SECOND DIVISION . G.R. No. 116194 . February 2, 2000 .

Labor Code expressly allowed supervisory employees to form,

join, or assist their own unions.
SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC., petitioner,
vs. On December 9, 1993, the Med-Arbiter denied petitioner's motion
HON. UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, to dismiss. He scheduled the inclusion-exclusion proceedings in
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED- preparation for the certification election on December 16, 1993.
ARBITER ACHILLES MANIT, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 7, CEBU CITY, AND
SRBI appealed the Med-Arbiter's decision to the Secretary of
SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC. — ASSOCIATION OF
Labor and Employment. The appeal was denied for lack of merit.
PROFESSIONAL, SUPERVISORY, OFFICE, AND TECHNICAL
The certification election was ordered.
EMPLOYEES UNION-TRADE UNIONS CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
On June 16, 1994, the Med-Arbiter scheduled the holding of the
certification election for June 29, 1994. His order identified the
QUISUMBING, J.:
following SRBI personnel as the voting supervisory employees in
the election: the Cashier of the Main Office, the Cashier of the
In this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner Mandaue Branch, the Accountant of the Mandaue Branch, and
seeks the annulment of the April 27, 1994 Resolution of the the Acting Chief of the Loans Department.
Department of Labor and Employment, affirming the order of the
Med-Arbiter, dated December 9, 1993, which denied petitioner's
On June 17, 1994, SRBI filed with the Med-Arbiter an urgent
motion to dismiss respondent union's petition for certification
motion to suspend proceedings. The Med-Arbiter denied the
election.
same on June 21, 1994. SRBI then filed a motion for
reconsideration. Two days later, the Med-Arbiter cancelled the
Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a certification election scheduled for June 29, 1994 in order to
duly-registered banking institution with principal office in Cebu address the motion for reconsideration.
City and a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent SRBI
Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical
The Med-Arbiter later denied petitioner's motion for
Employees Union (APSOTEU) is a legitimate labor organization
reconsideration, SRBI appealed the order of denial to the DOLE
affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines
Secretary on December 16, 1993..
(TUCP). 1âwphi1.nêt

On December 22, 1993, petitioner proceeded to file a petition with

On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City
the DOLE Regional Office seeking the cancellation of the
granted Certificate of Registration No. R0700-9310-UR-0064 to
respondent union's registration. It averred that the APSOTEU-
APSOTEU-TUCP, hereafter referred to as the union.
TUCP members were actually managerial employees who were
prohibited by law from joining or organizing unions.
On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification
election of the supervisory employees of SRBI. It alleged, among
On April 22, 1994, respondent DOLE Undersecretary denied
others, that: (1) APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor organization duly-
SRBI's appeal for lack of merit. He ruled that APSOTEU-TUCP
registered with the Labor Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or
was a legitimate labor organization. As such, it was fully entitled
more supervisory employees; (3) a majority of these employees
to all the rights and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor
supported the petition: (4) there was no existing collective
organization, including the right to file a petition for certification
bargaining agreement (CBA) between any union and SRBI; and
election. He also held that until and unless a final order is issued
(5) no certification election had been held in SRBI during the past
cancelling APSOTEU-TUCP's registration certificate, it had the
12 months prior to the petition.
legal right to represent its members for collective bargaining
purposes. Furthermore, the question of whether the APSOTEU-
On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the TUCP members should be considered as managerial or
petition. The pre-certification election conference between SRBI confidential employees should not be addressed in the
and APSOTEU-TUCP was set for November 15, 1993. proceedings involving a petition for certification election but best
threshed out in other appropriate proceedings.
On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the
union's petition. It sought to prevent the holding of a certification On May 25, 1994, SRBI moved for reconsideration of the
election on two grounds. First, that the members of APSOTEU- Undersecretary's decision which was denied on July 7, 1994. The
TUCP were in fact managerial or confidential employees. Thus, Med-Arbiter scheduled the holding of certification elections on
following the doctrine in Philips Industrial Development August 12, 1994.
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,1 they were
disqualified from forming, joining, or assisting any labor
Hence the instant petition grounded on the following assignments
organization. Petitioner attached the job descriptions of the
of error:
employees concerned to its motion. Second, the Association of
Labor Unions-Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines or ALU-
TUCP was representing the union. Since ALU-TUCP also sought I
to represent the rank-and-file employees of SRBI, there was a
violation of the principle of separation of unions enunciated
in Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. v. Laguesma.2 RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY LAGUESMA ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND PALPABLY ERRED:

The union filed its opposition to the motion to dismiss on

December 1, 1993. It argued that its members were not
managerial employees but merely supervisory employees. The
members attached their affidavits describing the nature of their
respective duties. The union pointed out that Article 245 of the
A: IN HOLDING THAT ART. 257 OF THE LABOR CODE
REQUIRES THE MED-ARBITER TO CONDUCT A
CERTIFICATION ELECTION IN ANY UNORGANIZED
ESTABLISHMENT EVEN WHEN THE PETITIONING UNION
DOES NOT POSSESS THE QUALIFICATION FOR AN
APPROPRIATE BARGAINING AGENT; AND
B. IN REFUSING TO ASSUME JURISDICTION OVER THE
PETITIONER'S APPEAL AND TO DISMISS THE RESPONDENT
UNION'S PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION.
II
RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY LAGUESMA ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND PALPABLY ERRED IN
DENYING THE PETITIONER'S APPEAL DESPITE THE FACT
THAT:
A. THE ALLEGED MEMBERS OF RESPONDENT UNION ARE
MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES WHO ARE LEGALLY
DISQUALIFIED FROM JOINING ANY LABOR ORGANIZATION.
B. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ALLEGED MEMBERS OF
RESPONDENT UNION ARE OCCUPYING HIGHLY
CONFIDENTIAL POSITIONS IN PETITIONER AND, THUS, THE
LEGAL DISQUALIFICATION OF MANAGERIAL EMPLOYEES
EQUALLY APPLY TO THEM.
III
IN ANY EVENT, THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE
SUBJECT RESOLUTIONS ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND ARE
DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED TO RESPONDENT UNION'S
RECORDED ADMISSIONS AND REPRESENTATIONS.
Considering petitioner's assigned errors, we find two core issues
for immediate resolution:
(1) Whether or not the members of the respondent
union are managerial employees and/or highly-placed
confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from
joining labor organizations and engaging in union
activities?
(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order
the holding of a certification election upon the filing of a
petition for certification election by a registered union,
despite the petitioner's appeal pending before the
DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the union's
registration?
The other issues based on the assigned errors could be resolved
easily after the core issues are settled.
Respecting the first issue, Article 212 (m) of the Labor Code
defines the terms "managerial employee" and "supervisory
employees" as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions —
(m) "Managerial employee" is one who is vested with
powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or hire, transfer, suspend,
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign or discipline
employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in
the interest of the employer, effectively recommend
such managerial actions if the exercise of such
authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. All
employees not falling within any of the above definitions
are considered rank-and-file employees for purposes of
this Book (Emphasis supplied).
Petitioner submitted detailed job descriptions to support its
contention that the union members are managerial employees
and/or confidential employees proscribed from engaging in labor
activities.3 Petitioner vehemently argues that the functions and
responsibilities of the employees involved constitute the "very
core of the bank's business, lending of money to clients and
borrowers, evaluating their capacity to pay, approving the loan
and its amount, scheduling the terms of repayment, and
endorsing delinquent accounts to counsel for collection."4 Hence,
they must be deemed managerial employees. Petitioner
cites Tabacalera Insurance Co. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,5 and Panday v. National Labor Relations
Commission,6 to sustain its submission. In Tabacalera, we
sustained the classification of a credit and collection supervisor by
management as a managerial/supervisory personnel. But in that
case, the credit and collection supervisor "had the power to
recommend the hiring and appointment of his subordinates, as
well as the power to recommend any promotion and/or
increase."7 For this reason he was deemed to be a managerial
employee. In the present case, however, petitioner failed to show
that the employees in question were vested with similar powers.
At best they only had recommendatory powers subject to
evaluation, review, and final decision by the bank's management.
The job description forms submitted by petitioner clearly show
that the union members in question may not transfer, suspend,
lay-off, recall, discharge, assign, or discipline employees.
Moreover, the forms also do not show that the Cashiers,
Accountants, and Acting Chiefs of the Loans Department
formulate and execute management policies which are normally
expected of management officers.
Petitioner's reliance on Panday is equally misplaced. There, we
held that a branch accountant is a managerial employee because
the said employee had managerial powers, similar to the
supervisor in Tabaculera. Their powers included recommending
the hiring and appointment of his subordinates, as well as the
power to recommend any promotion and/or increase.8
Here, we find that the Cashiers, Accountant, and Acting Chief of
the Loans Department of the petitioner did not possess
managerial powers and duties. We are, therefore, constrained to
conclude that they are not managerial employees.
Now may the said bank personnel be deemed confidential
employees? Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or
act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons who
formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies
[specifically in the field of labor relations].9 The two criteria are
cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be
considered a confidential employee — that is, the confidential
relationship must exist between the employee and his superior
officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities
relating to labor relations.10
Art. 245 of the Labor Code11 does not directly prohibit confidential
employees from engaging in union activities. However, under the
doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of
managerial employees equally applies to confidential
employees.12 The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion of
confidential employees because in the normal course of their
duties they become aware of management policies relating to
labor relations.13 It must be stressed, however, that when the
employee does not have access to confidential labor relations
information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential
employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.14
Petitioner contends that it has only 5 officers running its day-to-
day affairs. They assist in confidential capacities and have
complete access to the bank's confidential data. They form the
core of the bank's management team. Petitioner explains that:
 . . . Specifically: (1) the Head of the Loans Department respondent union and the rank-and-file union. Again, we find
initially approves the loan applications before they are nothing in the records to support this bare assertion.
passed on to the Board for confirmation. As such, no
loan application is even considered by the Board and
The law frowns on a union where the membership is composed of
approved by petitioner without his stamp of approval
both supervisors and rank-and-file employees, for fear that
based upon his interview of the applicant and
conflicts of interest may arise in the areas of discipline, collective
determination of his (applicant's) credit standing and
bargaining, and strikes.19 However, in the present case, none of
financial capacity. The same holds true with respect to
the members of the respondent union came from the rank-and-file
renewals or restructuring of loan accounts. He himself
employees of the bank.
determines what account should be collected, whether
extrajudicially or judicially, and settles the problems or
complaints of borrowers regarding their accounts; Taking into account the circumstances in this case, it is our view
that respondent Undersecretary committed no reversible error nor
grave abuse of discretion when he found the order of the Med-
(2) the Cashier is one of the approving officers and
Arbiter scheduling a certification election in order. The list of
authorized signatories of petitioner. He approves the
employees eligible to vote in said certification election was also
opening of accounts, withdrawals and encashment, and
found in order, for none was specifically disqualified from union
acceptance of check deposits. He deals with other
membership.
banks and, in the absence of the regular Manager,
1âwphi1.nêt

manages the entire office or branch and approves

disbursements of funds for expenses; and WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
(3) the Accountant, who heads the Accounting
Department, is also one of the authorized signatories of SO ORDERED.
petitioner and, in the absence of the Manager or
Cashier, acts as substitute approving officer and
assumes the management of the entire office. She
handles the financial reports and reviews the
debit/credit tickets submitted by the other
departments.15
THIRD DIVISION . G.R. No. 99395 June 29, 1993
Petitioner's explanation, however, does not state who among the
employees has access to information specifically relating to its
labor to relations policies. Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner,
serves as the secretary of the bank's Board of Directors may not vs.
be so classified. True, the board of directors is responsible for HON. RUBEN O. TORRES and ST. LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER
corporate policies, the exercise of corporate powers, and the ASSOCIATION-ALLIANCE OF FILIPINO WORKERS
general management of the business and affairs of the ("SLMCEA-AFW"), respondents.
corporation. As secretary of the bank's governing body. Patricia
Maluya serves the bank's management, but could not be deemed Sofronio A. Ona for petitioner.
to have access to confidential information specifically relating to
SRBI's labor relations policies, absent a clear showing on this
matter. Thus, while petitioner's explanation confirms the regular Edgar R. Martir for respondent union.
duties of the concerned employees, it shows nothing about any
duties specifically connected to labor relations.

As to the second issue. One of the rights of a legitimate labor MELO, J.:
organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is the right to
be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an
In response to the mandate under Article 263(g) of the Labor
appropriate bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining.
Code and amidst the labor controversy between petitioner St.
Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view
Luke's Medical Center and private respondent St. Luke's Medical
that respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of
Center Employees Association-Alliance of Filipino Workers
the Labor Code mandates that a certification election
(SLMCEA-AFW), then Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres,
shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the
issued the Order of January 28, 1991 requiring the parties to
filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization.16Nothing is
execute and finalize their 1990-1993 collective bargaining
said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the
agreement (CBA) to retroact to the expiration of the anterior CBA.
certification election if the management appeals on the issue of
The parties were also instructed to incorporate in the new CBA
the validity of the union's registration. On this score, petitioner's
the disposition on economic and non-economic issues spelled out
appeal was correctly dismissed.
in said Order (p. 48, Rollo). Separate motions for re-evaluation
from the parties were to no avail; hence, the petition at bar
Petitioner argues that giving due course to respondent union's premised on the following ascriptions of error, to wit:
petition for certification election would violate the separation of
unions doctrine.17 Note that the petition was filed by APSOTEU-
I
TUCP, a legitimate labor organization. It was not filed by ALU.
Nor was it filed by TUCP, which is a national labor federation of
with which respondent union is affiliated. Petitioner says that PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. SECRETARY
respondent union is a mere alter ego of ALU. The records show OF LABOR ACTED IN EXCESS OF
nothing to this effect. What the records instead reveal is that JURISDICTION AND/OR COMMITTED
respondent union was initially assisted by ALU during its GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
preliminary stages of organization. A local union maintains its HE VIOLATED PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO
separate personality despite affiliation with a larger national DUE PROCESS, PUBLIC RESPONDENT
federation.18 Petitioner alleges that ALU seeks to represent both COMPLETELY IGNORED THE LATTER'S
 EVIDENCE AND ISSUED THE
QUESTIONED AWARDS ON THE BASIS OF
ARBITRARY GUESSWORKS,
CONJECTURES AND INFERENCES.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
HE CURTAILED THE PARTIES' RIGHT TO
FREE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, AND
WHEN HE GRANTED MONETARY
AWARDS AND ADDITIONAL BENEFITS TO
THE EMPLOYEES GROSSLY
DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE
OPERATING INCOME OF PETITIONER.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN
HE ADOPTED/CONSIDERED THE
ALLEGATIONS OF THE UNION THAT THE
HOSPITAL OFFERED SALARY AND MEAL
ALLOWANCE INCREASES IN THE
AMOUNT OF P1,140,00 FOR THE FIRST
YEAR AND P700.00 ACROSS THE BOARD
MONTHLY SALARY INCREASES FOR THE
SECOND AND THIRD YEARS OF THE NEW
CBA.
IV
FINALLY, PUBLIC RESPONDENT
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION WHEN HE GAVE HIS AWARD
RETROACTIVE EFFECT.
When the collective bargaining agreement for the period August
1, 1987 to July 30, 1990 was forged between petitioner and
private respondent, the incumbent national president of AFW, the
federation to which the local union SLMCEA is affiliated, was
Gregorio del Prado.
Before the expiration of the 1987-90 CBA, the AFW was plagued
by internal squabble splitting its leadership between Del Prado
and Purita Ramirez, resulting in the filing by AFW and Del Prado
of a petition later docketed before the Department of Labor as
NCR-00-M-90-05-077, where a declaration was sought on the
legitimacy of Del Prado's faction as bona fide officers of the
federation. Pending resolution of said case, herein private
respondent SLMCEA-AFW brought to the attention of
petitioner via a letter dated July 4, 1990 that the 1987-1990 was
about to expire, and manifested in the process that private
respondent wanted to renew the CBA. This development
triggered round-table talks on which occasions petitioner
proposed, among other items, a maximum across-the-board
monthly salary increase of P375.00 per employee, to which
proposal private respondent demanded a P1,500.00 hike or 50%
increase based on the latest salary rate of each employee,
whichever is higher.
In the meantime, relative to the interpleader case (NCR-00-M-90-
05-070) initiated by petitioner to settle the question as to who
between Del Prado and Diwa was authorized to collect federation
dues assessed from hospital employees, the Med-Arbiter
recognized Del Prado's right (p. 423, Rollo). This resolution of
July 31, 1990 was elevated to the Labor Secretary.
That talks that then ensued between petitioner and private
respondent were disturbed anew when the other wing in the AFW
headed by Purita Ramirez, expressed its objections to the on-
going negotiations, and when a petition for certification election
was filed by the Association of Democratic Labor Organization of
petitioner. However, private respondent emerged victorious after
the elections and was thus certified as the exclusive bargaining
entity of petitioner's rank and file employees.
Following the decision dated September 14, 1990 in NCR-00-M-
90-05-077 (pp. 444-445, Rollo) which upheld the legitimacy of Del
Prado's
status including the other officers, Bayani Diwa of the Ramirez
Wing
appealed; the two cases — NCR-00-M-90-05-070 for interpleader
and NCR-00-90-05-077 — were consolidated.
On September 17, 1990, private respondent wrote petitioner for
the resumption of their negotiations concerning the union's
proposed CBA. Petitioner reacted by writing a letter on
September 20, 1990 expressing willingness to negotiate a new
CBA for the rank and file employees who are not occupying
confidential positions. Negotiations thus resumed. However, a
deadlock on issues, especially that bearing on across-the-board
monthly and meal allowances followed and to pre-empt the
impending strike as voted upon by a majority of private
respondent's membership, petitioner lodged the petition below.
The Secretary of Labor immediately assumed jurisdiction and the
parties submitted their respective pleadings.
On January 22, 1991, a resolution was issued in the consolidated
cases which eventually declared Gregorio del Prado and his
group as the legitimate officials of the AFW and the
acknowledged group to represent AFW (pp. 320-321, Rollo).
On January 28, 1991, public respondent Secretary of Labor
issued the Order now under challenge. Said Order contained a
disposition on both the economic and non-economic issues raised
in the petition. On the economic issues, he thus ruled:
First year — P1,140.00 broken down as
follows: P510.00 in compliance with the
government mandated daily salary increase
of P17.00; and P630.00 CBA across the
board monthly salary increase.
Second year — P700.00 across the board
monthly salary increase.
Third year — P700.00 across the board
monthly salary increase.
It is understood that the second and third
year salary increases shall not be chargeable
to future government mandated wage
increases. (p. 47, Rollo.)
As earlier stated, both parties moved for reconsideration of the
above order, but both motions were denied. Consequently,
petitioner St. Luke's filed the instant petition, a special civil action
on certiorari.
In assailing the Order of January 28, 1991, petitioner St. Luke's
focuses on public respondent's disposition of the economic
issues.
First, petitioner finds highly questionable the very basis of public
respondent's decision to award P1,140.00 as salary and meal
allowance increases for the first year and P700.00 across-the- b) 13th month pay: P1,140 x 1,500 —
board monthly salary increases for the succeeding second and 1,710,000
third years of the new CBA. According to petitioner, private
respondent SLMCEA-AFW misled public respondent into
c) Overtime pay, 20% of payroll — 4,104,000
believing that said amounts were the last offer of petitioner St.
Luke's immediately prior to the deadlock. Petitioner vehemently
denies having made such offer, claiming that its only offer d) Holiday pay, PM/Night pay — 1,026,000
consists of the following:
e) Sick leave — 855,000
Non-Economic Issues:
f) Funeral, Paternity, Maternity leaves,
St. Luke's submits that it is adopting the non- retirement
economic issues proposed and agreed upon pay — 820,000
in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with
SLMCEA-AFW for the period covering 1987,
1990. Copy of the CBA is attached as Annex B. P230 added to meal allowance
"F" hereof.
a) P230 x 1,500 x 12 — 4,140,000
Economic Issue
C. One day added to sick leave
St. Luke's respectfully offers to give an
increase to all its rank and file employees a) (Ave. pay P3,000 = P1,140) divided by 30
computed as follows: x 1,500 — 222,000

First Year — P900 D. Sick leave cash conversion base reduced from 60 to
(P700.00 basic + 45 days
P200.00 food allowance)
for an over all total food
allowance of P320.00. a) (P3,300 = P1,140)/30 x 1,200 —
2,664,000

Second Year — P400

E. Retirement benefits adjustment — 500,000

Third Year — P400

—————

plus the union will be allowed to operate and

manage one (1) canteen for free to augment FIRST YEAR
their funds. Although the profit shall be ADDITIONAL COST P
divided equally between union and SLMC, 36,561,000
the operation of the canteen will generate for
them a monthly income of no less than YR II
P15,000.00, and likewise provide cheap and
subsidized food to Union members.
A. Yr I increase except sick leave cash
conversion
The wage increase as proposed shall be
credited to whatever increases in the
minimum wage or to any across the board from 60 to 45 — P33,897,000
increases that may be mandated by the
government or the DOLE. (pp. 20-21, Rollo.) B. P700 added to monthly basic pay

Petitioner charges that public respondent, in making such award, a) P700 x 1,500 x 12 — 2,600,000
erroneously relied on the extrapolated figures provided by b) 13th month pay: P700 x 1,500 —
respondent SLMCEA-AFW, which grossly inflated petitioner St. 1,050,000
Luke's net income. Petitioner contends that if the disputed award c) Overtime, pay, 20% of P12.6 M —
are sustained, the wage increases and benefits shall total 2,520,000
approximately P194,403,000.00 which it claims is excessive and d) Holiday pay, PM/Night pay — 630,000
unreasonable, considering that said aggregate amount is more e) Sick leave: 15 days x 700/30 x 1,500 —
than its projected income for the next three years. To illustrate its 525,000
point, petitioner submits the following computation: f) Funeral, paternity, maternity leaves,
retirement pay — 504,000
YR I ————

A. P1,40 added to basic pay SECOND YEAR ADDITIONAL

COST P51,726,000

a) P1,140 x 1,500 (no. of employees) x 12

(months) — P 20,520,000 YR III

A. Yr I and Yr II increases — 88,287,000

 B. P700 added to basic pay
a) P700 x 1,500 x 12 —
12,600,000
b) 13th month pay: P700 x 1,500
— 1,050,000
c) Overtime pay, 20% of P12.6 M
— 2,520,000
d) Holiday pay, PM/Night pay —
630,000
e) Sick leave — 525,000
f) Funeral, paternity, maternity,
leaves,
retirement pay — 504,000
————
THIRD YEAR ADDITIONAL COST
— 106,116,000
TOTAL THREE-YEAR
ADDITIONAL
BENEFIT/WAGES — 194,403,000
(pp. 14-16, Rollo).
On the basis of the foregoing, petitioner St. Luke's concludes that
it would be in a very poor position to even produce the resources
necessary to pay the wage increases of its rank and file
employees.
Petitioner also impugns public respondent's awards on grounds of
prematurity, emphasizing that the awards in question even
preceded collective bargaining negotiations which have to take
place first between both litigants. It denies entering into a round of
negotiations with private respondent SLMCEA-AFW on the theory
that the meetings referred to by the latter were merely informal
ones, without any binding effect on the parties because AFW is
torn between two factions vying for the right to represent it. Thus,
petitioner maintains that nothing conclusive on the terms and
conditions of the proposed CBA could be arrived at when the
other party, private respondent SLMCEA-AFW is confronted with
an unresolved representation issue.
Petitioner argues further that since no formal negotiations were
conducted, it could not have possibly made an offer of P1,140.00
as salary and meal allowance increases for the first year and an
increase of P700.00 across-the-board monthly salary for the
second and third years of the new CBA. It raises doubts on the
veracity of the minutes presented by private respondent
SLMCEA-AFW to prove that negotiations were held, particularly
on October 26, 1990, when petitioner allegedly made said offer as
its last ditch effort for a compromise prior to the deadlock.
According to petitioner, these minutes, unsigned by petitioner,
were merely concocted by private respondent SLMCEA-AFW.
Finally, petitioner attacks the Order of January 28, 1991 for being
violative of Article 253-A of the Labor Code, particularly its
provisions on retroactivity. Said Article pertinently provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any agreement on such other provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement entered
into within six (6) months from the date of
expiry of the term of such other provisions as
fixed in the collective bargaining agreement,
shall retroact to the day immediately following
such date. If any such agreement is entered
into beyond six months, the parties shall
agree on the duration of retroactivity thereof.
In case of a deadlock in the renegotiation of
the collective bargaining agreement, the
parties may exercise their rights under this
Code.
Petitioner argues that in granting retroactive effect to the
enforceability of the CBA, public respondent committed an act
contrary to the above provision of law, pointing out that the old
CBA expired on July 30, 1990 and the questioned order was
issued on January 28, 1991. Petitioner theorizes that following
Article 13 of the Civil Code which provides that there are 30 days
in one month, the questioned Order of January 28, 1991 was
issued beyond the six-month period, graphically shown thus:
July 30, 1990 Expiration
July 31 = 1 day
August 1-31, 1990 = 31
days
September 1-30, 1990 =
30 days
October 1-31, 1990 = 31
days
November 1-30, 1990 =
30 days
December 1-31, 1990 =
31 days
January 1-28, 1991 = 28
days
—————————
TOTAL = 182 days
(6 months and 2 days)
(p. 34, Rollo.)
Traversing petitioner's arguments, private respondent SLMCEA-
AFW contends that the formulation of the terms and conditions of
the CBA awards is well supported by the factual findings of public
respondent which established that petitioner failed to refute
private respondent's allegation that during their last meeting on
October 26, 1990, petitioner stood pat on its offer of P1,140.00 as
salary and meal allowance increases for the first year of the new
CBA and P700.00 across-the-board salary increases for the
second and third years thereof. Said awards, it said, are well
within the means of petitioner because its reported net income of
P15 million, P11 million, and 13 million for 1987, 1988, and 1989,
respectively, have been actually understated. Moreover, private
respondent claims that petitioner, in actual terms, does not have
to pay the alleged amount of P194,403,000.00 for wages and
benefits in favor of its employees. Such amount, according to
private respondent, is bloated and excessive. Private respondent
in substantiating such claim made the following analysis:
First P1,140.00 total salary increase for the
first year (1990-1991) of the new CBA is
divided into: P510.00 in compliance with the
government mandated daily salary increase
of P17.00 and P630.00 CBA across the
board monthly salary increase, thus, the
whole P1,140.00 salary increase is payable
only beginning August 1, 1990 (reckoned
from the CBA July 30, 1990 expiry date) up to
October 31, 1990 only following the
November 1, 1990 effectivity of WAGE
ORDER NO. NCR-01 which granted the said
P17.00 daily wage increase or P510.00
monthly of
which herein petitioner promptly complied
with and paid to its employees and therefore
deductible from P1,140.00 total monthly
salary increase (Annex "A" — Petitioner and
Annex "13" hereof);
Second, the remaining P630.00 CBA across
the board monthly salary increase takes
effect on November 1, 1990 up to January 7,
1991 only following the January 8, 1991
effectivity of WAGE ORDER NO. NCR-02
which mandated P12.00 daily wage increase
or P630.00 monthly, hence, reducing the
P630.00 CBA monthly salary increase to
P270.00 CBA monthly salary increase
effective January 8, 1991 and onwards till
July 31, 1991 (Annexes "22" and "23"
hereof);
Third, that out of an estimated workforce
of 1,264 regular employees inclusive of about
209 supervisors, unit, junior area, division
department managers and top level
executives, all occupying permanent
positions, and approximately 55 regular but
highly confidential employees, only 1,000
rank-and-file regular/permanent employees
(casuals, contractuals, probies and security
guards excluded) are entitled to the CBA
benefits for three (3) years (1990-1993) (as
private respondent SLMCEA-AFW gathered
and analyzed from the petitioner's Personnel
Strength Report hereto attached as Annex
"28" hereof) vis-a-vis the generalized and
inflated 1,500 employees as total workforce
purportedly entitled to CBA benefits per its
self-serving and incredible computation;
Fourth, the petitioner's computed 20%
overtime pay of the basic salary is unrealistic
and overstated in view of its extreme cost-
cutting/ savings measures on all
expenditures, most specially, on overtime
work adopted since last year and a
continuing management priority project up to
the present; and
Fifth, due to the above consideration, the
total real award of wages and fringe benefits
is far less than the true annual hefty
operating net income of the petitioner.
The net result is that the first year award of
P1,140.00 monthly salary increase of which
P510.00 monthly salary increase is made in
compliance with the P510.00 monthly wage
increase at P17.00 daily wage increase
effective November 1, 1990 under Wage
Order No. NCR-01 (Annex "13" hereof) or
with the intended P630.00 CBA monthly
salary increase is further reduced by P360.00
monthly wage increase at P12.00 daily wage
increase effective January 8, 1991 under
Wage Order No.
NCR-02 (Annex "22" hereof), thereby leaving
a downgraded or watered down CBA monthly
increase of P270.00 only.
Comparatively speaking, the 13% monthly
salary increase of each employee average
basic monthly salary of P2,500.00 in 1987 or
P325.00 monthly salary increase granted by
the petitioner under the first old CBA (1987-
1990) is better than the much diluted P270.00
CBA monthly salary increase (in lieu of the
awarded P630.00 CBA monthly salary
increase for the first year of the new CBA
under Order, dated January 28, 1991, of
public respondent). (Annexes "A" and "G" —
Petition). (pp. 390-391, Rollo.)
Private respondent concludes that petitioner's version that it will
have to pay P194,403,000.00 is not true because this will be
drastically reduced by 40% to 60% in real terms due to a smaller
number of employees covered. It is further explained that the
government-decreed wage increases abovementioned already
form part of the P1,140.00 wage and meal allowance increases,
not to mention the strict cost-cutting measures and practices on
overtime and expense items adopted by petitioner since 1990.
With respect to public respondent's ruling that the CBA awards
should be given retroactive effect, private respondent agrees with
the Labor Secretary's view that Article 253-A of the Labor Code
does not apply to arbitral awards such as those involved in the
instant case. According to private respondent, Article 253-A of the
Labor Code is clear and plain on its face as referring only to
collective bargaining agreements entered into by management
and the certified exclusive bargaining agent of all rank-and-file
employees therein within six (6) months from the expiry of the old
CBA.
These foregoing contentions and arguments of private respondent
have been similarly put forward by the Office of the Solicitor
General in its Consolidated Comment filed on November 23,
1991. The Solicitor General share a the views of private
respondent SLMCEA-AFW.
We are now tasked to rule on the petition. Do petitioner's
evidence and arguments provide adequate basis for the charge of
alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by public respondent
in his Order of January 28, 1991 as to warrant its annulment by
this Court? This is the sole issue in the case at bar.
Consequently, this Court would apply the following yardstick in
resolving the aforestated issue: that public respondent, in the
exercise of his power to assume over subject labor dispute, acted
whimsically, capriciously, or in an arbitrary, despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility which was so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation
of law (San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA
138 [1991]).
Subjected to and measure by this test, the challenged Order, we
believe, can withstand even the most rigorous scrutiny.
Petitioner assails the Order of January 28, 1991 on three
grounds:
(a) unreasonable and baselessness; (b) prematurity; and (c)
violation of Article 253-A of the Labor Code.
We rule that the Order, particularly in its disposition on the
economic issues, was not arbitrarily imposed by public
respondent. A perusal of the Order shows that public respondent
took into consideration the parties' respective contentions, a clear
indication that he was keenly aware of their contrary positions.
Both sides having been heard, they were allowed to present their
respective evidence. The due process requirement was thus
clearly observed. Considering public respondent's expertise on
the subject and his observance of the cardinal principles of due
process, the assailed Order deserves to be accorded great existence. (at p. 688; emphasis in the
respect by this Court. original.)

Equally worth mentioning is the fact that in resolving the economic Appending "AFW" to the local union's name does not mean that
issues, public respondent merely adopted in toto petitioner's the federation absorbed the latter. No such merger can be
proposals. Consequently, petitioner cannot now claim that the construed. Rather, what is conveyed is the idea of affiliation, with
awards are unreasonable and baseless. Neither can it deny the local union and the larger national federation retaining their
having made such proposals, as it attempted to do in its Motion separate personalities.
for Reconsideration of the challenged Order before public
respondent and which it continues to pursue in the instant
Petitioner cannot pretend to be unaware of these legal principles
petition. It is too late in the day for such pretense, especially so
since they enjoy the benefit of legal advice from their
because petitioner failed to controvert private respondent's
distinguished counsel. Thus, we are constrained to agree with the
allegation contained in its Comment to the petition before the
position of the Solicitor General that petitioner conveniently used
Labor Secretary that petitioner had offered as its last proposal
the representation issue within AFW to skirt entering into
said salary and meal allowance increases. As correctly pointed
bargaining negotiations with the private respondent.
out by public respondent, petitioner failed, when it had the
chance, to rebut the same in its Reply to said Comment,
considering that the resolution of the labor dispute at that was still Too, petitioner is in error in contending that the order was
pending. Any objection on this point is thus deemed waived. prematurely issued. It must be recalled that immediately after the
deadlock in the talks, it was petitioner which filed a petition with
the Secretary of Labor for the latter to assume jurisdiction over
We do not see merit in petitioner's theory that the awards were
the labor dispute. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the public
granted prematurely. In its effort to persuade this Court along this
respondent's authority and recognized the latter's power to settle
point, petitioner denies having negotiated with private respondent
the labor dispute pursuant to article 263(g) of the Labor Code
SLMCEA-AFW. Petitioner collectively refers to all the talks
granting him the power and authority to decide the dispute. It
conducted with private respondent as mere informal negotiations
cannot, therefore, be said that public respondent's decision to
due to the representation issue involving AFW. Petitioner thus
grant the awards is premature and pre-emptive of the parties'
argues that in the absence of any formal negotiations, no
right to collectively bargain, simply because the Order of January
collective bargaining could have taken place. Public respondent,
28, 1991 was unfavorable to one or the other party, for as we held
petitioner avers, should have required the parties instead to
in Saulog Transit, Inc. vs. Lazaro, (128 SCRA 591 [1984]):
negotiate rather than prematurely issuing his order.

It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke

We cannot agree with this line of reasoning. It is immaterial
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative
whether the representation issue within AFW has been resolved
relief against his opponent and after failing to
with finality or not. Said squabble could not possibly serve as a
obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
bar to any collective bargaining since AFW is not the real party-in-
same jurisdiction. A party cannot invoke
interest to the talks; rather, the negotiations were confined to
jurisdiction at one time and reject it at another
petitioner and the local union SLMCEA which is affiliated to AFW.
time in the same controversy to suit its
Only the collective bargaining agent, the local union SLMCEA in
interests and convenience. The Court frowns
this case, possesses legal standing to negotiate with petitioner. A
upon and does not tolerate the undesirable
duly registered local union affiliated with a national union or
practice of same litigants who submit
federation does not lose its legal personality or independence
voluntarily a cause and then accepting the
(Adamson and Adamson, Inc. vs. The Court of Industrial
judgment when favorable to them and
Relations and Adamson and Adamson Supervising Union (FFW),
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when
127 SCRA 268 [1984]). In Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU)
adverse. (Tajonera v. Lamaroxa, 110 SCRA
vs. Noriel (180 SCRA 681 [1977]), then Justice Teehankee re-
447, citingTijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA
echoed the words of Justice Esguerra in Liberty Cotton Mills
35). (at p. 601.)
Workers Union vs. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc. (66 SCRA 512
[1975]), thus:
Finally, the effectivity of the Order of January 28, 1991, must
retroact to the date of the expiration of the previous CBA, contrary
(T)he locals are separate and distinct units
to the position of petitioner. Under the circumstances of the case,
primarily designed to secure and maintain an
Article 253-A cannot be property applied to herein case. As
equality of bargaining power between the
correctly stated by public respondent in his assailed Order of April
employer and their employee-members in the
12, 1991 dismissing petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration —
economic struggle for the fruits of the joint
productive effort of labor and capital; and the
association of the locals into the national Anent the alleged lack of basis for the
union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the retroactivity provisions awarded, we would
same end. These associations are stress that the provision of law invoked by the
consensual entities capable of entering into Hospital, Article 253-A of the Labor Code,
such legal relations with their members. The speak of agreements by and between the
essential purpose was the affiliation of the parties, and not arbitral awards . . . (p.
local unions into a common enterprise to 818, Rollo.)
increase by collective action the common
bargaining power in respect of the terms and
conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained Therefore, in the absence of a specific provision of law prohibiting
the basic units of association, free to serve retroactivity of the effectivity of arbitral awards issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code,
their own and the common interest of all,
subject to the restraints imposed by the such as herein involved, public respondent is deemed vested with
Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, plenary and discretionary powers to determine the effectivity
thereof.
and free also to renounce the affiliation for
mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in
the agreement which brought it into
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111836. February 1, 1996.]
PAMBANSANG KAPATIRAN NG MGA ANAK PAWIS
SA FORMEY PLASTIC NATIONAL WORKERS
BROTHERHOOD, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF
LABOR, SECRETARY BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA,
FORMEY PLASTIC,INC., KALIPUNAN NG
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMAPI) and MED-
ARBITER RASIDALI C. ABDULLAH, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The rank and file workers of Formey Plastic, Inc.
(FORMEY), formed a local union known as Pambansang
Kapatiran ng mga Anak Pawis sa Formey Plastic
(KAPATIRAN) under the auspices of the National Workers
Brotherhood (NWB). They ratified their Constitution and
By-Laws on 4 April 1993.
On 22 April 1993 KAPATIRAN filed a Petition for
Certification EIection 1 with the Department of Labor and
Employment Med-Arbiter Division alleging that there was
no existing and effective Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between FORMEY and any union; neither was there
any recognized union within the company.
FORMEY moved to dismiss the petition 2 while Kalipunan
ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMAPI) intervened and
likewise moved to dismiss 3 on the ground that there was
already a duly registered CBA covering the period 1
January 1992 to 31 December 1996 hence the "contract
bar rule" 4 would apply. KAPATIRAN opposed both
motions to dismiss 5 with an Addendum 6 thereto
claiming that the CBA executed between FORMEY and
KAMAPI was fraudulently registered with the Department
of Labor and Employment and that it was defective since
what was certified as bargaining agent was KAMAPI
which, as a federation, only served as mere agent of the
local union hence without any legal personality to sign in
behalf of the latter.
Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah found that a valid and
existing CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI effectively
barred the filing of the petition for certification election.
7 (i), of the Labor Code. In consonance thereto, Art. 261
KAPATIRAN appealed 8 imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the Med-Arbiter in applying the "contract bar
rule" and in not adopting the case of Progressive
Development Corporation v. Secretary, Department of
Labor and Employment, 9 as authority to disregard the
CBA between FORMEY and KAMAPI. The Secretary of
Labor acting through Undersecretary Bienvenido E.
Laguesma upheld the decision of the Med-Arbiter. 10 The
Motion for Reconsideration having been denied 11
KAPATIRAN now files this Petition for Certiorari 12
charging the Secretary of Labor with grave abuse of
discretion in applying the "contract bar rule" literally and
in ruling that the Progressive Development Corporation
13 case could not be invoked.
Pending resolution of the petition KAMAPI filed an Urgent
Motion to Dismiss 14 the instant petition contending that
it had become moot and academic due to the cancellation
of NWB’s 15 certificate of registration and its delisting
from the roll of labor federations. 16 KAPATIRAN opposed
the motion 17 claiming that the cancellation and delisting
were not yet final and executory considering that it had
filed a motion for reconsideration 18 with the Bureau of
Labor Relations.
The rule is that findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies
will not be disturbed unless there is a showing of grave
abuse of discretion. We find none in the case at bench.
We therefore affirm that there is a validly executed
collective bargaining agreement between FORMEY and
KAMAPI.
Art. 253-A of the Labor Code provides that" (n)o petition
questioning the majority status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall be entertained and no certification
election shall be conducted by the Department of Labor
and Employment outside of the-sixty (60) day period
immediately before the date of expiry of such five-year
term of the collective bargaining agreement." Sec. 3,
Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code provides that." . . (i)f a collective bargaining
agreement has been duly registered in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
election or a motion for intervention can only be
entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date
of such agreement." cralaw virtua1aw library
The subject agreement was made effective 1 January
1992 and is yet to expire on 31 December 1996. The
petition for certification election having been filed on 22
April 1993 it is therefore clear that said petition must fail
since it was filed before the so-called 60-day freedom
period. KAPATIRAN insists that the CBA was a fake it
having been surreptitiously registered with the
Department of Labor and Employment.
The resolution of this issue hinges on the determination
of factual matters which certainly is not within the ambit
of the present petition for certiorari. Besides, the
contention is without any legal basis at all; it is purely
speculative and bereft of any documentary support.
Petitioner itself even admitted the existence of an
agreement but argued that its provisions were not being
implemented nor adhered to at all. Suffice it to mention
that the filing of the petition for certification election is
not the panacea to this allegedly anomalous situation.
Violations of collective bargaining agreements constitute
unfair labor practice as provided for under Art. 248, par.
equips petitioner with the proper and appropriate
recourse —
Art. 261. The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from
the interpretation or implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement . . . Accordingly, violations of a
Collective Bargaining Agreement, except those which are
gross in character, shall no longer be treated as unfair
labor practice and shall be resolved under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement. For purposes of this article, gross
violations of Collective Bargaining Agreement shall mean
flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the
economic provisions of such agreement.
The CBA entered into between FORMEY and KAMAPI
stipulates among others —
Article IX — GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
Sec. 1. Any complaint, grievance, difficulty, disagreement
or dispute arising out of any section taken (sic) by the
Company and/or by the Union concerning the
interpretation of the terms and conditions of the
agreement and/or which may arise regarding (sic) the
terms and conditions of employment shall be settled in
the manner provided for under this Article.
Sec. 2. The Company and the Union agree to create and
establish a Grievance Committee composed of two (2)
representatives from the Company and two (2) from the
Union to receive complaint, grievance or dispute from the
workers and/or from the Company with the view to settle
it amicably.
Sec. 3. In case a complaint or grievance has been filed
by either the Union or the Company, the grievance
committee shall discuss the same and have (sic) to settle
it. If after the meeting of the grievance committee no
satisfactory settlement is reached the matter shall be
referred to the top officers of the Union and the Company
for the settlement of the said grievance or dispute.
Sec. 4. Within five (5) days from the time the top officers
of the Union and the Company has (sic) failed to reach an
amicable settlement of the grievance or dispute, the sale
shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration. The
arbitrator or arbitrators shall be chosen by lottery and
the union and the Company shall avail (sic) the list of
arbitrators of the honorable Bureau of Labor Relations.
Sec. 5. The mutually agreed or chosen arbitrator shall
proceed to try and hear the case and for (sic) the
reception of evidence and to call witnesses to testify and
after the submission of the case by both parties an award
or order shall be issued in accordance with the rules and
guidelines promulgated by the honorable Department of
Labor and Employment based on the pertinent: laws and
established jurisprudence. The expenses of the
arbitration proceedings shall be borned (sic) equally by
the Company and the Union. 19
By filing the petition for certification election it is clear
that KAPATIRAN did not avail of the abovementioned
grievance procedure.
It is further argued that the CBA has no binding force
since it was entered into by KAMAPI as a federation and
not by the local union. Perusal of the agreement proves
the signatories for KAMAPI consisted of its national
president and of the duly elected officers of the local
union. Thus the fact that KAMAPI was particularly
mentioned as the bargaining party without specifying the
local union cannot strip it of its authority to participate in
the bargaining process. The local union maintains its
separate personality despite affiliation with a larger
national federation. 20
The doctrine laid down in Progressive Development
Corporation 21 is a mere clarification of the principle
enunciated in Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.
Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc. 22 Both cases have provided
that "the mother union acting for and in behalf of its
affiliate ha(s) the status of an agent while the local union
remained the basic unit of the association free to serve
the common interest of all its members subject only to
the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-Laws
of the association." Nonetheless, the facts and principles
laid down in both cases do not jibe squarely with the case
at bench. The controversy in Progressive Development
Corporation 23 centered on the requirements before a
local or chapter of a federation may file a petition for
certification election and be certified as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent, while in Liberty Cotton Mills
Workers 24 the issue involved was the disaffiliation of the
local union from the federation. The question of whether
there was a valid and existing CBA, which is the question
being resolved in the case at bench, was never raised in
the two cited cases since it was already an accepted fact
that the CBA was validly executed and existing.
Anent the Urgent Motion to Dismiss 25 filed by KAMAPI
on the ground that the instant petition had become moot
and academic due to the cancellation by the Bureau of
Labor Relations of NWB’s certificate of registration and its
consequent delisting from the roll of labor federations,
suffice it to state that at this juncture we cannot properly
rule on the issue considering that KAMAPI has not proven
that the decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations has
become final and executory taking into account
KAPATIRAN’s filing of a motion for reconsideration with
the Bureau. This notwithstanding, Sec. 9, Rule II, Book V
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code
requires that an appeal be filed with the Bureau, or in
case of cancellation by the Bureau, with the Secretary of
Labor and Employment whose decision shall become final
and no longer subject of appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated 15 August
1993 sustaining the order dated 31 May 1993 is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113907. February 28, 2000]
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA M.
GREENFIELD (MSMG-UWP), ITS PRESIDENT BEDA
MAGDALENA VILLANUEVA, MARIO DAGANIO, DONATO
GUERRERO BELLA P. SANCHEZ, ELENA TOBIS, RHODA
TAMAYO, LIWAYWAY MALLILIN, ELOISA SANTOS,
DOMINADOR REBULLO, JOSE IRLAND, TEOFILA QUEJADA,
VICENTE SAMONTINA, FELICITAS DURIAN, ANTONIO
POLDO, ANGELINA TUGNA, SALVADOR PENALOSA,
LUZVIMINDA TUBIG, ILUMINADA RIVERA, ROMULO
SUMILANG, NENITA BARBELONIA, LEVI BASILIA, RICARDO
PALAGA, MERCY ROBLES, LEODEGARIO GARIN, DOMINGO
ECLARINAL, MELCHOR GALLARDO, MARCELO GARIN,
ROSALINA BAUTISTA, MARY ANN TALIGATOS,
ALEJANDRO SANTOS, ANTONIO FRAGA, LUZ GAPULTOS,
MAGDALENA URSUA, EUGENIO ORDAN, LIGAYA MANALO,
PEPITO DELA PAZ, PERLITA DIMAQUIAT, MYRNA
VASQUEZ, FLORENTINA SAMPAGA, ARACELI FRAGA,
MAXIMINA FAUSTINO, MARINA TAN, OLIGARIO LOMO,
PRECILA EUSEBIO, SUSAN ABOGANO, CAROLINA
MANINANG, GINA GLIFONIA, OSCAR SOTTO, CELEDONA
MALIGAYA, EFREN VELASQUEZ, DELIA ANOVER,
JOSEPHINE TALIMORO, MAGDALENA TABOR, NARCISA
SARMIENTO, SUSAN MACASIEB, FELICIDAD SISON,
PRICELA CARTA, MILA MACAHILIG, CORAZON NUNALA,
VISITACION ELAMBRE, ELIZABETH INOFRE, VIOLETA
BARTE, LUZVIMINDA VILLOSA, NORMA SALVADOR,
ELIZABETH BOGATE, MERLYN BALBOA, EUFRECINA
SARMIENTO, SIMPLICIA BORLEO, MATERNIDAD DAVID,
LAILA JOP, POTENCIANA CULALA, LUCIVITA NAVARRO,
ROLANDO BOTIN, AMELITA MAGALONA, AGNES CENA,
NOLI BARTOLAY, DANTE AQUINO, HERMINIA RILLON,
CANDIDA APARIJADO, LYDIA JIMENEZ, ELIZABETH
ANOCHE, ALDA MURO, TERESA VILLANUEVA, TERESITA
RECUENCO, ELIZA SERRANO, ESTELLA POLINAR,
GERTRUDES NUNEZ, FELIPE BADIOLA, ROSLYN
FERNANDEZ, OSCAR PAGUTA, NATIVIDAD BALIWAS,
ELIZABETH BARCIBAL, CYNTHIA ESTELLER, TEODORA
SANTOS, ALICIA PILAR, MILA PATENO, GLORIA CATRIZ,
MILA MACAHILIG, ADELAIDA DE LEON, ROSENDO EDILO,
ARSENIA ESPIRITU, NUMERIANO CABRERA, CONCEPSION
ARRIOLA, PAULINA DIMAPASOK, ANGELA SANGCO,
PRESILA ARIAS, ZENAIDA NUNES, EDITHA IGNACIO, ROSA
GUIRON, TERESITA CANETA, ALICIA ARRO, TEOFILO
RUWETAS, CARLING AGCAOILI, ROSA NOLASCO, GERLIE
PALALON, CLAUDIO DIRAS, LETICIA ALBOS, AURORA
ALUBOG, LOLITA ACALEN, GREGORIO ALIVIO, GUILLERMO
ANICETA, ANGELIE ANDRADA, SUSAN ANGELES,
ISABELITA AURIN, MANUELA AVELINA, CARLING
AGCAOILI, TERESITA ALANO, LOLITA AURIN, EMMABETH
ARCIAGA, CRESENCIA ACUNA, LUZVMINDA ABINES,
FLORENCIA ADALID, OLIVIA AGUSTIN, EVANGELINE
ALCORAN, ROSALINA ALFERES, LORNA AMANTE,
FLORENTINA AMBITO, JULIETA AMANONCO, CARMEN
AMARILLO, JOSEFINA AMBAGAN, ZENAIDA ANAYA, MARIA
ANGLO, EDITHA ANTA ZO, MARY JANE ANTE, ANDREA
AQUINO, ROWENA ARABIT, MARIETA ARAGON, REBECCA
ARCENA, LYDIA ARCIDO, FERNANDO ARENAS, GREGORIO
ARGUELLES, EDITHA ARRIOLA, EMMA ATIENZA, EMMA
ATIENZA, TEODY ATIENZA, ELIZABETH AUSTRIA, DIOSA
AZARES, SOLIDA AZAINA, MILAGROS BUAG, MARIA
BANADERA, EDNALYN BRAGA, OFELIA BITANGA,
FREDISMINDA BUGUIS, VIOLETA BALLESTEROS, ROSARIO
BALLADJAY, BETTY BORIO, ROMANA BAUTISTA, SUSARA
BRAVO, LILIA BAHINGTING, ENIETA BALDOZA, DAMIANA
BANGCORE, HERMINIA BARIL, PETRONA BARRIOS,
MILAGROS BARRAMEDA, PERLA BAUTISTA, CLARITA
BAUTISTA, ROSALINA BAUTISTA, ADELINA BELGA,
CONSOLACION BENAS, MARIA BEREZO, MERCEDES
BEREBER, VIOLETA BISCOCHO, ERNESTO BRIONES,
ALVINA BROSOTO, AGUSTINA BUNYI, CARMEN BUGNOT,
ERLINDA BUENAFLOR, LITA BAQUIN, CONSEJO BABOL,
CRISANTA BACOLOD, CELIA DE BACTAT, MAZIMA BAGA,
ELENA BALADAD, ROSARIO BALADJAY, AMALIA
BALAGTAS, ANITA BALAGTAS, MARIA BALAKIT, RUFINA
BALATAN, REBECCA BALDERAMA, AMELIA BALLESTER,
BELEN BARQUIO, BERNANDITA BASILIDES, HELEN BATO,
HELEN BAUTISTA, ROMANA BAUTISTA, ALMEDA BAYTA,
AVELINA BELAYON, NORMA DE BELEN, THELMA DE
BELEN, JOCELYN BELTRAN, ELENA BENITEZ, VIRGINIA
BERNARDINO, MERLINA BINUYAG, LINA BINUYA,
BLESILDA BISNAR, SHIRLEY BOLIVAR, CRESENTACION
MEDLO, JOCELYN BONIFACIO, AMELIA BORBE, AMALIA
BOROMEO, ZENAIDA BRAVO, RODRIGO BEULDA,
TERESITA MENDEZ, ELENA CAMAN, LALIANE
CANDELARIA, MARRY CARUJANO, REVELINA CORANES,
MARITESS CABRERA, JUSTINA CLAZADA, APOLONIA DELA
CRUZ, VICTORIA CRUZ, JOSEFINA DELA CRUZ, MARITESS
CATANGHAL, EDNA CRUZ, LUCIA DE CASTRO, JOSIE
CARIASO, OFELIA CERVANTES, MEDITA CORTADO,
AMALIA CASAJEROS, LUCINA CASTILIO, EMMA CARPIO,
ANACORITA CABALES, YOLANDA CAMO, MILA
CAMAZUELA, ANITA CANTO, ESTELA CANCERAN,
FEMENCIA CANCIO, CYNTHIA CAPALAD, MERLE CASTILLO,
JESUSA CASTRO, CECILIA CASTILLO, SILVERITA
CASTRODES, VIVIAN CELLANO, NORMA CELINO, TERESITA
CELSO, GLORIA COLINA, EFIPANIA CONSTANTINO,
SALVACION CONSULTA, MEDITA CORTADO, AIDA CRUZ,
MARISSA DELA CRUZ, EDITO CORCILLES, JELYNE CRUZ,
ROSA CORPOS, ROSITA CUGONA, ELSIE CABELLES,
EMMA CADUT, VICTORIA CALANZA, BARBARA CALATA,
IMELDA CALDERON, CRISTINA CALIDGUID, EMMALINDA
CAMALON, MARIA CAMERINO, CARMENCITA CAMPO,
CONNIE CANEZO, LOURDES CAPANANG, MA. MILAGROS
CAPILI, MYRNA T. CAPIRAL, FLOR SAMPAGA, SUSAN B.
CARINO, ROSARIO CARIZON, VIRGINIA DEL CARMEN,
EMMA CARPIO, PRESCILA CARTA, FE CASERO, LUZ DE
CASTRO, ANNA CATARONGAN, JOSEFINA CASTISIMO, JOY
MANALO, EMMIE CAWALING, JOVITA CARA, MARINA
CERBITO, MARY CAREJANO, ESTELA R. CHAVEZ,
CONCEPCION PARAJA, GINA CLAUDIO, FLORDELIZA
CORALES, EDITO CORCIELER, ROSA C. CORROS, AMELIA
CRUZ, JELYNE CRUZ, WILFREDO DELA CRUZ, REINA
CUEVAS, MARILOU DEJECES, JOSEPHINE DESACULA,
EDITHA DEE, EDITHA DIAZ, VIRGIE DOMONDON, CELSA
DOROPAW, VIOLETA DUMELINA, MARIBEL DIMATATAC,
ELBERTO DAGANIO, LETECIA DAGOHOY, DINDO DALUZ,
ANGELITA DANTES, GLORIA DAYO, LUCIA DE CASTRO,
CARLITA DE GUZMAN, CARMEN DELA CRUZ, MERCY DE
LEON, MARY DELOS REYES, MARIETA DEPILO, MATILDE
DIBLAS, JULIETA DIMAYUGA, TEODORA DIMAYUGA,
YOLANDA DOMDOM, LUCITA DONATO, NELMA DORADO,
RITA DORADO, SUSAN DUNTON, HERMINIA SAN ESTEBAN,
AMALI EUGENIO, OLIVIA EUSOYA, ERNESTO ESCOBIN,
EVELYN ESCUREL, LYDIA ESCOBIN, VICENTE E. ELOIDA,
ELENA EGAR, GLORIA ERENO, NORMA ESPIRIDION,
ARSENIA ESPIRITU, AURORA ESTACIO, DEMETRIA
ESTONELO, MILAGROS FONSEGA, LYDIA FLORENTINO,
JULIA FARABIER, TRINIDAD FATALLA, IMELDA FLORES,
JESSINA FRANCO, MA. CRISTINA FRIJAS, ESPECTACION
FERRER, BERDENA FLORES, LEONILA FRANCISCO,
BERNARDA FAUSTINO, DOLORES FACUNDO, CRESTITA
FAMILARAN, EMELITA FIGUERAS, MA. VIRGINIA
FLORENDO, AURORA FRANCISCO, MA. JESUSA
FRANCISCO, NENITA FUENTES, MARILOU GOLINGAN,
JUANITA GUERRERO, LYDIA GUEVARRA, SOCORRO
GONZAGA, PATRICIA GOMEO, ROSALINDA GALAPIN,
CARMELITA GALVEZ, TERESA GLE, SONIA GONZALES,
PRIMITA GOMEZ, THERESA GALUA, JOSEFINA GELUA,
BRENDA GONZAGA, FLORA GALLARDO, LUCINDA
GRACILLA, VICTORIA GOZUM, NENITA GAMAO, EDNA
GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA, ROSARIO GIRAY, ARACELI
GOMEZ, JOEMARIE GONZAGA, NELIA GONZAGA, MARY
GRANCE GOZON, CARMEN GONZALES, MERLITA
GREGORIO, HERMINIA GONZALES, CARLITA DE GUZMAN,
MODESTA GABRENTINA, EDITHA GADDI, SALVACIO
GALIAS, MERLINDA GALIDO, MELINDA GAMIT, JULIETA
GARCIA, EMELITA GAVINO, CHARITO GILLIA, GENERA
GONEDA, CRESTITA GONZALES, HERMINIA GONZALES,
FRANCISCA GUILING, JULIAN HERNANDEZ, GLECERIA
HERRADURA, SUSANA HIPOLITO, NERISSA HAZ, SUSAN
HERNAEZ, APOLONIA ISON, SUSAN IBARRA, LUDIVINA
IGNACIO, CHOLITA INFANTE, JULIETA ITURRIOS, ANITA
IBO, MIRASOL INGALLA, JULIO JARDINIANO, MERLITA
JULAO, JULIETA JULIAN, MARIBETH DE JOSE, JOSEPHINE
JENER, IMELDA JATAP, JULIETA JAVIER, SALOME JAVIER,
VICTORIA JAVIER, SALVACION JOMOLO, EDNA JARNE,
LYDIA JIMENEZ, TERESITA DE JUAN, MARILYN LUARCA,
ROSITA LOSITO, ROSALINA LUMAYAG, LORNA LARGA,
CRESTETA DE LEON, ZENAIDA LEGASPI, ADELAIDA LEON,
IMELDA DE LEON, MELITINA LUMABI, LYDIA LUMABI,
ASUNCION LUMACANG, REGINA LAPIADRIO, MELANIA
LUBUGUAN, EVANGELINE LACAP, PELAGIA LACSI, LORNA
LAGUI, VIRGIE LAITAN, VIRGINIA LEE, CRESTELITA DE
LEON, FELICISIMA LEONERO, DIOSA LOPE, ANGELITA
LOPEZ, TERESITA LORICA, JUANITA MENDIETA, JUANITA
MARANQUEZ, JANET MALIFERO, INAS MORADOS,
MELANIE MANING, LUCENA MABANGLO, CLARITA MEJIA,
IRENE MENDOZA, LILIA MORTA, VIGINIA MARAY, CHARITO
MASINAHON, FILMA MALAYA, LILIA MORTA, VIRGINIA
MARAY, CHARITO MASINAHON, FILMA MALAYA, LILIA
MORTA, ROSITA MATIBAG, LORENZA MLINA, SABINA DEL
MUNDO, EDITHA MUYCO, NARCISA MABEZA, MA. FE
MACATANGAY, CONCEPCION MAGDARAOG, IMELDA
MAHIYA, ELSA MALLARI, LIGAYA MANAHAN, SOLEDA
MANLAPAS, VIRGINIA MAPA, JOSEI MARCOS, LIBRADA
MARQUEZ, VIRGINIA MAZA, JULIANITA MENDIETA,
EDILBERTA MENDOZA, IRENE MERCADO, HELEN MEROY,
CRISTINA MEJARES, CECILIA MILLET, EMELITA MINON,
JOSEPHINE MIRANA, PERLITA MIRANO, EVANGELINE
MISBAL, ELEANOR MORALES, TERESITA MORILLA, LYDIA
NUDO, MYRIAM NAVAL, CAROLINA NOLIA, ALICIA NUNEZ,
MAGDALENA NAGUIDA, ELSA NICOL, LILIA NACIONALES,
MA. LIZA MABO, REMEDIOS NIEVES, MARGARITA NUYLAN,
TERESITA NIEVES, PORFERIA NARAG, RHODORA NUCASA,
CORAZON OCRAY, LILIA OLIMPO, VERONA OVERENCIA,
FERMIN OSENA, FLORENCIA OLIVAROS, SOLEDAD OBEAS,
NARISSA OLIVEROS, PELAGIA ORTEGA, SUSAN ORTEGA,
CRISTINA PRENCIPE, PURITA PENGSON, REBECCA
PACERAN, EDNA PARINA, MARIETA PINAT, EPIFANIA
PAJERLAN, ROSALINA PASIBE, CECILIA DELA PAZ,
LORETA PENA, APOLONIA PALCONIT, FRANCISCO
PAGUIO, LYDIA PAMINTAHON, ELSIE PACALDO, TERESITA
PADILLA, MYRNA PINEDA, MERCEIDTA PEREZ, NOVENA
PORLUCAS, TERESITA PODPOD, ADORACION PORNOBI,
ALICIA PERILLO, HELEN JOY PENDAL, LOURDES
PACHECO, LUZVIMINDA PAGALA, LORETA PAGAPULAN,
FRANCISCO PAGUIO, PRISCO PALACA, FLORA
PAMINTUAN, NOEMI PARISALES, JOSEPHINE PATRICIO,
CRISTINA PE BENITO, ANGELA PECO, ANGELITA PENA,
ESTER PENONES, NORMA PEREZ, MAURA
PERSEVERANCIA, MARINA PETILLA, JOSIE PIA, ZULVILITA
PIODO, REBECCA PACERAN, CLARITA POLICARPIO,
MAXIMO POTENTO, PORFIRIO POTENTO, FLORDELIZA
PUMARAS, FERNANDO QUEVEDO, JULIANA QUINDOZA,
CHARITO QUIROZ, CARMELITA ROSINO, RODELIA
RAYONDOYON, FLORENCIA RAGOS, REBECCA ROSALES,
ROSALYN RIVERO, FRANCISCO RUIZ, FRANCIA ROSERO,
EMELY RUBIO, EDILBERTO RUIO, JUANA RUBY, RAQUEL
REYES, MERCY ROBLES, ESTELA RELANO, ROSITA REYES
NIMFA RENDON, EPIFANIO RAMIRO, MURIEL REALCO,
BERNARDITA RED, LEONITA RODIL, BENITA REBOLA,
DELMA REGALARIO, LENY REDILLAS, JULIETA DELA
ROSA, FELICITAS DELA ROSA, SUSAN RAFALLO, ELENA
RONDINA, NORMA RACELIS, JOSEPHINE RAGEL,
ESPERANZA RAMIREZ, LUZVIMINDA RANADA, CRISTINA
RAPINSAN, JOCELYN RED, ORLANDO REYES, TERESITA
REYES, ANGELITA ROBERTO, DELIA ROCHA, EDLTRUDES
ROMERO, MELECIA ROSALES, ZENAIDA ROTAO, BELEN
RUBIS, FE RUEDA, SYLVIA SONGCAYAWON, CRISTINA
SANANO, NERCISA SARMIENTO, HELEN SIBAL, ESTELITA
SANTOS, NORMA SILVESTRE, DARLITA SINGSON,
EUFROCINA SARMIENTO, MYRNA SAMSON, EMERLINA
SADIA, LORNA SALAZAR, AVELINA SALVADOR, NACIFORA
SALAZAR, TITA SEUS, MARIFE SANTOS, GRACIA
SARMIENTO, ANGELITA SUMANGIL, ELIZABETH SICAT, MA.
VICTORIA SIDELA, ANALITA SALVADOR, MARITES
SANTOS, VIRGINIA SANTOS, THELMA SARONG, NILDA
SAYAT, FANCITA SEGUNDO, FYNAIDA SAGUI, EDITHA
SALAZAR, EDNA SALZAR, EMMA SALENDARIO, SOLEDAD
SAMSON, EDNA SAN DIEGO, TERESITA SAN GABRIEL,
GERTRUDES SAN JOSE, EGLECERIA OSANCHEZ,
ESTRELLA SANCHEZ, CECILIA DELOS SANTOS, LUISA
SEGOVIA, JOCELYN SENDING ELENA SONGALIA,
FELICITAS SORIANO, OFELIA TIBAYAN, AIDA TIRNIDA,
MONICA TIBAYAN, CRISTETA TAMBARAN, GLORIA TACDA,
NENVINA, FELINA TEVES, ANTONINA DELA TORRE,
MAXIMA TANILON, NENA TABAT, ZOSIMA TOLOSA, MARITA
TENOSO, IMELDA TANIO, LUZ TANIO, EVANGELINE TAYO,
JOSEFINA TINGTING, ARSENIA TISOY, MAGDALENA
TRAJANO, JOSEFINA UBALDE, GINA UMALI, IRMA
VALENZUELA, FELY VALDEZ, PAULINA VALEZ, ROSELITA
VALLENTE, LOURDES VELASCO, AIDA VILLA, FRANCISCA
VILLARITO, ZENAIDA VISMONTE, DELIA VILLAMIEL, NENITA
VASQUEZ, JOCELYN VILLASIS, FERMARGARITA VARGAS,
CELIA VALLE, MILA CONCEPCION VIRAY, DOMINGA
VALDEZ, LUZVIMINDA VOCINA, MADELINE VIVERO, RUFINA
VELASCO, AUREA VIDALEON, GLORIA DEL VALLE,
THELMA VALLOYAS, CYNTHIA DELA VEGA, ADELA
VILLAGOMEZ, TERESITA VINLUAN, EUFEMIA VITAN,
GLORIA VILLAFLORES, EDORACION VALDEZ, ANGELITA
VALDEZ, ILUMINADA VALENCI, MYRNA VASQUEZ, EVELYN
VEJERAMO, TEODORA VELASQUEZ, EDAN VILLANUEVA,
PURITA VILLASENOR, SALVADOR WILSON, EMELINA YU,
ADELFA YU, ANA ABRIGUE, VIRGINIA ADOBAS, VICTORIA
ANTIPUESTO, MERCEDITA CASTILLO, JOCELYN CASTRO,
CREMENIA DELA CRUZ, JOSEPHINE IGNACIO, MELITA
ILILANGOS, LIGAYA LUMAYAT, DELIA LUMBES, ROSITA
LIBRADO, DELIA LAGRAMADA, GEMMA MAGPANTAY,
EMILY MENDOZA, FIDELA PANGANIBAN, LEONOR
RIZALDO, ILUMINDA RIVERA, DIVINA SAMBAYAN,
ELMERITA SOLAYAO, NANCY SAMALA, JOSIE SUMARAN,
LUZVIMINDA ABINES, ALMA ACOL, ROBERTO ADRIATICO,
GLORIA AGUINALDO, ROSARIO ALEYO, CRISTETA
ALEJANDRO, LILIA ALMOGUERA, CARMEN AMARILLO,
TRINIDAD ARDANIEL, CERINA AVENTAJADO, ZENAIDA
AVAYA, LOLITA ARABIS, MARIA ARSENIA, SOFIA
AGUINALDO, SALVE ABAD, JOSEFINA AMBANGAN EMILIA
AQUINO, JOSEFINA AQUINO, JULIANA AUSAN, AMERCIANA
ACOSTA, CONCEPCION ALEROZA, DIANA ADOVOS, FELY
ADVINCULA, SEOMINTA ARIAS, JOSEPHINE ARCEDE,
NORMA AMISTOSO, PRESENTACION ALONOS, EMMA
ATIENZA, LEONIDA AQUINO, ANITA ARILLON, ADELAIDA
ARELLANO, NORMA AMISTOSO, JOSEPHINE ARCEDE,
SEMIONITA ARIAS, JOSEFINA BANTUG, LOLITA BARTE,
HERMINIA BASCO, MARGARITA BOTARDO, RUFINO
BUGNOT, LOLITA BUSTILLO, ISABEL BALAKIT, ROSARIO
BARRERO, TESSIE BALBOS, NORMA BENISANO,
GUILLERMA BRUGES, BERNADETTE BARTOLOME,
SHIRLEY BELMONTE, MERONA BELZA, AZUCENA
BERNALES, JOSE BASCO, NIMPHA BANTOG, BENILDA
BUBAN, REGINA BUBAN, SALOME BARRAMEDA, IRENE
BISCO, FELICITAS BAUTISTA, VIOLETA BURA, LINA
BINUYA, BIBIANA BAARDE, ELSA BAES, ANASTACIA
BELONZO, SONIA BENOYO, ELIZABETH BACUNGAN,
PATRICIA BARRAMEDA, ERLINDA BARCELONA, EMMA
BANICO, APOLONIA BUNAO, LUCITA BOLEA, PACIFICA
BARCELONA, EDITHA BASIJAN, RENITA BADAMA, ELENA
BALADAD, CRESENCIA BAJO, BERNADITA BASILID,
MELINDA BEATO, YOLANDA BATANES, EDITHA BORILLA,
ANITA BAS, ELSA CALIPUNDAN, MARIA CAMERINO,
VIRGINIA CAMPOSANO, MILAGROS CAPILI, CARINA
CARINO, EUFEMIA CASIHAN, NENITA CASTRO, FLORENCIA
CASUBUAN, GIRLIE CENTENO, MARIANITA CHIQUITO,
IMELDA DELA CRUZ, TEODOSIA CONG, TEOFILA
CARACOL, TERESITA CANTA, IRENEA CUNANAN, JULITA
CANDILOSAS, VIOLETA CIERES, MILAGROS DELA CRUZ,
FLOREPES CAPULONG, CARMENCITA CAMPO, MARILYN
CARILLO, RUTH DELA CRUZ, RITA CIJAS, LYDIA CASTOR,
VIRGIE CALUBAD, EMELITA CABERA, CRISTETA CRUZ,
ERLINDA COGADAS, IMELDA CALDERON, SUSIE LUZ
CEZAR, ESTELA CHAVEZ, NORMA CABRERA, ELDA
DAGATAN, LEONISA DIMACUNA, ERNA DUGTONG,
FLORDELISA DIGMA, VIRGILIO DADIOS, LOLITA DAGTA,
ADELAIDA DORADO, CELSA DATUMANONG, VIRGINIA
DOCTOLERO, EDNA SAN DIEGO, JULIETA DANG, JULIETA
DORANTINAO, LOLITA DAGANO, JUDITH DIAZ, MARIA
ENICANE, MARITA ESCARDE, ENRIMITA ESMAYOR,
ROSARIO EPIRITU, REMEDIOS EMBOLTORIO, IRENE
ESTUITA, TERESITA ERESE, ERMELINDA ELEZO, MARIA
ESTAREJA, MERLITA ESQUERRA, YOLANDA FELICITAS,
FRUTO FRANCIA, MARTHA FRUTO, LILIA FLORES,
SALVACION FORTALESA, JUDITH FAJARDO, SUSANA
FERNANDO, EDWIN FRANCISCO, NENITA GREGORY, ROSA
CAMILO, MARIVIC GERRARDO, CHARITA GOREMBALEM,
NORMA GRANDE, DOLORES GUTIERREZ, CHARLIE
GARCIA, LUZ GALVEZ, ADELAIDA GAMILLA, LUZ
GAPULTOS, ERLINDA GARCIA, HELEN GARCIA, ERLINDA
GAUDIA, FRANCISCA GUILING, MINTA HERRERA,
ASUNCION HONOA, JUAN HERNANDEZ, LUCERIA ANNA
MAE HERNANDEZ, JULIANA HERNANDEZ, EDITHA
IGNACIO, ANITA INOCENCIO, EULALIA INSORIO, ESTELITA
IRLANDA, MILAGROS IGNACIO, LINDA JABONILLO,
ADELIMA JAEL, ROWENA JARABJO, ROBERT JAVILINAR,
CLARITA JOSE, CARMENCITA JUNDEZ, SOFIA LALUCIS,
GLORIA LABITORIA, ANGELITA LODES, ERLINDA LATOGA,
EVELYN LEGASPI, ROMEO LIMCHOCO, JESUS LARA,
ESTRELLA DE LUNA, LORETA LAREZA, JOSEPHINE
ALSCO, MERCY DE LEON, CONSOLACION LIBAO, MARILYN
LIWAG, TERESITA LIZAZO, LILIA MACAPAGAL, SALVACION
MACAREZA, AMALIA MADO, TERESITA MADRIAGA, JOVITA
MAGNAYE, JEAN MALABAD, FRANCISCA MENDOZA,
NELCITA MANGANTANG, TERESITA NELLA, GENEROZA
MERCADO, CRISTETA MOJANA, BERNARDA MONGADO,
LYDIA MIRANDA, ELISA MADRILEJOS, LOIDA MAGSINO,
AMELIA MALTO, JULITA MAHIBA, MYRNA MAYORES, LUISA
MARAIG, FLORENCIA MARAIG, EMMA MONZON, IMELDA
MAGDANGAN, VICTORIA MARTIN, NOEMI MANGUILLO,
BASILIZA MEDINA, VICTORIO MERCADO, ESTELA MAYPA,
EMILIA MENDOZA, LINA MAGPANTAY, FELICIANA
MANLOLO, ELENA MANACOP, WILMA MORENO, JUANA
MENDOZA, EVELYN DEL MUNDO, ROSIE MATUTINA,
MATILDE MANALO, TERESITA MENDEZ, FELIPINA
MAGONCIA, MARIA MANZANO, LIGAYA MANALO, LETICIA
MARCHA, MARINA MANDIGMA, LETICIA MANDASOC,
PRESCILLA MARTINEZ, JULIA MENDOZA, PACITA
MAGALLANES, ANGELINA MARJES, SHIRLEY MELIGRITO,
IRENE MERCADO, ELISA MAATUBANG, MARCELINA
NICOLAS, AGUSTINA NICOLAS, ROSA NOLASCO, WILMA
NILAYE, VIOLETA ORACION, ANGELA OSTAYA, JUANITA
OSAYOS, MAGDALENA OCAMPO, MARDIANA OCTA,
ROSELA OPAO, LIBRADA OCAMPO, YOLANDA OLIVER,
MARCIA ORLANDA, PAGDUNAN, RITA PABILONA, MYRA
PALACA, BETHLEHEM PALINES, GINA PALIGAR, NORMA
PALIGAR, DELMA PEREZ, CLAUDIA PRADO, JULIE
PUTONG, LUDIVINA PAGSALINGAN, MERLYN PANALIGAN,
VIOLETA PANAMBITAN, NOREN PAR, ERLINDA PARAGAS,
MILA PARINO, REBECCA PENAFLOR, IMELDA PENAMORA,
JERMICILLIN PERALTA, REBECCA PIAPES, EDITHA PILAR,
MAROBETH PILLADO, DIOSCORO PIMENTEL, AURORA LAS
PINAS, EVANGELINA PINON, MA. NITA PONDOC, MA.
MERCEDES PODPOD, ANGELITO PANDEZ, LIGAYA
PIGTAIN, LEONILA QUIAMBAO, ELENA QUINO, MARITESS
QUIJANO, CHOLITA REBUENO, LOLITA REYES, JOCELYN
RAMOS, ROSITA RAMIREZ, ELINORA RAMOS, ISABEL
RAMOS, ANNABELLE RESURRECCION, EMMA REYES,
ALILY ROXAS, MARY GRACE DELOS REYES, JOCELYN DEL
ROSARIO, JOSEFINA RABUSA, ANGELITA ROTAIRO,
SAMCETA ROSETA, EDERLINA RUIZ, ZENAIDA ROSARIO,
BENITA REBOLA, ROSITA REVILLA, ROSITA SANTOS,
ROWENA SALAZAR, EMILYN SARMIENTO, ANA SENIS,
ELOISA SANTOS, NARCISA SONGLIAD, ELMA SONGALIA,
AMPARA SABIO, JESSIE SANCHEZ, VIVIAN SAMILO,
GLORIA SUMALINOG, ROSALINA DELOS SANTOS,
MARIETA SOMBRERO, HELEN SERRETARIO, TEODORO
SULIT, BELLA SONGUINES, LINDA SARANTAN, ESTELLA
SALABAR, MILAGROS SISON, GLORIA TALIDAGA, CECILIA
TEODORO, ROMILLA TUAZON, AMELITA TABULAO,
MACARIA TORRES, LUTGARDA TUSI, ESTELLA TORREJOS,
VICTORIA TAN, MERLITA DELA VEGA, WEVINA ORENCIA,
REMEDIOS BALECHA, TERESITA TIBAR, LACHICA
LEONORA, JULITA YBUT, JOSEFINA ZABALA, WINNIE
ZALDARIAGA, BENHUR ANTENERO, MARCELINA
ANTENERO, ANTONINA ALAPAN, EDITHA ANTOZO,
ROWENA ARABIT, ANDRA AQUINO, TERESITA ANGULO,
MARIA ANGLO, MYRNA ALBOS, ELENITA AUSTRIA, ANNA
ABRIGUE, VIRGINIA ADOBAS, VICTORIA ANTIPUESTO,
REMEDIOS BOLECHE, MACARIA BARRIOS, THELMA
BELEN, ESTELLA BARRETTO, JOCELYN CHAVEZ, VIRGINIA
CAPISTRANO, BENEDICTA CINCO, YOLLY CATPANG,
REINA CUEVAS, VICTORIA CALANZA, FE CASERO,
ROBERTA CATALBAS, LOURDES CAPANANG, CLEMENCIA
CRUZ, JOCELYN COSTO, MERCEDITA CASTILLO, EDITHA
DEE, LUCITA DONATO, NORMA ESPIRIDION, LORETA
FERNANDEZ, AURORA FRANCISCO, VILMA FAJARDO,
MODESTA GABRENTINA, TERESITA GABRIEL, SALVACION
GAMBOA, JOSEPHINE IGNACIO, SUSAN IBARRA,
ESPERANZA JABSON, OSCAR JAMBARO, ROSANNA
JARDIN, CORAZON JALOCON, ZENAIDA LEGASPI, DELLA
LAGRAMADA, ROSITA LIBRANDO, LIGAYA LUMAYOT,
DELIA LUMBIS, LEONORA LANCHICA, RELAGIA LACSI,
JOSEFINA LUMBO, VIOLETA DE LUNA, EVELYN MADRID,
TERESITA MORILLA, GEMMA MAGPANTAY, EMILY
MENDOZA, IRENEA MEDINA, NARCISA MABEZA, ROSANNA
MEDINA, DELIA MARTINEZ, ROSARIO MAG-ISA, EDITHA
MENDOZA, EDILBERTA MENDOZA, FIDELA PANGANIBAN,
OFELIA PANGANIBAN, AZUCENA POSTGO, LOURDES
PACHECO, LILIA PADILLA, MARISSA PEREZ, FLORDELIZA
PUMARES, LUZ REYES, NORMA RACELIS, LEONOR
RIZALDO, JOSIE SUMASAR, NANCY SAMALA, EMERLITA
SOLAYAO, MERCEDITA SAMANIEGO, BLANDINA
SIMBULAN, JOCELYN SENDING, LUISITA TABERRERO,
TERESITA TIBAR, ESTERLINA VALDEZ, GLORIA
VEJERANO, ILUMINADA VALENCIA, MERLITA DELA VEGA,
VIRGIE LAITAN, JULIET VILLARAMA, LUISISTA OCAMPO,
NARIO ANDRES, ANSELMA TULFO, GLORIA MATEO,
FLANIA MENDOZA, CONNIE CANGO, EDITHA SALAZAR,
MYRNA DELOS SANTOS, TERESITA SERGIO, CHARITO
GILLA, FLORENTINA HERNAEZ, BERNARDINO VIRGINIA,
AMPO ANACORITA, SYLVIA POASADAS, ESTRELLA
ESPIRITU, CONCORDIA LUZURIAGA, MARINA CERBITO,
EMMA REYES, NOEMI PENISALES, CLARITA POLICARPIO,
BELEN BANGUIO, HERMINIA ADVINCULA, LILIA MORTA,
REGINA LAPIDARIO, LORNA LARGA, TERESITA VINLUAN,
MARITA TENOSO, NILDS SAYAT, THELMA SARONG, DELMA
REGALIS, SUSAN RAFAULO, ELENA RONDINA, MYRNA
PIENDA, VIOLETA DUMELINA, FLORENCIA ADALID, FILMA
MELAYA, ERLINDA DE BAUTISTA, MATILDE DE BLAS,
DOLORES FACUNDO, REBECCA LEDAMA, MA. FE
MACATANGAY, EMELITA MINON, NORMA PAGUIO, ELIZA
VASQUEZ, GLORIA VILLARINO, MA. JESUS FRANCISCO,
TERESITA GURPIDO, LIGAYA MANALO, FE PINEDA, MIRIAM
OCMAR, LUISA SEGOVIA, TEODY ATIENZA, SOLEDA
AZCURE, CARMEN DELA CRUZ, DMETRIA ESTONELO, MA.
FLORIDA LOAZNO, IMELDA MAHIYA, EDILBERTA
MENDOZA, SYLVIA POSADAS, SUSANA ORTEGA,
JOSEPHINE D. TALIMORO, TERESITA LORECA, ARSENIA
TISOY, LIGAYA MANALO, TERESITA GURPIO, FE PINEDA,
and MARIA JESUS FRANCISCO, petitioners, vs. HON.
CRESENCIO J. RAMOS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, M. GREENFIELD (B), INC., SAUL TAWIL,
CARLOS T. JAVELOSA, RENATO C. PUANGCO, WINCEL
LIGOT, MARCIANO HALOG, GODOFREDO PACENO, SR.,
GERVACIO CASILLANO, LORENZO ITAOC, ATTY.
GODOFREDO PACENO, JR., MARGARITO CABRERA,
GAUDENCIO RACHO, SANTIAGO IBANEZ, AND RODRIGO
AGUILING, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court to annul the decision of the National Labor
Relations Commission in an unfair labor practice case instituted
by a local union against its employer company and the officers of
its national federation.
The petitioner, Malayang Samahan ng mga Manggagawa sa M.
Greenfield, Inc., (B) (MSMG), hereinafter referred to as the "local
union", is an affiliate of the private respondent, United Lumber
and General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP), referred to as
the "federation". The collective bargaining agreement between
MSMG and M. Greenfield, Inc. names the parties as follows:
"This agreement made and entered into by
and between:
M. GREENFIELD, INC. (B) a
corporation duly organized in
accordance with the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines with
office address at Km. 14, Merville
Road, Paraaque, Metro Manila,
represented in this act by its
General manager, Mr. Carlos T.
Javelosa, hereinafter referred to as
the Company;
-and-
MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA
MANGGAGAWA SA M.
GREENFIELD (B)
(MSMG)/UNITED LUMBER AND
GENERAL WORKERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULGWP), a
legitimate labor organization with
address at Suite 404, Trinity
Building, T.M. Kalaw Street,
Manila, represented in this act by a
Negotiating Committee headed by
its National President, Mr.
Godofredo Paceno, Sr., referred to
in this Agreement as the UNION."
The CBA includes, among others, the following pertinent
provisions:
Article II-Union Security
Section 1. Coverage and Scope. All
employees who are covered by this
Agreement and presently members of the
UNION shall remain members of the UNION
for the duration of this Agreement as a
condition precedent to continued employment
with the COMPANY.
xxxxxx
xxxxxx
Section 4. Dismissal. Any such employee
mentioned in Section 2 hereof, who fails to
maintain his membership in the UNION for
non-payment of UNION dues, for resignation
and for violation of UNIONs Constitution and
By-Laws and any new employee as defined
in Section 2 of this Article shall upon written
notice of such failure to join or to maintain
membership in the UNION and upon written
recommendation to the COMPANY by the
UNION, be dismissed from the employment
by the COMPANY; provided, however, that
the UNION shall hold the COMPANY free
and blameless from any and all liabilities that
may arise should the dismissed employee
question, in any manner, his dismissal;
provided, further that the matter of the
employees dismissal under this Article may
be submitted as a grievance under Article XIII
and, provided, finally, that no such written
recommendation shall be made upon the
COMPANY nor shall COMPANY be
compelled to act upon any such
recommendation within the period of sixty
(60) days prior to the expiry date of this
Agreement conformably to law."
Article IX
Section 4. Program Fund - The Company
shall provide the amount of P10, 000.00 a
month for a continuing labor education
program which shall be remitted to the
Federation x x x."[2]
On September 12, 1986, a local union election was held under
the auspices of the ULGWP wherein the herein petitioner, Beda
Magdalena Villanueva, and the other union officers were
proclaimed as winners. Minutes of the said election were duly
filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations on September 29, 1986.
On March 21, 1987, a Petition for Impeachment was filed with the
national federation ULGWP by the defeated candidates in the
aforementioned election.
On June 16, 1987, the federation conducted an audit of the local
union funds. The investigation did not yield any unfavorable result
and the local union officers were cleared of the charges of
anomaly in the custody, handling and disposition of the union
funds.
[1]
The 14 defeated candidates filed a Petition for
Impeachment/Expulsion of the local union officers with the DOLE
NCR on November 5, 1987, docketed as NCR-OD-M-11-780-87.
However, the same was dismissed on March 2, 1988, by Med-
Arbiter Renato Parungo for failure to substantiate the charges and
to present evidence in support of the allegations.
On April 17, 1988, the local union held a general membership
meeting at the Caruncho Complex in Pasig. Several union
members failed to attend the meeting, prompting the Executive
Board to create a committee tasked to investigate the non-
attendance of several union members in the said assembly,
pursuant to Sections 4 and 5, Article V of the Constitution and By-
Laws of the union, which read:
"Seksyon 4. Ang mga kinukusang hindi
pagdalo o hindi paglahok sa lahat ng
hakbangin ng unyon ng sinumang kasapi o
pinuno ay maaaring maging sanhi ng
pagtitiwalag o pagpapataw ng multa ng hindi
hihigit sa P50.00 sa bawat araw na
nagkulang.
Seksyon 5. Ang sinumang dadalo na aalis ng
hindi pa natatapos ang pulong ay ituturing na
pagliban at maparusahan ito ng alinsunod sa
Article V, Seksyong 4 ng Saligang Batas na
ito. Sino mang kasapi o pisyales na mahuli
and dating sa takdang oras ng di lalampas sa
isang oras ay magmumulta ng P25.00 at
babawasin sa sahod sa pamamagitan ng
salary deduction at higit sa isang oras ng
pagdating ng huli ay ituturing na pagliban. [3]
On June 27, 1988, the local union wrote respondent company a
letter requesting it to deduct the union fines from the
wages/salaries of those union members who failed to attend the
general membership meeting. A portion of the said letter stated:
"xxx xxx xxx
In connection with Section 4 Article II of our
existing Collective Bargaining Agreement,
please deduct the amount of P50.00 from
each of the union members named in said
annexes on the payroll of July 2-8, 1988 as
fine for their failure to attend said general
membership meeting." [4]
In a Memorandum dated July 3, 1988, the Secretary General of
the national federation, Godofredo Paceo, Jr. disapproved the
resolution of the local union imposing the P50.00 fine. The union
officers protested such action by the Federation in a Reply dated
July 4, 1988.
On July 11, 1988, the Federation wrote respondent company a
letter advising the latter not to deduct the fifty-peso fine from the
salaries of the union members requesting that:
" x x x any and all future representations by
MSMG affecting a number of members be
first cleared from the federation before
corresponding action by the Company." [5]
The following day, respondent company sent a reply to petitioner
unions request in a letter, stating that it cannot deduct fines from
the employees salary without going against certain laws. The
company suggested that the union refer the matter to the proper
government office for resolution in order to avoid placing the
company in the middle of the issue.
The imposition of P50.00 fine became the subject of bitter
disagreement between the Federation and the local union
culminating in the latters declaration of general autonomy from
the former through Resolution No. 10 passed by the local
executive board and ratified by the general membership on July
16, 1988.
In retaliation, the national federation asked respondent company
to stop the remittance of the local unions share in the education
funds effective August 1988. This was objected to by the local
union which demanded that the education fund be remitted to it in
full.
The company was thus constrained to file a Complaint for
Interpleader with a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the Med-
Arbitration Branch of the Department of Labor and Employment,
docketed as Case No. OD-M-8-435-88. This was resolved on
October 28, 1988, by Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin in an Order,
disposing thus:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is
hereby ordered:
1. That the United Lumber and General
Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP) through
its local union officers shall administer the
collective bargaining agreement (CBA).
2. That petitioner company shall remit the
P10,000.00 monthly labor education program
fund to the ULGWP subject to the condition
that it shall use the said amount for its
intended purpose.
3. That the Treasurer of the MSMG shall be
authorized to collect from the 356 union
members the amount of P50.00 as penalty
for their failure to attend the general
membership assembly on April 17, 1988.
However, if the MSMG Officers could present
the individual written authorizations of the
356 union members, then the company is
obliged to deduct from the salaries of the 356
union members the P50.00 fine." [6]
On appeal, Director Pura-Ferrer Calleja issued a Resolution dated
February 7, 1989, which modified in part the earlier disposition, to
wit:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed portion is hereby modified to the
extent that the company should remit the
amount of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) of
the P10,000.00 monthly labor education
program fund to ULGWP and the other
P5,000.00 to MSMG, both unions to use the
same for its intended purpose." [7]
Meanwhile, on September 2, 1988, several local unions (Top
Form, M. Greenfield, Grosby, Triumph International, General
Milling, and Vander Hons chapters) filed a Petition for Audit and
Examination of the federation and education funds of ULGWP
which was granted by Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah on
December 25, 1988 in an Order which directed the audit and
examination of the books of account of ULGWP.
On September 30, 1988, the officials of ULGWP called a Special
National Executive Board Meeting at Nasipit, Agusan del Norte
where a Resolution was passed placing the MSMG under
trusteeship and appointing respondent Cesar Clarete as
administrator.
On October 27, 1988, the said administrator wrote the respondent
company informing the latter of its designation of a certain Alfredo
Kalingking as local union president and "disauthorizing" the
incumbent union officers from representing the employees. This
action by the national federation was protested by the petitioners
in a letter to respondent company dated November 11, 1988.
On November 13, 1988, the petitioner union officers received
identical letters from the administrator requiring them to explain
within 72 hours why they should not be removed from their office
and expelled from union membership.
On November 26, 1988, petitioners replied:
(a) Questioning the validity of the alleged
National Executive Board Resolution placing
their union under trusteeship;
(b) Justifying the action of their union in
declaring a general autonomy from ULGWP
due to the latters inability to give proper
educational, organizational and legal services
to its affiliates and the pendency of the audit
of the federation funds;
 (c) Advising that their union did not commit
any act of disloyalty as it has remained an
affiliate of ULGWP;
(d) Giving ULGWP a period of five (5) days to
cease and desist from further committing acts
of coercion, intimidation and harrassment. [8]
However, as early as November 21, 1988, the officers were
expelled from the ULGWP. The termination letter read:
"Effective today, November 21, 1988, you are
hereby expelled from UNITED LUMBER AND
GENERAL WORKERS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (ULGWP) for committing acts
of disloyalty and/or acts inimical to the
interest and violative to the Constitution and
by-laws of your federation.
You failed and/or refused to offer an
explanation inspite of the time granted to you.
Since you are no longer a member of good
standing, ULGWP is constrained to
recommend for your termination from your
employment, and provided in Article II
Section 4, known as UNION SECURITY, in
the Collective Bargaining agreement." [9]
On the same day, the federation advised respondent company of
the expulsion of the 30 union officers and demanded their
separation from employment pursuant to the Union Security
Clause in their collective bargaining agreement. This demand was
reiterated twice, through letters dated February 21 and March 4,
1989, respectively, to respondent company.
Thereafter, the Federation filed a Notice of Strike with the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board to compel the company
to effect the immediate termination of the expelled union officers.
On March 7, 1989, under the pressure of a threatened strike,
respondent company terminated the 30 union officers from
employment, serving them identical copies of the termination
letter reproduced below:
We received a demand letter dated 21
November 1988 from the United Lumber and
General Workers of the Philippines (ULGWP)
demanding for your dismissal from
employment pursuant to the provisions of
Article II, Section 4 of the existing Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA). In the said
demand letter, ULGWP informed us that as of
November 21, 1988, you were expelled from
the said federation "for committing acts of
disloyalty and/or acts inimical to the interest
of ULGWP and violative to its Constitution
and By-laws particularly Article V, Section 6,
9, and 12, Article XIII, Section 8."
In subsequent letters dated 21 February and
4 March 1989, the ULGWP reiterated its
demand for your dismissal, pointing out that
notwithstanding your expulsion from the
federation, you have continued in your
employment with the company in violation of
Sec. 1 and 4 of Article II of our CBA, and of
existing provisions of law.
In view thereof, we are left with no alternative
but to comply with the provisions of the Union
Security Clause of our CBA. Accordingly, we
hereby serve notice upon you that we are
dismissing you from your employment with M.
Greenfield, Inc., pursuant to Sections 1 and
4, Article II of the CBA effective
immediately." [10]
On that same day, the expelled union officers assigned in the first
shift were physically or bodily brought out of the company
premises by the companys security guards. Likewise, those
assigned to the second shift were not allowed to report for work.
This provoked some of the members of the local union to
demonstrate their protest for the dismissal of the said union
officers. Some union members left their work posts and walked
out of the company premises.
On the other hand, the Federation, having achieved its objective,
withdrew the Notice of Strike filed with the NCMB.
On March 8, 1989, the petitioners filed a Notice of Strike with the
NCMB, DOLE, Manila, docketed as Case No. NCMB-NCR-NS-
03-216-89, alleging the following grounds for the strike:
(a) Discrimination
(b) Interference in union activities
(c) Mass dismissal of union officers and shop
stewards
(d) Threats, coercion and intimidation
(e) Union busting
The following day, March 9, 1989, a strike vote referendum was
conducted and out of 2, 103 union members who cast their votes,
2,086 members voted to declare a strike.
On March 10, 1989, the thirty (30) dismissed union officers filed
an urgent petition, docketed as Case No. NCMB-NCR-NS-03-
216-89, with the Offfice of the Secretary of the Department of
Labor and Employment praying for the suspension of the effects
of their termination from employment. However, the petition was
dismissed by then Secretary Franklin Drilon on April 11, 1989, the
pertinent portion of which stated as follows:
"At this point in time, it is clear that the
dispute at M. Greenfield is purely an intra-
union matter. No mass lay-off is evident as
the terminations have been limited to those
allegedly leading the secessionist group
leaving MSMG-ULGWP to form a union
under the KMU. xxx
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding no sufficient
jurisdiction to warrant the exercise of our
extraordinary authority under Article 277 (b)
of the Labor Code, as amended, the instant
Petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED." [11]
On March 13 and 14, 1989, a total of 78 union shop stewards
were placed under preventive suspension by respondent
company. This prompted the union members to again stage a
walk-out and resulted in the official declaration of strike at around
3:30 in the afternoon of March 14, 1989. The strike was attended
with violence, force and intimidation on both sides resulting to
physical injuries to several employees, both striking and non-
striking, and damage to company properties.
The employees who participated in the strike and allegedly
figured in the violent incident were placed under preventive
suspension by respondent company. The company also sent
return-to-work notices to the home addresses of the striking
employees thrice successively, on March 27, April 8 and April 31,
1989, respectively. However, respondent company admitted that
only 261 employees were eventually accepted back to work.
Those who did not respond to the return-to-work notice were sent
termination letters dated May 17, 1989, reproduced below:
M. Greenfield Inc., (B)
Km. 14, Merville Rd., Paraaque, M.M.
May 17, 1989
xxx
On March 14, 1989, without justifiable cause
and without due notice, you left your work
assignment at the prejudice of the Companys
operations. On March 27, April 11, and April
21, 1989, we sent you notices to report to the
Company. Inspite of your receipt of said
notices, we have not heard from you up to
this date.
Accordingly, for your failure to report, it is
construed that you have effectively
abandoned your employment and the
Company is, therefore, constrained to
dismiss you for said cause.
Very truly yours,
M. GREENFIELD, INC., (B)
By:
WENZEL STEPHEN LIGOT
Asst. HRD Manager" [12]
On August 7, 1989, the petitioners filed a verified complaint with
the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, DOLE, Manila,
docketed as Case No. NCR-00-09-04199-89, charging private
respondents of unfair labor practice which consists of union
busting, illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, interference in union
activities, discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence,
and oppresion.
After the filing of the complaint, the lease contracts on the
respondent companys office and factory at Merville Subdivision,
Paraaque expired and were not renewed. Upon demand of the
owners of the premises, the company was compelled to vacate its
office and factory.
Thereafter, the company transferred its administration and
account/client servicing department at AFP-RSBS Industrial Park
in Taguig, Metro Manila. For failure to find a suitable place in
Metro Manila for relocation of its factory and manufacturing
operations, the company was constrained to move the said
departments to Tacloban, Leyte. Hence, on April 16, 1990,
respondent company accordingly notified its employees of a
temporary shutdown. in operations. Employees who were
interested in relocating to Tacloban were advised to enlist on or
before April 23, 1990.
The complaint for unfair labor practice was assigned to Labor
Arbiter Manuel Asuncion but was thereafter reassigned to Labor
Arbiter Cresencio Ramos when respondents moved to inhibit him
from acting on the case.
On December 15, 1992, finding the termination to be valid in
compliance with the union security clause of the collective
bargaining agreement, Labor Arbiter Cresencio Ramos dismissed
the complaint.
Petitioners then appealed to the NLRC. During its pendency,
Commissioner Romeo Putong retired from the service, leaving
only two commissioners, Commissioner Vicente Veloso III and
Hon. Chairman Bartolome Carale in the First Division. When
Commissioner Veloso inhibited himself from the case,
Commissioner Joaquin Tanodra of the Third Division was
temporarily designated to sit in the First Division for the proper
disposition of the case.
The First Division affirmed the Labor Arbiters disposition. With the
denial of their motion for reconsideration on January 28, 1994,
petitioners elevated the case to this Court, attributing grave abuse
of discretion to public respondent NLRC in:
I. UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE
UNION OFFICERS BY RESPONDENT
COMPANY AS VALID;
II. HOLDING THAT THE STRIKE STAGED
BYTHE PETITIONERS AS ILLEGAL;
III. HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER
EMPLOYEES WERE DEEMED TO HAVE
ABANDONED THEIR WORK AND HENCE,
VALIDLY DISMISSED BY RESPONDENT
COMPANY; AND
IV. NOT FINDING RESPONDENT
COMPANY AND RESPONDENT
FEDERATION OFFICERS GUILTY OF
ACTS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE.
Notwithstanding the several issues raised by the petitioners and
respondents in the voluminous pleadings presented before the
NLRC and this Court, they revolve around and proceed from the
issue of whether or not respondent company was justified in
dismissing petitioner employees merely upon the labor
federations demand for the enforcement of the union security
clause embodied in their collective bargaining agreement.
Before delving into the main issue, the procedural flaw pointed out
by the petitioners should first be resolved.
Petitioners contend that the decision rendered by the First
Division of the NLRC is not valid because Commissioner
Tanodra, who is from the Third Division, did not have any lawful
authority to sit, much less write the ponencia, on a case pending
before the First Division. It is claimed that a commissioner from
one division of the NLRC cannot be assigned or temporarily
designated to another division because each division is assigned
a particular territorial jurisdiction. Thus, the decision rendered did
not have any legal effect at all for being irregularly issued.
Petitioners argument is misplaced. Article 213 of the Labor Code
in enumerating the powers of the Chairman of the National Labor
Relations Commission provides that:
"The concurrence of two (2) Commissioners
of a division shall be necessary for the
pronouncement of a judgment or resolution.
Whenever the required membership in a
division is not complete and the concurrence
of two (2) commissioners to arrive at a
judgment or resolution cannot be obtained,
the Chairman shall designate such number of
additional Commissioners from the other
divisions as may be necessary."
It must be remembered that during the pendency of the case in
the First Division of the NLRC, one of the three commissioners,
Commissioner Romeo Putong, retired, leaving Chairman
Bartolome Carale and Commissioner Vicente Veloso III.
Subsequently, Commissioner Veloso inhibited himself from the
case because the counsel for the petitioners was his former
classmate in law school. The First Division was thus left with only
one commissioner. Since the law requires the concurrence of two
commisioners to arrive at a judgment or resolution, the
Commission was constrained to temporarily designate a
commissioner from another division to complete the First Division.
There is nothing irregular at all in such a temporary designation
for the law empowers the Chairman to make temporary
assignments whenever the required concurrence is not met. The
law does not say that a commissioner from the first division
cannot be temporarily assigned to the second or third division to
fill the gap or vice versa. The territorial divisions do not confer
exclusive jurisdiction to each division and are merely designed for
administrative efficiency.
Going into the merits of the case, the court finds that the
Complaint for unfair labor practice filed by the petitioners against
respondent company which charges union busting, illegal
dismissal, illegal suspension, interference in union activities,
discrimination, threats, intimidation, coercion, violence, and
oppression actually proceeds from one main issue which is the
termination of several employees by respondent company upon
the demand of the labor federation pursuant to the union security
clause embodied in their collective bargaining agreement.
Petitioners contend that their dismissal from work was effected in
an arbitrary, hasty, capricious and illegal manner because it was
undertaken by the respondent company without any prior
administrative investigation; that, had respondent company
conducted prior independent investigation it would have found
that their expulsion from the union was unlawful similarly for lack
of prior administrative investigation; that the federation cannot
recommend the dismissal of the union officers because it was not
a principal party to the collective bargaining agreement between
the company and the union; that public respondents acted with
grave abuse of discretion when they declared petitioners
dismissals as valid and the union strike as illegal and in not
declaring that respondents were guilty of unfair labor practice.
Private respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the thirty
dismissed employees who were former officers of the federation
have no cause of action against the company, the termination of
their employment having been made upon the demand of the
federation pursuant to the union security clause of the CBA; the
expelled officers of the local union were accorded due process of
law prior to their expulsion from their federation; that the strike
conducted by the petitioners was illegal for noncompliance with
the requirements; that the employees who participated in the
illegal strike and in the commission of violence thereof were
validly terminated from work; that petitioners were deemed to
have abandoned their employment when they did not respond to
the three return to work notices sent to them; that petitioner labor
union has no legal personality to file and prosecute the case for
and on behalf of the individual employees as the right to do so is
personal to the latter; and that, the officers of respondent
company cannot be liable because as mere corporate officers,
they acted within the scope of their authority.
Public respondent, through the Labor Arbiter, ruled that the
dismissed union officers were validly and legally terminated
because the dismissal was effected in compliance with the union
security clause of the CBA which is the law between the parties.
And this was affimed by the Commission on appeal. Moreover,
the Labor Arbiter declared that notwithstanding the lack of a prior
administrative investigation by respondent company, under the
union security clause provision in the CBA, the company cannot
look into the legality or illegality of the recommendation to dismiss
by the union nd the obligation to dismiss is ministerial on the part
of the company. [13]
This ruling of the NLRC is erroneous. Although this Court has
ruled that union security clauses embodied in the collective
bargaining agreement may be validly enforced and that
dismissals pursuant thereto may likewise be valid, this does not
erode the fundamental requirement of due process. The reason
behind the enforcement of union security clauses which is the
sanctity and inviolability of contracts cannot override ones right
[14]
to due process.
In the case of Cario vs. National Labor Relations
Commission, this Court pronounced that while the company,
[15]
under a maintenance of membership provision of the collective
bargaining agreement, is bound to dismiss any employee
expelled by the union for disloyalty upon its written request, this
undertaking should not be done hastily and summarily. The
company acts in bad faith in dismissing a worker without giving
him the benefit of a hearing.
"The power to dismiss is a normal
prerogative of the employer. However, this is
not without limitation. The employer is bound
to exercise caution in terminating the services
of his employees especially so when it is
made upon the request of a labor union
pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, xxx. Dismissals must not be
arbitrary and capricious. Due process must
be observed in dismissing an employee
because it affects not only his position but
also his means of livelihood. Employers
should respect and protect the rights of their
employees, which include the right to labor."
In the case under scrutiny, petitioner union officers were expelled
by the federation for allegedly commiting acts of disloyalty and/or
inimical to the interest of ULGWP and in violation of its
Constitution and By-laws. Upon demand of the federation, the
company terminated the petitioners without conducting a separate
and independent investigation. Respondent company did not
inquire into the cause of the expulsion and whether or not the
federation had sufficient grounds to effect the same. Relying
merely upon the federations allegations, respondent company
terminated petitioners from employment when a separate inquiry
could have revealed if the federation had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in expelling the union officers. Respondent companys
allegation that petitioners were accorded due process is belied by
the termination letters received by the petitioners which state that
the dismissal shall be immediately effective.
As held in the aforecited case of Cario, "the right of an employee
to be informed of the charges against him and to reasonable
opportunity to present his side in a controversy with either the
company or his own union is not wiped away by a union security
clause or a union shop clause in a collective bargaining
agreement. An employee is entitled to be protected not only from
a company which disregards his rights but also from his own
union the leadership of which could yield to the temptation of swift
and arbitrary expulsion from membership and mere dismissal
from his job."
While respondent company may validly dismiss the employees
expelled by the union for disloyalty under the union security
clause of the collective bargaining agreement upon the
recommendation by the union, this dismissal should not be done
hastily and summarily thereby eroding the employees right to due
process, self-organization and security of tenure. The
enforcement of union security clauses is authorized by law
provided such enforcement is not characterized by arbitrariness,
and always with due process. Even on the assumption that the
[16]
federation had valid grounds to expell the union officers, due
process requires that these union officers be accorded a separate
hearing by respondent company.
In its decision, public respondent also declared that if
complainants (herein petitioners) have any recourse in law, their
right of action is against the federation and not against the
company or its officers, relying on the findings of the Labor
Secretary that the issue of expulsion of petitioner union officers by
the federation is a purely intra-union matter.
Again, such a contention is untenable. While it is true that the
issue of expulsion of the local union officers is originally between
the local union and the federation, hence, intra-union in character,
the issue was later on converted into a termination dispute when
the company dismissed the petitioners from work without the
benefit of a separate notice and hearing. As a matter of fact, the
records reveal that the the termination was effective on the same
day that the the termination notice was served on the petitioners.
In the case of Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union vs. Liberty
Cotton Mills, Inc. , the Court held the company liable for the
[17]
payment of backwages for having acted in bad faith in effecting
the dismissal of the employees.
"xxx Bad faith on the part of the respondent
company may be gleaned from the fact that
the petitioner workers were dismissed hastily
and summarily. At best, it was guilty of a
tortious act, for which it must assume solidary
liability, since it apparently chose to
summarily dismiss the workers at the unions
instance secure in the unions contractual
undertaking that the union would hold it free
from any liability arising from such dismissal."
Thus, notwithstanding the fact that the dismissal was at the
instance of the federation and that it undertook to hold the
company free from any liability resulting from such a dismissal,
the company may still be held liable if it was remiss in its duty to
accord the would-be dismissed employees their right to be heard
on the matter.
Anent petitioners contention that the federation was not a
principal party to the collective bargaining agreement between the
company and the union, suffice it to say that the matter was
already ruled upon in the Interpleader case filed by respondent
company. Med-Arbiter Anastacio Bactin thus ruled:
After a careful examination of the facts and
evidences presented by the parties, this
Officer hereby renders its decision as follows:
1.) It appears on record that in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) which took
effect on July 1, 1986, the contracting parties
are M. Greenfield, Inc. (B) and Malayang
Samahan ng Mga Manggagawa sa M.
Greenfield, Inc. (B) (MSMG)/United Lumber
and General Workers of the Philippines
(ULGWP). However, MSMG was not yet a
registered labor organization at the time of
the signing of the CBA. Hence, the union
referred to in the CBA is the ULGWP." [18]
Likewise on appeal, Director Pura Ferrer-Calleja put the issue to
rest as follows:
It is undisputed that ULGWP is the certified
sole and exclusive collective bargaining
agent of all the regular rank-and-file workers
of the company, M. Greenfield, Inc. (pages
31-32 of the records).
It has been established also that the
company and ULGWP signed a 3-year
collective bargaining agreement effective July
1, 1986 up to June 30, 1989. [19]
Although the issue of whether or not the federation had
reasonable grounds to expel the petitioner union officers is
properly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Labor Relations, being an intra-union conflict, this Court deems
it justifiable that such issue be nonetheless ruled upon, as the
Labor Arbiter did, for to remand the same to the Bureau of Labor
Relations would be to intolerably delay the case.
The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner union officers were
justifiably expelled from the federation for committing acts of
disloyalty when it "undertook to disaffiliate from the federation by
charging ULGWP with failure to provide any legal, educational or
organizational support to the local. x x x and declared autonomy,
wherein they prohibit the federation from interfering in any internal
and external affairs of the local union."[20]
It is well-settled that findings of facts of the NLRC are entitled to
great respect and are generally binding on this Court, but it is
equally well-settled that the Court will not uphold erroneous
conclusions of the NLRC as when the Court finds insufficient or
insubstantial evidence on record to support those factual findings.
The same holds true when it is perceived that far too much is
concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts
appearing of record. [21]
In its decision, the Labor Arbiter declared that the act of
disaffiliation and declaration of autonomy by the local union was
part of its "plan to take over the respondent federation." This is
purely conjecture and speculation on the part of public
respondent, totally unsupported by the evidence.
A local union has the right to disaffiliate from its mother union or
declare its autonomy. A local union, being a separate and
voluntary association, is free to serve the interests of all its
members including the freedom to disaffiliate or declare its
autonomy from the federation to which it belongs when
circumstances warrant, in accordance with the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of association. [22]
The purpose of affiliation by a local union with a mother union or a
federation
"xxx is to increase by collective action the
bargaining power in respect of the terms and
conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained
the basic units of association, free to serve
their own and the common interest of all,
subject to the restraints imposed by the
Constitution and By-Laws of the Association,
and free also to renounce the affiliation for
mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in
the agreement which brought it into
existence." [23]
Thus, a local union which has affiliated itself with a federation is
free to sever such affiliation anytime and such disaffiliation cannot
be considered disloyalty. In the absence of specific provisions in
the federations constitution prohibiting disaffiliation or the
declaration of autonomy of a local union, a local may dissociate
with its parent union. [24]
The evidence on hand does not show that there is such a
provision in ULGWPs constitution. Respondents reliance upon
Article V, Section 6, of the federations constitution is not right
because said section, in fact, bolsters the petitioner unions claim
of its right to declare autonomy:
Section 6. The autonomy of a local union
affiliated with ULGWP shall be respected
insofar as it pertains to its internal affairs,
except as provided elsewhere in this
Constitution.
There is no disloyalty to speak of, neither is there any violation of
the federations constitution because there is nothing in the said
constitution which specifically prohibits disaffiliation or declaration
of autonomy. Hence, there cannot be any valid dismissal because
Article II, Section 4 of the union security clause in the CBA limits
the dismissal to only three (3) grounds, to wit: failure to maintain
membership in the union (1) for non-payment of union dues, (2)
for resignation; and (3) for violation of the unions Constitution and
By-Laws.
To support the finding of disloyalty, the Labor Arbiter gave weight
to the fact that on February 26, 1989, the petitioners declared as
vacant all the responsible positions of ULGWP, filled these
vacancies through an election and filed a petition for the
registration of UWP as a national federation. It should be pointed
out, however, that these occurred after the federation had already
expelled the union officers. The expulsion was effective
November 21, 1988. Therefore, the act of establishing a different
federation, entirely separate from the federation which expelled
them, is but a normal retaliatory reaction to their expulsion.
With regard to the issue of the legality or illegality of the strike, the
Labor Arbiter held that the strike was illegal for the following
reasons: (1) it was based on an intra-union dispute which cannot
properly be the subject of a strike, the right to strike being limited
to cases of bargaining deadlocks and unfair labor practice (2) it
was made in violation of the "no strike, no lock-out" clause in the
CBA, and (3) it was attended with violence, force and intimidation
upon the persons of the company officials, other employees
reporting for work and third persons having legitimate business
with the company, resulting to serious physical injuries to several
employees and damage to company property.
On the submission that the strike was illegal for being grounded
on a non-strikeable issue, that is, the intra-union conflict between
the federation and the local union, it bears reiterating that when
respondent company dismissed the union officers, the issue was
transformed into a termination dispute and brought respondent
company into the picture. Petitioners believed in good faith that in
dismissing them upon request by the federation, respondent
company was guilty of unfair labor pratice in that it violated the
petitioners right to self-organization. The strike was staged to
protest respondent companys act of dismissing the union officers.
Even if the allegations of unfair labor practice are subsequently
found out to be untrue, the presumption of legality of the strike
prevails.
[25]
Another reason why the Labor Arbiter declared the strike illegal is
due to the existence of a no strike no lockout provision in the
CBA. Again, such a ruling is erroneous. A no strike, no lock out
provision can only be invoked when the strike is economic in
nature, i.e. to force wage or other concessions from the employer
which he is not required by law to grant. Such a provision cannot
[26]
be used to assail the legality of a strike which is grounded on
unfair labor practice, as was the honest belief of herein
petitioners. Again, whether or not there was indeed unfair labor
practice does not affect the strike.
On the allegation of violence committed in the course of the strike,
it must be remembered that the Labor Arbiter and the
Commission found that "the parties are agreed that there were
violent incidents x x x resulting to injuries to both sides, the union
and management." The evidence on record show that the
[27]
violence cannot be attributed to the striking employees alone for
the company itself employed hired men to pacify the strikers. With
violence committed on both sides, the management and the
employees, such violence cannot be a ground for declaring the
strike as illegal.
With respect to the dismissal of individual petitioners, the Labor
Arbiter declared that their refusal to heed respondents recall to
work notice is a clear indication that they were no longer
interested in continuing their employment and is deemed
abandonment. It is admitted that three return to work notices were
sent by respondent company to the striking employees on March
27, April 11, and April 21, 1989 and that 261 employees who
responded to the notice were admittted back to work.
However, jurisprudence holds that for abandonment of work to
exist, it is essential (1) that the employee must have failed to
report for work or must have been absent without valid or
justifiable reason; and (2) that there must have been a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested
by some overt acts. Deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part
[28]
of the employee to go back to his work post amd resume his
employment must be established. Absence must be accompanied
by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee
simply does not want to work anymore. And the burden of proof
[29]
to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests
on the employer.
In the present case, respondents failed to prove that there was a
clear intention on the part of the striking employees to sever their
employer-employee relationship. Although admittedly the
company sent three return to work notices to them, it has not
been substantially proven that these notices were actually sent
and received by the employees. As a matter of fact, some
employees deny that they ever received such notices. Others
alleged that they were refused entry to the company premises by
the security guards and were advised to secure a clearance from
ULGWP and to sign a waiver. Some employees who responded
to the notice were allegedly told to wait for further notice from
respondent company as there was lack of work.
Furthermore, this Court has ruled that an employee who took computed from the time petitioners were terminated until the
steps to protest his lay-off cannot be said to have abandoned his finality of this decision. Costs against the respondent company.
work. The filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal is inconsistent
[30]

with the allegation of abandonment. In the case under

SO ORDERED.
consideration, the petitioners did, in fact, file a complaint when
they were refused reinstatement by respondent company.

Anent public respondents finding that there was no unfair labor

practice on the part of respondent company and federation
officers, the Court sustains the same. As earlier discussed, union
security clauses in collective bargaining agreements, if freely and
voluntarily entered into, are valid and binding. Corrolarily,
dismissals pursuant to union security clauses are valid and legal
subject only to the requirement of due process, that is, notice and
hearing prior to dismissal. Thus, the dismissal of an employee by
the company pursuant to a labor unions demand in accordance
with a union security agreement does not constitute unfair labor
practice. [31]
However, the dismissal was invalidated in this case because of
respondent companys failure to accord petitioners with due
process, that is, notice and hearing prior to their termination. Also,
said dismissal was invalidated because the reason relied upon by
respondent Federation was not valid. Nonetheless, the dismissal
still does not constitute unfair labor practice.
THIRD DIVISION . G.R. No. 96566 January 6, 1992
ATLAS LITHOGRAPHIC SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
UNDERSECRETARY BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
(Department of Labor and Employment) and ATLAS
LITHOGRAPHIC SERVICES, INC. SUPERVISORY,
ADMINISTRATIVE, PERSONNEL, PRODUCTION,
ACCOUNTING AND CONFIDENTIAL EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION-KAISAHAN NG MANGGAWANG PILIPINO
(KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN), respondents.
Romero, Lagman, Valdecantos & Arreza Law Offices for
petitioner.
Esteban M. Mendoza for private respondent.

Lastly, the Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that respondent

company officials cannot be held personally liable for damages on
account of the employees dismissal because the employer
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from its
officers who merely acted as its agents.
It has come to the attention of this Court that the 30-day prior
notice requirement for the dismissal of employees has been
repeatedly violated and the sanction imposed for such violation
enunciated in Wenphil Corporation vs. NLRC has become an
[32]
ineffective deterrent. Thus, the Court recently promulgated a
decision to reinforce and make more effective the requirement of
notice and hearing, a procedure that must be observed before
termination of employment can be legally effected.
In Ruben Serrano vs. NLRC and Isetann Department Store (G.R.
No. 117040, January 27, 2000), the Court ruled that an employee
who is dismissed, whether or not for just or authorized cause but
without prior notice of his termination, is entitled to full backwages
from the time he was terminated until the decision in his case
becomes final, when the dismissal was for cause; and in case the
dismissal was without just or valid cause, the backwages shall be
computed from the time of his dismissal until his actual
reinstatement. In the case at bar, where the requirement of notice
and hearing was not complied with, the aforecited doctrine laid
down in the Serrano case applies.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking the
modification of the Order dated 14 December 1990 and the Resolution dated 21
November 1990 issued by the public respondents.
The antecedent facts of the case as gathered from the records
are as follows:
On July 16, 1990, the supervisory, administrative personnel,
production, accounting and confidential employees of the
petitioner Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. (ALSI) affiliated with
private respondent Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino, a
national labor organization. The local union adopted the name
Atlas Lithographic Services, Inc. Supervisory, Administrative,
Personnel, Production, Accounting and Confidential Employees
Association or ALSI-SAPPACEA-KAMPIL in short and which we
shall hereafter refer to as the "supervisors" union.
Shortly thereafter, private respondent Kampil-Katipunan filed on
behalf of the "supervisors" union a petition for certification election
so that it could be the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the
supervisory employees.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the decision of the

The petitioners opposed the private respondent's petition claiming
National Labor Relations Commission in case No. NCR-00-09- that under Article 245 of the Labor bode the private respondent
04199-89 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the respondent
cannot represent the supervisory employees for collective
company is hereby ordered to immediately reinstate the bargaining purposeless because the private respondent also
petitioners to their respective positions. Should reinstatement be represents the rank-and-file employees' union.
not feasible, respondent company shall pay separation pay of one
month salary for every year of service. Since petitioners were
terminated without the requisite written notice at least 30 days On September 18, 1990, the Med-Arbiter issued an order in favor
prior to their termination, following the recent ruling in the case of the private respondent, the dispositive portion of which
of Ruben Serrano vs. National Labor Relations Commission and provides:
Isetann Department Store, the respondent company is hereby
ordered to pay full backwages to petitioner-employees while the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a
Federation is also ordered to pay full backwages to petitioner-
certification election among the supervisory
union officers who were dismissed upon its instigation. Since the
employees belonging to the Administrative,
dismissal of petitioners was without cause, backwages shall be
Personnel, Production, Accounting
computed from the time the herein petitioner employees and
Departments as well as confidential
union officers were dismissed until their actual reinstatement.
employees performing supervisory functions
Should reinstatement be not feasible, their backwages shall be
 of Atlas Lithographic Services, Incorporated
is hereby ordered conducted within 20 days
from receipt hereof, subject to usual pre-
election conference, with the following
choices:
1. KAMPIL (KATIPUNAN);
2. No union.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 39-40)
The petitioners, as expected, appealed for the reversal of the
above order. The public respondent, however, issued a resolution
affirming the Med-Arbiter's order.
The petitioners, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not, under
Article 245 of the Labor Code, a local union of supervisory
employees may be allowed to affiliate with a national federation of
labor organizations of rank-and-file employees and which national
federation actively represents its affiliates in collective bargaining
negotiations with the same employer of the supervisors and in the
implementation of resulting collective bargaining agreements.
The petitioner argues that KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN already
represents its rank-and-file employees and, therefore, to allow the
supervisors of those employees to affiliate with the private
respondent is tantamount to allowing the circumvention of the
principle of the separation of unions under Article 245 of the Labor
Code.
It further argues that the intent of the law is to prevent a single
labor organization from representing different classes of
employees with conflicting interests.
The public respondent, on the other hand, contends that despite
affiliation with a national federation, the local union does not lose
its personality which is separate, and distinct from the national
federation. It cites as its legal basis the case of Adamson &
Adamson, Inc. v. CIR (127 SCRA 268 [1984]).
It maintains that Rep. Act No. 6715 contemplates the principle laid
down by this Court in the Adamson case interpreting Section 3 of
Rep. Act No. 875 (the Industrial Peace Act) on the right of a
supervisor's union to affiliate. The private respondent asserts that
the legislature must have noted the Adamson ruling then
prevailing when it conceived the reinstatement in the present
Labor Code of a similar provision on the right of supervisors to
organize.
Under the Industrial Peace Act of 1953, employees were
classified into three groups, namely: (1) managerial employees;
(2) supervisors; and (3) rank-and file employees. Supervisors,
who were considered employees in relation to their employer
could join a union but not a union of rank-and-file employees.
With the enactment in 1974 of the Labor Code (Pres Decree No.
442), employees were classified into managerial and rank-and-file
employees. Neither the category of supervisors nor their right to
organize under the old statute were recognized. So that,
in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez (144 SCRA 628
[1986]), the Court interpreted the superseding labor law to have
removed from supervisors the right to unionize among
themselves. The Court ruled:
In the light of the factual background of this
case, We are constrained to hold that the
supervisory employees of petitioner firm may
not, under the law, form a supervisors union,
separate and distinct from the existing
bargaining unit (BEU), composed of the rank-
and-file employees of the Bulletin Publishing
Corporation. It is evident that most of the
private respondents are considered
managerial employees. Also, it is distinctly
stated in Section 11, Rule II, of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing the Labor Code, that
supervisory unions are presently no longer
recognized nor allowed to exist and operate
as such. (pp. 633, 634)
In Section 11, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing
Pres. Decree No. 442, the supervisory unions existing since the
effectivity of the New Code in January 1, 1975 ceased to operate
as such and the members who did not qualify as managerial
employees under this definition in Article 212 (k) therein became
eligible to form, to join or assist a rank-and-file union.
A revision of the Labor Code undertaken by the bicameral
Congress brought about the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6715 in
March 1989 in which employees were reclassified into three
groups, namely: (1) the managerial employees; (2) supervisors;
and (3) the rank and file employees. Under the present law, the
category of supervisory employees is once again recognized.
Hence, Art. 212 (m) states:
(m) . . . Supervisory employees are those
who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial
actions if the exercise of such authority is not
merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. . .
.
The rationale for the amendment is the government's recognition
of the right of supervisors to organize with the qualification that
they shall not join or assist in the organization of rank-and-file
employees. The reason behind the Industrial Peace Act provision
on the same subject matter has been adopted in the present
statute. The interests of supervisors on the one hand, and the
rank-and-file employees on the other, are separate and distinct.
The functions of supervisors, being recommendatory in nature,
are more identified with the interests of the employer. The
performance of those functions may, thus, run counter to the
interests of the rank-and-file.
This intent of the law is made clear in the deliberations of the
legislators on then Senate Bill 530 now enacted as Rep. Act No.
6715.
The definition of managerial employees was limited to those
having authority to hire and fire while those who only recommend
effectively the hiring or firing or transfers of personnel would be
considered as closer to rank-and-file employees. The exclusion,
therefore, of middle level executives from the category of
managers brought about a third classification, the supervisory
employees. These supervisory employees are allowed to form
their own union but they are not allowed to join the rank-and-file
union because of conflict of interest (Journal of the Senate, First
Regular Session, 1987, 1988, Volume 3,
p. 2245).
In terms of classification, however, while they are more closely
identified with the rank-and-file they are still not allowed to join the
union of rank-and-file employees. To quote the Senate Journal:
 In reply to Sen. Guingona's query whether
"supervisors" are included in the term
"employee", Sen. Herrera stated that while
they are considered as rank-and-file
employees, they cannot join the union and
they would have to form their own
supervisors' union pursuant to Rep. Act 875.
(supra, p. 2288)
The peculiar role of supervisors is such that while they are not
managers, when they recommend action implementing
management policy or ask for the discipline or dismissal of
subordinates, they identify with the interests of the employer and
may act contrary to the interests of the rank-and-file.
We agree with the petitioner's contention that a conflict of interest
may arise in the areas of discipline, collective bargaining and
strikes.
Members of the supervisory union might refuse to carry out
disciplinary measures against their co-member rank-and-file
employees.
In the area of bargaining, their interests cannot be considered
identical. The needs of one are different from those of the other.
Moreover, in the event of a strike, the national federation might
influence the supervisors' union to conduct a sympathy strike on
the sole basis of affiliation.
More important, the factual issues in the Adamson case are
different from the present case. First, the rank-and-file employees
in the Adamson case are not directly under the supervisors who
comprise the supervisors' union. In the case at bar, the rank-and
file employees are directly under the supervisors organized by
one and the same federation.
The contemplation of the law in Sec. 3 of the Industrial Peace Act
is to prohibit supervisors from joining a labor organization of
employees under their supervision. Sec. 3 of the Industrial Peace
Act provides:
Sec. 3 — Employees' Right to Self
Organization. Employees shall have the right
to self-organization and to form, join or assist
labor organizations of their own choosing for
the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to
engage in concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining and other mutual aid
or protection. Individuals employed as
supervisors shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of
employees under their supervision but may
form separate organizations of their own
(Emphasis supplied).
This was not the consideration in the Adamson case because as
mentioned earlier, the rank-and-file employees in
the Adamson case were not under the supervision of the
supervisors involved.
Meanwhile, Article 245 of the Labor Code as amended by Rep.
Act No. 6715 provides:
Art. 245. Ineligibility of managerial employees
to join any labor organization: right of
supervisory employees. — Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or
form any labor organization. Supervisory
employees shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of the
rank-and-file employees but may join, assist
or form separate labor organizations of their
own.
The Court construes Article 245 to mean that, as in Section 3 of
the Industrial Peace Act, supervisors shall not be given an
occasion to bargain together with the rank-and-file against the
interests of the employer regarding terms and conditions of work
Second, the national union in the Adamson case did not actively
represent its local chapters. In the present case, the local union is
actively represented by the national federation. In fact, it was the
national federation, the KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN, which initially filed
a petition for certification in behalf of the respondent union.
Thus, if the intent of the law is to avoid a situation where
supervisors would merge with the rank and-file or where the
supervisors' labor organization would represent conflicting
interests, then a local supervisors' union should not be allowed to
affiliate with the national federation of union of rank-and-file
employees where that federation actively participates in union
activity in the company.
The petitioner further contends that the term labor organization
includes a federation considering that Art. 212 (g) mentions "any
union or association of employees."
The respondent, however, argues that the phrase refers to a local
union only in which case, the prohibition in Art. 245 is inapplicable
to the case at bar.
The prohibition against a supervisors' union joining a local union
of rank-and-file is replete with jurisprudence. The Court
emphasizes that the limitation is not confined to a case of
supervisors wanting to join a rank-and-file local union. The
prohibition extends to a supervisors' local union applying for
membership in a national federation the members of which
include local unions of rank-and-file employees. The intent of the
law is clear especially where, as in the case at bar, the
supervisors will be co-mingling with those employees whom they
directly supervise in their own bargaining unit.
Technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of
the parties. (Rapid Manpower Consultants, Inc. v. NLRC, 190
SCRA 747 [1990]) What should be paramount is the intent behind
the law, not its literal construction. Where one interpretation would
result in mischievous consequences while another would bring
about equity, justice, and the promotion of labor peace, there can
be no doubt as to what interpretation shall prevail.
Finally, the respondent contends that the law prohibits the
employer from interfering with the employees' right to self-
organization.
There is no question about this intendment of the law. There is,
however, in the present case, no violation of such a guarantee to
the employee. Supervisors are not prohibited from forming their
own union. What the law prohibits is their membership in a labor
organization of rank-and-file employees (Art. 245, Labor Code) or
their joining a national federation of rank-and-file employees that
includes the very local union which they are not allowed to directly
join.
In a motion dated November 15, 1991 it appears that the
petitioner has knuckled under to the respondents' pressures and
agreed to let the national federation KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN
represent its supervisors in negotiating a collective bargaining
agreement. Against the advise of its own counsel and on the
basis of alleged "industrial peace", the petitioner expressed a loss
of interest in pursuing this action. The petitioner is, of course, free
to grant whatever concessions it wishes to give to its employees
unilaterally or through negotiations but we cannot allow the
resulting validation of an erroneous ruling and policy of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to remain on the
basis of the petitioner's loss of interest. The December 14, 1990
order and the November 21, 1990 resolution of DOLE are
contrary to law and must be declared as such.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The private
respondent is disqualified from affiliating with a national federation
of labor organizations which includes the petitioner's rank-and-file
employees.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION . G.R. No. L-35120. January 31, 1984.
ADAMSON & ADAMSON, INC., Petitioner, v. THE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and ADAMSON
& ADAMSON SUPERVISORY UNION
(FFW), Respondents.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna & Feliciano for Petitioner.
Jaime D. Lauron for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR LAW;
REPUBLIC ACT 875, INDUSTRIAL PEACE ACT; RIGHT TO
SELF-ORGANIZATION; LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF
LAWS IMPLEMENTING PROTECTION TO LABOR
PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. — The right of
employees to self-organization and to form, join or assist
labor organizations of their own choosing for the purpose
of collective bargaining and to engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection is a fundamental
right of labor that derives its existence from the
Constitution. It is recognized and implemented through
the abovecited Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act as
amended. In interpreting the protection to labor and
social justice provisions of the Constitution and the labor
laws or rules and regulations implementing the
constitutional mandates, we have always adopted the
liberal approach which favors the exercise of labor rights.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES’ RIGHT
THERETO RESTRICTED BUT MAY NOT BE DENIED; CASE
AT BAR. — The right of supervisory employees to
organize under the Industrial Peace Act carries certain
restrictions but the right itself may not be denied or
unduly abridged. The supervisory employees of an
employer cannot join any labor organization of
employees under their supervision but may validly form a
separate organization of their own. As stated in Caltex
Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. Court of
Industrial Relations (47 SCRA 112), it would be to attach
unorthodoxy to, not to say an emasculation of, the
concept of law if managers as such were precluded from
organizing. Thus, if Republic Act 875, in its Section 3,
recognizes the right of supervisors to form a separate
organization of their own, albeit they cannot be members
of a labor organization of employees under their
supervision, that authority of supervisors to form a
separate labor union carries with it the right to bargain
collectively with the employer. (Government Service
Insurance System v. Government Service Insurance
System Supervisors’ Union, 68 SCRA 418).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AFFILIATION OF LOCAL UNION
WITH A NATIONAL UNION OR FEDERATION; EFFECT
THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — The specific issue before us
is whether or not a supervisor’s union may affiliate with a
federation with which unions of rank-and-file employees
of the same employer are also affiliated. We find without
merit the contentions of petitioner that if affiliation will be
allowed, only one union will in fact represent both
supervisors and rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner; that there would be an indirect affiliation of
supervisors and rank-and-file employees with one labor
organization; that there would be a merging of the two
bargaining units; and that the respondent union will lose
its independence because it becomes an alter ego of the
federation. There is nothing in the provisions of the
Industrial Peace Act which provides that a duly registered
local union affiliating with a national union or federation
loses its legal personality, or its independence.
Notwithstanding affiliation, the local union remained the
basic unit free to serve the common interest of all its
members (Elisco-Elirol Labor Union v. Noriel, 80 SCRA
681 and Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Noriel 80
SCRA 681 and Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v.
Liberty cotton Mills Inc., 66 SCRA 512). In the case at
bar, the Adamson and Adamson Supervisory Union and
the Adamson and Adamson, Inc., Salesmen Association
(FFW), have their own respective constitutions and by-
laws. They are separately and independently registered
of each other. Both sent their separate proposals for
collective bargaining agreements with their employer.
There could be no employer influence on rank-in-file
organizational activities nor there could be any rank and
file influence on the supervisory functions of the
supervisors because of the representation sought to be
proscribed.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Adamson and Adamson, Inc., filed this petition to set
aside orders of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations (CIR) holding that the Adamson and Adamson,
Inc. Supervisory Union (FFW) can legally represent
supervisors of the petitioner corporation notwithstanding
the affiliation of the rank and file union of the same
company with the same labor federation, the Federation
of Free Workers. chanrobles law library : red
The Adamson and Adamson, Inc. Supervisory Union
(FFW) informed the petitioner about its having organized
on the same date that the Adamson and Adamson, Inc.
Salesmen Association (FFW) advised the petitioner that
the rank and file salesmen had formed their own union.
The CIR dismissed the petition in CIR Case No. 3267-MC
entitled "In the Matter of Representation of the
Supervisory Employees of Adamson and Adamson, Inc.,
Petitioner" thus prompting the filing of this petition for
review on certiorari.
Subsequently and during the pendency of the present
petition, the rank and file employees formed their own
union, naming it Adamson and Adamson Independent
Workers (FFW).
The petitioner made a lone assignment of error, to
wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE ELIGIBILITY OF THE
RESPONDENT UNION TO REPRESENT THE PETITIONER’S
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES NOTWITHSTANDING THE
AFFILIATION OF THE SAID UNION WITH THE SAME
NATIONAL FEDERATION WITH WHICH THE UNIONS OF
NON-SUPERVISORS IN THE PETITIONER COMPANY ARE
ALSO AFFILIATED.
The petitioner argues that the affiliation of the
respondent union of supervisors, the salesmen’s
association, and the Adamson and Adamson Independent
Worker’s Union of rank and file personnel with the same
national federation (FFW) violates Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act, as amended), because — (1) it
results in the indirect affiliation of supervisors and rank-
and-file employees with one labor organization; (2) since
respondent union and the unions of non-supervisors in
the same company are governed by the same
constitution and by-laws of the national federation, in
practical effect, there is but one union; and (3) it would
result in the respondent union’s losing its independence
because it becomes the alter ego of the federation.
red
chanrobles law library :
The petitioner also submits that should affiliation be
allowed, this would violate the requirement of
separateness of bargaining units under Section 12 of the
Act because only one union will in fact represent both
supervisors and rank-and-file employees of the
petitioner.
The respondents on the other band argue that the
supervisory employees of an employer may validly join
an organization of the rank-and-file employees so long as
the said rank and file employees are not under their
supervision. They submit that Adamson and Adamson
Supervisory Union (FFW) is not composed of sales
supervisors and, therefore, the salesmen of the company
are not under the supervision of the supervisory
employees forming the union. Respondents also argue
that even if the salesmen of the petitioner company are
under the supervision of the members of the supervisory
union, the prohibition would not apply because the
salesmen and the supervisory employees of the company
have their separate and distinct labor organizations, and,
as a matter of fact, their respective unions sent separate
proposals for collective bargaining agreements. They
contend that their respective labor organizations, not the
FFW, will represent their members in the negotiations as
well as in the signing of their respective contracts.
Respondents further argue that the Federation of Free
Workers has, as its affiliates, supervisory as well as rank-
and-file employees, and should both the supervisory and
the rank-and-file employees of a certain employer who
have separate certificates of registration affiliate with the
same federation, the prohibition does not apply as the
federation is not the organization of the supervisory
employees contemplated in the law. chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The issue presented involves the correct interpretation of
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, the Industrial Peace
Act, as amended, which states: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Employees shall have the right to self-organization and to
form, join or assist labor organizations of their own
choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid or protection. Individuals
employed as supervisors shall not be eligible for
membership in a labor organization of employees under
their supervision but may form separate organizations of
their own.
The right of employees to self-organization and to form,
join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection is a
fundamental right of labor that derives its existence from
the Constitution. It is recognized and implemented
through the abovecited Section 3 of the Industrial Peace
Act as amended.
In interpreting the protection to labor and social justice
provisions of the Constitution and the labor laws or rules
and regulations implementing the constitutional
mandates, we have always adopted the liberal approach
which favors the exercise of labor rights.
In deciding this case, we start with the recognized rule
that the right of supervisory employees to organize under
the Industrial Peace Act carries certain restrictions but
the right itself may not be denied or unduly abridged.
The supervisory employees of an employer cannot join
any labor organization of employees under their
supervision but may validly form a separate organization
of their own. As stated in Caltex Filipino Managers and
Supervisors Association v. Court of Industrial Relations
(47 SCRA 112), it would be to attach unorthodoxy to, not
to say an emasculation of, the concept of law if managers
as such were precluded from organizing. Thus, if Republic
Act 875, in its Section 3, recognizes the right of
supervisors to form a separate organization of their own,
albeit they cannot be members of a labor organization of
employees under their supervision, that authority of
supervisors to form a separate labor union carries with it
the right to bargain collectively with the employer.
(Government Service Insurance System v. Government
Service Insurance System Supervisors’ Union, 68 SCRA
418).
The specific issue before us is whether or not a
supervisor’s union may affiliate with a federation with
which unions of rank-and-file employees of the same
employer are also affiliated. We find without merit the
contentions of petitioner that if affiliation will be allowed,
only one union will in fact represent both supervisors and
rank-and-file employees of the petitioner; that there
would be an indirect affiliation of supervisors and rank-
and-file employees with one labor organization; that
there would be a merging of the two bargaining units;
and that the respondent union will lose its independence
because it becomes an alter ego of the federation. chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
There is nothing in the provisions of the Industrial Peace
Act which provides that a duly registered local union
affiliating with a national union or federation loses its
legal personality, or its independence.
In Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) v. Noriel (80 SCRA
681) and Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty
Cotton Mills, Inc. (66 SCRA 512) we held:
x x
". . . the Court expressly cited and affirmed the basic
principle that ‘(T)he locals are separate and distinct units
primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of
bargaining power between the employer and their
employee-members in the economic struggle for the
fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and capital;
and the association of the locals into the national union
(as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end. These
associations are consensual entities capable of entering
into such legal relations with their members. The
essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions
into a common enterprise to increase by collective action
the common bargaining power in respect of the terms
and conditions of labor. Yet the locals remained the basic
units of association, free to serve their own and the
common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed
by the Constitution and By-laws of the Association, and
free also to renounce the affiliation for mutual welfare
upon the terms laid down in the agreement which
brought it into existence.’"
In other words, notwithstanding affiliation, the local
union remained the basic unit free to serve the common
interest of all its members.
We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations when it
ruled that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x
"The confusion seems to have stemmed from the prefix
of FFW after the name of the local unions in the
registration of both. Nonetheless, the inclusion of FFW in
the registration is merely to stress that they are its
affiliates at the time of registrations. It does not mean
that said local unions cannot stand on their own. Neither
can it be construed that their personalities are so merged
with the mother federation that for one difference or
another they cannot pursue their own ways,
independently of the federation. This is borne by the fact
that FFW, like other federations, is a legitimate labor
organization separate and distinct from its locals and
affiliates and to construe the registration certificates of
the aforecited unions, along the line of the Company’s
argument, would tie up any affiliates to the shoe string of
the federation. . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library
The Adamson and Adamson Supervisory Union and the
Adamson and Adamson, Inc., Salesmen Association
(FFW), have their own respective constitutions and by-
laws. They are separately and independently registered
of each other. Both sent their separate proposals for
collective bargaining agreements with their employer.
There could be no employer influence on rank-in-file
organizational activities nor there could be any rank and
file influence on the supervisory functions of the
supervisors because of the representation sought to be
proscribed. chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack
of merit. The questioned order and the resolution en banc
of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations are
AFFIRMED.
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SO ORDERED.
x
SECOND DIVISION . G.R. No. L-45824 June 19, 1985
VOLKSCHEL LABOR UNION, petitioner,
vs.
BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ASSOCIATED LABOR
UNION FOR METAL, WORKERS, DMG, INC., PEOPLE'S CAR,
INC., KARBAYAN INC., and RTC TRADING, INC., respondents.
Ignacio P. Lacsina for petitioner.
William D. Dichoso for respondent DMG, Inc.
Abraham B. Drapiza for private respondent.
CUEVAS, J.:
Petition for certiorari to review the Resolutions dated January 25,
1977 and March 14, 1977 of the Bureau of Labor Relations.
On April 25. 1977, however, a Supplemental Petition was filed
seeking the issuance of —
x
(1) A preliminary mandatory injunction
commanding respondents to return to
petitioner the union dues amounting to about
P55,000.00 lawfully pertaining to it but
illegally levied upon, collected and handed
over by respondent Bureau, acting through
the NLRC sheriff, to respondent Associated
Labor Union for Metal workers, with the
collusion of respondents DMG, Inc.,
Karbayan, Inc. and RTC Machineries, Inc.;
(2) A preliminary restraining order prohibiting
respondents from making further delivery to
respondent Associated Labor Union for Metal
workers of Union dues collected or to be
collected through check-off from the wages of
petitioner's members by respondents, DMG,
Inc., Karbayan, Inc., RTC Machineries, Inc.,
and People's Car, Inc., under or by virtue of
the questioned writ of execution issued by
respondent Bureau, dated April 4, 1977.
Petitioner was once affiliated with the Associated Labor Union for
Metal Workers (ALUMETAL for short). On August 1, 1975, both
unions, using the name Volkschel Labor Union Associated Labor
Union for Metal Workers, jointly entered into a collective
bargaining agreement with respondent companies. One of the
subjects dealt with is the payment of union dues which is provided
for in Section 3, Article 1, of the CBA, which reads:
Section 3. CHECK-OFF. — The COMPANY
agrees to make payroll deductions not
 softener than twice a month of UNION
membership dues and such special
assessments fees or fines as may be duly
authorized by the UNION, provided that the
same is covered by the individual check-off
authorization of the UNION members. All said
deductions shall be promptly transmitted
within five (5) days by the COMPANY to the
UNION Treasurer. The COMPANY shall
prepare two (2) checks. One (1) check will be
under the name of the local union as their
local fund including local special assessment
funds and the other check will be for the ALU
Regional Office regarding the remittance of
the UNION dues deduction.
On March 10, 1976, a majority of petitioner's members decided to
disaffiliate from respondent federation in order to operate on its
own as an independent labor group pursuant to Article 241
(formerly Article 240) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, the
pertinent portion of which reads:
Incumbent affiliates of existing federations or
national unions may disaffiliate only for the
purpose of joining a federation or national
union in the industry or region in which it
properly belongs or for the purpose of
operating as an independent labor group.
Accordingly, a resolution was adopted and signed by petitioner's
members revoking their check-off authorization in favor of
ALUMETAL and notices thereof were served on ALUMETAL and
respondent companies.
Confronted with the predicament of whether or not to continue
deducting from employees' wages and remitting union dues to
respondent, ALUMETAL which wrote respondent companies
advising them to continue deducting union dues and remitting
them to said federation, respondent companies sought the legal
opinion of the respondent Bureau as regards the controversy
between the two unions. On November 11, 1976, Med-Arbiter
George A. Eduvalla of respondent Bureau rendered a Resolution
which in effect found the disaffiliation legal but at the same time
gave the opinion that, petitioner's members should continue
paying their dues to ALUMETAL in the concept of agency fees. 1
From the said Resolution, of the Med-Arbiter both petitioner and
respondent ALUMETAL appealed to the Director of respondent
Bureau. Petitioner' contended that the Med-Arbiter's opinion to the
effect that petitioner's members remained obligated to pay dues
to respondent ALUMETAL was inconsistent with the dispositive
finding that petitioner's disaffiliation from ALUMETAL was valid.
ALUMETAL, on the other hand, assailed the Resolution in
question asserting that the disaffiliation should have been
declared contrary to law.
On January 25, 1977, respondent Bureau, through its Acting
Director, Francisco L. Estrella, REVERSED the Med-Arbiter's
Resolution., and declared that the Bureau recognized "the
continued affiliation of Volkschel Labor Union with the Associated
Labor Union for Metal Workers." 2
Petitioner appealed the Acting Director's Resolution to the
Secretary of Labor know Minister of Labor and Employment) who,
treating the appeal as a Motion for Reconsideration referred the
same back to respondent Bureau On March 14, 1977, the Bureau
denied the appeal for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition.
Meanwhile, on April 4, 1977, on motion of ALUMETAL, the then
Acting Secretary of Labor, Amado Gat Inciong, issued a of
execution commanding the Sheriff of the National Labor Relations
Commission to enforce and execute the order of January 25,
1977, which has become final and executory. Pursuant thereto,
3
the NLRC Sheriff enforced and implemented the Order of January
25, 1977, as a result of which respondent companies turned over
and handed to respondent federation the union dues and other
assessments in accordance with the check-off provision of the
CBA,
From the pleadings filed and arguments of counsel, the following
issues present themselves for this Court's resolution.
I
Is petitioner union's disaffiliation from
respondent federation valid?
II
Do respondent companies have the right to
effect union dues collections despite
revocation by the employees of the check-off
authorization? and
III
Is respondent federation entitled to union
dues payments from petitioner union's
members notwithstanding their disaffiliation
from said federation?
We resolve the first issue in the affirmative.
The right of a local union to disaffiliate from its mother union is
well-settled. In previous cases, it has been repeatedly held that a
local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to
serve the interest of all its members including the freedom to
disaffiliate when circumstances warrant. This right is consistent
4
with the Constitutional guarantee of freedom of association
(Article IV, Section 7, Philippine Constitution).
Petitioner contends that the disaffiliation was not due to any
opportunists motives on its part. Rather it was prompted by the
federation's deliberate and habitual dereliction of duties as mother
federation towards petitioner union. Employees' grievances were
allegedly left unattended to by respondent federation to the
detriment of the employees' rights and interests.
In reversing the Med-Arbiter's resolution, respondent Bureau
declared: the Department of Labor is set on a task to restructure
the labor movement to the end that the workers will unite
themselves along industry lines. Carried to its complete fruition,
only one union for every industry will remain to bargain
collectively for the workers. The clear policy therefore even now is
to conjoin workers and worker groups, not to dismember
them. This policy is commendable. However, we must not lose
5
sight of the constitutional mandate of protecting labor and the
workers' right to self-organization. In the implementation and
interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code and its
implementing regulations, the workingman's welfare should be the
primordial and paramount consideration. In the case at bar, it
would go against the spirit of the labor law to restrict petitioner's
right to self-organization due to the existence of the CBA. We
agree with the Med-Arbiter's opinion that "A disaffiliation does not
disturb the enforceability and administration of a collective
agreement; it does not occasion a change of administrators of the
contract nor even an amendment of the provisions thereof." But6 FIRST DIVISION . G.R. No. L-33987 September 4, 1975
nowhere in the record does it appear that the contract entered
into by the petitioner and ALUMETAL prohibits the withdrawal of
LIBERTY COTTON MILLS WORKERS UNION, RAFAEL
the former from the latter.
NEPOMUCENO, MARIANO CASTILLO, NELLY ACEVEDO,
RIZALINO CASTILLO and RAFAEL COMBALICER, petitioners,
This now brings us to the second issue. Under Section 3, Article I, vs.
of the CBA, the obligation of the respondent companies to deduct LIBERTY COTTON MILLS, INC., PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION
and remit dues to ALUMETAL is conditioned on the individual OF FREE LABOR UNION (PAFLU) and the COURT OF
check-off authorization of petitioner's members, In other words, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
ALUMETAL is entitled to receive the dues from respondent
companies as long as petitioner union is affiliated with it and
Carlos E. Santiago for petitioners.
respondent companies are authorized by their employees
(members of petitioner union) to deduct union dues. Without said
affiliation, the employer has no link to the mother union. The Paredes, Poblador, Nazareno, Azada, Tomacuz & Paredes for
obligation of an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with respondent Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc. Ernesto D. Llaguno for
his affiliation or membership. "The employees' check-off respondent Union.
authorization, even if declared irrevocable, is good only as long as
they remain members of the union concerned." A contract
7

between an employer and the parent organization as bargaining Jose K. Manguiat, Jr. for respondent Court.
agent for the employees is terminated by the disaffiliation of the
local of which the employees are members. Respondent
8

companies therefore were wrong in continuing the check-off in

favor of respondent federation since they were duly notified of the ESGUERRA, J.:
disaffiliation and of petitioner's members having already rescinded
their check-off authorization.
Petition for Certiorari to review the decision dated March 30, 1971
of the Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 4216, dismissing
With the view we take on those two issues, we find no necessity petitioners' complaint for unfair labor practice.
in dwelling further on the last issue. Suffice it to state that
respondent federation is not entitled to union dues payments from
petitioner's members. "A local union which has validly withdrawn The factual background of this case is as follows:
from its affiliation with the parent association and which continues
to represent the employees of an employer is entitled to the
The Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union, hereinafter referred to as
check-off dues under a collective bargaining contract." 9
the Union, adopted its Constitution and By-laws on January 1,
1959. Among other things, the said Constitution provided:
1

WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Bureau of Labor Relations

of January 25, 1977 and March 14, 1977 are REVERSED and
ARTICLE I — NAME AND DOMICILE.
SET ASIDE. Respondent ALUMETAL is ordered to return to
petitioner union all the union dues enforced and collected through
the NLRC Sheriff by virtue of the writ of execution dated April 4, Section 1. The name of this organization shall be
1977 issued by respondent Bureau. Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union-PAFLU.

No costs. Section 2. This Union shall have its office at l233

Tecson, Tindalo, Tondo, Manila.
SO ORDERED.
xxx xxx xxx

ARTICLE X — UNION AFFILIATION

Section 1. The Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union-Paflu

shall be affiliated with the Philippine Association of Free
* Alex Ferrer vs. NLRC, 224 SCRA 410, GR 100898, July Labor Unions, otherwise known as PAFLU, and shall
5, 1993 (see PDF) remain an affiliate as long as ten or more of its
members evidence their desire to continue the said
local union's affiliation, in accordance with the Paflu
Constitution, Article XI-Paragraph 11:15 thereof;

ARTICLE XIII — CHARGES, TRIALS, AND

IMPEACHMENT OF OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS: APPEALS.

Section 1. Any member or officer of the Liberty Cotton

Mills Workers Union-Paflu may be charged, tried or
impeached if an officer, in accordance with this and the
PAFLU CONSTITUTION.

On October 1, 1959, a Collective Bargaining Agreement was 2

entered into by and between the Company and the Union

represented by PAFLU. Said Agreement contained these clear
and unequivocal provisions:
This Agreement, made and entered into this 1st day of upon request in writing by the
October, 1959, in the City of Manila, by and between UNION which shall hold the
COMPANY free from any liability
arising from or caused by such
The LIBERTY COTTON MILLS
dismissal.
INC., a corporation duly organized
and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, with principal office at XI. TERM
549 San Francisco Street,
Karuhatan, Polo, Bulacan,
This Agreement shall be effective
hereinafter referred to as the
from October 1, 1959 to September
COMPANY, represented in this Act
30, 1961, during which time it shall
by its President, Mr. RAFAEL
be binding upon the parties hereto
GOSINGCO:
and all the employees of
COMPANY comprised within the
AND appropriate bargaining unit defined
above, and may not be modified by
court action, by concerted activities
THE PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION
or by any other means. ... Should,
OF FREE LABOR UNIONS, a
either party fail to give written
legitimate labor organization
notice to the other of its desire to
existing and operating under the
amend or discontinue this
laws of the Philippines, with postal
Agreement at least thirty (30) days
address at 1233 Tecson, Tindalo,
from the expiry date set forth
Tondo, Manila, hereinafter referred
above, this Agreement shall be
to as the UNION, represented in
continued in force for one (1) year,
this Act by its National Treasurer
and thereafter for yearly terms
and duly authorized representative,
unless written notice is given at
Mr. CATALINO G. LUZANO, herein
least thirty (30) days from the
acting for and in behalf of its
expiration of the contract.
affiliate the LIBERTY COTTON
MILLS WORKERS UNION-PAFLU,
and the employees of the The above Collective Bargaining Agreement was amended on
Company in the appropriate February 28, 1964, thus:3

bargaining unit hereinafter defined:

Article III. UNION SECURITY
WITNESSETH:
Additional Clause
I. UNION RECOGNITION
The Company agrees to encourage
The COMPANY recognizes the casual workers and non-union
UNION as the sole bargaining members to join the Union which is
agent for all of its employees, other the sole and exclusive agent for all
than supervisors ... consonant with the employees covered by this
the certification of the said UNION Agreement.
by the Court of Industrial Relations
in Case No. 627-MC, entitled" In re
Article XI. DURATION
Petition for Certification Election,
Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.,
petitioner." The Duration of this Agreement
shall be for two (2) years, that is
from November 2, 1963 up to
III. UNION SECURITY
November, 1965.

All employees who, at the time of

the signing of this Agreement are
members of the UNION, or who, at
any time during the effectivity of
this Agreement, may join the
UNION, shall as a condition for
continued employment, remain
members of the UNION while this
agreement remains in force; any
employee, who, at any time during
the life of this agreement shall
resign from the UNION or be
expelled, therefrom in accordance
with its Constitution and By-Laws
for non-payment of union dues or
other duly approved union
assessments or for disloyalty to the
UNION shall be dismissed from
employment by the COMPANY
The Agreements aforementioned bore the signatures of
representatives of both the Company and the PAFLU, and the
incumbent President of the local union.
On March 13, 1964, while the Collective Bargaining Agreement
was in full force, Marciano Castillo and Rafael Nepomuceno,
President and Vice-President, respectively, of the local union,
wrote PAFLU, its mother federation, complaining about the legal
counsel assigned by the PAFLU to assist them in a ULP case
(Case No. 4001) they filed against the Company. In said letter,
the local union expressed its dissatisfaction and loss of
confidence in the PAFLU lawyers, claiming that PAFLU never
lifted a finger regarding this particular complaint.
On May 17, 1964, thirty two (32) out of the 36 members of the
local union disaffiliated themselves from respondent PAFLU
pursuant to their local union's Constitution and By-Laws,
specifically Article X thereof, supra (p. 12 Record). A copy of the
signed resolution of disaffiliation was furnished the Company as
well as the Bureau of Labor Relations. The following day, the local
union wrote the Company and required the turn-over of the
checked-off dues directly to its Treasurer.
On May 27, 1964, PAFLU, thru its National Secretary wrote the
Company this letter:
This is to inform your good office that sometime last
May 25, 1964, our federation was in receipt of a letter
signed by 32 persons and informing us of their desire to
disaffiliate the local union from the mother federation —
PAFLU. The members and officers who made the letter
have no right to do the same under our existing contract
and under the PAFLUs Constitution and By-Laws.
We wish to make it clear with the management that the
contractural union in our contract which was signed a
few months ago is the Philippine Association of Free
Labor Union (PAFLU). The actuation made by the
supposed union members is inconsistent with the
present contract we have and under the provisions of
"Maintenance of Union Membership" they can an be
dismissed. Under the PAFLUs Constitution that is null
and void. And in view of the disloyalty shown by those
members, the mother federation will take over the
administration of the Union in dealing with the
management especially.
We inform your goodself that the mother federation is
not honoring the said letter and we request you do the
same under the circumstances.
Hence, all the communications pertaining to union
business and other relative matters be coursed to the
mother federation for prompt action.
And on May 29,1964, PAFLU wrote the Company again, this time
quoting en toto Article III of the Collective Bargaining Agreement
on "Union Security" and requesting the termination of the
employment of Rafael Nepomuceno, Marciano Castillo, Nelly
Acevedo, Enrique Managan, Rizalino Castillo and Rafael
Combalicer, all petitioners herein. PAFLU at the same time
expelled the aforementioned workers from their' union
membership in the mother federation for allegedly "instigating
union disaffiliation.".
On May 30,1964, the Company terminated the employment of the
members expelled by the PAFLU (Exhs. "D", "D-1" to "D-3" pp.
14-17 Record). On the last day of May, 1964, counsel for the
ousted workers wrote the Company requesting their
reinstatement. This was denied by the Company; hence the
complaint for unfair labor practice filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations.
After due hearing, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint, but with a strong' recommendation for the
reinstatement of complainant workers in respondent Company.
The workers (petitioners herein) being unsatisfied with the
decision, appealed to this Court and raised the following
questions:
1. Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement, who
between the PAFLU and the local union is the sole
bargaining agent of the workers of the Company?
2. Was the disaffiliation of the local union from the
PAFLU valid and justified under the Constitution and
By-laws of the Union?
3. Was the disaffiliation of the Union from the PAFLU
an act of disloyalty of the petitioners (workers) which
could be a valid ground for their expulsion from their
own union and their dismissal from the Company?
4. Does the PAFLU as the mother federation of the
union possess the power to expel the officers and
members of the union under the Constitution and By-
Laws? And assuming it has such powers, were the
petitioner workers validly expelled from the Union in
accordance with the Constitution and By-Laws?
5. May the workers be summarily dismissed by the
Company under the Collective Bargaining Agreement
even without valid proof of their valid expulsion from
their own union?
6. Did not the dismissal of only the five (5) petitioner
workers constitute discrimination, considering that the
disaffiliation was signed by more than the majority of
the union members?
All these questions boil down to the single issue of whether or not
the dismissal of the complaining employees, petitioners herein,
was justified or not. The resolution of this question hinges on a
precise and careful analysis of the Collective Bargaining
Agreements. (Exhs. "H' and "I") In these contracts it appears that
PAFLU has been recognized as the sole bargaining agent for all
the employees of the Company other than its supervisors and
security guards. Moreover it likewise appears that "PAFLU,
represented in this Act by its National Treasurer, and duly
authorized representative, ... (was) acting for and in behalf of its
affiliate, the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union and the
employees of the Company, etc.' In other words, the PAFLU,
acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an agent
while the local union remained the basic unit of the association
free to serve the common interest of all its members including the
freedom to disaffiliate when the circumstances warrant. This is
clearly provided in its Constitution and By-Laws, specifically
Article X on Union Affiliation, supra. At this point, relevant is the
ruling in an American case: 4
The locals are separate and distinct units primarily
designed to secure and maintain an equality of
bargaining power between the employer and their
employee-members in the economic struggle for the
fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and
capital; and the association of the locals into the
national union (as PAFLU) was in furtherance of the
same end. These associations are consensual entities
capable of entering into such legal relations with their
members. The essential purpose was the affiliation of
the local unions into a common enterprise to increase
by collective action the common bargaining power in
respect of the terms and conditions of labor. Yet the
locals remained the basic units of association, free to
serve their own and the common interest of all, subject
to the restraints imposed by the Constitution and By-
Laws of the Association, and also to renounce the
affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in
the agreement which brought it into existence.
(Emphasis supplied)
This brings Us to the question of disaffiliation which was the root
cause of the dismissal. It is claimed by PAFLU that the local union
could not have validly disaffiliated from it as the Union Security
Clause so provided. We have meticulously read the provision of
the supposed union security clause and We cannot agree with
both the stand of PAFLU and the respondent court. For while it is
correct to say that a union security clause did exist, this clause
was limited by the provision in the Unions' Constitution and By-
Laws, which states:
That the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union-PAFLU
shall be affiliated with the PAFLU, and shall remain an
affiliate as long as ten (10) or more of its members
evidence their desire to continue the said local unions
affiliation.
does not bind the courts much less released the Company from
liability should a finding for unfair labor practice be positive. In the
case at bar, however, considering that the dispute revolved
around the mother federation and its local, with the company
dismissing the workers at the instance of the mother federation,
We believe that the Company's liability should be limited to the
immediate reinstatement of the workers.
Considering, however, that their dismissal was effected without
previous hearing, and at the instance of PAFLU, this mother
federation should be, as it is hereby, held liable to the petitioners
for the payment of their back wages. Following the precedent
of Mercury Drug Co. vs. CIR, of fixing an amount of net
5

backwages and doing away with the protracted process of

Record shows that only four (4) out of its members remained for
32 out of the 36 members of the Union signed the resolution of
disaffiliation on May 17, 1964, triggered by the alleged negligence
of PAFLU in attending to the needs of its local union, particularly
its failure to assign a conscientious lawyer to the local to attend to
the ULP case they filed against the Company. The disaffiliation
was, therefore, valid under the local's Constitution and By-Laws
which, taken together with the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
is controlling. The Court of Industrial Relations likewise held in its
decision that the act of disaffiliation did not have any effect as the
workers retracted from such act. As stated by the respondent
court —
... it is believed that the effect of their retraction
obliterates their participation in the resolution. Hence,
under Article X of the said Constitution and By-Laws,
complainant union remained affiliated with respondent
union at the time termination of the services of
complainant workers was requested and when they
were dismissed by the Company on May 30, 1964.
determining the complainants-workers' earnings elsewhere during
the period of their illegal dismissal, the Court fixes the amount of
backwages to be paid under this decision to the complainants-
workers at three (3) years backwages without deduction or
qualification.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed and set
aside and the company is hereby ordered to immediately reinstate
complainant workers, within thirty (30) days from notice of this
decision and failure to so reinstate the workers without valid and
just cause shall make respondent company liable to the workers
for the payment of their wages from and after the expiration of
such thirty-day period. The mother federation respondent PAFLU
is sentenced to pay complainants-workers the equivalent of three
(3) years backwages without deduction or qualification.
In view of the length of time that this dispute has been pending,
this decision shall be immediately executory upon promulgation
and notice to the parties. Without pronouncement as to costs.

Although the fact of retraction is true, We find that the respondent

court failed to notice the fact that not all signatories to the
resolution of disaffiliation dated May 17, 1964, took part in the
retraction. Only a number of employees, 16 to be exact, retracted.
Also, and this is a significant factor, the retraction is dated June 3,
1964, or four days after the petitioners herein had been
SECOND DIVISION . G.R. No. L-41288 January 31, 1977
dismissed. There is no use in saying that the retraction obliterated
the act of disaffiliation when they were already out of the service
when it was done. The disaffiliation, coming as it did from the PHILIPPINES LABOR ALLIANCE COUNCIL (PLAC), petitioner,
greater majority of its members, is more than enough to show the vs.
collective desire of the members of the Liberty Cotton Mills BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS-
ORION CHAPTER, GERARDO ROSANA and ORION MANILA,
Workers Union to sever their relations from the mother federation. INC. respondents.
The right of disaffiliation is inherent in the compact and such act
should not have been branded as an act of disloyalty, especially
considering the cause which impelled the union to take such a Fortunato Gupit, Jr. for petitioner.
step.
Solicitor General Estelito P Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Reynato
S. Puno and Solicitor Romeo C. de la Cruz for respondent Bureau of Labor
Lastly, we will take up the process by which the workers were
Relations.
dismissed. We find that it was hastily and summarily done. The
PAFLU received the resolution to disaffiliate on or about May 25,
1964, after which it wrote the Company about its stand, first on F. F. Bonifacio, Jr. for respondent Union and Gerardo Rosana.
the 27th of May followed by its letter of the 29th requesting for the
termination of petitioners herein for 'disloyalty in having instigated Cesar C. Cruz & Associates for respondent Orion Manila,
disaffiliation'. The Company the acting on the request of the
mother federation sent notices of termination to the officers of the
local union immediately on the day following, or on May 30, 1964,
heavily relying on the Collective Bargaining Agreement, viz:
FERNANDO, J:
... for disloyalty to the union shall be dismissed from
employment by the Company upon request in writing by It would be to frustrate the hopes that inspired the present Labor Code 1 to
the Union, which shall hold the COMPANY free from minimize judicial participation in the solution of employer-
any liability arising from or caused by such dismissal. employee disputes resort to the courts would remain unabated.
Nevertheless, in view of the certiorari jurisdiction of this
Tribunal, 2 a grave abuse of discretion may be alleged as a
While the above quoted provision may have been the basis for
grievance thus calling for remedial action. So petitioner Philippine
the Company's actuation, as in fact it was alleged by the
Labor Alliance Council did hope to achieve in this certiorari and
Company in its Brief, We are of the opinion that such stipulation
prohibition proceeding against respondent Bureau of Labor
Relations. 3 It would indict an order 4 for a certification election by
respondent Bureau as tainted by a jurisdictional infirmity in view of
what is contended to be an existing duly certified collective
bargaining contract between it and private respondent Orion
Manila, Inc., the employer. It would thus ignore the withdrawal in
the same order of such certification based on a finding that there
was a failure on the part of the majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit to ratify the collective contract, renewed nine
months before the termination of the previous agreement.
Apparently, the difficulty confronting it was due to the disaffiliation
of many of its members. The order complained of recognized that
there was such a sentiment on the part of sizable number of
employees in the collective bargaining unit, thus making patent
the desirability of conducting a certification election. That was the
method to determine the exclusive bargaining representative
followed even under the previous labor legislation .5 It would thus
appear rather obvious that the attempt to impute arbitrariness to
respondent Bureau cannot be attended with success. The petition
must be dismissed.
It was a detailed narration of facts set forth in the petition, starting with the
allegation that there was a renewal of the collective bargaining agreement
with a union shop clause on March 9,1974 between petitioner union and
respondent company to last for another period of three (3) years
incorporating therein new economic benefits to expire on December 31,
1977. 6 The claim was that at that time it was the only bargaining
agent of the respondent company unchallenged by any labor
organization. 7 Then came the assertion that on May 27, 1974,
with due notice to all the members of the petitioner union, and
with more than 1,500 of them present, such collective bargaining
agreement was ratified by a unanimous vote .8 It was then so
certified by the former National Labor Relations Commission on
June 4, 1974. 9 It was further alleged that at the time of such
certification, there was no pending request for union recognition
by any other labor organization with management.10 Thereafter, on
June 20, 1974, respondent Federation of Free Workers, setting
forth that its members represent more than 60% out of 1,500
members, more or less, rank-and-file employees of respondent
company, sought a certification election. 11 Petitioner union, as
could be expected, opposed such a move as in its view the
collective bargaining agreement entered into with the respondent
company had been certified. 12 It was sustained, the Secretary of
Labor to whom an appeal was taken concurring with the former
National Labor Relations Commission affirming the dismissal of
such petition for certification, on the ground of the existence of a
certified collective bargaining agreement.13That did not end the
dispute, " respondent Federation on January 15, 1975, filed a
complaint with the respondent Bureau of Labor Relations, the
present Labor Code having become effective, alleging that some
employees, numbering 848 in all, in a resolution attached to the
complaint disaffiliated from petitioner union and affiliated with it,
characterizing the certified agreement as having been entered
into allegedly to thwart such disaffiliation and seeking a
declaration of the nullity thereof. 14 After both petitioner union and
respondent Federation of Free Workers had filed their
pleadings, 15 the Med-Arbiter, on March 20, 1975, dismissed the
complaint.16 There was a motion for reconsideration, then an
opposition.17 On April 8, 1975, respondent Bureau of Labor
Relations issued an order setting aside the certification of the
collective bargaining agreement and ordering a certification
election within 20 days from receipt of the order, upon the
following declaration: "In the instant case, it is not disputed that
the collective bargaining agreement certified by the National
Labor Relations Commission was not ratified by the majority of
the employees within the bargaining unit. This is defective. It is
blatant non- observance of the basic requirement necessary to
certification. ... With respect to the complaint of the confirmation of
disaffiliation of the members of respondent Philippine Labor
Alliance Council, the same should be resolved in the most
expedient and simple method of determining the exclusive
bargaining representative—the holding of a certification
election"18 There was a motion for reconsideration as well as a
verified urgent petition filed with the Secretary of Labor by
respondent Company, but the order was affirmed on July 31,
1975, the motion to consider being denied. 19
From the very petition with its annexes, it is undisputed that there was a
finding in the challenged order by respondent Bureau of Labor Relations of
the non-ratification by the majority of the employees of the certified
collective bargaining agreement, thus calling for its decertification. It is also
noteworthy that in the comment of respondent labor union, considered as
its answer, the allegation that there was such a ratification was specifically
denied. It cannot be taken as having proven. There is nothing in the
exhaustive memorandum of petitioner either that would justify the
imputation that respondent Bureau, in ordering decertification of the
collective bargaining agreement with petitioner to be followed by a
certification election, committed a transgression of the present Labor Code,
much less one of such grievous character as to taint its actuation with a
jurisdictional infirmity. It is quite apparent therefore that with due recognition
of the ability and scholarship evident in the pleadings of Attorney Fortunate
Gupit, Jr. for the petitioner, the attempt to invoke our certiorari jurisdiction
cannot succeed..20 So it was noted at the outset.
1. It is indisputable that the present controversy would not have arisen if
there were no mass disaffiliation from petitioning Union. Such a
phenomenon is nothing new in the Philippine labor movement. 21 Nor is it
open to any legal objection. It is implicit in the freedom of
association explicitly ordained by the Constitution.22 There is then
the incontrovertible right of any individual to join an organization
of his choice. That option belongs to him. A workingman is not to
be denied that liberty. 23 He may be, as a matter of fact, more in
need of it if the institution of collective bargaining as an aspect of
industrial democracy is to succeed. No obstacle that may possible
thwart the desirable objective of militancy in labor's struggle for
better terms and conditions is then to be placed on his way. Once
the fact of disaffiliation has been demonstrated beyond doubt, as
in this case, a certification election is the most expeditious way of
determining which labor organization is to be the exclusive
bargaining representative. It is as simple as that. There is
relevance to this excerpt from a recent decision, Philippine
Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor
Relations: 24 "Petitioner thus appears to be woefully lacking in
awareness of the significance of a certification election for the
collective bargaining process. It is the fairest and most effective
way of determining which labor organization can truly represent
the working force. It is a fundamental postulate that the will of the
majority, if given expression in an honest election with freedom on
the part of the voters to make their choice, is controlling. No better
device can assure the institution of industrial democracy with the
two parties to a business enterprise, managment and labor,
establishing a regime of self-rule. As was pointed out by Chief
Justice Castro in Rivera v. San Miguel Brewery Corporation, Inc.,
"a collective bargaining agreement is the law of the plant." To the
same effect is this explicit pronouncement in Mactan Workers
Union v. Aboitiz: 'The terms and conditions of a collective
bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties.' What
could be aptly stressed then, as was done in Compania Maritima
v. Compania Maritima Labor Union, is "the primacy to which the
decision reached by the employees themselves is entitled."
Further, it was therein stated: 'That is in the soundest tradition of
industrial democracy. For collective bargaining implies that
instead of a unilateral imposition by management, the terms and
conditions of employment should be the subject of negotiation
between it and labor. Thus the two parties indispensable to the
economy are supposed to take care of their respective interests.
Moreover, the very notion of industrial self-rule negates the
assumption that what is good for either party should be left to the
will of the other. On the contrary, there is an awareness that labor
can be trusted to promote its welfare through the bargaining
process. To it then must be left the choice of its agent for such
purpose.' To paraphrase an observation of the recently retired
Chief Justice Makalintal in Seno v. Mendoza, it is essential that
there be an agreement to govern the relations between labor
marked by confusion, with resulting breaches of the law by either
party. There is, it would appear, a decidedly unsympathetic
approach to the institution of collective bargaining at war with
what has so often and so consistently decided by this Tribunal." 25
2. A different conclusion could have been reached had there been no
qqqdecertification The contract-bar rule could then be invoked by petitioner.
It is, as pointed out by Justice Fernandez in Confederation of Citizens
Labor Unions v. National Labor Relations Commission, 26 "a principle in
labor law that a collective bargaining agreement of reasonable
duration is, in the interest of the stability of industrial relations, a
bar to certification elections." 27 Even then, as was pointed out in
the just-cited Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
decision, it "is not to be applied with rigidity. ... The element of
flexibility in its operation cannot be ignored." 28 In this controversy,
however, such a principle is not applicable. The collective
bargaining agreement entered into by petitioner with management
on March 9, 1974 was decertified in the chiallenged order of April
8, 1975 .29 The power to decertify by respondent Bureau is not
disputed. It was the exercise thereof that is now assailed. If done
arbitrarily, there is valid ground for complaint. The due process
clause is a guarantee against any actuation of that sort. lt stands
for fairness and justice, That standard was not ignored. It suffices
to read the petition to disprove any allegation of such failing,
whether in its procedural or substantive aspect. Petitioner was
heard by respondent Bureau before the order of decertification
was issued on April 8, 1975. The denial of its motion for
reconsideration came also after it had an opportunity to present
its side. Procedural due process was thus observed. Nor was
there any denial of substantive due process in the sense of such
decertification being an act of arbitrariness and caprice.
In the order of April 8, 1975, it was specifically pointed out; "In the instant
case, it is not disputed that the collective bargaining agreement certified by
the National Labor Relations Commission was not ratified by the majority of
the employees within the bargaining unit. This is defective. It is blatant non-
observance of the basic requirement necessary to certification. To allow it
to remain uncorrected would allow circumvention of what the law
specifically ordained. We cannot countenance irregularities of the highest
order to exist in our very own eyes to be perpetuated. With respect to the
complaint of the confirmation of disaffiliation of the members of respondent
Philippine Labor Alliance counsel the same should be resolved in the most
expedient and simple method of determining the exclusive bargaining
representative — the holding of a certification election." 30 In the order
denying the motion for reconsideration dated July 31, 1975, it was
first noted: "On January 20, 1975, FFW and 848 Orion employees
filed with the Bureau a petition for the annulment of the 1974
collective bargaining agreement and for the confirmation of the
disaffiliation of the 848 employees from PLAC and their affiliation
with FFW. The petition alleged among others, that the new
agreement was concluded about ten months before the expiry
date of the old purposely to defeat the right of the covered
employees to choose their bargaining representative at the proper
time appointed by law. It appears, indeed, that there qqqas no
urgency. for the premature renegotiations considering that the
new agreement provides for a 50-centavo salary increase
effective yet on January 1, 1976." 31 Then, there was further
clarification of the decision reached as to the holding of a
certification election being the appropriate mode of solving the
dispute: "With the decertification of the collective agreement, the
representation issue comes back to the fore. Petitioner wants this
resolved by ruling on the affiliation and disaffiliation of the union,
The Bureau holds, however, that certification election can better
reolve the issue. parenthetically, it should be stated that a
certification election can still be held even if the collective
agreement were certified, considering the peculiar facts of the
case. Good policy and equity demand that when an agreement is
renegotiated before the appointed 60-day period, its certification
must still give way to any representation issue that may be raised
within 60-day period so that the right of employees to choose a
bargaining unit agent and the right, of unions to be chosen shall
be preserved." 32
3. There is, finally, another insuperable obstacle success of this petition.
There is no need for a citation of authorities to show how well-settled and
firmly-rooted is the doctrine of the well- nigh conclusive respect for the
findings of facts of administrative tribunals, leaving to the judiciary, in the
ultimate analysis, this Tribunal, to set forth the correct legal norm applicable
to the controversy. With specific reference to the agencies at present
dealing with labor relations, there is this excerpt from Justice Aquino's
opinion in Antipolo Highway Lines, Inc. v. Inciong: 33 "A dispassionate
scrutiny of the proceedings in the NLRC does not sustain
petitioners' view that they were denied due process and that the
NLRC committed a grave abuse of discretion. (See Maglasang v.
Ople, L-38813, April 29, 1975 per Justice Fernando). We found
no justification for setting aside the factual findings of the NLRC,
which like those of any other administrative agency, are generally
binding on the courts (Timbancaya v. Vicente. 62 O.G. 9424, 9
SCRA 852). " 34
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition is dismissed. The
restraining order issued by this Court in its resolution of September 8, 1975
is hereby lifted. No costs.
THIRD DIVISION . G.R. No. 118562 July 5, 1996
ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND GENUINE LABOR
ORGANIZATION (ANGLO-KMU), petitioner,
vs.
SAMAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG NAGKAKAISA SA
MANILA BAY SPINNING MILLS AT J.P. COATS (SAMANA
BAY), GILBERT SUNGAYANN, FERNANDO MELARPIS, ET
AL), respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:p
Petitioner Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization (ANGLO for
brevity) is a duly registered labor organization while respondent union Samahan
Ng Mga Manggagawang Nagkakaisa sa Manila Bay Spinning Mills and J.P.
Coats (SAMANA BAY for brevity) is its affiliate. In representation of SAMANA
BAY, ANGLO entered and concluded a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
with Manila Bay Spinning Mills and J.P. Coats Manila Bay, Inc. (hereinafter
referred to as the corporations) on November 1, 1991. On December 4, 1993, the
Executive Committee of SAMANA BAY decided to disaffiliate from ANGLO in
view of the latter's dereliction of its duty to promote and advance the welfare of
SAMANA BAY and the alleged cases of corruption involving the federation
officers. Said disaffiliation was unanimously confirmed by the members of
SAMANA BAY.
On April 4, 1994, a petition to stop remittance of federation dues
to ANGLO was filed by SAMANA BAY with the Bureau of Labor
Relations on the ground that the corporations, despite having
been furnished copies of the union resolution relating to said
disaffiliation, refused to honor the same. ANGLO counter-acted by
unseating all officers and board members of SAMANA BAY and
appointing, in their stead, a new set of officers who were duly
recognized by the corporations.
In its position paper, ANGLO contended that the disaffiliation was
void considering that a collective bargaining agreement is still
existing and the freedom period has not yet set in. The Med-
Arbiter resolved that the disaffiliation was void but upheld the
illegality of the ouster of the officers of SAMANA BAY. Both
parties filed their respective appeals with the Department of Labor
and Employment. In a resolution dated September 23, 1994,
herein public respondent modified the order and ruled in favor of
respondent union, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondent
ANGLO is hereby denied for lack of merit
while the appeal of petitioners is hereby
granted. Accordingly, the order of the Med-
Arbiter is modified by:
1) declaring the disaffiliation of petitioner
union from respondent ANGLO as valid;
 2) directing respondent Manila Bay Spinning
Mills, Inc. and J.P. Coats to stop remitting to
ANGLO federation dues and instead to remit
the whole amount of union dues to the
treasurer of petitioner union; and
3) enjoining ANGLO-KMU from interfering in
the affairs of petitioner union.
SO ORDERED. 1
ANGLO filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
The petition calls upon us to resolve two issues, to wit:
1) whether the disaffiliation was valid; and
2) whether petitioner can validly oust
individual private respondents from their
positions.
We rule for the respondents.
For clarity, we shall first consider the issue respecting
the validity of the disaffiliation.
Petitioner ANGLO wants to impress on us that the
disaffiliation was invalid for two reasons, namely: that
the procedural requirements for a valid disaffiliation
were not followed; and that it was made in violation of
P.D 1391.
Anent the first ground, we reiterate the rule that all
employees enjoy the right to self-organization and to
form and join labor organizations of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining. This is a
fundamental right of labor and derives its existence
from the Constitution. In interpreting the protection to
labor and social justice provisions of the Constitution
and the labor laws, rules or regulations, we have
always adopted the liberal approach which favors the
exercise of labor rights. 2
This Court is not ready to bend this principle to yield to
a mere procedural defect, to wit: failure to observe
certain procedural requirements for a valid disaffiliation.
Non-compliance with the procedure on disaffiliation,
being premised on purely technical grounds cannot rise
above the fundamental right of self-organization. 3
We quote, with approval, the findings of herein public
respondent, that:
. . . the resolution of the general membership
ratifying the disaffiliation action initiated by
the Board, substantially satisfies the
procedural requirements for disaffiliation. No
doubt was raised on the support of the
majority of the union members on the
decision to
disaffiliate.
4
This, to our mind, is clearly supported by the evidence.
ANGLO's alleged acts inimical to the interests of
respondent union have not been sufficiently rebutted. It
is clear under the facts that respondent union's
members have unanimously decided to disaffiliate from
the mother federation and ANGLO has nothing to offer
in dispute other than the law prohibiting the disaffiliation
outside the freedom period.
In the same wise, We find no ground for ruling against
the validity of the disaffiliation in the light of recent
jurisprudential rules.
Although P.D. 1391 provides:
Item No. 6. No petition for certification
election, for intervention and disaffiliation
shall be entertained or given due course
except within the 60-day freedom period
immediately preceeding the expiration of a
collective bargaining agreement,
said law is definitely not without exceptions. Settled is
the rule that a local union has the right to disaffiliate
from its mother union when circumstances
warrant. Generally, a labor union may disaffiliate from
5
the mother union to form a local or independent union
only during the 60-day freedom period immediately
preceding the expiration of the CBA. However, even
before the onset of the freedom period, disaffiliation
may be carried out when there is a shift of allegiance on
the part of the majority of the members of the union. 6
Coming now to the second issue, ANGLO contends
that individual private respondents were validly ousted
as they have ceased to be officers of the incumbent
union (ANGLO-KMU) at the time of disaffiliation. In
order to fill the vacuum, it was deemed proper to
appoint the individual replacements so as not to put in
disarray the organizational structure and to prevent
chaos and confusion among the general membership
and within the company.
The contention is bereft of merit. A local labor union is a
separate and distinct unit primarily designed to secure
and maintain an equality of bargaining power between
the employer and their employee-members. A local
union does not owe its existence to the federation with
which it is affiliated. It is a separate and distinct
voluntary association owing its creation to the will of its
members. The mere act of affiliation does not divest
7
the local union of its own personality, neither does it
give the mother federation the license to act
independently of the local union. It only gives rise to a
contract of agency where the former acts in
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representation of the latter.
By SAMANA BAY's disaffiliation from ANGLO, the
vinculum that previously bound the two entities was
completely severed. ANGLO was divested of any and
all power to act in representation of SAMANA BAY.
Thus, any act performed by ANGLO affecting the
interests and affairs of SAMANA BAY, including the
ouster of herein individual private respondent, is
rendered without force and effect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED.