a Memorandum2 dated July 22, 2009, Atty. Eden T.
Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative
Officer, Office of Administrative Services, made the following
observation and recommendation:
This refers to the directive of the Honorable Court En Banc in
its resolution dated June 23, 2009 to this Office to comment on
the attached letter of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna, Chancellor,
PHILJA requesting the following:
1. the conversion of the position of one (1) PHILJA Attorney VI
(SG 27) in the Office of the Chancellor to Judicial Staff Head
with the same Salary Grade 27; and
2. the reversion of the status from permanent to coterminous of
the positions in the Office of the Chancellor enumerated below:
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer SG 25 Jud
Under the Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, re: "Further
Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational Structure and
Administrative Set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy,"
dated September 23, 2008, the status of the aforesaid
positions, among others, was changed from coterminous to
permanent.
18
Justice Azcuna avers that the nature of work required for the secondly, per the Index of Occupational Services, Position
staff under the Office of Chancellor necessitates that their Titles and Salary Grades issued by the Department of Budget
appointments be based on his trust and confidence. and Management (DBM), the position of Judicial Staff Head
has an assigned Salary Grade of 28, not Salary Grade 27.
Shown below is the plantilla of the Office of the Chancellor as
approved pursuant to A.M. No. 01-1-SC-PHILJA, to wit: As an alternative, we propose that the position of PHILJA
Attorney VI in the Office of the Chancellor be converted and/or
reclassified as PHILJA Head Executive Assistant with the
No. of Existing same Salary Grade 27 as that of Court Attorney VI.
Position Title SG
Positions Status
As regards the second request of Justice Azcuna, we propose
PHILJA the reversion of the status of the permanent positions in his
1 31
Chancellor Office to coterminous except, however, to the position of
Records Officer II which we proposed to be retained as
PHILJA Attorney permanent in order that there would be continuity of the
1 27 Coterm
VI smooth operations in the office should there be a chance of a
new administration. All of the four (4) subject positions have
PHILJA Attorney existing funds.
2 26 Coterm
V
Meanwhile, we believe that the restructuring of the Office of the
SC Chief Judicial Chancellor might as well affect the hierarchy of positions in the
1 25 Perm
Staff Officer Offices of the Vice-Chancellor and Executive Secretary.
Hence, with due respect also to Honorables Justo P. Torres
Executive and Marina L. Buzon, PHILJA Vice-Chancellor and PHILJA
1 24 Coterm
Assistant V Executive Secretary, respectively, we propose that some
changes be likewise made in their respective plantillas.
Executive
1 22 Coterm
Assistant IV Shown below are the plantillas of the Offices of the PHILJA
Vice-Chancellor and PHILJA Executive Secretary pursuant to
Judicial Staff the Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA:
1 18 Perm
Officer III
OFFICE OF THE PHILJA VICE-CHANCELLOR
1 Records Officer II 14 Perm

Judicial Staff No. of Existing

1 10 Perm Position Title SG
Assistant III Positions Status

1 Chauffeur II 6 Coterm PHILJA Vice-

1 30
Chancellor
1 Utility Worker II 3 Coterm
1 PHILJA Attorney V 26 Coterm
Total
Number 1 PHILJA Attorney IV 25 Coterm
12
of
Positions 1 PHILJA Attorney III 24 Coterm

SC Supervising
1 23 Perm
COMMENTS/OBSERVATIONS: Judicial Staff Officer

Executive Assistant
It may be stated that the results of the study made on the old 1 20 Coterm
III
plantillas of the PHILJA showed that there is a need for
permanent positions in the Executive Offices (Offices of the Judicial Staff Officer
PHILJA Chancellor, PHILJA Vice-Chancellor and PHILJA 1 18 Perm
III
Executive Secretary) for purposes of continuity of workflow
insofar as the records management therein is concerned. Executive Assistant
1 17 Coterm
II
We believe that the request of Justice Azcuna to convert the
position of Court Attorney VI [should be PHILJA Attorney VI] 1 Clerk III 6 Perm
(SG 27) in his Office is meritorious in order to give his Honor
the discretion to hire a non-lawyer when necessary. However, 1 Chauffeur I 5 Coterm
with due respect to him, we cannot favorably recommend its
conversion as Judicial Staff Head with the same Salary Grade 1 Utility Worker II 3 Coterm
of 27, primarily because the position of Judicial Staff Head is
exclusively used only in the Offices of the Justices; and, 11 Total Number of

19
 the Executive Offices in the PHILJA, except that of Clerk III
Positions
(SG 6) in the aforesaid Offices which we propose to be
retained as permanent. Moreover, except for Clerk III position,
it would be logical to have the other positions coterminous
OFFICE OF THE PHILJA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
since the Vice-Chancellor and the Executive Secretary serve
only for a specific period of two (2) years.
No. of Existing
Position Title SG Verification from the plantillas of the PHILJA Executive Officials
Positions Status
shows that the aforesaid three (3) positions which we propose
PHILJA for conversion and/or reclassification (i.e., PHILJA Attorney VI,
1 Executive 29 PHILJA Attorney V, and PHILJA Attorney IV) are still unfilled,
Secretary hence, no incumbent will be affected by the proposed
conversion and/or reclassification thereof.
PHILJA
1 25 Coterm
Attorney IV RECOMMENDATIONS:

PHILA Attorney In light of the foregoing, we respectfully recommend the

1 24 Coterm
III following:

Judicial Staff
1 22 Perm 1. the conversion and/or reclassification of the position of Court
Officer VI
Attorney VI [should be PHILJA Attorney VI] (SG 27) in the
Office of the Chancellor and to retain its status as coterminous,
Executive to wit:
1 20 Coterm
Assistant III

Judicial Staff FROM SG TO SG

1 18 Perm
Officer III PHILJA PHILJA Head
27 27
Attorney VI Executive Assistant
Executive
1 17 Coterm
Assistant II 2. the reversion of the status from permanent to coterminous,
but only insofar as the following positions in the Office of the
1 Clerk III 6 Perm Chancellor are concerned:

1 Chauffeur I 5 Coterm SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer SG 25 Judicial Staff

Officer III SG 18 Judicial Staff Assistant III SG 10
1 Utility Worker II 3 Coterm

[10] Total Number 3. the retention of the status as permanent of the position of
of Positions Records Officer II (SG 14) in the Office of the Chancellor for
[should be 10, purposes of continuity of the smooth operations in the office
should there be a change of new administration.
not 11]

With due respect to Honorables Justo P. Torres and Marina L.

We propose that the following positions in their respective Buzon, PHILJA Vice-Chancellor and PHILJA Executive
plantillas be likewise converted and/or reclassified, to wit: Secretary, respectively, we likewise respectfully recommend
the following changes in their respective plantillas for purposes
of maintaining the hierarchy of positions in the Executive
POSITIONS PROPOSED TO BE Offices of the PHILJA:
CONVERTED/RECLASSIFIED
OFFICE
1. the conversion and/or reclassification of the following
FROM SG TO SG positions in the Offices of the Vice-Chancellor and of the
Executive Secretary, and to retain their status as coterminous:
PHILJA
Office of the PHILJA
Executive
Vice- Attorney 26 26
Assistant S S
Chancellor V OFFICE FROM TO
Supervisor G G

Office of the PHILJA PHILJA PHILJA

Executive Attorney 25 Executive 25 Office of PHILJ Executiv
Secretary IV Assistant VI the Vice- A e
26 26
Chancell Attorne Assistant
or yV Supervis
and that all the positions therein be reverted as coterminous for or
the same reason of maintaining the hierarchy of positions in

20
 Office of PHILJA No. of Position Title SG Existing Proposed
PHILJ Positions Status
the Executiv
A
Executiv 25 e 25 Status
Attorne
e Assistant
y IV
Secretary VI
1 PHILJA Vice- 30
Chancellor
2. the reversion of the status of the permanent
positions in the Offices of the PHILJA Vice-Chancellor 1 PHILJA 26 Coterm Coterm
and PHILJA Executive Secretary to coterminous, EXECUTIVE
except for the position of Clerk III in each Office which ASSISTANT
we respectfully recommend to be retained both as SUPERVISOR
permanent.
(PHILJA
3. the immediate filling up of the aforesaid three (3) Attorney V)
converted/reclassified new coterminous positions, 1 PHILJA 25 Coterm Coterm
with the funds to be drawn from the savings of the Attorney IV
Court, pending the release of the Notice of
Organization, Staffing and Compensation Action 1 PHILJA 24 Coterm Coterm
(NOSCA) by the DBM. Attorney III
1 SC 23 Perm COTERM
Should all these recommendations merit the approval Supervising
of the Honorable Supreme Court, shown hereinbelow Judicial Staff
are the plantillas in the Executive Offices of the Officer
PHILJA showing the changes made therein, to wit:
1 Executive 20 Coterm Coterm
Assistant III
OFFICE OF THE PHILJA CHANCELLOR
1 Judicial Staff 18 Perm COTERM
Officer III
No. of Position Title SG Existing Proposed
1 Executive 17 Coterm Coterm
Positions
Assistant II
Status Status
1 Clerk III 6 Perm Perm
1 PHILJA Chancellor 31
1 Chauffeur I 5 Coterm Coterm
1 PHILJA HEAD 27 Coterm Coterm
EXECUTIVE
ASSISTANT 1 Utility Worker 3 Coterm Coterm
II

(PHILJA Attorney VI) 11 Total Number

of Positions
2 PHILA Attorney V 26 Coterm Coterm
1 SC Chief Judicial Staff 25 Perm COTERM OFFICE OF THE PHILJA EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
Officer
1 Executive Assistant V 24 Coterm Coterm
No. of Position Title SG Existing Proposed
1 Executive Assistant IV 22 Coterm Coterm Positions Status Status

1 Judicial Staff Officer III 18 Perm COTERM 1 PHILJA 29

Executive
1 Records Officer II 14 Perm Perm Secretary
1 Judicial Staff Assistant 10 Perm COTERM 1 PHILJA 25 Coterm Coterm
III EXECUTIVE
1 Chauffeur II 6 Coterm Coterm ASSISTANT VI

1 Utility Worker II 3 Coterm Coterm (PHILJA

12 Total Number of Attorney IV)
Positions 1 PHILA Attorney 24 Coterm Coterm
III
OFFICE OF THE PHILJA VICE-CHANCELLOR 1 Judicial Staff 22 Perm COTERM
Officer VI
1 Executive 20 Coterm Coterm
Assistant III

21
1 Judicial Staff 18 Perm COTERM
Officer III
1 Executive 17 Coterm Coterm
Assistant II
1 Clerk III 6 Perm Perm
1 Chauffeur I 5 Coterm Coterm
1 Utility Worker II 3 Coterm Coterm
[10] Total Number of
Positions
[should be 10,
not 11]
On July 28, 2009, the Court directed the PHILJA to reply to the
Memorandum dated July 22, 2009 of Atty. Candelaria, within
ten (10) days from notice thereof.
In his letter dated August 12, 2009, addressed to the Chief
Justice, Justice Azcuna stated that:
Anent the Resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court dated
July 28, 2009, received by us on August 6, 2009, A.M. No. 01-
1-04-PHILJA (Re: Further Clarifying and Strengthening the
Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-up of the
Philippine Judicial Academy), the undersigned has no objection
to the Memorandum date July 22, 2009 of Atty. Eden T.
Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief Administrative
Officer, insofar as the Office of the Chancellor is concerned,
but respectfully prays that the proposed changes in the Offices
of the Vice-Chancellor and the Executive Secretary be deferred
until after the end of the terms of the present Vice-Chancellor
and Executive Secretary, unless said officials agree to have
the same effective during their terms.
Respectfully submitted.
In the Resolution dated August 18, 2009, the Court required
the Offices of the PHILJA, namely, Office of the Vice-
Chancellor, Office of the Executive Secretary, and
Administrative Division to comment on the letter dated June 17,
2009 and Letter-Compliance dated August 12, 2009 of PHILJA
Chancellor, Justice Azcuna, as well as on the Memorandum
dated July 22, 2009 of Atty. Candelaria, within ten (10) days
from notice thereof, as these are the offices that will be
affected by the proposed conversion and reclassification of the
subject positions.
In their joint letter dated August 27, 2009, addressed to the
Chief Justice, PHILJA Vice-Chancellor, Justice Justo P. Torres,
PHILJA Executive Secretary, Justice Marina L. Buzon, and
PHILJA Administrative Chief, Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada,
with the conforme of PHILJA Chancellor, Justice Adolfo S.
Azcuna, stated that:
Anent A.M. No. 01-1-04-PHILJA (Re: Further Clarifying and
Strenthening the Organizational Structure and Administrative
Set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy) and the Resolution
of the Honorable Supreme Court therein dated August 18,
2009 and received by our office on August 26, 2009, the
undersigned respectfully submit this Comment in compliance
with the Resolution. Thus:
1. We respectfully agree with the Comment and Manifestation
of Chancellor Adolfo S. Azcuna earlier filed on this matter
dated August 12, 2009, copy of which is hereto attached as
Annex "A," and adopts the same;
2. We join his urgent request that he be provided the staff he
requested as recommended by Atty. Eden T. Candelaria,
Chief, Office of Administrative Services of this Court, in her
Memorandum dated July 22, 2009.
Respectfully submitted.
The recommendation of Atty. Candelaria is well-taken. The
Court grants the request of Justice Azcuna for the conversion
of a position title and the reversion from permanent to
coterminous status of certain positions, except the position of
Records Officer III (SG 14), in the Office of the Chancellor, and
approves and adopts the recommendation of Atty. Candelaria
as to the change in the position titles of the heads of each of
the Offices of the Vice-Chancellor and Executive Secretary
and, likewise, the reversion from permanent to coterminous
status, except the position of Clerk III (SG 6) in each office, in
the staffing pattern of the two offices.
Section 11 of Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, effective
September 23, 2008, provides that:
Section 11. Staffing Pattern
In order to enhance efficiency and effectiveness, the staffing
pattern of the Philippine Judicial Academy is hereby further
strengthened to include sixty-nine (69) new positions to
perform the functions of the new offices and divisions;
reclassify four (4) existing positions; convert twenty (20)
existing positions; change the status of eleven (11) co-
terminous positions to permanent status and to realign some
existing positions.
The staffing pattern shall be as follows:
OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR
1 PHILJA Chancellor 31
1 PHILJA ATTORNEY VI C.T. 27
1 PHILJA Attorney V c.t. 26
1 PHILJA Attorney V c.t. 26
1 SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer c.t. P 25
1 Executive Assistant V c.t. 24
1 Executive Assistant IV c.t. 22
22
1 Judicial Staff Officer III c.t. P 18 1 Driver I c.t. 3

Stenographic Reporter IV Records 1 Utility Worker II c.t. 3

1 c.t. P 14
Officer II
10 Total number of items in the Office of the
1 Judicial Staff Assistant III c.t. P 10 Executive Secretary

1 Chauffeur II c.t. 6
xxxx
1 Utility Worker II c.t. 3
*- item co-terminous with the Chief of Office
12 Total number of items in the Office of the P – Permanent c.t. – co-terminous
Chancellor Italic Bold Font – New Item, funding to be sourced from
Existing DBM approved item
ITALIC BOLD FONT ALL CAPS – New Item, funding to be
OFFICE OF THE VICE-CHANCELLOR requested from DBM
Italic Underlined – converted/retitled position
1 PHILJA Vice-Chancellor 30 Regular Font-Underlined – reclassified/upgraded position
Regular Font – Existing DBM approved item
1 PHILJA ATTORNEY V C.T. 26
Due to the increase in the programs and commitments of the
1 PHILJA Attorney IV c.t. 25 PHILJA, the Court en banc3 issued Revised A.M. No. 01-1-04-
SC-PHILJA for the purpose of clarifying and strengthening the
1 PHILJA Attorney III c.t. 24 organizational structure and administrative set-up of the
PHILJA, including the key operating systems, staffing pattern,
SC Supervising Judicial Staff and the need to make it more appropriate to an academic
1 c.t. P 23 institution. The Court amended the staffing pattern of the
Officer
following offices of the PHILJA:
1 Executive Assistant III c.t. 20
A. Office of the Chancellor:
1 Judicial Staff Officer III c.t. P 18
1. PHILJA Attorney VI (SG 27) – newly created item;
1 Executive Assistant II c.t. 17 coterminous

1 Clerk III c.t. P 6 2. SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) – from
coterminous to permanent
1 Chauffeur I c.t. 6
3. Judicial Staff Officer III (SG 18) – from coterminous
1 Utility Worker II c.t. 3 to permanent
11 Total number of items in the Office of the Vice-
Chancellor 4. Records Officer II [formerly Stenographic Reporter
IV (SG 13)] (SG 14) - from coterminous to permanent

OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 5. Judicial Staff Assistant III (SG 10) – from
coterminous to permanent
1 PHILJA Executive Secretary 29
B. Office of the Vice-Chancellor:
1 PHILJA ATTORNEY IV C.T. 25
1. PHILJA Attorney V (SG 26) – newly created item;
1 PHILJA Attorney III c.t. 24 coterminous

1 Judicial Staff Officer VI c.t. P 22

2. SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) –
from coterminous to permanent
1 Executive Assistant III c.t. 20

1 Judicial Staff Officer III c.t. P 18 3. Judicial Staff Officer III (SG 18) – from coterminous
to permanent
1 Executive Assistant II c.t. 17
4. Clerk III (SG 6) – from coterminous to permanent
1 Clerk III c.t. P 6
C. Office of the Executive Secretary:

23
 1. PHILJA Attorney IV (SG 25) – newly created item; Thus, the following will be the amended staffing pattern of the
coterminous respective offices of the PHILJA:

2. Judicial Staff Officer VI (SG 23) – from coterminous A. Office of the Chancellor:
to permanent
1. PHILJA Head Executive Assistant (SG 27) –
3. Judicial Staff Officer III (SG 18) – from coterminous newly-created item; coterminous
to permanent
2. SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) –
4. Clerk III (SG 6) – from coterminous to permanent from permanent to coterminous

In Re: Clarifying and Strengthening the Organizational 3. Judicial Staff Officer III (SG 18) –
Structure and Administrative Set-Up of the Philippine Judicial from permanent to coterminous
Academy,4 the Court saw the necessity of retaining the
originally proposed titles and salary grades of the positions of 4. Judicial Staff Assistant III (SG 10) –
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer (SG 25) and Supervising Judicial from permanent to coterminous
Staff Officer (SG 23) in the PHILJA as part of further enhancing
its organizational structure and administrative set-up.
B. Office of the Vice-Chancellor:
Corollarily, while the Court grants the request of Justice
Azcuna that the PHILJA Attorney VI (SG 27), a newly created 1. PHILJA Executive Assistant Supervisor (SG 26) – newly-
item, be changed to a non-lawyer designation, the appropriate created item; coterminous
position title should be PHILJA Head Executive Assistant with
same Salary Grade 27, instead of Judicial Staff Head, which 2. SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (SG 23) –
has an assigned Salary Grade 28, per Index of Occupational from permanent to coterminous
Services, Position Titles and Salary Grades issued by the
DBM. The change in the position title to PHILJA Head 3. Judicial Staff Officer III (SG 18) –
Executive Assistant will afford him the discretion to hire an from permanent to coterminous
individual, including a non-lawyer, who possesses the
qualifications required for the highly sensitive and confidential
position. The position of Judicial Staff Head is peculiar to the C. Office of the Executive Secretary:
Offices of the Associate Justices performing functions
pertaining to the adjudication of cases and administrative 1. PHILJA Executive Assistant VI (SG 25) –
supervision and other confidential matters. Additionally, as newly-created item; coterminous
PHILJA Chancellor, Justice Azcuna should be given a free
hand to select his office staff based on his trust and confidence
2. Judicial Staff Officer VI (SG 22) –
and, hence, the need to have some position status changed
from permanent to coterminous
from permanent to coterminous. The position of Records
Officer II should remain to be permanent as there is a need to
ensure the continuity of workflow and preserve the records 3. Judicial Staff Officer III (SG 18) –
management. from permanent to coterminous

Similarly, the changes in the nomenclature for the positions of
PHILJA Attorney V to PHILJA Executive Assistant Supervisor
(with same SG 26) for the Office of the Vice-Chancellor, and
PHILJA Attorney IV to PHILJA Executive Assistant VI (with
same SG 25) of the Office of the Executive Secretary, both
being newly created and with position status of coterminous,
are justified as the Vice-Chancellor and the Executive
Secretary have the prerogative to hire heads of their office staff
upon whom they can repose their trust and confidence. The
heads of the three offices who occupy Private Secretary
positions perform functions which are primarily confidential in
nature and, thus, coterminous with the official they
WHEREFORE, in the best interest of service and to maintain
optimum work efficiency in the Executive Offices of the
Philippine Judicial
Academy (PHILJA), namely, Office of the Chancellor, Office of
the Vice-Chancellor, and Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Court RESOLVES:
1. To GRANT the request of Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna,
Chancellor of the Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA), with
regard to the Office of Chancellor, as follows:

a. The change in the position title from PHILJA Attorney VI, a

serve.5 In like manner, the hiring of key positions which are
newly-created item which is unfilled, to PHILJA Head Executive
categorized as
Assistant and maintaining the nature of the appointment as
coterminous with Salary Grade 27;
confidential should be reverted from permanent to
coterminous, except the position of Clerk III (SG 6) in each
b. The reversion of the position status from permanent to
office which should remain to be permanent as there is a need
coterminous with regard to the following items in the plantilla:
to ensure the continuity of workflow and preserve the records
management.

24
SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer — Salary Grade 25
Judicial Staff Officer III — Salary Grade 18
Judicial Staff Assistant III — Salary Grade 10
However, the request to revert the position status of Records
Officer II, with Salary Grade 14, from permanent to
coterminous is DENIED and said position shall remain to be
permanent to ensure the continuity of workflow and preserve
the records management in the Office of the Chancellor.
2. To APPROVE AND ADOPT the recommendation of Atty.
Eden T. Candelaria, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief
Administrative Officer, Office of Administrative Services, as to
the following:
a. The reclassification of each position in the PHILJA Offices of
the Vice-Chancellor and Executive Secretary, both having the
status of coterminous:
Office of the Vice-Chancellor:
From PHILJA Attorney V to PHILJA Executive Assistant
Supervisor, with Salary Grade 26; unfilled
Office of the Executive Secretary:
From PHILJA Attorney IV to PHILJA Executive Assistant VI,
with Salary Grade 25; unfilled
2. The reversion of the position status from permanent to
coterminous with regard to the following designated items in
the plantilla of the PHILJA Offices of the Vice-Chancellor and
Executive Secretary:
Office of the Vice-Chancellor:
a. SC Supervising Judicial Staff Officer (Salary Grade 23)
b. Judicial Staff Officer III (Salary Grade 18)
Office of the Executive Secretary:
a. Judicial Staff Officer VI (Salary Grade 22)
b. Judicial Staff Officer III (Salary Grade 18)
except the position of Clerk III (Salary Grade 6) in each office,
which remains to be permanent to ensure the continuity of
workflow and preserve the records management in each office;
and
3. To REQUEST the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, Executive
Secretary to appoint qualified personnel to the three (3) newly
reclassified coterminous positions, namely:
Office of the Chancellor:
PHILJA Head Executive Assistant (Salary Grade 27)
Office of the Vice-Chancellor:
PHILJA Executive Assistant Supervisor (Salary Grade 26)
Office of the Executive Secretary:
PHILJA Executive Assistant VI (Salary Grade 25)
subject to availability of the funds of the Court, pending the
release of the Notice of Organization, Staffing and
Compensation Action (NOSCA) by the Department of Budget
and Management. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No.177580 October 17, 2008
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. VICTORIO N.
MEDRANO, respondent.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via Petition for Review on Certiorari are the
Decision1 dated June 29, 2006 and Resolution dated April 2,
2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
931652 which nullified the Decision dated July 19, 2004 of the
Office of the Ombudsman (petitioner), as modified, finding
Victorio N. Medrano (respondent) guilty of sexual harassment
in the administrative complaint against him and dismissed the
said complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
Sometime in May 2003, Ma. Ruby A. Dumalaog (Ma. Ruby), a
teacher at Jacobo Z. Gonzales Memorial National High School
in Biñan, Laguna (the school), filed a sworn letter-
complaint3 before the Office of the Ombudsman (for Luzon)
charging her superior–herein respondent, Officer-In-Charge
(OIC) of the school and concurrently the principal of San Pedro
Relocation Center National High School in San Pedro, Laguna,
with (1) violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual
Harassment Act of 1995), docketed as OMB-L-C-03-0613-E
(criminal case), and (2) grave misconduct, docketed as OMB-
L-A-03-0488-E (administrative case).
The administrative complaint, in essence, alleged that in the
afternoon of March 28, 2003, respondent made sexual
advances on Ma. Ruby and abused her sexually.
In his Counter-Affidavit,4 respondent denied the charge,
claiming that it was "maliciously designed to harass and
threaten him to succumb to Ma. Ruby’s demand that she be
given a regular teaching post." He thus prayed for the
dismissal of the complaint.
While the administrative case was pending investigation, Ma.
Ruby filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Preventive
Suspension,5 alleging that respondent was "using the powers
of his office by utilizing his subordinates in harassing her." By
Order6 of July 29, 2003, petitioner granted the motion and
ordered the preventive suspension of respondent for six (6)
months without pay.
Respondent, this time assisted by counsel, Atty. Alan P.
Cabaero, moved for the lifting of the preventive suspension
Order on the ground that the evidence of his guilt is not
strong.7 It was denied.
Undaunted, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration8 alleging that the Schools Division
Superintendent Lilia T. Reyes had already designated
Hereberto Jose D. Miranda as the new OIC of the school in his
25
stead, effective September 1, 2003. By Order9 of October 16,
2003, petitioner lifted the preventive suspension Order.
By Decision10 of July 19, 2004 rendered in the administrative
case, petitioner adjudged respondent guilty of grave
misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal
from the service.
With respect to the criminal case, petitioner, by Resolution 11 of
July 19, 2004, found probable cause to indict respondent for
violation of the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. An
information for violation of said Act, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 29190 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Biñan,
Laguna, was in fact filed.
Respondent moved for reconsideration of petitioner’s
issuances in both cases. Respecting the administrative
case,12 he assailed not only the factual findings and
conclusions of petitioner, but, for the first time, he challenged
its jurisdiction over the case. He argued that under Section 9 of
R.A. No. 4670 (the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers),
an administrative complaint against a public school teacher
should be heard by an investigating committee of the
Department of Education Culture & Sports, now Department of
Education (DepEd), composed of the school superintendent of
the division where the teacher belongs, a representative from a
teachers’ organization, and a supervisor of the division. He
thus prayed for the dismissal of the administrative case as
petitioner has no jurisdiction over it.
By Joint Order13 of April 8, 2005, petitioner affirmed its
Resolution in the criminal case but modified its Decision in the
administrative case by finding respondent guilty of sexual
harassment, instead of grave misconduct, and meted on him
the penalty of suspension from the service for one (1) year,
without pay.
Dissatisfied, respondent filed a Petition for Review (with prayer
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction)14 before the Court of Appeals,
assailing petitioner’s decision in the administrative case,
attributing to it grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it –
I of the events that led to the filing of the instant cases [referring
. . . assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case against
petitioner, although under R.A. 4670, otherwise known as
the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, only the appropriate committee ofthe Departmen
t of Education has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and try adm
inistrative complaintsagainst public school teachers.
II
. . . denied him his right to present before the Graft
Investigation Officer the text messages sent by complainant
which would have established the fact that the sexual
harassment charge did not actually happen. x x x
III
. . . totally ignored his overwhelming evidence positively
establishing his presence in another place at the time the
alleged acts of sexual harassment were committed against
complainant.
IV
. . . found him guilty of sexual harassment and imposed upon
him the penalty of one (1) year suspension from the
service.15 (Underscoring supplied)
By the now assailed Decision of June 29, 2006, the appellate
court annulled petitioner’s July 19, 2004 Decision, as modified,
in the administrative case and dismissed the complaint on the
sole ground that petitioner has no jurisdiction over it. It held
that although respondent raised the issue of jurisdiction only
after petitioner rendered an adverse decision, "the rule
on estoppel will not apply against [Medrano]" because such
jurisdictional issue was raised "when the case was still before
the Ombudsman."16 It thus found no need to address the other
issues raised by respondent.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration17 of the appellate
court’s Decision was denied by Resolution18 of April 2, 2007,
hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in not ruling
that it (petitioner) has concurrent jurisdiction with the DepEd
over the administrative complaint against respondent.19
Instead of filing a comment on the present petition as directed,
respondent filed a Manifestation With Motion In Lieu Of
Comment20 praying that "the instant petition be dismissed for
being moot and academic" in view of the execution of an
Affidavit of Desistance21 by Ma. Ruby on September 17, 2007
before Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Ramonito Delfin of
Biñan, Laguna, as well as the Order22 of even date issued by
the MeTC of Biñan dismissing the criminal case 23 against him
due to her lack of interest to prosecute the case.
In her Affidavit of Desistance, Ma. Ruby stated, inter alia:
2. That in retrospect and after an objective and sincere review
to the criminal and administrative cases], I am now fully
enlightened that said incident was just
a product of mistake of fact and clear misunderstanding
between me and the accused/respondent, who after all,
was not actually criminally nor immorally motivated to do any fo
rmof offense/harm to my person. Thus, I
am now retracting everything I said against theaccused/respon
dent in my letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
dated May 13, 2003, which became the basis for the filing of
the criminal and administrative cases against him;
3. That x x x, I am no longer interested in pursuing the criminal
and administrative cases I filed against Mr. Victorio N.
Medrano, and is now requesting the Honorable Court [referring
to the trial court in the criminal case], the Office of the
Ombudsman or the Honorable Supreme Court with whom the
administrative case is pending, to dismiss the said cases.
(Underscoring supplied)
26
Petitioner opposes respondent’s move, contending that Ma.
Ruby’s Affidavit of Desistance and the dismissal of the criminal
case do not constitute legal bases for dismissing the present
petition and the administrative complaint.
The issues for resolution are:
1. Whether the petition has become moot and academic, Ma.
Ruby having executed an affidavit of desistance and the
criminal case having been dismissed due to her lack of interest
to prosecute the same;
2. Whether petitioner has jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint against respondent; and
3. Whether respondent is estopped to question
petitioner’s assumption of jurisdiction over the administrative
complaint.
With respect to the first issue, the Court holds in the negative.
The flaw in respondent’s argument that the execution of Ma.
Ruby’s Affidavit of Desistance and the dismissal of the criminal
case must result in the dismissal of the administrative case is
that it ignores the whale of a difference between those two
remedies. In Gerardo R. Villaseñor and Rodel A. Mesa v.
Sandiganbayan and Louella Mae Oco-Pesquerra (Office of the
Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman),24 the Court stressed
the distinct and independentcharacter of the remedies
available to an offended party against any impropriety or
wrongdoing committed by a public officer, thus:
Significantly, there are three kinds of remedies available
against a public officer for impropriety in the performance of his
powers and the discharge of his duties: (1) civil, (2) criminal,
and
(3) administrative. These remedies may be invoked separately,
alternately, simultaneously or successively. Sometimes, the
same offense may be the subject of all three kinds of remedies.
Defeat of any of the three remedies will not necessarily preclud
e resort to other remedies or affectdecisions reached thereat, a
s different degrees of evidence are required in these several ac
tions. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is
needed, whereas a mere preponderance of evidence will
suffice in civil cases. In administrative cases, only substantial
evidence is required.
It is clear, then, that criminal and administrative cases are
distinct from each
other. The settled rule isthat criminal and civil cases are alt
ogether different from administrative matters, such that th
efirst two will not inevitably govern or affect the third and
vice versa. Verily, administrative casesmay proceed indep
endently of the criminal proceedings. (Underscoring
supplied)
At any rate, an affidavit of desistance (or recantation) is, as a
rule, viewed with suspicion and reservation because it can
easily be secured from a poor and ignorant witness, usually
through intimidation or for monetary consideration. 25 And there
is always the probability that it would later be repudiated, and
criminal prosecution would thus be interminable. 26 Hence, such
desistance, by itself, is not usually a ground for the dismissal of
an action once it has been instituted in court.27
The suspicious and unreliable nature of Ma. Ruby’s Affidavit of
Desistance is evident. Firstly, her affidavit was executed only
on September 17, 2007 or more than three (3) years after
petitioner had rendered its July 19, 2004Decision, as modified
by its Joint Order of April 8, 2005 finding respondent guilty of
sexual harassment. Secondly, unlike her six-page sworn letter-
complaint of May 13, 2003 wherein she narrated in her own
Pilipino dialect the factual details of respondent’s acts
complained of, Ma. Ruby’s one-page Affidavit of Desistance is
couched in English with legal terms and conclusions only one
with a trained legal mind can formulate, e.g., "I am now fully
enlightened that said incident was just
a product of mistake of fact and clear misunderstanding
between me and the accused/respondent, who after all,
was not actually criminally nor immorally motivated to
do any form ofoffense/harm to my person." Thirdly, Ma. Ruby’s
Affidavit is bereft of any factual particulars, engendering more
questions that bolster its unreliability, e.g.: What was the
"misunderstanding" between her and respondent? How was
she "fully enlightened" about the whole incident? How did she
arrive at her conclusion that he "was not actually criminally nor
immorally motivated to do any form of offense/harm" against
her person?
In fine, the bases of respondent’s plea to have the present
petition dismissed do not obliterate his liability in the
administrative case subject of the present petition.
In resolving the second issue – whether petitioner has
jurisdiction over the administrative complaint against
respondent – it is necessary to examine the source, nature and
extent of the power and authority of the Ombudsman vis-à-
vis the provisions of the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers.
Section 5, Article XI of the Constitution "created
the independent Office of the Ombudsman." Hailed as the
"protectors of the people," the Ombudsman and his Deputies
are bestowed with overreaching authority, powers, functions,
and duties to act on complaints against public officials and
employees, as provided in Sections 12 and 13 thereof, thus:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people,
shall act promptly oncomplaints filed in any form or manner ag
ainst public officials or employees of the Government, or anysu
bdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including governm
ent-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the
result thereof.
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agenc
y, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, impr
oper, orinefficient;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public
official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
27
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report
any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate
action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and
make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency; and
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure
and exercise such other powers or perform such functions ordu
ties as may be provided by law. (Underscoring supplied)
The above enumeration of the Ombudsman’s far-reaching
powers is not exclusive as the framers of the Constitution gave
Congress the leeway to prescribe, by subsequent legislation,
additional powers, functions or duties to the Ombudsman, as
mandated in Section 13(8), quoted above.
Pursuant to the constitutional command, Congress enacted
R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) providing for the
functional, structural organization, and the extent of the
administrative disciplinary authority of the petitioner. 28 The
provisions of this law "apply
to all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance"
committed by any officer or employee of the Government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, "during his
tenure in office."29 The acts or omissions which the petitioner
may investigate are quite extensive:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints.– The Ombudsman shall
act
on all complaints relating, but notlimited, to acts or omissions w
hich:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s
functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment
of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an
improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
Its mandate is not only to "act promptly on complaints" against
such public officers or employees, but also to
"enforce their administrative, civil and
criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in o
rder topromote efficient service by the Government to the peopl
e."30
R.A. No. 6770, however, restrains the petitioner from
exercising its disciplinary authority "over
officials who may beremoved only by impeachment or over Me
mbers of Congress and the Judiciary," thus:
SEC. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority;
Exceptions.– The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive offici
als of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and
their
subsidiaries, except over officials who maybe removed only
by impeachment or over Members of Congress and the Ju
diciary.
SEC. 22. Investigatory Power.– The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in
office allegedly committed by officials removable by
impeachment, for thepurpose of filing a verified complaint for i
mpeachment, if warranted.
In all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of
the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person
in the investigation and proceed against such private person as
the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the
private person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the
same penalties and liabilities. (Underscoring supplied)
The above constitutional and statutory provisions taken
together reveal the manifest intent of the lawmakers to bestow
upon the petitioner full administrative disciplinary power over
public officials and employees except those impeachable
officials, Members of Congress and of the Judiciary.
When an administrative charge is initiated against
a public school teacher, however, Section 9 of the Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers specifically provides that the
same shall be heard initially by
an investigating committeecomposed of the school
superintendent of the division, as chairman, a representative of
the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national
teachers’ organization, and a supervisor of the division, as
members, thus:
28
SEC. 9. Administrative Charges. – As used in this Act, the term ‘teacher’ shall mean all persons
Administrative charges against a teacher shall
be heard initially by a committee composed of the
corresponding Schools Superintendent of the Division or a duly
authorized representative who should at least have the rank of
a division supervisor, where the teacher belongs, as
chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any
existing provincial or
national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the Division
, the last two to be designated by the Director of Public
Schools. The committee shall submit its findings and
recommendations to the Director of PublicSchools within thirty
days from termination of the hearings; Provided, however, That
where the school superintendent is the complainant or an
interested party, all the members of the committee shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Education. (Underscoring
supplied)
In Fabella v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court held:
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving
public schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly
provides that the committee to hear public schoolteachers’
administrative cases should be composed of the school
superintendent of the division as chairman, a representative of
the local or any existing provincial or national teachers’
organization, and a supervisor of the division. x x x.
xxxx
The
aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects the le
gislative intent to impose astandard and a separate set of pr
ocedural requirements in connection with administrativepr
oceedings involving public schoolteachers. x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Significantly, The Ombudsman Act of 1989 recognizes the
existence of some "proper disciplinary authorit[ies]," such as
the investigating committee of the DepEd mentioned in Section
9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Thus,
Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of 1989 directs that the
petitioner "may refer certain complaints to
the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate
administrative proceedings against erring public officers or
employees."32
In light of this, the Court holds that the administrative
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman over a public
school teacher is not an exclusive power but
is concurrent with the proper committee of the DepEd.
In the instant case, respondent, although designated as then
OIC of a public school and concurrently the school principal of
another public school, is undoubtedly covered by the definition
of the term "teacher" under the second paragraph of Section 2
of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers which provides:
SEC 2. Title – Definition.– This Act shall x x x apply to all
public school teachers except those in the professorial staff of
state colleges and universities.
engaged in the classroom, in any level of instruction; on full
time basis, including guidance counselors, school librarians,
industrial arts or vocational
instructors, and all other persons performing supervisory and/o
r administrative functions inall schools, colleges and
universities operated by the Government or its political subdivis
ions; but shall not include school nurses, school physicians,
school dentists, and other school employees. (Underscoring
supplied)
Thus, the administrative complaint against respondent should
have been referred by petitioner to the proper committee of the
DepEd for the institution of appropriate administrative
proceedings, in light of Section 23 of The Ombudsman Act of
1989.
This brings the Court to the third issue. While petitioner should
have desisted from hearing the administrative complaint
against respondent and referred it to the proper DepEd
committee, given that it had already concluded the proceedings
and had rendered a decision thereon, respondent is
now barred from assailing petitioner’s acts under the principle
of estoppel. He had actively participated in the administrative
proceedings before petitioner. In his Counter-Affidavit,
he asked petitioner for affirmative relief by seeking the
dismissal of the administrative complaint allegedly for being
baseless.33 From then on, he was assisted by counsel in filing
several motions. When he was preventively suspended for six
months without pay, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration
praying that "a new Order be issued reversing or setting aside
the preventive suspension Order."34 When this was denied, he
again filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 35 for the
lifting of his suspension since he was already replaced as OIC,
which motion was granted. It was only after petitioner had
rendered an adverse Decision that he, in a Motion for
Reconsideration, impugned petitioner’s assumption of
jurisdiction over his case. Verily, respondent cannot be
permitted to challenge petitioner’s acts belatedly.
In applying the principle of estoppel in Alcala v. Villar,36 the
Court held:
Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the School Principal of Lanao
National High School, Pilar, Cebu City. In February 1998, x x x,
teachers of Lanao National High School, x x x, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman an administrative complaint against
respondent for dishonesty.
xxxx
On June 22, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
resolution finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and
dismissing him from the service. x x x.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that
the latter was without jurisdiction over the administrative
complaints against public school teachers. It ruled that the
governing law is Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and not Republic
Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. x x x.
xxxx
29
x x x, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, it was ruled that R.A. No.
4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically
covers and governs administrative proceedings involving public
school teachers. x x x.
xxxx
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals erred whe
n it
nullified the proceedings before theOffice of the Ombudsman. x
x x. In Emin v. De Leon, a public school teacher was
administratively charged with and found guilty of dishonesty
under P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Law). The Supreme Court
ruled that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, is the applicable law and that the Civil Service
Commission does not have jurisdiction over the administrative
case. Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the dismissal from the
service of the public school teacher as the latter was found to
have been sufficiently afforded due process. x x x. Thus –
However, at this late hour, the proceedings
conducted by the public respondent CSC canno longer be
nullified on procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppe
l by laches, petitioner is now barred from
impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction over his case.
xxxx
As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative
proceedings withoutraising any
objection thereto bars them from raising any jurisdictional
infirmity afteran adverse decision is rendered against the
m. x x x. Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, petitioner himself
invoked the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission by x x
x further praying for ‘any remedy or judgment which under the
premises are just and
equitable.’ It isan undesirable practice of a party
participating in the proceedings, submitting his case for
decision and accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attac
king it for lack ofjurisdiction when adverse.
xxxx
In the same vein, respondent in the case should be barred un
der the principle of estoppel bylaches from assailing the ju
risdiction of the Ombudsman. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals should have resolved the appeal on its merits, x x x.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The ruling by the Court of Appeals that estoppel will not apply
against respondent because he raised the issue of jurisdiction
"when the case was still before the Ombudsman"37 is thus
bereft of merit.
The appellate court’s citation of Duero v. Court of Appeals38 in
which this Court held that the therein private
respondent Duero was not estopped from questioning the RTC
jurisdiction, despite his active participation in the proceedings
before it, is misplaced. For Duero involved lack of jurisdiction.
The present case involves concurrentjurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Court
of Appeals Decision of June 29, 2006 and Resolution of April 2,
2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93165 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Appeals
which is directed to decide the case on the merits. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165416 January 22, 2008
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. FLORITA A.
MASING and JOCELYN A. TAYACTAC, respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165584 January 22, 2008
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, petitioner, vs. FLORITA A.
MASING, respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 165731 January 22, 2008
PAUL L. CANSINO, FELICIDAD MOJICA, VENERANDO
MOJICA and RICARTE L. MAMPARO, petitioners, vs.
FLORITA A. MASING and JOCELYN A.
TAYACTAC, respondents.
PUNO, C.J.:
These cases involve the issue of whether the Ombudsman
may directly discipline public school teachers and employees,
or merely recommend appropriate disciplinary action to the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
In G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165731, respondent Florita A.
Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City Integrated
Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent
Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in the same school. In
1997, respondents were administratively charged before the
Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly collecting
unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to
account for public funds. The cases were docketed as follows:
1. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193 for grave misconduct and neglect of
duty, against respondent Masing only;
2. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-249 for violation of Republic Act No.
6713, against respondent Masing and a schoolteacher;
3. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253 for violation of Republic Act No.
6713, against respondents Masing and Tayactac, and several
schoolteachers;
4. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-254 for violation of Republic Act No.
6713, against respondent Masing and several schoolteachers.
The complainants were parents of children studying at the
DCISS, among whom were the petitioners in G.R. No. 165731,
namely, Paul L. Cansino, Felicidad Mojica, Venerando Mojica,
and Ricarte L. Mamparo.
30
On July 2, 1998, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over them.
Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them
which shall exercise the same through a committee to be
constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4670,
otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers." The motion was denied, as well as respondents’
motion for reconsideration.
On June 30, 2000, the Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a
joint decision finding respondents Masing and Tayactac guilty,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this
Office finds substantial evidence that:
1. Respondent Florita Masing is guilty of gross misconduct,
neglect of duty and violation of Section 4, paragraphs (a), (b),
and (c) of RA 6713 in relation to the collection of unauthorized
fees, non-remittance of authorized fees and failure to account
for public funds; and of misconduct in relation to the complaint
of Felicidad Mojica, and she is hereby DISMISSED FROM
[THE] SERVICE with all the accessory penalties including
forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from
holding public office; and
2. Respondent Jocelyn Tayactac is guilty of simple neglect of
duty, and is hereby suspended for a period of six (6) months. A
repetition of the same offense will be met with stiffer penalty. x
x x x1
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the
Ombudsman denied in an Order dated September 26, 2000.
Respondents sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61993. On February 27, 2004,
the Court of Appeals granted the petition, viz:
WHEREFORE, the joint decision of June 30, 2000 and the
Order of September 26, 2000 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and Administrative Cases Nos. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-
193, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-249, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253, and
OMB-MIN-ADM-97-254 of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao are hereby DISMISSED.
The IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of the petitioners with full
backwages and other benefits is further ORDEREDin the
interest of justice.2
On April 13, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman, which was
not impleaded as respondent in the cases, filed an Omnibus
Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration.3 The Court of
Appeals denied the omnibus motion on the grounds that (1)
intervention is not proper because it is sought by the quasi-
judicial body whose judgment is on appeal, and (2)
intervention, even if permissible, is belated under Section 2,
Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.4 Hence, the petition before us by
the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. No. 165416.
The complainant-parents filed their own petition for review of
the Court of Appeals’ decision dated February 27, 2004,
docketed as G.R. No. 165731.
In G.R. No. 165584, respondent Florita A. Masing faced yet
another administrative case before the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao filed by Erlinda P. Tan.5 The charges
were oppression, serious misconduct, discourtesy in the
conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or
disability due to immoral or vicious habits.
As in the other administrative cases, respondent Masing filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the Office of the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case. The motion was
denied, as well as respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
On December 27, 1999, the Ombudsman for Mindanao found
respondent Masing guilty as charged and ordered her
suspension for six (6) months without pay. The DECS Regional
Director, Regional Office No. XI, was ordered to implement the
decision upon its finality.
Respondent Masing filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58735. On July 31,
2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed Ombudsman
decision, viz:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the herein petition, the same is
hereby given due course and the decision of the agency a
quo in Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-282 is hereby SET
ASIDE, and petitioner is further declared as entitled to her
salary which she failed to receive during the period of her
flawed suspension.6
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to
Intervene and for Reconsideration which the Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution dated September 30,
2004.7 Hence, this petition by the Office of the Ombudsman,
docketed as G.R. No. 165584.
We consolidated G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165584 in our
Resolution dated November 9, 2005. G.R. No. 165731 was
consolidated per Resolution dated June 21, 2006.
The Office of the Ombudsman contends8—
I.
THE x x x COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IGNORED THE CLEAR
LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS NO AUTHORITY TO
DISCIPLINE ERRING MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), THIS
CONSIDERING THAT:
(A) THE TAPIADOR [TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, 379 SCRA 322 (2002)] CASE CITED BY THE
APPELLATE COURT A QUO IS NOT APPLICABLE, AS
THE TAPIADOR OBITER DICTUM CAN NEVER BE CITED
AS A VALID RATIO DECIDENDI;
(B) THE FABELLA [FABELLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 282
SCRA 256 (1997)] CASE, WHICH INVOLVED AN ILLEGAL
CONSTITUTION OF AN INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE IN
THE DECS, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE DISCIPLINARY
31
CASE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PUBLIC
SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND OFFICE CLERK OF THE DECS;
(C) SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA
CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS) HAS NOT
ADDED PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPALS, TEACHERS AND
EMPLOYEES, LIKE HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, TO
THE LIST OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGED CLASSES OF PUBLIC
SERVANTS EXEMPTED FROM THE OMBUDSMAN’S
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE
SUBSEQUENT 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND ANY SUCH
INTERPRETATION SUFFERS FROM THE VICE OF
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY;
(D) THE CONCEDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
JURISDICTION OF THE PETITIONER OMBUDSMAN OVER
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, A PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPAL
AND AN OFFICE CLERK OF THE DECS, WHICH IS FULLY
SUPPORTED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, CANNOT BE SUPPLANTED
BY SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA
CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS); AND
(E) THE POWER OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO DISCIPLINE
PUBLIC SERVANTS NOT EXEMPTED FROM ITS
JURISDICTION AND TO IMPLEMENT ITS JUDGMENTS HAS
BEEN AFFIRMED IN LEDESMA VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. 161629, 29 JULY 2005.9
(F) THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS
CONCURRENT INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY WITH THE DECS OVER PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS, INCLUDING HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENT
MASING, AS THERE IS SIMPLY NO REPUGNANCE
BETWEEN THE LAWS CONFERRING INVESTIGATIVE AND
DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION ON THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN (ART. XI, 1987 CONSTITUTION AND R.A.
6770) AND THE LAWS CONFERRING THE SAME
INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION TO
DECS (R.A. 4670 [MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS] AND P.D. 807, NOW BOOK V OF E.O. 292
[CIVIL SERVICE LAW]).10
II.
CONTRARY TO THE APPELLATE COURT A
QUO’S RULING, THE PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN TIMELY AND RIGHTFULLY FILED ITS
OMNIBUS MOTION TO INTERVENE AND FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WHICH HAS NOT
YET ATTAINED FINALITY.11
The petitioners in G.R. No. 165731 contend—
I.
TAPIADOR V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (379 SCRA
322) CITED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS NOT
APPLICABLE, AS THE TAPIADOR OBITER DICTUM CAN
NEVER BE CITED AS A VALID RATIO DECIDENDI.
MOREOVER, THE TAPIADOR RULING HAS EFFECTIVELY
BEEN ABANDONED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY
OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN SUBSEQUENT CASES EVEN
AS TAPIADOR FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BASES OF
THE OMBUDSMAN’S DISCIPLINARY POWER OVER ALL
APPOINTIVE AND ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES.
II.
TO INSIST THAT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS PURSUANT
TO THE RULING IN FABELLA V. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R.
NO. 110379, 28 NOVEMBER 1997) CAN ONLY BE
PROCEEDED AGAINST ADMINISTRATIVELY THROUGH
THE "COMMITTEE" UNDER SECTION 9 OF R.A. NO. 4670
WOULD BE AN UNDUE, UNWARRANTED AND INVALID
"CLASSIFICATION" BY JUDICIAL FIAT OF A CERTAIN
GROUP OF PUBLIC SERVANTS WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION. MOREOVER, THE SAID LAW DOES NOT
CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE "COMMITTEE."
III.
SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 HAS NOT ADDED
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TO THE LIST OF SPECIAL
PRIVILEGED CLASSES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS EXEMPTED
FROM THE OMBUDSMAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, AND ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION
SUFFERS FROM THE VICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.
IV.
THE CONCEDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY
JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER THE HEREIN
RESPONDENTS, WHICH IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE
1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 AND
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE CANNOT BE SUPPLANTED
BY SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670.
In sum, the pivotal issues are (1) whether the Office of the
Ombudsman may intervene and seek reconsideration of the
adverse decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals, and (2)
whether the Office of the Ombudsman may directly discipline
public school teachers and employees.
First, the procedural issue. The Office of the Ombudsman was
not allowed by the Court of Appeals to intervene because (1)
the motions to intervene were filed after the decisions have
already been rendered in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 58735 and 61993,
and (2) the Office of the Ombudsman was the quasi-judicial
body which rendered the impugned decisions.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a
motion for intervention may be filed before rendition of
judgment, viz:
SECTION 2. Time to intervene.– The motion to intervene
may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by
the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be
32
attached to the motion and served on the original parties.
(emphasis ours)
We have ruled however that allowance or disallowance of a
motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the
court12 after consideration of the appropriate
circumstances.13 Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully
and completely available for justice.14 Its purpose is not to
hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration
of justice.15 Thus, interventions have been allowed even
beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher interest
of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right
to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the
trial court,16 when the petition for review of the judgment was
already submitted for decision before the Supreme
Court,17 and even where the assailed order has already
become final and executory.18 In Lim v. Pacquing,19 the
motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the Philippines
was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury
and to settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by
the parties.
In the cases at bar, the rulings of the Court of Appeals
adversely affected the all-important jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman. The rulings aggrieved the Office of the
Ombudsman for they have serious consequences on its
effectiveness as the body charged by the Constitution with the
prosecution of officials and employees of the government
suspected of violating our laws on graft and corruption.
In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,20 we recognized
the standing of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to appeal
a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed its decision
finding Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism and ordering his dismissal
from the service. Although the CSC was the quasi-judicial body
which rendered the decision appealed to the Court of Appeals,
it became the party aggrieved or adversely affected by its
decision which "seriously prejudices the civil service
system."21 In Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-
Gania,22 we likewise ruled that the CSC may seek a review of
decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its
constitutional mandate as the central personnel agency of the
government.23
However, rather than remand the cases at bar to the Court of
Appeals for a ruling on the merits of the Ombudsman’s motions
for reconsideration, we shall resolve the legal issues involved
in the interest of speedy justice.
The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed
against public officers and employees is explicit in Article XI,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the
people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form
or manner against public officials or employees of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the
complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.
(emphasis ours)
Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the
powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman as follows:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any
act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public
official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any
government-owned or controlled corporation with original
charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or
prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to
furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts and
transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate and report any irregularity
action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and
make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other
powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided
by law.
The enumeration of these powers is non-exclusive.24 Congress
enacted R.A. No. 6770,25 otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, on November 17, 1989 giving the
Office such other powers that it may need to efficiently perform
the task given by the Constitution,26 viz:
Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.- The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and
duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction,
33
it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
the Government, the investigation of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or
employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and
expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent,
and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public officer or employee at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its
disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act;
Provided, That the refusal by any officer without just cause to
comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who
is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty
required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against
said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and
subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of
procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to
contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the
disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report
any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate
action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and
information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities,
and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and
documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by is investigation of the matters
mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when
circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided,
That the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may
determine what cases may not be made public: Provided,
further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be
balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape,
mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the Government, and
make recommendations for their elimination and the
observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry,
including the power to examine and have access to bank
accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court
and under the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or
representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the
effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and
duties herein or hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery
of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after February
25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. x
x x x27
In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on
the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary
authority in accord with the constitutional
deliberations.28 Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the
past the powers of which extend to no more than making
findings of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman
or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who may file and
prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public
officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is
intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws
on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses
committed by public officers and employees. 29 The
Ombudsman is to be an "activist watchman," not merely a
passive one.30 He is vested with broad powers to enable him to
implement his own actions.31
Respondents, however, insist that the findings of the
Ombudsman are mere recommendations, and that he may not
directly impose administrative sanctions on public officials and
employees, citing Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman32 where the following statement is found, viz:
x x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner was
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to
directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service,
more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section
13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public
official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.
The foregoing is now a settled issue. In Ledesma v. Court of
Appeals,33 we explained Tapiador and ruled categorically that:
x x x x Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault,
and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner insists that the word "recommend" be given its literal
meaning; that is, that the Ombudsman’s action is only advisory
in nature rather than one having any binding effect,
citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, thus:
. . . Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to
directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service,
more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section
13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the
Ombudsman can only "recommend" the removal of the public
34
official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official
concerned.
For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the
Ombudsman argue that the word "recommend" must be taken
in conjunction with the phrase "and ensure compliance
therewith." The proper interpretation of the Court’s
statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has
the authority to determine the administrative liability of a
public official or employee at fault, and direct and compel
the head of the office or agency concerned to implement
the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns
the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and
not its jurisdiction.
We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several
reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject
Constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading
of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the
failure of the complainant therein to present substantial
evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The
statement that made reference to the power of the
Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it
is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to
varying interpretations x x x x [h]ence, it cannot be cited
as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe from
judicial examination. (emphases ours)
We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Laja,34 where we emphasized that "the Ombudsman’s order to
remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory
but is actually mandatory."35 Implementation of the order
imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the
proper officer.36 Recently, in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Court of Appeals,37 we also held—
While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman
has the power to "recommend x x x removal, suspension,
demotion x x x" of government officials and employees, the
same Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the
alternative may "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of RA 6770. (emphasis supplied)
Finally, respondent Masing contends that she may be
administratively dealt with only by following the procedure
prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 or the The Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers. She cites Fabella v.
Court of Appeals.38
Section 9, R.A. No. 4670 provides—
Section 9. Administrative Charges.- Administrative charges
against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the
Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least
have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher
belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teachers’
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The Committee
shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director
of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the
hearings; Provided, however, That where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Education.
In Fabella, several public schoolteachers were administratively
charged by then DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño for taking part
in mass actions in violation of civil service laws and
regulations. A committee was constituted to hear the charges.
The teachers assailed the procedure adopted by the committee
in a petition for certiorari filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. In affirming the regional trial court’s decision
which declared illegal the constitution of the committee, we
ruled—
x x x x Section 9 of RA 4670 x x x reflects the legislative intent
to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural
requirements in connection with administrative proceedings
involving public schoolteachers. x x x [R]ight to due process of
law requires compliance with these requirements laid down by
RA 4670.39
Fabella, however, does not apply to the cases at bar. The
public schoolteachers in Fabella were charged with violations
of civil service laws, rules and regulations in administrative
proceedings initiated by the DECS Secretary. In contrast,
herein respondents Masing and Tayactac were administratively
charged in letter-complaints duly filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao. The charges were for violations of
R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
collecting unauthorized fees, failure to remit authorized fees,
failure to account for public funds, oppression, serious
misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and
physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or
vicious habits. In short, the acts and omissions complained of
relate to respondents’ conduct as public official and employee,
if not to outright graft and corruption.
The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations is beyond cavil. 40 As the principal
and primary complaints and action center41 against erring
public officers and employees, it is mandated by no less than
Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution.42 In conjunction
therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the
Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative
complaints,43 viz:
Sec. 19. Administrative complaints.— The
Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but
not limited, to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or
discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an
agency’s functions, though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary
ascertainment of facts;
35
 (5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for
an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of
justification.
Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman shall
be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent
with due process.
It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A.
No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the
DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive
procedure in administrative investigations involving
them.44 R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the
other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in
a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on
November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution
should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier
enactment. The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were
quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act
on complaints against allpublic officials and employees, with
the exception of officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over members of Congress and the
Judiciary.45 If an issue should ever arise, therefore, it should
rather be whether the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770
have abrogated R.A. No. 4670. However, repeals by
implication are not favored, and courts have the duty to
harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently conflicting or
inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement
in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 "reflects the
legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of
procedural requirements in connection with administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers" should be
construed as referring only to the specific procedure to be
followed in administrative investigations conducted by the
DECS.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are GRANTED. The
assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals dated February 27,
2004 and July 31, 2003, as well as its Resolutions dated
September 27, 2004 and September 30, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP
No. 61993 and CA-G.R. SP No. 58735, respectively,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Joint Decision dated
June 30, 2000 of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao in
Administrative Case Nos. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193, OMB-MIN-
ADM-97-249, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253 and OMB-MIN-ADM-97-
254 and its Decision dated December 27, 1999 in OMB-MIN-
ADM-97-282, as well as its orders denying reconsideration,
are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157383 August 10, 2010
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and
General Manager of GSIS, Petitioner, vs. MARIO I. MOLINA
and ALBERT M. VELASCO, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 174137
WINSTON F. GARCIA, in his capacity as President and
General Manager of the Government Service Insurance
System, Petitioner, vs. MARIO I. MOLINA and ALBERT M.
VELASCO, Respondents.
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions filed by
Winston F. Garcia (petitioner) in his capacity as President and
General Manager of the Government Service Insurance
System, or GSIS, against respondents Mario I. Molina (Molina)
and Albert M. Velasco (Velasco). In G.R. No. 157383,
petitioner assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated
January 2, 2003 and Resolution2 dated March 5, 2003 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 73170. In G.R. No. 174137, petitioner assails the
CA Decision3 dated December 7, 2005 and Resolution4 dated
August 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 75973.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:
Respondents Molina and Velasco, both Attorney V of the
GSIS, received two separate Memoranda 5 dated May 23, 2002
from petitioner charging them with grave misconduct.
Specifically, Molina was charged for allegedly committing the
following acts: 1) directly and continuously helping some
alleged disgruntled employees to conduct concerted protest
actions and/or illegal assemblies against the management and
the GSIS President and General Manager; 2) leading the
concerted protest activities held in the morning of May 22,
2002 during office hours within the GSIS compound; and 3)
continuously performing said activities despite warning from his
immediate superiors. 6 In addition to the charge for grave
misconduct for performing the same acts as Molina, Velasco
was accused of performing acts in violation of the Rules on
Office Decorum for leaving his office without informing his
supervisor of his whereabouts; and gross insubordination for
persistently disregarding petitioner’s instructions that Velasco
should report to the petitioner’s office.7 These acts, according
to petitioner, were committed in open betrayal of the
confidential nature of their positions and in outright defiance of
the Rules and Regulations on Public Sector Unionism. In the
same Memoranda, petitioner required respondents to submit
their verified answer within seventy two (72) hours.
Considering the gravity of the charges against them, petitioner
ordered the preventive suspension of respondents for ninety
(90) days without pay, effective immediately.8 The following
day, a committee was constituted to investigate the charges
against respondents.
In their Answer9 dated May 27, 2002, respondents denied the
charges against them. Instead, they averred that petitioner was
motivated by vindictiveness and bad faith in charging them
falsely. They likewise opposed their preventive suspension for
lack of factual and legal basis. They strongly expressed their
opposition to petitioner acting as complainant, prosecutor and
judge.
On May 28, 2002, respondents filed with the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) an Urgent Petition to Lift Preventive
Suspension Order.10 They contended that the acts they
allegedly committed were arbitrarily characterized as grave
misconduct. Consistent with their stand that petitioner could not
act as the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the same time,
36
respondents filed with the CSC a Petition to Transfer
Investigation to This Commission.11
Meanwhile, the GSIS hearing officer directed petitioners to
submit to the jurisdiction of the investigating committee and
required them to appear at the scheduled hearing.12
Despite their urgent motions, the CSC failed to resolve
respondents’ motions to lift preventive suspension order and to
transfer the case from the GSIS to the CSC.
On October 10, 2002, respondents filed with the CA a special
civil action for certiotari and prohibition with prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO).13 The case was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 73170. Respondents sought the annulment
and setting aside of petitioner’s order directing the former to
submit to the jurisdiction of the committee created to hear and
investigate the administrative case filed against them. They
likewise prayed that petitioner (and the committee) be
prohibited from conducting the scheduled hearing and from
taking any action on the aforesaid administrative case against
respondents.
On January 2, 2003, the CA rendered a decision 14 in favor of
respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. Public
respondents are hereby PERPETUALLY RESTRAINED from
hearing and investigating the administrative case against
petitioners, without prejudice to pursuing the same with the
Civil Service Commission or any other agency of government
as may be allowed for (sic) by law.
SO ORDERED.15
The CA treated the petition as one raising an issue of gnawing
fear, and thus agreed with respondents that the investigation
be made not by the GSIS but by the CSC to ensure that the
hearing is conducted before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal.
Aggrieved, petitioner comes before the Court in this petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising
the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PETITIONERS ABUSED THEIR AUTHORITY AND HAVE
BEEN PARTIAL IN REGARD TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS; AND IN
PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE PETITIONERS FROM
HEARING AND INVESTIGATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CASES FILED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS – SOLELY
ON THE BASIS OF THE TOTALLY UNFOUNDED
ALLEGATIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS THAT THE
PETITIONERS ARE PARTIAL AGAINST THEM.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
AND APPLY THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AND THE RULE ON NON
FORUM SHOPPING IN PERPETUALLY RESTRAINING THE
PETITIONERS FROM HEARING AND INVESTIGATING THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO AND COMPLETELY
DISREGARDS APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE AND
WHICH, IN VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT, DOES
NOT CLEARLY STATE THE FACTS AND THE LAW ON
WHICH IT IS BASED.16
In the meantime, on February 27, 2003, the CSC resolved
respondents’ Petition to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension
and Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission
through Resolution No. 03-0278,17 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby rules that:
1. The Urgent Petition to Lift the Order of Preventive
Suspension is hereby DENIED for having become moot and
academic.
2. The Petition to Transfer Investigation to the Commission is
likewise DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, GSIS President
and General Manager Winston F. Garcia is directed to continue
the conduct of the formal investigation of the charges against
respondents-petitioners Albert Velasco and Mario I. Molina.18
As to the lifting of the order of preventive suspension, the CSC
considered the issue moot and academic considering that the
period had lapsed and respondents had been allowed to
resume their specific functions. This notwithstanding, the CSC
opted to discuss the matter by way of obiter dictum. Without
making a definitive conclusion as to the effect thereof in the
case against respondents, the CSC declared that a preliminary
investigation is a pre-requisite condition to the issuance of a
formal charge.19
On the requested transfer of the investigation from the GSIS to
the CSC, the latter denied the same for lack of merit. The
Commission concluded that the fact that the GSIS acted as the
complainant and prosecutor and eventually the judge does not
mean that impartiality in the resolution of the case will no
longer be served.20
Aggrieved, respondents appealed to the CA through a Petition
for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.21The case was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO. 75973.
On December 7, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision22 in favor
of respondents, the dispositive portion of which reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is hereby GRANTED.
The formal charges filed by the President and General
Manager of the GSIS against petitioners, and necessarily, the
37
order of preventive suspension emanating therefrom, are
declared NULL AND VOID. The GSIS is hereby directed to pay
petitioners’ back salaries pertaining to the period during which
they were unlawfully suspended. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.23
The CA declared null and void respondents’ formal charges for
lack of the requisite preliminary investigation. In view thereof,
the CA disagreed with the CSC that the question on the
propriety of the preventive suspension order had become moot
and academic. Rather, it concluded that the same is likewise
void having emanated from the void formal charges.
Consequently, the CA found that respondents were entitled to
back salaries during the time of their illegal preventive
suspension.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WERE FULLY ACCORDED
THE REQUISITE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD, WERE IN
FACT HEARD AND BEING HEARD, AND WHETHER THE
CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IS AN ESSENTIAL
REQUISITE TO THE CONDUCT OF ADJUDICATION.
II.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS WAIVED THEIR RIGHT TO
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION.
III.
WHETHER PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS REQUIRED
IN INDICTMENTS IN FLAGRANTI, AS HERE.
IV.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
LACKED JURISDICTION, AS THE ALLEGED LACK OF
PRELIMNARY INVESTIGATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN
RAISED BEFORE THE GSIS AND, THEREAFTER, BEFORE
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, UNDER THE
PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES; THE GSIS HAVING ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE PERSONS OF THE RESPONDENTS, TO THE
EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS.
V.
WHETHER THE ALLEGED LACK OF PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS A NON-ISSUE.
VI.
WHETHER THE PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION ORDERS
ISSUED AGAINST RESPONDENTS MOLINA AND VELASCO
ARE VALID, WELL-FOUNDED AND DULY RECOGNIZED BY
LAW.
VII.
WHETHER PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION IS A PENALTY
AND, THUS, MAY NOT BE IMPOSED WITHOUT BEING
PRECEDED BY A HEARING.
VIII.
WHETHER THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO
PAYMENT OF BACK SALARIES PERTAINING TO THE
PERIOD OF THEIR PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION.
IX.
WHETHER THE INSTITUTION OF THE RESPONDENTS’
PETITION BEFORE THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
WAS ENTIRELY PREMATURE.
X.
WHETHER THE MISAPPREHENSIONS OF THE
RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THE PARTIALITY OF THE
GSIS COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE CHARGES
AGAINST THEM IS BLATANTLY WITHOUT FACTUAL BASIS.
XI.
WHETHER RESPONDENTS’ OBVIOUS ACT OF FORUM
SHOPPING SHOULD BE COUNTENANCED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT.24
The petitions are without merit.
The civil service encompasses all branches and agencies of
the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) with original charters, like the GSIS, or
those created by special law. As such, the employees are part
of the civil service system and are subject to the law and to the
circulars, rules and regulations issued by the CSC on
discipline, attendance and general terms and conditions of
employment.25 The CSC has jurisdiction to hear and decide
disciplinary cases against erring employees. In addition,
Section 37 (b) of Presidential Decree No. 807 or the Civil
Service Decree of the Philippines also gives the heads of
departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities the authority to investigate and decide
matters involving disciplinary action against officers and
employees under their jurisdiction. As for the GSIS, Section 45,
Republic Act (R.A.) 8291 otherwise known as the GSIS Act of
1997, specifies its disciplining authority, viz:
SECTION 45. Powers and Duties of the President and General
Manager. The President and General Manager of the GSIS
shall among others, execute and administer the policies and
resolutions approved by the Board and direct and supervise
the administration and operations of the GSIS. The President
and General Manager, subject to the approval of the Board,
shall appoint the personnel of the GSIS, remove, suspend or
otherwise discipline them for cause, in accordance with
38
existing Civil Service rules and regulations, and prescribe their
duties and qualifications to the end that only competent
persons may be employed.
By this legal provision, petitioner, as President and General
Manager of GSIS, is vested the authority and responsibility to
remove, suspend or otherwise discipline GSIS personnel for
cause.26
However, despite the authority conferred on him by law, such
power is not without limitations for it must be exercised in
accordance with Civil Service rules. The Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service lays down the
procedure to be observed in issuing a formal charge against an
erring employee, to wit:
First, the complaint. A complaint against a civil service official
or employee shall not be given due course unless it is in writing
and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant. However, in
cases initiated by the proper disciplining authority, the
complaint need not be under oath.27 Except when otherwise
provided for by law, an administrative complaint may be filed at
anytime with the Commission, proper heads of departments,
agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other
instrumentalities.28
Second, the Counter-Affidavit/Comment. Upon receipt of a
complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the
disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to
submit Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three
days from receipt.29
Third, Preliminary Investigation. A Preliminary investigation
involves the ex parte examination of records and documents
submitted by the complainant and the person complained of,
as well as documents readily available from other government
offices. During said investigation, the parties are given the
opportunity to submit affidavits and counter-affidavits. Failure
of the person complained of to submit his counter-affidavit shall
be considered as a waiver thereof.30
Fourth, Investigation Report. Within five (5) days from the
termination of the preliminary investigation, the investigating
officer shall submit the investigation report and the complete
records of the case to the disciplining authority.31
Fifth, Formal Charge. If a prima facie case is established
during the investigation, a formal charge shall be issued by the
disciplining authority. A formal investigation shall follow. In the
absence of a prima facie case, the complaint shall be
dismissed.32
It is undisputed that the Memoranda separately issued to
respondents were the formal charges against them. These
formal charges contained brief statements of material or
relevant facts, a directive to answer the charges within seventy
two (72) hours from receipt thereof, an advice that they had the
right to a formal investigation and a notice that they are entitled
to be assisted by a counsel of their choice.33
It is likewise undisputed that the formal charges were issued
without preliminary or fact-finding investigation. Petitioner
explained that no such investigation was conducted because
the CSC rules did not specifically provide that it is a pre-
requisite to the issuance of a formal charge. He likewise
claimed that preliminary investigation was not required in
indictments in flagranti as in this case.
We disagree.
Indeed, the CSC Rules does not specifically provide that a
formal charge without the requisite preliminary investigation is
null and void. However, as clearly outlined above, upon receipt
of a complaint which is sufficient in form and substance, the
disciplining authority shall require the person complained of to
submit a Counter-Affidavit/Comment under oath within three
days from receipt. The use of the word "shall" quite obviously
indicates that it is mandatory for the disciplining authority to
conduct a preliminary investigation or at least respondent
should be given the opportunity to comment and explain his
side. As can be gleaned from the procedure set forth above,
this is done prior to the issuance of the formal charge and the
comment required therein is different from the answer that may
later be filed by respondents. Contrary to petitioner’s claim, no
exception is provided for in the CSC Rules. Not even an
indictment in flagranti as claimed by petitioner.
This is true even if the complainant is the disciplining authority
himself, as in the present case. To comply with such
requirement, he could have issued a memorandum requiring
respondents to explain why no disciplinary action should be
taken against them instead of immediately issuing formal
charges. With respondents’ comments, petitioner would have
properly evaluated both sides of the controversy before making
a conclusion that there was a prima facie case against
respondents, leading to the issuance of the questioned formal
charges. It is noteworthy that the very acts subject of the
administrative cases stemmed from an event that took place
the day before the formal charges were issued. It appears,
therefore, that the formal charges were issued after the sole
determination by the petitioner as the disciplining authority that
there was a prima facie case against respondents.
To condone this would give the disciplining authority an
unrestricted power to judge by himself the nature of the act
complained of as well as the gravity of the charges. We,
therefore, conclude that respondents were denied due process
of law. Not even the fact that the charges against them are
serious and evidence of their guilt is – in the opinion of their
superior – strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut
undertaken by petitioner which is evident in the record of this
case.34 The filing by petitioner of formal charges against the
respondents without complying with the mandated preliminary
investigation or at least give the respondents the opportunity to
comment violated the latter's right to due process. Hence, the
formal charges are void ab initio and may be assailed directly
or indirectly at anytime.35
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.
The violation of a party's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right
to due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of
that right is void for lack of jurisdiction. This rule is equally true
in quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by the
39
type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) where
he stands to lose the same.36
Although administrative procedural rules are less stringent and
often applied more liberally, administrative proceedings are not
exempt from basic and fundamental procedural principles,
such as the right to due process in investigations and
hearings.37 In particular, due process in administrative
proceedings has been recognized to include the following: (1)
the right to actual or constructive notice to the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a
real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance
of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor,
and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known
to the parties affected.38
Petitioner contends that respondents waived their right to
preliminary investigation as they failed to raise it before the
GSIS.
Again, we do not agree.
It is well-settled that a decision rendered without due process is
void ab initio and may be attacked at anytime directly or
collaterally by means of a separate action, or by resisting such
decision in any action or proceeding where it is
invoked.39 Moreover, while respondents failed to raise before
the GSIS the lack of preliminary investigation, records show
that in their Urgent Motion to Resolve (their Motion to Lift
Preventive Suspension Order) filed with the CSC, respondents
questioned the validity of their preventive suspension and the
formal charges against them for lack of preliminary
investigation.40 There is, thus, no waiver to speak of.
In the procedure adopted by petitioner, respondents were
preventively suspended in the same formal charges issued by
the former without the latter knowing that there were pending
administrative cases against them. It is true that prior notice
and hearing are not required in the issuance of a preventive
suspension order.41 However, considering that respondents
were preventively suspended in the same formal charges that
we now declare null and void, then their preventive suspension
is likewise null and void.1avvphi1
Lastly, the CA committed no reversible error in ordering the
payment of back salaries during the period of respondents’
preventive suspension. As the administrative proceedings
involved in this case are void, no delinquency or misconduct
may be imputed to respondents and the preventive suspension
meted them is baseless. Consequently, respondents should be
awarded their salaries during the period of their unjustified
suspension.42 In granting their back salaries, we are simply
repairing the damage that was unduly caused respondents,
and unless we can turn back the hands of time, we can do so
only by restoring to them that which is physically feasible to do
under the circumstances.43 The principle of "no work, no pay"
does not apply where the employee himself was unlawfully
forced out of job.44
In view of the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to
discuss the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition in G.R. No.
157383 is DENIED while the petition in G.R. No. 174137 is
DISMISSED, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110379 November 28, 1997
HON. ARMAND FABELLA, in his capacity as SECRETARY
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND
SPORTS; John Doe (not his real name), in his capacity as
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DECS-NCR; DR. BIENVENIDO
ICASIANO, in his capacity as the SUPERINTENDENT OF
THE QUEZON CITY SCHOOLS DIVISION; ALMA BELLA O.
BAUTISTA, AURORA C. VALENZUELA and TERESITA V.
DIMAGMALIW, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROSARITO A. SEPTIMO,
ERLINDA B. DE LEON, CLARISSA T. DIMAANO,
WILFREDO N. BACANI, MARINA R. VIVAR, VICTORIA S.
UBALDO, JENNIE L. DOGWE, NORMA L. RONGCALES,
EDITA C. SEPTIMO, TERESITA E. EVANGELISTA,
CATALINA R. FRAGANTE, REBECCA D. BAGDOG,
MARILYNNA C. KU, MARRISA M. SAMSON, HENEDINA B.
CARILLO, NICASIO C. BRAVO, RUTH F. LACANILAO,
MIRASOL C. BALIGOD, FELISA S. VILLACRUEL, MA.
VIOLETA ELIZABETH Y. HERNANDEZ, ANTONIO C.
OCAMPO, ADRIANO S. VALENCIA and ELEUTERIO S.
VARGAS, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Due process of law requires notice and hearing. Hearing, on
the other hand, presupposes a competent and impartial
tribunal. The right to be heard and, ultimately, the right to due
process of law lose meaning in the absence of an independent,
competent and impartial tribunal.
Statement of the Case
This principium is explained by this Court as it resolves this
petition for review on certiorari assailing the May 21, 1993
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R.. SP No. 29107
which affirmed the trial court's decision, 3 as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED and
the appeal is DISMISSED.
The Hon. Armand Fabella is hereby ORDERED substituted as
respondent-appellant in place of former Secretary Isidro Cariño
and henceforth this fact should be reflected in the title of this
case. SO ORDERED.4
The Antecedent Facts
The facts, as found by Respondent Court, are as follows:
On September 17, 1990, then DECS Secretary Cariño issued a
return-to-work order to all public school teachers who had
participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during
the period September 26, 1990 to October 18, 1990. The mass
40
action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month
differentials, clothing allowances and passage of a debt-cap bill
in Congress, among other things.
On October 18, 1990, Secretary Cariño filed administrative
cases against herein petitioner-appellees, who are teachers of
the Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
petitioner-appellees to explain in writing why they should not be
punished for having taken part in the mass action in violation of
civil service laws and regulations, to wit:
1. grave misconduct;
2. gross neglect of duty;
3. gross violation of Civil Service Law and rules on reasonable
office regulations;
4. refusal to perform official duty;
5. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
6. absence without leave (AWOL)
At the same time, Secretary Cariño ordered petitioner-appellee
to be placed under preventive suspension.
The charges were subsequently amended by John Doe (not
his real name)on November 7, 1990 to include the specific
dates when petitioner-appellees allegedly took part in the
strike.
Administrative hearings started on December 20, 1990.
Petitioner-appellees' counsel objected to the procedure
adopted by the committee and demanded that he be furnished
a copy of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the
investigation and imposition of penalties. As he received no
response from the committee, counsel walked out. Later,
however, counsel, was able to obtain a copy of the guidelines.
On April 10, 1991, the teachers filed a an injunctive suit (Civil
Case No. 60675) with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City,
charging the committee appointed by Secretary Cariño with
fraud and deceit and praying that it be stopped from further
investigating them and from rendering any decision in the
administrative case. However, the trial court denied them a
restraining order.
They then amended their complaint and made it one
for certiorari and mandamus. They alleged that the
investigating committee was acting with grave abuse of
discretion because its guidelines for investigation place the
burden of proof on them by requiring them to prove their
innocence instead of requiring Secretary Cariño and his staff to
adduce evidence to prove the charges against the teachers.
On May 30, 1991, petitioner-appellee Adriano S. Valencia of
the Ramon Magsaysay High School filed a motion to intervene,
alleging that he was in the same situation as petitioners since
he had likewise been charged and preventively suspended by
respondent-appellant Cariño for the same grounds as the other
petitioner-appellees and made to shoulder the burden of
proving his innocence under the committee's guidelines. The
trial court granted his motion on June 3, 1991 and allowed him
to intervene.
On June 11, 1991, the Solicitor General answered the
petitioner for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of respondent
DECS Secretary. In the main he contended that, in accordance
with the doctrine of primary resort, the trial court should not
interfere in the administrative proceedings.
The Solicitor General also asked the trial court to reconsider its
order of June 3, 1991, allowing petitioner-appellee Adriano S.
Valencia to intervene in the case.
Meanwhile, the DECS investigating committee rendered a
decision on August 6, 1991, finding the petitioner-appellees
guilty, as charged and ordering their immediate dismissal.
On August 15, 1991, the trial court dismissed the petition
for certiorari and mandamus for lack of merit. Petitioner-
appellees moved for a reconsideration, but their motion was
denied on September 11, 1991.
The teachers then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court which, on February 18, 1992, issued a
resolution en banc declaring void the trial court's order of
dismissal and reinstating petitioner-appellees' action, even as it
ordered the latter's reinstatement pending decision of their
case.
Accordingly, on March 25, 1992, the trial court set the case for
hearing. June 8, 1992, it issued a pre-trial order which reads:
As prayed for by Solicitor Bernard Hernandez, let this case be
set for pre-trial conference on June 17, 1992 at 1:30 p.m., so
as to expedite the proceedings hereof. In which case, DECS
Secretary Isidro Cariño, as the principal respondent, is hereby
ordered to PERSONALLY APPEAR before this Court on said
date and time, with a warning that should he fail to show up on
said date, the Court will declare him as IN DEFAULT. Stated
otherwise, for the said Pre-Trial Conference, the Court will not
recognize any representative of his.
By agreement of the parties, the trial conference was reset on
June 26, 1992. However, Secretary Cariño failed to appear in
court on the date set. It was explained that he had to attend a
conference in Maragondon, Cavite. Instead, he was
represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other
respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili. But the
court just the same declared them as in default. The Solicitor
General moved for a reconsideration, reiterating that Cariño
could not personally come on June 26, 1992 because of prior
commitment in Cavite. It was pointed out that Cariño was
represented by Atty. Reno Capinpin, while the other
respondents were represented by Atty. Jocelyn Pili, both of the
DECS-NCR and that both had special powers of attorney. But
the Solicitor General's motion for reconsideration was denied
by the trial court. In its order of July 15, 1992, the court stated:
The "Motion For Reconsideration" dated July 3, 1992 filed by
the respondents thru counsel, is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. It appears too obvious that respondents simply did not
want to comply with the lawful orders of the Court.
The respondents having lost their standing in Court, the
"Manifestation and Motion," dated July 3, 1992 filed by the
Office of the Solicitor General is hereby DENIED due course.
SO ORDERED.
41
On July 3, 1992, the Solicitor General informed the trial court
that Cariño had ceased to be DECS Secretary and asked for
his substitution. But the court failed to act on his motion.
The hearing of the case was thereafter conducted ex parte with
only the teachers allowed to present their evidence.
On August 10, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision, in
which it stated:
The Court is in full accord with petitioners' contention that Rep.
Act No. 4670 otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers" is the primary law that governs the conduct
of investigation in administrative cases filed against public
school teachers, with Pres. Decree No. 807 as its
supplemental law. Respondents erred in believing and
contending that Rep. Act No. 4670 has already been
superseded by the applicable provisions of Pres. Decree No.
807 and Exec. Order No. 292. Under the Rules of Statutory
Construction, a special law, Rep. Act. No. 4670 in the case at
bar, is not regarded as having been replaced by a general law,
Pres. Decree No. 807, unless the intent to repeal or alter the
same is manifest. A perusal of Pres. Decree No. 807 reveals
no such intention exists, hence, Rep. Act No. 4670 stands. In
the event that there is conflict between a special and a general
law, the former shall prevail since it evidences the legislator's
intent more clearly than that of the general statute and must be
taken as an exception to the General Act. The provision of
Rep. Act No. 4670 therefore prevails over Pres. Decree No.
807 in the composition and selection of the members of the
investigating committee. Consequently, the committee tasked
to investigate the charges filed against petitioners was illegally
constituted, their composition and appointment being violative
of Sec. 9 of Rep. Act No. 4670 hence all acts done by said
body possess no legal color whatsoever.
Anent petitioners' claim that their dismissal was effected
without any formal investigation, the Court, after consideration
of the circumstances surrounding the case, finds such claim
meritorious. Although it cannot be gain said that respondents
have a cause of action against the petitioner, the same is not
sufficient reason to detract from the necessity of basic fair play.
The manner of dismissal of the teachers is tainted with
illegality. It is a dismissal without due process. While there was
a semblance of investigation conducted by the respondents
their intention to dismiss petitioners was already manifest when
it adopted a procedure provided for by law, by shifting the
burden of proof to the petitioners, knowing fully well that the
teachers would boycott the proceedings thereby giving them
cause to render judgment ex-parte.
The DISMISSAL therefore of the teachers is not justified, it
being arbitrary and violative of the teacher's right to due
process. Due process must be observed in dismissing the
teachers because it affects not only their position but also their
means of livelihood.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby GRANTED and all the questioned orders/decisions of
the respondents are hereby declared NULL and VOID and are
hereby SET ASIDE.
The reinstatement of the petitioners to their former positions
without loss of seniority and promotional rights is hereby
ORDERED.
The payment, if any, of all the petitioners' back salaries,
allowances, bonuses, and other benefits and emoluments
which may have accrued to them during the entire period of
their preventive suspension and/or dismissal from the service
is hereby likewise ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.5
From this adverse decision of the trial court; former DECS
Secretary Isidro Cariño filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals raising the following grounds:
I. The trial court seriously erred in declaring appellants as in
default.
II. The trial court seriously erred in not ordering the proper
substitution of parties.
III. The trial court seriously erred in holding that R.A. No. 4670,
otherwise known as "Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers", should govern the conduct of the investigation
conducted.
IV. The trial court seriously erred in ruling that the dismissal of
the teachers are without due process. 6
As mentioned earlier, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC
decision, holding in the main that private respondents were
denied due process in the administrative proceedings instituted
against them.
Hence, this petition for review.7
The Issues
Before us, petitioners raise the following issues:
I
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding in effect that private respondents
were denied due process of law.
II
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals seriously erred
and committed grave abuse of discretion in applying strictly the
provision of R.A. No. 4670 in the composition of the
investigating committee.
III
Whether or not Respondent Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal and in affirming
the trial court's decision. 8
42
These issues, all closely related, boil down to a single
question: whether private respondents were denied due
process of law.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit. We agree with the Court of
Appeals that private respondents were denied due process of
law.
Denial of Due Process
At the outset, we must stress that we are tasked only to
determine whether or not due process of law was observed in
the administrative proceedings against herein private
respondents. We note the Solicitor General's extensive
disquisition that government employees do not have the right
to strike. 9 On this point, the Court, in the case of Bangalisan
vs. Court of Appeals, 10 has recently pronounced, through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado:
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the
public service may not engage in strikes. While the Constitution
recognizes the right of government employees to organize,
they are prohibited from staging strikes, demonstrations mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will
result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services.
The right of government employees to organize is limited only
to the formation of unions or associations, without including the
right to strike.
More recently, in Jacinto vs. Court of Appeals, 11 the Court
explained the schoolteachers' right to peaceful assembly vis-a-
vis their right to mass protest:
Moreover, the petitioners here, except Merlinda Jacinto, were
not penalized for the exercise of their right to assemble
peacefully and to petition the government for a redress of
grievances. Rather, the Civil Service Commission found them
guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
for having absented themselves without proper authority, from
their schools during regular school days, in order to participate
in the mass protest, their absence ineluctably resulting in the
non-holding of classes and in the deprivation of students of
education, for which they were responsible. Had petitioners
availed themselves of their free time — recess, after classes,
weekends or holidays — to dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds of law,
no one — not the DECS, the CSC or even this Court — could
have held them liable for the valid exercise of their
constitutionally guaranteed rights. As it was, the temporary
stoppage of classes resulting from their activity necessarily
disrupted public services, the very evil sought to be forestalled
by the prohibition against strikes by government workers. Their
act by its nature was enjoined by the Civil Service
law, rules and regulations, for which they must, therefore, be
made answerable. 12
In the present case, however, the issue is not whether the
private respondents engaged in any prohibited activity which
may warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanctions against
them as a result of administrative proceedings. As already
observed, the resolution of this case revolves around the
question of due process of law, not on the right of government
workers to strike. The issue is not whether private respondents
may be punished for engaging in a prohibited action but
whether, in the course of the investigation of the alleged
proscribed activity, their right to due process has been violated.
In short, before they can be investigated and meted out any
penalty, due process must first be observed.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been
recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or
constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may
affect a respondent's legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be
heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so
constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a
reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties
affected. 13
The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the
Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, which specifically
covers administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that
the committee to hear public schoolteachers' administrative
cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the
division as chairman, a representative of the local or any
existing provincial or national teachers' organization and a
supervisor of the division. The pertinent provisions of RA 4670
read:
Sec. 8. Safeguards in Disciplinary Procedure. — Every teacher
shall enjoy equitable safeguards at each stage of any
disciplinary procedure and shall have:
a: the right to be informed, in writing, of the charges;
b. the right to full access to the evidence in the case;
c. the right to defend himself and to be defended by a
representative of his choice and/or by his organization,
adequate time being given to the teacher for the preparation of
his defense; and
d. the right to appeal to clearly designated authorities. No
publicity shall be given to any disciplinary action being taken
against a teacher during the pendency of his case.
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. — Administrative charges
against teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the
Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least
have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher
belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee
shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director
of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the
hearings: Provided, however, That where the school
superintended is the complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Education.
43
The foregoing provisions implement the Declaration of Policy of
the statute; that is, to promote the "terms of employment and
career prospects" of schoolteachers.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS
to hear the administrative charges against private respondents
did not include "a representative of the local or, in its absence,
any existing provincial or national teacher's organization" as
required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these
committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction.
Thus, all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily
void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension or
dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a
representative of a teachers' organization in these committees
was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to
the right to be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence
of procedural due process is embodied in the basic
requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. 14
Petitioners argue that the DECS complied with Section 9 of RA
4670, because "all the teachers who were members of the
various committees are members of either the Quezon City
Secondary Teachers Federation or the Quezon City
Elementary Teachers Federation" 15 and are deemed to be the
representatives of a teachers' organization as required by
Section 9 of RA 4670.
We disagree. Mere membership of said teachers in their
respective teachers' organizations does not ipso factomake
them authorized representatives of such organizations as
contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this section, the
teachers' organization possesses the right to indicate its choice
of representative to be included by the DECS in the
investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be
usurped by the secretary of education or the director of public
schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is no
dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as
members of its investigating committee was ever designated or
authorized by a teachers' organization as its representative in
said committee.
Contrary to petitioners' asseverations, 16 RA 4670 is applicable
to this case. It has not been expressly repealed by the general
law PD 807, which was enacted later, nor has it been shown to
be inconsistent with the latter. It is a fundamental rule of
statutory construction that "repeals by implication are not favor.
An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly
and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are so
clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-
exist. This is based on the rationale that the will of the
legislature cannot be overturned by the judicial function of
construction and interpretation. Courts cannot take the place of
Congress in repealing statutes. Their function is to try to
harmonize, as much as possible, seeming conflicts in the laws
and resolve doubts in favor of their validity and co-
existence." 17 Thus, a subsequent general law does not repeal
a prior special law, "unless the intent to repeal or alter is
manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad
enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." 18
The aforementioned Section 9 of RA 4670, therefore, reflects
the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set
of procedural requirements in connection with administrative
proceedings involving public schoolteachers. Clearly, private
respondents' right to due process of law requires compliance
with these requirements laid down by RA 4670. Verba legis
non est recedendum.
Hence, Respondent Court of Appeals, through Mr. Justice
Vicente V. Mendoza who is now a member of this Court,
perceptively and correctly stated:
Respondent-appellants argue that the Magna Carta has been
superseded by the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) and
that pursuant to the latter law the head of a department, like
the DECS secretary, or a regional director, like the respondent-
appellant John Doe (not his real name), can file administrative
charges against a subordinate, investigate him and take
disciplinary action against him if warranted by his findings.
Respondent-appellants cite in support of their argument the
following provisions of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807).
Sec. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. —
xxx xxx xxx
b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities. .
. shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees
under their jurisdiction. . . .
Sec. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-
Presidential Appointees. —
a) Administrative Proceedings may be commenced against a
subordinate officer or the employee by the head of department
or officer of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or
chiefs of agencies, or regional directors, or upon sworn, written
complaint of any other persons.
There is really no repugnance between the Civil Service
Decree and the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.
Although the Civil Service Decree gives the head of
department or the regional director jurisdiction to investigate
and decide disciplinary matters, the fact is that such power is
exercised through committees. In cases involving public school
teachers, the Magna Carta provides that the committee be
constituted as follows:
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. — Administrative charges
against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the
Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least
have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher
belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher's
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee
shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director
of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the
hearings: Provided, however, that where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Education.
Indeed, in the case at bar, neither the DECS [s]ecretary nor the
DECS-NCR regional director personally conducted the
44
investigation but entrusted it to a committee composed of a
division supervisor, secondly and elementary school teachers,
and consultants. But there was no representative of a teachers
organization. This is a serious flaw in the composition of the
committee because the provision for the representation of a
teachers organization is intended by law for the protection of
the rights of teachers facing administrative charges.
There is thus nothing in the Magna Carta that is in any way
inconsistent with the Civil Service Decree insofar as
procedures for investigation is concerned. To the contrary, the
Civil Service Decree, [S]ec. 38(b) affirms the Magna Carta by
providing that the respondent in an administrative case may
ask for a "formal investigation," which was what the teachers
did in this case by questioning the absence of a representative
of a teachers organization in the investigating committee.
The administrative committee considered the teachers to have
waived their right to a hearing after the latter's counsel walked
out of the preliminary hearing. The committee should not have
made such a ruling because the walk out was staged in protest
against the procedures of the committee and its refusal to give
the teachers' counsel a copy of the guidelines. The committee
concluded its investigation and ordered the dismissal of the
teachers without giving the teachers the right to full access of
the evidence against them and the opportunity to defend
themselves. Its predisposition to find petitioner-appellees guilty
of the charges was in fact noted by the Supreme Court when in
its resolution in G.R. No. 101943 (Rosario Septimo v. Judge
Martin Villarama, Jr.) it stated:
The facts and issues in this case are similar to the facts and
issues in Hon. Isidro Cariño, et al. v. Hon. Carlos C. Ofilada, et
al. G.R. No. 100206, August 22, 1961.
As in the Cariño v. Ofilada case, the officials of the Department
of Culture and Education are predisposed to summarily hold
the petitioners guilty of the charges against them. In fact, in this
case Secretary Cariño, without awaiting formal administrative
procedures and on the basis of reports and "implied
admissions" found the petitioners guilty as charged and
dismissed them from the service in separate decisions dated
May 16, 1997 and August 6, 1991. The teachers went to court.
The Court dismissed the case. 19
Furthermore, this Court sees no valid reason to disregard the
factual findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals. It is
not our function "to assess and evaluate all over again the
evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the parties
particularly where, such as here, the findings of both the trial
court and the appellate court coincide." 20
It is as clear as day to us that the Court of Appeals committed
to reversible error in affirming the trial court's decision setting
aside the questioned orders of petitioners; and ordering the
unqualified reinstatement of private respondents and the
payment of them of salaries, allowances, bonuses and other
benefits
that accrued to their benefit during the entire duration of their
suspension or dismissal. 21 Because the administrative
proceedings involved in this case are void, no delinquency or
misconduct may be imputed to private respondents. Moreover,
the suspension or dismissal meted on them is baseless.
Private respondents should, as a consequence, be
reinstated 22 and awarded all monetary benefits that may have
accrued to them during the period of their unjustified
suspension or dismissal. 23 This Court will never countenance
a denial of the fundamental right to due process, which is a
cornerstone of our legal system.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED for its utter failure to show any reversible error on the
part of the Court of Appeals. The assailed Decision is thus
AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 180146 December 18, 2008
PO2 RUEL C. MONTOYA, petitioner, vs. POLICE DIRECTOR
REYNALDO P. VARILLA, REGIONAL DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, POLICE OFFICE and ATTY.
RUFINO JEFFREY L. MANERE, REGIONAL LEGAL
AFFAIRS SERVICE, respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court seeking to nullify and set aside the
Decision1 dated 9 August 2007 and Resolution2 dated 18
October 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
96022, which affirmed Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-
1500 dated 24 August 2005 and 23 August 2006, respectively,
of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), dismissing petitioner
Police Officer 2 (PO2) Ruel C. Montoya from the police service.
The following are the factual antecedents:
Montoya, a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP),
was assigned to the Central Police District (CPD) in Quezon
City, when the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
issued Special Order No. 10443 on 9 September 1998
dropping him from the rolls, effective 15 August 1998, for
failure to attend the Law Enforcement and Enhancement
Course (LEEC) at the Special Training Unit, National Capital
Region Police Office (NCRPO), Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig
City. Montoya had been absent without official leave (AWOL)
for a period of 67 days, from 23 January 1998 to 31 March
1998.
On 15 December 1998, four months after he was dropped from
the rolls, Montoya filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof
addressed to the PNP Regional Director for the National
Capital Region (NCR), explaining that on 22 January 1998, he
went to the Baler Police Station/Police Station 2 to have his
Sick Leave Form approved by the station commander.
Allegedly due to the fact that his name had already been
forwarded to the NCRPO for the LEEC, his Sick Leave Form
was not approved. Montoya averred that his failure to attend
the LEEC was beyond his control, since he was suffering from
arthritis with on and off symptoms of severe body pain.
Montoya attached to his Motion a certification simply dated
1998, issued by a certain Dr. Jesus G. de Guzman, and
authenticated by Police Chief Inspector (P/CINSP.) Ethel Y.
Tesoro, Chief, Medical Service, CPD.
Upon the recommendation of the Chief of the NCRPO Legal
Division, the NCR Regional Director issued on 11 June 1999
Special Order No. 990 canceling Special Order No. 1044.
45
Montoya was also preventively suspended for 30 days, from 8
June to 8 July 1999, pending Summary Proceedings of his
administrative liability. The 67 days when Montoya went on
absence without leave (AWOL) were immediately deducted
from his leave credits.
The Summary Dismissal Proceedings against Montoya were
conducted by Hearing Officer Police Superintendent (P/Supt.)
Francisco Don C. Montenegro of the Central Police District
Office (CPDO), and based on his findings, the NCR Regional
Director rendered a Decision4 on 23 June 2000 dismissing
Montoya from the police service for Serious Neglect of Duty
(due to AWOL), effective immediately. Montoya received a
copy of said Decision on 20 July 2000.
Allegedly unassisted by counsel, Montoya filed on 1 August
2000 with the CPD office a Petition for Review/Motion for
Reconsideration5 of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR
Regional Director, which he addressed to the PNP Chief. In a
Memorandum issued on 3 July 2002 by the Directorate for
Personnel and Records Management of the PNP
Headquarters, Montoya’s Petition/Motion was denied for lack of
jurisdiction, since a disciplinary action involving demotion or
dismissal from service imposed by a PNP regional director may
only be appealed to the Regional Appellate Board (RAB).
Montoya next filed on 2 September 2002 an appeal of the 23
June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director before the
RAB of the National Capital Region (RAB-NCR), alleging lack
of due process considering that he was not even notified of any
hearing by the Summary Hearing Officer and was thus
deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in his defense.
The Summary Hearing Officer in the Summary Dismissal
Proceedings against him recommended his dismissal from
police service based on his failure to report for the LEEC,
without even looking into his side of the controversy.
On 11 December 2002, the RAB-NCR rendered its
Decision6 granting Montoya’s appeal and ordering his
reinstatement. Pertinent provisions of the said Decision read:
The Summary Hearing Officer (SHO), P/Supt. Francisco Don
Montenegro, conducted the hearing ex-parte on the basis only
of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the [herein petitioner
Montoya] in which he categorically stated that on January 22,
1998, when he went to Police Station 2 to have his sick leave
form approved, he was informed that his name was already
forwarded to NCRPO to undergo LEEC schooling. With that
information, the SHO concluded that appellant, PO2 Montoya,
should have proceeded to STU, NCRPO to inform his superior
about his physical predicament. However, [Montoya] did
nothing to have the officers of STU, NCRPO notified of his
sickness in order that appropriate actions can be instituted.
Sixty-seven days is too long for a period for [Montoya] to allow
even one day of reporting to STU, NCRPO to present his
Medical Certificate and seek proper action for his ailment.
Thus, [Montoya] was ordered dismissed from the Police
Service.
xxxx
This Board, after careful review and evaluation of the records
and arguments/evidence presented by herein [Montoya] finds
this appeal meritorious and tenable. Nothing on the records
would show that [Montoya] was notified of the summary
hearing conducted by the Summary Hearing Officer nor was he
given a chance to explain his side and submit controverting
evidence on his behalf. On the other hand, what appeared on
the record is the fact that the Summary Hearing Officer, who
was tasked to resolve this case, conducted the hearing ex-
parte. Thereafter, he recommended for the [Montoya’s]
dismissal from the police service on the ground that the latter
failed to inform his superiors about his physical predicament
since [Montoya] did nothing to have the officers of STU,
NCRPO notified of his sickness in order that appropriate
actions can be instituted. Summary Hearing Officer further
concluded that sixty-seven days is too long for a period (sic) for
[Montoya] to allow even one day of reporting to STU, NCRPO
to present his Medical Certificate and seek proper action for his
ailment.
The RAB-NCR decreed in the end:
Wherefore, premises considered, the decision appealed from is
hereby reversed and movant-appellant PO2 Ruel Catud
Montoya is hereby ordered to be reinstated in the police
service without loss of seniority rights and with full payment of
his salaries and backwages covering the period effective from
the time of his dismissal from the service up to his
reinstatement.7
Thereafter, the NCR Regional Director authorized Police
Senior Superintendent (P/SSupt.) Rufino Jeffrey L. Manere
(Manere) to appeal several RAB-NCR decisions involving
different police officers,8 including the Decision dated 11
December 2002 on Montoya’s case, before the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG). The NCR Regional
Director assailed the RAB-NCR decision reinstating Montoya in
the police service on the following grounds:
a. Failure to file a Notice of Appeal with the NCRPO prior to his
appeal to the Appellate Board, as provided by Sec. 2, Rule III,
MC # 91-007;
b. The Board erred to take cognizance of the case despite the
fact that the decision of the NCRPO dated 23 June 2000 had
already become final and executory.
c. The Board erred in giving backwages despite the "no work,
no pay" policy.
On 8 August 2003, Montoya, together with the other police
personnel9 reinstated in the service by RAB-NCR (hereinafter
collectively referred to as Montoya, et al.), filed before the DILG
an Urgent Motion to Dismiss and/or Opposition to the Appeal of
the NCR Regional Director.
On 10 November 2003, DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr.
issued an Order denying the appeal of the NCR Regional
Director.10 DILG Secretary Lina noted that the NCR Regional
Director received a copy of the RAB-NCR decision on
Montoya’s case on 10 February 2003, but it only appealed the
same to the DILG on 30 April 2003, beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for appeals. DILG Secretary Lina also
declared that neither Manere nor the NCR Regional Director
has personality to appeal the RAB-NCR decision to the DILG.
The right to appeal from the decision of the RAB to the DILG is
available only to the active complainant or the respondent who
46
was imposed a penalty of demotion in rank, forced resignation,
or dismissal from the service. Manere, representing the NCR
Regional Director, is not a party complainant or a respondent
aggrieved by the adverse decision, hence, he cannot appeal
the said decision. Similarly, there is no specific provision
allowing the NCR Regional Director, in his capacity as the
judge and/or arbiter of PNP disciplinary cases, to file an appeal
to the DILG from the decision of the RAB. Finally, DILG
Secretary Lina explained that the filing of an appeal by "either
party" under Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975 11 covers only
demotion and dismissal from the service and never
exoneration and suspension. Thus, the appeal of the RAB-
NCR decision exonerating Montoya should be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction and for the reason that the said decision had
already become final and executory. The dispositive portion of
DILG Secretary Lina’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeals are hereby denied for lack
of merit. The assailed decisions of the Regional Appellate
Board – National Capital Region, 4th Division, are hereby
affirmed in toto.12
The NCR Regional Director, represented by Manere, appealed
the Order dated 10 November 2003 of DILG Secretary Lina to
the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The NCR Regional
Director asserted its right to appeal citing Civil Service
Commission v. Dacoycoy.13
On 23 March 2004, the NCR Regional Director issued Special
Order No. 611 reinstating Montoya, et al., without prejudice to
the pending appeal of the NCR Regional Director before the
CSC.
Subsequently, the CSC issued on 24 August 2005 Resolution
No. 05-1200 which recognized the right of the PNP disciplining
authorities to appeal the decision of the RAB-NCR to the DILG.
The CSC set aside the 10 November 2003 Order of DILG
Secretary Lina and affirmed the decisions of the NCR Regional
Director dismissing Montoya, et al., from police service.
According to the CSC, Montoya, in particular, was guilty of
laches and abandonment of his position. It also held that the 11
December 2002 Decision of the RAB-NCR on Montoya’s case,
affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, was based on mere affidavits
which were not substantiated.
The CSC denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Montoya, et
al., in Resolution No. 06-1500 dated 23 August 2006 for lack of
new evidence or any valid reason that warrants the setting
aside or modification of its Resolution No. 05-1200.
Montoya, et al., sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 43 with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 96022.
On 9 August 2007, the Court of Appeals promulgated its
Decision dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, since there was
no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CSC in issuing
Resolutions No. 05-1200 and No. 06-1500. The dispositive
portion of said Decision states:
Wherefore this Court DENIES the instant petition and
AFFIRMS Resolution No. 05-1200 dated August 24, 2005 and
Resolution No. 06-1500 dated August 23, 2006 of the Civil
Service Commission. Accordingly, the Order dated November
10, 2003 of the DILG Secretary Jose D. Lina, Jr. affirming the
nine (9) decisions of the Regional Appellate Board reinstating
[Montoya, et al.] to the police service is SET ASIDE. The
decisions of the NCRPO Regional Director dismissing
petitioners-police officers Enrique C. Paulino, Rebecca P.
Fernandez, Donato L. Geda, Marlo S. Quiambao, Danilo De
Leon Nuqui, Ruel C. Montoya, Cecilia Z. de Leon, Alberto S.
Mendoza and Rodolfo C. de Leon are hereby AFFIRMED.14
Aggrieved, Montoya filed his own Motion for Reconsideration in
CA-G.R. SP No. 96022, but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals in its Resolution dated 18 October 2007.
Hence, the present Petition15 in which Montoya raises the
following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT MANERE FAILED TO
EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES.
II. WHETHER OR NOT MANERE HAS THE LEGAL
PERSONALITY TO APPEAL THE DECISION EXONERATING
THE PETITIONER.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF
PETITIONER WAS VIOLATED.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DELAYED IN
APPEALING THE DECISION SUMMARILY DISMISSING HIM.
V. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER DESERVED TO BE
DISMISSED FROM SERVICE.
The Court finds merit in the Petition at bar.
Though procedural rules in administrative proceedings are less
stringent and often applied more liberally, administrative
proceedings are not exempt from basic and fundamental
procedural principles, such as the right to due process in
investigations and hearings. The right to substantive and
procedural due process is applicable to administrative
proceedings.16
Well-settled is the rule that the essence of due process is
simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s
side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.17 Unarguably, this rule, as it is stated,
strips down administrative due process to its most fundamental
nature and sufficiently justifies freeing administrative
proceedings from the rigidity of procedural requirements. In
particular, however, due process in administrative proceedings
has also been recognized to include the following: (1) the right
to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings
which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and
to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration
47
during the hearing or contained in the records or made known
to the parties affected.18
Hence, even if administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
powers are not strictly bound by procedural requirements, they
are still bound by law and equity to observe the fundamental
requirements of due process. Notice to enable the other party
to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality
or a trivial matter in any administrative or judicial
proceedings.19 In the application of the principle of due
process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.20
In the instant case, the Summary Dismissal Proceedings
against Montoya were flawed from the very beginning when
these were conducted without due notice to him. The NCR
Regional Director, through Manere, never contested the fact
that the Hearing Officer proceeded with his investigation
without giving notice to Montoya. Without notice, Montoya was
unable to attend the hearings, present written or oral
arguments, and submit evidence in his favor; he was
completely deprived of the opportunity to be heard on the
administrative charges against him and was irrefragably denied
due process.
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted from their jurisdiction.
The violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right
of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of
that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.21 The rule must be
equally true for quasi-judicial administrative bodies, for the
constitutional guarantee that no man shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process is unqualified by what
type of proceedings (whether judicial or administrative) he
stands to lose the same. Consequently, the Decision dated 23
June 2000 of the NCR Regional Director dismissing Montoya
from service is void for having been rendered in violation of the
latter’s due process.
The foregoing finding of this Court precludes a ruling that
Montoya delayed appealing the NCR Regional Director’s
Decision of 23 June 2000, and the said decision has already
become final and executory.
The Court reviews the vital dates. Montoya was able to receive
a copy of the 23 June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional
Director dismissing him from service on 20 July 2000. He
erroneously filed his Petition for Review/Motion for
Reconsideration with the PNP Chief on 1 August 2000. The
PNP denied Montoya’s Petition/Motion on 3 July 2002, two
years after the filing thereof, citing lack of jurisdiction,
considering that the proper appellate body is the RAB-NCR.
Thus, Montoya was only able to file his appeal of the decision
of the NCR Regional Director before the RAB-NCR on 2
September 2002.
Section 45 of Republic Act No. 6975, otherwise known as the
DILG Act of 1990, provides:
SEC. 45. Finality of Disciplinary Action. – The disciplinary
action imposed upon a member of the PNP shall be final and
executory: Provided, That a disciplinary action imposed by the
Regional Director or by the PLEB involving demotion or
dismissal from the service may be appealed to the Regional
Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt of the
copy of the notice of decision: Provided, further, That the
disciplinary action imposed by the Chief of the PNP involving
demotion or dismissal may be appealed to the National
Appellate Board within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof: Provided, furthermore, That, the Regional or National
Appellate Board, as the case may be, shall decide the appeal
within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of
appeal: Provided, finally, That failure of the Regional Appellate
Board to act on the appeal within said period shall render the
decision final and executory without prejudice, however, to the
filing of an appeal by either party with the Secretary.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Obviously, Montoya’s appeal on 2 September 2002 with the
RAB-NCR, the appellate body with jurisdiction, was filed way
beyond 10 days from his receipt of a copy of the NCR Regional
Director’s decision on 20 July 2000.
As a general rule, the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory
but also jurisdictional, and the failure to perfect the appeal
renders the judgment of the court final and executory.22 The
Court, however, reiterates its previous pronouncements herein
that the Summary Dismissal Proceedings were conducted
without notice to Montoya and in violation of his right to due
process. The violation of Montoya’s fundamental constitutional
right deprived the NCR Regional Director of jurisdiction over
Montoya’s administrative case; and the decision rendered by
the NCR Regional Director therein was void. A void judgment
does not become final and executory and may be challenged
at any time.
A decision of the court (or, in this case, a quasi-judicial
administrative body) without jurisdiction is null and void; hence,
it can never logically become final and executory. Such a
judgment may be attacked directly or collaterally. 23Any
judgment or decision rendered notwithstanding the violation of
due process may be regarded as a "lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever it
exhibits its head."24
The Court also observes that it took the PNP two years to deny
Montoya’s Petition/Motion before it, even though the PNP Chief
manifestly did not have jurisdiction over the same. While
Montoya did err in first filing his appeal with the PNP Chief, the
prompt denial thereof would have spurred Montoya to re-file his
appeal sooner before the appropriate forum, the RAB-NCR.
As to the issue of whether the NCR Regional Director may
appeal the Decisions dated 11 December 2002 and 10
November 2003 of the RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina,
respectively, the Court answers in the negative.
Prior to Dacoycoy, case law held that dismissal of the charges
against or exoneration of respondents in administrative
disciplinary proceedings is final and not subject to appeal even
by the government. On 29 April 1999, the Court promulgated
its Decision in Dacoycoy, in which it made the following
pronouncements:
48
At this point, we have necessarily to resolve the question of the
party adversely affected who may take an appeal from an
adverse decision of the appellate court in an administrative civil
service disciplinary case. There is no question that respondent
Dacoycoy may appeal to the Court of Appeals from the
decision of the Civil Service Commission adverse to him. He
was the respondent official meted out the penalty of dismissal
from the service. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the court
required the petitioner therein, herein respondent Dacoycoy, to
implead the Civil Service Commission as public respondent as
the government agency tasked with the duty to enforce the
constitutional and statutory provisions on the civil service.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the Civil Service Commission and held respondent not guilty of
nepotism. Who now may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court? Certainly not the respondent,
who was declared not guilty of the charge. Nor the complainant
George P. Suan, who was merely a witness for the
government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission
has become the party adversely affected by such ruling,
which seriously prejudices the civil service system.
Hence, as an aggrieved party, it may appeal the decision
of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. By this
ruling, we now expressly abandon and overrule extant
jurisprudence that "the phrase ‘party adversely affected by the
decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action
which may take the form of suspension, demotion in rank or
salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office" and not
included are "cases where the penalty imposed is suspension
for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty days salary" or "when the respondent is
exonerated of the charges, there is no occasion for appeal." In
other words, we overrule prior decisions holding that the
Civil Service Law "does not contemplate a review of
decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges" enunciated in Paredes v. Civil
Service Commission; Mendez v. Civil Service Commission;
Magpale v. Civil Service Commission; Navarro v. Civil Service
Commission and Export Processing Zone Authority and more
recently Del Castillo v. Civil Service Commission.25 (Emphasis
ours.)
Subsequently, the Court qualified its declarations in Dacoycoy.
In National Appellate Board of the National Police Commission
v. Mamauag,26 citing Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,27 this
Court elucidated that:
RA 6975 itself does not authorize a private complainant to
appeal a decision of the disciplining authority. Sections 43 and
45 of RA 6975 authorize "either party" to appeal in the
instances that the law allows appeal. One party is the PNP
member-respondent when the disciplining authority
imposes the penalty of demotion or dismissal from the
service. The other party is the government when the
disciplining authority imposes the penalty of demotion but
the government believes that dismissal from the services
is the proper penalty.
However, the government party that can appeal is not the
disciplining authority or tribunal which previously heard
the case and imposed the penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service. The government party
appealing must be one that is prosecuting the
administrative case against the respondent. Otherwise, an
anomalous situation will result where the disciplining authority
or tribunal hearing the case, instead of being impartial and
detached, becomes an active participant in prosecuting the
respondent. Thus, in Mathay, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, decided
after Dacoycoy, the Court declared:
To be sure, when the resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission were brought before the Court of Appeals, the
Civil Service Commission was included only as a nominal
party. As a quasi-judicial body, the Civil Service Commission
can be likened to a judge who should "detach himself from
cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for
review."
In instituting G.R. No. 126354, the Civil Service Commission
dangerously departed from its role as adjudicator and became
an advocate. Its mandated function is to "hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or
on appeal, including contested appointments and to review
decisions and actions of its offices and agencies," not to
litigate.
While Dacoycoy established that the government could appeal
the decision exonerating respondent public officer or employee
from administrative charges, it was Mamauag which
specifically required that the government party appealing must
be the one prosecuting the case and not the disciplining
authority or tribunal which heard the administrative case.
In the present case, Montoya appealed to the RAB-NCR the 23
June 2000 Decision of the NCR Regional Director dismissing
him from service. The RAB-NCR, in its 11 December 2002
Decision, reversed the appealed decision of the NCR Regional
Director and ordered Montoya’s reinstatement. The NCR
Regional Director then appealed the decision of the RAB-NCR
to the Office of the DILG Secretary. DILG Secretary Lina, in his
Decision dated 10 November 2003, affirmed the decision of the
RAB-NCR. Once more, the NCR Regional Director filed an
appeal with the CSC, where he was able to secure a favorable
ruling.
It is beyond dispute that the NCR Regional Director was acting
as the investigating and disciplining authority when he
rendered his Decision dated 23 June 2000 dismissing Montoya
from the service. The pronouncement in Mamauag, that the
disciplining authority or tribunal which heard the case and
imposed the penalty of demotion or dismissal should not be the
one appealing the subsequent exoneration of the public officer
or employee, squarely applies to the NCR Regional Director.
In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group,28 the Court explained:
It is a well-known doctrine that a judge should detach himself
from cases where his decision is appealed to a higher court for
review. The raison d'etre for such doctrine is the fact that a
judge is not an active combatant in such proceeding and must
leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions
and the appellate court to decide the issues without his active
participation. When a judge actively participates in the appeal
of his judgment, he, in a way, ceases to be judicial and has
become adversarial instead.
49
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and
impartial, not only when hearing and resolving the case before
it, but even when its judgment is brought on appeal before a
higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasi-
judicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who
must settle the controversies between parties in accordance
with the evidence and the applicable laws, regulations, and/or
jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and
completely state his findings of fact and law. There must be no
more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is
appealed before appellate courts. When the court judge or the
quasi-judicial officer intervenes as a party in the appealed
case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality,
and his interest in the case becomes personal since his
objective now is no longer only to settle the controversy
between the original parties (which he had already
accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more
significantly, to refute the appellant’s assignment of errors,
defend his judgment, and prevent it from being overturned on
appeal.
The NCR Regional Director, in actively appealing the reversal
of his Decision, had inevitably forsaken his impartiality and had
become adversarial. His interest was only in seeing to it that
his decision would be reinstated.
The party who has the personality and interest to appeal the
decisions of the RAB-NCR and DILG Secretary Lina
exonerating Montoya from the administrative charges against
him and reinstating him to the service is the PNP as a bureau.
It was the PNP, in the exercise of its authority to implement
internal discipline among its members, which instigated the
administrative investigation of Montoya, so it may be deemed
the prosecuting government party. And it is the PNP which
stands to suffer as a result of the purportedly wrongful
exoneration of Montoya, since it would be compelled to take
back to its fold a delinquent member.
Given all of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the
RAB-NCR, affirmed by DILG Secretary Lina, reinstating
Montoya to the service. It was only the RAB-NCR which
properly acquired jurisdiction over the appeal filed before it and
was able to render a decision after a consideration of both
sides to the controversy. In Go v. National Police
Commission,29 the Court already issued a caveat, worth
reiterating herein:
We conclude that petitioner was denied the due process of law
and that not even the fact that the charge against him is
serious and evidence of his guilt is – in the opinion of his
superiors – strong can compensate for the procedural shortcut
evident in the record of this case. It is precisely in cases such
as this that the utmost care be exercised lest in the drive to
clean up the ranks of the police those who are innocent are
denied justice or, through blunder, those who are guilty are
allowed to escape punishment.
Before finally writing finis to this case, the Court still finds it
necessary to address the remaining issue on the supposed
failure of the NCR Regional Director to exhaust administrative
remedies. Montoya argues that the NCR Regional Director
failed to exhaust administrative remedies when he appealed
the 10 November 2003 Decision of DILG Secretary Lina
directly to the CSC, without first filing an appeal with the Office
of the President.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it
is a pre-condition that he should have availed himself of all the
means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a
remedy within the administrative machinery can still be
resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his
jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before
court’s judicial power can be sought.30 The administrative
agency concerned is in the best position to correct any
previous error committed in its forum.31
Montoya’s reliance on the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is misplaced, for said doctrine does
not find application in the instant case. The doctrine intends to
preclude premature resort from a quasi-judicial administrative
body to the court. Such is not the situation in this case.
Montoya is questioning the supposed premature resort of the
NCR Regional Director from the decision of the DILG
Secretary to the CSC, instead of to the Office of the
President; obviously, he is challenging the resort from one
administrative body to another.
Furthermore, Montoya’s assertion that DILG Secretary Lina’s
decision should have first been appealed to the Office of the
President before the CSC is baseless.
PNP personnel fall under the administrative control and
supervision of the DILG,32 which, in turn, is under the
administrative control and supervision of the CSC.
In Mendoza v. NAPOLCOM,33 the Court settled that the one
and only Philippine police force, the PNP, shall be civilian in
character34 and, consequently, falls under the civil service
pursuant to Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution, which
states:
Section 2. (1). The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters.
It is already explicitly provided in Section 45 of the DILG Act of
1990 that the decision of the Regional Director imposing upon
a PNP member the administrative penalty of demotion or
dismissal from the service is appealable to the RAB. From the
RAB Decision, the aggrieved party may then appeal to the
DILG Secretary.
Now the question is, from the DILG Secretary, where can the
aggrieved party appeal?
In the event the DILG Secretary renders an unfavorable
decision, his decision may be appealed to the CSC.35
Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. – The Civil Service
Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to
all personnel of the Department [DILG].
Consequently, case law on administrative disciplinary
proceedings under the Civil Service Law also applies to
50
administrative disciplinary proceedings against PNP members.
The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act
of 1990 is Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code
of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof
provides, inter alia, that in cases where the decision rendered
by a bureau or office (i.e., RAB of the PNP) is appealable to
the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to
the department (i.e., DILG) and finally to the Commission
(i.e., CSC).36
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated 9
August 2007 and Resolution dated 18 October 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96022
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Philippine National
Police is ORDERED to reinstate petitioner PO2 Ruel C.
Montoya to the police service without loss of seniority rights
and with full payment of his salaries and backwages covering
the period effective from the time of his dismissal from the
service up to his reinstatement. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139794 February 27, 2002
MARTIN S. EMIN, petitioner, vs.
CHAIRMAN CORAZON ALMA G. DE LEON,
COMMISSIONERS THELMA P. GAMINDE and RAMON P.
ERENETA, JR., of the CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision dated October 30, 1998
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 46549, affirming
Civil Service Commission Resolution Nos. 96-3342 and 97-
4049 finding petitioner Martin Emin, guilty of dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and dismissing him from the service as Non-Formal
Education (NFE) Supervisor of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports (DECS), Kidapawan, Cotabato.
The facts are as follows:
Sometime in the year 1991, appointment papers for a change
of status from provisional to permanent under Republic Act No.
6850 of teachers were submitted to the Civil Service Field
Office-Cotabato at Amas, Kidapawan, Cotabato. Attached to
these appointment papers were photocopies of certificates of
eligibility of the teachers.
Director Gantungan U. Kamed noticed that the certificates of
eligibility were of doubtful authenticity. He called the Head Civil
Service Field Officer. While the certificates seemed to be
authentic, the signature of Civil Service Commission Director
Elmer R. Bartolata and the initials of the processors of said
certificates were clearly forgeries. Director Kamed initially
forwarded five (5) appointments to Civil Service Regional
Office No. XII for verification of their R.A. 6850 eligibilities and
for appropriate action through an indorsement letter dated
September 26, 1991. The appointment papers of the same
nature subsequently submitted to the Field Office were likewise
forwarded to the CSRO No. XII.
Upon verification of the records of CSRO No. XII, it was found
that said applications for civil service eligibility under R.A. 6850
were disapproved. However, the certificates of eligibility they
submitted were genuine as their control number belonged to
the batch issued to CSRO No. XII by the CSC Central Office.
But the records showed that these certificates were never
issued to any one.
Two separate investigations1 were conducted by Director
Cesar P. Buenaflor of Regional Office No. 12 of the Civil
Service Commission in Cotabato City: (1) on how the R.A.
6850 certificates were issued/released from the Office, and (2)
on how the teachers got said certificates. The teachers
concerned were asked to report to the Office and bring the
original copies of their certificates of eligibility. On several
dates, the teachers appeared and gave their sworn statements
pointing to petitioner as the person who gave them the R.A.
6850 certificates of eligibility they had attached to their
appointments for a fee. Upon finding a prima facie case,
petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave
misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service.2
In his sworn letter dated April 8, 1992 to the CSC Regional
Director, petitioner denied the accusation.3 He filed a motion to
dismiss, dated June 5, 1992,4 but the motion was denied on
July 8, 1992.
During the hearing, the six teachers cited in the charge sheet,
namely: Eufrocina Sicam, Ma. Elisa Sarce, Lilia Millondaga,
Merla Entiero, Lourdes Limbaga and Florida P. Alforjas were
presented as witnesses for the prosecution. Felixberta Ocho
and Araceli G. Delgado who were also holders of fake
certificates of eligibility were likewise presented as witnesses.
Alforjas and Delgado identified petitioner and a certain Teddy
Cruz as the persons who facilitated their applications for R.A.
6850 eligibility. The other witnesses corroborated Alforjas’ and
Delgado’s testimonies. They all identified petitioner as the
person who helped them obtain the fake certificates of
eligibility.
On June 29, 1994, Director Buenaflor submitted a report5 to the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission. The CSC found
that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of
petitioner. On May 14, 1996, the Civil Service Commission in
its resolution decreed:
WHEREFORE, Martin S. Emin is hereby found guilty of Grave
Misconduct. Accordingly, the penalty of dismissal from the
service including all its accessory penalties is imposed upon
him.6
Not satisfied with the abovecited resolution, the petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration,7 but it was denied.
On January 16, 1998, petitioner elevated the case to the Court
of Appeals, but it was dismissed for failure to comply with
Section 5, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8
However, the CA granted petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration9 and time to amend his petition.10 In his
amended petition, he raised before the CA the twin issues of
51
(1) whether the CSC had original jurisdiction over the
administrative cases against the public school teachers; and
(2) whether petitioner was accorded due process. 11
Finding the petition unmeritorious, the appellate court ruled on
the appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition (appeal) is
DISMISSED, hereby affirming public respondents’ assailed
appealed resolutions (Resolution No. 963342, dated May
14,1996; and Resolution No. 974049, dated October 14, 1997).
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner is now before us raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION HAS
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
AGAINST PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS.
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT
ACCORDED HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT GROUND TO
DISMISS THE PETITIONER FROM SERVICE.
IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN NOT ADMITTING THE NEWLY DISCOVERED
EVIDENCE.13
Notwithstanding petitioner’s formulation, we find that the issues
to be resolved are: (1) whether or not the CSC has original
jurisdiction over the present case; and (2) whether or not
petitioner was accorded due process.
Petitioner avers that as a teacher, original jurisdiction over the
administrative case against him is lodged with a committee and
not with the CSC, as provided for by Republic Act 4670
otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Public School
Teacher," specifically, Section 9 thereof, which provides:
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges.- Administrative charges
against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the
Division or a duly authorized representative who should at least
have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher
belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local, or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools within thirty days
from the termination of the hearings: Provided, however, That
where the school superintendent is the complainant or an
interested party, all the members of the committee shall be
appointed by the Secretary of Education.
For public respondent CSC, the Office of the Solicitor General
maintains that original jurisdiction over the present case is with
the CSC pursuant to the Constitution and P.D. 807 (Civil
Service Law) which provide that the civil service embraces
every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations whether performing governmental or proprietary
function.
We find merit in petitioner’s contention that R.A. 4670 is good
law and is applicable to this case. R.A. 4670 has not been
expressly repealed by the general law P.D. 807, nor has R.A.
4670 been shown to be inconsistent with the presidential
decree.14 Section 2 thereof specified those who are covered by
the term "teacher" as follows:
SEC. 2. Title – Definition. - This Act shall be known as the
"Magna Carta for Public School Teachers" and shall apply to
all public school teachers except those in the professorial staff
of state colleges and universities.
As used in this Act, the term "teacher" shall mean all persons
engaged in classroom teaching, in any level of instruction, on
full-time basis, including guidance counselors, school
librarians, industrial arts or vocational instructors, and all other
persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions
in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the
Government or its political subdivisions; but shall not include
school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other
school employees.
Petitioner is the Non-Formal Education Supervisor of the
DECS, in Kidapawan, Cotabato, in-charge of the out-of-school
programs.15 The 1993 Bureau of Non-formal Education
Manual16 outlines the functions of a NFE Division Supervisor
which include, "…(5) implementation of externally assisted
NFE programs and projects; (6) monitoring and evaluation of
NFE programs and projects… (8) supervision of the
implementation of NFE programs/projects at the grassroots
level."17 Clearly, petitioner falls under the category of "all other
persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions
in all schools, colleges and universities operated by the
government or its political subdivisions."
Under Section 2 of R.A. 4670, the exclusions in the coverage
of the term "teachers" are limited to: (1) public school teachers
in the professorial staff of state colleges and universities; and
(2) school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other
school employees under the category of "medical and dental
personnel". Under the principle of ejusdem generis, general
words following an enumeration of persons or things, by words
of a particular and specific meaning, are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those
specifically mentioned.18 Too, the enumeration of persons
excluded from the coverage of the term "teachers" is restricted,
limited and exclusive to the two groups as abovementioned.
Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may
not by interpretation or construction be extended to other
matters.19 Exclusio unios est inclusio alterius. Had Congress
intended to exclude an NFE Division Supervisor from the
coverage of R.A. 4670, it could have easily done so by clear
and concise language.
As petitioner is covered by R.A. 4670, it is the Investigating
Committee that should have investigated his case conformably
with Section 9 of R.A. 4670, now being implemented by
52
Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS Order No. 33, S. 1999,
otherwise known as the DECS Rules of Procedure.20
However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the
public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on
procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches,
petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction
over his case.
But we must stress that nothing herein should be deemed as
overriding the provision in the Magna Carta for Teachers on
the jurisdiction of the Committee to investigate public school
teachers as such, and the observance of due process in
administrative proceedings involving them, nor modifying prior
decided cases of teachers on the observance of the said
Magna Carta such as Fabella vs. Court of Appeals.21
Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service
Commission had afforded petitioner sufficient opportunity to be
heard and defend himself against charges of participation in
faking civil service eligibilities of certain teachers for a fee. Not
only did he answer the charges before the CSC Regional
Office but he participated in the hearings of the charges
against him to the extent that we are left with no doubt that his
participation in its proceedings was willful and voluntary.
As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars them
from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse
decision is rendered against them.22 In the case at bar,
petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time
in his amended petition for review23 before the CA. He did not
raise this matter in his Motion to Dismiss 24 filed before the CSC
Regional Office. Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, he himself
invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission by stating that he
was "open to further investigation by the CSC to bring light to
the matter"25 and by further praying for "any remedy or
judgment which under the premises are just and equitable." 26 It
is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the
proceedings, submitting his case for decision, and then
accepting the judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for
lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.27
Equally unmeritorious is petitioner’s contention that he was
denied due process. He avers that he was not allowed cross-
examination. It is well to remember that in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense.28
Nothing on record shows he asked for cross-examination as
most of the submissions were written. In our view, petitioner
cannot argue that he has been deprived of due process merely
because no cross-examination took place. The rule is well
established that due process is satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of
the controversy or given opportunity to move for a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 29 In the
present case, the record clearly shows that petitioner not only
filed his Counter-Affidavit30 during the preliminary investigation,
and later his Motion to Dismiss.31 He also filed a Motion for
Reconsideration32 of the October 19, 1993 Order of the
Commission. The essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.33
Neither is there merit in petitioner’s assertion that he was
denied the right to due process when the CSC Regional Office,
according to him, acted as investigator, prosecutor, judge and
executioner. He laments that Director Buenaflor who formally
filed the charge nominally was also the hearing officer, and that
prosecutor Atty. Anabelle Rosell was also the one who
submitted the recommendation to the CSC for the dismissal of
petitioner. Recall, however, that it was ultimately the Civil
Service Chairman who promulgated the decision. The report
submitted by Atty. Rosell based on the hearing where Director
Buenaflor sat as hearing officer, was merely recommendatory
in character to the Civil Service Commission itself. Such
procedure is not unusual in an administrative
proceeding.1âwphi1
Petitioner claims that there was no valid case to dismiss him as
Director Elmer Bartolata was not presented to ascertain the
alleged forged signature contained in the questioned
certificates of eligibility. The Court of Appeals and the Civil
Service Commission made a finding on this fact of forgery. It is
not this Court’s function now to evaluate factual questions all
over again. This is particularly true in this case, where the
Commission and the appellate court agree on the facts.34
Lastly, petitioner contends that the affidavit of Teodorico
Cruz35 should have been admitted as newly discovered
evidence. Petitioner raised this issue for the first time on
appeal, when he filed his Motion for New Trial and to Admit
Newly Discovered Evidence before the CA. For a particular
piece of evidence to be regarded as "newly discovered" for
purposes of a new trial, it is essential that the offering party had
exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate such
evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to
secure it. The OSG36 observed that despite the knowledge of
the importance of Mr. Cruz’s testimony on the matter, petitioner
did not ask for a subpoena duces tecum to obtain said "newly
discovered evidence." Neither did petitioner, on his own,
secure said affidavit or testimony during the proceedings to
support his cause. We note too, that the said affidavit attempts
to exonerate the petitioner and Cruz and points to someone
else ("Jing") as the culprit, leaving the impression that the idea
of the affidavit was a mere afterthought, a last ditch effort to
clear petitioner’s name. Thus, we are not persuaded by
petitioner’s claim of newly discovered evidence, for it appears
to us as a dilatory contrivance for petitioner’s benefit.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by
the Court of Appeals and the respondent officials of the CSC,
the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated
October 30, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No.
46549 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 156063 November 18, 2003
MELECIO ALCALA, PERLA ALCALA, ROQUE BORINAGA,
DIOSDADA BORINAGA, HELEN LENDIO, and MARY
BABETH MAGNO, petitioners, vs. JOVENCIO
VILLAR, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
53
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the July 31, 2002
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57391
which nullified and set aside the June 22, 1999 Resolution of
the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-VIS-ADM-98-0103, as
well as the Resolution2 dated October 25, 2002 denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent Jovencio D. Villar is the School Principal of Lanao
National High School, Pilar, Cebu City. In February 1998,
Rolando Torceno and petitioners, Melecio Alcala, Perla Alcala,
Roque Borinaga, Helen Lendio, Emma Labaniego and Mary
Babeth Mano, all teachers of Lanao National High School, as
well as Asterio Villarante and petitioner Diosdada Borinaga,
teachers of Dapdap National High School, Pilar, Dapdap, Cebu
City (herein collectively referred to as complainants), filed with
the Office of the Ombudsman an administrative complaint
against respondent for dishonesty.3
Complainants alleged that on August 18-22, 1997, they
attended a mass training/seminar at the Consolacion National
High School, Consolacion, Cebu. Respondent asked them to
submit their respective Certificates of Appearance for the
preparation of the vouchers for the refund of their expenses
during the said training/seminar. Thereafter, they received from
respondent the following amounts as refund:
1. Perla Alcala - P280.00
2. Roque Borinaga - 310.00
3. Mary Babeth Magno - 160.00
4. Emma Labaniego - 130.00
5. Asterio Villarante - 130.00
6. Melecio Alcala - 280.00
7. Diosdado Borinaga - 310.00
8. Rolando Torceno - 130.00
9. Helen Lendio - 130.004
Upon verification with the Department of Education Culture and
Sports (DECS) Division Office, complainants discovered that
each of them were issued checks in the amount of P312.00 as
reimbursement, and that respondent received the same by
forging their signature.
Complainants further alleged that sometime in November
1997, Melecio Alcala, Diosdada Borinaga, Helen Lendio, and
Rolando Torceno received from respondent P1,500.00 each
representing Loyalty Benefits. They learned, however, from the
DECS Division Office that they were entitled to receive
P2,000.00 each.5
Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that he was in fact
authorized by the complainants to claim and encash their
checks at the E and E Lending Investors where most of them
have existing loans. He contended that their school is located
in the rural area where no banks are operating, such that it has
been the practice of teachers to authorize the principal to
claim, receive and encash the checks in their behalf. He
explained that complainants did not receive the entire amount
of P312.00 because they authorized the E and E Lending
Investors to deduct certain amounts from their checks as
payment for their respective loans.6 As for the Loyalty Benefits,
respondent alleged that complainants received the entire
amount due them and that he deducted nothing therefrom. 7 He
asserted that the real reason behind the filing of the complaint
was to force him to resign so that one of the complainants
could apply for his post.8
On June 22, 1999, the Office of the Ombudsman issued a
resolution finding respondent guilty of dishonesty and
dismissing him from service. The dispositive portion thereof
reads:
WHEREORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent is meted the
penalty of DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE WITH FORFEITURE
OF ALL BENEFITS AND DISQUALIFICATION TO HOLD
PUBLIC OFFICE.
SO RESOLVED.9
A motion for reconsideration was filed by respondent; however,
the same was denied on October 13, 1999.10
On appeal, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that
the latter was without jurisdiction over administrative
complaints against public school teachers. It ruled that the
governing law is Republic Act No. 4670, otherwise known as
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, and not Republic
Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989. Thus –
WHEREFORE, the Ombudsman’s Resolution dated June 22,
1999 and Order dated October 13, 1999 are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, without prejudice to the
ventilation of the charges against respondent-appellant before
the proper forum.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied on October
25, 2002.12
Hence, the instant petition.
Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides
that the Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and
agencies, including members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries except over officials who may be removed by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.13 However, in Fabella v. Court of Appeals,14 it was
held that R.A. No. 4670, the Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers, specifically covers and governs administrative
proceedings involving public school teachers. Section 9 of said
law expressly provides that –
54
Sec. 9. Administrative Charges. – Administrative charges
against a teacher shall be heard initially by a committee
composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the
Division or a duly authorized representative who would at least
have the rank of a division supervisor, where the teacher
belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its
absence, any existing provincial or national teacher’s
organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The committee
shall submit its findings, and recommendations to the Director
of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the
hearings: Provided, however, that where the school
superintendent is the complainant or an interested party, all the
members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary
of Education.
The foregoing provision implements the Declaration of Policy of
the statute, that is, to promote the "terms of employment and
career prospects" of schoolteachers.
Likewise, in Emin v. De Leon,15 the Court ruled that although
under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law), the civil
service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and
instrumentality of the government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations whether performing
governmental or proprietary function, the Civil Service
Commission does not have original jurisdiction over an
administrative case against a public school teacher. It was
stressed therein that jurisdiction over administrative cases of
public school teachers is lodged with the Investigating
Committee created pursuant to Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670,
now being implemented by Section 2, Chapter VII of DECS
Order No. 33, S. 1999, otherwise known as the DECS Rules of
Procedure.16
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals erred
when it nullified the proceedings before the Office of the
Ombudsman. Indeed, the question of jurisdiction may be
tackled motu proprio on appeal even if none of the parties
raised the same.17 This rule, however, is not absolute. In Emin
v. De Leon,18 a public school teacher was administratively
charged with and found guilty of dishonesty under P.D. No. 807
(Civil Service Law). The Supreme Court ruled that R.A. No.
4670, the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, is the
applicable law and that the Civil Service Commission does not
have jurisdiction over the administrative case. Nevertheless,
the Court affirmed the dismissal from service of the public
school teacher as the latter was found to have been sufficiently
afforded due process.1awp++i1 It was held that what is crucial
is that the respondent be given sufficient opportunity to be
heard and defend himself. Thus –
However, at this late hour, the proceedings conducted by the
public respondent CSC can no longer be nullified on
procedural grounds. Under the principle of estoppel by laches,
petitioner is now barred from impugning the CSC’s jurisdiction
over his case.
But we must stress that nothing herein should be deemed as
overriding the provision in the Magna Carta for Teachers on
the jurisdiction of the Committee to investigate public school
teachers as such, and the observance of due process in
administrative proceedings involving them, nor modifying prior
decided cases of teachers on the observance of the said
Magna Carta such as Fabella vs. Court of Appeals.
Here what is crucial, in our view, is that the Civil Service
Commission had afforded petitioner sufficient opportunity to be
heard and defend himself against charges of participation in
faking civil service eligibilities of certain teachers for a fee. Not
only did he answer the charges before the CSC Regional
Office but he participated in the hearings of the charges
against him to the extent that we are left with no doubt that his
participation in its proceedings was willful and voluntary.
As held previously, participation by parties in the administrative
proceedings without raising any objection thereto bars them
from raising any jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse
decision is rendered against them. In the case at bar, petitioner
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for the first time in his
amended petition for review before the CA. He did not raise
this matter in his Motion to Dismiss filed before the CSC
Regional Office. Notably, in his Counter-Affidavit, he himself
invoked the jurisdiction of the Commission by stating that he
was "open to further investigation by the CSC to bring light to
the matter" and by further praying for "any remedy or judgment
which under the premises are just and equitable." It is an
undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings,
submitting his case for decision, and then accepting the
judgment only if favorable, but attacking it for lack of
jurisdiction, when adverse.19
In the case at bar, respondent was amply afforded due process
in an administrative proceeding, the essence of which is an
opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.20 Not only
did respondent file a counter-affidavit and a motion for
reconsideration, he also participated in the hearings conducted
by the Office of the Ombudsman and was given the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses against him. Verily,
participation in the administrative proceedings without raising
any objection thereto amounts to a waiver of jurisdictional
infirmities.21
In the same vein, respondent in this case should be barred
under the principle of estoppel by laches from assailing the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. Therefore, the Court of
Appeals should have resolved the appeal on its merits,
considering that respondent’s right to procedural due process
was properly observed.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the July 31, 2002
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 57391
which nullified the Resolution dated June 22, 1999 and Order
dated October 13, 1999 of the Office of the Ombudsman, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to
the Court of Appeals for determination of the appeal on its
merits. SO ORDERED.
55
G.R. No. 153155 September 30, 2005
MANUEL D. LAXINA, SR., Petitioners, vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, EVANGELINE URSAL,
HON. JOSE E. LINA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of
the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),
and HON. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as
City Mayor of Quezon City, Respondent.
Tinga, J.:
The instant petition seeks the review of the 24 April
2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66412, affirming the 2 July 2001 Memorandum Order2 and
the 1 August 2001 Order3 of the Office of the Ombudsman in
OMB-ADM-00-0350,4 imposing upon petitioner the penalty of
dismissal from office with forfeiture of material benefits
pursuant to Sec. 25(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770.5
Petitioner Manuel D. Laxina, Sr. was Barangay Chairman of
Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City. On 15 December 1998,
Evangeline Ursal ("Ursal"), Barangay Clerk of Batasan Hills,
Quezon City, filed with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) a complaint for attempted rape against petitioner.
Petitioner was subsequently charged with sexual harassment
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.6
On 13 March 2000, Ursal brought before the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG) a complaint-affidavit
charging petitioner with grave misconduct for the alleged
attempted rape. However, the DILG referred the complaint to
the Quezon City Council ("City Council")for appropriate action.
Said complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. 00-13 before
the City Council.7
Thereafter, on 30 March 2000, Ursal filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman a similar complaint-affidavit charging petitioner
with grave misconduct, docketed as OMB ADM Case No. 0-00-
0350.8 Petitioner filed his counter-affidavit and attached thereto
the affidavits of two witnesses. On 15 August 2000, the
Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman exonerated petitioner from the charge, dismissing
the complaint for lack of substantial evidence. 9 However, on 2
July 2001, upon review, and with the approval of the
Ombudsman, petitioner was found guilty of grave misconduct
and meted the penalty of dismissal, with forfeiture of material
benefits, per its Memorandum Order.10
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the adjudication, alleging
lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman, but the
motion was denied.11
Meanwhile, Ursal asked the City Council to waive its
jurisdiction in favor of the Ombudsman. 12 The City Council
merely noted Ursal’s motion.13
On 20 August 2001, the AAB issued an order directing Quezon
City Mayor Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. to implement the 2 July
2001 Memorandum Order and to submit a compliance
report.14 Mayor Belmonte issued an implementing order,
notifying petitioner of his dismissal from service and enjoining
him to cease and desist from performing his duties as
barangay captain.15
Petitioner sought the review of the
Ombudsman’s Memorandum Order before the CA, arguing
that: (i) the Office of the Ombudsman did not have jurisdiction
over the administrative complaint; (ii) Ursal’s filing of the same
administrative case before the Office of the Ombudsman and
the City Council through the DILG warranted the dismissal of
both cases; and (iii) petitioner was denied due process in the
proceedings before the Ombudsman.16
In its Decision promulgated on 24 April 2002, the CA dismissed
the petition for lack of merit. According to the CA, petitioner
participated in the proceedings before the Ombudsman and
questioned the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction for the first time only
in his motion for reconsideration, or after the Ombudsman had
found him guilty of grave misconduct. Thus, he is estopped
from impugning the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman over the
case.17 The CA found the Ombudsman’s assumption of
jurisdiction justified since it became aware of the earlier case
before the City Council only when petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration.18 In addition, the CA stated that the
Ombudsman was justified in not dismissing the administrative
cases as a penalty for forum-shopping because petitioner and
Ursal are in pari delicto.19 Neither was petitioner deprived of
administrative due process since he was allowed to present
evidence and said evidence were passed upon by the
Ombudsman, the CA added.20
Before this Court, petitioner seeks the dismissal of the
administrative charge against him anchored on the following
assignment of errors:
I. THE PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR OF LAW IN REFUSING TO DISMISS THE CASES
AGAINST PETITIONER ON THE GROUND OF "FORUM
SHOPPING" AND MISAPPLYING INSTEAD THE PRINCIPLE
OF ESTOPPEL.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT REFUSED TO PREVENT PUBLIC
RESPONDENTS FROM PREMATURELY IMPLEMENTING
THE MEMORANDUM ORDER DISMISSING PETITIONER – A
DULY ELECTED OFFICIAL – DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE ORDER IS NOT YET FINAL AND EXECUTORY
CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THE
SUPREME COURT IN "LAPID VS. COURT OF APPEALS",
329 SCRA 771.
III. THE RESPONDENTS AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN VIOLATING THE
RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS IN DECREEING
HIS DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER WITHOUT SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE AND WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE EVIDENCE
OF PETITIONER.21
Petitioner likewise seeks the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
public respondents from implementing the Order of the
Ombudsman and to reinstate him to the position of Barangay
Chairman of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City.
Petitioner claims that estoppel cannot apply to him because he
never invoked the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, much less
sought affirmative relief therefrom.22 Arguing that he has no
obligation to disclose the fact that there is another identical
56
case pending before another forum since he is not the one who
instituted the identical cases,23 he reiterates the rule that when
two or more courts have concurrent jurisdiction, the first to
validly acquire jurisdiction takes it to the exclusion of the other
or the rest.24
On the second assignment of error, petitioner claims that he is
entitled to the injunctive relief as prayed for in his petition
before the CA. He asserts that Adm. Order No. 7, as amended
by Adm. Order No. 14-A of the Office of the Ombudsman,
decreeing that all administrative orders, directives and
decisions rendered by the said office are immediately
executory notwithstanding the perfection of an appeal unless a
temporary restraining order shall have first been secured, is
contrary to the expressed mandate of R.A. No. 6770.
Moreover, citing the case of Lapid v. Court of
Appeals,25 petitioner claims that an appeal if timely filed stays
the immediate implementation of a decision, and that the fact
that the Ombudsman Act has given the parties the right to
appeal should carry with it the stay of said decision pending
appeal.26
Lastly, petitioner maintains that he was deprived of
administrative due process when the Ombudsman refused to
consider his evidence and rendered a decision that is not
supported by substantial evidence.27 Questioning the findings
of fact made by the Ombudsman, claiming that these were
"speculations, surmises, probabilities, half-truths and other
unfounded/unsupported hearsay evidence," 28 petitioner
invokes the principles employed in a prosecution for the crime
of rape29 and points out that the Ombudsman did not adhere to
these principles.30
In his Comment,31 Mayor Belmonte substantially reiterates the
findings and reasoning of the CA Decision. He notes that the
injunctive reliefs prayed for by petitioner are improper as he
had already issued an implementing order dismissing petitioner
from service, and another person has been sworn into office as
Barangay Chairman of Brgy. Batasan Hills, Quezon City.32
Meanwhile, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), while advancing the same
reasoning as the appellate court’s additionally argues that the
City Council’s assumption of jurisdiction over the case will not
deprive the Ombudsman of its constitutional mandate to give
justice to the victims of oppressive acts of public officials and to
protect the citizenry from illegal acts or omissions of any
government official.33 Even assuming that there was forum-
shopping, petitioner is estopped from questioning the technical
defect.34 Besides, technical rules of procedure should be
applied with liberality, and at any rate, in administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not
strictly applied, the OSG emphasizes.35
The petition must be denied.
At the onset, it must be stressed that the rule on forum-
shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings,36 and
not to administrative cases. Petitioner has not cited any rule or
circular on forum-shopping issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman or that of the City Council. In fact, it was only on
15 September 2003 that the Ombudsman, in Administrative
Order No.17, S. 2003, required that a Certificate of Non-Forum
Shopping be attached to the written complaint against a public
official or employee. Supreme Court Administrative Circulars
Nos. 04-94 and 28-9137adverted to by petitioner mention only
initiatory pleadings in a court of law when another case is
pending before other tribunals or agencies of the government
as the pleadings to which the rule on forum-shopping applies,
thus:
The complaint and other initiatory pleadings referred to and
subject of this Circular are the original civil complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.) party complaint, or
complaint-in-intervention, petition, or application wherein a
party asserts his claim for relief.
Ursal filed identical complaint-affidavits before the City Council,
through the DILG, and the Office of the Ombudsman. A review
of the said complaints-affidavits shows that far from being the
typical initiatory pleadings referred to in the above-mentioned
circulars, they merely contain a recital of the alleged culpable
acts of petitioner. Ursal did not make any claim for relief, nor
pray for any penalty for petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over
the case since the City Council had earlier acquired jurisdiction
over the matter. The Court is not convinced.
The mandate of the Ombudsman to investigate complaints
against erring public officials, derived from both the
Constitution38 and the law39 gives it jurisdiction over the
complaint against petitioner. The Constitution has named the
Ombudsman and his Deputies as the protectors of the people
who shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manner against public officials or employees of the
government.40 To fulfill this mandate, R.A. No. 6770, or the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, was enacted, giving the
Ombudsman or his Deputies jurisdiction over complaints on all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-
feasance41 against officers or employees of the government, or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality therefor, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, and the
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials,
except those who may be removed only by impeachment or
over members of Congress and the Judiciary.42 On the other
hand, under R.A. No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the
sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has
disciplinary authority over any elective barangay
official.43 Without a doubt, the Office of the Ombudsman has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Quezon City Council over
administrative cases against elective officials such as
petitioner.
The Ombudsman was not aware of the pending case before
the Quezon City Council when the administrative complaint
was filed before it. There was no mention of such complaint
either in the complaint-affidavit or in the counter-affidavit of
petitioner. Thus, the Ombudsman, in compliance with its duty
to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the
government, took cognizance of the case, made its
investigation, and rendered its decision accordingly.
As explained quite frequently, a party may be barred from
raising questions of jurisdiction where estoppel by laches has
set in. Estoppel by laches is failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do what, by
exercising due diligence, ought to have been done earlier,
57
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
either abandoned it or has acquiesced to the correctness and
fairness of its resolution. This doctrine is based on grounds of
public policy which for peace of society requires the
discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally an
issue of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to
be enforced or espoused.44
Petitioner is also estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman. A perusal of the records shows that he
participated in the proceedings by filing his counter-affidavit
with supporting evidence. Neither did he inform the
Ombudsman of the existence of the other administrative
complaint of which he is presumably aware at the time the
proceedings in the Ombudsman were on-going. It was only
when the Ombudsman rendered an adverse decision that he
disclosed the proceedings before the Quezon City Council and
raised the issue of jurisdiction. Thus, it has been held that
participation in the administrative proceedings without raising
any objection thereto bars the parties from raising any
jurisdictional infirmity after an adverse decision is rendered
against them.45
Another submission made by petitioner is that he was deprived
of his right to administrative due process when he was
dismissed from service without substantial evidence and
without consideration of the evidence he proffered. He raises
as a defense Ursal’s failure to state the actual date of
commission of the alleged attempted rape, the impossibility of
the assault, and the affidavits of his other
subordinates.46 Calling attention to the weakness of Ursal’s
evidence, he states that such evidence is not sufficient to
establish the crime of rape, in whatever stage. 47Finally, he
argues that as testament to his innocence, his constituents
voted him to a third term.48
Again, the Court is not impressed.
Petitioner was accorded the opportunity to be heard. He was
required to answer the formal charge and given a chance to
present evidence in his behalf. He was not denied due
process. More importantly, the decision of the Ombudsman is
well supported by substantial evidence.
A finding of guilt in an administrative case would have to be
sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence
that respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint
or formal charge.49 Substantial evidence has been defined as
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. This is different from the
degree of proof required in criminal proceedings, which calls
for a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 50 Petitioner’s
reliance on the rules on prosecution for the crime of rape is
therefore misplaced. What is at issue in the case before the
Ombudsman is whether his acts constitute grave misconduct,
and not whether he is guilty of the crime of attempted rape.
There is no basis for believing petitioner’s claim that the
Ombudsman had refused to consider his evidence. As properly
observed by the CA,51 the Ombudsman passed upon
petitioner’s evidence which, however, was found bereft of
credibility. In fact, unfortunately for petitioner at that, the
Ombudsman and the CA discovered Ursal’s allegations more
credible, supported and corroborated as they were by the
medical findings, the NBI reports and the surrounding
circumstances.
One final point. The Court notes that the order made by the
Ombudsman requiring Mayor Belmonte to implement
the Memorandum Order dated 2 July 2001 dismissing
petitioner was made even though the Memorandum Orderhad
not yet attained finality.52 Under the Ombudsman Act, a motion
for reconsideration may be filed within five (5) days after
receipt of the written notice, while all administrative disciplinary
cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for
reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. 53
Petitioner received a copy of the Memorandum Order on 23
July 2001, and filed his motion for reconsideration on 27 July
2001. The motion was denied in the Order dated 1 August
2001, copy of which was received by petitioner on 21 August
2001. Petitioner thereafter filed his petition with the CA on 31
August 2001, or within the reglementary period provided by the
Rules.54
Thus, it was improper for the Ombudsman to order the
implementation of the Memorandum Order before it could
become final and executory. In Lapid v. Court of Appeals,55 this
Court held that the import of Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act
is that all other decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
which impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said
Section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately
executory.56 An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the
instant case, will therefore stay the immediate implementation
of the decision.57 Thus:
In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed
therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary
period of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal
therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the appellate
tribunal becomes final. It is this final judgment which is then
correctly categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in
respect to which execution shall issue as a matter of right. In
other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the
right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it
the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the
essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would
be rendered nugatory.58
However, the implementation sought to be enjoined is
already fait accompli. Petitioner had already stepped down and
a new barangay chairman for Brgy. Batasan Hills had already
been sworn in. Injunction would not lie anymore, as the acts
sought to be enjoined have already been accomplished or
consummated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals dated 24 April 2002 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
58

G.R. No. 152048 April 7, 2009
FELIX B. PEREZ and AMANTE G. DORIA, Petitioners, vs.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY
and JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO, Respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed
by respondent Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company
(PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor, respectively, in
PT&T’s Shipping Section, Materials Management Group.
Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous
transactions at the Shipping Section, respondents formed a
special audit team to investigate the matter. It was discovered
that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of the freight
costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping
documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration
and superimposition.
On September 3, 1993, petitioners were placed on preventive
suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the
anomaly.1 Their suspension was extended for 15 days twice:
first on October 3, 19932 and second on October 18, 1993.3
On October 29, 1993, a memorandum with the following tenor
was issued by respondents:
In line with the recommendation of the AVP-Audit as presented
in his report of October 15, 1993 (copy attached) and the
subsequent filing of criminal charges against the parties
mentioned therein, [Mr. Felix Perez and Mr. Amante Doria
are] hereby dismissed from the service for having falsified
company documents.4 (emphasis supplied)
On November 9, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal
suspension and illegal dismissal.5 They alleged that they were
dismissed on November 8, 1993, the date they received the
above-mentioned memorandum.
The labor arbiter found that the 30-day extension of petitioners’
suspension and their subsequent dismissal were both illegal.
He ordered respondents to pay petitioners their salaries during
their 30-day illegal suspension, as well as to reinstate them
with backwages and 13th month pay.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed
the decision of the labor arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were
dismissed for just cause, that they were accorded due process
and that they were illegally suspended for only 15 days
(without stating the reason for the reduction of the period of
petitioners’ illegal suspension).6
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its
January 29, 2002 decision,7 the CA affirmed the NLRC
decision insofar as petitioners’ illegal suspension for 15 days
and dismissal for just cause were concerned. However, it found
that petitioners were dismissed without due process.
Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision. They
contend that there was no just cause for their dismissal, that
they were not accorded due process and that they were
illegally suspended for 30 days.
We rule in favor of petitioners.
Respondents Failed to Prove Just Cause and to Observe
Due Process
The CA, in upholding the NLRC’s decision, reasoned that there
was sufficient basis for respondents to lose their confidence in
petitioners8 for allegedly tampering with the shipping
documents. Respondents emphasized the importance of a
shipping order or request, as it was the basis of their liability to
a cargo forwarder.9
We disagree.
Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or
request, we find respondents’ evidence insufficient to clearly
and convincingly establish the facts from which the loss of
confidence resulted.10 Other than their bare allegations and the
fact that such documents came into petitioners’ hands at some
point, respondents should have provided evidence of
petitioners’ functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure
in the handling and approval of shipping requests and the fact
that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. There
was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting petitioners
to the alleged tampering of shipping documents.
The alterations on the shipping documents could not
reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it was never
proven that petitioners alone had control of or access to these
documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated
otherwise, impartial tribunals should not rely only on the
statement of the employer that it has lost confidence in its
employee.11
Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by
his employer or duly authorized representative is a just cause
for termination.12 However, in General Bank and Trust Co. v.
CA,13 we said:
[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be
used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified. Loss of confidence may not be arbitrarily asserted
in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must
be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith.
The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the
dismissal is for cause in view of the security of tenure that
employees enjoy under the Constitution and the Labor Code.
The employer’s evidence must clearly and convincingly show
the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee may
be fairly made to rest.14 It must be adequately proven by
substantial evidence.15 Respondents failed to discharge this
burden.
Respondents’ illegal act of dismissing petitioners was
aggravated by their failure to observe due process. To meet
the requirements of due process in the dismissal of an
59
employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two
written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for
termination and giving to said employee a reasonable
opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice
indicating that, upon due consideration of all circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify the employer's
decision to dismiss the employee.16
Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them
nor given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply
and arbitrarily separated from work and served notices of
termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and
security of tenure. The labor arbiter and the CA correctly found
that respondents failed to comply with the two-notice
requirement for terminating employees.
Petitioners likewise contended that due process was not
observed in the absence of a hearing in which they could have
explained their side and refuted the evidence against them.
There is no need for a hearing or conference. We note a
marked difference in the standards of due process to be
followed as prescribed in the Labor Code and its implementing
rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an
employer must provide the employee ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative if he so desires:
ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. — x x x
(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of
tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except
for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the
requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the
employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought
to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the
causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the
assistance of his representative if he so desires in
accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated
pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be
without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the
validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the
regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.
The burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or
authorized cause shall rest on the employer. (emphasis
supplied)
The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other
hand, require a hearing and conference during which the
employee concerned is given the opportunity to respond to the
charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented
against him:17
Section 2. Security of Tenure. — x x x
(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following
standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as
defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the
ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee
reasonable opportunity within which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee
concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires,
is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his
evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee,
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances,
grounds have been established to justify his termination.
(emphasis supplied)
Which one should be followed? Is a hearing (or conference)
mandatory in cases involving the dismissal of an employee?
Can the apparent conflict between the law and its IRR be
reconciled?
At the outset, we reaffirm the time-honored doctrine that, in
case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative
regulations implementing it.18 The authority to promulgate
implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a
rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the
provisions of the enabling statute.19 As such, it cannot amend
the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.20
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of
termination for a just cause, an employee must be given
"ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself." Thus,
the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is
qualified by the word "ample" which ordinarily means
"considerably more than adequate or sufficient." 21In this
regard, the phrase "ample opportunity to be heard" can be
reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover actual
hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of
the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in
conformity with Article 277(b).
Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of
Book VI of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that
holding an actual hearing or conference is a condition sine qua
non for compliance with the due process requirement in
termination of employment. The test for the fair procedure
guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has
been a formal pretermination confrontation between the
employer and the employee. The "ample opportunity to be
heard" standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal
hearing. To confine the employee’s right to be heard to a
solitary form narrows down that right. It deprives him of other
equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense.
Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist interpretation is
overly restrictive. The "very nature of due process negates any
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation."22
The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is
couched in general language revealing the legislative intent to
give some degree of flexibility or adaptability to meet the
peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid
proceeding such as a formal hearing will defeat its spirit.
Significantly, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of
Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that the so-called
60
standards of due process outlined therein shall be
observed "substantially," not strictly. This is a recognition
that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an
absolute, mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.
An employee’s right to be heard in termination cases under
Article 277(b) as implemented by Section 2(d), Rule I of the
Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should be
interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied not only by a formal
face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to
controvert the charges against him and to submit evidence in
support thereof.
A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to
adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that
the evidence should be taken into account in the adjudication
of the controversy.23 "To be heard" does not mean verbal
argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as
effectively through written explanations, submissions or
pleadings.24 Therefore, while the phrase "ample opportunity to
be heard" may in fact include an actual hearing, it is not limited
to a formal hearing only. In other words, the existence of an
actual, formal "trial-type" hearing, although preferred, is not
absolutely necessary to satisfy the employee’s right to be
heard.
This Court has consistently ruled that the due process
requirement in cases of termination of employment does not
require an actual or formal hearing. Thus, we categorically
declared in Skipper’s United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad:25
The Labor Code does not, of course, require a formal or
trial type proceeding before an erring employee may be
dismissed. (emphasis supplied)
In Autobus Workers’ Union v. NLRC,26 we ruled:
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the
essential elements of due process. Due process of law simply
means giving opportunity to be heard before judgment is
rendered. In fact, there is no violation of due process even
if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a
chance to explain his side of the controversy. What is
frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
xxxxxxxxx
A formal trial-type hearing is not even essential to due
process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of
the controversy and to present supporting evidence on
which a fair decision can be based. This type of hearing is
not even mandatory in cases of complaints lodged before the
Labor Arbiter. (emphasis supplied)
In Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid
Development Corporation,27 we had the occasion to state:
[W]ell-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice
and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in
the dismissal of employees. It is a cardinal rule in our
jurisdiction that the employer must furnish the employee with
two written notices before the termination of employment can
be effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the particular
acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the
second informs the employee of the employer’s decision to
dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing, on the other
hand, is complied with as long as there was an
opportunity to be heard, and not necessarily that an actual
hearing was conducted.
In separate infraction reports, petitioners were both apprised of
the particular acts or omissions constituting the charges
against them. They were also required to submit their written
explanation within 12 hours from receipt of the reports. Yet,
neither of them complied. Had they found the 12-hour period
too short, they should have requested for an extension of time.
Further, notices of termination were also sent to them informing
them of the basis of their dismissal. In fine, petitioners were
given due process before they were dismissed. Even if no
hearing was conducted, the requirement of due process
had been met since they were accorded a chance to explain
their side of the controversy. (emphasis supplied)
Our holding in National Semiconductor HK Distribution, Ltd. v.
NLRC28 is of similar import:
That the investigations conducted by petitioner may not
be considered formal or recorded hearings or
investigations is immaterial. A formal or trial type hearing
is not at all times and in all instances essential to due
process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the
parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their side of the controversy. It is deemed sufficient for the
employer to follow the natural sequence of notice, hearing and
judgment.
The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer
may provide an employee with ample opportunity to be heard
and defend himself with the assistance of a representative or
counsel in ways other than a formal hearing. The employee
can be fully afforded a chance to respond to the charges
against him, adduce his evidence or rebut the evidence against
him through a wide array of methods, verbal or written.
After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges
against him, the employee may submit a written explanation
(which may be in the form of a letter, memorandum, affidavit or
position paper) and offer evidence in support thereof, like
relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time
records) and the sworn statements of his witnesses. For this
purpose, he may prepare his explanation personally or with the
assistance of a representative or counsel. He may also ask the
employer to provide him copy of records material to his
defense. His written explanation may also include a request
that a formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case,
the conduct of a formal hearing or conference becomes
mandatory, just as it is where there exist substantial evidentiary
disputes29 or where company rules or practice requires an
actual hearing as part of employment pretermination
procedure. To this extent, we refine the decisions we have
rendered so far on this point of law.
This interpretation of Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing
Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code reasonably implements the
"ample opportunity to be heard" standard under Article 277(b)
of the Labor Code without unduly restricting the language of
61
the law or excessively burdening the employer. This not only
respects the power vested in the Secretary of Labor and
Employment to promulgate rules and regulations that will lay
down the guidelines for the implementation of Article 277(b).
More importantly, this is faithful to the mandate of Article 4 of
the Labor Code that "[a]ll doubts in the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code], including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor."
In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection
with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases:
(a) "ample opportunity to be heard" means any meaningful
opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer
the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his
defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair,
just and reasonable way.
(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only
when requested by the employee in writing or substantial
evidentiary disputes exist or a company rule or practice
requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.
(c) the "ample opportunity to be heard" standard in the Labor
Code prevails over the "hearing or conference" requirement in
the implementing rules and regulations.
Petitioners Were Illegally
Suspended for 30 Days
An employee may be validly suspended by the employer for
just cause provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a
period of 30 days, after which the employee shall either be
reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.30
In this case, petitioners contended that they were not paid
during the two 15-day extensions, or a total of 30 days, of their
preventive suspension. Respondents failed to adduce evidence
to the contrary. Thus, we uphold the ruling of the labor arbiter
on this point.
Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and
there was no due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as
amended, mandates that the employee is entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the
time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual
reinstatement.31 In this case, however, reinstatement is no
longer possible because of the length of time that has passed
from the date of the incident to final resolution.32 Fourteen
years have transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully
dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer
serve any prudent or practical purpose.33
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals dated January 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP
No. 50536 finding that petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante
G. Doria were not illegally dismissed but were not accorded
due process and were illegally suspended for 15 days, is SET
ASIDE. The decision of the labor arbiter dated December 27,
1995 in NLRC NCR CN. 11-06930-93 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONthat petitioners
should be paid their separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 140079 March 31, 2005
AUGUSTO R. SAMALIO, Petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE and BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION, respondents.
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court assailing the May 24, 1999 decision,1 as
well as the September 1, 1999 resolution, of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 48723 which in turn affirmed
the November 26, 1997 resolution of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The aforementioned CSC resolution
upheld the August 30, 1996 1st Indorsement of then Justice
Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona confirming the penalty of
dismissal from service imposed by the Bureau of Immigration
upon petitioner on the ground of dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct and conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest
of the service in connection with his act of extorting money
from Ms. Weng Sai Qin, a foreign national.
The facts, as found by the CA and adopted by petitioner
himself, are as follows:
Petitioner Augusto R. Samalio was formerly an Intelligence
Officer of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation.
In Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993, the City
Prosecutor’s office of Pasay City recommended that petitioner
Samalio be prosecuted for the crimes of Robbery and Violation
of Section 46 of the Immigration Law before the
Sandiganbayan under the following facts:
"x x x that on 2 February 1993, Ms. Weng Sai Qin arrived at
the NAIA from Saipan. While waiting for her turn at the arrival
immigration counter, her passport was examined by
Immigration Officer Juliet Pajarillaga. Noting that Ms. Weng, a
Chinese, was holding a Uruguayan passport, Ms. Pajarillaga
suspected that the former’s passport was fake. Ms. Weng was
taken out of the queue and brought to Respondent who was
the duty intelligence officer. Ms. Weng, who could only speak
in Chinese, asked respondent by sign language that she
wanted to meet a friend who was waiting at the NAIA arrival
area. Respondent approved the request and accompanied Ms.
Weng to the arrival area. Thereafter, Respondent, with Ms.
Weng and her male friend in tow, returned to the immigration
area. While inside the office of Respondent, Ms. Weng asked
that her passport be returned. Sensing a demand for money in
exchange for her passport, Ms. Weng flashed $500.00 in front
of Respondent. The money was grabbed by Respondent.
Shortly, her passport was returned ans [sic] she was allowed to
leave. When Ms. Weng checked her passport later, she
discovered that it did not bear an immigration arrival stamp.
Thereafter, Ms. Weng complained against Respondent."
In a later Indorsement communication dated February 9, 1993
to the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID), former
62
NAIA General Manager Gen. Guillermo G. Cunanan enclosed
a copy of the aforesaid City Prosecutor’s Resolution. Reacting,
then BID Commissioner, Zafiro L. Respicio, issued Personnel
Order No. 93-179-93 commencing an administrative case
against petitioner Augusto R. Samalio for Violation of CSMC
No. 46, Rule 2, Section 1, for dishonesty, oppression,
misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, inefficiency and
incompetence in the performance of official duties, violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial
to the best interest of the service, requiring petitioner to submit
his answer to the charges together with supporting statements
and documents, and whether or not he elects a formal
investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. In the
same Personnel Order, Samalio was preventively suspended
for a period of ninety (90) days as the charge sheet against him
involves dishonesty, oppression and misconduct. Forthwith,
petitioner attempted the lifting of his preventive suspension. It
was struck down.
Later on, petitioner submitted an answer denying the charges
and expressly electing a formal investigation if such answer be
not found to be satisfactory. Attached thereto are the affidavits
of his witnesses Rodrigo C. Pedrealba, Dante Aquino,
Florencio B. Austria and Winston C. Vitan. The answer was
found to be unsatisfactory so the case was set for formal
hearing before the Board of Discipline of BID.
The case suffered several postponed hearings due to the
requests and non-availability of the parties but mostly due to
the absence of complainant’s witnesses until on September 7,
1993, respondent was allowed to file a motion to dismiss with
the Special Prosecutor designated given time to comment
thereon. When the dismissal motion was filed, assigned
Special Prosecutor Edmund F. Macaraig interposed no
objection thereto. Notwithstanding, the case was not dismissed
and instead, the Special Prosecutor was given five (5) days to
inform the Board whether or not he intends to present
additional witnesses.
On December 16, 1993, the DID Commissioner issued
Personnel Order No. 93-428 reorganizing the Board of
Discipline and this case was assigned to a new Board presided
by Atty. Kalaw. Subpoenas were again sent and hearings were
scheduled several times before the new Board until on
February 6, 1995, Special Prosecutor assigned, Edmund F.
Macaraig, moved that Samalio’s Motion to Dismiss be denied
and that the case be considered submitted for resolution based
on the records. On February 16, 1995, the hearing officer
denied Samalio’s Motion to Dismiss but granted his
Comment/Manifestation explaining his absence during the
February 6, 1995 hearing and requesting that the case be set
anew on February 22, 1995.
Finally, on July 25, 1996, BID Acting Commissioner Ramon J.
Liwag, issued the decision finding Augusto R. Samalio guilty of
the charges and was ordered dismissed from service.
In the 1stIndorsement dated August 30, 1996, former Justice
Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. confirmed the penalty of
dismissal from service of Augusto R. Samalio. Soon after, the
Motion for Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated
June 2, 1997.
Guingona’s decision was appealed to the Civil Service
Commission which issued Resolution No. 974501 dated
November 26, 1997 dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and
affirming the decisions of Acting Commissioner Liwag and
Secretary Guingona. Similarly, the attempt for a
reconsideration was likewise dismissed in Civil Service
Resolution No. 981925.
In the meantime, on June 13, 1994, during the pendency of the
instant administrative case, Augusto R. Samalio was convicted
(in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679) of the crime of
Robbery, as defined in Articles 293 and 294, paragraph 5 of
the Revised Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer
indeterminate penalty of Four (4) Months and One (1) Day
of Arresto Mayor to Four (4) Years, Two (2) Months and Eleven
(11) Days of Prision Correccional and to indemnify complainant
Weng Sai Qin the amount of US $500.00 and to pay the costs.
Samalio did not appeal the conviction and instead applied for
and was granted probation by the Sandiganbayan for two (2)
years in an Order dated December 12, 1994. 2 (Citations
omitted)
Petitioner assailed before the CA, in a petition for review, the
correctness and validity of CSC Resolution Nos. 974501 and
981925. The CA, however, dismissed the petition for review
and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner now comes before us to challenge the CA decision
dismissing his petition for review as well as the resolution
denying his motion for reconsideration. Petitioner claims he
was not accorded due process and the CA failed to consider
the proper effects of his discharge under probation.
In support of his contention that he was deprived of due
process, petitioner alleges that no witness or evidence was
presented against him, that the CA erred in the interpretation of
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court and that there was
no hearing conducted on his case.
Petitioner’s contention is without merit.
The CSC decision and resolution which upheld the resolution
of the Secretary of Justice confirming the decision of the
Commissioner of the BID are supported by substantial
evidence. The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the
Commissioner of the BID, decided the case on the basis of the
pleadings and papers submitted by the parties, and relied on
the records of the proceedings taken. In particular, the decision
was based on the criminal complaint filed by Weng Sai Qin
against petitioner before the City Prosecutor’s Office of Pasay
City, as well as Resolution No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4,
1993 of the same office recommending the prosecution of
petitioner at the Sandiganbayan for the crimes of robbery and
violation of Section 46 of the Immigration Law.
The CSC, as well as the Secretary of Justice, also took
cognizance of the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in
Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 and the fact of
petitioner’s conviction in that case. Thus, there was ample
evidence which satisfied the burden of proof required in
administrative proceedings – substantial evidence or that
quantum of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion3 ― to support the
decision of the CSC.
63
The CSC and the Secretary of Justice did not err in applying
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the "rule on former testimony," in deciding
petitioner’s administrative case. The provisions of the Rules of
Court may be applied suppletorily to the rules of procedure of
administrative bodies exercising quasi-judicial powers, unless
otherwise provided by law or the rules of procedure of the
administrative agency concerned. The Rules of Court, which
are meant to secure to every litigant the adjective phase of due
process of law, may be applied to proceedings before an
administrative body with quasi-judicial powers in the absence
of different and valid statutory or administrative provisions
prescribing the ground rules for the investigation, hearing and
adjudication of cases before it.4
For Section 47, Rule 130 to apply, the following requisites must
be satisfied: (a) the witness is dead or unable to testify; (b) his
testimony or deposition was given in a former case or
proceeding, judicial or administrative, between the same
parties or those representing the same interests; (c) the former
case involved the same subject as that in the present case,
although on different causes of action; (d) the issue testified to
by the witness in the former trial is the same issue involved in
the present case and (e) the adverse party had an opportunity
to cross-examine the witness in the former case.5
In this case, Weng Sai Qin was unable to testify in the
administrative proceedings before the BID because she left the
country on February 6, 1993,6 or even before the
administrative complaint against petitioner was instituted.
Petitioner does not deny that the testimony of Weng Sai Qin
was given in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679, a case
which sprang from the information filed pursuant to Resolution
No. 0-93-0224 dated February 4, 1993 of the City Prosecutor’s
Office of Pasay City, the very same resolution used by
Commissioner Respicio as basis for filing the administrative
complaint. Hence, the issue testified to by Weng Sai Qin in
Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679 was the same issue
in the administrative case, that is, whether petitioner extorted
money from Weng Sai Qin. Petitioner also had the opportunity
to face and cross-examine his accuser Weng Sai Qin, and to
defend and vindicate his cause before the Sandiganbayan.
Clearly, all the requisites for the proper application of the rule
on former testimony, as embodied in Section 47, Rule 130,
were satisfied. Thus, the CSC and the Secretary of Justice
committed no error when they applied it and took cognizance
of the former testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan
Criminal Case No. 18679 where petitioner was convicted.
Petitioner contends that the CA, as well as the CSC and the
Secretary of Justice, should not have applied Section 47, Rule
130 because there was failure to lay the basis or predicate for
the rule. The argument is specious and deserves scant
consideration. The records of this case reveal that even in the
early stages of the proceedings before the Board of Discipline
of the BID, Weng Sai Qin’s departure from the country and
consequent inability to testify in the proceedings had already
been disclosed to the parties.7
Further, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical
niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts
of law.8 Administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial
powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, subject to the observance of fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in justiciable cases
presented before them.9 In administrative proceedings,
technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied and administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense.10
The Uniform Rules of Procedure in the Conduct of
Administrative Investigations in the CSC11 which were
applicable to petitioner’s case provided that administrative
investigations shall be conducted without necessarily adhering
to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings.12 The
Uniform Rules further provided that evidence having materiality
and relevance to the administrative case shall be
accepted.13 Not only was petitioner’s objection to the
application of Section 47, Rule 130 a technicality that could be
disregarded; the testimony of Weng Sai Qin in Sandiganbayan
Criminal Case No. 18679 was also material and relevant to the
administrative case. Hence, the CSC was correct in applying
Section 47, Rule 130 when it took cognizance of the former
testimony of Weng Sai Qin in the aforementioned criminal
case.
Petitioner’s assertion that there was no hearing (that he was
deprived of the opportunity to be heard) is likewise without
merit. Apparently, petitioner’s concept of the opportunity to be
heard is the opportunity to ventilate one’s side in a formal
hearing where he can have a face-to-face confrontation with
the complainant. However, it is well-settled that, in
administrative cases, the requirement of notice and hearing
does not connote full adversarial proceedings.14
Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-
type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where
opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or
through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural
due process.15 A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times
and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy at hand. 16 The standard
of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals
allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not
ignored.17 In other words, it is not legally objectionable for
being violative of due process for an administrative agency to
resolve a case based solely on position papers, afidavits or
documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of
witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.18
In this case, petitioner was heard through the various pleadings
which he filed with the Board of Discipline of the BID when he
filed his answer19 and two motions to dismiss,20 as well as
other motions and papers. He was also able to participate in all
stages of the administrative proceeding. He was able to
elevate his case to the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently,
to the CSC by way of appeal.
We have consistently held that the essence of due process is
simply the opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain one’s
side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action
or ruling complained of.21 And any seeming defect in its
observance is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration.22 Denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked by a party who has had the opportunity to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration.23
64
Petitioner himself admits that he filed a motion for
reconsideration24 of the decision of the BID which was
confirmed by the Secretary of Justice. He also admits that he
filed a motion for reconsideration25 with the CSC. Hence, by his
own admission, petitioner’s protestations that he had been
deprived of due process must necessarily fail.
Petitioner claims that when the Sandiganbayan approved his
probation in the criminal case, it restored him to all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction, including the
right to remain in government service. Petitioner cites the case
of Baclayon v. Mutia, et al.26 where the grant of probation
suspended the imposition not only of the principal penalties but
of the accessory penalties as well.
Petitioner’s contention is misplaced.
First, the Baclayon case is not in point. In that case, no
administrative complaint was instituted against the public
officer, a public school teacher, during the pendency of the
criminal case against her and even after her conviction. There
being no administrative case instituted against the public officer
and no administrative liability having been imposed, there was
no administrative sanction that could have been suspended by
the grant of probation.
Second, dismissal is not an accessory penalty either of prision
correccional 27 or arresto mayor,28 the range of penalty imposed
upon petitioner in Sandiganbayan Criminal Case No. 18679.
Hence, even assuming arguendo that petitioner’s contention
was correct, the grant of probation could not have resulted in
the suspension of an accessory penalty like dismissal that
does not even exist.
Third, "to suspend" means "to stop temporarily; to
discontinue" 29 or "to cause to be intermitted or
interrupted."30The records of this case show that petitioner was
granted probation in an order dated December 12, 1992 31 of
the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. He was dismissed
from the service in the decision dated July 25, 1996 32 of the
BID Commissioner. Since the grant of probation was granted
long before the administrative case was decided, the probation
could not have possibly suspended the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal from the service in the administrative case
since there was no administrative penalty that could have been
interrupted by the probation at the time it was granted. Indeed,
petitioner’s discharge on probation could not have restored or
reinstated him to his employment in government service since
he had not been yet been dismissed therefrom at the time of
his discharge.
Finally, even if dismissal had been one of the accessory
penalties of the principal penalty imposed upon petitioner in the
criminal case, and even if the administrative case had been
decided earlier than the criminal case, still the imposition of the
penalty of dismissal could not have been suspended by the
grant of probation. As petitioner himself contends, the criminal
action is separate and distinct from the administrative case.
And, if only for that reason, so is administrative liability
separate and distinct from penal liability.33 Hence, probation
affects only the criminal aspect of the case,34 not its
administrative dimension.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DEnIed. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 48723
dated May 24, 1999, affirming the decision and resolution of
the Civil Service Commission is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170512 October 5, 2011
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO T.
REYES, Respondent.
LEONARDO – DE CASTRO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeks the reversal of the Decision2 dated July 4,
2005 and the Resolution3 dated October 27, 2005 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 70571. The judgment of the
appellate court reversed and set aside the Decision4 dated
September 24, 2001 and the Joint Order5 dated February 15,
2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao in OMB-
MIN-ADM-01-170; while the appellate court’s resolution denied
the motion for reconsideration6 assailing its decision.
On January 11, 2001, Jaime B. Acero executed an affidavit
against herein respondent Antonio Reyes and Angelito
Peñaloza, who were the Transportation Regulation Officer
II/Acting Officer-in-Charge and Clerk III, respectively, of the
Land Transportation Office (LTO) District Office in Mambajao,
Camiguin. Acero narrated thus:
That, on January 10, 2001, at about 2:00 o’clock P.M. I went to
the Land Transportation Office, at Mambajao, Camiguin to
apply for a driver’s license;
That, I was made to take an examination for driver’s license
applicants by a certain Tata Peñaloza whose real name
is Angelito, a clerk in said office;
That, after the examination, [Peñaloza] informed me that I
failed in the examination; however if I am willing to pay
additional assessment then they will reconsider my application
and I am referring to [Peñaloza] and [Reyes];
That, I asked how much will that be and [Peñaloza] in the
presence of [Reyes] answered ₱680.00, so I agreed;
That, I then handed ₱1,000.00 to [Peñaloza] and [Peñaloza]
handed it to the cashier;
That, [Peñaloza] in turn handed to me the change of ₱320.00
only and a little later I was given the LTO Official Receipt No.
62927785 (January 10, 2001) but only for ₱180.00 which O.R.
serves as my temporary license for 60 days; and the balance
of ₱500.00 was without O.R. and retained by Peñaloza;
That, I feel that the actuation of Antonio Reyes and Angelito
Peñaloza are fraudulent in that they failed to issue receipt for
the extra ₱500.00 paid to them; and [Reyes] know that I am
with [the Commission on Audit];
That, I execute this affidavit to file charges against the guilty
parties.7
65
Attached to Acero’s affidavit was the LTO Official Receipt No.
62927785, showing his payment of ₱180.00.8
The above affidavit was apparently filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Camiguin, but the same was later
referred9 to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The latter
office thereafter ordered10 Reyes and Peñaloza to submit their
counter-affidavits within ten days from notice.
On June 19, 2001, Peñaloza filed his Counter-Affidavit.11 He
denied telling Acero that if the latter were willing to pay
additional costs, Reyes and Peñaloza would reconsider his
application. Peñaloza stated that he did administer the
examination to Acero but since he was very busy, he
requested their security guard, Dominador Daypuyat, to check
the answers of Acero using their answer guide. After Daypuyat
checked Acero’s paper, Peñaloza noted the score of 22/40.
Peñaloza informed Acero of the failing grade and told him that
it was up to Reyes to decide on the matter. Acero then went to
the office of Reyes and after a few minutes, he came back and
returned his application documents to Peñaloza. After
examining the application form, Peñaloza saw that the same
did not contain Reyes’ signature but a plus sign (+) and the
number 27 beside the score of 22/40. Peñaloza knew that it
was Reyes who wrote the "+ 27" and the same indicated that
Acero had to pay additional costs in order to pass the
examination, as was done in the past.
Thereafter, when Peñaloza allegedly informed Reyes that
Acero was an auditor, the latter was summoned into Reyes’
office. Reyes asked if Acero wanted to retake the examination
or just pay the additional costs. Acero eventually said "yes" and
Peñaloza inferred that the former agreed to pay Reyes the
extra costs. Peñaloza recounted that Reyes instructed him to
prepare the driver’s license of Acero. Peñaloza gave Acero’s
application documents to Lourdes Cimacio, the senior
statistician, who processed the driver’s license. When the
cashier asked for Acero’s payment, the latter gave Peñaloza a
one-thousand-peso bill. The cashier, in turn, handed to
Peñaloza a change of ₱820.00. From the said amount,
Peñaloza gave to Acero ₱320.00, while ₱500.00 was given to
Reyes. Acero soon left the office. Peñaloza said that Acero
called their office not long after, asking for a receipt for the
₱500.00. Peñaloza then asked if Acero had not come to an
understanding with Reyes that a receipt would not be issued
for the additional cost. Acero insisted on a receipt then hanged
up. Peñaloza told Reyes of Acero’s demand and Reyes told
him to cancel the driver’s license. When told that the same
could not be done anymore, Reyes allegedly gave Peñaloza
₱500.00, instructing the latter to return the money to Acero
under circumstances where nobody could see them. Peñaloza
stated that he waited for Acero to come back to their office but
the latter did not do so anymore.
Peñaloza also submitted in evidence the affidavit 12 of Rey P.
Amper. Amper narrated that he started working at the LTO in
Mambajao, Camiguin in September 1988 as a driver-examiner.
In February 1994, Reyes became the acting Head of Office,
and eventually the Head of Office, of the LTO in Mambajao.
About four months thereafter, Reyes verbally instructed Amper
to send to him (Reyes) all the applicants for driver’s licenses
who failed the examinations. In case Reyes was absent, the
applicants were to wait for him. Subsequently, Reyes gave
Amper a piece of paper containing the rates to be charged to
the "applicant-flunkers" in addition to the legal fees. Amper was
also told to deliver the additional payments to Reyes. Amper
stated that his office table and that of Reyes were located in
one room. Reyes would allegedly tell the applicant-flunkers to
either re-take the examinations or pay additional costs. In most
cases, Amper said that the applicant-flunkers would only be too
willing to pay the extra costs. Reyes would then instruct Amper
to add more points to applicant-flunkers’ scores, which meant
that Reyes and the applicants concerned had come to an
agreement for the payment of additional costs. Amper added
that the said practice of Reyes was a "goad to his conscience"
and he talked about it to Peñaloza. They allegedly reported the
matter to their District Representative Pedro Romualdo, but the
latter could only express his regrets for having recommended
Reyes to his position. The practice of Reyes of claiming
additional costs continued up to the time Amper left the LTO.
Amper declared that he knew that it was Reyes alone who took
and benefitted from his illegal exactions. The employees of the
LTO in Mambajao were purportedly aware of the practice of
Reyes but they were afraid to come out against their Head of
Office.
The affidavit13 of Margie B. Abdala was also presented by
Peñaloza. Abdala stated that she accompanied Peñaloza and
the latter’s wife, Ebony, to the house of Acero on January 13,
2001. Ebony urged Acero not to include Peñaloza anymore in
the complaint. Acero assured them that his complaint was
principally directed against Reyes for requiring him (Acero) to
pay additional costs for which he was not issued any official
receipt. Peñaloza brought with him Acero’s application form for
a driver’s license, which had already been approved by Reyes,
and he asked the latter to complete the same. Peñaloza also
tried to return the ₱500.00 from Reyes that was not covered by
a receipt. Acero, however, refused to fill up the application form
and to accept the money. When Ebony asked why Acero
agreed to pay the additional cost required by Reyes, the latter
answered that he did not understand what was meant by
additional cost.
On June 19, 2001, Reyes manifested14 that, for purposes of
the instant case, he was adopting the counter-affidavit he filed
in another Ombudsman case, docketed as OMB-MIN-01-
0090,15 as both cases involved the same parties and the same
incident.
In his counter-affidavit,16 Reyes claimed that Acero’s complaint
was a "blatant distortion of the truth and a mere fabrication of
the complainant."17 Reyes asserted that a perusal of the
affidavit-complaint revealed that the only imputation against
him was that Peñaloza allegedly told Acero to pay ₱680.00 in
his (Reyes’) presence. The affidavit revealed that it was
Peñaloza who processed the application of Acero; the money
was allegedly given to Peñaloza and it was he who handed the
change back to Acero; and he had no participation and was not
present when the money changed hands. Reyes stated that
when he conducted an informal investigation on the complaint,
Peñaloza admitted to having pocketed the extra ₱500.00.
Reyes allegedly reprimanded Peñaloza and ordered the latter
to return the money to Acero. Based on the receipt submitted
by Acero, the same proved that as far as the LTO and Reyes
were concerned, what was received by the office was only
₱180.00. Reyes contended that he did not ask or receive
money from Acero and it was Peñaloza who pocketed the
₱500.00.
66
In an Order18 dated June 20, 2001, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao directed the parties to appear before
its office on July 11, 2001 for a preliminary conference. The
parties were to consider, among others, the need for a formal
investigation or whether the parties were willing to submit their
case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record and
such other evidence as they will present at the conference.
On July 6, 2001, Acero sent the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao a telegram,19 stating that he was waiving his right to
avail of the preliminary conference.
On July 11, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao
issued an Order,20 stating that none of the parties appeared in
the preliminary conference scheduled for that day. In view of
the non-appearance of the respondents therein, they were
considered to have waived their right to a preliminary
conference. The case was then deemed submitted for
decision.
On July 23, 2001, the counsel for Peñaloza informed the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao that his client was waiving his
right to a formal investigation and was willing to submit the
case for resolution on the basis of the evidence on record.
Peñaloza also submitted the additional affidavit of one of their
witnesses, Rickie Valdehueza.
In his affidavit,21 Valdehueza stated that on January 5, 2001,
he applied for a driver’s license with the LTO in Mambajao,
Camiguin. He took an examination on that day, which was
conducted by an employee he later came to know as
Dominador Daypuyat. After the latter checked his test paper,
Valdehueza was told that he got a failing score. His application
was then turned over to Peñaloza, who told him to see Reyes.
Valdehueza said that Reyes advised him not to retake the
examination anymore and just pay ₱1,500.00. Valdehueza
bargained for ₱1,200.00 since he had no money and Reyes
agreed. Reyes then wrote the sign "+ 20" next to Valdueza’s
score of 30, such that what appeared on the test paper was
"30 + 20." Reyes returned the test paper and instructed
Valdehueza to tell Peñaloza to add "20" to his score.
Valdehueza went back to the LTO on January 10, 2001
bringing ₱1,200.00. Before he could go to Reyes’ office, he
was accosted by Daypuyat in the lobby who informed him that
his license was already completed. Daypuyat also took
₱700.00 to give to Reyes. Valdehueza gave ₱500.00 to the
cashier as payment for the ₱240.00 license fee. He told the
cashier to just give his change to Reyes.
On September 24, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao rendered a Decision in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170,
adjudging Reyes guilty of grave misconduct and finding
Peñaloza guilty of simple misconduct. The pertinent portion of
the decision reads:
Here, as borne out of the record, there is no denying the fact
that [Acero] failed in the examination given for a driver’s
license, yet ultimately, herein complainant was granted a
temporary driver’s license. It is therefore very logical to
presume that something in between was agreed upon between
the applicant and the person charged with the grant of license.
Based on the testimony of [Peñaloza] and corroborated by the
testimonies of Rey P. Amper (Record, pp. 31-32) and Rickie
Valdehueza (Record, pp. 44-45), [Reyes] would give the
flunker the option of retaking the examination or to simply pay
an additional cost to have a passing grade without actually re-
taking the same. As testified to by Rey P. Amper, "xxx in
almost all cases, the applicant-flunker would only be too willing
to pay the additional costs, in which case, Mr. Reyes would
instruct him to go back to my table. Then Mr. Reyes would call
me, saying: ‘Ray, just add more to his score.’, which to me
meant that he and the applicant-flunker had come to an
agreement to pay the ‘additional costs’." Mr. Amper testifies
further that this matter of extending a passing grade to a
flunker for a monetary consideration has been a system within
this LTO agency perpetrated by [Reyes] since he assumed as
Head of Office thereat.
Verily, [Reyes] took advantage of his position and office in
exacting the so-called additional cost from those who flunked
the examination. There is nowhere in the record authorizing the
Head of Office of the LTO to adjust a failing grade into a
passing grade. In addition, there is nowhere in the record that
supports the legality of collecting additional costs over and
above the legal fees. This is a pure and simple case of
extortion and certainly, such act is a breach of his oath of office
as well as a deliberate disregard of existing rules and
regulations. Based on the foregoing, this Office finds
respondent [Reyes] guilty of grave misconduct.
As regards [Peñaloza], while he may have helped or facilitated
in the collection of that additional costs, he could not be as
guilty as [Reyes].
Understandably, it is normal for a subordinate to keep mum
while an anomaly is going on specially when the perpetrator is
the Head of Office. There is fear in him and normally, such
subordinate would just "ride along", so to speak. But
nonetheless, [Peñaloza] has to be sanctioned. While the
infraction he had helped accomplished may not have been
voluntary on his part but as a public official, he should have
registered his objection regardless of the consequence that
may occur. Based on the foregoing, this Office finds
respondent [Peñaloza] guilty of simple misconduct.
WHEREFORE, there being substantial evidence, this Office
finds respondent Antonio T. Reyes guilty of grave misconduct
and he is hereby meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the
service pursuant to Section 23(c) [Grave Offenses], Rule XIV
of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292.
Likewise, this Office finds respondent Angelito G. Peñaloza
guilty of Simple Misconduct and he is hereby meted the penalty
of SUSPENSION from office without pay for a period of Six (6)
months based on Section 23(b) [Less Grave Offenses] Rule
XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No.
292. In both instances, the execution of the penalties imposed
shall be made immediately after the same shall have been final
and executory.22
In their bid to challenge the above ruling, Reyes filed a Motion
for Reconsideration cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary
Conference,23 while Peñaloza filed a Motion for
Reconsideration.24 On February 15, 2002, the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao issued a Joint Order,25 denying the
aforesaid motions of Reyes and Peñaloza.
67
Reyes elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a Petition
for Review26 under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, which
petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70571.
In the assailed Decision dated July 4, 2005, the Court of
Appeals granted the petition of Reyes and reversed the
judgment of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao. The
appellate court reasoned thus:
It must be pointed out that in the complaint-affidavit filed by
Acero, it was only Peñaloza who received the money and the
balance of P 500.00 which was without O.R. was retained by
Peñaloza. Nowhere in the complaint-affidavit could one find the
name of Reyes, herein petitioner, nor is it alleged there that
Reyes was around when Acero handed to Peñaloza the P
1000.00. From the evidence on record, it was, clearly, only
Peñaloza all along. Nowhere in the record is Reyes’ complicity
suggested or even slightly hinted.
xxxx
It does not appear on record that [Reyes] was the one who
ordered and received the "additional assessment". Rather, it
was Peñaloza alone who approached the complainant,
discussed about the "additional assessment", and retained the
balance of P 500 basing on the complaint-affidavit filed by
Acero.
We note with sadness that the counter-affidavit of Peñaloza, of
itself, was considered enough evidence by the investigation
officer in finding [Reyes] guilty of grave misconduct, and
dismissing him from government service. The testimony of
Peñaloza is, however, a self-serving declaration considering
that he is the co-respondent in the Ombudsman case filed by
Acero. Such a declaration which was obviously made
principally to save his own neck should have been received
with caution. This vital objection to the admission of this kind of
evidence is its hearsay character and to permit its unqualified
introduction in evidence would open the door to frauds and
perjuries.
It may be true that Reyes failed to attend the scheduled
preliminary conference where he could have refuted all the
hearsay evidence submitted against him. The introduction of
such as evidence does not, however, give them the probative
value which they did not bear in the first place. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given
credence.
The self-serving evidence presented in the form of a counter-
affidavit by Peñaloza should not have been taken hook, line
and sinker, so to speak, for there was no way of ascertaining
the truth of their contents. Moreover, in the Motion for
Reconsideration dated November 13, 2001 [Reyes] claimed
that he was not furnished any copy of Peñaloza’s counter-
affidavit. Thus, admissions made by Peñaloza in his sworn
statement are binding only on him. Res inter alios acta alteri
nocere non debet. The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced
by an act, declaration or omission of another.
The charge of misconduct is a serious charge, a "capital
offense" in a manner of speaking, which may cause the
forfeiture of one’s right to hold a public office. Therefore, said
charge must be proven and substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. Mere allegation will not suffice. It should
be supported by competent evidence, by substantial evidence.
We find the case against [Reyes] wanting in this regard.
FOR THESE REASONS, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
decision dated 24 September 2001 and the Joint Order dated
15 February 2002 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. [Reyes] is
hereby exonerated from the administrative charge for
insufficiency of evidence.27
The Office of the Ombudsman, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, filed a Motion for Reconsideration 28 of the
Court of Appeals decision. The same was, however, denied in
the assailed Resolution dated October 27, 2005.
Hence, the Office of the Ombudsman (petitioner) filed the
instant petition, raising the following issues:
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, IN NULLIFYING THE D E C I S I O N OF THE
OMBUDSMAN, DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
CONTRARY TO LAW AND APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE
IN THAT:
(i) It re-examined and weighed the evidence submitted in
the administrative proceedings and worse, substituted its
judgment for that of the Ombudsman; and,
(ii) It made a conclusion that substantial evidence does not
exist to warrant a finding of administrative culpability on
the part of respondent Reyes.
In essence, the fundamental issue in the instant case is
whether the charge of grave misconduct against Reyes was
sufficiently proven by substantial evidence. Petitioner settled
this issue in the affirmative, while the Court of Appeals ruled
otherwise.
In Salazar v. Barriga,30 the Court characterized the
administrative offenses of misconduct and grave misconduct
as follows:
Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate
violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute
an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be
connected with the performance of official functions and duties
of a public officer.
In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct,
the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or
flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest.
Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists in the
act of an official who unlawfully or wrongfully uses his station or
character to procure some benefit for himself, contrary to the
rights of others.31
Here, petitioner adjudged Reyes guilty of grave misconduct
after finding that Reyes, being then the Head of Office of the
LTO in Mambajao, Camiguin, illegally exacted money from
Acero in exchange for the issuance of a driver’s license to the
latter, notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite
written examination therefor.
68
In assailing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, petitioner
avers that the findings of fact of the Office of the Ombudsman
are entitled to great weight and must be accorded full respect
and credit as long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Petitioner argues that it is not the task of the
appellate court to weigh once more the evidence submitted
before an administrative body and to substitute its own
judgment for that of the administrative agency with respect to
the sufficiency of evidence.
Indeed, Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 mandates that the
findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive
when supported by substantial evidence. 32 In administrative
and quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is
necessary to establish the case for or against a party.
Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.
It is that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably opine
otherwise.33
Dadulo v. Court of Appeals34 reiterates that in reviewing
administrative decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court
to weigh the conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of
witnesses, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the
administrative agency with respect to the sufficiency of
evidence. However, while it is not the function of the Court to
analyze and weigh the parties' evidence all over again, an
exception thereto lies as when there is serious ground to
believe that a possible miscarriage of justice would thereby
result.
After carefully perusing the records of this case, we find that
the above-cited exception, rather than the general rule, applies
herein. Otherwise stated, the Court deems it proper that a
review of the case should be made in order to arrive at a just
resolution.
In the main, the evidence submitted by the parties in OMB-
MIN-ADM-01-170 consisted of their sworn statements, as well
as that of their witnesses. In the affidavit of Acero, he
categorically identified both Reyes and Peñaloza as the
persons who had the prerogative to reconsider his failed
examination, provided that he paid an additional amount on top
of the legal fees. For his part, Peñaloza ostensibly admitted the
charge of Acero in his counter-affidavit but he incriminated
Reyes therein as the mastermind of the illicit activity
complained of. To corroborate this allegation, Peñaloza
submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza. Amper was
a former LTO employee who allegedly had first-hand
knowledge of the practice of Reyes of imposing and pocketing
additional fees; while Valdehueza declared that he was an
applicant for a driver’s license who was likewise made to pay
the said additional fees to Reyes. Upon the other hand, Reyes’
counter-affidavit repudiated the allegations of Acero, insisting
that it was Peñaloza who illegally took the amount of ₱500.00
from Acero.
Reyes faults petitioner for placing too much reliance on the
counter-affidavit of Peñaloza, as well as the affidavits of Amper
and Valdehueza. Reyes claims that he was not furnished a
copy of the said documents before petitioner rendered its
Decision dated September 24, 2001. Reyes, thus, argues that
his right to due process was violated. Petitioner, on the other
hand, counters that Reyes was afforded due process since he
was given all the opportunities to be heard, as well as the
opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration of petitioner’s
adverse decision.
On this point, the Court finds merit in Reyes’ contention.
Ledesma v. Court of Appeals35 elaborates on the well
established doctrine of due process in administrative
proceedings as follows:
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and
in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him
and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In
administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer
the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process. The essence of due process is
simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 36
Moreover, Department of Health v. Camposano37 restates the
guidelines laid down in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations38 that due process in administrative proceedings
requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1)
the respondents’ right to a hearing, which includes the right to
present one’s case and submit supporting evidence, must be
observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support
itself; (4) there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision
must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or
at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have
acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the
controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a
subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered in such
manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the
various issues involved.39
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not
complied with.1avvphi1 Reyes was not properly apprised of the
evidence offered against him, which were eventually made the
bases of petitioner’s decision that found him guilty of grave
misconduct.
To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao, the respondents therein, i.e.,
Reyes and Peñaloza, were ordered to submit their counter-
affidavits in order to discuss the charges lodged against them.
While Peñaloza acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his
participation in the illicit transaction complained of, he pointed
to Reyes as the main culprit. Peñaloza thereafter submitted the
affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza as witnesses who would
substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal that
only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were
furnished copies of the said affidavits.40 Thus, Reyes was able
to respond only to the affidavit of Acero. It would appear that
Reyes had no idea that Peñaloza, a co-respondent in the
administrative case, would point an accusing finger at him and
even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The
said affidavits were made known to Reyes only after the
rendition of the petitioner’s Decision dated September 24,
2001.
69
The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of
the petitioner via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to
Set the Case for Preliminary Conference did not cure the
violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes filed the
said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his
right to due process. There is nothing on record to show that
Reyes was furnished with, or had otherwise received, a copy of
the affidavits of Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza, whether
before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was
issued. Thus, it cannot be said that Reyes had a fair
opportunity to squarely and intelligently answer the accusations
therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.
It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to
due process of a respondent in an administrative case was not
violated if he was able to file a motion for reconsideration to
refute the evidence against him. However, the instant case
should be differentiated from Ruivivar v. Office of the
Ombudsman,41 which likewise involved the issue of
administrative due process. In the said case, Ruivivar was
found administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her
official functions and was meted the penalty of reprimand. In
her motion for reconsideration, Ruivivar argued that she was
deprived of due process because she was not furnished copies
of the affidavits of complainant’s witnesses. Thereafter, the
Ombudsman ordered that Ruivivar be furnished with copies of
the affidavits of the witnesses, with the directive for her to file
any pleading that she may deem appropriate. As Ruivivar still
opted not to controvert the affidavits that were belatedly
provided to her, the Ombudsman ruled that her right to due
process was not violated and her administrative liability was
upheld. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Ombudsman,
declaring that "the law can no longer help one who had been
who had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did
not take full advantage of the proffered chance." 42
In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes’
protestations without giving him a similar opportunity, as
in Ruivivar, to be belatedly furnished copies of the affidavits of
Peñaloza, Amper and Valdehueza to enable him to refute the
same. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision dated
September 24, 2001 on the basis of evidence that were not
disclosed to Reyes. This the Court cannot sanction. A
judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme
penalty of dismissal must not only be based on substantial
evidence but also rendered with due regard to the rights of the
parties to due process.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 4, 2005 and the
Resolution dated October 27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70571, as well as the Decision dated
September 24, 2001 and the Joint Order dated February 15,
2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-
170, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The records of OMB-MIN-ADM-01-170 are REMANDED to the
Office of the Ombudsman, which is hereby ordered (a) to
furnish respondent Antonio T. Reyes copies of the affidavits of
Angelito G. Peñaloza, Rey P. Amper and Rickie Valdehueza,
and (b) to conduct further proceedings in OMB-MIN-ADM-01-
170 as may be appropriate. No pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175201 April 23, 2008
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN SIMEON V.
MARCELO, petitioner, vs. LEOPOLDO F. BUNGUBUNG and
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court, whereby petitioner Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) prays for the reversal of the
Decision1 dated 30 June 2006 and Resolution2 dated 26
October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
89689 which, in turn, reversed and set aside the Ombudsman's
Orders dated 11 January 2005 and 28 April 2005 in OMB-
ADM-0-01-0502. The Ombudsman found respondent Leopoldo
F. Bungubung (Bungubung) administratively liable for grave
misconduct, dismissing him from the service and imposing the
accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of
retirement benefits, and his perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service.
The Hon. Simeon V. Marcelo represented the Ombudsman,
with powers and functions provided under Article XI, Section 13
of the 1987 Constitution and the provisions of Republic Act No.
6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
Bungubung is the Manager of the Port District Office (PDO) of
Manila, Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), South Harbor, Port
Area, Manila. He is also the Chairman of the Ports District
Security Bids and Awards Committee (PDSBAC) of the PPA.
On 24 September 2001, Roberto C. Doromal (Doromal), the
President of Combat Security & Executive Protection Agency
(CSEPA), a security agency that participated in the bidding for
security services for the PPA, filed a Complaint-Affidavit3 dated
7 September 2001 against Bungubung before PPA Resident
Ombudsman Manolo M. Mabini, alleging as follows:
3. That sometime in June 1995, my aforesaid wife was
instrumental in negotiating and concluding a contract for
Security Services with the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA),
more particularly at the Port District of Manila (PDO-Manila) for
two (2) years starting August 1, 1995;
xxxx
6. That after a service contract was signed by PPA and this
agency on January 28, 1999, the Port District Manager of
PDO-Manila, Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung and other PPA officials
asked for certain amounts from my said wife as "balato" for
winning the award where (sic) the latter obliged herself to give;
7. That initially, Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung and other PPA
officials demanded amounts ranging from P10,000 a month
down to P2,000 for him (Bungubung) and his subordinates,
respectively; and my wife directed our staff, particularly the
Billing and Collection Clerk and Cashier to include in our
70
records and books of account these disbursements as
"Representation expense";
8. That when my late wife died on May 3, 2000, the same
arrangement was pursued and carried over through the period
that I was already the one dealing with PPA, and that,
sometime in late April 2000, when the security force was
increased to 184 Security guards at North Harbor-Special
Take-Over Unit (STU), the amount demanded by Mr.
Bungubung was also increased to P40,000 a month and
sometimes P50,000;
xxxx
10. That sometime in late February, 2001, one of office staff
received a telephone call from a certain Capt. Valenzuela of
the Port Police Dept. of PPA and because I was not around,
said Capt. Valenzuela left a message advising me to see Mr.
Leopoldo Bungubung for some important matters;
11. That upon receipt of the advise (sic) from my office staff, I
went to PPA, with my secretary, Ms. Evalyn Cruz, to see Mr.
Leopoldo Bungubung at his office located at old PNR Bldg.,
South Harbor, Port Area, Manila and at the same time
personally delivered a sum of money amounting to P50,000 as
earlier requested by him (Bungubung).
12. That during the course of my conversation with Mr.
Leopoldo Bungubung after giving the P50,000, he asked from
me a vehicle, Mitsubishi Pajero (late model) van, to be due and
delivered supposedly to him in the middle part of March 2001
while there is no award of the winning bidder yet; and that I
asked the said Bid Committee Chairman, Mr. Bungubung to
give me a grace period of two (2) months to produce what he
was asking from me. Unfortunately, however, due to the
expensive value of the said Pajero van, I was not able to
deliver. Hence, on March 30, 2001, I was served a Notice of
Award of the winning bidder which is STAR SPECIAL
WATCHMAN & DETECTIVE AGENCY, INC. an agency
comparatively smaller than mine;
13. That taking a cue from the Pajero van being asked, I
instructed my men to conduct an investigation and there, they
found a late model Pajero van with Plate No. WLA-674 parked
in from of the residence of Mr. Leopoldo Bungubung and later
verified to have been registered and transferred on 12 March
2001 under the name of Mr. Norman Vincent Bungubung, son
of Chairman Bungubung at #45 Buencamino St., BF Homes,
Paranaque City.4
In support of the allegations in his Complaint-Affidavit, Doromal
submitted an affidavit of his secretary Evalyn Cruz (Cruz) and
an alleged "blue book" of CSEPA. Cruz recounted in her
affidavit another incident wherein she personally handed over
the amount of P50,000.00 cash to Bungubung at his office on
16 January 2001. The CSEPA blue book purportedly detailed
monthly balato or payola paid to PPA officials from July 2000 to
February 2001, recorded therein as representation expenses. It
was allegedly prepared by a certain Evalyn M. Ebora (Ebora),
and approved by Doromal.
Thereafter, PPA Resident Ombudsman Mabini released a
Memorandum/Investigation Report5 dated 25 September 2001,
recommending the following:
a. That criminal complaint be filed against Mr. Leopoldo F.
Bungubung for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019; Section
7(d) of R.A. 6713 and Art. 211 of the RPC for demanding and
receiving "balato" from COMBAT in the total amount
of P320,000 more or less;
b. That likewise, an administrative complaint be filed against
Mr. Leopoldo F. Bungubung for Grave Misconduct and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service arising
from the above criminal act;
c. That Mr. Leopoldo F. Bungubung be placed under
Preventive Suspension for a period of six (6) months without
pay pursuant to Section 24 of R.A. 6770.
From the foregoing, the following complaints were filed against
Bungubung before the Ombudsman: (1) an administrative
complaint for Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service, docketed as OMB-ADM-0-01-0502
(OMB-0-01-0793); and (2) a criminal complaint for violation of
Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
docketed as OMB-0-01-0793.
After the parties submitted the required pleadings, a
preliminary conference was held on 21 February 2002 in OMB-
ADM-0-01-0502, the administrative case. Bungubung
manifested therein that he was submitting the case for
resolution. Doromal, however, was still undecided on whether
to opt for the conduct of a formal investigation or to submit the
case for resolution at once. In a Manifestation filed on 25
February 2002, Doromal informed the Ombudsman that he
was opting instead for the conduct of a formal investigation for
purposes of submission of evidence and affidavits of
witnesses.6
Doromal's aforecited manifestation notwithstanding, the
Ombudsman, in an Order dated 6 March 2002, through Graft
Investigation Officer II Joselito P. Fangon, ordered the
submission of the case for resolution.
The parties were then required to submit their respective
Memoranda.
On 28 November 2002, Graft Investigation Officer II Fangon
drafted a Decision7 which recommended the dismissal of the
administrative case against Bungubung, without prejudice to its
re-filing.
However, Ombudsman Marcelo disapproved Graft
Investigation Officer II Fangon's 28 November 2002 Decision,
and issued another Order8 dated 11 January 2005 finding
Bungubung liable for grave misconduct (which absorbed the
lesser offense of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service) and ordering Bungubung's dismissal from service,
together with the accessory penalties of cancellation of
eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and respondent's
perpetual disqualification from reemployment in government
service. The dispositive part of Ombudsman Marcelo's 11
January 2005 Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the 28 November 2002 Decision prepared by
the former Administrative Adjudication Bureau (AAB), this
Office, recommending the dismissal (without prejudice to its re-
71
filing) of the administrative complaint against [Bungubung] is
hereby DISAPPROVED.
Respondent LEOPOLDO F. BUNGUBUNG, Port District
Manager, Manila Port District, Philippine Ports Authority, is
hereby found liable for Grave Misconduct and, as such, is
DISMISSED from the service. The penalty of dismissal shall
carry with it the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits, and [Bungubung's] perpetual
disqualification from reemployment in the government service.
In the interim, the Ombudsman issued an Order9 dated 10
September 2003 in OMB-0-01-0793, for the filing of the
criminal complaint against Bungubung, after finding that there
was probable cause to indict him for violation of Section 3(b) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.10
The Ombudsman took into consideration its aforementioned 10
September 2003 Order in OMB-0-01-0793, when it found in
OMB-ADM-0-01-0502 that Bungubung took advantage of his
position as Chairman of the PDSBAC of the PPA, using it as
leverage in soliciting cash and a Mitsubishi Pajero van from the
bidders as consideration for the award of the security contract.
According to the Ombudsman, such actuations constitute
conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It
rejected Bungubung's denial and instead gave credence to the
attestation of Cruz that she personally delivered
the P50,000.00 to Bungubung.
Bungubung filed a Motion for Reconsideration 11 of the 11
January 2005 Order of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM-0-01-
0502, but it was denied by the Ombudsman in another
Order12 dated 28 April 2005, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration dated 21
January 2005 filed by respondent Leopoldo F. Bungubung is
DENIED. The Order dated 11 January 2005 finding him liable
for Grave Misconduct thereby ordering him dismissed from the
service, together with its accessory penalties, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
Bungubung then sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a
Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89689. He asserted
therein that the Ombudsman erred in (a) holding that there was
substantial evidence to make him liable for grave misconduct,
resulting in his dismissal from service and imposition upon him
of the accessory penalties; and (b) ordering him dismissed
from the service, when the Constitution merely empowered
said office to make a recommendation of dismissal. Pending
resolution of CA-G.R. SP No. 89689 by the Court of Appeals,
Bungubung filed therein a Motion for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
to enjoin the Ombudsman and the PPA General Manager from
implementing the Order dated 11 January 2005 which
dismissed him from service.13 The Court of Appeals granted
the TRO on 3 June 2005.14
In the meantime, Doromal executed an Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion to Withdraw Complaint15 dated 18 August 2005
and an Affidavit of Desistance16 dated 23 August 2005, which
he filed before the Ombudsman. In his Ex-Parte Manifestation
and Motion to Withdraw Complaint and Affidavit of Desistance,
Doromal expressed his desire to withdraw his Complaint-
Affidavit against Bungubung and desist from the continuance of
both OMB-ADM-0-01-0502 and OMB-0-01-0793. Doromal
explicitly admitted in said documents that his allegations in the
administrative and criminal complaints against Bungubung
were all fabricated. He further confessed that Bungubung
never demanded or received any balato from him or his wife in
exchange for the award of the PPA security service contract;
nor did Bungubung ask for a Mitsubishi Pajero van from him.
On 30 June 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89689 ruling in Bungubung's favor, and
reversing and setting aside the Orders dated 11 January 2005
and 28 April 2005 of the Ombudsman. It further absolved
Bungubung from liability for the charge of grave misconduct,
finding no substantial evidence that Bungubung committed the
same.
According to the appellate court:
There is merit in the petition.
Indeed, there is absence of substantial evidence to hold
[Bungubung] liable for grave misconduct.
To begin with, [Doromal] and his witness failed to appear at the
preliminary conference on February 21, 2005 to attest to the
truth of the contents of their affidavits. For such failure, their
affidavits are inadmissible as they are hearsay evidence.
xxxx
By not appearing at the preliminary conference and affirming
their affidavits, We can not readily conclude that the contents
thereof are true. It is highly probable that [Doromal] is only sour
graping for losing the PPA 2001 service contract. As early as
January 18, 2001, the bids for the 2001 service contract were
already opened and authenticated. Thus, it can not be said that
the bids were manipulated or rigged to favour somebody.
While rules of procedure do not strictly apply to administrative
cases as long as defendant's right to due process is not
violated, its liberal application in administrative cases does not
allow admission of hearsay evidence, i.e. affidavits not
identified by affiants, as this would violate the constitutional
right of petitioner to due process and his substantive right not
to be adjudged guilty on the basis of hearsay evidence.
xxxx
In the instant case, [Bungubung], in denying the assertion of
Evalyn Cruz in her affidavit that she gave him P50,000.00, and
in describing her claim as a self-serving fabrication, is positive
evidence that what she claimed did not occur. This holds true
with respect to [Bungubung's] positive denial of [Doromal's]
assertion that he gave [Bungubung] another P50,000.00 in late
February 2001 and that he also demanded a late model Pajero
from [Doromal].
[The Ombudsman] accepted as credible [Doromal's] claim that
[Bungubung] asked for a late model Pajero in exchange for the
2001 security service contract. x x x
72
The following must, however, be considered:
1. The rule on positive and negative testimonies do not apply
where a person who is in a position to know if a fact occurred
denies that it did. This is positive denial which has the same
weight as a contrary assertion.
2. The finding that the van was acquired after the failed
solicitation and before the award readily assumes as true
private respondent's bare assertion that petitioner asked him
for a van.
Allegedly taking cue from his failure to deliver a Pajero van,
[Doromal] had [Bungubung's] home cased and saw a Pajero in
front of his house. If this is the case, why was this not
mentioned by [Doromal] when he filed a civil case to stop the
award of the security service contract on ground of
irregularities in the bidding? Neither was this matter brought up
during the hearing on the application for a TRO. [Doromal] only
brought up this matter about a Pajero in his affidavit-complaint
of September 7, 2001 after hearing that [Bungubung's] son has
a newly-bought Pajero.
1. [Bungubung] presented proof that on May 4, 2001,
[Doromal] filed a false "hit-and-run" report involving the Pajero
with plate WLA 674 of [Bungubung's] son. This shows the
extent that [Doromal] would go just to spite [Bungubung].
2. The President of Star Security Agency declared under oath
that he did not give [Bungubung] any Pajero;
3. The Pajero was acquired by [Bungubung's] son from a
certain Teresito Uy as evidenced by a notarized deed of sale;
4. It is unfair to assume that [Bungubung's] son could not afford
the price of a used Pajero. He put up a glass and aluminum
business after getting married.
From the foregoing, [the Ombudsman] should have dismissed
the complaint for lack of substantial evidence to support it.
The fallo of the Court of Appeals' 30 June 2006 Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED and
GIVEN DUE COURSE. The Orders17 of the Ombudsman dated
January 11, 200[5] and April 28, 200[5] are reversed and set
aside and a new one issued absolving petitioner from liability
for the charge of grave misconduct.18
The Ombudsman filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
afore-quoted Decision, which the appellate court denied in its
Resolution dated 26 October 2006 for lack of merit, thus:
Notably, the issues raised in the motion have already been
thoroughly threshed out and passed upon in the assailed
decision. No novel or new matters were introduced therein.
The disquisition made by the Supreme Court in Dela Cruz vs.
Department of Education, Culture and Sports-Cordillera
Administrative Region is most helpful, "We have long held that
affidavits are deemed hearsay evidence because the adverse
party is deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the
affiants. Hence, affidavits are generally deemed inadmissible
or rejected outright unless the affiants themselves are placed
on the witness stand to testify thereon.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.19
Consequently, the Ombudsman filed this Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
based on the following grounds:
I.
THE RELIANCE BY THE OMBUDSMAN ON THE
AFFIDAVITS OF ROBERTO DOROMAL AND HIS
WITNESS IN DETERMINING [BUNGUBUNG]'S
ADMINISTRATIVE LIABILITY WAS PROPER. IT DID
NOT DEPRIVE [BUNGUBUNG] OF DUE PROCESS;
II.
THE FINDING OF ADMINISTRATIVE OFFENSE
FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT AGAINST
[BUNGUBUNG] IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE;
III.
AS CONSEQUENTLY HELD BY THE SUPREME
COURT, THE FINDINGS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
DESERVE GREAT WEIGHT, AND MUST BE
ACCORDED FULL RESPECT AND CREDIT.
The Ombudsman prays that this Court render a Decision
nullifying and setting aside the Decision dated 30 June 2006
and Resolution dated 26 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 89689, and affirming the Ombudsman's
Orders dated 11 January 2005 and 28 April 2005 in OMB-
ADM-0-01-0502 which found Bungubung guilty of Grave
Misconduct and dismissing him from service with all the
accessory penalties incident thereto.
Bungubung counters that the Court of Appeals correctly held
that there was no substantial evidence to hold him liable for
grave misconduct; and that the reliance by the Ombudsman on
the affidavits of Doromal and Cruz in determining his
administrative liability, despite the fact that the contents thereof
were not personally attested to by the affiants before the
Ombudsman, was a clear violation of his right to due process.
He also avers that the Court of Appeals was correct in giving
credence to the Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion to
Withdraw the Complaint and Affidavit of Desistance, filed by
Doromal with the Ombudsman in August 2005, as proof of
Bungubung's lack of culpability.
The present Petition must fail.
Before proceeding to the merits of the instant Petition, this
Court deems it necessary to first address the allegation of
Bungubung that he was denied due process by the
Ombudsman. The fact that no formal hearing took place is not
73
sufficient ground to say that due process was not afforded
Bungubung. It is well-settled that in administrative proceedings,
including those before the Ombudsman, cases may be
submitted for resolution on the basis of affidavits and
pleadings. The standard of due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as
long as fairness is not ignored. It is, therefore, not legally
objectionable for being violative of due process for an
administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on
position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may
take the place of their direct testimonies.20 Undoubtedly,
due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to
explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of,21 which requirement was
afforded Bungubung.22
In Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas v. National
Labor Relations Commission,23 this Court held that:
Actual adversarial proceeding becomes necessary only for
clarification or when there is a need to propound searching
questions to unclear witnesses. This is a procedural right which
the employee must, however, ask for it is not an inherent right,
and summary proceedings may be conducted. This is to
correct the common but mistaken perception that procedural
due process entails lengthy oral arguments. Hearings in
administrative proceedings and before quasi-judicial agencies
are neither oratorical contests nor debating skirmishes where
cross examination skills are displayed. Non-verbal devices
such as written explanations, affidavits, positions papers or
other pleadings can establish just as clearly and concisely
aggrieved parties' predicament or defense. What is essential is
ample opportunity to be heard, meaning, every kind of
assistance that management must accord the employee to
prepare adequately for his defense.
After the filing of the Complaint, Bungubung was allowed by
the Ombudsman to submit the following: (a) a counter-affidavit
refuting the charges against him; (b) a rejoinder-affidavit; and
(c) a Motion for Reconsideration of the 11 January 2005 Order
of the Ombudsman. Moreover, Bungubung had the option to
subject the case to a formal investigation, but his Manifestation
dated 21 February 2002 before the Ombudsman was evidence
that he did not choose to do so and, instead, agreed to submit
the case for resolution on the basis of the affidavits on record.
These facts establish that Bungubung was not deprived of his
right to due process, having ample opportunity to present his
side before the Ombudsman. In fact, it was only later on in a
Manifestation filed on 25 February 2002 that Doromal changed
his mind and informed the Ombudsman that he was opting
instead for the conduct of a formal investigation.
That point having been settled, this Court moves on to
determine the merits of the Petition at bar.
The Petition primarily involves questions of fact, pitting against
each other the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals and
those of the Ombudsman, both of which depended on the
probative weight to be given to the affidavits of Doromal, Cruz,
and the alleged CSEPA blue book.
We stress the procedural tenet that a petition for review
on certiorari filed with this Court under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court shall raise only questions of law. 24 A question of
law has been defined as one that does not call for any
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented
by the parties;25 a question of fact arises when the doubt or
difference pertains to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or
when the query necessarily solicits calibration of the whole
evidence considering mostly the credibility of witnesses,
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances,
their relation to one another and to the whole and probabilities
of the situation.26 We have consistently held that in a petition
for review on certiorari, this Court does not sit as an arbiter of
facts for it is not the function of the Supreme Court to analyze
or weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the
proceedings below.27 Such factual findings can be questioned
only if, among other exceptions,28 the findings of fact are
conflicting and the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the lower court and/or administrative agency, which
exceptional circumstances are present herein, thus, justifying
the review by this Court of the factual findings of the
Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals.
In Montemayor v. Bundalian,29 this Court laid down the
following guidelines for the judicial review of decisions
rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial power:
First, the burden is on the complainant to prove by substantial
evidence the allegations in his complaint. Substantial evidence
is more than a mere scintilla of evidence. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally
reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. Second, in
reviewing administrative decisions of the executive branch of
the government, the findings of facts made therein are to be
respected so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence. Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the
conflicting evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or
otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the administrative
agency with respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third,
administrative decisions in matters within the executive
jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross abuse of
discretion, fraud, or error of law. These principles negate the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of
the evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted
therein, and do not authorize the court to receive additional
evidence that was not submitted to the administrative agency
concerned.
As stated above, the fundamental rule in administrative
proceedings is that the complainant has the burden of proving,
by substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint.
Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act is unequivocal: Findings of
fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by
substantial evidence are conclusive. Conversely, therefore,
when the findings of fact by the Ombudsman are not
adequately supported by substantial evidence, they shall not
be binding upon the courts. Such is the case in the present
Petition.
Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.30 The standard of substantial evidence
is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe that
respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained
74
of,31 even if such evidence might not be overwhelming or even
preponderant.32 While substantial evidence does not
necessarily import preponderance of evidence as is required in
an ordinary civil case,33 or evidence beyond reasonable doubt
as is required in criminal cases,34 it should be enough for a
reasonable mind to support a conclusion. There is none here.
Bungubung is being charged with the administrative offense of
Grave Misconduct, which has been authoritatively defined
in Amosco v. Judge Magro35 as:
Misconduct in office has a definite and well-understood legal
meaning. By uniform legal definition, it is a misconduct such as
affects his performance of his duties as an officer and not such
only as affects his character as a private individual. In such
cases, it has been said at all times, it is necessary to separate
the character of the man from the character of the officer x x x.
It is settled that misconduct, misfeasance, or malfeasance
warranting removal from office of an officer, must have direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of official
duties amounting either to maladministration or willful,
intentional neglect and failure to discharge the duties of the
office. x x x.
In In re: Impeachment of Horilleno,36 this Court authoritatively
defined serious misconduct --
"[S]ufficient cause" must exist in the judgment of the Supreme
Court involving "serious misconduct." The adjective is
"serious"; that is, important, weighty, momentous, and not
trifling. The noun is "misconduct"; that is, a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. x x
x.
Being guided accordingly by the aforementioned evidentiary
rules and jurisprudence, this Court finds that the evidence on
record in the present case does not constitute substantial
evidence of Bungubung's administrative culpability for grave
misconduct.
Within the field of administrative law, while strict rules of
evidence are not applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings,
nevertheless, in adducing evidence constitutive of substantial
evidence, the basic rule that mere allegation is not evidence
cannot be disregarded.37
In his Affidavit-Complaint, Doromal accused Bungubung of
soliciting and receiving P100,000.00 from him and a Mitsubishi
Pajero van from another bidder in exchange for the award of
the security services contract of the PPA. Doromal also
accused Bungubung and other PPA employees of demanding
and receiving balato in consideration of the award of the PPA
Security Service Contract.
In addition to his Complaint-Affidavit, Doromal submitted a
Reply-Affidavit, as well as the following supporting documents:
(a) Affidavit of Evalyn Cruz, his secretary;
(b) CSEPA blue book detailing the monthly "balato" or "payola"
paid to PPA officials and employees, referred to therein as
representation expenses.
On the other hand, Bungubung filed his Counter-Affidavit and
Rejoinder-Affidavit. In his defense, Bungubung further
submitted the following evidence:
(a) Affidavit of Celso A. Fernandez, President and Chairman of
Star Special Watchman and Detective Agency, Inc., the
winning bidder, who denied giving any money or a Pajero to
Bungubung;
(b) Affidavit of a certain Rufino Valenzuela, who denied giving
instructions for Doromal to go to Bungubung's office;
(c) A copy of the petition in Civil Case No. 01-100678, entitled
"Roberto C. Doromal, etc. v. Philippine Ports Authority, et al.,"
questioning the legality of the case filed by Doromal against
Bungubung before the RTC to show that Doromal never
mentioned therein that Bungubung requested for a Pajero from
him;
(d) A copy of the Deed of Sale of the Pajero executed by
Teresito Uy in favor of Norman Vincent Bungubung, as proof
that the said vehicle was bought and is now owned by
Bungubung's son;
(e) A copy of the "Traffic Incident Report" of the Central Police
Traffic Enforcement Office to evidence the fabricated "hit and
run" charge made by an employee of CSEPA against the
Pajero owned by Bungubung's son; and
(f) PSBAC Resolutions establishing that the award of the PPA
Security Contracts was made by public bidding.
The Ombudsman chose to give more credence to Doromal's
allegations and evidence when it found that Bungubung took
advantage of his position as Chairman of the PSBAC and used
it as leverage in soliciting cash and a Mitsubishi Pajero van
from the bidders as a consideration for the award of the PPA
security service contract. However, Doromal's evidence is
hardly substantive.
First, Doromal's allegation that Bungubung acquired the
Mitsubishi Pajero van from another bidder after failing to
successfully solicit the same from him is highly suspect, since
Doromal only narrated the alleged solicitation in his Affidavit-
Complaint against Bungubung filed with the Ombudsman on 7
September 2001. He failed to mention such a significant
circumstance in Civil Case No. 01100678, Roberto C. Doromal
v. Philippine Ports Authority, before the RTC or in his petition
for TRO in the same case, both of which were filed ahead of
his Affidavit-Complaint before the Ombudsman.
Second, little weight should be given to the CSEPA blue book
allegedly detailing the monthly payola or balato paid to PPA
officials and employees from July 2000 to February 2001,
recorded therein as representation expenses. According to the
CSEPA blue book, the following PPA key officials received
monthly representation allowances:
75
 the straightforward and positive declaration of a witness since
NAME POSITION PERIOD TOTAL
denials constitute self-serving negative evidence which cannot
AMOUNT
be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
Mr. Cecilio AGM July 2000- P200,000.00 credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. Thus, in
Operations Feb 2001 the case of contradictory declarations and statements, greater
Leopoldo Port District July 2000- P300,000.00 weight is generally given to positive testimonies than to mere
Bungubung Manager Feb 2001 denials.38
Ted Alcalde District July 2000- P144,000.00
Manager Feb 2001 In this instance, however, Bungubung's denial of the
allegations against him are supported by his own controverting
Capt. Gamis Chief of Port July 2000- P144,000.00 evidence. In contrast, Doromal's Complaint-Affidavit and Cruz's
Police – Feb 2001 Affidavit support only each other.

North Harbor Finally, this Court cannot ignore Doromal's Ex-

Felix Barcala Chief of Port July 2000- P35,000.00 Parte Manifestation and Motion to Withdraw Complaint dated
Police – Feb 2001 18 August 2005 and Affidavit of Desistance dated 23 August
2005, which he filed with the Ombudsman. In both documents,
Doromal expressed his desire to withdraw his Complaint-
South Harbor
Affidavit filed with the Ombudsman and desist from the
Alex Cruz July 2000- P144,000.00 continuance of the criminal and administrative complaints
Feb 2001 against Bungubung. Doromal explicitly admitted therein that he
merely fabricated all his allegations against Bungubung.

The CSEPA blue book, however, is evidently self-serving. The
entries therein were purportedly made by a certain Ebora, who
was never presented to personally identify the entries she
made or confirm the same. The only other person involved in
the preparation of the blue book was Doromal who supposedly
approved the entries therein. The blue book is not audited, nor
is it subject to review by an independent party. The blue book
then can easily be manufactured. Considering the seriousness
of the charges which may arise against the public officers
named therein, the entries in the blue book must not be
accepted at face value when the entries therein are
uncorroborated by any other evidence.
Third, while the Ombudsman gave much weight and credit to
Doromal's evidence, it lightly brushed aside that submitted by
Bungubung. Among Bungubung's evidence which the
Ombudsman failed to consider was a copy of the "Traffic
Accident Incident Report" prepared by the Central Police
Traffic Enforcement Office, stating that on 4 May 2001,
Doromal filed a false report of a "hit-and-run" incident which
supposedly occurred on 1 May 2001 involving the Mitsubishi
Pajero van of Bungubung's son. The report was made by the
police investigator in his official capacity; thus, it enjoys the
presumption of regularity and is a prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. The filing of the false report establishes ill
motive on the part of Doromal specifically directed against
Bungubung.
Fourth, the main defense put up by Bungubung is complete
denial, a defense which is said to be the weakest, seldom
believed or given weight, as it is easy to fabricate.
Nonetheless, Bungubung's denial of -- (a) Cruz's allegation in
her affidavit that she personally gave Bungubung P50,000.00
on 16 January 2001; (b) Doromal's assertion in his affidavit that
he gave Bungubung another P50,000.00 in late February 2001;
and (c) Doromal's assertion that Bungubung demanded from
him a late model Mitsubishi Pajero van -- is given weight in this
instance.
In the absence of corroborative evidence, the Court would not
be prepared to accept the usual lame defense of denial over
While this Court looks with disfavor on affidavits of desistance,
still, its effect on the instant case cannot be ignored. Doromal's
Affidavit of Desistance includes an explicit admission that he
fabricated the charges against Bungubung. Therefore,
Doromal's Affidavit of Desistance is an express repudiation of
the material points alleged in his Complaint-Affidavit, and not a
mere expression of his lack of interest to pursue his complaints
against Bungubung. Since Doromal willfully and knowingly
executed his Affidavit of Desistance, there being no showing
that he was made to do so fraudulently or under duress, then it
may be admitted and considered as evidence which
considerably puts into question the probative value of the
Affidavit-Complaint he executed earlier and he now repudiates.
In Gaviola v. Salcedo,39 which involved an administrative case
for suspension or disbarment against a lawyer, this Court gave
probative value to the Affidavit of Desistance of the
complainant, pronouncing that while the filing of an Affidavit of
Desistance by the complainant for lack of interest does not ipso
facto result in the termination of the administrative case, it was
constrained to dismiss the charges since such charges cannot
be proven without the evidence of the complainant and her
witnesses. Such is the case at bar. Essentially, the
administrative case against Bungubung was based on the
allegations made by Doromal in his Affidavit-Complaint, without
which, the case against Bungubung collapses.
The Court of Appeals therefore took proper notice of
Doromal's Ex-Parte Motion to Withdraw the Affidavit-Complaint
and Affidavit of Desistance since they cast a different light on
the evidence previously considered by the Ombudsman.
After evaluating the totality of evidence on record, this Court
reaches the inescapable conclusion that complainant Doromal
failed to present substantial evidence that Bungubung is
administratively liable for grave misconduct.
As this Court declared in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations,40 the assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go so far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force.

76
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review
on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 30 June 2006 and
Order dated 26 October 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89689 are AFFIRMED. No Costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 191877 June 18, 2013
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), Petitioner, vs. ARIEL R. MARQUEZ, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 192287
IRENEO M. VERDILLO, Petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT and GAMING CORPORATION
(PAGCOR), Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended.
The petition in G.R. No. 191877 seeks to reverse the October
9, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 106196, which set aside Resolution Nos. 08-07022 and 08-
18583 of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) dismissing
respondent Ariel R. Marquez from service for serious
dishonesty, violation of office rules and regulations, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The petition in G.R. No. 192287 meanwhile, questions the July
21, 2009 CA Decision4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 106961, which
affirmed CSC Resolution Nos. 08-09315 and 08-2231,
dismissing petitioner Ireneo M. Verdillo from service for serious
dishonesty, violation of office rules and regulations, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Ariel R. Marquez and Ireneo M. Vedillo were both employed as
dealers in the game of Craps at the Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) at the Casino Filipino
Heritage. The game of Craps is initiated when a player, called
a "shooter," rolls a pair of dice that should pass a demarcation
line set across the table. As a rule, at least one of the two dice
must come in contact with the rubber wall at the end of the
table. When these conditions are met, the dealer known as a
stickman6 considers the throw a "good dice" and the pay-off
dealer pays the winner. Otherwise, the throw is invalidated,
and the stickman must announce "no dice." The conditions are
imposed to prevent manipulation of the results of the throw.
On November 26, 2006, Marquez and Verdillo alternately
manned Craps Table No. 30, together with Joselito Magahis
and Virgilio Ruanto. At around 2:46 a.m., Mr. Johnny
Cheng7 began playing at Craps Table No. 30 with Verdillo as
stickman and Marquez as the pay-off dealer. While doing her
rounds, Acting Pit Supervisor Eulalia Yang noticed that on
several occasions Verdillo made a "good dice" call even
though not one of the dice from the player’s throw hit the
table’s rubber wall. Alarmed by what she saw, Yang reported
the matter to the Casino Management. Thereafter, Mr. Ariston
Tangalin, the Acting Casino Shift Manager, requested to review
the Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) footage of the incident.
After watching the footage, the members of the Casino
Management and the investigators from the Corporate
Investigation Unit were convinced that several void throws
were declared as "good dice" in Table No. 30 while the same
was being manned by Marquez and Verdillo. Senior Branch
Surveillance Officer Wilbur U. Isabelo also submitted a report
to the Surveillance Unit, stating that Based on video footage,
there were [eight (8)] occasions when the dices did not [touch]
the rubber wall. Dealer Stickman Verdillo should have declared
the games void or no dice but instead declared the games as
good dice after which, Dealer Pay-off paid the bets of the
customer, a certain Mr. Johnny Ching. It was noted that
whenever A/PS Eulalia Yang, Dealers Joselito Magahis and
Virgilio Ruanto were monitoring the transactions on said table,
Mr. Ching would throw the dices normally which touched the
rubber wall. It was also observed that Mr. Ching was positioned
near the Stickman.
Hereunder is the chronological fraudulent transactions which
transpired from 0246H – 0314H November 27, 2006 at table
#30 (Craps):
0246H : Customer Mr. Johnny Ching started playing at table
#30.
0258:05H : Game was no dice. Customer’s placed bet of
₱2,000 on point 5 was paid with ₱3,000.
0258:41H : Game was no dice. Customer’s placed bet of
₱1,000 on point 6 was paid with ₱1,100.
0259:23H : Game was no dice. Customer’s placed bet of
₱4,000 on point 5 was paid with ₱5,000.
0259:36H : Game was no dice. Customer’s placed bet of
₱2,000 on point 6 was paid with ₱2,200.
0302:57H : Game was no dice. Customer’s placed bet of
₱4,000 on point 6 was paid with ₱4,400.
0303:23H : Game was no dice. Customer’s placed bet of
₱1,000 on point 8 was paid with ₱1,100.
0303:39H : Game was no dice. Customer’s placed bet of
₱2,000 on point 9 was paid with ₱2,500.
0305:18H : Game was no dice. Customer’s placed bet of
₱4,000 on point 9 was paid with ₱5,000.
0314H : Customer Mr. Ching stopped playing.8
On November 28, 2006, after conducting a fact-finding
investigation, the Internal Security Investigation Section found
that a prima facie case exists against Marquez and Verdillo.
Hence, they were administratively charged with conspiring with
Cheng in defrauding PAGCOR of an undetermined amount of
money9 and were required to submit a written explanation. In
his Sinumpaang Salaysay,10 Marquez admitted that he was
77
aware of several erroneous calls made by Verdillo on the dice
throws, but he still paid out winnings to Cheng. Meanwhile,
Verdillo also submitted a written explanation, denying the
accusations against him. On December 13, 2006, they were
invited by the Branch Management Panel (BMP) to a hearing
to explain their side of the controversy.11
Later, the BMP rendered its decision finding both Marquez and
Verdillo liable for fraudulent transactions and recommended
their dismissal from service, as follows:
Though it was only in November 26, 2006 that the anomaly
was discovered, the information and revelations pronounced by
PM Senatin12 since August 2005 and the proof from the
footages, are strong evidence to prove that there is something
going on with craps.
It was observed and viewed in the CCTV footages that
whenever there are other customers watching his play, Mr.
Cheng throws the dice with force passing through the center of
the table in such a way that it produces a sound to be heard
loudly when it touches the rubber wall. However, when both
Marquez and Verdillo are around, the dice is thrown at the side
of the table barely touching its rubber walling.
Dealer Pay-off may overrule the decision of the stickman.
However, during the game on eight (8) occasions, Dealer
Marquez did not become observant considering that Dealer
Verdillo is not good in craps nor did not insist on calling his
attention for the bad calls.
Foregoing considered, the Panel resolved to dismiss Dealers
Ireneo Verdillo and Ariel Marquez for the offense of
"FRAUDULENT TRANSACTIONS AT CRAPS TO THE
DISADVANTAGE OF THE HOUSE."13 (Emphasis and
underscoring in the original.)
The BMP’s recommendation was adopted by the Adjudication
Committee and its findings were then forwarded to PAGCOR’s
Board of Directors for final approval. Senior Managing Head of
the Human Resource and Development Department, Visitacion
F. Mendoza, later sent a Memorandum to Marquez and
Verdillo informing them that the Board had approved the
Adjudication Committee’s recommendation to dismiss them
from the service due to "Dishonesty, Grave violation of
company rules and regulations, Conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the company, and Loss of trust and confidence" for
conspiring with a co-dealer and a customer in defrauding the
house on numerous occasions on November 27, 2006. 14
Marquez and Verdillo filed their motions for reconsideration,
but both were denied by PAGCOR for lack of merit.15
Aggrieved, they appealed their dismissal from the service to
the CSC.
In Resolution No. 08-0702, the CSC dismissed Marquez’s
appeal for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the Resolution
reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Ariel R. Marquez is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the PAGCOR
Board of Directors dated February 1, 2007, finding respondent-
appellant guilty of the administrative offenses of Dishonesty,
Grave Violation of Company Rules and Regulations, Conduct
Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Company, Loss of Trust
and Confidence and Conspiring with a co-Dealer and a
Customer in Defrauding the House and imposing upon him the
penalty of dismissal from the service and the decision of the
same Board denying his Motion for Reconsideration is hereby
MODIFIED. Accordingly, this Commission finds that
respondent-appellant is guilty of the administrative offenses of
Serious Dishonesty, Violation of Office Rules and Regulations
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service and
imposes the penalty of dismissal from the service with all its
accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits,
perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government
service, bar from taking civil service examinations in the future
and cancellation of civil service eligibilities.16
Likewise, in Resolution No. 08-0931, the appeal of Verdillo was
dismissed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of Ireneo M. Verdillo, Dealer,
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),
Manila is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of
the PAGCOR Board of Directors dated February 1, 2007,
finding respondent-Appellant guilty of the administrative
offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Violation of Company Rules and
Regulations, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Company, Loss of Trust and Confidence and Conspiring with a
coDealer and a Customer in Defrauding the House and
imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service
and the decision of the same Board denying his Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly, this
Commission finds that respondent-Appellant is guilty of the
administrative offenses of Serious Dishonesty, Violation of
Office Rules and Regulations and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service and imposes the penalty of
dismissal from the service with all its accessory penalties of
forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service and cancellation of all
eligibilities.17
The CSC held that it has reasonable ground to believe that
Marquez and Verdillo were involved in a conspiracy to
manipulate the game of Craps on November 27, 2006. It found
that the statements made by Marquez and Verdillo, the CCTV
footage, the investigation report, and the statements of the
employees, all belie their innocence. The CSC further pointed
out that it was incumbent upon Marquez to make sure that
Verdillo’s calls were in order, and it was Verdillo’s duty to verify
that his declarations on the dice throws were accurate. Hence,
it concluded that together with Cheng, they were one in their
goal to manipulate the game of Craps to the detriment of
PAGCOR. The CSC denied their motions for reconsideration.
Not satisfied, Marquez filed a petition for review with the CA
arguing that he was not accorded his right to due process and
that there was no substantial evidence to support a finding of
his guilt in the administrative charge.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 106196, the CA rendered a decision in his
favor, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed resolutions
dated February 1, 2007 and May 12, 2007 are REVERSED
78
and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering
respondent to reinstate petitioner to his former position and to
pay his backwages and benefits from March 28, 2007 onwards.
SO ORDERED.18
The CA held that there is no administrative charge of
conspiracy under the Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service. It found Marquez’s Sinumpaang Salaysay
credible and ruled that there was no dishonesty on his part,
much less a conspiracy with Verdillo and Cheng to defraud
PAGCOR. The CA observed that the fact that as stated in his
sworn statement, Marquez called Verdillo’s attention to his
erroneous call only on the second time that Verdillo made an
erroneous call, cannot be interpreted that he was dishonest or
engaged in a conspiracy. Rather, it shows that he was
negligent in the performance of his duties.
Meanwhile, Verdillo filed with the CA a separate petition for
review which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 106961. He
argued that PAGCOR’s Decision was not supported by the
evidence on record. He also averred that he was denied due
process of law.
The CA, however, denied Verdillo’s petition, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Civil Service Commission Resolution Nos. 080931 and 082231
are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.19
In that case, the CA found that Verdillo did not judiciously
perform all the acts expected of him as a dealer-stickman and
all acts necessary to protect PAGCOR’s interest. The CA found
that there exists substantial evidence to support the conclusion
that Verdillo is guilty of the offense of violation of office rules
and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service. The CA also concluded that the circumstances
present in the case supply more than reasonable grounds to
believe that Verdillo conspired with Marquez and Cheng to
defraud PAGCOR.
Unsatisfied, PAGCOR filed before this Court a petition for
review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 191877, arguing that
the CA erred in finding that the notice of charges against
Marquez was not in accordance with the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases. It contends that the designation of the
offense in an administrative case is not controlling and one
may be found guilty of another offense if it is based on the
same facts subject of the original designation. Furthermore,
PAGCOR asserts that the CA erred in simply brushing aside
the evidence considered by the CSC, stressing that the factual
findings of administrative bodies are controlling on the
reviewing authority.
On the other hand, Marquez maintains that there was no
substantial evidence to support the findings of the CSC. He
insists that conspiracy must be proved as sufficiently as the
crime itself through clear and convincing evidence. In this case,
there was no unity of purpose in the execution of the fraudulent
acts since he called Verdillo’s attention whenever he made bad
calls. Marquez claims that the charges against him are based
mainly on suspicions and are not supported by facts.
For his part, Verdillo also filed before this Court a petition for
review on certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 192287. He argues
that PAGCOR failed to present substantial evidence to justify
his dismissal from service. He contends that his sworn
statement cannot be considered as substantial evidence to
support the offense of violation of office rules and regulations
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service as
there was no admission on his part that he violated house
rules. Finally, he stresses that the existence of conspiracy was
not established. Thus, he prays for his reinstatement to his
former position without loss of seniority rights and other
benefits as well as back wages.
Essentially, the issue in this case is whether Marquez and
Verdillo are guilty of dishonesty, violation of office rules and
regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service to justify their dismissal from service.
It is worthy to state that in petitions for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, only questions of law may be raised. It is not our
function to analyze or weigh all over again evidence already
considered in the proceedings below, our jurisdiction being
limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been
committed by the lower court. The resolution of factual issues
is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these
matters are received with respect. A question of law which we
may pass upon must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. 20
This rule, however, is not ironclad. We have consistently
recognized several exceptional circumstances where we
disregarded the aforesaid tenet and proceeded to review the
findings of facts of the lower court such as when the findings of
fact are conflicting or when the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant and undisputed facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 21 Considering
the conflict in the factual findings of the CSC and of the CA, we
rule on the factual issues as an exception to the general rule.
Marquez was administratively charged for conspiring with
Verdillo and Cheng to defraud PAGCOR in CA-G.R. SP No.
106196. The CA observed that there was a disparity between
the offense charged and the offenses for which Marquez was
found guilty -- dishonesty, grave violation of company rules and
regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
company and loss of trust and confidence. The CA concluded
that PAGCOR failed to comply with the requirement of
administrative due process since Marquez was not duly
apprised of the proper charges which led to his dismissal.
We do not agree.
Section 16, Rule II of the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service provides as follows:
Section 16. Formal Charge. – After a finding of a prima facie
case, the disciplining authority shall formally charge the person
complained of. The formal charge shall contain a specification
of charge(s), a brief statement of material or relevant facts,
accompanied by certified true copies of the documentary
evidence, if any, sworn statements covering the testimony of
witnesses, a directive to answer the charge(s) in writing under
oath in not less than seventy-two (72) hours from receipt
79
thereof, an advice for the respondent to indicate in his answer
whether or he elects a formal investigation of the charge(s),
and a notice that he is entitled to be assisted by a counsel of
his choice.
In Dadubo v. Civil Service Commission,22 the Court
pronounced that the charge against the respondent in an
administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an
information in a criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is
apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is
controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the
designation of the offense. It must be stressed that what the
law requires is to simply inform the civil servant of the nature
and cause of accusation against him in a clear and concise
manner for the purpose of giving him the right to confront the
allegations against him.
In the present case, the CSC found that a formal charge was
issued identifying the administrative offenses committed by
Marquez. A Memorandum23 dated November 28, 2006 was
issued charging Marquez of conspiring with Verdillo and Cheng
in defrauding PAGCOR during void gaming transactions at
Table No. 30 on several occasions. He was then required to
explain in writing within 72 hours from receipt of the
Memorandum. Records also show that he participated in the
investigation by executing a Sinumpaang Salaysay. Thereafter,
the BMP of Casino Filipino Heritage conducted a formal
investigation and invited him to attend the meeting on
December 13, 2006 to explain his side. Clearly, Marquez was
sufficiently informed of the basis of the charge against him and
was able to defend himself. He was given every opportunity to
present his side of the case.
The failure to designate the offense specifically and with
precision is of no moment in this administrative case. The
essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a
party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense.
The law simply requires that the civil servant is informed of the
nature and cause of accusation against him in a clear and
concise manner to give the person a chance to answer the
allegations intelligently. Evidently, PAGCOR substantially
complied with the requirements of due process for
administrative cases.
With regard to Verdillo’s contention that he would be in a better
position to defend himself if confronted with the CCTV footage,
we find the same to be without merit. There is more than
substantial evidence which proves that he indeed declared void
transactions as valid on at least eight occasions. We note that
the CCTV footage is not the only evidence against him. Acting
Pit Supervisor Yang actually witnessed that several clearly void
transactions were declared by Verdillo as good and
valid.24 Even Verdillo’s sworn statement reveals that he did not
see the dice hit the rubber wall. In fact, he mentioned in his
statement that he used his sense of hearing in determining
whether or not the dice hit the rubber wall.
The CSC, as affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 106961,
found sufficient evidence to support a finding of dishonesty,
grave violation of company rules and regulations, conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the company and loss of trust
and confidence. The circumstances in this case all point to the
conclusion that Verdillo conspired with Marquez and Cheng.
Verdillo declared several dice throws of Cheng as "good dice"
even if they were void. Marquez then paid Cheng his winnings
in huge amounts. Whenever a customer or employee would
pass the Craps table, Cheng would change his dice throws and
would even comment "may multo" (there is a ghost) when
Acting Pit Supervisor Yang would approach the craps
tableThese anomalous transactions were not only witnessed
by Acting Pit Supervisor Yang, but were also confirmed by the
CCTV footage.
Dishonesty is defined as the concealment or distortion of truth
in a matter of fact relevant to one’s office or connected with the
performance of his duty. It implies a disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness
and straightforwardness.25 Under the Civil Service Rules,
dishonesty is a grave offense punishable by dismissal which
carries the accessory penalties of cancellation of eligibility,
forfeiture of retirement benefits (except leave credits), and
disqualification from reemployment in the government
service.26
As regards Marquez, evidence shows that on eight occasions,
Marquez paid customer Cheng despite the fact that the latter’s
throws were void. He admitted that he knew that on several
occasions the throws made should have been declared void
and that it was incumbent upon him to make sure that the calls
were in order.1âwphi1 This duty could not have escaped him
as he had been a dealer for five years. Hence, it is our view
that the conduct of Marquez amounts to serious dishonesty,
and not merely negligence, since his dishonest act was
committed not just a few times but repeatedly or eight times
over a very short period of seven minutes, a statistical
improbability.
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial
evidence rule." A finding of guilt in an administrative case
would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence that the respondent has committed the
acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined,
substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 27 We
find that Marquez and Verdillo failed to present any cogent
reason for the Court to deviate from the rule that factual
findings of administrative agencies are generally held to be
binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial
evidence in the record of the case.
All told, we find that there was substantial evidence for the
charges against Marquez and Verdillo, warranting their
dismissal from service.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 191877 is GRANTED.
The October 9, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 106196 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, Resolution Nos. 08-0702 and 08-1858 of the
Civil Service Commission dismissing Ariel R. Marquez from
service are REINSTATED and UPHELD.
The petition in G.R. No. 192287 is DENIED. The July 21, 2009
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106961,
which affirmed Civil Service Commission Resolution Nos. 08-
0931 and 08-2231 dismissing Ireneo M. Verdillo from service,
is AFFIRMED. With costs against the petitioner in G.R. No.
192287. SO ORDERED.
80