PEOPLE V. CASTRO
reliance on the conflicting testimony of the victim
On the witness stand, six (6) year old Diana Rose
Castro narrated how, while playing with a neighbor
sometime on 4 October 1986, she was pulled by the
accused inside a bathroom, prevented from going
out, and made to stand on the toilet bowl. Accused
is a first cousin of Diana Rose's mother. Kuya Delfin,
as Diana Rose referred to the accused, then put up
her clothes, took off her panty, made her lean on the
wall and, despite her efforts to pull away he inserted
his private part into her causing pain. Then she was
told by the accused to go home. At home, she
refused to have her private part washed by her
Auntie Alice because it was hurting and painful.
Defendant’s defense: Delfin's alibi begins on 3
October 1986 in 1692 Muñoz, Pasay City, where he
lives two (2) houses away from complainant's. At
about 12:00 P.M., Diana went to his house while he
was taking a bath. She was crying and went inside
the bathroom. When asked by the accused why, she
replied that while going down the stairs, a dog whose
two (2) hind legs were limping, chased her and so
she tripped. The accused told Diana to go out
because their dog might bite her. He proceeded to
dress up and saw the victim playing outside.
In the morning of 4 October 1986, he woke up at about
quarter to seven,6 left the house at 7:307 took a jeep
plying the Pasay-Taft- Luneta route, arrived in school
(Adamson University) at 8:15 in the morning. He
proceeded to see Dolores Rivera, a godsister who
worked in the treasurer's office of the university to ask
the latter to type a term paper which was due that day.
After submitting the term paper, he treated his
godsister to lunch. Around 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he went home.
Issue: WON Castro is guilty of the crime of rape
considering that there was no laceration.
Discussion/Decision
The accused appealed to this Court pointing out the
following alleged errors:
1. there is no rape because —
a. the hymen of the victim was not lacerated.
b. the victim was allegedly standing while the crime
was being committed.
c. the victim is still a virgin.
2.
and not that of the accused.
A recent decision of this Court in a case of statutory
rape observed that, usually, the average adult's
hymen measures 2.8 to 3 centimeters in diameter,
making it compatible with, or easily penetrable by an
average size penis. The victim being of tender age,
the penetration of the male organ could go only as
deep as the labia. In any case, for rape to be
committed, full penetration is not required. It is
enough that there is proof of entrance of the
male organ within the labia or pudendum of the
female organ. Even the slightest penetration is
sufficient to consummate the crime of rape.12
Perfect penetration, rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina are not essential for the
offense of consummated rape. Entry, to the least
extent, of the labia or lips of the female organ is
sufficient.13 Diana's remaining a virgin does not
negate rape.
Sexual intercourse in a standing position, while
perhaps uncomfortable, is not improbable. The
RTC decision explained:
. . . For her account that she was made to stand on
the toilet bowl made it easy for the accused to do the
act as she was too small and their private parts
would not align unless she was elevated to a higher
position. The suggestion of the defense counsel that
a finger could have been used is absurd. For if it
were only a finger there would have been no need to
let Diana stand on the toilet bowl.. . .14
The Solicitor General's brief, in turn, asserts that the
position Diana was forced to take, made it easier for
appellant to accomplish insertion of his organ than if
Diana had been made to lie down.15
Experience has shown that unfounded charges of
rape have frequently been proffered by women
actuated by some sinister, ulterior or undisclosed
motive. Convictions in such cases should not be
sustained without clear and convincing proof of
guilt,16 considering the gravity of the offense and the
penalty it carries.
On the alleged sinister motive of Diana's
grandmother engendered by envy, we find this
incredulous. For, what grandmother would exact
vengeance on her enemies at the perpetual
humiliation and disrepute of her six (6) year old
granddaughter?
Finally, the issue of credibility. Who among the
contending parties is telling the truth? The
prosecution's evidence is simple and
straightforward. Appellant's alibi must fall. Claims of
his scholastic achievements, assuming they are
relevant, were unsubstantiated. His counsel did not
even formally offer the exhibits attesting to his
enrollment at Adamson University where he was
supposed to have submitted in the morning of 4
October 1986 a term paper. His credibility is
dubious; he was not able to even identify the topic of
his alleged term paper. To discredit the victim he
testified on her alleged propensity to tell lies.17 The
trial court, however, categorically held:
While Diana's testimony was in some instances
flawed, the flaw was minor and only with respect to
dates.1âwphi1She is a young girl. She sat at the
witness stand four times, yet she survived the rigors
of testifying, unwavering in her claim that she was
raped.18
Accused-appellant claims he was coerced and
tortured by Pasay policemen to admit the rape,
showing to the trial court bodily signs of said
abuse.19 Aside from his self-serving assertion, the
truth of such allegation was not proven. Besides, this
allegedly coerced admission of guilt cannot affect
the prosecution's case which has been established
by other positive evidence pointing to his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Finding no reversible error in the decision subject of
this appeal, we affirm the same in its entirety.
WHEREFORE, the decision is AFFIRMED.
Accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim,
Diana Rose Castro in the amount of P30,000.00 in
line with prevailing jurisprudence. Costs against the
appellant.
PEOPLE vs. ATENTO
G.R. No. 84728, April 26, 1991
RAPE
FACTS: Glenda Aringo, who was sixteen years old
at the time of the alleged offense is a neighbor of
Cesar Atento, a 39-year old store-keeper with a wife
and eight children. Her claim is that Atento raped her
five separate times, the first sometime in April 1986.
She says that on that first occasion, she went to
Atento's store in Barangay 18, Minoro, Cabagñan, in
Legazpi City to buy bread. Her parents were at work
and Atento was alone in his house except for his
three-year old daughter. Glenda claims Atento
cajoled her into coming inside the house and then
took her downstairs, where he succeeded in
deflowering her. She says her maiden head ached
and bled. Afterwards, he gave her P5.00. Glenda
speaks of four other times when he raped her. It was
later (presumably because her hymen had healed)
that she felt tickled by his manhood and described
the act of coitus as "masarap."
The girl says she never told anybody about Atento's
attacks on her because he had threatened her life.
But she could not conceal her condition for long and
after five months had to admit she was pregnant.
She revealed the accused-appellant as the father of
the fetus in her womb. The child was delivered on
December 27, 1987.
Atento denies the charge against him, saying it was
pure harassment concocted by a relative of the girl
who wanted to eject him from the land where his
house was erected. Insisting that Glenda was a girl
of loose morals, he says he had twice seen her in
sexual congress with a man and that she had once
offered her body to his thirteen year old son for a fee
of P5.00.
Glenda's description of the act of coitus as
pleasurable would have destroyed the whole case
against Atento but for one singular significant fact.
The girl is a mental retardate.
According to a series of intelligence tests to which
she was subjected, Glenda is with an intellectual
capacity between the ages of nine (9) and twelve
(12) years. As such, her intellectual functioning is
within the mentally defective level. Her fund of
information is inadequate, her judgment is unsound,
and her thinking and working capacity is poor. She
is unable to distinguish essential from non-essential
details. Her vocabulary is limited. Her capacity for
her perceptual processes is unsatisfactory. She
lacks the capacity for abstracting and synthesizing
concepts. However, in the midst of all these, Glenda
was found capable of telling the truth.
The trial court, held Atento guilty of rape under
Article 335, Paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty of rape
HELD: Yes. The Court finds this to be the reason
why, while a rape victim with normal intelligence,
would have said that the attack on her caused her
much physical pain and mental agony, Glenda
naively declared that Atento's sexual organ in hers
gave her much pleasure. It is worth observing that
Glenda's child was born on December, nine months
after her rape in April, and that, according to the trial
judge, there was a remarkable resemblance
between Atento and the child.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“When and how rape committed. Rape is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances: 1) By using force or
intimidation; 2) When the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious and 3) When the
woman is under twelve years of age, even though
neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two
next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
It has not been clearly established that Atento
employed force or threat against Glenda to make her
submit to his lust. Nevertheless, there is no question
that Atento is guilty of rape upon Glenda under
paragraph 2, because the girl was deprived of
reason. Alternatively, he is liable under paragraph 3,
because his victim had the mentality of a girl less
than twelve years old at the time she was raped.
Given the low I.Q. of Glenda, it is impossible to
believe that she could have fabricated her charges
against the accused. She lacks the gift of articulation
and inventiveness. She could not even explain with
ease the meaning of rape, a term which she learned
in the community. Even with intensive coaching,
assuming that happened, on the witness stand
where she was alone, it would show with her
testimony falling into irretrievable pieces. But that did
not happen. She proceeded, though with much
difficulty, with childlike innocence. A smart and
perspicacious person would hesitate to describe to
the Court her sexual experiences as "tickling" and
"masarap" for that would only elicit disdain and
laughter. Only a simple-minded artless child would
do it. And Glenda falls within the level of a 9-12 year
old child. And Glenda was telling the truth. There is
no doubt that when she submitted herself to the
accused later for subsequent intercourses, she was
dominated more by fear and ignorance than by
reason. In any event, whether under paragraph 2 or
under paragraph 3 of Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, the accused-appellant deserves to be
punished for the rape of Glenda Aringo.
RATIO: In the rape of a woman deprived of reason
or unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence
of will determines the existence of the rape. Such
lack of will may exist not only when the victim is
unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but also
when she is suffering some mental deficiency
impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not
necessary that she should offer real opposition or
constant resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal
knowledge of a woman so weak in intellect as to be
incapable of legal consent constitutes rape. Where
the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and
almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape.
Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean
consent for she was incapable of giving any rational
consent.
The deprivation of reason need not be complete.
Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough.
Cohabitation with a feeble-minded, idiotic woman is
rape.
People v. Campuhan
Facts:
Defendant Primo Campuhan was a helper of
Conrado Plata Jr. brother of Corazon Plata
Pamintuan. One afternoon when Corazon, mother
of the victim Crysthel Pamintuan, went down from
second floor on their house to prepare MILO
chocolate drinks for her 2 daughters heard one of
her daughter cries: "Ayo'ko Ayo'ko" When she rush
upstairs, she saw Primo inside her children's room
kneeling before Chrysthel whose
pajamas and panty were already removed, while
his short pants were down to his knees. She ran
out and called for help. Primo was apprehended by
her brother and a certain cousin and was brought
to barangay officials. Primo asserted his innocence
contending that the 4 year yr old child was in a
playing mood and wanted to ride on his back, when
he suddenly pulled the child down causing both of
them to fall down on the floor. It was that fallen
position which the mother of the victim saw. He
claims that it was very truly inconceivable that
Corazon could give vivid description of the alleged
sexual contact and the touching of the sexual
organs of the victim. He asserts that the absence of
any external signs of physical injuries or of
penetration of Crysthel's private parts more than
bolsters his innocence. Such assertion was
manifested by the physical examination of the
victim yielded negative results. No evident sign of
extra-genital physical injury was noted by the
medico legal officer on
victim's body as her hymen was intact and its
orifice was only 0.5 cm in diameter. The trial court
then found the accused guilty of statutory rape and
sentenced him to death penalty with moral
and exemplary damages. Hence, an automatic
review for the Supreme Court
Issue/s:
Whether the act of Primo constitutes consummated
rape?
Held:
The Supreme Court held that it is necessary to
carefully ascertain whether the penis of the
accused in reality entered the labial threshold of the
female organ to accurately conclude that rape
was consummated. It was supported by the
physical examination results
that there were no external signs of physical
injuries to conclude in a medical perspective
that penetration had taken place. Although
the absence of complete penetration of the hymen
does not negate the
possibility of contact, Medico legal officer clarified
that there was no medical basis to hold that
there was sexual contact between
the accused and the victim
Under Art.6 RPC provides that rape is attempted
when the offender commences the commission of
rape directly by overt acts, and does
not perform all the acts of execution which should
produce the crime by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. All the elements of
attempted rape are only present;
hence the accused should be punished for this.
The lower court decision was modified and the
accused was found guilty for ATTEMPTED RAPE.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. EMMANUEL AARON, accused-
appellant.
(BASAHA NI IN FULL TEXT KAY “LAMI”)
Before us on appeal is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial
Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 3, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 6730, 6731 and 6732 convicting herein appellant,
Emmanuel Aaron, of one count of rape and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity.
The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged
with three counts of rape defined and penalized under
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal
Code,[2]respectively, in three separate criminal complaints
filed and signed by the private complainant, Jona G.
Grajo, and subscribed and sworn to on January 17, 1998
before 3rdAssistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar M.
Lasam. Save for their docket numbers, the said criminal
complaints are identically worded thus:
That on or about 16 January 1998 at Brgy. San Jose,
Balanga, Bataan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a
knife and by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in
having sexual intercourse with the offended party JONA
G. GRAJO, against the will and consent of the latter, to
her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on January 30, 1998, the accused,
Emmanuel Aaron, assisted by counsel of his choice,
entered the plea of not guilty to each of the three
complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and
6732. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January
16, 1998, at around 7:00 oclock in the morning, the private
complainant, Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed (papag)
inside her room on the second floor of the apartment unit
which she shared with her sister and her brother-in-law,
herein appellant Emmanuel Aaron. Jona was wearing
only a panty and was covered with a blanket. Sensing that
someone was inside her room, Jona opened her eyes and
was surprised to find Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed
totally naked. Emmanuel immediately went on top of Jona
and poked a knife on her neck. Jonas attempt to cry for
help proved futile as Emmanuel quickly covered her
mouth with his left hand.[3]
Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having
carnal intercourse with Jona who could only manage to
cry. Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and
ordered Jona to lie down on the floor. He inserted his
penis into her vagina for the second time with the knife
still poked on Jonas neck. Thereafter, Emmanuel stood
up and commanded Jona to lie down near the headboard
of the papag bed where he inserted his penis into her
vagina for the third time, still armed with a knife, and
continued making pumping motions (umiindayog).[4]
After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but
Emmanuel initially refused. He budged only after Jona
told him that she urgently needed to relieve herself (Ihing-
ihi na ako, puputok na ang pantog ko.) but not before
warning her not to tell anyone about the incident. Jona
quickly put on her panty and hurried down the street in
front of the apartment with only a blanket covering herself.
Her cries drew the attention of a neighbor, Lilibeth Isidro,
who tried to persuade Jona to go back inside the
apartment, to no avail, for fear of Emmanuel. Upon the
prodding of another neighbor, a certain Agnes, Jona
revealed that she was raped by her brother-in-law,[5] the
appellant herein.
Jona proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady upon
the latters arrival from the market and she related the
misfortune that had befallen her. At that instance,
Emmanuel approached and warned her to be careful with
her words. Then he left for the house of Bong Talastas. [6]
After Emmanuel left, Jona went back to their house and
dressed up. Thereafter, she went to the police station in
Balanga, Bataan to report the incident.[7] Police Officers
Rommel Morales and Edgardo Flores proceeded to the
residence of the private complainant who appeared very
tense but the neighbors informed them that Emmanuel
had left.The police officers then proceeded to the house
of Bong Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, where
the victim told them Emmanuel could have possibly gone.
On arrival there, they found Emmanuel conversing with
Bong Talastas and they immediately arrested the
appellant herein upon ascertaining his identity.[8]
After bringing Emmanuel to the police station, Police
Officers Morales and Flores accompanied Jona to the
provincial hospital in Bataan for physical
examination.Thereupon, the attending physician at the
Bataan Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita Firmacion, M.D.,
found multiple healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 oclock
position(s), incomplete type in Jona Grajos private part.
At the trial, Dra. Firmacion identified her
[9]
signature appearing on the lower right portion of the
medical certificate[10] and affirmed the medical findings
contained therein. The multiple hymenal lacerations
sustained by Jona which were respectively indicated in
the medical certificate as 1 oclock, 3 oclock, 5 oclock, 6
oclock and 9 oclock could have been caused by sexual
intercourse, masturbation, strenuous exercises or
penetration of any hard object. The appearance of a
lacerated hymen could indicate the approximate time
when the laceration was sustained. In the case of Jona
Grajo, her hymenal lacerations were completely healed,
indicating that the same were sustained at least
one month before she was examined on January 16,
1998. However, it was possible that she had sexual
intercourse immediately before the said examination.[11]
The defense denied any liability for the three counts of
rape charged. Appellant Emmanuel Aaron testified that he
and his wife were residing in an apartment unit together
with his sister-in-law, herein private complainant, Jona
Grajo.[12] Jona occupied a room on the second floor while
the couple stayed at the ground floor.[13]
On the date of the incident, Emmanuel admitted that he
and Jona were the only persons inside the apartment. He
had just arrived from work as a night-shift waiter at Base
One restaurant in Balanga, Bataan. He had earlier met
Bong Talastas at 7:00 oclock in the morning as Bong was
preparing to leave his house while his wife had gone to
the market. Emmanuel changed his clothes upstairs
where the cabinet was located opposite the room
occupied by Jona. Emmanuel noticed that the door of
Jonas room was partly open so he peeped through the
narrow opening and saw her wearing only a panty. He
was about to close the door when Jona woke up and
began shouting.[14]
Emmanuel did not know why Jona kept on shouting. She
even followed as Emmanuel descended the stairs and
she proceeded to the nearby store of their
landlady.Emmanuel went her to the store to caution Jona
about her words (Ayusin mo ang sinasabi mo) because
she was telling their landlady that he raped her. However,
Jona ignored him so he left and decided to see Bong
Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan to
inquire from the latter why Jona was accusing him of
having raped her. Emmanuel denied that he was armed
with a knife during the incident, much less threatened
Jona with it.[15]
On October 14, 1998, the trial court rendered a
decision,[16] the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the single act
of rape having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the
accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalty provided by law. The
accused is further required to indemnify the complainant
the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, Emmanuel
Aaron interposed the instant appeal. In his
Brief,[17] appellant raised a single assignment of error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Appellant argues that the account of the private
complainant, Jona Grajo, of the alleged incidents of rape
appears incredible and contrary to common human
experience.Based on her testimony, the appellant
suddenly placed himself on top of her with his right hand
poking a knife on her neck and with his left hand covering
her mouth. Subsequently, the appellant removed her
panty and succeeded in inserting his penis into her private
part even without previously opening his zipper or
removing his pants. Likewise, the private complainant did
not offer any resistance although she could have done
so. After the alleged acts of rape, the victim did not even
complain to her sister who, by then, had already arrived
from the market. The uncharacteristic behavior of the
private complainant could only be explained by the fact
that she admittedly had several sexual experiences in the
past with her boyfriend and live-in partner Bong Talastas.
The appellant theorizes that private complainant wanted
to get back at him for the embarrassment of being seen
by him in her panty after her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, left
the apartment. Appellant downplays the testimony of PO1
Rommel Morales as not worthy of credence for lack of
corroborative evidence. [18]
On the other hand, the prosecution showed that the
appellant was already naked even before the private
complainant was awakened by his presence; that the
private complainant could not effectively offer any
resistance as the appellant was armed with a knife which
he used to intimidate her; and that the private
complainants being a non-virgin did not discount rape on
January 16, 1998.[19]
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed.-- Rape
is committed -
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman
under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse
of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above are present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons
mouth or anal orifice or any instrument or object, into the
genital or anal orifice of another person.
Article 266-B of the same Code provides:
Article 266-B. Penalties.Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that in the review of rape cases, this
Court is almost invariably guided by three principles: (1)
an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person accused,
though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant is
scrutinized with extreme caution and (3) the evidence of
the prosecution stands or falls on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of
the defense.[20] In other words, the credibility of the private
complainant is determinative of the outcome of these
cases for rape. Her consistency on material points, or lack
of it, that can sustain or negate conviction, becomes the
single most important matter in inquiry.[21]
After a thorough review, we find that the testimony of
private complainant, Jona Grajo, sufficiently established
all the elements of rape committed under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: a)
that the offender, who must be a man, had carnal
knowledge of a woman and (b) that such act is
accomplished by using force or intimidation.[22] The gist of
private complainants testimony clearly shows that the
appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, forced himself on her at
around 7:00 oclock in the morning on January 16,
1998. The sexual assault started on the papag bed inside
her room on the second floor of their apartment unit. After
going on top of the private complainant, the appellant
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina after
which he made pumping motions while poking a knife on
her neck. He then succeeded in inserting his penis into
her vagina two more times on the same occasion after
transferring locations inside the room, with the knife
continuously poked on her neck.
We also find no reason to disturb the assessment of the
trial court of private complainants credibility. Her
testimony during the trial was completely credible as it
was given in an honest and straightforward manner. As
noted above, she gave a lucid and consistent account of
the commission of the crime and did not waiver in
pinpointing her brother-in-law, herein appellant, as the
perpetrator thereof. Likewise, her actuation after the
incident vividly portrayed a confused and traumatized
woman typical of victims of rape. Thus, after she broke
free of the appellant on the pretense that she urgently
needed to relieve herself, the private complainant quickly
put on her panty and rushed to the street with only a
blanket to cover her naked body. Her neighbors took note
of her obviously troubled condition and admonished her
to go back inside the apartment but she refused, claiming
that she had been raped. She sought refuge at the nearby
store of their landlady to whom she confided that she was
raped by her brother-in-law. Private complainant hurried
back to their apartment to get dressed only upon making
sure that the appellant had already left the place. Without
losing time, she proceeded directly to the police station
and lodged a complaint for rape against the appellant.
Prosecution witness PO1 Rommel Morales of Balanga,
Bataan, who was the police officer on duty at the time
Jona Grajo came to the police station, recounted during
the trial that the private complainant was crying and
trembling on arrival at the Balanga, Bataan police station
on January 16, 1998. Private complainant took time to
answer the queries of the police officer since she was
crying uncontrollably. When she finally got hold of herself,
the private complainant reported that she had been raped
by the appellant who was subsequently arrested by the
police. The actuations of the private complainant
immediately after the incident may be considered as part
of the res gestae that substantially strengthens her claim
of sexual assault by the appellant.[23]
On the other hand, all the appellant can offer in his
defense is bare denial. He claims that he had just
changed his clothes on the second floor of their apartment
where his cabinet was located when he chanced upon the
private complainant naked inside her room as the door
was then slightly ajar. He did not do anything further as
the private complainant was awakened and she already
started shouting. In view of the positive and convincing
testimony of the private complainant, however, the
defense of denial must fail. It is well-settled that denial is
an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by
strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.[24]
The appellant argues that it was impossible for him to
have inserted his penis into the private part of the
complainant without first opening his zipper or removing
his pants.This argument of the appellant is misleading for
the reason that, per the testimony of the private
complainant, the appellant was already naked when his
presence roused her from her sleep:
PROS. LASAM:
Q: While you were in your room on that time and date, do
you remember of any incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that incident?
A: While I was inside my room, I sensed that there was a
person inside my room and when I opened my eyes, I saw
that he is my brother-in-law.
Q: And that brother-in-law of yours is the person whom
you pointed a while ago. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How does he look when you saw him inside your
room?
A: He was naked sitting beside me. [25]
That the private complainant did not offer sustained
resistance despite having been ordered twice by the
appellant to change location inside the room can easily be
explained by the fact that the appellant was threatening to
stab her if she resisted. The private complainant was
obviously overwhelmed by intense fear when she woke
up with a knife pointed at her neck. The continuing
intimidation of private complainant cowed her into
helpless submission to appellants lechery. She could only
express her disgust over the sexual attack of her brother-
in-law silently in tears. In this connection, it has been ruled
that physical resistance need not be established in rape
when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter
submits herself, against her will, to the rapists embrace
because of fear for her life and personal safety.[26]
The failure of the private complainant to confide the
sexual assault to her sister who, appellant claimed, had
arrived from the market before she (private complainant)
went to report the matter to the police is quite
understandable and far from being uncharacteristic of a
rape victim, as what appellant would like to make it
appear. The workings of the human mind which is under
a great deal of emotional and psychological stress are
unpredictable and different people will react differently to
a given situation.[27] Besides, the private complainant did
not want to drag her sister into the controversy and hurt
her in the process. During the trial, the private
complainant revealed that she kept from her sister the
previous sexual advances of the appellant in order not to
destroy their good relationship. Private complainant
explained that she did not leave the apartment despite the
said harassments of the appellant inasmuch as she had
no other place to go. However, she confided her ordeal to
their landlady, a certain Elsa Navarro. At any rate, what is
important is that the private complainant reported the rape
immediately to the police.
Admittedly, private complainant was having an affair with
a certain Bong Talastas[28] and that she was not innocent
to the ways of the world. However, such fact alone does
not negate the commission of rape by the appellant
against her. Dra. Firmacion testified that although the
lacerations found in the private part of Jona Grajo were
completely healed, such fact did not discount the
possibility that she was sexually molested immediately
before she was examined on January 16, 1998. We
emphasize that moral character is immaterial in the
prosecution and conviction of the offender in the crime of
rape. The Court has ruled time and again that even a
prostitute can be a victim of rape[29] as the essence is the
victims lack of consent to the sexual act.
Significantly, the appellant failed to advance any credible
motive that could have impelled the private
complainant to testify falsely against him.[30] In a
desperate attempt toavoid any responsibility for his
crime, however, the appellant theorizes that the private
complainant merely wanted to exact revenge from him for
the embarrassment sheexperienced when he chanced
upon her clad merely in a panty inside her room. This
alleged motive on the part of the private complainant is
too shallow to merit even scant consideration from this
Court. If appellant were to be believed, would not private
complainant have instead opted to keep quiet about the
incident to spare herself from further
embarrassment? Common
experience dictates that no woman, especially one of
tender age, will concoct a rape complaint, allow a
gynecological examination and permit herself to be
subjected to public trial if she is not motivated solely by
the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished.[31] Indeed, coming out in the open with the
accusation of sexual assault on her by her brother-in-law
inevitably entailed risking her relationship with her
boyfriend, Bong Talastas, and with her sister. However,
the rape simply proved too much for her to bear.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be
convicted of only one count of rape. It may appear from
the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting
his penis into the private part of Jona Grajo. However, the
three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of
rape in which the appellant was obviously motivated by a
single criminal intent. There is no indication in the records,
as the trial court correctly observed, from which it can be
inferred that the appellant decided to commit those
separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his
lustful desire to change positions inside the room where
the crime was committed.
Considering that the crime of rape was committed by the
appellant with the use of a deadly weapon, the imposable
penalty under Article 266-B is reclusion perpetua to
death. In the absence of any mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua on the appellant. She is also
entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000). And due to the emotional distress suffered by
the private complainant who was only nineteen years old
at the time of the rape, she is also entitled to an award of
moral damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000).[32]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a
quo convicting the appellant Emmanuel Aaron of one
count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay the private
complainant the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000)
as civil indemnity is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that said appellant shall pay an
additional fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) by way of moral
damages.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE V. LUCENA
FACTS:
 Three (3) similarly worded Informations all dated 24
June 2003 allege: o That on or about the 28th day of April
2003, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named appellant, a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took
advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of
the crime, by means of force, threat or intimidation and
with the use of a gun did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her
will and consent.
 On 28 April 2003, at around 11:30 p.m., while AAA,
who was then 17 years old, having been born on 10 July
1986, was walking and chatting with her friends along
one of the streets of San Dionisio, Parañaque City, two
(2) barangay tanods, one of whom is the appellant,
approached and informed them that they were being
arrested for violating a city ordinance imposing curfew
against minors. AAA's companions, however, managed
to escape, thus, she alone was apprehended. AAA was
then ordered by the barangay tanods to board the
tricycle. Afraid that she might spend the night in jail, AAA
pleaded with them and protested that she did not
commit any offense as she was just chatting with her
friends. AAA's plea, however, remained unheeded.
 AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay
tanods within the vicinity of the San Dionisio Barangay
Hall. Afterwards, one of them alighted from the tricycle
and went inside the barangay hall. The appellant, on the
other hand, stayed in the tricycle to guard AAA. After a
while, the barangay tanod, the one who went inside the
barangay hall, returned. But, the appellant told the
former that he will just be the one to bring AAA back to
her house.
 But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the
appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio,
Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant
threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or
jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant
ordered AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the
appellant what he would do with her but the former did
not respond. The appellant then took out the backseat of
the tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He
subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her
to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant
later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his
penis into AAA's vagina despite the latter's plea not to
rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a
short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the
appellant, once again, inserted his penis into AAA's
vagina. Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the
appellant inserted again his penis into AAA's vagina.
Fulfilling his bestial desire, the appellant stopped and
finally ordered AAA to dress up. The appellant even
threatened AAA that he would kill her should she tell
anyone about what happened between them.
  The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the
tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a school in
Parañaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the
appellant repeated his threat to kill her should she tell
anyone about the incident.
 The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the
assistance of their barangay kagawad, who simply
advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge
her complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother
subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to
physical examination by Dr. Tan which results showed
disclosure of sexual abuse, genital findings show clear
evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma
 AAA was able to identify the appellant as her assailant
because the former was wearing a jacket emblazoned
with "Barangay Police," as well as a Barangay
Identification Card, at the time of the incident.
 Appellant claimed that he was on duty as a radio
operator at the barangay hall. On the same day, he
received a call from his companion, who is also a
barangay tanod. He cannot, however, recall any unusual
incident that transpired on that day. The appellant
admitted that he knew AAA as the one who lodged a
complaint against him but he denied that he knew her
personally. He also vehemently denied the following that
he raped AAA, that he was one of those barangay tanods
who apprehended AAA for violating the curfew ordinance
of their barangay, and that he was the one driving the
tricycle in going to the barangay hall. Instead, the
appellant claimed that after 12:00 midnight, he went home
already. In fact, he was shocked when he was arrested
on as he did not commit any crime.
 RTC: Convicted the appellant of three (3) counts of
rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1 (a) of
Art. 266-A, in relation to Art. 266-B, of the RPC
 CA: Affirmed o Appellant succeeded thrice in inserting
his penis into AAA's vagina. The said three (3)
penetrations happened one after another at an interval of
five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a rest
after satiating his lust and after regaining his strength
would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the appellant
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of
sexual assault on AAA.
 Appellant argues:
o Prosecution failed to prove that force or intimidation
attended the commission of rape. Records revealed that
AAA did not even attempt to resist his alleged sexual
advances over her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain
passive throughout her ordeal despite the fact that during
the three (3) episodes of their sexual intercourse he was
unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to escape,
which she never did. These reactions of AAA were
contrary to human experience, thus, cast serious doubts
on the veracity of her testimony and on her credibility as
a witness.
o Result of AAA's medical examination is quite disturbing
as it appears that her anal orifice was also penetrated by
a hard object though nothing was said to this effect in her
testimony.
o He cannot be convicted of three counts of rape. The
intervening period of five (5) minutes between each
penetration does not necessarily prove that he decided to
commit three separate acts of rape. What is of prime
importance is that he was motivated by a single criminal
intent. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the trial court erred in
convicting the appellant of rape despite the prosecution's
failure to prove the element of force and intimidation. (2)
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting him of
three (3) counts of rape.
HELD:
(1) NO.
o Court is guided with three settled principles: (1) an
accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the
accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for
the person accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two
persons being usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant should be scrutinized with great caution; and
(3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
o Carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following instances constitutes rape: (1) when force or
intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is
under twelve (12) years of age.
o The force and violence required in rape cases is relative
and need not be overpowering or irresistible when
applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the force
or intimidation be so great or be of such character as
could not be resisted — it is only necessary that the force
or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose
which the accused had in mind. Further, it should be
viewed from the perception and judgment of the victim at
the time of the commission of the crime. What is vital is
that the force or intimidation be of such degree as to cow
the unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission.
Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim, such as
when the latter is threatened with death.
o AAA's categorical, straightforward and positive
testimony revealed that the appellant was armed with a
gun and the same was pointed at her while she was
ordered to lie down and to take off her clothes, to which
she acceded because of fear for her life and personal
safety. The appellant then put the gun down on the
ground and successfully inserted his penis into AAA's
vagina, not only once but thrice. This happened despite
AAA's plea not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust,
the appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should
she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of
killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the
former was still inside the tricycle on their way to Kabuboy
Bridge. It cannot be denied, therefore, that force and
intimidation were employed by the appellant upon AAA in
order to achieve his depraved desires. o Although the gun
was put down on the ground the moment he inserted his
penis into AAA's vagina and was actually unarmed on
those three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same
does not necessarily take away the fear of being killed
that had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. The
gun was still within appellant's reach, therefore, he could
still make good of his threat on AAA at any time the latter
would show any resistance to his evil desires.
o When a rape victim becomes paralyzed with fear, she
cannot be expected to think and act coherently. Further,
as has been consistently held by this Court, physical
resistance is not an essential element of rape and need
not be established when intimidation is exercised upon
the victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will,
to the rapist's embrace because of fear for her life and
personal safety. Not every rape victim can be expected to
act with reason or in conformity with the usual
expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind
placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people
react differently.
o A medical examination and a medical certificate, albeit
corroborative of the commission of rape, are not
indispensable to a successful prosecution for rape. Even
though AAA made no mention of any anal penetration,
such omission would not change the fact that she was,
indeed, raped by the appellant. AAA categorically,
straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her
harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant
consistent with the rest of the medical findings showing
fresh hymenal lacerations on AAA's vagina, which
according to Dr. Tan is a clear evidence of "blunt force or
penetrating trauma" — a disclosure of sexual abuse.
o Appellant puts forward denial and alibi. Notably, these
defenses are totally inconsistent with his line of argument
that the rape was committed without force or intimidation
thereby implying that the sexual intercourse between him
and AAA was consensual. This Court has viewed denial
and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless supported
by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot
prevail over the positive declarations of the victim who, in
a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly
identified the appellant as the defiler of her chastity.
o Appellant failed to show any ill-motive on the part of AAA
to testify falsely against him. This bolsters the veracity of
AAA's accusation since no woman would concoct a tale
that would tarnish her reputation, bring humiliation and
disgrace to herself and her family, and submit herself to
the rigors, shame, and stigma attendant to the
prosecution of rape, unless she is motivated by her quest
to seek justice for the crime committed against her. (2)
NO. The three insertions into AAA were in satiation of
successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the
appellant's conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
o Aaron Case  Accused inserted his penis into the
victim's vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered the latter
to lie down on the floor and, for the second time, he
inserted again his penis into the victim's vagina; the
accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim
to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for the
third time, he inserted again his penis into the victim's
vagina and continued making pumping motions. Court
convicted the accused therein for only one count of rape
despite the three successful penetrations because there
is no indication in the records from which it can be inferred
that the accused decided to commit those separate and
distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful desire
to change positions inside the room where the crime was
committed.
o The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the other
at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein the appellant
would rest after satiating his lust upon his victim. It can be
clearly inferred from the foregoing that when the appellant
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of
sexual assault upon AAA, he was not motivated by a
single impulse, but rather by several criminal intent.
PEOPLE V. CATAYTAY
FACTS:
 Accused-appellant Cataytay was charged with the
crime of rape against a 19 year of age but with a mental
age of a minor. The RTC and the CA found the accused
guilty of the crime. Hence, the present appeal.
 Facts show that BBB, the mother of the victim, left
AAA, the victim, in their house. Thirty minutes later, her
neighbor brought her to the barangay outpost. There she
found her daughter who told her that she was raped
which was ended only when a certain Mimi knocked at
the door.
 In a Physchological Evaluation Report from the DSWD,
which was conducted in connection with another rape
case, it is stated that AAA had the mental capacity of an
eight-year-old child.
  Accused-appellant interposed alibi and denial as his
defense. He further questions that credibility of BBB’s
testimony concerning the details of the commission of
the crime and that AAA can be easily influenced. ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of the accused-appellant of the
crime of rape was proved beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
 YES, the guilt of the accused was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. Despite lacking certain details
concerning the manner in which AAA was allegedly
raped, the trial court, taking into consideration the
mental incapacity of AAA and qualifying her to be a child
witness, found her testimony to be credible and
convincing. AAA’s mental condition may have prevented
her from delving into the specifics of the assault in her
testimony almost three years later, unlike the way she
narrated the same when she was asked at the barangay
outpost merely minutes after the incident. However, as
ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman, more so if she
is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect,
all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed.
Youth and, as is more applicable in the case at bar,
immaturity are generally badges of truth.
 In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to
have mental retardation with the mental capacity of a
seven-year old child. 34 The prosecution and the defense
agreed to stipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist
that the “mental age of the victim whose chronological
age at the time of the commission of the offense is
nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year old
child.” Accused-appellant is therefore criminally liable
for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that: o The death
penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances: x x x x 10. When
the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional
disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party
at the time of the commission of the crime.
 Since the accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s
mental retardation was alleged in the Information and
admitted by the former during the trial, the above special
qualifying circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of
death should have been imposed. With the passage,
however, of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall instead be imposed.
 Hence, the guilt of the accused was proven beyond
reasonable doubt
PEOPLE V. JUMAWAN
FACTS:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were
married and have four children.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a
Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December
3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro City, and
that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed
her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.
As to the charge of rape according to
KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was,
in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and
she, of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in
bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans
any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina.
His abridged method of lovemaking was physically
painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but
he would threaten her into submission.
One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK
changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but
she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and
instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her
reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are
you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously order: “You
transfer here to our bed.”
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained
that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease
him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the
cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the
floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her
pillow and transferred to the bed.
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK
and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with
her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined
by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not
feeling well.
The accused-appellant again asserted his
sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding
on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they
tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend
her legs.
The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s
daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs
on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held
her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was
carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest
by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that to me because
I’m not feeling well.”
Accused raised the defense of denial and
alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as
her revenge because he took over the control and
management of their businesses, and to cover up her
extra-marital affairs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there can be a marital rape.
HELD:
YES. The Supreme Court held
that husbands do not have property rights over their
wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm
of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.
Violation of equal protection clause
The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases
differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the
elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their
proof, infringes on the equal protection clause.
The Court found that there is no rational basis
for distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital
rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in
defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic
notions about the consent and property rights incident to
marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the
slightest scrutiny.
The Court declared the marital exemption for
rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Said exemption states that a husband was
endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for the
rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained
to him alone. He had the marital right to rape his wife but
he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in
raping her.
Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the
crime without regard to the rapist’s legal relationship with
his victim.
Implied consent theory untenable
The Court also ruled against the application of
implied consent theory which was raised by the accused.
The accused argued that consent to copulation is
presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless
the contrary is proved.
According to the Court, it is now acknowledged
that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within
marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her
consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon
her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW
and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes
the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
PEOPLE V. DALAN (FULL TEXT KAY GAMAY RA)
We review the appeal, filed by appellant Jose Dalan,
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
04279. The CA affirmed the Judgment2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 64, Abatan,
Buguias, Benguet, which found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory
rape.
In its Judgment dated December 3, 2009, the RTC
convicted the appellant of two counts of statutory
rape. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove
that the appellant inserted his penis in AAA' s vagina
on two occasions, namely, in December 2006 and on
March 3, 2007. It added that AAA' s testimony was
corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Sabrina
Florendo. The RTC further explained that AAA's
mental retardation cannot disqualify her as a witness,
since she capably narrated the details of the sexual
abuses committed against her by the appellant in
2006 and 2007.
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to
indemnify the victim the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages,
both for each count of statutory rape.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The
CA ruled that AAA positively identified the appellant
asthe person who raped her on two occasions.
According to the CA, AAA was consistent in her
recollection of the details of the crime. It alsoadded
that AAA’s moderate mental retardation was
sufficiently established by the prosecution’s evidence.
Finally, the RTC found the appellant’s uncorroborated
denial and alibi to be unmeritorious.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal, but modify the designation of the
crime committed and the awarded indemnities.
For the charge of rape to prosper,the prosecution
must prove that (1) the offender had carnal
knowledge of a woman, and (2) he accomplished
such act through force or intimidation, or when she
was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or
when she was under 12 years of age or was
demented.3 Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a
mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. Proof of force or intimidation is not
necessary, as a mental retardate is not capable of
giving consent to a sexual act. What need to be
proven are the facts of sexual congress between the
accused and the victim, and the mental retardation of
the latter.4
In the present case, the prosecution established the
elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. First, AAA positively
identified the appellant as the person who inserted his
penis in her vaginain December 2006 and in March
2007; she never wavered in this identification.
Significantly, AAA’s claim of sexual intercourse had
been corroborated by the medical findings and
testimony of Dr. Florendo who testified that the
markedattenuated hymen at 6 o’clock position was
most probably caused by an erect penis, while the
absent hymen at the 4, 5 and 7 o’clock positions
could be caused by repeated sexual experience.
Second, the prosecution satisfactorily established the
mental condition of the victim. Dr. Ekid conducted a
battery of tests to determine the mental age, social
maturity and emotional condition of AAA. During trial,
Dr. Ekid explained each test, and how she arrived at
her conclusions. Accordingly, she found AAA to be
suffering from moderate retardation, with a mental
age of a person four (4) years and seven (7) months
old.
As the lower courts did, we are unpersuaded by the
appellant’s alibi that he was at a farm in Ca-ew,
Bulalacao, during the two rapes. Aside from being
uncorroborated, we point out thatCa-ew was just five
(5) minutes away from the scene of the rape. In short,
the appellant miserably failed to show that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the places
where AAA had been sexually abused.
The Crime Committed
Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, provides:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. –
Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of
reasonor is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above
be present; x x x
In the present case, the Information alleged that the
victim was "xxx a minor, being seventeen (17) years
of age,or below eighteen (18) years old at the time of
the commission of the crime, but mentally retarded
with a mental age that equates to a child of four (4)
years and seven (7) months," and this circumstance
had been proven during trial. The RTC, however,
equated AAA’s mental retardation with dementia. It is
settled that carnal knowledge of a woman who is a
mental retardate is rape as she is in the same class
as a woman deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious.5 Our ruling in People v. Monticalvo6 on
this point is instructive:
The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to
encompass those suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency or retardation. The term "demented," on
the other hand, means having dementia, which
Webster defines as mental deterioration; also
madness, insanity. Dementiahas also been defined in
Black’sLaw Dictionary as a "form of mental disorder in
which cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind
are prominently affected; x x x total recovery not
possible since cerebral disease is involved."Thus, a
mental retardate can be classified as a person
"deprived of reason," not one who is "demented" and
carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is considered
rape under subparagraph (b), not subparagraph (d) of
Article 266-A(1)of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. [Emphasis in the original]
Aside from erroneously equating AAA’s mental
retardation with dementia, the RTC further justified its
conviction of the appellant of statutory rape on
account of the victim’s mental age. The gravamen of
the offense of statutory rape, as provided for in Article
266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is the carnal knowledge of a woman below
12 years old. To convict an accused of the crime of
statutory rape, the prosecution must prove: first, the
age of the complainant; second, the identity of the
accused; and last but not the least, the carnal
knowledge between the accused and the
complainant.7
In the present case, it is not disputed that AAA was
already 17 years old when she was raped. In People
1âw phi 1
v. Butiong,8 we held that carnal knowledge of a female moral damages, and exemplary damages
mental retardate with the mental age below 12 years from finality of judgment until fully paid.
of ageis considered as rape of a woman deprived of
reason, thus: SO ORDERED.

It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental

retardate falls under paragraph 1(b), of Article 266-A,
x x x, because the provision refers to a rape of a
female "deprived of reason," a phrase that refers to
mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.

We are not unaware that there have been

cases9 where the Court stated that sexual intercourse
with a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape.
Nonetheless, the Court in these cases affirmed the
accused’s conviction for simple rape despite a finding
that the victim was a mental retardate with a mental
age of a person less than 12 years old.

Based on these discussions, we hold that the term

statutory rape should only be confined to situations
where the victim of rape is a person less than 12
years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with
mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation,the
crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1)(b) asshe is considered "deprived of
reason" notwithstanding that her mental age
isequivalent to that of a person under 12. In short,
carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose
mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while
akinto statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph
1(d), should still be designated as simple rape under
paragraph 1(b). At any rate, proof of force, threat or
intimidation is dispensed with in both statutory rape
and rape with a person who is deprived of reason.

With respect to the awarded indemnities, we further

direct the appellant to pay the victim ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages to set a public example and to
protect hapless individuals from sexual molestation.
We also impose a 6% interest on all the monetary
awards for damages to be reckoned from the date of
finality of this decision until fully paid.10

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the CA

decision dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 04279 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS:

(a) the appellant is found guilty of simple rape

under Article 266-A(1)(b) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended;

(b) he is further ordered to pay AAA

₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

(c) he is ordered to pay interest, at the rate of

6% per annum on the award of civil indemnity,