Summary of Buck v.

Bell

Citation: 274 U.S. 200 (1927)

Relevant Facts: Carrie Buck, a resident of the State of Virginia, was a “feeble-minded" eighteen year old
woman, whose mother was similarly feeble-minded. Ms. Buck, who was not married, was also the
mother of a child likewise described by the State of Virginia as feeble-minded. In 1924, Virginia passed a
statute authorizing the superintendents of institutions for certain classes of persons afflicted with
hereditary conditions causing insanity of imbecility to order the sterilization of such persons. In order for
the sterilization procedure to proceed, superintendents were required to present a petition to the board
of directors for their institutions, notify the inmate and their guardian, and convene a hearing to present
evidence for and against conducting the procedure. In this case, Dr. John Hendren Bell conducted the
proceedings against Ms. Buck after her first physician passed away during the pendency of her case. Dr.
Bell similarly pushed for sterilization under the statute, based on the same justification.

Issue: May a State, consistent with due process and equal protection, order the sterilization of a woman
deemed mentally deficient by a state agency and review board?

Holding: Yes, states can require the sterilization of certain citizens without breaching constitutional
rights. The statute in question provided adequate safeguards, and appropriate opportunity for
notification and review, to comport with due process requirements.

Reasoning: Justice Holmes delivered a short majority opinion on behalf of the Court. He pointed out that
the challenge to the law before the Court was properly considered a challenge to the law itself, not to
compliance with the safeguards contained therein. He then argued that as the State can require
sacrifices from citizens, up to and including their very lives, it is not unusual to require something less
than the sacrifice of their life on behalf of the public good. Making a policy case, Justice Holmes opined
that society would be better served by preventing reproduction by members of society most likely to
produce progeny dependent on the government. The Court also made clear that the process for review
of a sterilization order properly considered the rights of those whom the State targeted for such
procedures. Finally, Justice Holmes dismissed concerns regarding equal protection. Here he reasoned
that while not all citizens were equally subject to the potential to have their reproductive capacity
forfeited, the State could reasonably direct its attention to those deemed unfit to reproduce and
thereby conserve necessary resources for other prerogatives. Comparing forced sterilization to
mandatory vaccination, Justice Holmes argued that both were for the overall benefit of society. Noting
the sad history of Ms. Buck, her mother, and her child, Justice Holmes suggested that “[t]hree
generations of imbeciles are enough."
Jacobson v. Massachusetts was an important case for a number of different reasons, ranging from the
implications that the case had on states' rights to coerce citizens in appropriate situations, to the effect
it had upon the very nature of understanding healthcare even in the modern day world. But the case
had an effect which is often overshadowed by those more blatant issues of citizens' rights versus states'
rights and health care policy established by the Government. The case actually asserted an important
point regarding the Preamble to the Constitution, helping to specify the Preamble's place in court
decisions and legal thinking.

The facts of the case boil down to a conflict between a single man, Jacobson, and the State of
Massachusetts, over whether or not Massachusetts could force Jacobson to be vaccinated.
Massachusetts passed a statute in 1902 which would require all citizens who had not been vaccinated at
some point during the past 5 years to become vaccinated or pay a fine. Jacobson, however, refused both
to be vaccinated and to pay the fine. He sued on the argument that the Massachusetts statute infringed
on his liberty and sought to have his position supported through Masachusettes law.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled against him, however, so he appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. They decided against Jacobson, ruling that Jacobson's refusal to accept the vaccination
was not so much an act of individual choice as it was an act endangering those around him. He was
accepting the benefits of everyone else having received the vaccine without having gotten it himself.
Furthermore, this was a situation in which the State had the power to force citizens to act in certain
ways in order to protect the common good.

The case established the concept of manifold restraints to action which each citizen inherently accepts
in being a citizen in order to make the overall society function. There was some dissent, as the decision
was a 7-2 decision, but the decision was accepted, in general, primarily because it was a decision so
clearly in favor of the public. Jacobson's disbelief in the science of vaccination was not based on sound
evidence and the general public welfare was helped by the prevalence of the vaccination.

In terms of the Preamble to the Constitution, however, Jacobson v. Massachusetts had a different
effect. The Preamble does not have any legal power within the Constitution; it is an introduction to the
document as a whole and does not, in and of itself, allow the exercise of any kind of legal power. This
was confirmed and established in the Syllabus of the decision for Jacobson V. Massachusetts. The
syllabus opened up with a statement on the fact that the Preamble did not confer any powers to the
Government or to citizens, and the only power that can arise from the Constitution must come from
elsewhere, not the Preamble.

The spirit of the Constitution can be understood through the Preamble's words, yes, but actual legal
power would not arise from the Preamble. This means that, for all that the Preamble to the Constitution
may provide a strong basic framework for understanding the intent behind the Constitution as a whole,
the Preamble cannot be taken as directly legally relevant in providing rights or powers either to the
citizen or to the State.

In this particular case, the State's actions were actually found to be in accordance with the intent of the
Constitution as described in the Preamble. This would not have been enough to push the decision in
Massachusetts' favor if there had not been a law on the books for acting as it was, but it was enough to
confirm that Massachusetts was in the right.

US vs. Toribio

Facts:

Sometime in the 1900s, in the town of Carmen, province of Bohol, Toribio applied for a license to have
his carabao be slaughtered. His request was denied because his carabao is found to be fit for agricultural
work. Even so, he still slaughtered his carabao for the purpose of human consumption. The trial court of
Bohol found that the respondent slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao without a permit
from the municipal treasurer of the municipality, in violation of Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an
Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The act prohibits the slaughter of
large cattle fit for agricultural work or other draft purposes for human consumption.

The counsel for appellant contended that the provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the
slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the municipal treasure if the slaughtering of large cattle
happened outside the municipal slaughterhouse. They said that the prohibition and penalty is limited
only to the large cattle slaughtered at the municipal slaughterhouse for the prohibition contained in
section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 stated only the phrase “at the municipal
slaughterhouse”.

They also contended that the act constitutes a taking of property for public use in the exercise of the
right of eminent domain without providing for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it deprives them of the enjoyment of their private
property.

Issue:

Whether or not the prohibition and the penalty imposed in Act No. 1147 is limited only to the slaughter
of large cattle at the municipal slaughterhouse.

Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an
undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

HELD:

Where the language of a statute is fairly susceptible of two or more constructions, that construction
should be adopted which will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmaker and
promote the object for which the statute was enacted, and a construction should be rejected which
would tend to render abortive other provisions of the statute and to defeat the object which the
legislator sought to attain by its enactment. The court is of opinion, therefore, that sections 30 and 33 of
the Act prohibit and penalize the slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption of
large cattle at any place without the permit provided for in section 30.
Act no. 1147 is not a taking of the property for public use, within the meaning of the constitution, but is
a just and legitimate exercise of the power of the legislature to regulate and restrain such particular use
of the property as would be inconsistent with the rights of the publics. All property is acquired and held
under the tacit condition that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights of others or greatly
impair the public rights and interests of the community.