MACAWIWILI GOLD MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CO., INC.

and OMICO MINING AND INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 115104. October 12, 1998.*

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Generally a motion for reconsideration must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer
against whom the writ of certiorari is sought.—It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies only when petitioner has no
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for reconsideration, as a
general rule, must be filed before the tribunal, board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is sought.
Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.

Same; Same; Rule is not without exceptions.—This rule, however, is not without exceptions. In Pajo v. Ago and Ortiz
we held: Respondent contends that petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration of the order in question,
or asked for the dissolution of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, before coming to us. This is not
always so. It is only when the questions are raised for the first time before this Court in a certiorari proceeding that
the writ shall not issue unless the lower court had first been given the opportunity to pass upon the same. In fine,
when the questions raised before this Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised in and passed
upon by, the court below, the filing of a motion for reconsideration in said court before certiorari can be instituted in
this Court, is no longer prerequisite.

Same; Same; The writ of certiorari lies when a court, in denying a motion to dismiss, acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; Meaning of grave abuse of discretion.—To begin with, the writ of
certiorari lies when a court, in denying a motion to dismiss, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion. By “grave abuse of discretion” is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be grave as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act all in contemplation of
law.

Same; Appeals; Summary of the rules on appeals from the judgments of the regional trial courts in civil cases.—The
rules on appeals from the judgments of the regional trial courts in civil cases may thus be summarized as follows: (1)
Original Jurisdiction—In all cases decided by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction,
appeal may be made to: (a) Court of Appeals—where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law, by filing a mere notice of appeal.(b) Supreme Court—where the appellant solely raises questions of law, by
filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. (2) Appellate Jurisdiction—All appeals from judgments rendered
by the regional trial courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction, whether the appellant raises questions of fact,
of law, or mixed questions of fact and law, shall be by filing a petition for review under Rule 42.
STOLT-NIELSEN MARINE SERVICES, INC. (now STOLT-NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP, INC.),
petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER ARIEL C. SANTOS,
RICARDO O. ATIENZA and RAMON ALPINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 147623. December 13, 2005.*

Actions; Appeals; Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law.—Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due
process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules,
failing in which the right to appeal is lost.

Labor Law; Appeals; Bonds; An appeal from rulings of the Labor Arbiter to the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) must be perfected within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof, otherwise the same shall become final
and executory.—Evident it is from the foregoing that an appeal from rulings of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be
perfected within ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof, otherwise the same shall become final and executory. In
a judgment involving a monetary award, the appeal shall be perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of the required
appeal fee and (2) posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company and (3) filing of a
memorandum of appeal. A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites mentioned shall not
stop the running of the period for perfection of appeal.

Same; Same; Same; The requirement of a cash or surety bond for the perfection of an appeal from the Labor
Arbiter’s monetary award is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and non-compliance therewith is fatal and
has the effect of rendering the award final and executory.—The requirement of a cash or surety bond for the
perfection of an appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s monetary award is not only mandatory but jurisdictional as well, and
non-compliance therewith is fatal and has the effect of rendering the award final and executory. The reason therefor
is explained by the Court in this language: . . . [T]he obvious and logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure,
during the period of appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery under the judgment if
subsequently affirmed; it also validates and justifies, at least prima facie, an interpretation that would limit the
amount of the bond to the aggregate of the sums awarded other than in the concept of moral and exemplary
damages.

Same; Same; Same; The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is evident from the aforequoted
provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code which explicitly states that the appeal may be perfected only upon the
posting of cash or surety bond.—The mandatory filing of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is evident from the
aforequoted provision of Article 223 of the Labor Code which explicitly states that the appeal may be perfected only
upon the posting of cash or surety bond. The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the lawmakers intended the
posting of a cash or surety bond to be the exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be perfected. This
requirement is intended to dissuade employers from using the appeal to delay, or even evade, their obligation to
satisfy their employee’s just and lawful claims.

Same; Same; Same; The implementing rules of respondent NLRC are unequivocal in saying that “the filing of the
motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of the period to perfect appeal.”—The implementing rules of
respondent NLRC are unequivocal in saying that “the filing of the motion to reduce bond shall not stop the running of
the period to perfect appeal.” Thus, petitioner should have seasonably filed the appeal bond within the ten-day
reglementary period following its receipt of the decision of Labor Arbiter Ariel Santos in order to forestall the finality of
said decision. Since petitioner failed to post an appeal bond within the reglementary period, no appeal was perfected
from the decision of Labor Arbiter Santos, for which reason, the decision sought to be appealed to the NLRC had
become final and executory and therefore immutable.

Same; Same; Same; The requirement of posting a bond on appeals involving monetary awards has been given a
liberal interpretation in certain cases but only where there was substantial compliance of the NLRC Rules of Procedure
or where the party involved, at the very least, demonstrated willingness to abide by the rules by posting a partial
bond.—It is true that the requirement of posting a bond on appeals involving monetary awards has been given a
liberal interpretation in certain cases. However, relaxation of this rule can only be done where there was substantial
compliance of the NLRC Rules of Procedure or where the party involved, at the very least, demonstrated willingness
to abide by the rules by posting a partial bond. Petitioner did not post a full or partial appeal bond within the
prescribed period. Petitioner could have even paid a moderate and reasonable sum as premium for such bond as the
law does not require outright payment but merely the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually
paid should the appeal be dismissed, but still, petitioner failed to do so. Hence, we find no cogent reason to apply the
same liberal interpretation in this case.
Same; Same; Same; While Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure allows the reduction of the appeal bond
upon motion of the appellant, the exercise of authority is not a matter of right on the part of the movant but lies
within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of meritorious grounds.—Section 6, Rule VI of the NLRC Rules
of Procedure allows the reduction of the appeal bond upon motion of the appellant, the exercise of the authority is
not a matter of right on the part of the movant but lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon showing of
meritorious grounds. Nevertheless, even granting arguendo that petitioner has meritorious grounds to reduce the
appeal bond, the result would have been the same since it failed to post cash or surety bond within the prescribed
period.
ESTATE OF FELOMINA G. MACADANGDANG, represented by Court Appointed Administrator ATTY.
OSWALDO MACADANGDANG, petitioner, vs. LUCIA GAVIOLA, AGA-PITO ROMERO, CRISTINA
QUIÑONES, BOY LAURENTE, AGUSTINA TUNA, SOTERO TAPON, BUENAVENTURA MURING, SR.,
ROGELIO PASAJE, FE TUBORO, ESTANISLAO PEN, PABLO NAVALES, and JOSE DAGATAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 156809. March 4, 2009.*

Actions; Rules on Summary Procedure; The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to prevent undue delays
in the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is prohibited, including the filing of a
motion for reconsideration; The appeal before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) is no longer covered by the Rules on
Summary Procedure—the Rules on Summary Procedure apply before the appeal to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).—
Juris-diction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial
Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Since the case before the the MTCC
was an unlawful detainer case, it was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on
Summary Procedure is to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain
pleadings is prohibited, including the filing of a motion for reconsideration. However, the motion for reconsideration
that petitioners allege to be a prohibited pleading was filed before the RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal
before the RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The Rules on Summary Procedure apply
before the appeal to the RTC. Hence, respondents’ motion for reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a prohibited
pleading.

Same; Attorneys; Negligence; The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in
the realm of procedural technique.—The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his
counsel in the realm of procedural technique. There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in
the outright deprivation of one’s property through a technicality.

Same; Same; Same; For a claim of gross negligence of counsel to prosper, nothing short of clear abandonment of the
client’s cause must be shown.—We find no reason to exempt respondents from the general rule. The cause of the
delay in the filing of the appeal memorandum, as explained by respondents’ counsel, was not due to gross
negligence. It could have been prevented by respondents’ counsel if he only acted with ordinary diligence and
prudence in handling the case. For a claim of gross negligence of counsel to prosper, nothing short of clear
abandonment of the client’s cause must be shown. In one case, the Court ruled that failure to file appellant’s brief can
qualify as simple negligence but it does not amount to gross neglience to justify the annulment of the proceedings
below.

Appeals; Due Process; The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process—it is merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law.—Respondents
were not deprived of due process of law. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process. It is
merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law. The Court notes that in their memoranda, respondents admitted that they signed an agreement that they would
vacate the land they occupy not later than 28 February 1998. They refused to vacate the land only because they were
not relocated as promised by the owner. Respondents claimed that the land was later declared alienable and
disposable, and the decision was affirmed by this Court. Hence, respondents alleged that petitioner no longer had the
right to drive them out of the land. However, respondents did not even indicate the case number and title, as well as
the date of promulgation of the alleged Supreme Court decision, in their memoranda.
ROSARIO LACSAMANA, FLORENCIO BAUTISTA, QUIRICO PACLIBAR, EDUARDO OCAMPO, JULIO
BARIZO, PEDRO PANGILINAN. ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE SECOND SPECIAL CASES
DIVISION OF THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ANIGIA I. CRUZ, ET AL., respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-73146-53. August 26, 1986.*

Appeals; In ordinary appeals by mere notice of appeal no extension of time to file notice of appeal is allowed.—In an
ordinary appeal from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan or municipal trial court to the regional trial court,
and from the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals in actions or proceedings originally filed in the regional trial
court, the fifteen-day period for appeal provided by Section 39 of BP No. 129 and Section 19(a) of the Interim Rules is
interrupted or suspended by a motion for new trial or reconsideration, unless such motion fails to satisfy the
requirements of Rule 37 (Section 3 of Rule 41). If the motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the moving
party has only the remaining period from notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal, which is the only
requirement for taking an appeal under the present rules. Obviously, no extension of time to file such a notice of
appeal is needed, much less allowed.

Same; Special Proceedings; In appeals where a record on appeal is required, a motion for extension of time to file
record on appeal may be granted.—In an appeal in a special proceeding under Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and in
other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal is thirty days, a record on appeal being
required (Section 19[b] of the Interim Rules). If a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed and denied, the
remaining period within which to file a record on appeal may be too short and, hence a motion for extension of time
to file the record on appeal may be granted, subject to the requirements summarized in the Resolution of May 30,
1988. As the Court stated in the case of Roque vs. Gunigundo, “the thirty-day period may be extended because,
where the record is voluminous or the appellant has other pressing matters to attend to, it may not be practicable to
submit the record on appeal within the reglementary period.” (89 SCRA 178, 183).

Same; A motion for extension of time to file a petition for review may be granted.—The final judgment or order of a
regional trial court in an appeal from the final judgment or order of a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and
municipal circuit trial court, may be appealed to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review in accordance with
Section 22 of BP No. 129 and Section 22(b) of the Interim Rules, or to this Court through a petition for review on
certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and Section 25 of the Interim Rules. The reason for
extending the period for the filing of a record on appeal is also applicable to the filing of a petition for review with the
Court of Appeals. The period for filing a petition for review is fifteen days. If a motion for reconsideration is filed with
and denied by a regional trial court, the movant has only remaining period within which to file a petition for review.
Hence, it may be necessary to file a motion with the Court of Appeals for extension of time to file such petition for
review.

Same; In appeals from quasi-judicial bodies by mere notice of appeal, no extension of time to file notice of appeal is
allowed.—In an appeal from quasi-judicial bodies to the Court of Appeals under Republic Act No. 5434 and Section
22(c) of the Interim Rules, the appeal shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals and with
the quasi-judicial body within fifteen days from notice of the ruling, award, order, decision or judgment; or in case a
motion for reconsideration is filed within said period, then within ten days from notice of the resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration (Sections 2 and 3 of RA No. 5434). No extension of time to file such a notice of appeal is
needed, much less allowed.

Same; In appeals by certiorari a motion for extension of time to file petition for review on certiorari may be granted.—
In an appeal by certiorari to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Section 25 of the Interim Rules and
Section 7 of PD No. 1606, a party may file a petition for review on certiorari of the judgment of a regional trial court,
the Intermediate Appellate Court, or the Sandiganbayan within fifteen days from notice of judgment or of the denial
of his motion for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee (Section
1 of Rule 45). In other words, in the event a motion for reconsideration is filed and denied, the period of fifteen days
begins to run again from notice of denial. (See Codilla vs. Estenzo, 97 SCRA 351; Turingan vs. Cacdac, 122 SCRA 634)
A motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari may be filed with the Supreme Court within
the reglementary period, paying at the same time the corresponding docket fee. Copies of the motion for extension of
time and of the subsequent petition for review on certiorari must be served on the lower court and on the adverse
party.

Same; The Court of Appeals may grant an extension of only 15 days within which to file a petition for review, save in
meritorious cases.—Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Decision, an extension of only fifteen days for
filing a petition for review may be granted by the Court of Appeals, save in exceptionally meritorious cases. The
motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid within the reglementary period of
appeal.
ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. ERNESTO REYES
and LORNA REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 111324. July 5, 1996.*

Actions; Appeals; Multiple Appeals; Rationale Behind Multiple Appeals; Multiple appeals are allowed in special
proceedings, in actions for recovery of property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting,
in the special civil actions of eminent domain and foreclosure of mortgage.—The case at bar is not one where multiple
appeals can be taken or are necessary. Multiple appeals are allowed in special proceedings, in actions for recovery of
property with accounting, in actions for partition of property with accounting, in the special civil actions of eminent
domain and foreclosure of mortgage. The rationale behind allowing more than one appeal in the same case is to
enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by the court and held
to be final.

Same; Same; Same; Where two issues do not arise from two or more causes of action but from the same cause of
action, there is no ground for the splitting of appeals, even if it involves an Order granting (and denying) a motion to
dismiss and a Partial Judgment granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings.—The disputes in the case below for
specific performance have arisen from the demand to make adjustments on the property where the adjacent owner is
alleged to have usurped a part thereof, the exercise of the right of the pre-emption and the payment of rental
arrearages. A ruling on the issue of encroachment will perforce be determinative of the issue of unpaid rentals. These
two points do not arise from two or more causes of action, but from the same cause of action. Hence, this suit does
not require multiple appeals. There is no ground for the splitting of appeals in this case, even if it involves an Order
granting (and denying) a motion to dismiss and a Partial Judgment granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The subject matter covered in the Order and in the Partial Judgment pertain to the same lessorlessee relationship,
lease contract and parcel of land. Splitting appeals in the instant case would, in effect, be violative of the rule against
multiplicity of appeals.

Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Decisions of the Regional Trial Court may be directly reviewed by the Supreme Court on
petition for review only if pure questions of law are raised.—Petitioner is correct in saying that decisions of the
Regional Trial Court may be directly reviewed by the Supreme Court on petition for review only if pure questions of
law are raised.

Same; Same; Same; When the Constitution states that cases involving questions of fact or mixed questions of fact
and law should be appealed to the Court of Appeals, it merely restates in another way the principle that if only
questions of law are raised, these cases should be elevated to the Supreme Court.—From the foregoing provisions,
the following principles may be formulated: decisions of the Regional Trial Court may be elevated directly to the
Supreme Court on certiorari in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including
cases arising out of the same occurrence and in all other cases in which only errors or questions of law are involved.
When the Constitution states that cases involving questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should be
appealed to the Court of Appeals, it merely restates in another way the principle that if only questions of law are
raised, these cases should be elevated to the Supreme Court.

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Question of Law,” Defined.—Petitioner has correctly defined what is a
“question of law,” thus: there is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; when a party questions the conclusion of the trial court that there was no meeting
of the minds
between the lessor and lessee regarding the sale of the leased property, he raises a factual issue.—Upon a careful
analysis of the issues raised by private respondent in its appeal to respondent court, the Court finds that they are not
purely questions of law. Specifically, when private respondent questioned the conclusion of the trial court that there
was no meeting of the minds between lessor and lessee regarding the sale of the leased property, private respondent
raised a factual issue. Similarly, the issue of whether or not there was a perfected contract of sale necessitates an
inquiry into the facts and evidence on record. Likewise, the question regarding the propriety of granting judgment on
the pleadings on the matter of rental arrears demands a scrutiny of the facts of the case.
CLEMENTE FONTANAR, DIOSDADO PELAYO, ANTONIO PELAYO, JR., and NORMA S. PELAYO, petitioners,
vs. RUBEN BONSUBRE, LEONARDO BONSUBRE, Hon. BERNARDO LL SALAS, Presiding Judge, CFI of
Cebu, Branch VIII, Hon. GALICANO ARRIESGADO, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Court of Bogo-San
Remegio, Cebu, respondents.
No. L-56315. November 25,1986.*

Appeal; Non-payment of appellate docket fee in an appeal from a municipal court to the RTC should not result in
automatic dismissal of appeaL Court should weigh the reasons for the failure.—In the subsequent cases of Favis vs.
Municipality of Sabangan, 27 SCRA 92 (1969), Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 401 (1977), Panes vs. Court of
Appeals, 120 SCRA 509 (1983) and more recently in the case of Dei Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. vs.
National Labor Relations Commission, et al, 136 SCRA 669 (1985), this Court not only emphasized the rule that the
failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the 15-day reglementary period confers a directory, not mandatory
power to dismiss the proposed appeal, but further stated that such power should be used in the exercise of the
Court’s sound discretion “in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play” and with a great deal of
circumspection considering all attendant circumstances.

Same; Under Sec. 20, B.P. 129 an appeal from the judgment of the municipal court is perfected by filing a notice of
appeal, where no record on appeal is required. No payment of appellate docket is mentioned to perfect the appeal.—
Under Section 20 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983 relative to the
implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981 (B.P. Blg. 129), the only requirement for taking an appeal
from the judgment or order of the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts or municipal circuit courts to the
regional trial courts, in cases where no record on appeal is required, is the filing of a notice of appeal Said appeal is
deemed perfected upon the expiration of the last day to appeal by any party pursuant to Section 23 of the said
Interim Rules. In view of this, the proposed appeal of herein petitioners from the decision of the then Municipal Circuit
Court of Bogo-San Remegio, Cebu in Civil Case No. 173 may be allowed. The Branch of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu to which this case will be assigned on appeal shall decide the case on the basis of the entire record of the
proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or brief s as may be submitted by the parties or
required by the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 22, B.P. Blg. 129 and Section 21 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines.
BONIFACIO M. MEJILLANO, petitioner, vs. ENRIQUE LUCILLO, HON. GREGORIA B. CONSULTA, Presiding
Judge of RTC, Legaspi City, Branch 4, respondents.
G.R. No. 154717. June 19, 2009.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Memorandum on Appeal; Filing of memorandum on appeal within fifteen
days from receipt of the notice to file the same is obligatory on the part of petitioner.—The rule is clear. It is
obligatory on the part of petitioner to file his memorandum on appeal within fifteen days from receipt of the notice to
file the same; otherwise, his appeal will be dismissed. In Enriquez v. Court of Appeals (396 SCRA 377 [2003]), we
ruled: x x x The use of the word “shall” in a statute or rule expresses what is mandatory and compulsory. Further, the
Rule imposes upon an appellant the “duty” to submit his memorandum. A duty is a “legal or moral obligation,
mandatory act, responsibility, charge, requirement, trust, chore, function, commission, debt, liability, assignment,
role, pledge, dictate, office, (and) engagement.” Thus, under the express mandate of said Rule, the appellant is duty-
bound to submit his memorandum on appeal. Such submission is not a matter of discretion on his part. His failure to
comply with this mandate or to perform said duty will compel the RTC to dismiss his appeal. In rules of procedure, an
act which is jurisdictional, or of the essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the
party affected is mandatory.

Same; Same; Same; While the rules of procedure are liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are
strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the prevention of needless delays and are necessary to the orderly and
speedy discharge of judicial business.—Time and again, we have ruled that procedural rules do not exist for the
convenience of the litigants. Rules of Procedure exist for a purpose, and to disregard such rules in the guise of liberal
construction would be to defeat such purpose. Procedural rules were established primarily to provide order to and
enhance the efficiency of our judicial system. It has been jurisprudentially held that, while the rules of procedure are
liberally construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are to the
prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business.

Same; Same; Same; An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the
requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.—The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it
is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law.
An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the
Rules of Court. In other words, he who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must play by the rules. This, the petitioner
failed to do when he did not submit his memorandum on appeal.
FIVE STAR MARKETING CO., INC., represented by its President SALVADOR BOOC, petitioner, vs. JAMES
L. BOOC, respondent.
G.R. No. 143331. October 5, 2007.*

Appeals; Modes of Appeal from Decision of the Regional Trial Courts; There are three modes of appeal from decisions
of the RTC, namely: a) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal
action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; b) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by
the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and c) petition for review to the Supreme Court.—The Court, in
Murillo v. Consul, UDK-9748 (March 1, 1990), Suarez v. Villarama, Jr., 493 SCRA 74 (2006) and Velayo-Fong v.
Velayo, 510 SCRA 320 (2006), had the occasion to clarify the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC,
namely: a) ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error, where judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by
the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; b) petition for review, where judgment was rendered by the RTC in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and c) petition for review to this Court. The first mode of appeal is governed
by Rule 41, and is taken to the CA on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode, covered
by Rule 42, is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode,
provided for by Rule 45, is elevated to this Court only on questions of law.

Same; Same; Questions of Law and Questions of Fact; Words and Phrases; A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.—A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law
provides on the given set of circumstances.

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Where the assailed decision was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction as it was brought before it from the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), the aggrieved party
should elevate the case to the Court of Appeals under Rule 42 via the second mode of appeal, instead of appealing
directly before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.—Petitioner raises only questions of law which require the
interpretation and application of the rules of procedure laid down by the Rules of Court. However, considering that
the assailed decision was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction as it was brought before it
from the MTCC, petitioner should have elevated the case to the CA under Rule 42 via the second mode of appeal,
instead of appealing directly before this Court under Rule 45.

Same; On this score alone that the petitioner availed itself of the wrong or inappropriate mode of appeal, the petition
could have been outrightly dismissed, but in the interest of justice and in view of the erroneous conclusion of the trial
judge clearly shown in the RTC decision, the Supreme Court shall proceed to address the issues involving a well-
settled question of law.—Section 4 of Circular 2-90 in effect provides that an appeal taken either to this Court or to
the CA by the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed. This rule is now incorporated in Section 5, Rule
56 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the filing of the case directly with this Court departs from the hierarchy of courts.
Normally, direct resort from the lower courts to this Court will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy
cannot be obtained in the lower tribunals. Petitioner, therefore, availed itself of the wrong or inappropriate mode of
appeal. On this score alone, the petition could have been outrightly dismissed. Nevertheless, in the interest of justice
and in view of the erroneous conclusion of the trial judge clearly shown in the RTC decision, this Court shall proceed
to address the issues involving a well-settled question of law.

Ejectment; Summary Proceedings; The avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which
have purposely been made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing
an alleged illegal possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the
maintenance of peace and order in the community, otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the
despair of long waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same
by force and vio-lence.—Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary proceedings designed to provide for
an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to the possession of the property involved. It does
not admit of a delay in the determination thereof. It is a “time procedure” designed to remedy the situation. Stated in
another way, the avowed objective of actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, which have purposely been
made summary in nature, is to provide a peaceful, speedy and expeditious means of preventing an alleged illegal
possessor of property from unjustly continuing his possession for a long time, thereby ensuring the maintenance of
peace and order in the community; otherwise, the party illegally deprived of possession might feel the despair of long
waiting and decide as a measure of self-protection to take the law into his hands and seize the same by force and
violence. And since the law discourages continued wrangling over possession of property for it involves perturbation
of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause
unnecessary delays should accordingly and carefully be avoided. In accordance with the above objective, the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure set forth the steps to expeditiously dispose of the cases covered by the rules, as in
ejectment. Specifically, the rules prohibit dilatory motions for postponements without justifiable cause; and make the
appearance of parties and their counsels, during the preliminary conference, mandatory.

Same; Same; It must be emphasized that in cases governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, no hearing is
conducted; rather, the parties are required to submit their respective position papers, and, on appeal to the RTC, the
parties are required to submit their memoranda.—The Court notes that the decision and order of the RTC are for
remanding the case to the MTCC on the mistaken conclusion that there was denial of due process for failure of the
respondent to present his evidence. As discussed above, the decision of the MTCC on the basis of petitioner’s
complaint is fully warranted. Furthermore, the RTC should have decided the case on the merits, as an appeal before
it, and not prolong the determination of the issues by remanding it to the MTCC. It must be emphasized that in cases
governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, no hearing is conducted; rather, the parties are required to submit
their respective position papers. On appeal to the RTC, the parties are required to submit their memoranda. The RTC
should have decided the appeal on the basis of the records elevated by the MTCC, as well as the memoranda of the
parties. To remand it is a superfluity and contrary to the summary nature of the case. Finally, had the RTC decided
the case in the manner required, the result could only have been to affirm the MTCC decision, since respondent did
not contest it on the merits.
LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. BELIO ICAO, respondent.
G.R. No. 196047. January 15, 2014.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; An appeal is not a matter of right, but is a mere statutory privilege.—The
Court finds it necessary to emphasize the well-entrenched doctrine that an appeal is not a matter of right, but is a
mere statutory privilege. It may be availed of only in the manner provided by law and the rules. Thus, a party who
seeks to exercise the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the rules; otherwise, the privilege is lost.

Labor Law; Appeals; Appeal Bond; In appeals from any decision or order of the labor arbiter, the posting of an appeal
bond is required under Article 223 of the Labor Code.—In appeals from any decision or order of the labor arbiter, the
posting of an appeal bond is required under Article 223 of the Labor Code, which reads: Article 223. APPEAL.—
Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be
entertained only on any of the following grounds: x x x x In case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an
appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable
bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the
judgment appealed from.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; When the law does not clearly provide a rule or norm for the tribunal to
follow in deciding a question submitted, but leaves to the tribunal the discretion to determine the case in one way or
another, the judge must decide the question in conformity with justice, reason and equity, in view of the
circumstances of the case.—We reiterate our pronouncement in Araneta v. Rodas, 81 Phil. 506 (1948), where the
Court said that when the law does not clearly provide a rule or norm for the tribunal to follow in deciding a question
submitted, but leaves to the tribunal the discretion to determine the case in one way or another, the judge must
decide the question in conformity with justice, reason and equity, in view of the circumstances of the case. Applying
this doctrine, we rule that petitioner substantially complied with the mandatory requirement of posting an appeal
bond for the reasons explained below.

Labor Law; Appeals; Appeal Bond; Under the Rule VI, Section 6 of the 2005 NLRC Rules, “[a] cash or surety bond
shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or
terminated, or the award satisfied.”—Under the Rule VI, Section 6 of the 2005 NLRC Rules, “[a] cash or surety bond
shall be valid and effective from the date of deposit or posting, until the case is finally decided, resolved or
terminated, or the award satisfied.” Hence, it is clear that a bond is encumbered and bound to a case only for as long
as 1) the case has not been finally decided, resolved or terminated; or 2) the award has not been satisfied. Therefore,
once the appeal is finally decided and no award needs to be satisfied, the bond is automatically released. Since the
money is now unencumbered, the employer who posted it should now have unrestricted access to the cash which he
may now use as he pleases — as appeal bond in another case, for instance. This is what petitioner simply did.
VICTORINO OPINALDO, petitioner, vs. NARCISA RAVINA, respondent.
G.R. No. 196573. October 16, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; The perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period and
in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.―Time and again, we have ruled and it has become
doctrine that the perfection of an appeal within the statutory or reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by
law is mandatory and jurisdictional. Failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory and deprives
the appellate court of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment, much less to entertain the appeal. In labor cases, the
underlying purpose of this principle is to prevent needless delay, a circumstance which would allow the employer to
wear out the efforts and meager resources of the worker to the point that the latter is constrained to settle for less
than what is due him.

Labor Law; National Labor Relations Commission; The National Labor Relations Commission is not bound by the
technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in the application of its rules in deciding labor cases.―We are
not, however, unmindful that the NLRC is not bound by the technical rules of procedure and is allowed to be liberal in
the application of its rules in deciding labor cases. Thus, under Section 2, Rule I of the 2005 Revised Rules of
Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission it is stated: Section 2. Construction.—These Rules shall be
liberally construed to carry out the objectives of the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines and other relevant
legislations, and to assist the parties in obtaining just, expeditious and inexpensive resolution and settlement of labor
disputes. It is significant that the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, under Section 2, Rule I thereof, also carries exactly
the same provision. Further, the 2005 Revised Rules and the 2011 Rules carry identical provisions appearing under
Section 10, Rule VII of both laws: Section 10. Technical rules not binding.—The rules of procedure and evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable
means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or
procedure, all in the interest of due process. In any proceeding before the Commission, the parties may be
represented by legal counsel but it shall be the duty of the Chairman, any Presiding Commissioner or Commissioner to
exercise complete control of the proceedings at all stages.

Same; Management Prerogative; Jurisprudence is replete with cases recognizing the right of the employer to have
free reign and enjoy sufficient discretion to regulate all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill
discipline in its employees and to impose penalties, including dismissal, upon erring employees.―Jurisprudence is
replete with cases recognizing the right of the employer to have free reign and enjoy sufficient discretion to regulate
all aspects of employment, including the prerogative to instill discipline in its employees and to impose penalties,
including dismissal, upon erring employees. This is a management prerogative where the free will of management to
conduct its own affairs to achieve its purpose takes form. Even labor laws discourage interference with the exercise of
such prerogative and the Court often declines to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. However, the
exercise of management prerogative is not unlimited. Managerial prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by
law, collective bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. Hence, in the exercise of its
management prerogative, an employer must ensure that the policies, rules and regulations on work-related activities
of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and the corresponding penalties, when prescribed,
commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction.

Same; Same; Due Process; While it is a management prerogative to require petitioner to submit a medical certificate,
the Supreme Court holds that respondent cannot withhold petitioner’s employment without observing the principles of
due process and fair play.―It is utterly significant in the case at bar that a considerably long period has lapsed from
petitioner’s last day of recorded work on September 21, 2006 until he was informed by respondent on December 22,
2006 that he was no longer an employee of the Agency. In the words of petitioner, he had been on a “floating status”
for three months. Within this period, petitioner did not have any work assignment from respondent who proffers the
excuse that he has not submitted the required medical certificate. While it is a management prerogative to require
petitioner to submit a medical certificate, we hold that respondent cannot withhold petitioner’s employment without
observing the principles of due process and fair play.

Same; Same; Same; The due process requirement in the deprivation of one’s employment is transcendental that it
limits the exercise of the management prerogative of the employer to control and regulate the affairs of the
business.―All said, what behooves the Court is the lack of evidence on record which establishes that respondent
informed petitioner that his failure to submit the required medical certificate will result in his lack of work assignment.
It is a basic principle of labor protection in this jurisdiction that a worker cannot be deprived of his job without
satisfying the requirements of due process. Labor is property and the right to make it available is next in importance
to the rights of life and liberty. As enshrined under the Bill of Rights, no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law. The due process requirement in the deprivation of one’s employment is
transcendental that it limits the exercise of the management prerogative of the employer to control and regulate the
affairs of the business. In the case at bar, all that respondent employer needed to prove was that petitioner employee
was notified that his failure to submit the required medical certificate will result in his lack of work assignment — and
eventually the termination of his employment — as a security guard. There is no iota of evidence in the records, save
for the bare allegations of respondent, that petitioner was notified of such consequence for non-submission.

Same; Termination of Employment; Abandonment; Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an
employee to resume his employment.―Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to
resume his employment. To constitute abandonment of work, two elements must concur: (1) the employee must
have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and, (2) there must have
been a clear intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some
overt act. None of these elements is present in the case at bar.
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; It is a time-honored legal principle that the employer has the onus probandi to show
that the dismissal or termination was for a just and authorized cause under the Labor Code.―We need not reiterate
that respondent did not properly exercise her management prerogative when she withheld petitioner’s employment
without due process. Respondent failed to prove that she has notified petitioner that her continuous refusal to provide
him any work assignment was due to his non-submission of the medical certificate. Had respondent exercised the
rules of fair play, petitioner would have had the option of complying or not complying with the medical certificate
requirement — having full knowledge of the consequences of his actions. Respondent failed to do so and she cannot
now hide behind the defense that there was no illegal termination because petitioner cannot show proof that he had
been illegally dismissed. It is a time-honored legal principle that the employer has the onus probandi to show that the
dismissal or termination was for a just and authorized cause under the Labor Code. Respondent failed to show that
the termination was justified and authorized, nor was it done as a valid exercise of management prerogative.
ANDREA CAMPOSAGRADO, VIRGINIA CAMPOSAGRADO, ESTER CAMPOSAGRADO, Represented by her
attorney-infact, FE C. MAGSAMBOL, and GUILLERMA CAMPO-SAGRADO, represented by her attorney-in-
fact, RENATO S. CAMPOSAGRADO, petitioners, vs. PABLO S. CAMPO-SAGRADO and The Hon. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. 143195. September 13, 2005.*

Remedial Law; Appeals; Docket Fees; The general rule is that payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is
mandatory for the perfection of an appeal; There are instances however when the Court applied the rule with
liberality.—The general rule is that payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the
perfection of an appeal. x x x There are instances however when the Court applied the rule with liberality. This is in
recognition of the importance of the remedy of appeal, which is an essential part of our judicial system and the need
to ensure that every party litigant is given the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause
freed from the constraints of technicalities.

Same; Same; Same; A party’s failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the reglementary period confers
only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal.—This Court on several occasions has
pronounced that failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal,
dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. A party’s failure to pay the appellate court docket fee
within the reglementary period confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed
appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the
tenets of justice and fair play with great deal of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances and must be
exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice.
ANGELINA PAHILA-GARRIDO, petitioner, vs. ELIZA M. TORTOGO, LEONILA FLORES, ANANIAS
SEDONIO, ADELINO MONET, ANGIE MONET, JUANITO GARCIA, ELEONOR GARCIA, BENITA MOYA,
JULIO ALTARES, LEA ALTARES, CLARITA SABIDO, JULIE ANN VILLAMOR, JUANITA TUALA, VICTOR
FLORES III, JOHNNY MOYA, HAZEL AVANCEÑA, SONIA EVANGELIO, and GENNY MONTAÑO,
respondents.
G.R. No. 156358. August 17, 2011.*

Appeals; Judgments; Interlocutory Orders; Words and Phrases; “Final Orders” and “Interlocutory Orders,”
Distinguished.—The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of
the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done
except to enforce by execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case
but leaves something else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on
the merits is yet to be held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment
is interlocutory or final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

Same; Same; Same; The reason for disallowing an appeal from an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of
appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and decision on the merits of the action during the
pendency of the appeals; An interlocutory order may be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been
rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being included in the appeal of the judgment itself; The remedy
against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.—The order
dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an interlocutory,
not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an
interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised
by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the
subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order being
included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an
appropriate special civil action under Rule 65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

Certiorari; Elements.—Certiorari is a writ issued by a superior court to an inferior court of record, or other tribunal or
officer, exercising a judicial function, requiring the certification and return to the former of some proceeding then
pending, or the record and proceedings in some cause already terminated, in cases where the procedure is not
according to the course of the common law. The remedy is brought against a lower court, board, or officer rendering
a judgment or order and seeks the annulment or modification of the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and the granting of such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. It is available when the following
indispensable elements concur, to wit: 1. That it is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions; 2. That such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion; and 3. That there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

Same; For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper and be given due course, it must be shown that: (a) the
respondent judge or tribunal issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; or
(b) the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal cannot afford adequate and
expeditious relief; Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.—For a petition for certiorari and prohibition to prosper and be given due course, it
must be shown that: (a) the respondent judge or tribunal issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion; or (b) the assailed interlocutory order is patently erroneous, and the remedy of appeal
cannot afford adequate and expeditious relief. Yet, the allegation that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion will
not alone suffice. Equally imperative is that the petition must satisfactorily specify the acts committed or omitted by
the tribunal, board or officer that constitute grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion means such
capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. To justify the issuance of the
writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law,
as to be equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction.

Same; Motions for Reconsideration; The requirement under Section 1 of Rule 65 that there must be no appeal, or any
plain or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law admits exceptions.—That the petitioner did not file a motion
for reconsideration in the RTC before coming to this Court did not preclude treating her petition as one for certiorari.
The requirement under Section 1 of Rule 65 that there must be no appeal, or any plain or adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law admits exceptions. In Francisco Motors Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 505 SCRA 8 (2006),
the Court has recognized exceptions to the requirement, such as: (a) when it is necessary to prevent irreparable
damages and injury to a party; (b) where the trial judge capriciously and whimsically exercised his judgment; (c)
where there may be danger of a failure of justice; (d) where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient;
(e) where the issue raised is one purely of law; (f) where public interest is involved; and (g) in case of urgency. The
allegations of the petition definitely placed the petitioner’s recourse under most, if not all, of the exceptions.

Same; Appeals; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; The rule that a petition should have been brought under Rule 65
instead of under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (or vice versa) is not inflexible or rigid.—We also observe that the rule
that a petition should have been brought under Rule 65 instead of under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (or vice versa)
is not inflexible or rigid. The inflexibility or rigidity of application of the rules of procedure is eschewed in order to
serve the higher ends of justice. Thus, substance is given primacy over form, for it is paramount that the rules of
procedure are not applied in a very rigid technical sense, but used only to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. If a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their aim is defeated. Verily, the strict application of
procedural technicalities should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the merits. To institute a guideline,
therefore, the Rules of Court expressly mandates that the rules of procedure “shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.”

Judgments; To frustrate the winning party’s right through dilatory schemes is to frustrate all the efforts, time and
expenditure of the courts, which thereby increases the costs of litigation; All courts are by oath bound to guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about the frustration of the winning party’s right, and to stop any attempt to
prolong controversies already resolved with finality.—Under the circumstances, the principle of immutability of a final
judgment must now be absolutely and unconditionally applied against the respondents. They could not anymore be
permitted to interminably forestall the execution of the judgment through their interposition of new petitions or
pleadings. Even as their right to initiate an action in court ought to be fully respected, their commencing SCA Case
No. 01-11522 in the hope of securing a favorable ruling despite their case having been already fully and finally
adjudicated should not be tolerated. Their move should not frustrate the enforcement of the judgment, the fruit and
the end of the suit itself. Their right as the losing parties to appeal within the prescribed period could not defeat the
correlative right of the winning party to enjoy at last the finality of the resolution of her case through execution and
satisfaction of the judgment, which would be the life of the law. To frustrate the winning party’s right through dilatory
schemes is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts, which thereby increases the costs of
litigation. The interest of justice undeniably demanded that we should immediately write finis to the litigation, for all
courts are by oath bound to guard against any scheme calculated to bring about the frustration of the winning party’s
right, and to stop any attempt to prolong controversies already resolved with finality.

Preliminary Injunction; A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity or a
transcendent remedy. It is granted only to protect actual and existing substantial rights.—A writ of preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary event and is the strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy. It is granted only to
protect actual and existing substantial rights. Without actual and existing rights on the part of the applicant, and in
the absence of facts bringing the matter within the conditions for its issuance, the ancillary writ must be struck down
for being issued in grave abuse of discretion. Thus, injunction will not issue to protect a right not in esse, which is
merely contingent, and which may never arise, or to restrain an act which does not give rise to a cause of action.

Same; Courts; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; A judge’s act of ignoring a rule as elementary as the 20-day life
span of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) amounts to gross ignorance of law and procedure, and his violation is
seemingly made worse by the fact that he thereby usurped the authority of the Supreme Court as the only court with
the power to issue a TRO effective until further orders.—We further note that the RTC Judge expressly made the TRO
effective until further orders from him. He thereby contravened explicit rules of procedure. He knowingly did so,
considering that he thereby disregarded the nature and purpose of the TRO as a temporary and limited remedy,
instead of a permanent and unrestricted relief. He disregarded Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, which
expressly stated that the life span of a TRO was only 20 days from service of the TRO on the party or person sought
to be enjoined. Considering that the limited life span of a TRO was a long-standing and basic rule of procedure, he
consciously arrogated unto himself a power that he did not have. Ignoring a rule as elementary as the 20-day life
span of a TRO amounted to gross ignorance of law and procedure. His violation is seemingly made worse by the fact
that he thereby usurped the authority of the Court as the only court with the power to issue a TRO effective until
further orders.
MARY LOUISE R. ANDERSON, petitioner, vs. ENRIQUE HO, respondent.
G.R. No. 172590. January 7, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the
procedural requirements it imposes has been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these procedural
requirements is the certificate of non-forum shopping which, time and again, has been declared as basic, necessary
and mandatory for procedural orderliness.—The need to abide by the Rules of Court and the procedural requirements
it imposes has been constantly underscored by this Court. One of these procedural requirements is the certificate of
non-forum shopping which, time and again, has been declared as basic, necessary and mandatory for procedural
orderliness. In Vda. de Formoso v. Philippine National Bank, 650 SCRA 35 (2011), the Court reiterated the guidelines
respecting non-compliance with or submission of a defective certificate of non-forum shopping, the relevant portions
of which are as follows: 4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,
x x x, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the
Rule on the ground of ‘substantial compliance’ or presence of ‘special circumstances or compelling reasons’. x x x x 6)
Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If,
however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of
Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.

Same; Same; Same; The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-
forum shopping is due to the fact that a “certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal
party, an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the
same parties, issues and causes of action; If a petitioner is unable to sign a certification for reasonable or justifiable
reasons, she must execute an Special Power of Attorney (SPA) designating her counsel of record to sign on her
behalf.—The requirement that it is the petitioner, not her counsel, who should sign the certificate of non-forum
shopping is due to the fact that a “certification is a peculiar personal representation on the part of the principal party,
an assurance given to the court or other tribunal that there are no other pending cases involving basically the same
parties, issues and causes of action.” “Obviously, it is the petitioner, and not always the counsel whose professional
services have been retained for a particular case, who is in the best position to know whether [she] actually filed or
caused the filing of a petition in that case.” Per the above guidelines, however, if a petitioner is unable to sign a
certification for reasonable or justifiable reasons, she must execute an SPA designating her counsel of record to sign
on her behalf. “[A] certification which had been signed by counsel without the proper authorization is defective and
constitutes a valid cause for the dismissal of the petition.”

Same; Same; Forum Shopping; The rules on forum shopping were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping. The subsequent
filing of the certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac
vice.—In Donato vs. Court of Appeals, 417 SCRA 216 (2003), the CA dismissed therein petitioner’s Petition for Review
on the ground, among others, that the certification against forum shopping was signed by his counsel. In filing a
motion for reconsideration, petitioner submitted a certification duly signed by himself. However, the CA ruled that his
subsequent compliance did not cure the defect of the instant petition and denied his Motion for Reconsideration.
When the case reached this Court, it was held, viz.: The petition for review filed before the CA contains a certification
against forum shopping but said certification was signed by petitioner’s counsel. In submitting the certification of non-
forum shopping duly signed by himself in his motion for reconsideration, petitioner has aptly drawn the Court’s
attention to the physical impossibility of filing the petition for review within the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
considering that he is a resident of 1125 South Jefferson Street, Roanoke, Virginia, U.S.A. where he [needs] to
personally accomplish and sign the verification. We fully agree with petitioner that it was physically impossible for the
petition to have been prepared and sent to the petitioner in the United States, for him to travel from Virginia, U.S.A.
to the nearest Philippine Consulate in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. in order to sign the certification before the Philippine
Consul, and for him to send back the petition to the Philippines within the 15-day reglementary period. Thus, we find
that petitioner has adequately explained his failure to personally sign the certification which justifies relaxation of the
rule. We have stressed that the rules on forum shopping, which were precisely designed to promote and facilitate the
orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own
ultimate and legitimate objective which is simply to prohibit and penalize the evils of forum shopping. The subsequent
filing of the certification duly signed by the petitioner himself should thus be deemed substantial compliance, pro hac
vice.

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Rules are laid down for the benefit of all and should not be made dependent
upon a suitor’s sweet time and own bidding.—It is well to stress that “[r]ules are laid down for the benefit of all and
should not be made dependent upon a suitor’s sweet time and own bidding.” They should be faithfully complied with
and may not simply be ignored to suit the convenience of a party. Although they are liberally construed in some
situations, there must, however, be a showing of justifiable reasons and at least a reasonable attempt at compliance
therewith, which unfortunately are not obtaining in this case.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION and AURMELA GANZON, petitioners, vs. RAUL DE LEON, respondent.
G.R. No. 165622. October 17, 2008.*

Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Appeals; This Court stressed that the grounds for dismissal of an appeal under
Section 1 of Rule 50 are discretionary upon the appellate court.—In several cases, this Court stressed that the
grounds for dismissal of an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50 are discretionary upon the appellate court. The very
wording of the rule uses the word “may” instead of “shall.” This indicates that it is only directory and not mandatory.
Sound discretion must be exercised in consonance with the tenets of justice and fair play, keeping in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case.

Same; Same; This Court has held that the failure to properly cite reference to the original records is not a fatal
procedural lapse.—The absence of page reference to the record is a ground for dismissal. It is a requirement intended
to ultimately aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the case. However, as earlier
discussed, such dismissal is not mandatory, but discretionary on the part of the appellate court. This Court has held
that the failure to properly cite reference to the original records is not a fatal procedural lapse. When citations found
in the appellant’s brief enable the court to expeditiously locate the portions of the record referred to, there is
substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 13(c), (d), and (f) of Rule 44. In De Leon v. CA, 376 SCRA
531 (2002), this Court ruled that the citations contained in the appellant’s brief sufficiently enabled the appellate court
to expeditiously locate the portions of the record referred to. They were in substantial compliance with the rules.

Same; Rules of procedure are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice.—Rules of procedure are
intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice. They should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent rules governing appeals. It has, in
the past, refused to sacrifice justice for technicality.

Pharmacists; Druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact
and reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly
be exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.—Mercury Drug and
Ganzon can not exculpate themselves from any liability. As active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the
public, the highest degree of care and diligence is expected of them. Likewise, numerous decisions, both here and
abroad, have laid salutary rules for the protection of human life and human health. In the United States case of
Tombari v. Conners, 85 Conn. 231 (1912), it was ruled that the profession of pharmacy demands care and skill, and
druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care known to practical men. In other
words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and
reliable safeguards consistent with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be
exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicines.

Same; One holding himself out as competent to handle drugs, having rightful access to them, and relied upon by
those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and care called for by the peculiarly dangerous nature
of the business, cannot be heard to say that his mistake by which he furnishes a customer the most deadly of drugs
for those comparatively harmless, is not in itself gross negligence.—Smith’s Admrx v. Middelton, 56 LRA 484 (1902),
teaches Us that one holding himself out as competent to handle drugs, having rightful access to them, and relied
upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and care called for by the peculiarly dangerous
nature of the business, cannot be heard to say that his mistake by which he furnishes a customer the most deadly of
drugs for those comparatively harmless, is not in itself gross negligence. In our own jurisdiction, United States v.
Pineda, 37 Phil. 456 (1918), and Mercury Drug Corporation v. Baking, 523 SCRA 184 (2007) are illustrative. In Pineda,
the potassium chlorate demanded by complainant had been intended for his race horses. When complainant mixed
with water what he thought and believed was potassium chlorate, but which turned out to be the potently deadly
barium chlorate, his race horses died of poisoning only a few hours after. The wisdom of such a decision is
unquestionable. If the victims had been human beings instead of horses, the damage and loss would have been
irreparable.

Same; This Court once more reiterated that the profession of pharmacy demands great care and skill.—This Court
once more reiterated that the profession of pharmacy demands great care and skill. It reminded druggists to exercise
the highest degree of care known to practical men. In cases where an injury is caused by the negligence of an
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there has been negligence on the part of the employer,
either in the selection or supervision of one’s employees. This presumption may be rebutted by a clear showing that
the employer has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family. Mercury Drug failed to overcome
such presumption.

Same; This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not stand at arms
length.—As a buyer, De Leon relied on the expertise and experience of Mercury Drug and its employees in dispensing
to him the right medicine. This Court has ruled that in the purchase and sale of drugs, the buyer and seller do not
stand at arms length. There exists an imperative duty on the seller or the druggist to take precaution to prevent death
or injury to any person who relies on one’s absolute honesty and peculiar learning. The Court emphasized: x x x The
nature of drugs is such that examination would not avail the purchaser anything. It would be idle mockery for the
customer to make an examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the
druggist warrants that he will deliver the drug called for.

Damages; The award of damages must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.—Moral damages are not
intended to impose a penalty to the wrongdoer or to enrich the claimant at the expense of defendant. There is no
hard and fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages since each case
must be governed by its peculiar circumstances. However, the award of damages must be commensurate to the loss
or injury suffered.
ESPERANZA G. FRONDARINA, joined by her husband, PEDRO A. FRONDARINA, petitioners, vs.
NAPOLEON MALAZARTE and LAURA P. MALAZARTE, respondents.
G.R. No. 148423. December 6, 2006.*

Civil Procedure; Certiorari; It is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that petitions for
review on certiorari shall only raise questions of law. Questions of fact are not permitted because generally, the
findings of fact of the CA are final, conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal. The reason behind the rule is that
the court is not a trier of facts and it is not its duty to review, evaluate and weigh the probative value of the evidence
adduced before the lower courts.—It is clear under Section 1, Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure that
petitions for review on certiorari shall ONLY raise questions of law. Questions of fact are not permitted because
generally, the findings of fact of the CA are final, conclusive, and cannot be reviewed on appeal. The reason behind
the rule is that the Court is not a trier of facts and it is not its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value
of the evidence adduced before the lower courts.

Evidence; Witnesses; Under the admitted facts rule, “evidence of whatever description must yield to the extent that it
conflicts with admitted or clearly established facts.” The Court gives superior credit to petitioners’ witnesses whose
testimonies on material points are in accord with facts already established, rather than to respondents and witness
Romeo Valencia whose testimonies were shown to be false or “bereft of weight and credence.”—Under the admitted
facts rule, “evidence of whatever description must yield to the extent that it conflicts with admitted or clearly
established facts.” The Court gives superior credit to petitioners’ witnesses whose testimonies on material points are
in accord with facts already established, rather than to respondents and witness Romeo Valencia whose testimonies
were shown to be false or “bereft of weight and credence.”

Same; Words and Phrases; Circumstantial or presumptive evidence is defined as “the existence of the principal facts x
x x only inferred from one or more circumstances which have been established directly.” It is further explained as “an
inference of a fact from other facts proved, and the fact thus inferred and assented to by the mind is said to be
presumed, that is to say, it is taken for granted until the contrary is proved.”—Circumstantial or presumptive evidence
is defined as “the existence of the principal facts x x x only inferred from one or more circumstances which have been
established directly.” It is further explained as “an inference of a fact from other facts proved, and the fact thus
inferred and assented to by the mind is said to be presumed, that is to say, it is taken for granted until the contrary is
proved.” In effect, the absence of Andrada’s testimony did not do any damage to petitioners’ cause of action—as
ample circumstantial evidence is extant on record sufficient to convince the Court that respondents committed acts of
forcible entry.

Ownership; Possession; Lease; Verily, it has been settled jurisprudence that although tax declarations or real estate
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in
the concept of an owner.—Verily, it has been settled jurisprudence that although tax declarations or real estate
payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in
the concept of an owner. Based on the tax declarations and tax receipts of both parties, we rule that petitioners have
sufficiently adduced convincing evidence of possession over the disputed lot.
NAGKAHIUSANG MAMUMUO SA PICOP RESOURCES, INC.-SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES FEDERATION OF
LABOR (NAMAPRI-SPFL), ARTEMIO Q. AVILA, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
(Fifth Division) and PICOP RESOURCES, INC., respondents.
G.R. Nos. 148839-40. November 2, 2006.*

Actions; Appeals; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; As a general rule, a party cannot file a petition both under Rules
45 and 65 of the Rules of Court because said procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct
applications—a party should not join both petitions in one pleading, and when a party adopts an improper remedy, his
petition may be dismissed outright.—As a general rule, a party cannot file a petition both under Rules 45 and 65 of
the Rules of Court because said procedural rules pertain to different remedies and have distinct applications.
Meanwhile, in Hanjin Engineering and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 487 SCRA 78 (2006), we held that
the remedy of appeal under Rule 45 and an original action for certiorari under Rule 65 are mutually exclusive and not
alternative or cumulative. Thus, a party should not join both petitions in one pleading. In Mercado v. Court Appeals,
441 SCRA 463 (2004), we held that “when a party adopts an improper remedy,” as in this case, “his petition may be
dismissed outright.” We then further elucidated that: Indeed, not infrequently, litigants and parties to a petition have
invoked liberal construction of the Rules of Court to justify lapses in its observance. Hopefully, it is not simply a
coverup of their own neglect or sheer ignorance of procedure. While indeed this Court has on occasion set aside
procedural irregularities in the interest of justice, it must be stressed that liberality of construction of the rules should
not be a panacea for all procedural maladies. For this Court will not tolerate wanton disregard of the procedural rules
under the guise of liberal construction.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where there is still no final judgment from the Court of Appeals at the time of the filing of
the petition, then a petition for review under Rule 45 is not the appropriate remedy; When an interlocutory order is
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, then a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus under Rule 65 can be availed of depending on the
circumstances of each case.—As provided in Sec. 1, Rule 45, the petition for review must be from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the CA, Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, and other courts, whenever authorized by law.
Since a petition for review is a mode of appeal, the judgment, order, or resolution must be one that completely
disposes of the case or of a particular matter in it. It is clear however, that the assailed March 7, 2001 and July 4,
2001 CA Resolutions are merely interlocutory orders or provisional remedies. The aggrieved party must await the final
decision in the petition and then appeal from the adverse judgment, in the course of which the party may question
the issuance of the interlocutory orders as errors of judgment. As there was still no final judgment from the CA at the
time of the filing of the petition, then a petition for review under Rule 45 is not the appropriate remedy. However,
when an interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, then a petition for certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus under Rule 65
can be availed of depending on the circumstances of each case. In the case at bar, granting arguendo that petitioner
NAMAPRI-SPFL instituted the instant petition under Rule 65 on the ground that the CA rendered the disputed
Resolutions with grave abuse of discretion, still, the petition must fail because the CA did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
ASIAN TERMINALS, INC., petitioner, vs. SIMON ENTERPRISES, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 177116. February 27, 2013.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; “Question of Law” and “Question of Fact,” Distinguished.―A question of law exists
when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or
when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or
falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or
falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the
witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.

Same; Same; Appeals; Petition for Review on Certiorari; The well-entrenched rule in our jurisdiction is that only
questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari.―The well-entrenched rule in
our jurisdiction is that only questions of law may be entertained by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari.
This rule, however, is not ironclad and admits certain exceptions, such as when (1) the conclusion is grounded on
speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the findings of
absence of facts are contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court; (9) the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed
facts that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the Court of Appeals are
beyond the issues of the case; and (11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties.

Civil Law; Common Carriers; Extraordinary Diligence; Though it is true that common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently if the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, and
that the common carrier must prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption,
the plaintiff must still, before the burden is shifted to the defendant, prove that the subject shipment suffered actual
shortage.―Though it is true that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently if
the goods transported by them are lost, destroyed, or deteriorated, and that the common carrier must prove that it
exercised extraordinary diligence in order to overcome the presumption, the plaintiff must still, before the burden is
shifted to the defendant, prove that the subject shipment suffered actual shortage. This can only be done if the
weight of the shipment at the port of origin and its subsequent weight at the port of arrival have been proven by a
preponderance of evidence, and it can be seen that the former weight is considerably greater than the latter weight,
taking into consideration the exceptions provided in Article 1734 of the Civil Code.
DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, represented by Hon.
Anselmo G. Adriano, Acting Regional Director, Revenue Region No. 8, Makati City, respondent.
G.R. No. 197228. October 8, 2014.*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Courts; Court of Tax Appeals; The enactment of Republic Act (RA) No. 9282, which
took effect on 23 April 2004, elevated the rank of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) to the level of a collegiate court,
making it a coequal body of the Court of Appeals (CA).—The enactment of R.A. No. 9282, which took effect on 23
April 2004, elevated the rank of the CTA to the level of a collegiate court, making it a coequal body of the Court of
Appeals. The appeal of a CTA decision under Section 18 of R.A. No. 1125 was also amended by R.A. No. 9282.
Section 19 was added, and it reads as follows: Section 11. Section 18 of the same Act is hereby amended as follows:
SEC. 18. Appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals En Banc.—No civil proceeding involving matter arising under the National
Internal Revenue Code, the Tariff and Customs Code or the Local Government Code shall be maintained, except as
herein provided, until and unless an appeal has been previously filed with the CTA and disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of this Act. A party adversely affected by a resolution of a Division of the CTA on a motion for
reconsideration or new trial, may file a petition for review with the CTA En Banc. SEC. 19. Review by Certiorari.—A
party adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the CTA En Banc may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. (Emphasis supplied) Furthermore,
Section 2, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA reiterates the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA En Banc
relative to the review of the court divisions’ decisions or resolutions on motion for reconsideration or new trial in cases
arising from administrative agencies such as the BIR. Clearly, this Court is without jurisdiction to review decisions
rendered by a division of the CTA, exclusive appellate jurisdiction over which is vested in the CTA En Banc.

Same; Same; Appeals; An appeal is neither a natural nor a constitutional right, but is merely statutory; Neither is the
right to appeal a component of due process.—It is worth emphasizing that an appeal is neither a natural nor a
constitutional right, but is merely statutory. The implication of its statutory character is that the party who intends to
appeal must always comply with the procedures and rules governing appeals; or else, the right of appeal may be lost
or squandered. Neither is the right to appeal a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege and may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of law.
JOSE LUIS ANGEL B. OROSA, petitioner, vs. ALBERTO C. ROA, respondent.
G.R. No. 140423. July 14, 2006.*

Appeals; Department of Justice (DOJ) is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of Rule 43 of
the Rules of Court.—As may be noted, the DOJ is not among the agencies expressly enumerated under Section 1 of
Rule 43, albeit any suggestion that it does not perform quasi-judicial functions may have to be rejected. However, its
absence from the list of agencies mentioned thereunder does not, by this fact alone, already imply its exclusion from
the coverage of said Rule. This is because said Section 1 uses the phrase “among these agencies,” thereby implying
that the enumeration made is not exclusive of the agencies therein listed. There is compelling reason to believe,
however, that the exclusion of the DOJ from the list is deliberate, being in consonance with the constitutional power
of control lodged in the President over executive departments, bureaus and offices. This power of control, which even
Congress cannot limit, let alone withdraw, means the power of the Chief Executive to review, alter, modify, nullify, or
set aside what a subordinate, e.g., members of the Cabinet and heads of line agencies, had done in the performance
of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.

Same; Recourse from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President instead of the Court of
Appeals under the established principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.—Being thus under the control of the
President, the Secretary of Justice, or, to be precise, his decision is subject to review of the former. In fine, recourse
from the decision of the Secretary of Justice should be to the President, instead of the CA, under the established
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is
that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted to
before resort can be made to the courts. Immediate recourse to the court would be premature and precipitate;
subject to defined exception, a case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action should a party fail to
exhaust administrative remedies. Notably, Section 1, supra, of Rule 43 includes the Office of the President in the
agencies named therein, thereby accentuating the fact that appeals from rulings of department heads must first be
taken to and resolved by that office before any appellate recourse may be resorted to.
JUANA ALONZO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. VALENTINA ROSARIO ET AL., respondents.
[No. L-12309. April 30, 1959]

APPEAL AND ERRORS; MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL SUSPENDS THE PERIOD TO FILE BRIEF.—A motion to dismiss
an appeal suspends the period within which an appellant should file his brief until said motion is finally decided.

PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. CORONA INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 139910. September 29, 2000*

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Requirements laid down in Section 13, Rule 43 are intended to aid the appellate court
in arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the case.—The requirements laid down in Section 13, Rule 43 are
intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just and proper conclusion of the case. However, we are of the
opinion that despite its deficiencies petitioner’s appellant’s brief is sufficient in form and substance as to apprise the
appellate court of the essential facts and nature of the case as well as the issues raised and the laws necessary for
the disposition of the same.

Same; Same; Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, and not to suppress, substantial justice.—
Technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, and not to suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from
a rigid enforcement of the rules may thus, be allowed to attain the prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of
justice is the core reason for the existence of courts.