DAMIAN, SHERLEEN ANNE A.

PATERNO DE LOS SANTOS, JR. vs. COURT OF APPEALS 13TH DIVISION, ET AL.

FACTS: Paterno de los Santos, Jr. was found guilty of the crime of intentional abortion, and then he filed an application
for probation. It was ruled that he is ineligible to apply for probation, considering the fact that he has waived his right to
avail the benefits of probation law when he appealed the judgment of conviction by the trial court.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is entitled to the benefits of probation, considering that he had appealed his conviction,
contrary to the provision of Section 4, P.D. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990.

HELD: Probation is a special privilege granted by the State to a penitent qualified offender. It essentially rejects appeals
and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his liability and save the State the time, effort and
expenses to jettison an appeal.The pertinent provision of the Probation Law, as amended, reads:

Sec. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have convicted and
sentenced a defendant and upon application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as
it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction.

It is undisputed that petitioner appealed from the decision of the trial court. This fact alone merits the denial of petitioner's
Application for Probation. Having appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only
after the Court of Appeals had affirmed his conviction, petitioner was clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.

Furthermore, it was clear that when petitioner filed his appeal before the appellate court, what he was questioning was the
merit of the decision convicting him and not the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court for the purpose of
correcting a wrong penalty — to reduce it to within probational range. By perfecting his appeal, petitioner, therefore, ipso
facto relinquished the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law.

The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation.
This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the result of his appeal — that when
his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well nigh at hand and the service of his sentence inevitable,
he now applies for probation as an "escape hatch," thus, rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction. Consequently, probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to be
reformed and rehabilitated; who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.Considering that the prevailing
jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies, and petitioner opted to appeal his conviction,
he, therefore, deemed to relinquish his right to the benefits of probation.

ALEJANDRA PABLO vs. HON. SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO,

FACTS: Alejandra Pablo was convicted of a violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. She applied for probation and was
later denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the he should be denied probation on the ground of disqualification from probation under
Section 9 of P.D. 968.

HELD: The Court ruled that under Section 9 of the Probation Law, P.D. 968, the following offenders cannot avail of the
benefits of probation:

a) those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years;

b) those convicted of subversion or any crime against the national security or the public order;
c) those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day
and/or fine of not less than two hundred pesos ;

d) those who have been once on probation under the provisions of this Decree; and

e) those who are already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant
to Section 33 hereof.

The National Probation Office denied petitioners application for probation under Section 9 paragraph (c) P.D. 968 because
a prior conviction was entered against the petitioner on June 21, 1995 in Criminal Case No. 94-0199, penalizing her with
a fine of P4,648.00; thereby placing her within the ambit of disqualification from probation under Section 9 paragraph (c)
of P.D. 968.It is a basic rule of statutory construction that if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without any interpretation. Not only that; in the matter of interpretation of laws on
probation, the Court has pronounced that "the policy of liberality of probation statutes cannot prevail against the
categorical provisions of the law."

Section 9 paragraph (c) is in clear and plain language, to the effect that a person who was previously convicted
by final judgment of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not
less than two hundred pesos, is disqualified from applying for probation. This provision of law is definitive and unqualified.
There is nothing in Section 9, paragraph (c) which qualifies "previous conviction" as referring to a conviction for a crime
which is entirely different from that for which the offender is applying for probation or a crime which arose out of a single
act or transaction as petitioner would have the court to understand.

It is well-settled that the probation law is not a penal statute; and therefore, the principle of liberal interpretation
is inapplicable. And when the meaning is clearly discernible from the language of the statute, there is no room for
construction or interpretation.

ANTI FENCING LAW

MEL DIMAT, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Samson Delgado, together with Jose Mantequilla and police officers Danilo Ramirez and Ruben Familara, testified in
substance that in December 2000 Delgado’s wife, Sonia, bought from accused Dimat a 1997 Nissan Safari bearing plate
number WAH-569 for ₱850,000.00. The deed of sale gave the vehicle’s engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis
number as CRGY60-YO3553.
On March 7, 2001 PO Ramirez and fellow officers of the Traffic Management Group (TMG) spotted the Nissan Safari
on E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City, bearing a suspicious plate number. After stopping and inspecting the vehicle, they
discovered that its engine number was actually TD42-119136 and its chassis number CRGY60-YO3111. They also found
the particular Nissan Safari on their list of stolen vehicles. They brought it to their Camp Crame office and there further
learned that it had been stolen from its registered owner, Jose Mantequilla.
Mantequilla affirmed that he owned a 1997 Nissan Safari that carried plate number JHM-818, which he mortgaged to Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation. The vehicle was carnapped on May 25, 1998 at Robinsons Galleria’s parking area. He
reported the carnapping to the TMG.
For his part, Dimat claimed that he did not know Mantequilla. He bought the 1997 Nissan Safari in good faith and for
value from a certain Manuel Tolentino under a deed of sale that gave its engine number as TD42-126134 and its chassis
number as CRGY60-YO3553. Dimat later sold the vehicle to Delgado. He also claimed that, although the Nissan Safari
he sold to Delgado and the one which the police officers took into custody had the same plate number, they were not
actually the same vehicle.
On July 20, 2005 the RTC found Dimat guilty of violation of the Anti-Fencing Law and sentenced him to an imprisonment
of 10 years, 8 months, and 1 day of prision mayor to 20 years of reclusion temporal. The court also ordered him to pay
₱850,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
On October 26, 2007 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in CA-G.R. CR 297942 the RTC decision but modified the
penalty to imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its medium period, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months,
and 1 day of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum, thus, the present appeal.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA correctly ruled that accused Dimat knowingly sold to Sonia
Delgado for gain the Nissan Safari that was earlier carnapped from Mantequilla.
The Ruling of the Court
The elements of "fencing" are 1) a robbery or theft has been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the robbery
or theft, "buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in
any article or object taken" during that robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have known that the thing derived
from that crime; and (4) he intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for another. 3
Here, someone carnapped Mantequilla’s Nissan Safari on May 25, 1998. Two years later in December 2000, Dimat sold it
to Delgado for ₱850,000.00. Dimat’s defense is that the Nissan Safari he bought from Tolentino and later sold to Delgado
had engine number TD42-126134 and chassis number CRGY60-YO3553 as evidenced by the deeds of sale covering those
transactions. The Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla, on the other hand, had engine number TD42-119136 and chassis
number CRGY60-YO3111.
But Dimat’s defense is flawed. First, the Nissan Safari Delgado bought from him, when stopped on the road and inspected
by the police, turned out to have the engine and chassis numbers of the Nissan Safari stolen from Mantequilla. This means
that the deeds of sale did not reflect the correct numbers of the vehicle’s engine and chassis.
Second. Dimat claims lack of criminal intent as his main defense. But Presidential Decree 1612 is a special law and,
therefore, its violation is regarded as malum prohibitum, requiring no proof of criminal intent. 4 Of course, the prosecution
must still prove that Dimat knew or should have known that the Nissan Safari he acquired and later sold to Delgado was
derived from theft or robbery and that he intended to obtain some gain out of his acts.1âwphi1
Dimat testified that he met Tolentino at the Holiday Inn Casino where the latter gave the Nissan Safari to him as collateral
for a loan. Tolentino supposedly showed him the old certificate of registration and official receipt of the vehicle and even
promised to give him a new certificate of registration and official receipt already in his name. But Tolentino reneged on
this promise. Dimat insists that Tolentino’s failure to deliver the documents should not prejudice him in any way. Delgado
himself could not produce any certificate of registration or official receipt.
Based on the above, evidently, Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not properly documented. He said that
Tolentino showed him its old certificate of registration and official receipt. But this certainly could not be true because,
the vehicle having been carnapped, Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino was unable to make good on
his promise to produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit source.
Still, Dimat sold the same to Sonia Delgado who apparently made no effort to check the papers covering her purchase.
That she might herself be liable for fencing is of no moment since she did not stand accused in the case.

ONG V. People of the Philippines

FACTS:
Information: Charged with the crime of violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1612, otherwise 
 known as the
Anti-Fencing Law. 

PROSECUTION:
Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires of which 6 were sold and
38 tires remained inside the warehouse. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before storing them
inside the warehouse 

All thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was forcibly
opened. Private complainant, together with caretaker Cabal, reported the robbery. 

Private complainant chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and
operated by appellant. Private complainant inquired if appellant was selling any Model T494 1100 by 20 by 14 ply Firestone
tires, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. Appellant brought out a tire fitting the description, which private
complainant recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the chalk marking and the serial number
thereon. 

Private complainant then left the store and reported the matter to the police. 

A buy-bust team was formed and the appellant was arrested and the a total of 13 tires were

 confiscated. 

DEFENSE: 

 The appelant alleged that he had been engaged in the business of buying and selling tires for twenty-four (24) years and
denying that he had any knowledge that he was selling stolen tires in Jong Marketing.

RTC:TheRTCfoundthattheprosecutionhadsufficientlyestablishedthatallthirteen(13)tiresfoundin the possession of Ong

constituted a prima facie evidence of fencing. he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of P.D. 1612. 


CA: The CA affirmed the RTC's findings with modification by reducing the minimum penalty from ten (10) years and one
(1) day to six (6) years of prision correcional. 
 ISSUE:
 Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of P.D. 1612 or Anti-Fencing Law.

HELD: 

SC:Affirmedtheconvictionoftheaccused. 

Fencing is defined in Section 2 (a) of P.D. 1612 as the "act of any person who, with intent to gain for 
 himself or for
another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any manner deal
in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft." 

Theessentialelementsofthecrimeoffencingareasfollows:
a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; 

the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery 
 or
theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, 


G.R. No. 190475 Ong vs. People April 10, 2013

or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value 
 has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and 

there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another. 

Theprosecutionhasmettherequisitequantumofevidenceinprovingthatalltheelementsoffencingare
present in this case:
First, the owner of the tires, private complainant Francisco Azajar (Azajar), whose testimony was
corroborated by Jose Cabal — the caretaker of the warehouse where the thirty-eight (38) tires were stolen — testified that
the crime of robbery had been committed on 17 February 1995. 

Second, although there was no evidence to link Ong as the perpetrator of the robbery, he never
denied the fact that thirteen (13) tires of Azajar were caught in his possession. The facts do not establish that Ong was
neither a principal nor an accomplice in the crime of robbery, but thirteen (13) out of thirty-eight (38) missing tires were
found in his possession. 

Third, the accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value
has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the fact that a
person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would
govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists. 

Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust operation,
Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing. 

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for all
practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a
defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is disputable. 23 In this case, the validity of the issuance of the
receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. 24 Ong failed
to overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus, he was unable
to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D.

 Fencingismalumprohibitum,andP.D.1612createsaprimafaciepresumptionoffencingfromevidence of possession by
the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and
prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property. 


OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE

EVELYN V. RODRIGUEZ, AND ANDRES ABONITA, JR., petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
The January 17, 2000 three separate Orders of the Sandiganbayan denying petitioners motion to quash the second amended
information,[1] denying the motion to defer arraignment,[2] and entering a plea of not guilty for petitioners in light of their
refusal to plead to the information,[3] are assailed in the present petition for certiorari.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
On September 24, 1996, acting upon an information that rampant illegal logging activities have been going on in different
areas of Taytay, Palawan, a joint team composed of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB), the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO), the Philippine National Police (PNP) Tiniguiban
Command, the Bantay Palawan, and the Philippine Marines confiscated freshly cut/processed ipil lumber at Sitio Maypa,
Barangay Pancol, Taytay. The cutting and sawing of the lumber, which were alleged to have been done under the
supervision of Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego upon orders of herein petitioner Mayor Evelyn Rodriguez and
Association of Barangay Captains President Roberto Rodriguez, were without proper permit or license.
Due to the unavailability of trucks to haul all the lumber to Puerto Princesa for safekeeping, some were hauled inside the
Rural Agriculture Center (RAC) Compound of Taytay and left under the custody of 2nd Lt. Ernan Libao.
On September 25, 1997, Barangay Captain Rodriguez appeared at the RAC Compound demanding the release of the
lumber by presenting a letter-request addressed to the CENRO to salvage old cut timber, duly indorsed by Mayor
Rodriguez. As the request did not bear the approval of the CENRO, it was denied.
On October 5, 1997, Pancol Barangay Captain Pedro Samaniego and the other herein petitioner, Igang Barangay Captain
Andres Abonita, Jr., went to the RAC Compound upon orders of Mayor Rodriguez to haul the lumber to the Municipal
Hall, but the officer-in-charge refused to release the same without the advice of EIIB authorities. On even date, acting
upon the orders of Mayor Rodriguez, Barangay Captain Abonita returned to the RAC Compound accompanied by two
fully armed policemen who then and there forcibly took possession, hauled, and transferred the lumber to the Municipal
Hall of Taytay.
On November 7, 1996, Enrique A. Cuyos, Sr. of the EIIB, Region IV-A, Palawan filed complaints for robbery[4] and
violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829[5] (DECREE PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND
PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS) against petitioners Mayor Rodriguez and Barangay Captain Abonita
before the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan.
By Resolution[6] of February 18, 1997, the Deputized Ombudsman Investigator recommended the filing of an information
against petitioners for violation of Section 1(b), P.D. No. 1829,[7] and the forwarding of the records of the case to the
Office of the Ombudsman-Luzon for review and further proceedings, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez being a public officer
and the charge against her being work-connected.
Following its review of the case, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Luzon, by a Joint Review Action[8] of October
19, 1998, resolved to, as it did file an information[9] for violation of Section 1(b) P.D. 1829 on December 8, 1998 against
petitioners before the Sandiganbayan, docketed as Criminal Case No. 25065.
A warrant of arrest[10] was accordingly issued against petitioners on December 14, 1998. Before the 1 st Division of the
Sandiganbayan, petitioner Mayor Rodriguez voluntarily surrendered and posted a cash bond on January 4, 1999, [11] as did
Barangay Captain Abonita on January 29, 1999.[12]
On January 27, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion to Defer Arraignment, [13] they having filed on even date a Motion to
Quash[14]. By Order[15] of January 29, 1999, the Sandiganbayan reset the arraignment to February 26, 1999.
During the scheduled arraignment on February 26, 1999, the special prosecutor moved to defer the arraignment as
recommended changes in the information were not yet acted upon by the Ombudsman. Without objection from
petitioners counsel, the arraignment was reset[16] to April 8, 1999.
In the meantime, the special prosecutor filed on April 6, 1999 an opposition [17] to petitioners Motion to Quash.
Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan, acting upon a Motion to Admit Information[18] which was filed by the special prosecutor,
admitted the amended information by Order[19] of April 8, 1999.
Petitioners filed on April 26, 1999 a Motion to Quash[20] the amended information, to which motion the special prosecutor
filed a comment/opposition[21] on June 9, 1999, explaining that the belated filing thereof was due to the transfer of the
records of the Office of the Special Prosecutor to its new office at the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.
Thereafter or on June 28, 1999, the special prosecutor filed another Ex-parte Motion to Admit Amended Information[22]
which was set for hearing on November 25, 1999. The scheduled hearing on November 25, 1999 was, however, cancelled
and reset[23] to December 3, 1999 upon urgent motion by petitioners counsel upon the ground that on said date, he needed
to appear before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong.
By Order[24] of December 3, 1999, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion to admit amended information, denied the
motion to quash the amended information, and ordered the arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000.
On January 14, 2000, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash/Dismiss[25] the second amended information.
During the scheduled arraignment of petitioners on January 17, 2000, the Sandiganbayan issued in open court the assailed
separate orders denying petitioners motion to quash the second amended information, [26] denying the motion to defer
arraignment,[27] and entering a plea of not guilty for both accused[28] herein petitioners, which orders petitioners allege have
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners argue that the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the case which dragged for almost three years is
unreasonable or unjustifiable and violates their constitutional rights as accused to due process,[29] they citing Tatad v.
Sandiganbayan.[30] They add that the repeated and ex-parte amendment of the information by the Ombudsman resulted to
inordinate delay in bringing the case to trial, which is a ground for dismissal of the information under Section 13, in relation
to Section 7 of R.A. 8493 (The Speedy Trial Act of 1998).[31]
Petitioners likewise argue that the simultaneous filing by the Ombudsman of two informations against them, one before
the Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case No. 25065), and the other before the Regional Trial Court in Puerto Princesa City
(Criminal Case No. 14959), involving the same subject matter constitutes forum shopping which is expressly prohibited
under the Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 28-91 directing the summary dismissal of multiple complaints or charges,
and necessarily places both of them in double danger of conviction and punishment for the same offense. [32]
Petitioners additionally question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, they arguing that they are not tasked with the
enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 (REVISED FORESTRY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES) as neither
of them are law enforcement officers or prosecutors but are mere executive officials of their respective local government
units with entirely different official functions and, as such, the accusation against them is not in relation to their office. [33]
Petitioners thus conclude that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, as Section 4 of
R.A. 8249 limits the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to those offenses defined and penalized in Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.[34]
The petition fails.
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan[35] cited by petitioners has a different factual setting from the present case. The cases against
Tatad remained dormant for almost three years, drawing this Court to dismiss them in light of the following observations:
political motivation played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process; there was a blatant departure
from established procedures prescribed by law for the conduct of a preliminary investigation; and the long delay in
resolving the preliminary investigation could not be justified on the basis of the record. [36]
From the records of the case at bar, it is gathered that the Provincial Prosecutor of Palawan took only three months,
from November 7, 1996 to February 18, 1997, to come up with its resolution finding probable cause against petitioners.
The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon took eight months to review the case and come up with the joint review action on
October 19, 1998. On the other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman acted on the case for around two months.
Considering that the records were passed upon by three offices, the period of preliminary investigation, which did not
exceed two years, cannot be deemed to have violated petitioners constitutionally guaranteed rights to procedural due
process and to a speedy disposition of cases.
As Ty-Dazo v. Sandiganbayan[37] instructs:
The right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceedings
[are] attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when the unjustified postponements of the trial are asked
for and secured, or when without cause or unjustifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried. In the determination of whether or not the right has been violated, the factors that maybe considered
and balanced are: the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the assertion or failure to assert such right by the
accused, and the prejudice caused by the delay.
A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved, therefore, would not be sufficient. In the application of the
constitutional guarantee of the right to speedy disposition of cases, particular regard must also be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case.[38]
Parenthetically, as reflected in the following observation of the Sandiganbayan, petitioners themselves contributed to the
delay, thus:
With respect to the alleged delay of the filing of the Information and for the delay in finally getting the case ready for
arraignment, Prosecutor Evelyn T. Lucero has stated that, to a certain extent, the claim is valid although the delay is caused
not unreasonably but because of the exercise of the right of the accused to determine whether or not they could be charged
under the Information for which they have filed Motions to Quash; thus, the delay cannot be considered unreasonable
nor the grounds for setting aside the amended Information as it now stands.[39] (Underscoring supplied)
The rule is well settled that the right to a speedy disposition of cases, like the right to a speedy trial, is deemed violated
only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delay.[40]
In further pressing for the dismissal of the case, petitioners cite Sections 7 [41] and 13[42] of R.A. 8493, averring that the
unreasonable delay in bringing them to arraignment is a ground for the dismissal of the case, they having been arraigned
only on January 17, 2000, after several and repeated amendments of the information.
The records show, however, that it was on account of petitioners continuous filing of motions that the arraignment was
deferred.
Under Section 2 of Supreme Court Circular No. 38-98, Implementing Rules for R.A.8493, the pendency of petitioners
motion to quash takes the case out from the time limit for arraignment (and pre-trial) provided under Section 2 of said
law.
Sec. 2. Time Limit for Arraignment and Pre-trial. - The arraignment, and the pre-trial if the accused pleads not guilty to the
crime charged, shall be held within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. The period of the pendency of a motion to quash, or for a bill of particulars, or other cause justifying suspension
of arraignment shall be excluded. (Underscoring supplied)
On the claim of petitioners that the Sandiganbayan should be faulted for granting the repeated amendments of the
information by the Ombudsman, suffice it to state that an information may be amended in form or in substance without
leave of court at any time before an accused enters his plea.[43]
In another attempt at having the case dismissed, petitioners aver that the Ombudsman committed forum shopping by
filing the same information before the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan in violation
of Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 (Additional Requisites for Petitions filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals to Prevent Forum Shopping or Multiple Filing of Petitions and Complaints).
Assuming arguendo that indeed the same information for violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 was also filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, then as the People by the Office of the Ombudsman through the Special
Prosecutor contends in its Memorandum, since the Information in Criminal Case No. 25065 was filed with the
Sandiganbayan on December 8, 1988, while the information before the regional Trial Court was allegedly filed on February
24, 1999, then, if there is any case to be dismissed for forum shopping, that case should be the one before the Regional
trial Court, as it was the second action filed.[44]
Petitioners further assail the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the offense for which they were indicted.
Lamentably, petitioners may well have been confused regarding the charge against them for instead of showing that the
offense with which they were charged - violation of Section 1(b) of P.D. 1829 (obstruction of justice) - is not in relation
to their office, they argued that they are not tasked with the enforcement and implementation of P.D. No. 705 the offense
subject of the investigation which petitioners allegedly obstructed or interfered with.
Petitioners are charged not for violation of P.D. 705 but of P.D. 1829, hence, petitioners argument that the act complained
of was not done in relation to their office to take the case out of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan does not lie.
At all events, Republic Act 8249, which amended Presidential Decree No. 1606, provides that as long as one (or more)
of the accused is an official of the executive branch occupying position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989,[45] the Sandiganbayan exercises exclusive original jurisdiction
over offenses or felonies committed by public officials whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees in relation to their office. [46] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For purposes of vesting jurisdiction with the Sandiganbayan, the crux of the issue is whether petitioner Mayor Rodriguez,
who holds a position of Grade 27 under the Local Government Code of 1991[47], committed the offense charged in relation
to her office.
In Montilla v. Hilario[48], this Court laid down the principle that for an offense to be committed in relation to the office, the
relation between the crime and the office must be direct and not accidental, in that in the legal sense, the offense can not
exist without the office.[49]
As an exception to Montilla, this Court, in People v. Montejo,[50] held that although public office is not an element of an
offense charged, as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to
have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions,
there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused would not have committed it had he not held
the aforesaid office,[51] the accused is held to have been indicted for an offense committed in relation to his office.
Applying the exception laid down in Montejo, this Court in Cunanan v. Arceo,[52] held that although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder as it may be committed by any person, whether a public officer or a private citizen, the
circumstances under which the therein petitioner, who was a member of the Philippine National Police, shot and killed
the victim in the course of trying to restore local public order, bring the therein petitioners case squarely within the meaning
of an offense committed in relation to the [accuseds] public office. [53]
In the present case, public office is not an essential element of the offense of obstruction of justice under Section 1(b) of
P.D. 1829. The circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense alleged to have been committed by petitioner
Rodriguez are such, however, that the offense may not have been committed had said petitioner not held the office of the
mayor. As found during the preliminary investigation, petitioner Rodriguez, in the course of her duty as Mayor, who is
tasked to exercise general and operational control and supervision over the local police forces [54], used her influence,
authority and office to call and command members of the municipal police of Taytay to haul and transfer the lumber
which was still subject of an investigation for violation of P.D. 705.
The joint-counter affidavits[55] signed by petitioners during the preliminary investigation quoted the letter of petitioner
Mayor Rodriguez to the municipal police officers, viz:
To: SPO1 Juanito G. Gan
Upon receipt of this order you are hereby directed to proceed to Sitio Igang, Poblacion Taytay, Palawan, at the compound
of the Rural Agricultural Center[, in order t]o haul the flitches ipil lumber intended for the projects of the Municipal
Government of Taytay and to turn over to the DENR office of Taytay, Palawan.
For immediate strict compliance. [56]
Reference to this above-quoted letter of petitioner Rodriguez is found in both the Resolution[57] of the Deputized
Ombudsman Investigator of the Provincial Prosecution Office of Palawan and the Joint Review Action [58] of the Graft
Investigation Officer-Luzon.
What determines the jurisdiction of a court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
information[59]. The averment in the information that petitioner Rodriguez, as municipal mayor, took advantage of her
office and caused the hauling of the lumber to the municipal hall to obstruct the investigation of the case for violation of
P.D. 705 effectively vested jurisdiction over the offense on the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the amended information reads:
AMENDED INFORMATION
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer II, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses EVELYN VILLABERT
RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS BONITA JR. of Violation of Section 1(b), Presidential Decree No. 1829 committed as
follows:
That on or about October 5, 1996, at Sitio Igang, Barangay Poblacion, Municipality of Taytay, Province of Palawan, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused EVELYN VILLABERT RODRIGUEZ and ANDREWS
ABONITA JR., both public officers, being the Municipal Mayor and Barangay Captain of Barangay Igang of the same municipality,
respectively, committing the offense in relation to their office and taking advantage of the same, confederating and conspiring with each
other enter the compound of the Rural Agricultural Center (RAC) at Sitio Igang, Poblacion, Taytay, Palawan and while
inside with force, intimidation and against the will of the one officially detailed thereat, 2LT. ERNAN O. LIBAO, did
then and there willfully, feloniously, unlawfully, knowingly and forcibly haul 93 pieces or 2.577.32 board feet of assorted
dimensions of ipil lumber, that were officially confiscated by a joint team of EIIB, PENRO, BANTAY PALAWAN, PNP-
TINIGUIBAN COMMAND and PHILIPPINE MARINES, stockpiled inside the RAC for safekeeping while waiting for
available transportation to haul the same to Puerto Princesa City, and brought the same ipil lumber within the compound of the
Municipal Hall of Taytay, with the primordial purpose of suppressing or concealing the said ipil lumber as evidence in the investigation of the
case for violation of P.D. 705, as amended.[60] (Italics supplied)
There being no flaw or infirmity then in the amended information, respondent Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of January 17, 2000, denying petitioners
motion to quash.
The orders of the Sandiganbayan denying the motion to defer arraignment and entering a plea of not guilty for petitioners
in light of their refusal to plead were accordingly rendered without any grave abuse of discretion