LETICIA LIGON v COURT OF APPEALS and IGLESIA NI CRISTO, G.R.
discretion in refusing to order INC to implead or include IDP as an indispensable
No. 127683 | August 7, 1998 | 294 scra 73
FACTS: Petitioner Leticia P. Ligon (hereafter LIGON) is the mortgagee in three
deeds of mortgage covering two parcels of land located along Tandang Sora,
Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, belonging to the Islamic Directorate of the
Philippines (hereafter IDP). These deeds of mortgage were executed by certain
Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag and Rowaida Busran-Sampaco as security for the loans of
P3 million, P2 million, and P4 million, respectively, which IDP allegedly obtained
from LIGON.
Two groups had earlier vied for control of the IDP, namely, (1) the Carpizo group
and (2) the Abbas group. The Carpizo group caused the signing of an alleged Board
Resolution authorizing the sale of the two parcels of land mentioned above to private
respondent Iglesia ni Cristo. The sale was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale,
wherein IDP and INC stipulated that the former would evict all squatters and illegal
occupants in the two lots within forty-five (45) days from execution of the sale. IDP
failed to clear the lots of squatters, hence, INC filed a complaint for specific
performance with damages.
IDP’s original Board of Trustees headed by Senator Mamintal Tamano, or the
Tamano group, filed a petition with SEC to annul the sale of the two lots to INC. The
SEC promulgated its decision in SEC Case No. 4012 annulling, inter alia, the sale of
the two parcels of land to INC. Aggrieved, INC filed a special civil action for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals, the Court of Appeals granted INC’s petition
and set aside the portion of the SEC decision declaring the sale null and
void. Consequently, the Tamano group appealed to court in a petition for review.
The INC filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint[5] for the annulment of the
deeds of mortgage over the two lots, impleading as defendants therein LIGON,
Abdulrahman R.T. Linzag, Rowaida Busran-Sampaco, and the IDP. Later, LIGON
filed a motion to declare INC and IDP in default for their failure to file an answer to
her counterclaim and cross-claim, respectively. INC opposed the motion, saying that
some of the grounds raised by LIGON in her counterclaim were sufficiently dealt
with in INC’s complaint the trial court granted LIGON’s motion and allowed
LIGON to present evidence ex-parte to support her cross-claim against
IDP. Then, LIGON filed an urgent motion for rendition of partial judgment against
IDP in the cross-claim for the foreclosure of the mortgages. The trial court rendered
a partial judgment (1) ordering IDP to pay LIGON the amounts of P3 million, P2
million, and P4 million “with interest at 36% per annum compounded annually”
from the dates the loans became due and demandable; and (2) directing the
foreclosure sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment of said
amounts. INC filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the partial judgment, which was,
denied.
Consequently, INC filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to annul the aforementioned
partial judgment and the order denying private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration. Undaunted by the foregoing adversities, LIGON filed the instant
petition claiming that respondent Court of Appeals (1) acted with grave abuse of
party in the petition for certiorari; (2) acted without jurisdiction in annulling the
decision of the lower court; and (3) erred in not dismissing INC’s petition because
INC was not aggrieved by the trial court’s decision and was guilty of forum-
shopping.
ISSUE: WON INC was guilty of forum-shopping.
RULING: The SC hold that INC did not engage in forum-shopping. There is
forum-shopping when as a result of an adverse decision in one forum or, it may be
added, in anticipation thereof, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another forum
through means other than appeal or certiorari, raising identical causes of action,
subject matter, and issues. Forum-shopping exists when two or more actions involve
the same transactions, essential facts, and circumstances; and raise identical causes
of action, subject matter, and issues. Yet another indication is when the elements
of litis pendencia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in the other case. The test is whether in the two or more pending
cases there is an identity of (a) parties, (b) rights or causes of action, and (c) reliefs
sought.
INC instituted Civil Case No. Q-90-6937 to compel IDP to comply with its
undertaking to clear of squatters the lots the latter sold to the former. On the other
hand, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10494 INC sought to annul the mortgages and enjoin
LIGON from foreclosing them. The two cases involved different transactions and
sought different reliefs. Moreover, INC won in Civil Case No. Q-90-6937; hence, it
cannot be said that the later Civil Case No. Q-91-10494 was filed as a result of an
adverse decision in one forum. On the other hand, CA-G.R. SP No. 40258 was a
special civil action for certiorari, which was instituted, and correctly so, in reaction
to an adverse partial decision in Civil Case No. Q-91-10494.
Laurel vs Garcia
GR 92013 July 25, 1990.
Facts:
Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property,
which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese
Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the
war.
Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of
public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be
alienated.
Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case
because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs
applies.
Issues and Held:
1. WON the subject property cannot be alienated.
The answer is in the affirmative.
Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is
convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents
have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man. It cannot be alienated.
2. WON Philippine Law applies to the case at bar.
The answer is in the affirmative.
We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law
situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute
over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and
transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect
of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined;
and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict
with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law
should apply.
In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.
The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question
that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the
respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the
validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine
Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.
The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance
of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the
real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the
authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the
Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can
acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of
the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is
inapplicable.
Republic vs Naguiat
FACTS:
Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land
located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of
the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners
and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than
thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage
or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or
equitable, or in possession thereof.
Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior
thereto, considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question
have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable
property.
ISSUE:
Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands
of the public domain?
HELD:
No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and
continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For,
unclassified land cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession;
occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private
ownership and be registered as title.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover.
Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted
to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
mountains or in out of the way places. The classification is merely descriptive of its
legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like.
CRUZ AND EUROPA VS SEC OF DENR
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus
as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail
certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an
unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public domain as
well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian
doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA,
there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the
ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as
owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.