No. L-35766. July 12, 1973.
contradicted by his own previous representations of record
LIBERATO V. CASALS, and JOSE T. SUMCAD,
petitioners, vs. HON. VICENTE N. CUSI, JR.,
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, BR. I, REBECCA T. PALANCA and GRECAN
Co., INC., respondents.
Attorneys; Willful violation of section 5. Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court subjects attorney to appropriate disciplinary
action.—There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7,
section 5, of the Rules of Court, which provides that "the
signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading and that to the best of his
knowledge. information and belief, there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay" and
expressly admonishes that "for a willful violation of this rule
an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action."
Same; Duty to employ in conduct of case such means
consistent with truth and honor; Case at bar.—The Court
thus finds unsatisfactory the attorney's explanation for his
having allowed his extended period to lapse without
submitting the required comment nor extending to the
Court the courtesy of any explanation or manifestation for
his failure to do so. His inaction unduly prevented and
delayed for a considerable period the Court's prompt
disposition of the petition. Worse, when this was noted and
the Court required his explanation, he gave an explanation
that is devious and unworthy of belief since it is
as well as by the "supporting" documents submitted by him
therewith. The unsatisfactory explanation given by the
lawyer as against the pleadings of record evinces a willful
disregard of his solemn duty as an attorney to employ in the
conduct of a case "such means only as are consistent with
truth and honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by
an artifice or false statement."
Same; Same; Same.—lt should also not be necessary to
remind attorneys of their solemn oath upon their admission
to the Philippine Bar that they will do no falsehood and
conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of their
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts
and their clients.
DISCIPLINARY ACTION in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court imposes a three-months suspension from
the practice of law upon counsel of respondents for
improper conduct and abuse of the Court's good faith
by his acts in the case at bar manifesting gross
disrespect for the Court's processes and a willful
disregard of his solemn duty to conduct himself with
all good fidelity to the Court and tending to embarrass
gravely the administration of justice.
 Upon the filing on November 2, 1972 of the petition
at bar for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
writ of preliminary injunction, the Court as per its
resolution of November 9, 1972 resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to require
respondents to comment thereon within ten days from
notice and to issue a temporary restraining order
restraining respondent court inter aliafrom
proceeding with the hearing of the case pending
1 another extension of TEN (10) days in order to enable
before it below.
Under date of December 8, 1972, Atty. Leonido C.
Delante as counsel for respondents, stating that while
he had received on November 15, 1972 notice of the
Court's resolution of November 9, 1972, "no
accompanying copy of the petition has been attached
thereto, hence the undersigned counsel would not be
able to prepare the comments of the respondents as
directed in said resolution without said copy." filed
his first motion for a ten-day extension of time from
receipt of such petition within which to submit
respondents' comment. The Court granted such first
extension per its resolution of December 15, 1972.
Under date of December 14, 1972, Atty. Primo O.
Orellan on behalf of Delante, Orellan & Associates as
counsel for respondents filed a verified second motion
for extension of ten days from December 15, 1972
within which to submit respondents' comment on the
ground "2. That Atty. L. C. Delante, counsel of record,
got sick on December 6, 1972 and had not reported to
work as yet" as per verified medical certificate
attached to the motion and "3. That Atty. Delante has
just recovered from his ailment, and has requested
the undersigned to specially make this motion for
him to finish the comments for the respondents."
Under date of December 28, 1972, Atty. Leonido C.
Delante filed a third motion for "a last extension of
fifteen days from December 29, 1972 to submit the
required comment, stating "That the undersigned
counsel has already prepared the final draft of the
desired comments, but due to pressure of work in his
office and matters occasioned by the Christmas
season, the same has not been finalized and typed out
in a clean copy," for filing by the expiry date on
December 28, 1972.
The Court per its resolution of January 15,
1973 granted the said extensions totalling twenty-five
days. Having noted respondents' failure to file their
comment notwithstanding the numerous extensions
sought by and granted to their counsel, which expired
on January 12, 1973, the Court as per its resolution
of April 12, 1973resolved to require Atty. Delante as
counsel for respondents to explain and show cause
within ten days from notice why they failed to file the
required comment.
Atty. Delante filed in due course his explanation
dated May 7, 1973, wherein he claimed for the first
time that "in view of (his) pressing professional
commitments," he requested his clients "to have the
answer . . . prepared by another lawyer for which
reason (respondents) took delivery of the records of
the said case from his office and contracted the
services of Atty. Antonio Fernandez."
Atty. Delante goes on to claim that it was only upon
receipt of the Court's resolution of April 12,
1973 requiring his explanation that he learned that
Atty. Fernandez who had been contracted "to prepare
an answer, underwent a surgical operation," attaching
a copy of Atty. Fernandez' affidavit together with a
medical certificate which certified however to the
latter's confinement at the Davao Doctors'
Hospital only from "Dec. 23-26, 1972" and "(D)aily
follow up: Dec. 26, 1972 to Jan. 15, 1973." Atty.
Fernandez in his affidavit however stated that after
his services had been retained by respondents
"sometime on December 12, 1972"he "had been
confined in the Davao Doctors' Hospital and
subsequently operated on for sinusitis" (on December
23-26, 1972) and that Gregorio Cañeda, president of
respondent Grecan Co. Inc. "saw me in the hospital
and asked from me the answer and I told him that I
may not be able to proceed and prepare the answer
because of the operation that I just had, hence he got
the records of the case G.R. No. L-35766 from me."
Atty. Delante further submitted the so-called
"affidavit" dated May 5, 1973 of Gregorio Cañeda,
president and general manager of respondent Grecan
Co. Inc. supporting his belated claim now that their
corporation contracted the services of Atty. Fernandez
"to prepare the answer to meet the deadline" and
delivered the records of the case to the latter. The so-
called "affidavit" is however not sworn tobefore any
official authorized to administer oaths but merely
carries the statement "(T)hat the foregoing facts are
true and correct as what actually transpired" under
the signature of one "Rebecca T. Palanca (Secretary-
Treasurer)."
Atty. Delante pleads that "it is far from (his)
intention to cause any undue delay in the disposition
of the above-entitled case." and "(T)hat this is the first
time it happened to him, and that if given an
opportunity to prepare the answer, he will try his best
to do it within the period granted by this Honorable
Tribunal, and that he assures this Honorable
Tribunal that there would be no repetition of this
similar incident in the future." He prays that his
explanation be accepted and without blinking an
eye—notwithstanding that the required comment has
long been overdue for almost four months at the
time—that he "be given an opportunity to prepare the
necessary answer for the respondents."
Counsel for petitioners promptly filed their
comments dated May 11, 1973 citing the
inconsistencies and contradictions in Atty. Delante's
explanation, opposing his plea to still be allowed to
file respondents' comment after his "gross and
inexcusable negligence" and praying that the petition
be considered submitted for resolution by the Court.
In an earlier resolution of July 9, 1973, the Court
took action on the petition and dismissed the same for
insufficient showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of respondent court in denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss the case below and appeal in due
course from any adverse decision on the merits being
the proper and adequate remedy.
The present resolution concerns Atty. Delante's
explanation which the Court finds to be
unsatisfactory.
Atty. Delante's present explanation that his failure
to file respondents' comment is due to the failure of
the other lawyer, Atty. Fernandez, contracted by his
clients at his instance because of his pressing
professional commitments "to do so, because of a
surgical operation," is unworthy of credence because it
is contrary to the facts of record:
—In his previous motions for extension,
he nevermentioned his belated allegation now
that another lawyerhad been retained to file the
required comment, and no other lawyer, much less
Atty. Fernandez, ever entered an appearance herein
on behalf of respondents;
—In his second motion for extension, supra, Atty.
Delante's law office cited as reason the fact
that he had gotten sick on December 6, 1972 and had
just recovered and needed the additional 10-day
extension "in order to enable him to finish the
comments for the respondents;"
—In his third motion for a last 15-day extension,
Atty. Delante assured the Court "that (he) has already
prepared the final draft of the desired comments" and
cited "pressure of work in his office" and the
Christmas Season for not having "finalized and typed
out (the comments) in a clean copy"—which comments
never came to be submitted to this Court;
—His present explanation is not even borne out by
Atty. Fernandez' medical certificate which shows that
he was confined in the hospital for
sinusitis only from December 23-26, 1972 and
therefore had sufficient time and opportunity to
submit the comments by the extended deadline on
January 12, 1973;
—Atty. Fernandez' own affidavit as submitted by
Atty. Delante belies the latter's claim that the records
of the case had been given to the former, for Atty.
Fernandez swore therein that when Gregorio Cañeda
of respondent corporation saw him at the hospital
(sometime between December 23-26, 1972) he advised
Cañeda of his inability to prepare the "answer" and
Cañeda got back the records of the case from him;
—He submits no explanation whatsoever, why if his
"final draft of the desired comments" was "already
prepared" since year end of 1972 and only had to be
"finalized and typed out" he utterly failed to submit
the same notwithstanding the lapse of over six
months—and worse, in his "explanation" of May 7,
1973 asked yet for "an opportunity to prepare the
anser [which] he will try his best to do it within the
period granted by the Honorable Tribunal" when he
had utterly ignored and disregarded the numerous
extensions granted him which lapsed on January 12,
1973; and
—He likewise submits no explanation for his gross
neglect in not seeing to it, assuming that Atty.
Fernandez was to prepare the required comment, that
the required comment was filed within the last
extension (that expired on January 12, 1973) secured
by him from the Court on his assurance that the final
draft was ready and did nothing for three months
until after he received the Court's resolution of April
12, 1973 requiring his explanation.
The Court thus finds unsatisfactory Atty. Delante's
explanation for his having allowed his extended
period to lapse without submitting the required
comment nor extending to the Court the courtesy of
any explanation or manifestation for his failure to do
so. His inaction unduly prevented and delayed for a
considerable period the Court's prompt disposition of
the petition. Worse, when this was noted and the
Court required his explanation, he gave an
explanation that is devious and unworthy of belief
since it is contradicted by his own previous
representations of record as well as by the
"supporting" documents submitted by him therewith,
as shown hereinabove.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the lapse of over six
months which he let pass without submitting the
required comment which according to his motion
of December 28, 1972 was "already prepared" by him
and was only to be typed in clean, Atty. Delante in his
explanation still brazenly asked the Court for a
further period to submit respondents' comment which
supposedly had been readied by him for submittal six
months ago. His cavalier actions and attitude
manifest gross disrespect for the Court's processes
and tend to embarrass gravely the administration of
justice.
In Pajares vs. Abad Santos the Court reminded
2 his best to honor his oath, as there would be a great
attorneys that "There must be more faithful
adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court
which provides that 'the signature of an attorney
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading and that to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed for delay' and
expressly admonishes that 'for a willful violation of
this rule an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary
action.' "
It should also not be necessary to remind attorneys
of their solemn oath upon their admission to the
Philippine Bar, that they will do no falsehood and
conduct themselves as lawyers according to the best of
their knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity
to the courts and their clients.
The unsatisfactory explanation given by Atty.
Delante as against the pleadings of record in the case
at bar evinces a willful disregard of his solemn duty
as an attorney to employ in the conduct of a case
"such means only as are consistent with truth and
honor, and never seek to mislead" the courts "by an
artifice or f alse statement of fact or law."3
The Court has ever stressed that a lawyer must do
detriment to, if not a failure of the administration of
justice if courts could not rely on the submissions and
representations made by lawyers in the conduct of a
case. As stated by the Court in one case, "Time and
time again, lawyers have been admonished to
remember that they are officers of the court, and that
while they owe their clients the duty of complete
fidelity and the utmost diligence, they are likewise
held to strict accountability insofar as candor and
honesty towards the court is concerned." 4
Hence, the Court has in several instances
suspended lawyers from the practice of law for failure
to file appellants' briefs in criminal cases despite
repeated extensions of time obtained by them, (except
to file the missing briefs), with the reminder that "the
trust imposed on counsel in accordance not only with
the canons of legal ethics but with the soundest
traditions of the profession would require fidelity on
their part."
5 applied to persons admitted to the practice of law is
Considering, however, that counsel's record shows
no previous infractions on his part since his admission
to the Philippine Bar in 1959, the Court is inclined to
act in a spirit of leniency.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby suspends Atty.
Leonido C. Delante from the practice of law for a
period of three (3) months effective from his receipt of
notice hereof, with the warning that repetition of the
same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
The clerk of court is directed to circularize notice of
such suspension to the Court of Appeals and all courts
of f first instance and other courts of similar rank.
Let copies of this resolution be filed in his personal
record and furnished to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
Notes.—a) Attorney's duty of prime importance.—
An attorney's duty of prime importance is to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice
and 'judicial officers (Cruz vs. Government Service
Insurance System, L-21286, February 28, 1969).
b) Moral integrity of a lawyer.—The standard of
personal and professional integrity which should be
not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them
to escape the penalties of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty (Royong
vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 859).
 No. L-39253. November 24, 1978. * the interest of his client. His disclaimer of any intentional
REY BORROMEO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, et al., respondents.
Supreme Court; Attorneys; Contempt; Statements by
attorney imputing irregularity in internal procedures of the
Supreme Court and laxity in similar matters are
contemptous; Duty of attorneys as an officer of the court
reiterated.—The statements contained in the aforecited
motion for reconsideration imputing irregularity in the
internal procedures of the Court and laxity in similar
matters are unquestionably contemptous. In fact, Atty.
Abila does not deny that they are such, for which he
repeatedly expressed his apologies. Obviously, such
insinuations and imputations are highly derogatory and
disrespectful and serve nothing but to discredit the Court.
They are immaterial and uncalled for as they are based on
mere assumptions, and, if uttered by a member of the bar,
constitute serious disrespect. “As an officer of the court, it is
his sworn and moral duty to help maintain and not destroy
the high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential
to the proper administration of justice.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Good faith not a ground for
exoneration of contempt charge; For readily admitting his
mistakes and repeated apologies and requests for forgiveness
fine and warning imposed on erring lawyer.—Atty. Abila’s
central theme in his written explanation is that he acted in
good faith and was merely motivated by his duty to defend
disrespect is not a ground for exoneration. His intent must
be determined by a fair interpretation of the language
employed by him. He cannot escape responsibility by
claiming that his words did not mean what any reader must
have understood them to mean. Considering that this is the
first contempt charged lodged against Atty. Abila in this
court; that soon after he was required to explain why he
should not be cited for contempt for such unwarranted
statements, he readily admitted his mistakes and
repeatedly apologized and asked the forgiveness of this
Court; and that he was apparently carried away by his
“passion to protect the Interests of his client which he
believed to be meritorious”, the Court sentences Atty. Abila
to pay, within fifteen (15) days from notice, a fine of
P200.00, with a warning that repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
Supreme Court; Minute Resolutions; Members of the Bar
warned of gross error and misconception that Clerk of Court
issues lack-of merit resolutions.—I only wish to stress once
more for the benefit of the members of the bar that they
should not fall into respondent attorney’s gross
misconception and error that it is the Clerk of Court who
“allow(s) the Justices to read (these) petitions” for review on
certiorari of decisions of the lower courts and that this Court
or its divisions “submit to (its) Clerk’s whims under the
cover of ‘lack of merit’.”
 Same; Same; Minute resolutions of the Supreme Court
are transmitted to counsels under the signature of the Clerk
of Court.—Also in People vs. Catolico, the Court through the
writer called attention to “the time-honored usage of the
Court that minute resolutions, summons and processes of
the Court as well as official actions of the Chief Justice,
upon being duly adopted and recorded are transmitted to
the interested parties by and upon the signature of the
Clerk of Court who is duly authorized to do so. With the
thousands of resolutions approved monthly by the Court, it
would unduly tax the time and attention of the Chief Justice
and members of the Court to the prejudice of the
administration of justice if all such papers, other than
decisions, could be released only upon their own signatures.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C. J,:
The Court’s resolution of October 16, 1974 required
Atty. Enrique HR. Abila, original counsel of the
petitioner in G. R. No. L-39253, to show cause why he
should not be held guilty of contempt of court for
making the following statements in his motion for
reconsideration dated October 2, 1974:
“Has the Clerk of Court of the First Division become so caloused over the
plight of the innocent that she treats every appellant’s petition as one
with LACK OF MERIT? Doesn’t this Clerk of Court read the pleadings?
And in that regard does the ‘division’ of this Court submit to its Clerk’s
whims under the cover of ‘lack of merit’?”;
“And here’s the same application in this case. Yet the Clerk of Court
wrote the petitioner that his case lacks merit. Can the Clerk of Court use
no other language than that which is abused and over-abused, the ‘lack of
merit’ linggo?”;
“It is because of this fact that the undersigned cannot be convinced
that the Clerk of Court has ever allowed the Justices to read this petition
before the lack of merit’ resolution was issued out by her, If the Justices
have just read the petition undersigned believes that the same will be
given due course.”;
“How can this happen if the Clerk of Court would routinely issue
minute resolutions denying petition for ‘lack of merit’. With the many
incidents already afflicting the law practitioners of this country, gives the
irreconciliable conclusion that this drastic routine is an internal standard
operating procedures handed down to the Clerk to be followed
indiscriminately,”; and
“HOW CAN THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT take this step, if
it will allow the routinary ruling of ‘lack of merit’ supersede a review on
the merit of the case?”
On October 31, 1974, Atty. Abila submitted his
written explanation, the pertinent portions of which
read:
“. . . ., the undersigned is indeed very sorry to the Supreme Court justices
if he has offended them. He thought then that that was his best way to
attract attention of the Honorable Justices to enable him to display the
awful incidents of the case that they may see how badly the lower courts
had mangled the rights of the accused. Undersigned was just emotionally
carried in the defense of an innocent man who was wrongly convicted in
the court of origin. He had never been known to just stand idly by in the
face of injustice. He respectfully and humbly apoligizes for those
unpleasant statements. There was no malicious intent on his part.”
On May 7, 1975, after several postponements, a
hearing was held thereon, At the hearing, he again
expressed his apologies and admitted that the matters
adverted to in his motion for reconsideration, subject-
matter of the present contempt proceeding, were
merely based on assumptions.
The statements contained in the aforecited motion
for reconsideration imputing irregularity in the
internal procedures of the Court and laxity in similar
matters are unquestionably contemptuous. In fact,
Atty. Abila does not deny that they are such, for
which he repeatedly expressed his apologies.
Obviously such insinuations and imputations are
highly derogatory and disrespectful and serve nothing
but to discredit the Court. They are immaterial, and
uncalled-for as they are based on mere assumptions,
and, if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute
serious disrespect, “As an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help maintain and not
destroy the high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.”
Atty. Abila’s central theme in his written
explanation is that he acted in good faith and was
merely motivated by his duty to defend the interest of
his client. His disclaimer of any intentional disrespect
is not a ground for exoneration. His intent must be
determined by a fair interpretation of the language
employed by him. He cannot escape responsibility by
claiming that his words did not mean what any reader
must have understood them to mean (Intestate Estate
of Rosario Olva, in re Contempt Proc. vs. Antonio
Franco, 67 Phil. 312; Sison vs. Sandejas, L-9270, April
29, 1959; Rheem of the Phil. vs. Ferrer, L-22979, June
26, 1967, 20 SCRA 441).
Considering that this is the first contempt charge
lodged against Atty. Abila in this Court; that soon
after he was required to explain why he should not be
cited for contempt for such unwarranted statements,
he readily admitted his mistakes and repeatedly
apologized and asked the forgiveness of this Court;
and that he was apparently carried away by his
“passion to protect the interests of his client which he
believed to be meritorious,” the Court sentences Atty.
Abila to pay, within fifteen (15) days from notice, a
fine of P200.00, with a warning that repetition of the
same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur in the Court’s lenient disposition of this
incident in view of respondent attorney’s ready
admission of his grave error and repeated apologies
therefor to the Court.
I only wish to stress once more for the benefit of
the members of the bar that they should not fall into
respondent attorney’s gross misconception and error
that it is the Clerk of Court who “allow(s) the Justices
to read (these) petitions” for review on certiorari of
decisions of the lower court’s and that this Court or its
divisions “submit to (its) Clerk’s whims under the
cover of lack of merit’.” (Resolution at page 1).
In Barrera vs. Barrera , this Court remarked in
1
reprimanding a judge who recklessly made such a
baseless allegation that “He did speak with all the
valor of ignorance. Nor did he retreat from, such an
indefensible stand in the face of his being informed
that what the Clerk did was solely in accordance with
what was previously decided by this Court, which
certainly will not tolerate, anybody else, much less a
subordinate, to speak and act for itself. This gross
disrespect shown to this Court has no justification.”
In the 1970 case of In re: Almacen , the now Chief
2
Justice again clarified for all concerned the nature of
dismissals for petitions for review on certiorari for
“lack of merit” thus:
“Six years ago, in Novino, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-21098, May
31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court through the then Chief Justice Cesar
Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the
petitioner’s counsel urged that ‘lack of merit’ resolution violates Section
12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
‘In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these ‘resolutions’ are not ‘decisions’ within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should
not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court’s denial For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. ‘By the way, this mode of disposal
has—as intended—helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for
review are often merely ordered ‘dismissed’.’ ”
Also in People vs. Catolico the Court through the
3
writer called attention to “the time-honored usage of
the Court that minute resolutions, summons and
processes of the Court as well as official actions of the
Chief Justice, upon being duly adopted and recorded
are transmitted to the interested parties by and upon
the signature of the Clerk of Court who is duly
authorized to do so. With the thousands of resolutions
approved monthly by the Court, it would unduly tax
the time and attention of the Chief Justice and
members of the Court to the prejudice of the
administration of justice if all such papers, other than
decisions, could be released only upon their own
signatures. The situation is analogous to
administrative decisions signed by the Executive
Secretary ‘by authority of the President,’ which
decisions are given full faith and credit by our courts
as decisions of the President, ‘unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive.’ ”
Notes.—A charge of contempt will not prosper if
based solely on the order of the judge that the lawyer
acted with provoking gestures and exhibited a
threatening attitude, which are at best generalities
and conclusions of law. (Delgra, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 31
SCRA 237).
A contempt charge in the Supreme Court raising
issues involving questions of fact may be referred to
the lower court for rehearing and recommendation.
(Estrada vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, 6 SCRA 12).
Contempt is premature where, although the
administrator failed to deposit funds, they were duly
accounted for. (Go vs. Go Tuana, 6 SCRA 741).
In unfounded charge of partiality made in a
pleading against a judge constitutes direct contempt
and, hence, no formal charge is necessary. Malolos vs.
Reyes, 1 SCRA 559).
The failure of counsel to appear at the hearing is
not a direct but an indirect contempt. (People vs.
Gagui, 2 SCRA 752).
Threats and disrespectful language in a pleading
filed in court constitutes direct contempt (Paragas vs.
Cruz, 14 SCRA 809).
It is true that a judge may punish a party for
refusing to follow the order of the court, but if the
order is outside the court’s jurisdiction, it is void.
(Gosiengfiao vs. Yatco, 1 SCRA 358.)
The power to punish for contempt should be
exercised on the preservative and not the vindictive
principle and on the corrective rather than retaliatory
idea of punishment. (People vs. Estenzo, 64 SCRA
211; Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42.)
The Supreme Court upon finding a lawyer guilty of
indirect contempt for using disrespectful and offensive
language in the pleadings, may recommend to the
Solicitor General the disbarment or suspension of the
barrister preparing, the contemptuous pleadings.
(Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31
SCRA 1.).
 No. L-27072. January 9, 1970. agency to advance the ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes
AL., petitioners, vs. HON.GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, fidelity, “not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.” Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is
Proceedings Against Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago,
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and attainment of the liberties of the people.” Thus, it has been
Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling, and said of a lawyer that “as an officer, of the court, it is his
Morton F. Meads. sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
Legal ethics; Attorneys; Legal duties of attorneys; Duty of
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.”
an attorney to the courts.—Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the
Same; Same; Same; Same; Disrespectful language in
Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out the duty of
pleadings; Case at bar.—The language of attorney in his
an attorney to the courts—observe and maintain the respect
motion for reconsideration referring to the Supreme Court
due to the courts of justice and judicial officers. The first
as a “civilized, democratic tribunal,” but by innuendo would
canon of legal ethics pronounces that “it is the duty of the
suggest that it is not; in his motion to inhibit, categorizing
lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude,
the Court’s decision as “false, erroneous and illegal” and
not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
accusing two justices for being interested in the decision of
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance.”
the case without any basis in fact; asking the other
That same canon makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
members of the Court to inhibit themselves for favors or
lawyers to support the courts against unjust criticism and
benefits received from any of the petitioners including the
clamor. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds him to a conduct
President—constitute disrespectful language to the Court.
that should be with all good fidelity to the courts. The duty
It undermines and degrades the administration of justice.
of an attorney to the courts “can only be maintained by
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That language is
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial
necessary for the defense of client is no justification,—It ill
office which he is bound to uphold.”
behooves an attorney to justify his disrespectful language
Same; Same; Same; Same; Duty not to promote distrust
with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of
in the administration of justice.—A lawyer is an officer of
his client. A client’s cause does not permit an attorney to
the courts; he is, “like the court itself, an instrument or
cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers must
always keep in perspective the thought that “since lawyers
are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society,
their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but
to the administration of justice; to this, their clients’ success
is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must
be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.”
Same; Same; Same; Duty to abstain from offensive
personality against a party or witness.—It has been said
that “a lawyer’s language should be dignified in keeping
with the dignity of the legal profession.” It is the lawyer’s
duty as a member of the Bar “to abstain from an offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the
justice of the cause with which he is charged.” In this case,
it was necessary for attorney to accuse petitioners of having
made “false, ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate
attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur”; to
describe a proposition of petitioners as “corrupt on its face,”
laying bare “the immoral and arrogant attitude of the
petitioners”; and to charge petitioners with
opportunistically changing their claims and stories not only
from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same
case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Defense that Solicitor
General or his assistants may not be considered offended
parties in the case.—It is not a defense to say that the
Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered
offended parties in a contempt case. The Supreme Court
may motu proprio start proceedings of this Nature. For,
inherent in courts is the power “to control, in furtherance of
justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all
other persons in any manner connected with a case before
it, in every manner appertaining thereto.” [Sec. 5(d), Rule
185, Rules of Court]
Same; Same; Sane; Duty not to mislead the judge; Use of
distorted quotation.—Canon 22 of the Canons of Legal
Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with
candor and fairness, and specifically states that “it is not
candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote.” In
this case, deliberately misquoted Section 1, Rule 51 by
intentionally omitting the qualification which should not
have been done.
Same; Same; Same; Duty to counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to be just.—A lawyer
has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client
takes be within his knowledge and responsibility. Canon 16
of the Canons of Legal Ethics should remind a lawyer that
“a lawyer should be within his knowledge and
responsibility.” Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics
should remind a lawyer that “a lawyer should use his best
efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing
those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do,
particularly with reference to their conduct towards courts,
judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client
persists in such wrong doing the lawyer should terminate
their relation.”
Remedial law; Special civil actions; Contempt; Indirect
contempt; Improper conduct tending to degrade
administration of justice; Use of improper language in
motion to inhibit.—Counsel was held guilty of indirect
contempt for use of the following language in his motion to
inhibit, tending to degrade the administration of justice:
calling petitioners as “vulturous executives” and speaking of
the Supreme Court as a “civilized, democratic tribunal,” but
by innuendo would suggest that it is not; categorizing its
decision of July 31, 1968 as “false, erroneous and illegal” in
a presumptuous manner; warning the Court that loss of
confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not
be allowed to happen in our country “although the process
has already begun”; mentioning “unjudicial prejudice”
against respondent and “unjudicial favoritism” for
petitioners, and that “any other justices who have received
favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the
petitioners or members of any board-petitioner, or their
agents or principals, including the President” should inhibit
themselves, which accusations have no basis in fact and in
law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Effect of
voluntarily deleting paragraph 6 which contained,
disrespectful language.—The deletion of paragraph 6 which
contained disrespectful language did not erase the fact that
it has been made. It does not make much of a distinguishing
difference; it erects no shield against the charge of indirect
contempt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Misbehaviour as an officer of
the court in the performance of his official duties and
improper conduct tending to degrade the administration of
justice; Use of disrespectful language in pleadings.—Counsel
was held guilty of indirect contempt under Section 3(a),
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, for misbehavior as an officer
of the court in the performance of his official duties and
under Section 3(d) of the same rule, for improper conduct
tending to degrade the administration of justice for the use
of the following language in his pleadings; accusing
petitioners of having made “false, ridiculous and wild
statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur”; describing such efforts as “scatter-shot
desperation” and a proposition of petitioners as “corrupt on
its face”, laying bare “the immoral and arrogant attitude of
the petitioners”; and charging petitioners with
opportunistically changing their claim and stories not only
from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same
case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Fact that offensive statements
were made to Solicitor General or his assistants who may
not be considered offended parties in the case.—It is no
defense to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants
may not be considered offended parties in this case. The
Court may motu proprio start proceedings for contempt.
For, inherent in courts is the power “to control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers,
and of all other persons in any manner connected with a
case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto.”
(Section 5[d] Rule 135, Rules of Court).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Lifting a provision of law out
of context and threatening to take the case to the World Court
and/or the United States government, constitute contempt of
court.—Counsel was held guilty of contempt for filing a
motion for reconsideration without leave of court, lifting a
provision of the Rules of Court out of context in the said
motion and making therein an express threat to take the
case to the World Court and/or the United States
government.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Person who prepared
contemptuous pleading is guilty of contempt.—A person who
admitted having prepared the fourth motion for
reconsideration which contained contemptuous language
cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even
though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of contempt.
Same; Same; Same; Same; That counsel was just asked
by a friend to sign the contemptuous pleading without
reading it is no excuse.—Counsel’s insistence that he had
nothing to do with the contemptuous motion for
reconsideration and had not even read it because he was
just asked by a friend lawyer to sign it along with him does
not excuse him. As counsel of record, he has control of the
proceedings.
DISCIPLINARY ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Contempt.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION *
SANCHEZ, J.:
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse
to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co.,
the Solicitor General brought to our attention
statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L.
Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose
Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the
suggestion that disciplinary action be taken against
them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a
show-cause order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General
avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally
signed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
1. “a.‘They (petitioners, including the Executive
Secretary) have made these false, ridiculous
and wild statements in a desperate attempt to
prejudice the courts against MacArthur
International. Such efforts could be accurately
called ‘scattershot desperation’ (Memorandum
 for Respondents dated March 27, 1968, pp. 13-
14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and
first line page 14).
2. b.‘Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it
lays bare the immoral and arrogant attitude of
the petitioners.’ (Respondents’ Supplemental
Memorandum and Reply to Peti tioner’s
Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16,
last two lines on bottom of the page).
3. c.‘The herein petitioners xxx opportunistically
change their claims and stories not only from
case to case but from pleading to pleading in the
same case.’ (Respondents’ Supplemental
Memorandum, Ibid., p. 17, sixth, seventh and
eighth lines from bottom of the page).”
MacArthur’s third motion for reconsideration signed
by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and
purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala
and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor
General points out, contain the following statements:
1. “d.xxx; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked
the applicable law due to the misrepresentation
and obfuscation of the petitioners’ counsel.’
(Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
2. e.‘x x x Never has any civilized, democratic
tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to
the “right to reject any and all bids”) can be
used by vulturous executives to cover up and
excuse losses to the public, a government
agency or just plain fraud xxx and it is thus
difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent
justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court
intends to create a decision that in effect does
precisely that in a most absolute manner.’
(Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).”
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968—
after judgment herein was rendered—and signed by
Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for
Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and
Associates, asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to
inhibit themselves from considering, judging and
resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof
retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges
“[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice
Castro is a vice-president of the favored party who is
the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal
decision dated January 31, 1968” and the ex
parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-
entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and
predetermining this case even before the joining of an
issue. As to the Chief Justice, the motion states
“[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in
the Philippine Government by the President a short
time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered
in this case.” The appointment referred to was as
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments.
The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial
ethics, and makes a number of side comments
projecting what is claimed to be the patent
wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates “incidents” which, according to the
motion, brought about respondent MacArthur’s belief
that “unjudicial prejudice” had been caused it and
that there was “unjudicial favoritism” in favor of
“petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the said decision.” The
“incidents” cited are as follows:
1. “(a)said decision is in violation of the law, which
law has not been declared unconstitutional.
2. (b)said decision ignores totally the applicable
law in the above-entitled case.
3. (c)said decision deprives respondent of due
process of law and the right to adduce evidence
as is the procedure in all previous cases of this
nature.
4. (d)due course was given to the unfounded
certiorari in the first place when the appeal
from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is
neither new nor novel nor capable of leading to
a wholesome development of the law—but only
served to delay respondent for the benefit of the
favored party.
5. (e)the preliminary injunction issued herein did
not maintain the status quo but destroyed it,
and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it
was destroyed for a reason, not for no reason at
all.
6. (f)there are misstatements and
misrepresentations in the said decision which
the Honorable Supreme Court has refused to
correct.
 7. (g)the two main issues in the said decision were
decided otherwise in previous decisions, and the
main issue ‘right to reject any or all bids’ is
being treated on a double standard basis by the
Honorable Supreme Court.
8. (h)the fact that respondent believes that the
Honorable Supreme Court knows better and has
greater understanding than the said decision
manifests.
9. (i)the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to
two hundred million dollars by said decision—
without an effort by the Honorable Supreme
Court to learn all the facts through presentation
through the trial court, which is elementary.”
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago,
again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and
Graciano Regala and Associates, in writing pointed
out to this Court that the statements specified by the
Solicitor General were either quoted out of context,
could be defended, or were comments legitimate and
justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest
defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed
that if MacArthur’s attorney could not plead such
thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process
of law. However, counsel sought to change the words
“Chief Justice” to “Supreme Court” appearing on line
7, paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago
also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said
motion, which in full reads:
“6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial
authorities believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all
matters that come before them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto
eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally incapable of considering that
any emanation from their mind or pen could be the product of unjudicial
prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue.
Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to judge
a motion to hold himself in contempt of court—seemingly totally oblivious
or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved—and also
of Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal
case against an accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases.
What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty?
Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it
that many of our government officials are just amoral?”
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further sub-
paragraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof. It was
on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago
filed his compliance with this Court’s resolution of
November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion
to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration were of
his exclusive making and that he alone should be held
responsible therefor. He further elaborated on his
explanations made on November 21, 1968.
 On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his
explanations by saying that he already deleted
paragraph 6 of the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted
from his rough draft but that it was still included
through inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as
counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion
to inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief
Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit
themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original
motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on
judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking
the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be
stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in
withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the
lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not
agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two
justices. According to him, “[t]he present steps (sic)
now being taken is against counsel’s upbringing and
judicial conscience.”
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto’s return of November 29,
1968, he took pains to say that the questioned
statements he made were also taken out of context
and were necessary for the defense of his client
MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that
those statements lifted out of context would indeed be
sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule
138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were
filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred
that the Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction
over the charge against him because it is one of civil
contempt against a party and the charge is originally
cognizable by the Court of First Instance under
Sections 4 and 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He
also stressed that said charge was not signed by an
“offended party or witness”, as required by law; and
that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not
stand in the stead of an “offended party or witness.”
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his
explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified
by a supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he
manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm
in this case was neither authorized nor consented to
by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967,
one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur’s behalf, offered
to retain his services, which was accepted; that Meads
inquired from him whether he could appear in this
case; that he advised Meads that this case was outside
his professional competence and referred Meads to
another lawyer who later on likewise turned down the
offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he
agreed to terminate their previous retainer
agreement; that he had not participated in any
manner in the preparation or authorship of any
pleading or any other document in connection with
this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained
his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in
any of the court papers subject of our November 21,
1968 order; claimed that he was on six months’ leave
of absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as
one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave
his permission to have his name included as counsel
in all of MacArthur’s pleadings in this case (L-27072),
even while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on
March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July
14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new
counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a
special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth
motion for reconsideration without express leave of
court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised,
and contained the following paragraphs:
“4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders
qf the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the
above-entitled case—which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of
Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: ‘Justices; who may take part—x
x x x, only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication x x x.’ This
requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the
member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent
for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
x x x
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company
abandons its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine
Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required
by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of the Surigao nickel
deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and
confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either
its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent’s proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government
without either compensation or due process of law—and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits
to the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium,
amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until restitution or
compensation is made.”
This elicited another resolution from this Court on
July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling “to
show cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice
hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of
court.”
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanito M. Caling filed his
return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion
for reconsideration was already finalized when Atty.
Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested
him to accommodate MacArthur by signing the
motion; that he turned down said request twice on the
ground that he did not know anything about the case,
much less the truth of the allegations stated in the
motion; that “the allegations in said motion were
subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel
together with the background of the case involved by
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F.
Meads”; that upon assurance that there was nothing
wrong with the motion be was persuaded in good faith
to sign the same; that he was misled in so signing and
the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to
him especially the oral argument allegedly made in
the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty.
Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved “to
require Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads
to file in writing their answer to the said return [of
Atty. Caling] and at the same time to show cause why
they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads,
should not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or
before August 16, 1969; and xxx to direct that the
three, Atty. Juanito M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear
before this Court on Thursday, August 27, 1969, at
9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings
against all of them will be heard by this Court.”
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave
his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty.
Caling’s statement that he (Santiago) convinced
Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to
Santiago, is that one day Morton Meads went to his
office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby
who could help him file another motion for
reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty.
Caling; he thereupon accompanied Meads to Caling,
told Caling of Meads’ desire and left Meads with
Caling. Santiago insists that he never prepared the
motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered.
Meads’ version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he
went to Atty. Santiago’s office with the fourth motion
for reconsideration which he himself prepared.
Santiago started to reset the motion and in fact began
to make some changes in pencil in the first or second
paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur
wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same.
Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one.
They then went to Caling whose office was on the
same floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at
the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling.
While Caling was reading the document, Santiago
left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-
signal.
He signed the same after his name was typed
therein. The motion was then filed. According to
Meads, from the time he entered the office of Santiago
to the time the motion was filed, the period that
elapsed was approximately one hour and a half.
Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and
Meads was with Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge,
Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of
Court set forth in the fourth motion for
reconsideration has not been taken out of context
because said quotation is precisely accurate; that the
“xs” indicate that it is not a complete quotation and
that it is a common practice in court pleadings to
submit partial quotations. Meads further contends
that the announced plan to bring the case to the
World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also
included a notice of appeal to the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys.
Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton
Meads in oral argument with respect to the second
contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and
second contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we,
indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an
officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as
“vulturous executives”. He speaks of this Court as a
“civilized, democratic tribunal”, but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph
categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as “false,
erroneous and illegal” in a presumptuous manner. He
there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction
we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined
the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court
for being interested in the decision of this case:
Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his
brother is the vice president of the favored party who
is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments,
“a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered.” In this
backdrop, he proceeds to state that “it would seem
that the principles thus established [the moral and
ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial
authority] by the Honorable Supreme Court should
first apply to itself.” He puts forth the claim that
lesser and further removed conditions have been
known to create favoritism, only to conclude that
there is no reason for a belief that the conditions
obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro “would be less likely to engender favoritism or
prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.”
Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and
Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which
could make their actuation suspect. He makes it plain
in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice
Castro not only were not free from the appearance of
impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their
relationship did affect their judgment. He points out
that courts must be above suspicion at all times like
Caesar’s wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to
happen in our country, “although the process has
already begun.”
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted
paragraph 6 which contained language that is as
disrespectful. But we cannot erase the fact that it has
been made. He explained that he deleted this
paragraph in his rough draft, which paragraph was
included in the motion filed in this Court only because
of mere inadvertence. This explanation does not make
much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no
shield. Not only because it was belatedly made but
also because his signature appeared on the motion to
inhibit which included paragraph 6. And this
paragraph 6 describes with derision “many of our
judicial authorities” who ‘‘believe that they are the
chosen messengers of God in all matters that come
before them, and that no matter what the
circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained
by the Almighty unto eternity.” It depicts them as
seemingly “incapable of considering that any
emanation from their mind or pen could be the
product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy
or favoritism for a party or an issue.” After citing acts
of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask:
“What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many
of our government officials are just amoral?”
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated
mention of “unjudicial prejudice” against respondent
Mac-Arthur and spoke of “unjudicial favoritism” for
petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8
is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a
warning to this Court about loss of confidence, and
paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that “any
other justices who have received favors or benefits
directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or
members of any board-petitioner, or their agents or
principals, including the President”, should also
inhibit themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago’s
accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the
whole court. For, inhibition is also asked of, we
repeat, “any other justices who have received favors or
benefits directly or indirectly from any of the
petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or
their agents or principals, including the president.”
The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For
one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by
the President and in that sense may be considered to
have each received a favor from the President. Should
these justices inhibit themselves every time a case
involving the Administration crops up? Such a
thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the
machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be
wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of
government operating in this country. Counsel is
presumed to know this. But why the unfounded
charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on
the part of a losing litigant’s attorney to downgrade
this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing
gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect
detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel’s words
are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of
disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we
have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs.
Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: “By now,
a lawyer’s duties to the Court have become
commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid
excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20
(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical
terms, spells out one such duty: ‘To observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers.’ As explicit is the first canon of legal
ethics which pronounces that ‘[i]t is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance.’ That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to
support the courts against ‘unjust criticism and
clamor.’ And more. The attorney’s oath solemnly binds
him to a conduct that should be ‘with all good fidelity
x x x to the courts.’ Worth remembering is that the
duty of an attorney to the courts ‘can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any
disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to
uphold.”
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, “like the
court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice.” His duty is to uphold the dignity and
1 position, lacks the power to defend himself and it is
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, “not
to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.” Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to
2
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice “is
disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people.” Thus has it
3
been said of a lawyer that “[a]s an officer of the court,
it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.”4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with
the statement that it was necessary for the defense of
his client. A client’s cause does not permit an attorney
to cross the line between liberty and license. Lawyers
must always keep in perspective the thought that
“[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice, oath-
bound servants of society, their first duty is not to
their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice; to this, their clients’ success
is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and
must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.” As 5
rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his well-
known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his
the attorney, and no other, who can better or more
appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbent of the judicial position. From this, Mr.
6 courts against MacArthur.” He brands such efforts as
Justice Malcolm continued to say: “It will of course be
a trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions
to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may
happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of
the law than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that since
no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in
their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-
restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse
conditions are necessary for the orderly
administration of justice.”
7 We have analyzed the lines surrounding said
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just
recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this
Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style
that undermines and degrades the administration of
justice. The stricture in Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the
statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the
“scattershot desperation”. He describes a proposition
of petitioners as “corrupt on its face”, laying bare “the
immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners.” He
charges petitioners with opportunistically changing
their claims and stories not only from case to case but
from pleading to pleading in the same case. Such
language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing
of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant; it offends
the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to
say that these statements were taken out of context.
statements. They do not in any manner justify the
inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has
been said that “[a] lawyer’s language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession.” It is Sotto’s duty as a member of the Bar
9

Rules—against improper conduct tending to degrade “[t]o abstain from all offensive personality and to
the administration of justice —is thus transgressed.
8 advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court. of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. the cause with which he is charged.” 10

We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs.
Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses Young,83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the
petitioners of having made “false, ridiculous and wild accused convicted of murder made use of the following
raw language in his brief: “The accused since birth
was a poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since
his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in
his own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A
cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man’s life.
A simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds’ work and
that would transform him into a new man. Once in a
small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This
poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth,
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden
deed.” We there held that “[s]uch a plea is a disgrace
to the bar and an affront to the court.”
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor
General or his assistants may not be considered
offended parties in this case. This Court may motu
proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should
be no doubt about the power of this Court to punish
him for contempt under the circumstances. For,
inherent in courts is the power “[t]o control, in
furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial
officers, and of all other persons in any manner
connected with a case before it, in every manner
appertaining thereto.”11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto
has misbehaved, under Section 3(a), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties; and that he too has
committed, under Section 3(d) of the same rule,
improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of
contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty.
Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty.
Santiago to have included the name of the firm of
Atty. Regala without the latter’s knowledge and
consent. Correctly did Regala insist—and this is
confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents—that
he had not participated in any way in the pleadings of
the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know
that his name was included as co-counsel in this case.
He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first
contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy.
Borne out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was
not also involved in the preparation of any of the
pleadings subject of the contempt citation. He should
be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second
contempt incident. The fourth motion for
reconsideration is, indeed, an act of contumacy.
 First. It was filed without express leave of court. No
explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1, Rule 51, Rules of Court,
out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows:
“Justices; who may take part.—xxx. only those
members present when any matter is submitted for
oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication x x.” However, the provision in its entire
thought should be read thus—
“SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part.—All matters submitted to the
court for its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be
submitted for consideration and adjudication by any and all of the
Justices who are members of the division of the court at the time when
such matters are taken up for consideration and adjudication, whether
such Justices were or were not present at the date of submission:
however, only those members present when any matter is submitted for
oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication, if the
parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in writing filed with
the clerk at the date of submission.”12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966,
did not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out
why such a distorted quotation came about—the
portion left out was anyway marked by “XS”, which is
a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to
characterize his conduct with candor and fairness,
and specifically states that “it is not candid nor fair
for the lawyer knowingly to misquote.” While Morton
Meads is admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a
lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being
foisted upon this Court. There was a qualification to
the rule quoted and that qualification was
intentionally omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to
take the case to the World Court and/or the United
States government. It must be remembered that
respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In
doing so, unnecessary statements were injected. More
specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur
“will inevitably xxx raise the graft and corruption of
[the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of
May 12, 1955 xxx to the World Court” and would
invoke “the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the
cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium,
amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually
x x x.”
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the
mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A
notice of appeal to the World Court has even been
embodied in Meads’ return. There is a gross
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to
reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision
presupposes that a party has already abandoned any
move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would
appear that the appeal to the World Court is being
dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision
of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard
explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of
this Court that he should be exempted from the
contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an
officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the
fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it.
White he has been dragged in only at the last minute,
still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his
name should not be attached to pleadings
contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having
prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He
cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him
even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of
contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His
insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth
motion for reconsideration and that he had not even
read the same is too transparent to survive fair
appraisal. It goes against the grain of circumstances.
Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who
convinced him to sign the motion, who with Meads
explained to him the allegations thereof and the
background of the case. Caling says that if not for his
friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed
the motion. On the other hand, Meads states that
Santiago began to read the fourth motion for
reconsideration and even started to make changes
thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that
according to Meads himself, he spent, on July 14,
1969, quite some time with Santiago before they
proceeded to Caling. It is highly improbable that
Santiago did not read the fourth motion for
reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for
respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not
resigned from his position as such lawyer. He has
control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client
takes should be within his knowledge and
responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of
Legal Ethics should have reminded him that “[a]
lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to
prevent his clients from doing those things which the
lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with
reference to their conduct towards courts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client
persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer should
terminate their relation.”
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can
never be protected where infraction of ethics meets
with complacency rather than punishment. The
people should not be given cause to break faith with
the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor
amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of
justice should not yield to the assaults of disrespect.
Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause
before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say
again that, if only for one reason, this Court had
really no alternative but to decide the main case
against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our
decision of July 31, 1968, MacArthur did not even
adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to
bid. For, this invitation to bid explicitly warned that
“bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected.
And We repeat, “[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company
[MacArthur] had been submitted withoutthe requisite
bond.” It would not require the adroit mind of a
13
lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond,
contrary to the instructions to bidders; is not entitled
to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the
decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the
Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had
not taken part in the decision on the merits of this
case, the result would have been the same:
MacArthur’s cause would just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. 1.On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L.
Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of
contempt of court, and fines Atty. Santiago in
the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and
holds Attys. Graciano C. Regala and Associates
and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of
court; and
2. 2.On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente
L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanito
M. Caling guilty of contempt of court, and fines
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional Pl,000,
Morton F. Meads, P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M.
Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the
Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever
action he may deem proper to take in the premises
against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to
the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action
as he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment
or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose
Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append
a copy of this decision to the personal records of
Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and
Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.
Attorneys Vicente C. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto
and Juanito M. Caling and Morton F. Meads held
guilty of contempt of court. Attorneys Graciano C.
Regala & Associates and Erlito R. Uy held not guilty.
Notes.—Contemptuous comment or criticism
directed to Court.—In In re Velasquez, April 29, 1955,
the Supreme Court also held in contempt a lawyer
who, in his motion for reconsideration filed in said
Court, charged that the high court affirmed the order
of the lower court allowing an answer filed 48 days
after expiration of the time for filing it because the
lawyer who filed it (Claro M. Recto) was a “big name”
attorney and that no other lawyer would have been
given such consideration. The Court considered this
derogatory imputation as neither pertinent nor
relevant to the issues.
A lawyer was also found properly held in contempt
for sending to a judge the following telegram “Request
set aside your orders confiscation bond and my arrest
being vindictive abuse use powers unjust malicious as
you are the offended party otherwise will charge you
criminally, civilly and administratively.” The
telegram’s language was dubbed by the Court as
unbecoming of a lawyer and violative of the lawyer’s
oath (People vs. Venturanza, 98 Phil. 211).
[No. 42992. August 8, 1935]
FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner and
appellant, vs.FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent
and appellee. In re contempt proceedings against
Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO.
1. 1.CONTEMPT; PHRASES IN CONTEMPT OF
COURT CONTAINED IN A MoTION.—The phrases
contained in attorney V. J, F.'s motion disclose, in the
opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of
its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with
no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of
the laws, the rights of the parties and of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its
power and mocked and flouted the rights of attorney
V. J. F.'s client, because the acts of outraging and
mocking from which the words "outrage" and
"mockery" used therein are- derived, mean exactly
the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of
the Spanish Language published by the Spanish
Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th
ed., pages 132 and 513).
1. 2.ID.; ID.; THE LAWYER'S DUTIES TO THE
SUPREME COURT.—As a member of the bar and an
officer of this court, attorney V. J, F., as any attorney,
is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it has
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
he now is: a priest of justice (ln reThatcher, 80 Ohio
St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing he
neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of' justice, and he prevents anybody
from harboring and encouraging discontent, which in
many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation on which rests the
bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief.
1. 3.ID.; ID.; ID.; RESPECT OF THE COURTS.—It is
right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the
cause and rights of his client, should do so with all
the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and will never be so for him to exercise said right
by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without
the propriety and respect which the dignity of the
courts require. The reason for this is that respect of
the courts guarantees the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty said institution
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
1. 4.ID.; ID.; WANT OF INTENTION.—In his defense,
attorney V. J. F. states that it was not his intention
to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect
thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases
which require no further comment. Furthermore, it is
a well settled rule in all places where the same
conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction
 obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from
liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the
phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid
defense.
1. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; EXTENUATION OF LIABILITY.—
Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an
extenuation of liability in this case, taking into
consideration attorney V. J. F.'s state of mind,
according to him, when he prepared his said motion.
This court is disposed to make this concession.
However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and
to prevent others, by following a bad axample, from
taking the same course, this court considers it
imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the
justice it deserves.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Contempt.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf.
DIAZ, J.:
In a motion filed in this case, which is pending
resolution because the second motion for
reconsideration of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, who
represents the herein petitioner, has not been acted
upon to date, for the reason that the question whether
or not the decision which has already been
promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the
first assignment of error relied upon in said
petitioner's brief, has not yet been determined, for
which purpose the case was set for hearing on August
5, 1935, said attorney inserted a paragraph the
translation of which reads as follows:
"We should like frankly and respectfully to make it
of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous
and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality
of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means
within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it,
because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as
he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the
herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it
is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this
honorable court and of each and every member
thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time
we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions
like these, which the affected party and his thousands
of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the
proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice."
When the court's attention was called to said
paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J. Francisco
to show cause, if any, why he should not be found
guilty of contempt, giving him a period of ten days for
that purpose. In his answer Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, far from regretting having employed the
phrases contained in said paragraph in his motion,
reiterated them several times contending that they
did not constitute contempt because, according to him
it is not contempt to tell the truth.
The phrases:
"* * * and constitutes an outrage to the rights
of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the
popular will expressed at the polls * * *.
"* * * because we should not want that some
citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to
denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage
* * * justified nor in the least necessary, because in order
"and * * * we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected
party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism'
and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice", disclose, in the opinion of
this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority
of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the
rights of the parties, and of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and
mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and
mocking from which the words "outrage" and
"mockery" used therein are derived, mean exactly the
same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the
Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy
(Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages
132 and 513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said
motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many
years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither
to call the attention of the court in a special way to
the essential points relied upon in his argument and
to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons
stated in his said motion were sufficient and the
phrases in question were superfluous. In order to
appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper and
amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both
means are annoying and good practice can never
sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to
disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and
impartial judgment, particularly in judicial matters,
in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a
more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course
which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he
fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press
for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a
judicial outrage of which his client has been the
victim; and because he states in a threatening manner
with the intention of predisposing the mind of the
reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere
of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in
the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that
referred to in his motion promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes
of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is
of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few
days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt
of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the
authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort
to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with
good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court,
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to
defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred
upon him the high privilege, not a right
(Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
he now is: a priest of justice (In reThatcher, 80 Ohio
St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he
neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the
foundation upon which rests that bulwark called
judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn
for protection and relief.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in
defending the cause and rights of his client, should do
so with all the fervor and energy of which he is
capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts require. The reason for this is
that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of
their institution. Without such guaranty, said
institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation.
At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention
to the provisions of rule 1 of Chapter 2 of
Legal Ethics, which reads as follows:
"It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the
courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but f or the
maintenance of its importance. Judges, not being
wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly
entitled to receive the support of the bar against
unjust criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is
the right and duty of the lawyer to submit his
grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases but
not otherwise, such charges should be encouraged and
the person making them should be protected."
In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states
that it was not his intention to offend the court or to
be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately,
there are his phrases which need no further comment.
Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places
where the same conditions and practice as those in
this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no
excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact
that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a
valid defense:
"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence
that the language used was justified by the facts is
not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial
office should always be observed and enforced." (In
re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want
of intention con-
stitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this
case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he
prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make
such concession. However, in order to avoid a
recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following
the bad example, from taking the same course, this
court considers it imperative to treat the case of said
attorney with the justice it deserves.
Briefly, this court is of the opinion and so holds that
the act committed by Attorney Vicente J. Francisco
constitutes a contempt in the face of the court (in facie
curiæ) and, reiterating what this court said on
another occasion that the power to punish for
contempt is inherent in the courts in order that there
be due administration of justice (In reKelly, 35 Phil.,
944), and so that the institution of the courts of justice
may be stable and said courts may not fail in their
mission, said attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200
within the period of ten days, and to be reprimanded,
and he is hereby reprimanded; and it is ordered that
the entire paragraph of his motion containing the
phrases which as has been stated, constitute contempt
of court be stricken from the record de oficio. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad
Santos, Hull, Imperial, Butte, and Goddard,
JJ., concur.
MALCOLM, J., with whom concurs VICKERS, J.,
dissenting:
From 1918 when in the case of the United
States vs. Bustos(37 Phil., 731), it was declared that
"The guaranties of a free speech and a free press
include the right to criticize judicial conduct", until
the present, I have consistently and steadfastly stood
for the fullest expression of freedom of speech. I stand
for the application of that basic principle now.
The language which the majority of the court finds
contemptuous and punishes as such is found in a
second motion of reconsideration in an election case, a
class of cases out of which arise more bitter feelings
than any other. The motion is phrased in vigorous
language, in fact vigorous and convincing enough to
induce the granting of a rehearing on the merits. It is
hardly necessary to add that that action was taken
entirely uninfluenced by the peroration of the motion
here judicially penalized.
Following microscopic examination in the majority
opinion of the paragraph, attention is directed to
words which prophesy the loss of public confidence in
the courts and the growth of Sakdalism. If, however,
the passage flowing from the pen of Mr. Francisco be
set side by side with passages written by the late Mr.
Justice Johnson in the case
of Garchitorena vs. Crescini and Imperial ([1918], 39
Phil., 258), little difference in phraseology will be
noted. One came f rom a lawyer and is condemned;
the other came from a judge and is accepted.
The main burden of the charge is that threats
against this court were made by the respondent.
Admittedly a lawyer should maintain a respectful
attitude towards the courts. Any attempt on the part
of a lawyer to influence the action of the court by
intimidation will justify not alone punishment for
contempt but also disbarment. But does anyone
believe that the action taken in this case has been
obtained by coercion or could be obtained by such
methods ? Judges are of sterner stuff than weak
plants which bend with every wind.
The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up f
or his rights even in the face of a hostile court. He
owes entire devotion to the interests of his client. His
zeal when a case is lost, which he thinks should have
been won, may induce intemperate outbursts. Courts
will do well charitably to overlook professional
improprieties of the moment induced by chagrin at
losing a case.
So that it may not be assumed that the position
taken by me is isolated or peculiar, permit me to offer
a few corroborative authorities.
Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania was the pioneer authority in the
subject of professional ethics. Speaking for the court
in one case, he said: "No class of the community ought
to be allowed freer scope in the expression or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality
or integrity of judges than members of the bar. * *
* To say that an attorney can only act or speak on
this subject under liability to be called to account and
to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the
very judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty
to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained for a moment under our present system."
(Ex parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.)
Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the
Supreme Court of Kansas and subsequently was
elevated to the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the former capacity, in sustaining a contempt of
court, he nevertheless observed: "We remark again,
that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed
any mere hasty and unguarded expression of passion,
or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that,
in every case where a judge decides for one party, he
decides against another; and often times both parties
are beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The
disappointment, theref ore, is great, and it is not in
human nature that there should be other than bitter
feeling, which often reaches to the judge as the cause
of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be
patient, and tolerate every thing which appears but
the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second
thought will generally make a party ashamed of such
outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none
by passing it in silence." (In re Pryor [1877], 26 Am.
Rep., 747.)
The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court
of the United States was until recently the leader of
progressive thought in American jurisprudence. In a
dissenting opinion in a famous case, he said: "When it
is considered how contrary it is to our practice and
ways of thinking for the same person to be accuser
and sole judge in a matter which, if he be sensitive,
may involve strong personal feeling," I should expect
the power to be limited by the necessities of the case
'to insure order and decorum in their presence'. * * chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way is for the
* I confess that I cannot find in all this or in the
evidence in the case anything that would have
affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still less
can I find there anything that obstructed the
administration of justice in any sense that I possibly
can give to those words." (Toledo Newspaper
Co. vs. United States [1917], 247 U. S., 402.)
In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged
with having said in effect that the Supreme Court had
decided the election protest in favor of Cailles because
Governor-General Wood, out of friendship for Cailles,
had invited members of the court to Malacañang
previous to formulating the decision, and there,
following a secret conference, had offered them a
banquet. The proceedings for contempt initiated
against the respondent by the Attorney-General were
halted by the court. In the opinion it was said: "We
doubt very much if any one would think f or a moment
that members of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity
for a social courtesy and the favor of the Chief
Executive. * * * We feel also, that litigants and
lawyers should not be held to too strict an account for
words said in the heat of the moment, because of
court to condone even contemptuous language." (In re
Gomez [1922], 43 Phil., 376.)
 To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court constitutes contempt of court, but conceding that it
is a jurisdiction to be exercised with scrupulous care. did require explanation, I would accept his disavowal
The members of the court sit as prosecutors and as of wrong intent at its face value. I would not mar the
judges. Human sensitiveness to an attorney's unjust record of a member of the bar of long and honorable
aspersions on judicial character may induce too standing with this blemish. With due deference to the
drastic action. It may result in the long run in making opinion of the majority, I must strongly dissent
of lawyers weak exponents of their clients' causes. therefrom.
Respect for the courts can better be obtained by Respondent attorney found guilty of contempt, fined,
following a calm and impartial course from the bench and reprimanded.
than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary
by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious
exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs
lawyers of independent thought and courageous
bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and
unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will
do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate
language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which
affects in no way the outcome of a case.
Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his
intention to be recreant to the respect and
consideration which he has always shown the highest
tribunal in the Philippines, and that the language of
the last paragraph of his motion of June 19 was not
meant to offend the dignity of the court. I do not think [No. L-2028. April 28, 1949]
that the language found in Mr. Francisco's motion PHILIPPINE SHEET METAL WORKERS' UNION (CLO),
petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
 RELATIONS, PHILIPPINE CAN COMPANY, AND LIBERAL
LABOR UNION, respondents.
1.EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS;
FINALITY OF FINDINGS WHEN THERE IS FAIR HEARING AND AMPLE
EVIDENCE.—It appearing that there has been fair hearing and
that there is ample evidence to support the conclusions of fact of
the lower court, there exists no ground for interfering with those
conclusions.
2.ID.; JUSTIFICATION FOR REDUCING NUMBER OF WORKERS BY
INTRODUCTION OF MACHINERY.—There was real justification for
reducing the number of workers in respondent company's
factory, such a measure having been made necessary by the
introduction of machinery in the manufacture of its products.
3.ID. ; RIGHT OF MANUFACTURER TO USE NEW LABOR-SAVING
DEVICES.—There can be no question as to the right of the
manufacturer to use new labor-saving devices with a view to
effecting more economy and efficiency in its method of
production.
4.ID.; EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO DISMISS EMPLOYEES FOR FAILURE OF
LATTER TO OBSERVE PROPER DISCIPLINE AND EFFICIENCY.—The
right to reduce personnel should, of course, not be abused. It
should not be made a pretext for easing out laborers on account
of their union activities. But neither should it be denied when it
is shown that they are not discharging their duties in a manner
consistent with good discipline and the efficient operation of an
industrial enterprise.
454
PETITION for review on certiorari an order of the
Court of Industrial Relations.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Lazatin & Caballero for petitioners.
Juan R. Maralit for respondent Court of Industrial
Relations.
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review an order of
the Court of Industrial Relations on the ground that
the same was rendered in excess of jurisdiction and
with grave abuse of discretion.
The said order was issued in case No. 37-V (2) of
said court involving an industrial dispute between the
respondent company (a corporation engaged in the
manufacture of tin plates, aluminum sheets, etc.) and
its laborers some of whom belong to the Philippine
Sheet Metal Workers’ Union (CLO) and some to the
Liberal Labor Union. The dispute was over certain
demands made upon the company by the laborers, one
of the demands (No. 13th in the list) being for the
recall of eleven workers who had been laid off.
Temporarily taken back on certain conditions pending
final determination of the controversy, these eleven
workers were in the end ordered retained in the
decision handed down by the court on February 19,
1947, which disposed of this part of the case as
follows:
 "The petitioner tried to prove that the 11 laborers were laid off by the
respondent company due to their union activities. As a matter of fact, of
the 11 workers laid off, there are included officers and members of the
petitioning union, namely, the president, Pablo Sicat; the vice-president,
Generoso Villanueva; and the secretary, Marcos Eugenio. The respondent
company proved that the laying off of these eleven workers was due to
lack of materials. With regard tc this contention, the examining division
of this Court was ordered tc investigate the availability of materials used
in connection witi the work performed by these eleven laborers, the
volume of business and the work performed by these workers during
Sundays, legal holidays, and night shift.
"After considering the evidence, both testimonial and documentary
and the response of the chief of the examining division of this
Court, we are of the opinion that there was really lack of materials at the
tune of the laying off of these 11 laborers. However, there is also sufficient
evidence to the effect that the respondent company, in reducing the
number of its personnel, selected workers that belonged to the petitioning
union. This is discrimination and the same can mot be tolerated. The
right to reduce personnel must not be abused and must not be taken
advantage of to dismiss laborers with whom the management is
displeased due to their union activities. In the present case, it is the
opinion of the Court that the management of the company selected these
11 workers because they organized a labor union. Although the company
has the right to reduce its personnel, the said company erred in abusing
this right. It is, therefore, ordered that these 11 workers be retained in
the respondent company until the occurrence of facts that may give rise to
a just cause of their laying off or dismissal, or there is evidence of
sufficient weight to convince the Court that their conduct is not
satisfactory. As a consequence, the company is ordered to pay their
corresponding wages from the date of their lay-off to the date of their
temporary readmission in the company."
As a separate incident from the above, the
company, on February 10, 1947, that is, nine days
before the decision came down, filed a motion in the
case, asking for authority to lay off at least 15 workers
in its can department on the ground that the
installation and operation of nine new labor-saving
machines in said department had rendered the
services of the said workers unnecessary. The
Philippine Sheet Metal Workers' Union (CLO)
opposed the motion, alleging that there was more
than sufficient work in the company to keep all its
workers busy, and, on the further allegation that the
company had hired without the authority of the court
some ten new laborers pending resolution of the
principal case, it in turn asked that the company be
declared guilty of contempt of court. About a year
later, the court, after due hearing and investigation,
rendered an order, dated February 5, 1948, granting
the company's motion to lay off 15 workers and denied
the petition to have the company declared in contempt
of court. This order is the one now before us for
review.
The fifteen laborers slated for dismissal had each of
them a bad record according to the list submitted by
the company, which reads as follows:
"1. Pablo Sicat, coppersmith, por haber abandonado por mucho tiempo
su trabajo;
"2. Manuel Pajarillo, making the handles of the cans, por frecuentes
ausencias;
 "3. Marcos Eugenio, solderer, por haber estado saliendo a menud" en
horas de trabajo y dejado el servicio sin causa razonable ni permiso;
"4. Miguel Magcalin, solderer, por haber abandonado definitivamente
el trabajo;
"5. Juanito Villanueva, solderer, por ineficiencia;
"6. Melitona Basilio, solderer, por haber estado saliendo a menudo en
horas de trabajo sin causa razonable;
"7. Felicidad Villanueva, painting rubber, por ineficiencia;
"8. Conchita Basilio, painting rubber, por ser perezosa y salidas a
menudo en horas de trabajo;
"9. Soledad del Rosario, painting rubber, por no tener interes en el
trabajo y salidas a menudo en horas de labor;
"10. Fortunata Angelo, painting rubber, por ser ineficiente y
desobediente;
"11. Segundina San Juan, painting rubber, por ineficiencia e
inobediencia; todos miembros de la union recurrente;
"12. Fermino Tiozon, can maker, por ser perezoso;
"13. Genaro Galvez, general helper, por ser perezoso;
"'14. Leonardo Soliman, operator-messenger, por ineficiencia, por
haber estado llegando tarde a la fabrica y durmiendo en horas de trabajo;
miembros de la union terceristas; y
"15. Ho Ching Sing, laborer, por haber abandonado el traba; sin previa
notificación; no unionista."
And the order complained of is based upon the
following conclusions of fact of the court below:
"1. La compañía tiene instalada y en operación en su fabrica,
además de las maquinas antiguas, trece (13) nuevas unidades de
'labor saving machines', entre similares y enteramente diferente,
que llegaron de los Estados Unidos de America en distintas fechas
desde el agosto de 1946 hasta el junio de 1947.
"2. Dichas nuevas maquinas ahorran obra de mano y tiempo,
hacer mas fáciles y rápidos los trabajos y aumentan el volumen de
la producción.
"3. En su fabrica la compañía tiene ochenta y cinco (85) obreros,
y el propuesto despido de los quince (15) obreros, entre hombres y
mujeres, se debe principalmente a que sus servicios son ya
innecesarios porque sus trabajos han sido absorbidos por las nuevas
maquinas.
“4. En la selección de dichos quince (15) obreros la compañía,
mediante un grupo o comité de tres (3) de sus funcionarios y
empleados de confianza, con el gerente de la misma a la cabeza, se
baso en los servicios y la conducta de cada obrero.
"5. El comité de selección no se guió por la afiliación de los
obreros a ninguna de las dos uniones obreras existentes en el seno
de la fabrica, y solamente tuvo en cuenta al verificar la selección
estos (a) Abandono del trabajo, sin aviso o justa
causa; (b) Frecuentes ausencias injustificadas en la (el)
servicio; (c) Salidas a menudo durante las horas de labor, sin causa
razonable; y (d) ineficiencia, negligencia o falta de interés en el
cumplimiento del deber.
"6. Los obreros cuyo despido esta propuesto por la compañía han
incurrido en las faltas que se atribuyen por la misma a cada uno de
ellos.
"7. La compañía no ha aceptado nuevos obreros y si ha hecho
trabajar algunas veces a ciertos obreros o mecánicos suyos en
exceso de las ocho horas, ha sido en interés de la eficiencia o por
exigencias del servicio y no por haber tenido mucho volumen de
trabajo en su fabrica.
"Indudablemente, la compañía abrigando el deseo laudable de
des-arrollar su negocio y aumentar su producción, ha introducido
importantes cambios y mejoras en la elaboración de sus productos,
recurriendo al empleo de maquinarias modernas para atender
debidamente y satisfacer mejor las demandas del publico
consumidor. El propósito de la compañía merece aplausos, el medio
de que se vale para realizarlo es digno de encomio y su objetivo
significa desenvolvimiento progresivo en la solución de los
problemas industriales para el beneficio de la comunidad. Todo
paso o medida que tienda a favorecer el interés publico y con miras
a dar impulso a la mecanización de las industrias, contribuye a la
mejora de la economía y la ansiada rehabilitación del país; y por lo
tanto, no debe ser obstruido sino, por el contrario, fomentado."
It appearing that there has been fair hearing and
that there is ample evidence to support the
conclusions of fact of the lower court, we would have
no ground for interfering with those conclusions. And
these make it clear that there was real justification
for reducing the number of workers in respondent
company's factory, such a measure having been made
necessary by the introduction of machinery in the
manufacture of its products, and that the company
cannot be charged with discrimination in recommend-
ing the dismissal of the fifteen laborers named in the
above list since their selection was made by a
committee composed of both officers and employees
who took no account of the laborers' affiliation to the
unions and only considered their proven record.
There can be no question as to the right of the
manufacturer to use new labor-saving devices with a
view to effecting more economy and efficiency in its
method of production. As the lower court observes in
its order,
"No se puede detener el curso de los tiempos. Si se quiere sobrevivir y
prosperar, la única alternativa es adaptarse a las exigencias del presente
mundo moderno. No se puede cerrar los ojos a la realidad. No se puede
depender de métodos antiguos, hay que recurrir a métodos más eficientes
y avanzados. La producción no solo debe ser de elevada calidad sino
ilimitada y su costo al alcance de todos. Debe seguirse el ejemplo de
otros países.,,
The right to reduce personnel should, of course, not
be abused. It should not be made a pretext for easing
out laborers on account of their union activities. But
neither should it be denied when it is shown that they
are not discharging their duties in a manner
consistent with good discipline and the efficient
operation of an industrial enterprise. We, therefore,
approve of the following pronouncement of the court
below:
"La compañía tiene derecho de despedir a sus empleados u obreros. Si
bien este derecho esta sujeto a la regulación del Estado, en su normal
ejercicio no se inmiscuye la ley. El patrono paga el jornal de sus obreros
por su trabajo, y es lógico y justo que el mismo tenga derecho a esperar de
los mismos lealtad y fiel cumplimiento de sus obligaciones. No es el
propósito de la ley obligar al principal a retener en su servicio a un obrero
cuando no recibe de este trabajo adecuado, diligencia (diligencia) y buen
comportamiento, o cuando su continuación en el empleo es claramente
opuesta a los intereses de su patrono, porque la ley al proteger los
derechos del obrero no autoriza la opresión ni la destrucción del
principal."
The petitioner contends that the order complained
of was made with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of jurisdiction in that it is contrary to the Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Perfecto,
pronouncement made by the lower court in its Bengzon, Briones, Tuason, and Montemayor, J
decision in the main case where it disapproved of the J., concur.
dismissal of eleven workers "with whom the
management is displeased due to their union
activities." It appears, however, that the
pronouncement was made upon a distinct set of facts,
which are different from those found by the court in
connection with the present incident, and that very
decision, in ordering the reinstatement of the eleven
laborers, qualifies the order by saying that those
laborers are to be retained only "until the occurrence
of facts that may give rise to a just cause of their
laying off or dismissal, or there is evidence of
sufficient weight to convince the Court that their
conduct is not satisfactory."
After a careful review of the record, we find that the
Court of Industrial Relations has neither exceeded its
jurisdiction nor committed grave abuse of discretion
in rendering the order complained of. The petition for
certiorari is, therefore, denied, but without costs
against the petitioner for the reasons stated in its G.R. No. 142440. February 17, 2003.
*

motion to litigate as pauper. EL REYNO HOMES, INC., petitioner, vs. ERNESTO

ONG and MA. SONIA TAN SOON HA, respondents.
 Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Procedural Rules and
Technicalities; Technicality and procedural imperfection
should not serve as basis of decisions; Liberality in the
application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will
result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless
delay in the administration of justice.—In not a few
instances, we relaxed the rigid application of the rules of
procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to fully
ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with the
time-honored principle that cases should be decided only
after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should
thus not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of
justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing
always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to
promote the administration of justice. However, as correctly
pointed out by the private respondents, such liberality in
the application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it
will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause
needless delay in the administration of justice. It is equally
settled that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice.
Same; Same; Appeals; Affidavits of Service; Failure of
the petitioner to attach the required affidavit of service
warrants the outright denial of a motion for extension to file
a petition for review, and subsequent compliance does not
cure the defect.—We agree with the appellate court that the
failure of the petitioner to attach the required affidavit of
service warranted outright denial of the motion for
extension of time to file its petition for review.
Consequently, the judgment sought to be appealed from
became final after the lapse of the original period within
which the petition should have been filed. The subsequent
compliance by the petitioner with the required attachment
of affidavit of service did not cure the defect.
Same; Same; Same; The right to appeal is a mere
statutory privilege, and not being a natural right or a part of
due process, the right to appeal may be exercised only in the
manner and in accordance with the rules provided
therefore.—As if it were not enough, the explanation
regarding the mode of service used in the instant petition
was left unsigned by the counsel of the petitioner. It should
be pointed out that herein petitioner filed the instant
petition with this Court as an appeal from the adverse
resolutions of the Court of Appeals. We emphasize that the
right to appeal is a mere statutory privilege. Not being a
natural right or a part of due process, the right to appeal
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the rules provided therefore. Failure to bring an appeal in
the manner and within the period prescribed by the rules
renders the judgment appealed from final and executory.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Aristotle Q. Sarmiento for petitioner.
Edito A. Rodriguez for private respondents.
CORONA, J.:
The instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks a review of the Resolution dated 1 the name of one Antonio Tuazon, Jr., despite full payment of the lot by
December 15, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (Third
Division) in CA-G.R. SP No. 55988 denying
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review, thereby dismissing the case, and
the Resolution dated March 10, 2000 which denied the
2
subsequent motion for reconsideration.
It appears that private respondents, Ernesto Ong
and Ma. Sonia Tan Soon Ha purchased from
petitioner, El Reyno Homes, Inc., Lot 2, Block 9 of
subdivision plan PSD-04-001498 situated at the
Loyola Grand Villas W-2, Quezon City containing an
area of 1,000 square meters initially covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 261758. For its
failure to develop and deliver the title to the property,
the private respondents filed an action against the
petitioner for specific performance and for violation of
Sections 19, 20, 25 and 29 of Presidential Decree No.
957 on March 22, 1991 with the Housing and Land
3
Use Regulatory Board (HLURB for brevity). After
conducting the required hearings and an ocular
inspection of the property, HLURB Arbiter Cesar A.
Manuel, found that:
To this date, the parcel of land, Lot No. 2, Block No. 9 under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 261758 of the Registry of Deeds for Metro Manila
District II, sold by the respondent to complainants, is still registered in
the buyers, complainants herein, in violation of Section 25 of PD 957. We
are not persuaded by the respondent’s argument that complainants are
not entitled to delivery of title pending their payment of taxes and other
assessments (Respondent’s Answer Par. II). This is in contravention with
Section 26 of PD 957 which provides that “Real Esate (sic) Tax and
assessment on a lot x x x shall be paid by the owner or developer with out
(sic) recourse to the buyer for as long as the title has not passed to the
buyer; x x x.” The only exception to this rule is when the title has passed
to the buyer and the latter took possession of and occupied the lot. This is
not obtaining in the instant case.
As to the issue of non-development, the above quoted ocular inspection
speaks for itself.
We are not also convinced with the argument of respondent that it “is
physically and legally impossible for it at this point in time to force before
the development of the property as it may result in violence and
bloodshed x x x” (Respondent’s Opposition par. 1, sub-par, b, citing its par.
7 of its Answer). This principle which is enriched under Articles 1266 and
1267 of the Civil Code does not apply in the instant case for the simple
reason that in order for the said principle to apply, it is a condition sine
qua non that the prestation constituting the object of the obligation must
have become legally or physically impossible of compliance without the
fault of the obligor and before he has incurred in delay.
(Jurado, Comments and Jurisprudence on Obligations and Contracts,
1983 Edition, p. 249)
4
Hence, the HLURB arbiter rendered the following
judgment:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondent EL
REYNO HOMES, INC., within thirty (30) days from finality hereof to:
1. 1.To deliver immediately the title to the complainants;
2. 2.Complete the development of the said subdivision in accordance
with the approved subdivision plan such as to:
1. a.construct the road going to the property of the complainants;
2. b.construct the drainage and/or sewer pipe serving the said subject
lot;
3. c.provide and/or construct water distribution line;
4. d.provide electrical power supply;
1. 3.Pay to this Board an administrative fine of P10,000.00 for
violation of Sections 20 and 25 in relation to Section 38 of PD 957.
2. 4.Pay to the complainant the sum of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Finding the respondent’s counterclaim without merit, the same is
hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.” 5
From the said decision, the petitioner filed a notice of
appeal with the HLURB Board of Commissioners
(Board for brevity) on March 11, 1992 which
subsequently issued an Order on April 3, 1992
requiring the parties to file their respective
memoranda within 10 days from receipt thereof.
In an urgent motion filed on April 30, 1992,
petitioner El Reyno Homes, Inc. requested that it be
given an extension of 15 days from May 1, 1992, or
until May 16, 1992, to file its memorandum of appeal
which was granted by the Board on May 8, 1992.
However, the petitioner failed to file its
memorandum of appeal within the extended period
prompting the private respondents to file a motion to
dismiss the appeal. Despite the filing of a
memorandum of appeal by the petitioner on May 22,
6
1992, or six (6) days after the expiration of the period
of extension on May 16, 1992, the Board issued an
Order on December 16, 1992 dismissing the appeal of
7
the petitioner, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“Considering the foregoing, respondent’s (herein petitioner) appeal is
hereby declared ABANDONED and hence DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.”
On January 26, 1993, the petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the Board in an
Order dated May 4, 1993.
8
On May 24, 1993, the petitioner timely filed a notice
of appeal with the Office of the President which
subsequently issued an
 Order dated May 28, 1993 requiring the said
petitioner to file its memorandum of appeal.
The petitioner filed its memorandum of appeal on
July 20, 1993 while the respondents filed their reply
memorandum on August 10, 1993.
On October 27, 1999, the Office of the President
rendered a decision dismissing the appeal of the
9 REGULATORY BOARD WHICH GROSSLY
petitioner. On November 25, 1999, the petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals a motion for an
extension of 15 days within which to file a petition
10
for review counted from December 1, 1999, or until
December 16, 1999.
On December 9, 1999, which was within the
requested period of extension, the petitioner filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
11
In the questioned Resolution dated December 15,
1999 however, the Court of Appeals denied
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review for not having been accompanied
by an affidavit of service, consequently dismissing the
case. The motion for reconsideration of the questioned
resolution was denied by the appellate court on March
10, 2000.
Hence, the instant petition with the following
12
assignments of error:
1. 1.THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
AN ERROR IN DISMISSING THE CASE ON
PURE TECHNICALITY THEREBY DENYING
THE PETITIONER ITS DAY IN COURT AND
IN EFFECT AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE HOUSING AND LAND USE
ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE APPEAL AS
HAVING BEEN ABANDONED INSTEAD OF
DECIDING THE CASE.
2. 2.THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES WAS
MANIFESTLY EXCESSIVE AND WITHOUT
LEGAL OR FACTUAL BASIS.
The petitioner claims that the delay in filing its
memorandum of appeal with the Board was due to the
sudden and unexpected absence without official leave
of Attorney Herenio Martinez on May 15, 1992 to
whom the instant case was allegedly assigned. The
absence of Attorney Martinez, who remained in
possession of the records of this case, was beyond the
control of the petitioner, such that a rigid application
of the rules would defeat substantial justice especially
since the said petitioner filed its memorandum of
appeal, albeit 6 days after the expiration of the
extended period. Besides, Section 2 of the HLURB
rules provides for a liberal construction thereof “in
order to promote public interest and to assist the
parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action, application or other
proceedings.”
Likewise, according to petitioner, the Court of
Appeals erred when it denied petitioner’s motion for
extension of time to file a petition for review because
of its failure to attach an affidavit of service. The
private respondents were furnished a copy of the
motion for extension of time to file a petition for
review by registered mail posted on November 24,
1999 at Greenhills Post Office, San Juan, Metro
Manila under Registry Receipt No. 15088 addressed
to their counsel, Atty. Edito A. Rodriguez, at 16 CRM
Rhia Street, BF Almanza, Las Piñas City. The
pleading was actually received by the counsel of
private respondents on November 29, 1999 per
certification of the Las Piñas Post Office dated
13
January 5, 2000. The purpose of the rule on service of
pleadings, to ensure that the other party was properly
notified of the pleading, had thus been served.
Moreover, petitioner filed the petition for review with
the Court of Appeals on December 9, 1999 which was
well within the extended period prayed for in its
motion for extension of time to file a petition.
Invoking the ruling of this Court in the case
of Republic vs. Court of Appeals, the petitioner
14
opined that the Court of Appeals should have decided
the petition on the merits rather than on mere
technicality in order to promote substantial justice.
Additionally, petitioner argues that the award of
attorney’s fees by the HLURB arbiter had no factual
nor legal basis. It alleges that the private respondents
still had obligations to settle under the contract, thus,
the petitioner was not yet in default nor bound to
deliver the title to the lot to the said private
respondents.
In their comment, the private respondents contend
15
that, while the rules of procedure may be liberally
construed, such liberality should not apply in case of
wanton disregard of said rules or if it will only cause
needless delay. Respondents point out that petitioner
was silent until the motion for extension of time to file
its petition for review was denied and the case was
dismissed by the appellate court, before it exerted
effort to comply with the requirements. They claim
that the petitioner was advised of its failure to attach
the affidavit of service on the same day that it filed its
said motion. They also maintain that the award of
16
attorney’s fees is justified by the circumstances of the
case, praying that it be increased because the case is
now on appeal to the Supreme Court.
By way of reply, the petitioner insists that its
17
failure to attach the required affidavit of service to its
motion was not a wanton disregard of the rules nor
intended to cause needless delay in the
administration of justice. It also reiterates the alleged
lack of factual or legal basis for the award of
attorney’s fees in favor of the private respondents.
We deny the instant petition.
In not a few instances, we relaxed the rigid
application of the rules of procedure to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases
on the merits. This is in line with the timehonored
principle that cases should be decided only after
giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection
should thus not serve as basis of decisions. In that
way, the ends of justice would be better served. For,
18
indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims
of contending parties, bearing always in mind that
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice. 19
However, as correctly pointed out by the private
respondents, such liberality in the application of rules
of procedure may not be invoked if it will result in the
wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay
in the administration of justice. It is equally settled
that, save for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly
administration of justice.
20
The HLURB Board of Commissioners considered
the appeal filed by the petitioner from the adverse
decision of the HLURB arbiter as abandoned after it
failed to file the required memorandum of appeal
within the extended period prayed for by the
petitioner itself. The delay was allegedly brought
about by the failure of its counsel to turn over the
records before his sudden and unexpected absence
without official leave on May 15, 1992. This
unsubstantiated allegation of the petitioner is far
from convincing. The record shows that the petitioner
was represented by Atty. Emiliano L. Tamboan, Jr.
throughout the trial of the case before the HLURB
arbiter and subsequently by Atty. Aristotle Q.
Sarmiento. No Atty. Herenio Martinez ever entered
his appearance at any stage of the proceedings in this
case. It is obvious that this tale of “abandonment by
its supposed counsel” was merely concocted by the
petitioner in its desperate attempt to evade the legal
effects of failure to file timely appeal.
After its motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Board, the petitioner filed an appeal with the
Office of the President but this was denied on October
27, 1999. Subsequently, the petitioner filed a motion
for extension of time to file a petition with the Court
of Appeals. Apparently unmindful of its previous
mistake, the petitioner this time failed to attach to its
said motion for extension of time the required
affidavit of service. And in an attempt to cover up the
grave consequences of its second mistake, the
petitioner, in its subsequent motion for
reconsideration, contended that the purpose of this
particular procedural requirement had anyway been
served already when the private respondents’ counsel
actually received a copy of its motion on November 29,
1999, as shown by the certification of the Las Piñas
Post Office.
We agree with the appellate court that the failure of
the petitioner to attach the required affidavit of
service warranted outright denial of the motion for
extension of time to file its petition for review.
Consequently, the judgment sought to be appealed
from became final after the lapse of the original
period within which the petition should have been
filed. The subsequent compliance by the petitioner
with the required attachment of affidavit of service
did not cure the defect.
The petitioner has no one to blame but itself for its
failure to attach the required affidavit of service to its
motion. In fact, it did not even exert enough effort to
comply with this particular procedural requirement as
soon as practicable. Its counsel waited indifferently
until the motion for extension was denied and the
case was eventually dismissed on December 15,
1999—despite having been advised on the day it filed
the motion for extension on No-vember 25, 1999 of
such failure to attach the required affidavit of service.
As if it were not enough, the explanation regarding
the mode of service used in the instant petition was
left unsigned by the counsel of the petitioner. It 21
should be pointed out that herein petitioner filed the
instant petition with this Court as an appeal from
the adverse resolutions of the Court of Appeals. We
22
emphasize that the right to appeal is a mere statutory
privilege. Not being a natural right or a part of due
process, the right to appeal may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the rules provided
therefore. Failure to bring an appeal in the manner
and within the period prescribed by the rules renders
the judgment appealed from final and executory. 23
The case of Republic vs. Court of Appeals which
24
was relied upon by the petitioner does not apply
squarely to the case at bar. In that particular case,
the Solicitor General filed the record on appeal 6 days
late. This Court suspended the rules on perfection of
appeal as its strict application would have resulted in
the State’s loss of close to 300 hectares of prime
sugarland which a private individual had apparently
succeeded in registering in his name through
fraudulent misrepresentation and machination.
On the other hand, herein petitioner has failed to
convince the Court that an extremely compelling
reason exists to justify suspension of the strict
application of the rules and to avert the commission of
grave injustice. A review of the questioned decision of
the HLURB arbiter does not show any reversible error
in its appreciation of the facts and its application of
the pertinent laws. No development of roads, drainage
and water system has as yet been introduced by the
petitioner to the subject property in violation of
Section 20 of P.D. No. 957. The petitioner cannot
25
seek refuge in its gratuitous claim that the property
was invaded by squatters for its failure to introduce
the required development. As found by the HLURB
arbiter, the same was due to the fault of the said
petitioner and that the squatters entered the property
after petitioner was already in delay. Likewise, title to
the property has not been delivered up to the present
despite full payment of the price of the lot in
contravention of Section 25 of the same decree.
26
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition
is hereby DENIED and the questioned resolutions of
the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-
Gutierrezand Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, resolutions affirmed.
Notes.—The rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and
their strict and rigid application especially on
technical matters, which tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice, must be avoided. (Samala
vs. Court of Appeals, 363 SCRA 535 [2001])
When the error relates to something so elementary
as to be inexcusable, the Court’s discretion becomes
nothing more than exercise in frustration. (De Liano
vs. Court of Appeals, 370 SCRA 349 [2001])
 G.R. No. 164668. February 14, 2005.
*

ASIAN SPIRIT AIRLINES (AIRLINE EMPLOYEES

COOPERATIVE), petitioner, vs. SPOUSES
BENJAMIN AND ANNE MARIE BAUTISTA, KARL
BAUTISTA and GLORIA POMERA, respondents.
 Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Appeal Briefs; An
appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals on its
motion or that of the appellee for failure of the appellant to
file its brief within the time provided by Section 7, Rule 44 of
the Rules of Court.—Under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, an appeal may be dismissed by
the CA on its own motion or that of the appellee for failure
of the appellant to file its brief within the time provided by
Section 7, Rule 44 of the said Rules. The petitioner had until
January 31, 2004 within which to file its brief but failed to
do so. It was only on March 10, 2004, after receipt of
respondents’ motion filed on March 3, 2004, praying for the
dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file its
brief, that the petitioner filed its brief appended to an
unverified motion to admit the said brief.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; Blaming counsel’s
unidentified secretary for abject failure to file a litigant’s
brief is a common practice for negligent lawyers to cover for
their own negligence, incompetence, indolence, and
ineptitude.—The excuse contrived by the petitioner’s counsel
is totally unacceptable. We note that the motion of the
petitioner is unverified. Neither did the petitioner bother
appending to its motion an affidavit of its counsel’s
secretary containing his/her explanation why he/she failed
to file the said motion for extension if there was such a
motion in the first place. The petitioner did not even bother
appending to its Motion to Admit its motion for extension to
file brief which its counsel’s secretary allegedly failed to file
in the CA. Blaming its counsel’s unidentified secretary for
its abject failure to file its brief is a common practice for
negligent lawyers to cover up for their own negligence,
incompetence, indolence, and ineptitude. Such excuse is the
most hackneyed and habitual subterfuge employed by
litigants who fail to observe the procedural requirements
prescribed by the Rules of Court. It bears stressing that it is
the duty of counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system
that insures that all pleadings should be filed and duly
served within the period therefor and, if he fails to do so, the
negligence of his secretary or clerk to file such pleading is
imputable to the said counsel.
Same; Same; Like all rules, procedural rules are
required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of
reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an
injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure
prescribed.—We agree with the petitioner’s contention that
the rules of procedure may be relaxed for the most
persuasive reasons. But as this Court held in Galang v.
Court of Appeals: Procedural rules are not to be belittled or
dismissed simply because their non-observance may have
resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all
rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to
relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the
procedure prescribed.
 Same; Same; Procedural Rules and
Technicalities; Technicality and procedural imperfection
should not serve as basis for decisions, but liberality in the
application of rules of procedure may not be invoked if it will
result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless
delay in the administration of justice.—In not a few
instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the
rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity to
fully ventilate their cases on the merits. This is in line with
the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only
after giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should,
thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way, the ends of
justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of
justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing
always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to
promote the administration of justice. In this case, however,
such liberality in the application of rules of procedure may
not be invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the
rules or cause needless delay in the administration of
justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most
persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to
facilitate the orderly administration of justice.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the resolutions
of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Virgilio G. Farcon, Jr. for petitioner.
Francis V. Gustilo for respondents.
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissing the
1
appeal of the petitioner herein in CA-G.R. CV No.
79317 and its resolution in the same case denying the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of its first
resolution.
The Antecedents
The Spouses Benjamin and Anna Marie Bautista filed
a complaint, in behalf of their son Karl Bautista and
Gloria Pomera, against the Asian Spirit Airlines in
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City for breach of
contract and damages. After trial, the court rendered
a decision on March 24, 2003 in favor of the plaintiffs
and against the defendant. The fallo of the decision
reads:
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFFS and AGAINST THE DEFENDANT ordering the latter to
pay the former:
1. 1.P5,000.00 as temperate damages;
2. 2.P200,000.00 as moral damages;
3. 3.P150,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. 4.P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees;
5. 5.P18,371.25 as litigation expenses.
Defendant’s counterclaim is DISMISSED.” 2
Its motion for the reconsideration of the decision
having been denied by the trial court, the defendant
3
appealed. The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 79317. On December 10, 2003, the appellate court
directed the defendant-appellant to file its brief as
appellant within forty-five (45) days from notice
thereof. The defendant-appellant received its copy of
4
the resolution on December 17, 2003. Thus, it had
until January 31, 2004 within which to file its brief.
However, the defendant-appellant failed to file its
appellant’s brief. On March 3, 2004, the plaintiffs-
appellees filed a Manifestation and Motion for the 5 SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS AND DENIAL TO IT OF ITS RIGHT TO DUE
dismissal of the appeal of the defendant-appellant for
its failure to file its brief.
On March 10, 2004, the defendant-appellant filed
an unverified Motion to Admit Attached Appellant’s
Brief. The plaintiffs-appellees opposed the motion. On
6 7
April 23, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution denying8
the motion of the defendant-appellant and granting
the motion of the plaintiffs-appellees, and ordered the
appeal of the defendant-appellant dismissed. The
defendant-appellant filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the said resolution but on July 16,
2004, the appellate court denied the said motion for
lack of merit. 9
The defendant-appellant, now the petitioner, filed a
petition for review on certiorari with this Court
assailing the resolutions of the CA and asserting that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
STRICTLY APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT
ON DISMISSAL OF APPEAL TO HEREIN PETITIONER’S APPEAL
WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE MANDATED PRECEPT OF LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION EXPLICITLY PROVIDED FOR IN THE RULES AND
SANCTIONED BY JURISPRUDENTIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSIDERING THAT
PETITIONER’S APPEAL BELOW IS BASED AND FOUNDED ON
VERY MERITORIOUS GROUNDS THE DENIAL OF WHICH WILL
DEFINITELY RESULT TO PREJUDICE TO PETITIONER’S
PROCESS.
10
The petitioner avers that the late filing of its brief did
not cause material injury or prejudice to the
respondents and the issues raised by it in its brief
require an examination of the evidence on record.
The petitioner prays that we set aside the assailed
resolution of the CA and order the appellate court to
reinstate its appeal for further proceedings. In their
comment on the petition, the respondents submit
that:
The Court of Appeals was evidently not satisfied with the
explanation by the petitioner. Its action in this regard is not subject to
review, for the Supreme Court cannot interfere with the discretion of the
Court of Appeals.
 It is necessary to impress upon litigants and their lawyers the of its counsel in the said Motion for Leave to Admit,
necessity of a strict compliance with the periods for performing
certain acts incident to the appeal and the transgressions thereof, as thus:
a rule, would not be tolerated; otherwise, those periods could be evaded
by subterfuges and manufactured excuses and would ultimately 1. 1.The filing of the Appellant’s Brief is due on
become inutile.(Don Lino Gutierrez & Sons, Inc. vs. CA, G.R. No. L-
39124, Nov. 15, 1974).
January 31, 2004. The notice from the
This Honorable Court will be setting a bad example if it accepts the Honorable Court was received on December 17,
excuse of the Petitioner’s counsel that he instructed his secretary to file 2003 and because of the holiday season at that
the motion for extension who, in turn, forgot to file it. Logic dictates that
the Secretary cannot release the request without the lawyer’s signature
time, the undersigned counsel gave instruction
but still the basic and simple prudence to follow it up by counsel leaves to his Secretary to file the usual Motion for
much to be desired. Every lawyer may soon adopt this reasoning to Time asking for forty-five (45) days from
justify non-filing of the brief on time.
January 31, 2004 or until March 16, 2004.
11

The petition has no merit.

2. 2.The undersigned started to prepare the
Under Section 1(e), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, as
Appellant’s Brief bearing in mind the new
amended, an appeal may be dismissed by the CA on
deadline.
its own motion or that of the appellee for failure of the
3. 3.It was only when the undersigned received the
appellant to file its brief within the time provided by
Manifestation of plaintiffs on March 5, 2004
Section 7, Rule 44 of the said Rules. The petitioner
that he inquired with his secretary if the
had until January 31, 2004 within which to file its
Manifestation of counsel is true and she readily
brief but failed to do so. It was only on March 10,
admitted that she failed to prepare and file the
2004, after receipt of respondents’ motion filed on
Motion for Time.12

March 3, 2004, praying for the dismissal of the

petitioner’s appeal for its failure to file its brief, that
the petitioner filed its brief appended to an unverified
motion to admit the said brief. The only excuse of the
petitioner for its failure to file its brief was the claim
The excuse contrived by the petitioner’s counsel is
totally unacceptable. We note that the motion of the
petitioner is unverified. Neither did the petitioner
bother appending to its motion an affidavit of its
counsel’s secretary containing his/her explanation
why he/she failed to file the said motion for extension
if there was such a motion in the first place. The
petitioner did not even bother appending to its Motion
to Admit its motion for extension to file brief which its
counsel’s secretary allegedly failed to file in the CA.
Blaming its counsel’s unidentified secretary for its
abject failure to file its brief is a common practice for
negligent lawyers to cover up for their own
negligence, incompetence, indolence, and ineptitude.
Such excuse is the most hackneyed and habitual
subterfuge employed by litigants who fail to observe
the procedural requirements prescribed by the Rules
of Court. It bears stressing that it is the duty of
13
counsel to adopt and strictly maintain a system that
insures that all pleadings should be filed and duly
served within the period therefor and, if he fails to do
so, the negligence of his secretary or clerk to file such
pleading is imputable to the said counsel. 14
We agree with the petitioner’s contention that the
rules of procedure may be relaxed for the most
persuasive reasons. But as this Court held in Galang
v. Court of Appeals: 15
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their
non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive
rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the
most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant
of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness
in not complying with the procedure prescribed.
16
In an avuncular case, we emphasized that:
17
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are, thus, enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.
And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The
liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in
proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is
true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. The
instant case is no exception to this rule.
In the present case, we find no cogent reason to
exempt the petitioner from the effects of its failure to
comply with the Rules of Court.
The right to appeal is a statutory right and the
party who seeks to avail of the same must comply
with the requirements of the Rules. Failing to do so,
the right to appeal is lost. More so, as in this case,
where petitioner not only neglected to file its brief
within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an
extension of time for a cogent ground before the
expiration of the time sought to be extended. 18
In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid
application of the rules of procedure to afford the
parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases
on the merits. This is in line with the time-honored
principle that cases should be decided only after
giving all parties the chance to argue their causes and
defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection
should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that
way, the ends of justice would be better served. For,19
indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims
of contending parties, bearing always in mind that
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice. In this case, however, such
20
liberality in the application of rules of
procedure may not be invoked if it will result in
the wanton disregard of the rules or cause
needless delay in the administration of
justice. It is equally settled that, save for the most
persuasive of reasons, strict compliance is enjoined to
facilitate the orderly administration of justice.
21
Notes.—It is error on the part of the Court of
Appeals to dismiss an appeal on the ground that it
was formally deficient where it clear from the records
that such party exerted due diligence to get copies of
its appealed resolutions certified but failed to do so on
account of a typhoon, a fortuitous event. (Hagonoy
Market Vendors Association vs. Municipality of
Hagonoy, 376 SCRA 376[2002])
Strict compliance with the Rules of Court is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays
and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of
judicial business. (Saint Louis University vs.
Cordero, 434 SCRA 575 [2004])

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition

is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Austria-
Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.