G.R. No.
112235 November 29, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, defendant-appellant.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos
St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public Market when a man
suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist,
aimed the gun at the policeman's right ear and fired. The man who
shot Lucilo had three other companions with him, one of whom shot
the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking
the latter's gun, the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and
fled.1
The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by
Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who
claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal
shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias
Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew (appellant's father was his first
cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the
latter was a resident of Bagumbayan.
Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple
gunshot wounds on the face, the chest, and other parts of the body.2
On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of
death as hypovolemic shock.3
As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of
Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an Information charging accused-
appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:
That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30
o'clock in the afternoon, at Burgos Street, Municipality of Daraga,
Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with Gilberto
Longasa, who is already charged in Crim. Case No. 5931 before
RTC, Branch I, and three (3) others whose true identities are at
present unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another for a common purpose,
armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS LUCILO, a member of the Daraga
Police Station, inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds
causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. The dispositive portion of
said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court
finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are
still at large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories
provided by law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo
through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the amount of Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for
death; to pay the said widow the sum of Thirty Thousand
(P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and
to pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred
Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos, representing actual damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on
the part of the said accused.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that
portion of trial court decision finding him guilty of the crime of murder
and not rebellion.
Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution's principal witness,
Nestor Armenta, as supporting his claim that he should have been
charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a
member of the New People's Army. Additionally, he contends that
because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of
subversive ends,"4 (said killing) should have been deemed
absorbed in the crime of rebellion under Arts. 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal
shot but merely acted as a look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he
avers that he should have been charged merely as a participant in
the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article
135 of the Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been
meted only the penalty of prison mayor by the lower court.
Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the
crime of murder, the Solicitor General avers that the crime
committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the
defense itself had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for
the killing of the policeman was for "political and subversive ends."5
Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were
to be convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial court had found
appellant guilty merely of being a participant in a rebellion, the
proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant
contends, but reclusion temporal, because Executive Order No. 187
as amended by Republic Act
No. 6968, the Coup D'etat Law, prescribes reclusion temporal as
the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in
a rebellion.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was
murder and not rebellion.
Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 6968, rebellion is committed in the following manner:
[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or
depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature wholly or partially,
of any of their powers or prerogatives.6
The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising
against the government.7 By its very nature, rebellion is essentially
a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which
cannot be confined a priori within predetermined bounds.8 One
aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is that other acts
committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself
because they acquire a political character. This peculiarity was
underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez,9 thus:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to
achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the
Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part
thereof," then it becomes stripped of its "common" complexion,
inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the latter.
Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act,
however grave, assumes a different color by being absorbed in the
crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of
murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder,
it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain whether or not the
act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of
the act should be conclusively demonstrated.
In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on
the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better
than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes,10 this court
stressed that:
Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused's)
knowledge and since moreover this is an affirmative defense, the
burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could
easily do personally or through witnesses, that they killed the
deceased in furtherance of the resistance movement.
From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the
overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both purpose and overt acts
are essential components of the crime. With either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In
fact, even in cases where the act complained of were committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing,
robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit,
without any political motivation, it has been held that the crime would
be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be
absorbed by the crime rebellion.11
Clearly, political motive should be established before a person
charged with a common crime — alleging rebellion in order to lessen
the possible imposable penalty — could benefit from the law's
relatively benign attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this
regard is the case of Enrile v.
Amin,12 where the prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829,13 for allegedly
harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite
of the senator's knowledge that Honasan might have committed a
crime. This Court held, against the prosecution's contention, that
rebellion and violation of P.D 1829 could be tried separately14 (on
the principle that rebellion is based on the Revised Penal Code while
P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was
being charged, though punishable under a special law, was
absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated by, and related
to the acts for which he was charged in Enrile vs. Salazar (G.R. Nos.
92163 and 92164) a case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor
of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for violation of
P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for
rebellion had already been filed and in fact decided, the Court said:
The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain
us to rule that the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not
confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under special
laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.15
Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in
Enrile vs. Amin further underscored that:
[I]ntent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not
charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel
Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate,
the motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is
committed with political or social motives, that is in furtherance of
rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of
rebellion instead of being punished separately.
It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and
proved, the accused should be convicted of the common crime and
not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and
mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance
of rebellion would not, by and of itself, suffice.
The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v.
Ompad, Jr.,16 to the instant case is striking. Two witnesses, both
former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias
"Commander Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led
three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of Dionilo Barlaan,
a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his
notoriety as an NPA hitman, Ompad was merely charged with and
convicted of murder, not rebellion because political motive was
neither alleged nor proved.
As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed
was impelled by a political motive lies on the accused. Political
motive must be alleged in the information.17 It must be established
by clear and satisfactory evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we
held:
That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of
mitigation or defense that the accused has the burden of proving
clearly and satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of
appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being an informer, and
his suspicion that he was one such, is neither sufficient or adequate
to establish that the motivation for the killing was political,
considering appellant's obvious interest in testifying to that effect.18
Similarly, in People v. Buco,19 the Court stressed that accused in
that case failed to establish that the reason for the killing of their
victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced
by the defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco
was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias "Commander Sol" to kill
municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise
showed that Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to
order the killing on account of private differences over a ninety (90)
hectare piece of land. The court attributed no political motive for the
killing, though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap
movement.20
People v. Dasig21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant
case. There, the Court held that "the act of killing a police officer,
knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance
of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court however noted that the accused,
who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership
with the NPA but also executed an extrajudicial confession to the
effect that he was a member of an NPA "sparrow unit," a fact to
which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in
agreement. The Solicitor General's brief in Dasig which this Court
favorably quoted, noted that:
[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army
with the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government.
It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad
was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive
ends of the NPA.22
By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different
result in the case at bench. He states that accused-appellant's
belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only
insubstantial but also self serving23 an averment to which, given a
thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully agree.
He states:
[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA,
clearly overcame the burden of proving motive or intent. It was
shown that the political motivation for the killing of the victim was the
fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the PC. The
perpetrators even left a letter card, a drawing on the body of Ragaul
as a warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely
different in the case at bar where the evidence for the appellant
merely contains self-serving assertions and denials not substantial
enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of victim
SPO3 Jesus Lucilo.24
In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in
his extrajudicial confession to having participated in the killing of
Lucilo as follows:
Q What was that incident if any, please narrate?
A July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home,
three male person a certain alias ALWIN, ALIAS SAMUEL and the
other one unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them,
so I asked them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he
stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me board on said
jeepney. (sic)
Q Please continue.
A Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline
Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk towards Daraga
Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain
stopped we continue walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)
Q When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q.
7 you used the road near the bakery where did you proceed?
A I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion
continue walking, at more less 4:30 P.M. July 27, 1992 one of my
companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect, to wit: "AMO NA YADI
AN TINAMPO PALUWAS" (This is the place towards the poblacion),
so, I placed myself just ahead of a small store, my three (3)
companions continue walking towards poblacion, later on a
policeman sporting white T-shirt and a khaki pant was walking
towards me, while the said policeman is nearly approaching me,
ALWIN shot the said policeman in front of the small store, when the
said policeman fell on the asphalted road, ALWIN took the service
firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision,
then my two (2) companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until
we reached a hill wherein there is a small bridge, thereafter Ka
Samuel took the handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar,
Sorsogon. (sic)
Q Do you know the policeman that was killed by your
companion?
A I just came to know his name when I reached home and
heard it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)
Q What is your participation in the group?
A Look-out sir.
Q I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is
any? (sic)
A No more sir.25
It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession
did appellant ever mention that he was a member of the New
People's Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing
which would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant
was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover, the information filed
against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any
mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of
SPO3 Lucilo.26 Even prosecution eyewitness Nestor Armenta did
not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October 19, 1992.27
As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant's
membership in the NPA surfaced almost merely as an afterthought,
something which the defense merely picked up and followed
through upon prosecution eyewitness Armenta's testimony on
cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a member of the
NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta
admitted that he was "forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA
member.28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial court did
not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court,
after all, had the prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness'
testimony while upholding the rest of it.29 While disbelieving the
portion of Armenta's testimony on appellant's alleged membership
in the NPA, the trial court correctly gave credence to his unflawed
narration about how the crime was committed.30 Such narration is
even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity
of the gun wielder, by the testimony of the appellant himself.
In any case, appellant's claim regarding the political color attending
the commission of the crime being a matter of defense, its viability
depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that,
upon the prodding of alias Alwin and alias Samuel, he joined the
NPA because of the organization's
goals.31 He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because
he "had offended our organization,"32 without, however, specifying
what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been a
member of the NPA for five months before the shooting incident.33
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant's
contentions are couched in terms so general and non-specific34
that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing
would have made towards the achievement of the NPA's subversive
aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never alleged to
be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have
offended the NPA. Against appellant's attempts to shade his
participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on
record leaves the impression that appellant's bare allegations of
membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to mitigate the
penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA
infested areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the
furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political color for the
purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they are
no more than ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In
Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly observed:
The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of
numerous bandits, or irresponsible or deranged individuals, is a
reality that cannot be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings
and acts of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate,
unfortunately continue unabated despite the best efforts that the
Government authorities are exerting, although it may be true that
the insurrectionist groups of the right or the left no longer pose a
genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for more
stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be
gainsaid.35
In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a
political motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied
that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of
murder.36 It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor
Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the testimony of one
witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict.37 Against
appellant's claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony
of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs of impropriety
or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused.38 Moreover,
neither may lack of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant.
Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does not preclude
conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and
satisfactorily identified appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.39
In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution's case was
furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant's admission in open
court that he and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges
against each other.40

Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The

attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of
any kind.41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime
committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In
the absence of any mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the
trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
together with all the accessories provided by law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court's

decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing the accused of
Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL,
FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE:
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL.
EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO
DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding
Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA:
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES
CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO
MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and
P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R.
No. 83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos.
84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the
above-entitled petitions, seeking reconsideration of the Court's
decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity)
which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in
G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's
provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with
the statement that the decision did not rule — as many
misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist
Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest
without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing
laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions.
Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership
therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if
these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people,
it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the
Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum,
maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the
questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying on the
provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113
(Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and
Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions
made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive
documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch
as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on
admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation
of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be
deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of
Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the
function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire
into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the
detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners
was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July
1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant
were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in
accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from
such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or
person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant
of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The
law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which
a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando
Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that,
within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was
committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested
for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed
organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion
which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a
continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their
essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
...
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which
includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government,
Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of
arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as
one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow"
(NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen
anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It
is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is
perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which
generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective
of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere
suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the
CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported
by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said,
under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under
Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first,
that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and
second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will
be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private
person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests
without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded
on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the
other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988,
were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received
by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been
admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the
information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said
hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two
(2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988
at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining
St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same
information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital
management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of
Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to
the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated
for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable
and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member
was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by
circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31 January 1988,
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario,
Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon"
was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot
wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie
Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were
fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers
merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was
found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the
arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor
and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the
law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with
acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the
Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed
to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law
enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The
records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been
ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest,
without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after
Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information charging double
murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed
against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal
Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial
custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On
31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now
on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82),
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and
Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are
also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms,
explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were,
therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after
their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against
said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and
disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo
habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of
these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the
custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases
are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information
imparted by a former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA
in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato
Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse;
that in view of this information, the said house was placed under
military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted;
that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not
produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and
other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house
of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and
admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to
Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a
consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession
papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of
her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live
ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged
to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they
were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived
at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date;
that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and
loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show
a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without
warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe
house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of
the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant
duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant
the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found
ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo,
Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military
agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information
given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one
occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon)
were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with
information as to their exact location and the names of Renato
Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances
surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the
information they had received was true and the persons to be
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes:
first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the
Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a
person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the
time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted
ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified
by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA
members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The
records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without
warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse
and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been
ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and
after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra,
Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that
it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted
at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the
peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in
order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities
upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative
measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation
as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and
order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in
accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this
Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty
of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly
compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in
the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the
law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting
officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the
said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime
of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested
without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses:
that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa,
Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers,
where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27
(Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press
conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November
1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and
bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without
warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the
arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and
regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the
Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during
the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right
to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was
uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest,
without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and
freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has,
in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes
of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has
ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00
to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu
case moot and academic. For Espiritu had before arraignment
asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not
appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court
a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case
against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been
provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning
of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of
men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of
the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to
Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of
Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the
police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation.
29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988,
while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28
December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b)
of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made
promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and
despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in
upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several
facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without
warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala
and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock
eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but
the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January
1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused,
Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24,
ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued
a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that
the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by
reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said
case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence
against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and
Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed
in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on
probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They
complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They
were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since
been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to
the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R.
No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the
contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that
he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia
Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition
and subversive documents found in her possession during her
arrest, belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested
persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents
in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the
records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds
upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without
warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses,
in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To
note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the
persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their
warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the
guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper
in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on
the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan
vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling
reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of
prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still
directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist
rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be
tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court.
will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are
enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant
so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court,
as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall
forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then
the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must
be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or
convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of

being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not
a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court
predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in
these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on
compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are
probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and,
further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that
the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision

dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100231. April 28, 1993.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODRIGO DASIG @ KA RUBIN DAKU @ ARMAND; EDWIN
NUÑEZ Y TABANAS @ MABI; ALVIN DOE @ AL @ KA ALVIN;
ROGER DOE @ KA JAMES @ KA PEPE; TUDING ANDRINO @
KA ERMI @ KA ROEL @ KA GRINGO MONTAYRE; RUBEN
DOE @ KA RUBEN @ KA JOJI @ INO ECHAVEZ; ANASTACIO
BANGKAL @ KA JUNIOR; AND CARLITO MAGASIN @
BOBBY, accused, RODRIGO DASIG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Kinaadman and Archival for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONFESSION, AS A RULE,
ADMISSIBLE; EXCEPTION; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR.
— The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given
as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency. Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-
judicial confession was legally defective and hence, should not have
been admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In
an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity
of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood
by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a
matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty.
Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is
likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra-
judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively.
Finally, the alleged use of force and intimidation has not been
substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. as
has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of
appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt.
Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with
regularity and legality.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ABSORBS THE CRIME OF
DIRECT ASSAULT WHEN DONE IN FURTHERANCE THEREOF.
— The crime of rebellion consists of may acts. It is a vast movement
of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. The act of killing a police
officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate
charge.
3. ID.; ID.; NOT COVERED BY INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
LAW (R.A. 4203). — The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not
applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A. 4203),
contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion.
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
Appellant, Rodrigo Dasig is now before Us to plead the reversal of
his conviction by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Mandaue City
finding him guilty of Murder with Direct Assault.
He was charged together with Edwin Nuñez and 6 others who are
still at large, in an information which reads:
"That on or about the 4th day of August, 1987, in the city of
Mandaue, of this Honorable Court, the aforenamed accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, with
intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior
strength and use of motor vehicle, all armed with unlicensed
firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot one Redempto Manatad, a police officer
on traffic duty, at his vital portion which caused his death soon
thereafter, knowing beforehand that the victim was a policeman who
was then in the performance of his official duties."
Upon arraignment, appellant and Edwin Nuñes entered a plea of
"not guilty." However, after the prosecution had presented its first
witness, accused Nuñes changed his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty."
Hence, the lower court held in abeyance the promulgation of a
judgment against said accused until the prosecution had finished
presenting its evidence. While trial was still ongoing, Nuñez died on
March 10, 1989, thereby extinguishing his criminal liability.
The facts surrounding this case show that in the afternoon of August
4, 1987, Pfc. Redempto Manatad, Pfc. Ninah Tizon and Pfc. Rene
Catamora were tasked by their commanding officer to assist in
canning the traffic at M.N. Briones and Bonifacio Streets in
Mandaue City. Pfc. Tizon controlled the traffic lighting facility; Pfc.
Manatad manned the traffic; while Pfc. Catamora acted as back-up
and posted himself at Norkis Trading building.
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Pfc. Catamora noticed eight
(8) persons, one of whom he identified as Edwin Nuñez, acting
suspiciously. He noticed one of them giving instructions to two of the
men to approach Pfc. Manatad. He followed the two, but sensing
that they were being followed, they immediately proceeded to the
middle of the road and engaged Pfc. Catamora to a gun battle. At
that instant, Pfc. Catamora heard a series of shots from the other
group and thereafter saw Pfc. Manatad sprawled on the ground.
Being out-numbered and to save his own life, Pat. Catamora sought
refuge at the nearby BIR Office from where he saw two (2) persons
take Pfc. Manatad's gun and again fired at him to make sure that he
is dead while the rest of the group including Nuñes acted as back
up. Thereafter, the Nuñes group commandeered a vehicle and fled
from the scene of the shooting. Pfc. Rene Catamora testified that he
can identify accused-appellant Nuñes because of a mole at the
bridge of his nose near the left eye which he noticed when the
accused passed 2 or 3 meters in front of him together with his
companions.
On August 16, 1987, two teams of police officers were tasked to
conduct surveillance on a suspected safehouse of members of the
sparrow unit located in Peace Valley, Cebu City. Upon reaching the
place, the group saw Rodrigo Dasig and Edwin Nuñes trying to
escape. The team of Capt. Antonio Gorre captured Nuñes and
confiscated a .45 caliber revolver with 3 magazines and
ammunitions, while the group of Sgt. Ronald Arnejo pursued Dasig,
who threw a grenade at his pursuers, but was shot on his left upper
arm and subsequently apprehended. A .38 caliber revolver with 17
live ammunitions were confiscated from him.
Thereafter, Dasig was brought to the hospital for treatment, while
Nuñes was turned over to the Metrodiscom for investigation.
Meanwhile, Dasig was interrogated by M/Sgt. Ariston Ira of the PC
Criminal Investigation Service on August 19, 1987 at his hospital
bed at the Lapulapu Army Hospital in Cebu City. Assisting Dasig
during the interrogation was Atty. Fortunato Parawan of the Creer
Law Office, who was requested by the military to represent appellant
who did not have a lawyer. Before the start of the interrogation, Atty.
Parawan asked appellant whether he was willing to avail of his
services, to which appellant agreed. M/Sgt. Ira then appraised Dasig
of his constitutional rights. The interrogation was conducted in
Cebuano upon appellant's request.
Dasig confessed that he and the group of Edwin Nuñes killed Pfc.
Manatad. He likewise admitted that he and Nuñes were members
of the sparrow unit and the their aliases were "Armand" and "Mabi,"
respectively. The extra-judicial confession of appellant marked as
Exhibit "J" 2 was signed by him on every page thereof with the first
page containing a certification likewise signed by him, which states:
"I hereby certify that the herein statement is free and voluntary, and
that I am assisted by my counsel in the course of this investigation"
followed by the signed conformity of Atty. Parawan. The extra-
judicial confession was subscribed and sworn to before Cebu City
Asst. Fiscal Salvador Solima.
In the present appeal, Dasig contends that the procedure by which
his extra-judicial confession was taken was legally defective, and
contrary to his Constitutional rights. He further contends that
assuming he conspired in the killing of Pfc. Manatad, he should be
convicted at most of simple rebellion and not murder with direct
assault.
Appellant also claims that the custodial interrogation was done while
he was still very sick and consequently, he could not have fully
appreciated the wisdom of admitting such a serious offense. That
even with the presence of counsel, his extra-judicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence as said counsel did not actively assist him
and advise him of his rights. In effect, his presence was merely to
give a semblance of legality to the proceedings and not to protect
appellant against possible abuses of the investigator. Dasig,
likewise questions the sincerity of Atty. Parawan in protecting his
rights considering that the latter is a known anti-Communist
advocate and that the law firm to which he belongs has represented
high ranking officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
We find the argument specious. Fiscal Salvador Solima in his
certification, Exhibit "J-7-B," stated that he had personally examined
the affiant and that he is convinced that the latter's statement was
free and voluntary and that the affiant signed the same in his
presence and swore under oath as to the veracity of everything
therein. Atty. Fortunato L. Parawan also testified that he assisted
the affiant from the start of the investigation up to its termination.
Atty. Parawan testified thus:
"Q Who introduced Rodrigo Dasig to you?
A I inquired from the personnel of the hospital the whereabout of
Rodrigo Dasig and I introduced myself as a lawyer. So they informed
me the room of Rodrigo Dasig. At that time I introduced myself as a
lawyer who came to assist the person of Rodrigo Dasig. Once we
had a confrontation with Rodrigo Dasig, I asked him whether he was
willing to get me as his lawyer in that investigation. Then he told me
yes.
Q Did he tell you whether he as a counsel of his own choice?
A No.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In other words he accepted your services as counsel in
connection with that investigation which was about to be made?
A Yes.
Q Who are the persons present at that time?
A There were guards outside and inside. There was a man from the
CIS in the person of Sgt. Ira, myself and Dasig.
Q What happened after that?
A The CIS started the investigation.
Q You mean this Ariston Ira?
A Yes.
Q Before Ariston Ira conducted the investigation was Dasig
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel and
if he chooses to testify or say something, that statement of his will
be used against or in his favor in the court of justice?
A Yes. He was willing to get me as counsel in that investigation.
Q After he was informed of his constitutional rights what transpired
next?
A The investigation started.
Q Were you present at the very start of that investigation?
A Yes. I was present from the start until it was finished.
Q Was that reduced to writing?
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said you were present during the entire investigation. Were
the answers of the accused, Rodrigo Dasig, to the questions
propounded by the investigator voluntary?
A Yes, they voluntary.
Q After the investigation was finished what transpired next?
A After the investigation, I think that was already past 3:00 or 4:00,
we proceeded to the office of the City Fiscal at F. Ramos St., Cebu
City and then we proceeded to the Office of Fiscal Solema (sic) and
then it was subscribed there before Fiscal Solema (sic).
Q Were you present during the proceeding?
A I was also present."
We do not find any reason to doubt the factual findings and
conclusions of the trial court that the extra-judicial confession of the
appellant was voluntarily made. Said the trial court:
"The prosecution's evidence clearly shows that herein accused
during his investigation was properly informed and appraised of his
constitutional right to remain silent and to have a competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice but since at that
time he did not signify his intention to retain a lawyer of his own
choice, so he was provided with a lawyer in the person of Atty.
Fortunato Parawan of the Creer Law Office who was available at
that time, to assist him during the custodial investigation conducted
by T/Sgt. Ariston L. Ira at his hospital bed at Camp Lapulapu Army
Station Hospital, Cebu City where he was confined after being hit
on his upper left arm and in fact, Atty. Parawan only consented to
assist herein accused after the latter has answered in the affirmative
to his question as to whether he would be amenable to be assisted
by him as his counsel of his own choice.
"The prosecution's evidence further show that Atty. Fortunato
Parawan after consenting to be his counsel was with him when his
extra-judicial confession or sworn statement was subscribed and
sworn to by him before Assistant City Fiscal Salvador O. Solima of
the Cebu City Fiscal's Office who, before accused has actually
affixed his signature on each and every pages of his extra-judicial
confession, has informed him (accused) of his constitutional rights
and has explained the contents of his extra-judicial confession.
"Moreover, per certification made by Assistant City Fiscal Salvador
O. Solima of the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, clearly shows that
accused in executing the same has done so voluntarily and after
having understood the contents thereof which is in the visayan
language, a language known to him, found on the last page thereof
now marked as Exhibit "J-7-B."
"Furthermore, this sworn statement of accused Dasig is
collaborated by the sworn statement of his co-accused Edwin
Nuñes dated August 18, 1987 which is sworn and subscribed to
before City Fiscal Jopelinito Pareja of the city Fiscal's Office of Cebu
City."
The settled jurisprudence on the matter is that a confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given
as a result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency. 5 The case of People of the Philippines v. Parojinog is four
square to the case at bar. In Parojinog this court had this to say:
"Anent his claim that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice, Section 12
(1) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
'Sec. 12(1). — Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel
he must provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.'
"It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under
investigation for the commission of an offense may choose his own
counsel but if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. While the initial choice of the lawyer in the latter
case is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused
really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for
him and ask for another one. In the instant case, the records show
that no objection was voiced by the accused throughout the entire
proceedings of the investigation and afterwards when he subscribed
to its veracity before City Prosecutor Luzminda V. Uy. Thus, he
apparently acquiesced to the choice of the investigators. He
complained for the first time that Atty. Fuentes was not his choice
only during trial. Thus it was too late."
Appellant relies on the much abused claim that his extra-judicial Premises considered, We uphold the findings of the trial court that
confession was legally defective and hence, should not have been the extra-judicial confession was legally obtained. However,
admitted and considered by the trial judge. This accusation is appellant being a confessed member of the sparrow unit, the
whimsical and obviously a mere refuge for appellant's turnabout. In liquidation squad of the New People's Army whose objective is to
an attempt to avoid criminal liability, he now questions the integrity overthrow the duly constituted government, the crime committed is
of the police authorities and the reputation of the lawyer who stood simple rebellion and not murder with direct assault.
by him during the investigation. Indubitably established and now a WHEREFORE, accused Rogelio Dasig is found guilty of
matter of record is the fact that appellant was assisted by Atty. participating in an act of rebellion beyond reasonable doubt and is
Parawan who even signed the former's sworn declarations. It is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8)
likewise a matter of record that before appellant made his extra- years of prision mayor, and to pay the heirs of Pfc. Redempto
judicial confession, he was first asked if he was amenable to the Manatad, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
services of Atty. Parawan to which query he answered affirmatively. SO ORDERED.
Finally, the alleged use of fore and intimidation has not been
substantiated by evidence other than his self-serving testimony. As
has been pointed out, such allegation is another naive effort of
appellant to back track from his prior voluntary admission of guilt.
Evidently, the taking of his extra-judicial confession was done with
regularity and legality.
Nevertheless, there is merit in appellant's argument that granting he
is guilty, what he committed was a political crime of simple rebellion,
and hence he should not be convicted of murder with direct assault.
The Solicitor General agrees with the accused-appellant on this
point as manifested in the People's brief, which We quote:
"However, as correctly pointed by appellant, the lower court
erroneously convicted him of Murder with Assault Upon a Person in
Authority, instead of Rebellion.
"Rebellion is committed by taking up arms against the government,
among other means. (Article 135, Revised Penal Code). In this
case, appellant not only confessed voluntarily his membership with
the sparrow unit but also his participation and that of his group in
the killing of Pfc. Manatad while manning the traffic in Mandaue City
in the afternoon of August 4, 1987. It is of judicial notice that the
sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People's Army with
the objective of overthrowing the duly constituted government. It is
therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad
was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive
ends of the NPA. Consequently, appellant is liable for the crime of
rebellion, not murder with direct assault upon a person in authority."
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is a vast movement
of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots. Acts committed in
furtherance of rebellion though crimes in themselves are deemed
absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. 9 The act of killing a police
officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a
mere component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in
furtherance of the rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate
charge.
Moreover, in the case of People v. Mangallan 10 We held that where
the accused who was charged with murder admitted his
membership with the NPA and the killing of a suspected PC
informer, the crime committed is not murder but rebellion punishable
under Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to the proper imposable penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is not applicable to persons convicted of rebellion (Sec. 2, R.A.
4203), contrary to the insinuation of the Solicitor General. Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor
and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 to any person who promotes,
maintains, or heads a rebellion. However, in the case at bar, there
is no evidence to prove that appellant Dasig headed the crime
committed. As a matter of fact he was not specifically pinpointed by
Pfc. Catamora as the person giving instructions to the group which
attacked Pfc. Manatad.
Appellant merely participated in committing the act, or just executed
the command of an unknown leader. Hence, he should be made to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years of prision
mayor. For the resulting death, appellant is likewise ordered to pay
the heirs of Pfc. Manatad FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
as civil indemnity.

[G.R. Nos. L-6025-26. July 18, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., Defendants-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This refers to the petition for bail filed by Defendant Appellant
Amado Hernandez on June 26, 1954, and renewed on December
22, 1955. A similar petition, filed on December 28, 1953, had been
denied by a resolution of this court dated February 2, 1954. Although
not stated in said resolution, the same was due mainly to these
circumstances:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The prosecution
maintains that Hernandez is charged with, and has been convicted
of, rebellion complexed with murders, arsons and robberies, for
which the capital punishment, it is claimed, may be imposed,
although the lower court sentenced him merely to life imprisonment.
Upon the other hand, the defense contends, among other things,
that rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, arson, or robbery.
Inasmuch as the issue thus raised had not been previously settled
squarely, and this court was then unable, as yet, to reach a definite
conclusion thereon, it was deemed best not to disturb, for the time
being, the course of action taken by the lower court, which denied
bail to the movant. After mature deliberation, our considered opinion
on said issue is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The first two paragraphs of the amended information in this case
read:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The undersigned accuses (1) Amado V. Hernandez alias Victor
alias Soliman alias Amado alias AVH alias Victor Soliman, (2)
Guillermo Capadocia alias Huan Bantiling alias Cap alias G.
Capadocia, (3) Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony Collantes
alias Bonifacio, (4) Alfredo Saulo alias Elias alias Fred alias A.B.S.
alias A.B., (5) Andres Baisa, Jr. alias Ben alias Andy (6) Genaro de
la Cruz alias Gonzalo alias Gorio alias Arong, (7) Aquilino Bunsol
alias Anong, (8) Adriano Samson alias Danoy, (9) Juan J. Cruz alias
Johnny 2, alias Jessie Wilson alias William, (10) Jacobo Espino,
(11) Amado Racanday, (12) Fermin Rodillas, and (13) Julian
Lumanog alias Manue, of the crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies committed as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said
date and continuously thereafter until the present time, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had chosen as the
nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of
the Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating, and
cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31)
Defendants charged in criminal cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270,
14315, and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided
May 11, 1951) and also with others whose whereabouts and
identities are still unknown, the said accused and their co-
conspirators, being then officers and/or members of, or otherwise
associated with the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO)
formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organization (CLO), an
active agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (P.K.P.), with central offices in Manila and chapters
and affiliated or associated labor unions and other ‘mass
organizations’ in different places in the Philippines, and as such
agency, organ, and instrumentality, fully cooperates in, and
synchronizes its activities with the rebellious activities of the
‘Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan, (H.M.B.) and other organs,
agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (P.K.P.) to thereby assure, facilitate, and effect the
complete and permanent success of the armed rebellion against the
Republic of the Philippines, as the herein Defendants and their co-
conspirators have in fact synchronized the activities of the CLO with
the rebellious activities of the HMB and other agencies, organs and
instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines and have
otherwise master- minded or promoted the cooperative efforts
between the CLO and HMB and other agencies, organs, and
instrumentalities of the P.K.P. in the prosecution of the rebellion
against the Republic of the Philippines, and being then also high
ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with, the
Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively
engaged in an armed rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines through acts therefor committed and planned to be
further committed in Manila and other places in the Philippines, and
of which party the ‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ (HMB),
otherwise or formerly known as the ‘Hukbalahaps’ (Huks), is the
armed force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the
‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ (HMB) or the ‘Hukbalahaps’
(Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Republic of the
Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising,
for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines from the
allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said
‘Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan’ or ‘Hukbalahaps’ have risen
publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there
making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians,
and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in
connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and
there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and
planned destruction of private and public property to create and
spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose, as follows, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Then follows a description of the murders, arsons and robberies
allegedly perpetrated by the accused “as a necessary means to
commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in
furtherance thereof.”
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed,
the same to be applied in its maximum period.”
It is obvious, from the language of this article, that the same
presupposes the commission of two (2) or more crimes, and, hence,
does not apply when the culprit is guilty of only one crime.
Article 134 of said code reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly
and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the
territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, of any body of
land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief
Executive or the Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their
powers or prerogatives.”
Pursuant to Article 135 of the same code “any person, merely
participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.”
The penalty is increased to prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000 for “any person who promotes, maintains or heads a
rebellion or insurrection or who, while holding any public office or
employment, takes part therein”:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. “engaging in war against the forces of the government”,
2. “destroying property”, or
3. “committing serious violence”,
4. “exacting contributions or”
5. “diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they
have been appropriated”.
Whether performed singly or collectively, these five (5) classes of
acts constitute only one offense, and no more, and are, altogether,
subject to only one penalty — prision mayor and a fine not to exceed
P20,000. Thus for instance, a public officer who assists the rebels
by turning over to them, for use in financing the uprising, the public
funds entrusted to his custody, could neither be prosecuted for
malversation of such funds, apart from rebellion, nor accused and
convicted of the complex crime of rebellion with malversation of
public funds. The reason is that such malversation is inherent in the
crime of rebellion committed by him. In fact, he would not be guilty
of rebellion had he not so misappropriated said funds. In the
imposition, upon said public officer, of the penalty for rebellion it
would even be improper to consider the aggravating circumstance
of advantage taken by the offender of his public position, this being
an essential element of the crime he had perpetrated. Now, then, if
the office held by said offender and the nature of the funds
malversed by him cannot aggravate the penalty for his offense, it is
clear that neither may it worsen the very crime committed by the
culprit by giving rise, either to an independent crime, or to a complex
crime. Needless to say, a mere participant in the rebellion, who is
not a public officer, should not be placed at a more disadvantageous
position than the promoters, maintainers or leaders of the
movement, or the public officers who join the same, insofar as the
application of Article 48 is concerned.
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the
words of said Article 135, is by “engaging in war against the forces
of the government” and “committing serious violence” in the
prosecution of said “war”. These expressions imply everything that
war connotes, namely; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryresort to arms,
requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and
contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property, physical
injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that
war leaves in its wake — except that, very often, it is worse than war
in the international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight
between brothers, with a bitterness and passion or ruthlessness
seldom found in a contest between strangers. Being within the
purview of “engaging in war” and “committing serious violence”, said
resort to arms, with the resulting impairment or destruction of life
and property, constitutes not two or more offense, but only one
crime — that of rebellion plain and simple. Thus, for instance, it has
been held that “the crime of treason may be committed ‘by executing
either a single or similar intentional overt acts, different or similar but
distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one single
continuous offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz, 77 Phil., 801, 44 Off. Gaz.,
909.)” (People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil., 521.)
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we
repeat, one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer
no occasion for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor
the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never
in the past, convicted any person of the “complex crime of rebellion
with murder”. What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases
of rebellion published in the Philippine Reports, the Defendants
were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several
persons, sometimes peace officers (U. S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil.,
472; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil., 509, U. S.
vs. Ayala, 6 Phil., 151; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryLeague vs.
People, 73 Phil., 155).
Following a parallel line are our decisions in the more recent cases
of treason, resulting from collaboration with the Japanese during the
war in the Pacific. In fact, said cases went further than the
aforementioned cases of rebellion, in that the theory of the
prosecution to the effect that the accused in said treason cases were
guilty of the complex crime of treason with murder and other crimes
was expressly and repeatedly rejected therein. Thus, commenting
on the decision of the People’s Court finding the accused in People
vs. Prieto (80 Phil., 138, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329) “guilty of cralaw the
crime of treason complexed by murder and physical injuries” and
sentencing him to death, and on the contention of the Solicitor
General that Prieto had committed the “complex crime of treason
with homicide”, this court, speaking through Mr. Justice Tuason,
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The execution of some of the guerrilla suspects mentioned in these
counts and the infliction of physical injuries on others are not
offenses separate from treason. Under the Philippine treason law
and under the United States constitution defining treason, after
which the former was patterned, there must concur both adherence
to the enemy and giving him aid and comfort. One without the other
does not make treason.
“In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes, of a
deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer
vs. U.S., ante.) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is,
in itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision.
Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it
becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject
of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides. Just as one cannot be punished for possessing opium in
a prosecution for smoking the identical drug, and a robber cannot
be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution
for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass
are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a
Defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred
as a constitutive ingredient of treason cralaw . Where murder or
physical injuries are charged as overt acts of treason cralaw they
cannot be regarded separately under their general denomination.”
(Italics supplied.)
Accordingly, we convicted the accused of simple treason and
sentenced him to life imprisonment.
In People vs. Labra, 81 Phil., 377, 46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159,
we used the following language:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The lower court found Appellant guilty not only of treason, but of
murder, for the killing of Tomas Abella, and, following the provisions
of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code sentenced him to death, the
maximum penalty provided by article 114.
“The lower court erred in finding Appellant guilty of the murder of
Tomas Abella. The arrest and killing of Tomas Abella for being a
guerilla, is alleged in count 3 of the information, as one of the
elements of the crime of treason for which Appellant is prosecuted.
Such element constitute a part of the legal basis upon which
Appellant stands convicted of the crime of treason. The killing of
Tomas Abella cannot be considered as legal ground for convicting
Appellant of any crime other than treason. The essential elements
of a given crime cannot be disintegrated in different parts, each one
stand as a separate ground to convict the accused of a different
crime or criminal offense. The elements constituting a given crime
are integral and inseparable parts of a whole. In the contemplation
of the law, they cannot be used for double or multiple purposes.
They can only be used for the sole purpose of showing the
commission of the crime of which they form part. The factual
complexity of the crime of treason does not endow it with the
functional ability of worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction.
Otherwise, the accused will have to face as many prosecutions and
convictions as there are elements in the crime of treason, in open
violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.”
(Italics supplied.)
The same conclusion was reached in People vs. Alibotod 82 Phil.,
164, 46 Off. Gaz., 1005, despite the direct participation of the
Defendant therein in the maltreatment and killing of several persons.
In People vs. Vilo 82 Phil., 524, 46 Off. Gaz., 2517, we
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The People’s Court, however, erred in classifying the crime as
treason with murder. The killing of Amado Satorre and one Segundo
is charged as an element of treason, and it therefore becomes
identified with the latter crime, and cannot be the subject of a
separate punishment or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides.” (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz. 3329. See, also
People vs. Labra, L-886, 46 Off. Gaz., [Supp. to No. 1], 159.)” (Italics
supplied.)
To the same effect was our decision in People vs. Roble 83 Phil., 1,
46 Off. Gaz., 4207. We stated therein:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The court held that the facts alleged in the information is a complex
crime of treason with murders, with the result that the penalty
provided for the most serious offense was to be imposed on its
maximum degree. Viewing the case from the standpoint of
modifying circumstances, the court believed that the same result
obtained. It opined that the killings were murders qualified by
treachery and aggravated by the circumstances of evident
premeditation, superior strength, cruelty, and an armed band.
“We think this is error. The tortures and murders set forth in the
information are merged in and formed part of the treason. They were
in this case the overt acts which, besides traitorous intention
supplied a vital ingredient in the crime.” (Italics supplied.)
The accused in People vs. Delgado 83 Phil., 9, 46 Off. Gaz., 4213,
had been convicted by the People’s Court of “the crime of treason
complexed with the crime of murder” and sentenced to the extreme
penalty. In our decision, penned by Mr. Justice Montemayor, we
expressed ourselves as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Appellant herein was and is a Filipino citizen. His adherence to
the Japanese forces of occupation and giving them aid and comfort
by acting as their spy, undercover man, investigator, and even killer
when necessary to cow and compel the inhabitants to surrender
their firearms and disclose information about the guerrillas has been
fully established. His manner of investigation and maltreatment of
some of his victims like Tereso Sanchez and Patricio Suico, was so
cruel, brutal and inhuman that it is almost unbelievable that a Filipino
can commit and practice such atrocities especially on his own
countrymen. But, evidently, war, confusion and opportunism can
and do produce characters and monster unknown during peace and
normal times.
“The People’s Court found the Appellant guilty of treason complexed
with murder. The Solicitor General, however, maintains that the
offense committed is simple treason, citing the doctrine laid down
by this court in the case of People vs. Prieto, (L-399, 45 Off. Gaz.,
3329) but accompanied by the aggravating circumstance under
Article 14, paragraph 21, of the Revised Penal Code, and not
compensated by any mitigating circumstance, and he recommends
the imposition of the penalty of death. We agree with the Solicitor
General that on the basis of the ruling of this court in the case of
People vs. Prieto, supra, the Appellant may be convicted only a
treason, and that the killing and infliction of physical injuries
committed by him may not be separated from the crime of treason
but should be regarded as acts performed in the commission of
treason, although, as stated in said case, the brutality with which the
killing or physical injuries were carried out may be taken as an
aggravating circumstance.” (Italics supplied.)
and reduced the penalty from death to life imprisonment and a fine
of P20,000.
Identical were the pertinent features of the case of People vs.
Adlawan, 83 Phil., 194, 46 Off. Gaz., 4299, in which, through Mr.
Justice Reyes (A), we declared:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw we find merit in the contention that Appellant should have
not been convicted of the so called ‘Complex crime of treason with
murder, robbery, and rape.’ The killings, robbery, and raping
mentioned in the information are therein alleged not as specific
offenses but as mere elements of the crime of treason for which the
accused is being prosecuted. Being merged in and identified with
the general charged they cannot be used in combination with the
treason to increase the penalty under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code. (People vs. Prieto, L-399, January 29, 1948, 45 Off.
Gaz., 3329.) Appellant should, therefore, be held guilty of treason
only.” (Italics supplied.)
In People vs. Suralta, 85 Phil., 714, 47 Off. Gaz., 4595, the language
used was:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw But the People’s Court erred in finding the Appellant guilty
of the complex crime of treason with murder, because murder was
an ingredient of the crime of treason, as we have heretofore held in
several cases. (Italics supplied.)
This was reiterated in People vs. Navea, 87 Phil., 1, 47 Off. Gaz.,
Supp. No. 12, p. 252:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The Solicitor General recommends that the Appellant be sentenced
for the complex crime of treason with murder. We have already
ruled, however, that where, as in the present case, the killing is
charged as an element of treason, it ‘becomes identified with the
latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or
used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code provides.” (Italics supplied.)
The question at bar was, also, taken up in the case of Crisologo vs.
People and Villalobos (94 Phil., 477), decided on February 26, 1954.
The facts and the rule therein laid down are set forth in our
unanimous decision in said case, from which we
quote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The Petitioner Juan D. Crisologo, a captain in the USAFFE during
the last world war and at the time of the filing of the present petition
a lieutenant colonel in the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was on
March 12, 1946, accused of treason under Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code in an information filed in the People’s Court.
But before the accused could be brought under the jurisdiction of
the court, he was on January 13, 1947, indicted for violations of
Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as the Articles of
War, before a military court created by authority of the Army Chief
of Staff, the indictment containing three charges, two of which, the
first and third, were those of treason consisting in giving information
and aid to the enemy leaving to the capture of USAFFE officers and
men and other persons with anti-Japanese reputation and in urging
members of the USAFFE to surrender and cooperate with the
enemy, while the second was that of having certain civilians filled in
time of war. Found innocent of the first and third charges but guilty
of the second, he was on May, 8, 1947, sentenced by the military
court to life imprisonment.
“With the approval on June 17, 1948, of Republic Act No. 311
abolishing the People’s Court, the criminal case in that court against
the Petitioner was, pursuant to the provisions of said Act, transferred
to the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga and there the charges
of treason were amplified. Arraigned in that court upon the amended
information, Petitioner presented a motion to quash, challenging the
jurisdiction of the court and pleading double jeopardy because of his
previous sentence in the military court. But the court denied the
motion and, after Petitioner had pleaded not guilty, proceeded to
trial, whereupon, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition
was filed in this court to have the trial judge desist from proceeding
with the trial and dismiss the case.
“It is, however, claimed that the offense charged in the military court
different from that charged in the civil court and that even granting
that the offense was identical the military court had no jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the same because the People’s Court had
previously acquired jurisdiction over the case with the result that the
conviction in the court martial was void. In support of the first point,
it is urged that the amended information filed in the Court of First
Instance of Zamboanga contains overt acts distinct from those
charged in the military court. But we note that while certain overt
acts specified in the amended information in the Zamboanga court
were not specified in the indictment in the court martial, they all are
embraced in the general charge of treason, which is a continuous
offense and one who commits it is not criminally liable for as many
crimes as there are overt acts, because all overt act ‘he has done
or might have done for that purpose constitute but a single offense.’
(Guinto vs. Veluz, 44. Off. Gaz., 909; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Pacheco, L-4750, promulgated
July 31, 1953.) In other words, since the offense charged in the
amended information in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is
treason, the fact that the said information contains an enumeration
of additional ovart acts not specifically mentioned in the indictment
before the military court is immaterial since the new alleged overt
acts do not in themselves constitute a new and distinct offense from
that of treason, and this court has repeatedly held that a person
cannot be found guilty of treason and at the same time also guilty of
overt acts specified in the information for treason even if those overt
acts, considered separately, are punishable by law, for the simple
reason that those overt acts are not separate offenses distinct from
that of treason but constitute ingredients thereof.” (Italics supplied.)
Thus, insofar as treason is concerned, the opinion of this court, on
the question whether said crime may be complexed with murder,
when the former was committed through the latter, and it is so
alleged in the information, had positively and clearly crystalized itself
in the negative as early as January 29, 1948.
We have not overlooked the decision in People vs. Labra (L-1240,
decided on May 12, 1949), the dispositive part of which partly
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Wherefore, the verdict of guilty must be affirmed. Articles 48, 114
and 248 of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to the offense of
treason with murder. However for lack of sufficient votes to impose
the extreme penalty, the Appellant will be sentenced to life
imprisonment cralaw ..”
Although it mentions Articles 48 and 248 of the Revised Penal Code
and “the offense of treason with murder,” it should be noted that we
affirmed therein the action of the People’s Court, which, according
to the opening statement of our decision, convicted Labra of
“treason aggravated with murder”. Besides, the applicability of said
articles was not discussed in said decision. It is obvious, from a
mere perusal thereof, that this court had no intention of passing
upon such question. Otherwise, it would have explained why it did
not follow the rule laid down in the previous cases of Prieto, Labra
(August 10, 1948), Alibotod, Vilo, Roble, Delgado and Adlawan
(supra), in which the issue was explicitly examined and decided in
the negative. Our continued adherence to this view in the
subsequent cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco and Crisologo,
without even a passing reference to the second Labra case, shows
that we did not consider the same as reflecting the opinion of the
court on said question. At any rate, insofar as it suggests otherwise,
the position taken in the second Labra case must be deemed
reversed by our decisions in said cases of Suralta, Navea, Pacheco
and Crisologo.
It is true that treason and rebellion are distinct and different from
each other. This does not detract, however, from the rule that the
ingredients of a crime form part and parcel thereof, and, hence, are
absorbed by the same and cannot be punished either separately
therefrom or by the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code. Besides there is more reason to apply said rule in the crime
of rebellion than in that of treason, for the law punishing rebellion
(Article 135, Revised Penal Code) specifically mentions the act of
engaging in war and committing serious violence among its
essential elements — thus clearly indicating that everything done in
the prosecution of said war, as a means necessary therefor, is
embraced therein — unlike the provision on treason (Article 114,
Revised Penal Code) which is less explicit thereon.
It is urged that, if the crime of assault upon a person in authority or
an agent of a person in authority may be committed with physical
injuries (U. S. vs. Montiel, 9 Phil., 162), homicide (People vs. Lojo,
52 Phil., 390) and murder (U. S. vs. Ginosolongo, 23 Phil., 171; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryU. S. vs. Baluyot, 40 Phil., 385), and rape may
be perpetrated with physical injuries (U. S. vs. Andaya, 34 Phil.,
690), then rebellion may, similarly, be complexed with murder,
arson, or robbery. The conclusion does not follow, for engaging in
war, serious violence, physical injuries and destruction of life and
property are inherent in rebellion, but not in assault upon persons in
authority or agents of persons in authority or in rape. The word
“rebellion” evokes, not merely a challenge to the constituted
authorities, but, also, civil war, on a bigger or lesser scale, with all
the evils that go with it, whereas, neither rape nor assault upon
persons in authority connotes necessarily, or even generally, either
physical injuries, or murder. 1
In support of the theory that a rebel who kills in furtherance of the
insurrection is guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murder,
our attention has been called to Article 244 of the old Penal Code of
the Philippines, reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion, o
con motivo de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente segun las
disposiciones de este Codigo.
“Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores seran penados como
tales los jefes principales de la rebelion o sedicion.”
and to the following observations of Cuello Calon (Derecho Penal,
Vol. II, p. 110), in relation thereto:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

“Se establece aqui que el en una rebelion o sedicion, o con motivo
de ellas, comete otros delitos (v.g., roba, mata o lesiona), sera
responsable de estos ademas de los delitos de rebelion o sedicion.
La dificultad consiste en estos casos en separar los accidentes de
la rebelion o sedicion de los delitos independientes de estas, y como
las leyes no contienen en este punto precepto alguno aplicable, su
solucion ha quedado encomendada a los tribunales. La
jurisprudencia que estos han sentado considera como accidentes
de la rebelion o sedicion — cuya criminalidad queda embedida en
la de estos delitos, y, por tanto, no son punibles especialmente —
los hechos de escasa gravedad (v.g., atentados, desacatos,
lesiones menos graves); chan roblesvirtualawlibrarypor el contrario,
las infracciones graves, como el asesinato o las lesiones graves, se
consideran como delitos independientes de la rebelion o de la
sedicion.”
It should be noted, however, that said Article 244 of the old Penal
Code of the Philippines has not been included in our Revised Penal
Code. If the applicability of Article 48 to rebellion was determined by
the existence of said Article 244, then the elimination of the latter
would be indicative of the contrary.
Besides, the crime of rebellion, referred to by Cuello Calon, was that
punished in the Spanish Penal Code, Article 243 of which
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Son reos de rebelion los que se alzaren publicamente y en abierta
hostilidad contra el Gobierno para cualquiera de los
objetossiguientes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. “Destronar al Rey, deponer al Regente o Regencia del Reino, o
privarles de su libertad personal u obligarles a ejecutar un acto
contrario a su voluntad.
2. “Impedir la celebracion dc las elecciones para Diputados a
Cortes o Senadores en todo el Reino, o la reunion legitima de las
mismas.
3. “Disolver las Cortes o impedir la deliberacion de alguno de los
Cuerpos Colegisladores o arrancarles alguna resolucion.
4. “Ejecutar cualquiera de los delitos previstos en el articulo 165.
5. “Sustraer el Reino o parte de el o algun cuerpo de tropa de tierra
o de mar, o cualquiera otra clase de fuerza armada, de la
obediencia del Supremo Gobierno.
6. “Usar y ejercer por si o despojar a los Ministros de la Corona de
sus facultades constitucionales, o impedirles o coartarles su libre
ejercicio. (Articulo 167, Codigo Penal de 1850. — Veanse las
demas concordancias del articulo 181.)”
Thus, the Spanish Penal Code did not specifically declare that
rebellion includes the act of engaging in war against the forces of
the Government and of using serious violence for the purposes
stated in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of this
express statutory inclusion of the acts of war and serious violence
among the ingredients of rebellion in the Philippines, it is clear that
the distinction made by Cuello Calon between grave and less grave
offenses committed in the course of an insurrection cannot be
accepted in this jurisdiction. Again, if both classes of offenses are
part and parcel of a rebellion, or means necessary therefor, neither
law nor logic justifies the exclusion of the one and the inclusion of
the other. In fact, Cuello Calon admits that “the difficulty lies in
separating the accidents of rebellion or sedition from the offenses
independent therefrom.” Ergo, offenses that are not independent
therefrom, but constituting an integral part thereof committed,
precisely, to carry out the uprising to its successful conclusion —
are beyond the purview of Article 244. Indeed, the above quoted
statement of Cuello Calon — to the effect that grave felonies
committed in the course of an insurrection are independent
therefrom — was based upon a decision of the Supreme Court of
Spain of February 5, 1872, which we find reported in the Codigo
Penal de Filipinas, by Jose Perez Rubio, as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia en sentencia de 5 de Febrero de
1872, tiene declarado:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que segun los
articulos 184 del Codigo Penal de 1830, y 259 del reformado (1870),
los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o sedicion o con
motivo de ellas se castigan respectivamente segun las
disposiciones de los mismos Codigos; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryy
con arreglo al decreto de amnistia de 9 de Agosto de 1876 estan
solo comprendidos en aquella gracia las personas sentenciadas,
procesadas o sujatas a responsabilidad por delitos politicos de
cualquiera especie -cometidos desde el 29 de Septiembre de 1868;
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryQue el asesinato del Gobernador Civil de
Burgos no fue resultado de movimiento alguno politico, sino de un
mero tumulto que imprimio el fanatismo, y cuya unica aparente
tendencia era impedir que aquel funcionario inventariase ciertos
objetos artisticos que se decian existentes en la
Catedral:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Que esto lo demuestran las
salvajes voces de muerte proferidas por los asesinos contra la
persona del Gobernador; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarysin que al
ejecutar en el mismo recinto del templo los horrorosos hechos que
aparecen en la causa, alzasen bandera politica alguna ni dieran otro
grito que el, en aquel momento sacrilego e impio, de ‘Viva la
religion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary’ Que la apreciar la Sala
sentenciadora los hechos referentes al Gobernador Civil de delito
de asesinato, penarlo con arreglo al Codigo y declarar inaplicable
el citado Decreto de Amnistia, no ha cometido el error de derecho
señalado en los casos 1.° 3.° del articulo 4.° de la ley sobre
establecimiento de la casacion criminal, ni infringido los articulos
250 y 259 del Codigo Penal de 1870.” (Page 239; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryItalics supplied.) (See, also, “El Codigo Penal”,
by Hidalgo Garcia, Vol. I, p. 623.)’
It is apparent that said case is not in point. There was no issue
therein on whether murder may be complexed with rebellion or
sedition. The question for determination was whether the killers of
the victim were guilty of the common crime of murder, or should
have been convicted only of rebellion or sedition. The court adopted
the first alternative, not because of the gravity of the acts performed
by the accused, but because they had no political motivation.
Moreover, the Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary to said quotation
from Cuello Calon reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Los atentados desacatos y lesiones a la autoridad u otros delitos
contra el orden publico cometidos en la sedicion o con motivo de
ella, no son delitos distintos de la sedicion, 3 octubre 1903, 19
noviembre 1906; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryla resistencia o
acometimiento a la fuerza publica por los sediciosos es accidente
de la rebelion, 23 mayo 1890.
“El asesinato de un gobernador cometido en el curso de un tumulto
debe penarse como un delito comun de asesinato, 5 febrero 1872.
Sin embargo, la jurisprudencia, tratandose de ciertos delitos, es
vacilante; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryasi, v. g., el acometimiento al
teniente de alcalde se ha declarado en un fallo independiente de la
perturbacion tumultuaria promovida para impedir al alcalde el
cumplimiento de sus providencias, 16 marzo 1885, mientras que un
hecho analogo se ha considerado en otra sentenda ya citada como
accidente de la rebelion, 3 Octubre 1903. El acometimiento de los
sediciosos a la fuerza publica es accidente de la sedicion y no uno
de los delitos particulares a que se refiere este articulo, 23 de mayo
1890. Entre estos delitos a que alude el precepto se hallan las
lesiones que puedan causar los sediciosos, 19 noviembre 1906.”
(Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary 21, II Cuelo Calon, Derecho
Penal, pp. 110-111.) (Italics supplied.)
Thus in a decision, dated May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court of Spain
held:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Considerando que la nota deferencial entre los delitos de rebelion
y sedicion, de una parte, y el de atentado, esta constituida por la
circunstancia de alzamiento publico que caracteriza a los primeros,
los cuales, por su indole generica, absorben a los de atentado y
demas infracciones que durante su comision y con su motivo se
cometan, y afirmandose como hecho en la sentencia recurrida que
el procesado Mariano Esteban Martinez realizo, en union de otros,
el atendado que se le imputa sin alzarse publicamente, cae por su
base el recurso fundado en supuesto distinto.” (Jurisprudencia
Criminal, Tomo 130, p. 551.) (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect are, likewise, the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“La provocacion y el ataque a la Guardia Civil por paisanos alzadoz
tumultuariamente para impedir al Delegado de un Gobernador civil
el cumplimiento de sus providencias, no pueden estimarse
constitutivos de un delito distinto del de sedicion, ni ser, por tanto,
perseguidos y penados separadamente.
“La resistencia o el acometimiento de los sublevados a la fuerza
publica constituye, en su caso, una circunstancia o accidente de la
sedicion y no es delito de los que el Codigo Penal en este articulo
(formerly Article 244, now Article 227) supone que pueden
cometerse en ella o con su motivo, los cuales denomina delitos
particulares, y manda que se penen conforme a las disposiciones
del propio Codigo. (S. 23-5-890; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryG. 23-
6-890; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryt. 44; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarypagina 671)” (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo, p. 2411.) (Italics supplied.)
“La Audiencia condeno como autores de atentado a dos de los
amotinados que agredieron al alcalde, e interpuesto recurso de
casacion contra la sentencia, el Tribunal Supremo la casa y anula,
teniendo en cuenta lo dispuesto en el articulo 250 (numero 3.°) del
Codigo Penal;
‘Considerando que el acto llevado a cabo por el grupo constituye
una verdadera sedicion, sin que sea licito el dividir este hecho y
calificarlo de atentado respecto a las personas que agredieron a
dicho alcalde, porque el acometimiento fue un accidente de la
sedicion, de la cual eran todos responsables, ya se efectuara por
los agrupados en conjunto o por uno solo, por ser comun el objeto
que se proponian y no individual; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryy al
calificar y penar este hecho la Audencia de Gerona, de atentado
cralaw, ha incurrido en error de derecho e infringido los articulos
250 y siguientes del Codigo Penal, por no haberlos aplicado, y el
263, numero 2.°, en relacion con el 264, numeros 1.° y 3.°, por su
aplicacion cralaw” (Sent. 3 octubre 1903. — Gac. 12 Diciembre)
(Enciclopedia Juridica Española, Tomo xxviii p. 250).
These cases are in accord with the text of said Article 244, which
refers, not to all offenses committed in the course of a rebellion or
on the occasion thereof, but only to “delitos particulares” or common
crimes. Now, what are “delitos particulares” as the phrase is used in
said article 244? We quote from Viada:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Las disposicion del primer parrafo de este articulo no puede ser
mas justa; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycon arreglo a ella, los delitos
particulares o comunes cometidos en una rebelion er sedicion no
deberan reputarse como accidentes inherentes a estas, sino como
delitos especiales, a dicha rebelion y sedicion ajenos, los que
deberan ser respectivamente castigados con las penas que en este
Codigo se las señalan. Pero, que delitos deberan considerarse
como comunes, y cuales como constitutivos de la propia rebelion o
sedicion? En cuanto a la rebelion, no ofrece esta cuestion dificultad
alguna, pues todo hecho que no este comprendido en uno y otro de
los objetos especificados en los seis numeros del articulo 243 sera
extraño a la rebelion, y si se hallare definido en algun otro articulo
del Codigo, con arreglo a este debera ser castigado como delito
particular. Pero tratandose de la sedicion, comprendiendose como
objetos de la misma, en los numeros 3.°, 4.° y 5.° del articulo 250,
hechos que constituyen otros tantos ataques a las personas o a la
propiedad, cuales se consideran como accidentes inherentes a la
propria sedicion, y cuales deberan reputarse como delitos
particulares o comunes? En cuanto a los casos de los numeros 4.°
y 5.°, estimanos que el objeto politico y social que se requiera para
la realizacion de los actos en aquellos comprendidos es el que debe
servirnos de norma y guia para distinguir lo inherente a la sedicion
de lo que es ajeno o extraño a ella. Cuando no exista ese objeto
politico y social, el acto de odio o venganza ejercido contra los
particulares o cualquiera clase del Estado, y el atentado contra las
propiedades de los ciudadanos o corporaciones mentados en el
numero 5.° del articulo 250, no seran constitutivos del delito de
sedicion, sino que deberan ser apreciados y castigados como
delitos comunes, segun las disposiciones respectivas de este
Codigo — y por lo que toca a los actos de odio o venganza ejercidos
en la persona o bienes de alguna Autoridad o sus agentes,
estimamos que deberan reputarse como delitos comunes todos
aquellos hechos innecesarios 2 para la consecucion del fin
particular que se propusieran los sediciosos — y como esenciales,
constitutivos de la propia sedicion todos aquellos actos de odio o
venganza que sean medio racionalmente necesario para el logro
del objeto especial a que se encaminaran los esfuerzos de los
sublevados. Asi, en el caso de la Cuestion 1 expuesta en el
comentario del articulo 258, es evidente que el fin que se
propusieron los sediciosos fue no pagar el impuesto a cuya
cobranza iba a proceder el comisionado; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarypero para lograr este objeto, como lo lograron,
fue preciso hacer salir del pueblo al ejecutor, y a este efecto, lo
amenazaron, lo persiguieron y llegaron hasta lesionarle. Esas
amenazas y lesiones no pudieron apreciarse, ni las aprecio
tampoco la Sala sentenciadora, como delito comun, sino como
accidente inherente a la misma sedicion, por cuanto fueron un
medio racionalmente necesario para la consecucion del fin
determinado que se propusieron los culpables.
“Pero cuando tal necesidad desaparece, cuando se hiere por herir,
cuando se mata por matar, el hecho ya, no puede ser considerado
como un accidente propio de la sedicion, sino como un delito
especial, al que debe aplicarse la pena al mismo correspondiente.”
(III Viada, pp. 311-312.) (Italics supplied.)
Cuello Calon is even more illuminating. He
says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“La doctrina cientifica considera los delitos llamados politicos como
infracciones de un caracter especial distintas de los denominados
delitos comunes. De esta apreciacion ha nacido la division de los
delitos, desde el punto de vista de su naturaleza intrinseca, en
delitos politicos y delitos comunes o de derecho comun.
“Se reputan delitos comunes aquellos que lesionan bienes juridicos
individuales (v. gr., los delitos contra la vida, contra la honestidad,
contra la propiedad, etc.)
“La nocion del delito politico no parece tan clara. Desde luego
revisten este caracter los que atentan contra el orden politico del
Estado, contra su orden externo (independencia de la nacion,
integridad del territorio, etc.), o contra el interno (delitos contra el
Jefe del Estado, contra la forma de Gobierno, etc.). Pero tambien
pueden ser considerados como politicos todos los delitos,
cualesquiera que sean incluso los de derecho comun, cuando
fueron cometidos por moviles politicos. Deben, por tanto, estimarse
como infracciones de esta clase, no solo las que objetivamente
tengan tal caracter por el interes politico que lesionan, sino tambien
las que, apreciadas subjetivamente, manifiestan una motivacion de
caracter politico.
“Asi podria formulares esta definicion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary es
delito politico el cometido contra el orden politico del Estado, asi
como todo delito de cualquiera otra clase determinado por moviles
politicos.” (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, Tomo I, pp. 247-249.)
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to
achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive. If a crime usually regarded as common like homicide, is
perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the allegiance “to the
Government the territory of the Philippines Islands or any part
thereof,” then said offense becomes stripped of its “common”
complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of
rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the latter.
Conformably with the foregoing, the case of murder against the
Defendant in U. S. vs. Lardizabal (1 Phil., 729) — an insurgent who
killed a prisoner of war because he was too weak to march with the
retreating rebel forces, and could not be left behind without
endangering the safety of the latter — was dismissed upon the
ground that the execution of said prisoner of war formed part of, and
was included in, the crime of sedition, which, in turn, was covered
by an amnesty, to the benefits of which said Defendant was entitled.
True, in U. S. vs. Alfont (1 Phil., 115), the commander of an
unorganized group of insurgents was, pursuant to Article 244 of our
old Penal Code, convicted of homicide for having shot and killed a
woman who was driving a vehicle. But the complex crime of
rebellion with homicide was not considered in that case. Apart from
this, the accused failed to established the relation between her
death and the insurrection. What is more, it was neither proved nor
alleged that he had been prompted by political reasons. In other
words, his offense was independent from the rebellion. The latter
was merely the occasion for the commission of the former.
It is noteworthy that the aforementioned decisions of this court and
the Supreme Court of Spain in cases of treason, rebellion and
sedition, are in line with the trend in other countries, as well as in
the field of international relations. Referring to the question as to
what offenses are political in nature, it was said in In re Ezeta (62
Fed. Rep., 972):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“What constitutes an offense of a political character has not yet been
determined by judicial authority. Sir James Stephens, in his work,
History of the Criminal Law of England (Volume 2, p. 71), thinks that
it should be ‘interpreted to mean that fugitive criminals are not to be
surrendered for extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental to
and formed a part of political disturbances.’ Mr. John Stuart Mill, in
the house of commons, in 1866, while discussing an amendment to
the act of ‘extradition, on which the treaty between England and
France was founded, gave this definition:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Any offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war,
insurrection, or political commotion.’ Hansard’s Debates Vol. 184, p.
2115. In the Castioni Case, supra, decided in 1891, the question
was discussed by the most eminent counsel at the English bar, and
considered by distinguished judges, without a definition being
framed that would draw a fixed and certain line between a municipal
or common crime and one of political character. ‘I do not think,’ said
Denman, J., ‘it is necessary or desirable that we should attempt to
put into language, in the shape of an exhaustive definition, exactly
the whole state of things, or every state of things, which might bring
a particular case within the description of an offense of a political
character.’ In that case, Castioni was charged with the murder of
one Rossi, by shooting him with a revolver, in the town of Bellinzona,
in the canton of Ticino, in Switzerland. The deceased, Rossi, was a
member of the state council of the canton of Ticino. Castioni was a
citizen of the same canton. For some time previous to the murder,
much dissatisfaction had been felt and expressed by a large number
of inhabitants of Ticino at the mode in which the political party then
in power were conducting the government of the canton. A request
was presented to the government for a revision of the constitution
of the canton and, the government having declined to take a popular
vote on that question, a number of the citizens of Bellinzona, among
whom was Castioni, seized the arsenal of the town, from which they
took rifles and ammunition, disarmed the gendarmes, arrested and
bound or handcuffed several persons connected with the
government, and forced them to march in front of the armed crowd
to the municipal palace. Admission to the palace was demanded in
the name of the people, and was refused by Rossi and another
member of the government, who were in the palace. The crowd then
broke open the outer gate of the palace, and rushed in, pushing
before them the government officials whom they had arrested and
bound. Castioni, who was armed with a revolver, was among the
first to enter. A second door, which was locked, was broken open,
and at this time, or immediately after, Rossi, who was in the
passage, was shot through the body with a revolver, and died, very
soon afterwards. Some other shots were fired, but no one else was
injured. Castioni fled to England. His extradition was requested by
the federal council of Switzerland. He was arrested and taken before
a police magistrate, as provided by the statute, who held him for
extradition. Application was made by the accused to the high court
of justice of England for a writ of habeas corpus. He was
represented by Sir Charles Russell, now lord chief justice. The
attorney general, Sir Richard Webster, appeared for the crown, and
the solicitor general, Sir Edward Clarke, and Robert Woodfal, for the
federal council of Switzerland. This array of distinguished counsel,
and the high character of the court, commends the case as one of
the highest authority. It appeared from an admission by one of the
parties engaged in the disturbances ‘that the death of Rossi was a
misfortune, and not necessary for the rising.’ The opinions of the
judges as to the political character of the crime charged against
Castioni, upon the facts stated, is exceedingly interesting, but I need
only refer to the following passages. Judge Denman
says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“The question really is whether, upon the facts, it is clear that the
man was acting as one of a number of persons engaged in acts of
violence of a political character with a political object, and as part of
the political movement and rising in which he was taking part.’
“Judge Hawkins, in commenting upon the character of political
offenses, said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many acts of
a political character done without reason, done against all reason;
chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut at the same time one cannot look too
hardly, and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their
political excitement. We know that in heat, and in heated blood, men
often do things which are against and contrary to reason; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarybut none the less an act of this description may
be done for the purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a political
rising, even though it is an act which may be deplored and lamented,
as even cruel and against all reason, by those who can calmly reflect
upon it after the battle is over.’
“Sir James Stephens, whose definition as an author has already
been cited, was one of the judges, and joined in the views taken as
to the political character of the crime charged against Castioni. The
prisoner was discharged. Applying, by analogy, the action of the
English court in that case to the four cases now before me, under
consideration, the conclusion follows that the crimes charged here,
associated as they are with the actual conflict of armed forces, are
of a political character.
“The draft of a treaty on International Penal Law, adopted by the
congress of Montevideo in 1888, and recommended by the
International American Conference to the governments of the Latin-
American nations in 1890, contains the following provisions (Article
23):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘Political offenses, offenses subversive of the internal and external
safety of a state or common offenses connected with these, shall
not warrant extradition. The determination of the character of the
offense is incumbent upon the nations upon which the demand for
extradition is made; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand its decision shall
be made under and according to the provisions of the law which
shall prove to be most favorable to the
accused:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary’
“I am not aware that any part of this Code has been made the basis
of treaty stipulations between any of the American nations, but the
article cited may be at least accepted as expressing the wisdom of
leading jurists and diplomats. The article is important with respect to
two of its features:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) provides that a
fugitive shall not be extradited for an offense connected with a
political offense, or with an offense subversive of the internal or
external safety of the state; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) the
decision as to the character of the offense shall be made under and
according to the provisions of the law which shall prove most
favorable to the accused. The first provision is sanctioned by Calvo,
who, speaking of the exemption from extradition of persons charged
with political offenses, says:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘The exemption even extends to acts connected with political crimes
or offenses, and it is enough, as says Mr. Fuastin Helio; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarythat a common crime be connected with a
political act, that it be the outcome of or be in the outcome of or be
in the execution of such, to be covered by the privilege which
protects the latter’ Calvo, Droit Int. (3me ed.) p. 413, section 1262.
“The second provision of the article is founded on the broad
principles of humanity found everywhere in the criminal law,
distinguishing its administration with respect to even the worst
features of our civilization from the cruelties of barbarism. When this
article was under discussion in the international American
conference in Washington, Mr. Silva, of Colombia, submitted some
observations upon the difficulty of drawing a line between an offense
of a political character and a common crime, and incidentally
referred to the crime of robbery, in terms worthy of some
consideration here. He said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘In the revolutions, as we conduct them in our countries, the
common offenses are necessarily mixed up with the political in
many cases. A colleague General Caamaño (of Ecuador) knows
how we carry on wars. A revolutionist needs horses for moving, beef
to feed his troops, etc.; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand since he
does not go into the public markets to purchase these horses and
that beef, nor the arms and saddles to mount and equip his forces,
he takes them from the first pasture or shop he find at hand. This is
called robbery everywhere, and is a common offense in time of
peace, but in time of war it is a circumstance closely allied to the
manner of waging it.’ International American Conference, Vol. 2, p.
615.” (Italics supplied.)
We quote the following from Endnote:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(23) on pages 249-250, Vol. I, of Cuello Calon’s aforesaid work on
“Derecho Penal.”
“En algunos Codigo y leyes de fecha proxima ya se halla una
definicion de estos delitos. El Codigo penal ruso, en el articulo 58,
define como ‘delitos contra revolucionarios’ los hechos
encaminados a derrocar o debilitar el poder de los Consejos de
trabajadores y campesinos y de los gobiernos de la Union de
Republicas socialistas sovieticas, a destruir o debilitar la seguridad
exterior de la Union de Republicas Sovieticas y las conquistas
economicas, politicas y nacionales fundamentales de la revolucion
proletaria.’ El Codigo Penal italiano de 1930 considera en eu
articulo 8.° como delito politico ‘todo delito que ofenda un interes
politico del Estado o un derecho politico del ciudadano.’ Tambien
se reputa politico el delito comun deteminado, en todo o en parte
por motivos politicos. En la ley alemana de extradicion de 25
diciembre 1929 se definen asi:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ‘Son
delitos politicos los atentados punibles directamente ejecutados
contra la existencia o la seguridad del Estado, contra el jefe o contra
un miembro del gobierno del Estado como tal, contra una
corporacion constitucional, contra los derechos politicos las buenas
relaciones con el extranjero.’ parrafo 3.°, 2.
“La 6a. Conferencia para la Unificacion del Derecho penal
(Copenhague, 31 agosto — 3 septiembre 1935) adopto la siguiente
nocion del delito politico:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“1. Por delitos politicos se entienden los dirigidos contra la
organizacion y funcionamiento del Estado o contra los derechos
que de esta organizacion y funcionamiento provienen para el
culpable.
“2. Tambien se consideran como delitos politicos los delitos de
derecho comun que constituyen hechos conexos con la ejecucion
de los delitos previstos en seccion 1.°:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
como los hechos dirigidos a favorecer la ejecucion de un delito
politico o a permitir al autor de este delito sustraerse a la aplicacion
de la ley penal.
“3. No se consideraran delitos politicos aquellos a los que su autor
sea inducido por un motivo egoista y vil.
“4. No se consideraran delitos los que creen un peligro para la
comunidad o un estado de terror.” (Italics supplied.)
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as “common” offenses and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients,
and, consequently, cannot be punished separately from the
principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the
imposition of a graver penalty.
There is one other reason — and a fundamental one at that — why
Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If
murder were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant,
namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) for the crime of rebellion, a
fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding
period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but
never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48, said penalty would
have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable
to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of
favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe
than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him
were punished separately. In the word of Rodriguez
Navarro:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que
hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.” (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de España, p. 2168.) 3
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71
(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article
48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932,
reading:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso
de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
“En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito
mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represente la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.
“Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se
sancionaran los delitos por separado.” (Rodriguez Navarro,
Doctrino Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163.)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in
said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not
exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our
Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses,
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing
that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in
its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties
for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this
benevolent spirit of Article 48 is readily discernible. When two or
more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed
less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and
distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the
penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.
Did the framers of Article 48 have a different purpose in dealing
therein with an offense which is a means necessary for the
commission of another? To begin with, the culprit cannot, then, be
considered as displaying a greater degree of malice than when the
two offenses are independent of each other. On the contrary, since
one offense is a necessary means for the commission of the other,
the evil intent is one, which, at least, quantitatively, is lesser than
when the two offenses are unrelated to each other, because, in such
event, he is twice guilty of having harbored criminal designs and of
carrying the same into execution. Furthermore, it must be presumed
that the object of Article 48, in its entirety, is only one. We cannot
assume that the purpose of the lawmaker, at the beginning of the
single sentence of which said article consists, was to favor the
accused, and that, before the sentence ended, the former had a
change of heart and turned about face against the latter. If the
second part of Article 48 had been meant to be unfavorable to the
accused — and, hence, the exact opposite of the first part — each
would have been placed in, separate provisions, instead of in one
single article. If the first part sought to impose, upon the culprit, a
penalty less grave than that which he would deserve if the two or
more offenses resulting from his single act were punished
separately, then this, also, must be the purpose of the second part,
in dealing with an offense which is a necessary means for the
commission of another.
The accuracy of this conclusion is borne out by the fact that, since
1850, when the counterpart of our Article 48 was inserted in the
Penal Code of Spain, or for over a century, it does not appear to
have been applied by the Supreme Court thereof to crimes of
murder committed in furtherance of an insurrection.
Incidentally, we cannot accept the explanation that crimes
committed as a means necessary for the success of a rebellion had
to be prosecuted separately under the provisions of Article 259 of
the Penal Code of Spain, which is the counterpart of Article 244 of
our old Penal Code. To begin with, these articles are part of a
substantive law. They do not govern the manner or method of
prosecution of the culprits. Then again, said precepts ordain that
common crimes committed during a rebellion or sedition, or on the
occasion thereof, “shall be respectively punished according to the
provisions of this Code.” Among such provisions was Article 90
(later Article 71, then Article 75) of the Spanish Penal Code, and
Article 89 of our old Penal Code, of which Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines is a substantial reproduction. Hence,
had the Supreme Court of Spain or the Philippines believed that
murders committed as a means necessary to attain the aims of an
uprising were “common” crimes, the same would have been
complexed with the rebellion or sedition, as the case may be.
The cases of People vs. Cabrera (43 Phil., 64) and People vs.
Cabrera (43 Phil., 82) have not escaped our attention. Those cases
involved members of the constabulary who rose publicly, for the
purpose of performing acts of hate and vengeance upon the police
force of Manila, and in an encounter with the latter, killed some
members thereof. Charged with and convicted of sedition in the first
case, they were accused of murder in the second case. They
pleaded double jeopardy in the second case, upon the ground that
the facts alleged in the information were those set forth in the charge
in the first case, in which they had been convicted. This plea was
rejected upon the ground that the organic law prohibited double
jeopardy for the same offense, and that the offense of sedition is
distinct and different from that of murder, although both were the
result of the same act.
The question whether one offense was inherent in, or identified with,
the other was not discussed or even considered in said cases.
Besides, the lower court applied, in the murder case Article 89 of
the old Penal Code — which is the counterpart of Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code — but this Court refused to do so. Again,
simply because one act may constitute two or more offenses, it does
not follow necessarily that a person may be prosecuted for one after
conviction for the other, without violating the injunction against
double jeopardy. For instance, if a man fires a shotgun at another,
who suffers thereby several injuries, one of which produced his
death, may he, after conviction for murder or homicide, based upon
said fatal injury, be accused or convicted, in a separate case, for the
non-fatal injuries sustained by the victim? Or may the former be
convicted of the complex crime of murder or homicide with serious
and/or less serious physical injuries? The mere formulation of these
questions suffices to show that the limitation of the rule on double
jeopardy to a subsequent prosecution for the same offense does not
constitute a license for the separate prosecution of two offenses
resulting from the same act, if one offense is an essential element
of the other. At any rate, as regards this phase of the issue, which
was not touched in the Cabrera cases, the rule therein laid down
must necessarily be considered modified by our decision in the
cases of People vs. Labra (46 Off. Gaz., Supp. No. 1, p. 159) and
Crisologo vs. People and Villalobos (supra), insofar as inconsistent
therewith.
The main argument in support of the theory seeking to complex
rebellion with murder and other offenses is that “war” — within the
purview of the laws on rebellion and sedition — may be “waged” or
“levied” without killing. This premise does not warrant, however, the
conclusion — drawn therefrom — that any killing done in
furtherance of a rebellion or sedition is independent therefrom, and
may be complexed therewith, upon the ground that destruction of
human life is not indispensable to the waging or levying of war. A
person may kill another without inflicting physical injuries upon the
latter, such, for instance, as by poisoning, drowning, suffocation or
shock. Yet it is admitted that he who fatally stabs another cannot be
convicted of homicide with physical injuries. So too, it is undeniable
that treason may be committed without torturing or murdering
anybody. Yet, it is well-settled that a citizen who gives aid and
comfort to the enemy by taking direct part in the maltreatment and
assassination of his (citizen’s) countrymen, in furtherance of the
wishes of said enemy, is guilty of plain treason, not complexed with
murder or physical injuries, the later being — as charged and proven
— mere ingredients of the former. Now then, if homicide may be an
ingredient of treason, why can it not be an ingredient of rebellion?
The proponents of the idea of rebellion complexed with homicide,.
etc., have not even tried to answer this question. Neither have they
assailed the wisdom of our aforementioned decisions in treason
cases.
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the
considerable efforts exerted, by the Executive Department in the
apprehension and prosecution of those believed to be guilty of
crimes against public order, of the lives lost, and the time and money
spent in connection therewith, as well as of the possible implications
or repercussions in the security of the State. The careful
consideration given to said policy of a coordinate and co-equal
branch of the Government is reflected in the time consumed, the
extensive and intensive research work undertaken, and the many
meetings held by the members of the court for the purpose of
elucidating on the question under discussion and of settling the
same.
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is,
however, — clear — to settle justiceable controversies by the
application of the law. And the latter must be enforced as it is — with
all its flaws and defects, not affecting its validity — not as the judges
would have it. In other words, the courts must apply the policy of the
State as set forth in its laws, regardless of the wisdom thereof.
It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is to
consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof — as specified in
Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Penal Code — as constituting only one crime, punishable with one
single penalty — namely, that prescribed in said Article 135. It is
interesting to note, in this connection, that the penalties provided in
our old Penal Code (Articles 230 to 232) were much stiffer,
namely:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Life imprisonment to death — for the promoters, maintainers and
leaders of the rebellion, and, also, for subordinate officers who held
positions of authority, either civil or ecclesiastical, if the purpose of
the movement was to proclaim the independence of any portion of
the Philippine territory;
2. Reclusion temporal in its maximum period — for said promoters,
maintainers and leaders of the insurrection, and for its subordinate
officers, if the purpose of the rebellion was any of those enumerated
in Article 229, except that mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
3. Reclusion temporal:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (a) for
subordinate officers other than those already adverted to; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (b) for mere participants in the rebellion
falling under the first paragraph of No. 2 of Article 174; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand
4. Prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period — for participants not falling under No. 3.
After the cession of the Philippines to the United States, the rigors
of the old Penal Code were tempered. Its aforementioned provisions
were superseded by section 3 of Act No. 292, which reduced the
penalty to imprisonment for not more than ten (10) years and a fine
not exceeding $10,000, or P20,000, for “every person who incites,
sets on foot, assists or engages in any rebellion or insurrection
cralaw or who gives aid and comfort to any one so engaging in such
rebellion or insurrection.” Such liberal attitude was adhered to by the
authors of the Revised Penal Code. The penalties therein are
substantially identical to those prescribed in Act 292. Although the
Revised Penal Code increased slightly the penalty of imprisonment
for the promoters, maintainers and leaders of the uprising, as well
as for public officers joining the same, to a maximum not exceeding
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, it reduced the penalty of
imprisonment for mere participants to not more than eight (8) years
of prision mayor, and eliminated the fine.
This benign mood of the Revised Penal Code becomes more
significant when we bear in mind it was approved on December 8,
1930 and became effective on January 1, 1932. At that time the
communists in the Philippines had already given ample proof of their
widespread activities and of their designs and potentialities. Prior
thereto, they had been under surveillance by the agents of the law,
who gathered evidence of their subversive movements, culminating
in the prosecution of Evangelista, Manahan (57 Phil., 354; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary57 Phil., 372), Capadocia (57 Phil., 364),
Feleo (57 Phil., 451), Nabong (57 Phil., 455), and others. In fact, the
first information against the first two alleged that they committed the
crime of inciting to sedition “on and during the month of November,
1930, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto.”
As if this were not enough, the very Constitution adopted in 1935,
incorporated a formal and solemn declaration (Article II, section 5)
committing the Commonwealth, and, then the Republic of the
Philippines, to the “promotion of social justice”. Soon later,
Commonwealth Act No. 103, creating the Court of Industrial
Relations, was passed. Then followed a number of other statutes
implementing said constitutional mandate. It is not necessary to go
into the details of said legislative enactments. Suffice it to say that
the same are predicated upon a recognition of the fact that a good
many of the problems confronting the State are due to social and
economic evils, and that, unless the latter are removed or, least
minimized, the former will keep on harassing the community and
affecting the well-being of its members.
Thus, the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning
of the century, has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with
the laws enforce during the Spanish regime. Such policy has not
suffered the slightest alteration. Although the Government has, for
the past five or six years, adopted a more vigorous course of action
in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their prosecution
the established policy of the State, as regards the punishment of the
culprits has remained unchanged since 1932. It is not for us to
consider the merits and demerits of such policy. This falls within the
province of the policy-making branch of the government the
Congress of the Philippines. However, the following quotation from
Cuello Calon indicates the schools of thought on this subject and
the reason that may have influenced our lawmakers in making their
choice:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Durante muchos siglos, hasta tiempos relativamente cercanos, se
reputaban los hechos que hoy llamamos delitos politicos como mas
graves y peligrosos que los crimenes comunes. Se consideraba que
mientras estos solo causan un daño individual, aquellos producen
profundas perturbaciones en la vida collectiva llegando a poner en
peligro la misma vida del Estado. En consonancia con estas ideas
fueron reprimidos con extraordinaria severidad y designados con la
denominacion romana de delitos de lesa majestad se catalogaron
en las leyes penales como los crimenes mas temibles.
“Pero desde hace poco mas de un siglo se ha realizado en este
punto una transformacion profunda merced a la cual la delincuencia
politica dejo de apreciarse con los severos criterios de antaño
quedando sometida a un regimen penal, por regla general suave y
benevolo.
“El origen de este cambio se remonta, segun opinion muy difundida,
a la revolucion que tuvo lugar en Francia en el año 1830. El
gobierno de Luis Felipe establecio una honda separacion entre los
delitos comunes y los politicos, siendo estos sometidos a una
penalidad mas suave y sus autores exceptuados de la extradicion.
Irradiando a otros paises tuvieron estas tan gran difusion que en
casi todos los de regimen liberal-individualista se ha llegado a crear
un tratamiento desprovisto de severidad para la represion de estos
hechos. No solo las penas con que se conminaron perdieron gran
parte de su antigua dureza, sino qua en algunos paises se creo un
regimen penal mas suave para estos delicuentes, en otros se abolio
para ellos la pena de muerte. Tan profundo contraste entre el
antiguo y el actual tratamiento de la criminalidad politica en la
mayoria de los paises solo puede ser explicado por las ideas
nacidas y difundidas bajo los regimenes politicos liberalesacerca de
estos delitos y delincuentes. Por una parte se ha afirmado que la
criminalidad da estos hechos no contiene la misma inmoralidad que
la delincuencia comun, que es tan solo relativa, qua depende del
tiempo, del lugar, da las circumstancias, de las instituciones del
pais. Otros invocan la elevacion de los moviles y sentimientos
determinantes de estos hechos, el amor a la patria, la adhesion
ferviente a determinadas ideas o principios, el espiritu de sacrificio
por el triunfo de un ideal.
“Contra su trato benevolo, del que no pocas veces se han
beneficiado peligrosos malhechores, se ha iniciado hace algun
tiempo una fuerte reaccion (vease Cap. XV, 3.°, b), que llego a
alcanzar considerable severidad en las legislaciones de tipo
autoritario, y que tambien ha hallado eco, en forma mas suave, en
las de otros paises de constitucion democratica en los que,
especialmente en los ultimos años, la frecuencia de agitaciones
politicas y sociales ha originado la publicacion de numerosas leyes
encaminadas a la proteccion penal del Estado.” (Cuello Calon,
Derecho Penal, Tomo 1, pp. 250-252.)
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the law
punishing the offense to dovetail with the policy of the law enforcing
agencies in the apprehension and prosecution of the offenders are
matters which may be brought to the attention of the departments
concerned. The judicial branch cannot amend the former in order to
suit the latter. The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without
violating the principle of separation of powers, and, hence,
undermining the foundation of our republican system. In, short, we
cannot accept the theory of the prosecution without causing much
bigger harm than that which would allegedly result from the adoption
of the opposite view.
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against Defendant-Appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said
Defendants, as means “necessary” 4 for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the crime
charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore,
simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murder, arsons and robberies; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarythat the
maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed
twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand that, in conformity with the policy of this
court in dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar
punishment, said Defendant may be allowed bail.
It is urged that, in the exercise of its discretion, the Court should
deny the motion under consideration, because the security of the
State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed
from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Amado V. Hernandez is
strong. However, as held in a resolution of this court, dated January
29, 1953, in the case of Montano vs. Ocampo (G.R. L-
6352):chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ cralaw to deny bail it is not enough that the evidence of guilt is
strong; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryit must also appear that in case
of conviction the Defendant’s criminal liability would probably call for
a capital punishment. No clear or conclusive showing before this
Court has been made.”
In fact, in the case at bar, Defendant Amado V. Hernandez was
sentenced by the lower court, not to the extreme penalty, but to life
imprisonment. Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too
transcendental and vital in a republican state, like ours, to be denied
upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public
safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major
preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with
guaranteeing its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1)
of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution devoted
paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16),
(17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several
aspects of freedom. Thus, in line with the letter and spirit of the
fundamental law, we said in the aforementioned case of Montano
vs. Ocampo:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“Exclusion from bail in capital offenses being an exception to the
otherwise absolute right guaranteed by the constitution, the natural
tendency of the courts has been toward a fair and liberal
appreciation, rather than otherwise, of the evidence in the
determination of the degree of proof and presumption of guilt
necessary to warrant a deprivation of that right.”
xxx xxx xxx
“In the evaluation of the evidence the probability of flight is one other
important factor to be taken into account. The sole purpose of
confining accused in jail before conviction, it has been observed, is
to secure his presence at the trial. In other words, if denial of bail is
authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof
being strong, the Defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity,
rather than face the verdict of the jury. Hence, the exception to the
fundamental right to be bailed should be applied in direct ratio to the
extent of the probability of evasion of prosecution.
“The possibility of escape in this case, bearing in mind the
Defendant’s official and social standing and his other personal
circumstances, seem remote if not nil.”

This view applies fully to Amado V. Hernandez, with the particularity

that there is an additional circumstance in his favor — he has been
detained since January 1951, or for more than five (5) years, and it
may still take some time to dispose of the case, for the same has
not been, and is not in a position to be, included, as yet, in our
calendar, inasmuch as the briefs for some Appellants — other than
Hernandez — as well as the brief for the Government, are pending
submission. It should be noted, also, that the decision appealed
from the opposition to the motion in question do not reveal
satisfactorily and concrete, positive act of the accused showing,
sufficiently, that his provincial release, during the pendency of the
appeal, would jeopardize the security of the State.

Wherefore, the aforementioned motion for bail of Defendant-

Appellant Amado V. Hernandez is hereby granted and, upon the
filing of a bond, with sufficient sureties, in the sum of P30,000, and
its approval by the court, let said Defendant-Appellant be
provisionally released. It is SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. L-8936. October 23, 1956.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.
FEDERICO GERONIMO alias Cmdr. OSCAR, ET AL.,
Defendants, FEDERICO GERONIMO alias Cmdr. OSCAR,
Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
In an information filed on June 24, 1954 by the provincial Fiscal in
the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, Appellant Federico
Geronimo, together with Mariano P. Balgos alias Bakal alias Tony,
alias Tony Collante alias Taoic, alias Mang Pacio, alias Bonny
Abundio Romagosa alias David, Jesus Polita alias Rex, Jesus Lava
alias Jessie alias NMT, alias Balbas, alias Noli, alias Noli
Metangere, alias NKVD, Juan Ocompo alias Cmdr. Bundalian, alias
Tagle, Rosendo Manuel alias Cmdr. Sendong, alias Ruiz, Ernesto
Herrero alias Cmdr. Ed, alias Rene, alias Eddy, Santiago Rotas
alias Cmdr. Jessie, Fernando Principe alias Cmdr. Manding, Alfredo
Saguni alias Godo, alias Terry, alias Terpy, Andres Diapera alias
Maclang, alias Berto, alias Teny, Lorenzo Saniel alias Wenny,
Silvestre Sisno alias Tomo, alias Albert, Teodoro Primavera alias
Nestor, Lorenzo Roxas alias Argos, Vivencio Pineda alias Marquez,
Pedro Anino alias Fernandez, Mauro Llorera alias Justo, Richard
Doe alias Cmdr. Danny and John Doe alias Cmdr. Berion, alias
Mayo, alias Cmdr. Paulito and many others, were charged with the
complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping
committed as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx xxx xxx
“That on or about May 28, 1946 and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto continuously up to the present time in the
province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court and in other municipalities, cities and
provinces and other parts of the country where they have chosen to
carry out their rebellious activities, the above-named accused being
then ranking officers and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with
the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or otherwise known as the
Hukbalahaps (HUKS) the latter being the armed force of said
Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) having come to an
agreement and decide to commit the crime of Rebellion, and
therefore, conspiring together and confederating among themselves
with all of the thirty-one accused in criminal case Nos. 14071,
14282, 14315, 14270, 15344 and with all the accused in criminal
case No. 19166 of the Court of First Instance of Manila with the other
members, officers and/or affiliates of the Communist Party of the
Philippines and the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan and with
many others whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown,
acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance
thereof, and mutually helping one another, did, then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, help, support, promote, maintain,
direct and/or command the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) or the Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB), to rise publicly and take arms
against the government of the Republic of the Philippines, or
otherwise participate in such public armed uprisings for the purpose
of removing the territory of the Philippines from the allegiance to the
government and laws thereof as in fact the said ‘Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps’ (HUKS)
pursuant to such conspiracy, have risen publicly and taken arms
against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines to attain
said purpose, by then and there making armed raids, sorties, and
ambuscades, attacks against the Philippine Constabulary, the
civilian guards, the Police and the Army Patrols and other
detachments as well as upon innocent civilians, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of Rebellion, in connection therewith and
in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed wanton acts
of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, kidnapping and planned
destructions of private and public property and plotted the liquidation
of government officials, to create and spread disorder, terror,
confusion, chaos and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of
the aforesaid purpose, among which are as follows, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
‘1. That on or about April 28, 1949 at Kilometer 62 at Barrio
Salubsob, municipality of Nueva Ecija, an undetermined number of
HUKS led by Commanders Viernes, Marzan, Lupon and Mulong
did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ambush,
assault, attack and fired upon the party of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon
and her PC escort whom they considered as their enemies resulting
in the killing of Mrs. Aurora A. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Mayor
Bernardo of Quezon City, Major P. San Agustin, Lieutenant Lasam,
Philip Buencamino III, and several soldiers and the wounding of
General Jalandoni and Captain Manalang.
‘2. That on or about August 26, 1950 in Santa Cruz, Laguna, about
one hundred armed HUKS with intent to gain and for the purpose of
securing supplies and other materials for the support and
meintenance of the Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan (HMBS) did,
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and forcibly
bringing the Cashier of the Provincial Treasury, Mr. Vicente
Reventar from his house to the Provincial Capitol and at the point of
guns forced him to open the Treasury Vault and took therefrom
Eighty Thousand Pesos (P80,000) consisting of various
denominations and including Fifty, One hundred and Five-Hundred
Peso Bills and also took away with them type- writers and other
Office supplies which they found in the Provincial Capitol Building,
burning and looting private buildings in towns.
‘3. That on or about the years 1951 to 1952 in the municipality of
Pasacao, Camarines Sur, Philippines, a group of Armed Huks under
Commander Rustum raided the house of one Nemesio Palo, a
police sergeant of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and as a result, said
HUKS were able to capture said Nemesio Palo and once captured,
with evident premeditation, treachery and intent to kill, stab, shot
and cut the neck of said Nemesio Palo thereby causing the
instantaneous death of Nemesio Palo.
‘4. That on or about January 31, 1953, at barrio of Santa Rita, Del
Gallego, Camarines Sur a group of HMBS with Federico Geronimo
alias Commander Oscar ambushed and fired upon an Army Patrol
headed by Cpl. Bayrante, resulting in seriously wounding of Pfc.
Paneracio Torrado and Eusebio Gruta a civilian.
‘5. That on or about February 1954 at barrio Cotmo, San Fernando,
Camarines Sur, a group of four HMBS led by accused Commander
Oscar with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously killed one Policarpio Tipay a barrio lieutenant.’“
(Appellee’s brief, pp. 1-8)
Accused Federico Geronimo first entered a plea of not guilty to the
information. When the case was called for trial on October 12, 1954,
however, he asked the permission of the court to substitute his
original plea with one of guilty, and was allowed to change his plea.
On the basis of the plea of guilty, the fiscal recommended that the
penalty of life imprisonment be imposed upon the accused, his
voluntary plea of guilty being considered as a mitigating
circumstance. Geronimo’s counsel, on the other hand, argued that
the penalty imposable upon the accused was only prision mayor, for
the reason that in his opinion, there is no such complex crime as
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnapping, because the
crimes of murders robberies, and kidnapping being the natural
consequences of the crime of rebellion, the crime charged against
the accused should be considered only as simple rebellion. On
October 18, 1954, the trial court rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty of the complex crime of rebellion with murders,
robberies, and kidnappings; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand giving
him the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of
guilty, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
pay a fine of P10,000, to indemnify the heirs of the various persons
killed, as listed in the information, in the sum of P6,000 each, and to
pay the proportionate costs of the proceedings. From this judgment,
accused Federico Geronimo appealed, raising the sole question of
whether the crime committed by him is the complex crime of
rebellion with murders, robberies, and kidnappings, or simple
rebellion.
After mature consideration, a majority of seven justices 1 of this
Court are of the opinion that the issue posed by Appellant has been
already decided in the recent resolution of this Court in the case of
People vs. Hernandez et al., (99 Phil., 529; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrary21 Lawyers Journal, No. 7 [July 31, 1956], p.
316). As in treason, where both intent and overt act are necessary,
the crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the
armed uprising for the purposes expressed in article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the
first paragraph of article 135. That both purpose and overt acts are
essential components of one crime, and that without either of them
the crime of rebellion legally does not exist, is shown by the absence
of any penalty attached to article 134. 2 It follows, therefore that any
or all of the acts described in article 135, when committed as a
means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in
article 134, become absorbed in the crime of rebellion, and cannot
be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves. In law
they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself, and cannot be
considered as giving rise to a separate crime that, under article 48
of the Code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.
The terms employed in the first paragraph of article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code to describe the component of violence in the
crime of rebellion are broad and general. The Spanish text (which is
the one controlling, People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil. 665) states that the
acts of the rebels may consists of —
“Sosteniendo combate 3 con la fuerza leal, causando estragos en
las propiedades, ejerciendo violencia grave, exigiendo
contribuciones, o distroyendo caudales publicos de su inversion
legitima.”
If all the overt acts charged in the information against herein
Appellant were committed for political ends or in furtherance of the
rebellion, they come within the preceding description. Thus, count 4
(ambushing and firing upon army patrol) constitutes engaging in
combat with the loyal troops; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarycount 2
(taking funds and equipment from the Provincial Treasury of
Laguna) is diverting public funds from their ligitimate purpose; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarywhile the killings outlined in the other counts
(1, 3 and 5) are instances of committing serious violence.
The majority of the Court found no cogent reason for limiting
“commission of serious violence” in article 135 to hostilities against
the Government’s armed forces exclusively; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryfor in that case, the former expression would
be redundant and mere duplication of “engaging in combat” with
loyal troops, also described in the same article. If the infliction of
“serious violence” was separately expressed in the law, it is because
the violence referred to is that inflicted upon civilians. Again, to
restrict “serious violence” to acts short of homicide, is to
unwarrantedly assume that the broad term “violencia grave” is used
in the limited sense of “lesiones graves”, which in our Penal Code
has a specialized signification. In truth, if physical injuries constitute
grave violence, so would killing necessarily be, if not more.
Additionally, it may be observed that rebellion is by nature a crime
of masses or multitudes, involving crowd action, that cannot be
confined a priori within predetermined bounds. (People vs.
Hernandez, supra; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryPeople vs. Almazan,
C. A., 31 Off. Gaz. 1932). Hence the broad terms employed by the
statute.
The prosecution insists that the “more serious” crime of murder
cannot be justifiably regarded as absorbed by the lesser crime of
rebellion. In the first place, it is not demonstrated that the killing of
an individual is intrinsically less serious or less dangerous to society
than the violent subversion of established government, which
emperils the lives of many citizens, at least during the period of the
struggle for superiority between rebels and loyalists. If, on the other
hand, murder is punished by reclusion perpetua to death, and
rebellion only by prision mayor, this leniency is due to the political
purpose that impels every rebellious act. As noted by Groizard
(“Codigo Penal de 1870”, Vol. 3, p. 239) —
“El analisis de toda clase de delitos politicos ofrece para el
jurisconsulto un resultado precioso, pues pone de relieve las
diferencias cardinales que existen entre esta clase de hechos y los
delitos comunes; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryentre los reos de
aquellos crimenes y los reos de estos otros. Para los delitos
comunes, la sociedad tiene una constante y energica reprobacion
que no atenua ni el trascurso de tiempo ni el cambio de las ideas.
Para los delitos politicos, no. Quien se atrevera si de honrado se
precia, a hacer alarde de la amistad de un hombre condenado por
robo o por asesinato? Y quien no ha tendido la mano cariñosa sin
perder nada de respetabilidad, a algun reo de un delito politico en
la serie continuada de revoluciones y contrarevoluciones que
constituyen desgraciadamente los ultimos periodos de nuestra
historia? La consumacion del delito y el exito de la rebelion, ya lo
hemos dicho, para el reo politico, es mas que la impunidad, es el
triunfo, es el poder, es el Gobierno, es casi la gloria. Pero no sucede
lo mismo tratandose de delitos comunes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
la consumacion del delito ni apaga el remordimiento, ni aleja del
criminal el peligro de la pena, ni mejora en nada su condicion
respecto de la justicia. Hay, pues, entre el delito comun y el delito
politico, entre las personas responsables de unos y otros
diferencias sustanciales, y el mayor error que en el estado actual
de los estudios juridicos puede cometer el legislador es no apreciar
eses diferencias, sobre todo en la aplicacion de las penas.”
And our history of three centuries of uninterrupted rebellions against
sovereign Spain, until she was finally driven from our shores,
suffices to explain why the penalty against rebellion, which stood at
reclusion temporal maximum to death in the Spanish Penal Code of
1870, was reduced only prision mayor in our revised Penal Code of
1932.
In addition, the government counsel’s theory that an act punished
by more serious penalty cannot be absorbed by an act for which a
lesser penalty is provided, is not correct. The theory is emphatically
refuted by the treatment accorded by the Penal Code to the crime
of forcible abduction, for which the law imposes only reclusion
temporal (article 342), notwithstanding that such crime necessarily
involves illegal detention of the abducted woman for which article
267 of the same Penal Code fixes the penalty of reclusion temporal,
in its maximum period, to death. The same situation obtains in the
crime of slavery defined in article 272, whereby the kidnapping of a
human being for the purpose of enslaving him is punished with
prision mayor and a fine of not more than P10,000.00, when
kidnapping itself is penalized by article 267 with a much higher
penalty.
And we have already pointed out in the Hernandez resolution that
to admit the complexing of the crime of rebellion with the felonies
committed in furtherance thereof, would lead to these undesirable
results:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary (1) to make the punishment for
rebellion heavier than that of treason, since it has been repeatedly
held that the latter admits no complexing with the overt acts
committed in furtherance of the treasonous intent, and, in addition,
requires two witnesses to every overt act which is not true in the
case of rebellion; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary(2) to nullify the policy
expressed in article 135 (R.P.C.) of imposing lesser penalty upon
the rebel followers as compared to their leaders, because under the
complexing theory every rebel, leader or follower, must suffer the
heavier penalty in its maximum degree; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand (3) to violate the fundamental rule of
criminal law that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the
accused:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary “in dubiis reus est
absolvendus”; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary“nullum crimen, nulla
poena, sine lege.”
Of course, not every act of violence is to be deemed absorbed in
the crime of rebellion solely because it happens to be committed
simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If the killing,
robbing, etc. were done for private purposes or profit, without any
political motivation, the crime would be separately punishable and
would not be absorbed by the rebellion. But ever then, the individual
misdeed could not be taken with the rebellion to constitute a
complex crime, for the constitutive acts and intent would be
unrelated to each other; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand the
individual crime would not be a means necessary for committing the
rebellion as it would not be done in preparation or in furtherance of
the latter. This appears with utmost clarity in the case where an
individual rebel should commit rape; chan
roblesvirtualawlibrarycertainly the latter felony could not be said to
have been done in furtherance of the rebellion or facilitated its
commission in any way. The ravisher would then be liable for two
separate crimes, rebellion and rape, and the two could not be
merged into a juridical whole.
It is argued that the suppression in the present Penal Code of article
244 of the old one (article 259 of the Spanish Penal Code of 1870)
indicates the intention of the Legislature to revive the possibility of
the crime of rebellion being complexed with the individual felonies
committed in the course thereof, because the suppressed article
prohibited such complexing. The text of the suppressed provision is
as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
“ART. 244. Los delitos particulares cometidos en una rebelion o
sedicion, o con motivo de ellas, seran castigados respectivamente
segun las disposiciones de este codigo.
Cuando no puedan descubrirse sus autores, seran penados como
tales los jefes principales de la rebelion o sedicion.”
The first paragraph is to the effect that the “delitos particulares”
(meaning felonies committed for private non-political ends, as held
by the commentators Cuello Calon and Viada, since the Penal Code
does not classify crimes into “general” and “particular”) are to be
dealt with separately from the rebellion, punishment for each felony
to be visited upon the perpetrators thereof. This paragraph has no
bearing on the question of complex crimes, but is a mere
consequence of the fact that the delicts committed for private ends
bear no relation to the political crime of rebellion (other than a
coincidence of time) and therefore must be separately dealt with.
This is so obvious that, as Groizard pointed out (Vol. 3, p. 650), such
action (their punishment as a private misdeed) would be taken by
the courts even if this first paragraph of article 244 had not been
written.
Far more significant, in the opinion of the majority, is that our
Revised Penal Code of 1932 did not revive the rule contained in the
second paragraph of article 244 of the old Penal Code (Article 259
of the Spanish), whereby the rebel leaders were made criminally
responsible for the individual felonies committed during the rebellion
or on occasion thereof, in case the real perpetrators could not be
found. In effect that paragraph established a command
responsibility; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand in suppressing it, the
Legislature plainly revealed a policy of rejecting any such command
responsibility. It was the legislative intent, therefore, that the rebel
leaders (and with greater reason, the mere followers) should be held
accountable solely for the rebellion, and not for the individual crimes
(delitos particulares) committed during the same for private ends,
unless their actual participation therein was duly established. In
other words, the suppression of article 244 of the old Penal Code
virtually negates the contention that the rebellion and the individual
misdeeds committed during the same should legally constitute one
complex whole. Whether or not such policy should be maintained is
not for the courts, but for the Legislature, to say.
But while a majority of seven justices 4 are agreed that if the overt
acts detailed in the information against the Appellant had been duly
proved to have been committed “as a necessary means to commit
the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance
thereof”, then the accused could only be convicted of simple
rebellion, the opinions differ as to whether his plea of guilty renders
the accused amenable to punishment not only for rebellion but also
for murder or other crimes.
Six justices 5 believe that conceding the absence of a complex
crime, still, by his plea of guilty the accused-Appellant has admitted
all the acts described in the five separate counts of the information;
chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand that if any of such counts constituted
an independent crime committed within the jurisdiction of the lower
court as seems to be the case under the facts alleged in Count No.
5 (the killing of Policarpio Tibay), then the avertment in the
information that it was perpetrated in furtherance of the rebellion,
being a mere conclusion, cannot be a bar to Appellant’s conviction
and punishment for said offense, he having failed, at the
arraignment, to object to the information on the ground of multiplicity
of crimes charged. Hence, the acts charged in Counts 1 to 4 cannot
be taken into consideration in this case, either because they were
committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court below
(Count 1), or because the allegations do not charge the Appellant’s
participation (Count 3), or else the acts charged are essentially acts
of rebellion, with out private motives (Counts 2 and 4).
Five justices, 6 on the other hand, hold that by his plea of guilty, the
accused avowed having committed the overt acts charged in all five
counts; chan roblesvirtualawlibrarybut that he only admitted
committing them in fact “as a necessary means”, “in connection and
in furtherance of the rebellion”, as expressly alleged by the
prosecution. This is not only because the information expressly
alleged the necessary connection between the overt acts and the
political ends pursued by the accused, but in addition, it failed to
charge that the Appellant was impelled by private motives.
Wherefore, such overt acts must be taken as essential ingredients
of the single crime of rebellion, and the accused pleaded guilty to
this crime alone. Hence, there being no complex crime, the
Appellant can only be sentenced for the lone crime of rebellion.
Even more, the minority contends that under the very theory of the
majority, the circumstances surrounding the plea are such as to at
least cast doubt on whether the accused clearly understood that he
was pleading guilty to two different crimes or to only one; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryso that in fairness and justice, the case should
be sent back for a rehearing by the Court of origin, to ascertain
whether or not the accused fully realized the import of his plea (U.S.
vs. Patala, 2 Phil., 752; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Agcaoili,
31 Phil., 91; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryU.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil.,
305).

In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified and

the accused convicted for the simple (non-complex) crime of
rebellion under article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and also for
the crime of murder; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryand considering the
mitigating effect of his plea of guilty, the accused-Appellant Federico
Geronimo is hereby sentenced to suffer 8 years of prision mayor
and to pay a fine of P10,000, (without subsidiary imprisonment
pursuant to article 38 of the Penal Code) for the rebellion; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand, as above explained, for the murder,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to not less than 10 years
and 1 day of prision mayor and not more than 18 years of reclusion
temporal; chan roblesvirtualawlibraryto indemnify the heirs of
Policarpio Tibay in the sum of P6,000; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryand to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 92163 June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner
vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103], SENIOR STATE
PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE, PROSECUTOR
FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND CITY ASSISTANT CITY
PROSECUTOR EULOGIO MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG. GEN.
EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of the Northern
Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY
HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164 June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E. PANLILIO,
petitioners,
vs.
PROSECUTORS FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C. MANANQUIL,
and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
103, respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
Thirty-four years after it wrote history into our criminal jurisprudence,
People vs. Hernandez 1 once more takes center stage as the focus
of a confrontation at law that would re-examine, if not the validity of
its doctrine, the limits of its applicability. To be sure, the intervening
period saw a number of similar cases 2 that took issue with the
ruling-all with a marked lack of success-but none, it would Beem,
where season and circumstance had more effectively conspired to
attract wide public attention and excite impassioned debate, even
among laymen; none, certainly, which has seen quite the kind and
range of arguments that are now brought to bear on the same
question.
The facts are not in dispute. In the afternoon of February 27, 1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by
law enforcement officers led by Director Alfredo Lim of the National
Bureau of Investigation on the strength of a warrant issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City Branch
103, in Criminal Case No. 9010941. The warrant had issued on an
information signed and earlier that day filed by a panel of
prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C.
Trampe, State Prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis and Assistant
City Prosecutor Eulogio Mananquil, Jr., charging Senator Enrile, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio Honasan with
the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt
from November 29 to December 10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken
to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the
information and none fixed in the arrest warrant. The following
morning, February 28, 1990, he was brought to Camp Tomas
Karingal in Quezon City where he was given over to the custody of
the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig. Gen.
Edgardo Dula Torres.3
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator Enrile, through
counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging
that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having
been:
(a) held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in
the statute books;
(b) charged with a criminal offense in an information for which
no complaint was initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) denied his right to bail; and
(d) arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued
without the judge who issued it first having personally determined
the existence of probable cause. 4
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990 and
set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990. 5 On March 5, 1990, the
Solicitor General filed a consolidated return 6 for the respondents in
this case and in G.R. No. 92164 7 Which had been
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enrile's
co-accused, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised
similar questions. Said return urged that the petitioners' case does
not fall within the Hernandez ruling because-and this is putting it
very simply-the information in Hernandez charged murders and
other common crimes committed as a necessary means for the
commission of rebellion, whereas the information against Sen.
Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed on the
occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion. Stated otherwise, the
Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime
("delito complejo") arising from an offense being a necessary means
for committing another, which is referred to in the second clause of
Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject of the Hernandez
ruling, and the compound crime ("delito compuesto") arising from a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses
referred to in the first clause of the same paragraph, with which
Hernandez was not concerned and to which, therefore, it should not
apply.
The parties were heard in oral argument, as scheduled, on March
6, 1990, after which the Court issued its Resolution of the same date
8 granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional liberty
conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or
surety bonds of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00
(for the Panlilios), respectively. The Resolution stated that it was
issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the
matter of the provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that
it was not passing upon the legal issues raised in both cases. Four
Members of the Court 9 voted against granting bail to Senator
Enrile, and two 10 against granting bail to the Panlilios.
The Court now addresses those issues insofar as they are raised
and litigated in Senator Enrile's petition, G.R. No. 92163.
The parties' oral and written pleas presented the Court with the
following options:
(a) abandon Hernandez and adopt the minority view
expressed in the main dissent of Justice Montemayor in said case
that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes, and that under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code rebellion may properly be
complexed with common offenses, so-called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral argument although it is
not offered in his written pleadings;
(b) hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses committed in
furtherance, or as a necessary means for the commission, of
rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion which
also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less grave character;
(c) maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb
all other offenses committed in its course, whether or not necessary
to its commission or in furtherance thereof.
On the first option, eleven (11) Members of the Court voted against
abandoning Hernandez. Two (2) Members felt that the doctrine
should be re-examined. 10-A In the view of the majority, the ruling
remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood
all subsequent challenges and no new ones are presented here
persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the incumbent President,
exercising her powers under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit
to repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No. 942 of the former
regime which precisely sought to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by
enacting a new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal Code
to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on the occasion, of any of
the crimes penalized in this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which
includes rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon which
graver penalties are imposed by law are committed, the penalty for
the most serious offense in its maximum period shall be imposed
upon the offender."' 11 In thus acting, the President in effect by
legislative flat reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with the
effect of law. The Court can do no less than accord it the same
recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so
doing.
On the second option, the Court unanimously voted to reject the
theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in its application to
offenses committed as a necessary means for the commission of
rebellion and that the ruling should not be interpreted as prohibiting
the complexing of rebellion with other common crimes committed on
the occasion, but not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members of
the Court felt that the proponents' arguments were not entirely
devoid of merit, the consensus was that they were not sufficient to
overcome what appears to be the real thrust of Hernandez to rule
out the complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed in
its course under either of the aforecited clauses of Article 48, as is
made clear by the following excerpt from the majority opinion in that
case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental one at that-why Article
48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes were
punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon the movant, namely:
(1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and
prision mayor, in the corresponding period, depending upon the
modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of
prision mayor, and (2) for the crime of murder, reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present. in other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be
imposed upon him. However, under Article 48 said penalty would
have to be meted out to him, even in the absence of a single
aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in
conformity with the theory of the prosecution, would be unfavorable
to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of
favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe
than that which would be proper if the several acts performed by him
were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que
hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo.' (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal
Supremo de Espana, p. 2168.)
We are aware of the fact that this observation refers to Article 71
(later 75) of the Spanish Penal Code (the counterpart of our Article
48), as amended in 1908 and then in 1932, reading:
Las disposiciones del articulo anterior no son aplicables en el caso
de que un solo hecho constituya dos o mas delitos, o cuando el uno
de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer el otro.
En estos casos solo se impondra la pena correspondiente al delito
mas grave en su grado maximo, hasta el limite que represents la
suma de las que pudieran imponerse, penando separadamente los
delitos.
Cuando la pena asi computada exceda de este limite, se
sancionaran los delitos por separado. (Rodriguez Navarro, Doctrina
Penal del Tribunal Supremo, Vol. II, p. 2163)
and that our Article 48 does not contain the qualification inserted in
said amendment, restricting the imposition of the penalty for the
graver offense in its maximum period to the case when it does not
exceed the sum total of the penalties imposable if the acts charged
were dealt with separately. The absence of said limitation in our
Penal Code does not, to our mind, affect substantially the spirit of
said Article 48. Indeed, if one act constitutes two or more offenses,
there can be no reason to inflict a punishment graver than that
prescribed for each one of said offenses put together. In directing
that the penalty for the graver offense be, in such case, imposed in
its maximum period, Article 48 could have had no other purpose
than to prescribe a penalty lower than the aggregate of the penalties
for each offense, if imposed separately. The reason for this
benevolent spirit of article 48 is readily discernible. When two or
more crimes are the result of a single act, the offender is deemed
less perverse than when he commits said crimes thru separate and
distinct acts. Instead of sentencing him for each crime
independently from the other, he must suffer the maximum of the
penalty for the more serious one, on the assumption that it is less
grave than the sum total of the separate penalties for each offense.
12
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary
ruling of the Court, which is that Hernandez remains binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any
other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means
necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity
that constitutes rebellion.
This, however, does not write finis to the case. Petitioner's guilt or
innocence is not here inquired into, much less adjudged. That is for
the trial court to do at the proper time. The Court's ruling merely
provides a take-off point for the disposition of other questions
relevant to the petitioner's complaints about the denial of his rights
and to the propriety of the recourse he has taken.
The Court rules further (by a vote of 11 to 3) that the information
filed against the petitioner does in fact charge an offense.
Disregarding the objectionable phrasing that would complex
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment
is to be read as charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez, the
Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the
murders, arsons and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by said
defendants, as means "necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned
amended information is, therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that
the maximum penalty imposable under such charge cannot exceed
twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that,
in conformity with the policy of this court in dealing with accused
persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail. 13
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is charged with a crime that
does not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far
as the Court has ruled that rebellion may not be complexed with
other offenses committed on the occasion thereof, must therefore
be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of
Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with
a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple
rebellion.
Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially
filed and/or preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows
otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion
was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and
that on the strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was
conducted by the respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing
of the questioned information. 14 There is nothing inherently
irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an
indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the
initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed during
the preliminary investigation.
It is also contended that the respondent Judge issued the warrant
for petitioner's arrest without first personally determining the
existence of probable cause by examining under oath or affirmation
the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of Art. III, sec. 2, of
the Constitution. 15 This Court has already ruled, however, that it is
not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal
examination, it being sufficient that he follows established procedure
by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the prosecutor.16 Petitioner claims that the warrant of
arrest issued barely one hour and twenty minutes after the case was
raffled off to the respondent Judge, which hardly gave the latter
sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. 17 Merely because said respondent had
what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which
to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not,
or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance
suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed.
Petitioner finally claims that he was denied the right to bail. In the
light of the Court's reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to
petitioner's case, and of the logical and necessary corollary that the
information against him should be considered as charging only the
crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before conviction, that
must now be accepted as a correct proposition. But the question
remains: Given the facts from which this case arose, was a petition
for habeas corpus in this Court the appropriate vehicle for asserting
a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal
venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty
pending trial and judgment. The original jurisdiction to grant or deny
bail rested with said respondent. The correct course was for
petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be admitted
to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of
the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the
trial court should the review jurisdiction of this Court have been
invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
Even acceptance of petitioner's premise that going by the
Hernandez ruling, the information charges a non-existent crime or,
contrarily, theorizing on the same basis that it charges more than
one offense, would not excuse or justify his improper choice of
remedies. Under either hypothesis, the obvious recourse would
have been a motion to quash brought in the criminal action before
the respondent Judge. 18
There thus seems to be no question that All the grounds upon which
petitioner has founded the present petition, whether these went into
the substance of what is charged in the information or imputed error
or omission on the part of the prosecuting panel or of the respondent
Judge in dealing with the charges against him, were originally
justiciable in the criminal case before said Judge and should have
been brought up there instead of directly to this Court.
There was and is no reason to assume that the resolution of any of
these questions was beyond the ability or competence of the
respondent Judge-indeed such an assumption would be demeaning
and less than fair to our trial courts; none whatever to hold them to
be of such complexity or transcendental importance as to disqualify
every court, except this Court, from deciding them; none, in short
that would justify by passing established judicial processes
designed to orderly move litigation through the hierarchy of our
courts. Parenthentically, this is the reason behind the vote of four
Members of the Court against the grant of bail to petitioner: the view
that the trial court should not thus be precipitately ousted of its
original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail, and if it erred in that matter,
denied an opportunity to correct its error. It makes no difference that
the respondent Judge here issued a warrant of arrest fixing no bail.
Immemorial practice sanctions simply following the prosecutor's
recommendation regarding bail, though it may be perceived as the
better course for the judge motu proprio to set a bail hearing where
a capital offense is charged.19 It is, in any event, incumbent on the
accused as to whom no bail has been recommended or fixed to
claim the right to a bail hearing and thereby put to proof the strength
or weakness of the evidence against him.
It is apropos to point out that the present petition has triggered a
rush to this Court of other parties in a similar situation, all apparently
taking their cue from it, distrustful or contemptuous of the efficacy of
seeking recourse in the regular manner just outlined. The
proliferation of such pleas has only contributed to the delay that the
petitioner may have hoped to avoid by coming directly to this Court.
Not only because popular interest seems focused on the outcome
of the present petition, but also because to wash the Court's hand
off it on jurisdictional grounds would only compound the delay that
it has already gone through, the Court now decides the same on the
merits. But in so doing, the Court cannot express too strongly the
view that said petition interdicted the ordered and orderly
progression of proceedings that should have started with the trial
court and reached this Court only if the relief appealed for was
denied by the former and, in a proper case, by the Court of Appeals
on review.
Let it be made very clear that hereafter the Court will no longer
countenance, but will give short shrift to, pleas like the present, that
clearly short-circuit the judicial process and burden it with the
resolution of issues properly within the original competence of the
lower courts. What has thus far been stated is equally applicable to
and decisive of the petition of the Panlilio spouses (G.R. No. 92164)
which is virtually Identical to that of petitioner Enrile in factual milieu
and is therefore determinable on the same principles already set
forth. Said spouses have uncontestedly pleaded 20 that warrants of
arrest issued against them as co-accused of petitioner Enrile in
Criminal Case No. 90-10941, that when they appeared before NBI
Director Alfredo Lim in the afternoon of March 1, 1990, they were
taken into custody and detained without bail on the strength of said
warrants in violation-they claim-of their constitutional rights.

It may be that in the light of contemporary events, the act of rebellion

has lost that quitessentiany quixotic quality that justifies the relative
leniency with which it is regarded and punished by law, that present-
day rebels are less impelled by love of country than by lust for power
and have become no better than mere terrorists to whom nothing,
not even the sanctity of human life, is allowed to stand in the way of
their ambitions. Nothing so underscores this aberration as the rash
of seemingly senseless killings, bombings, kidnappings and
assorted mayhem so much in the news these days, as often
perpetrated against innocent civilians as against the military, but by
and large attributable to, or even claimed by so-called rebels to be
part of, an ongoing rebellion.

It is enough to give anyone pause-and the Court is no exception-

that not even the crowded streets of our capital City seem safe from
such unsettling violence that is disruptive of the public peace and
stymies every effort at national economic recovery. There is an
apparent need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the
penalty therefor or to clearly define and delimit the other offenses to
be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it cannot be
conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name. The Court has no power to effect such
change, for it can only interpret the law as it stands at any given
time, and what is needed lies beyond interpretation. Hopefully,
Congress will perceive the need for promptly seizing the initiative in
this matter, which is properly within its province.

WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine

enunciated in People vs. Hernandez, the questioned information
filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the spouses
Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple
rebellion only, hence said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final
conviction, as a matter of right. The Court's earlier grant of bail to
petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in
both cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix
the amount of bail to be posted by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed
by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the corresponding bail
bond flied with this Court shall become functus oficio. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 93335 September 13, 1990
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMAR U. AMIN, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 135, HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch
134, Pairing Judge, SPECIAL COMPOSITE TEAM of: Senior
State Prosecutor AURELIO TRAMPE, State Prosecutor
FERDINAND ABESAMIS and Asst. City Prosecutor EULOGIO
MANANQUIL; and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Ponce Enrile, Cayetano, Reyes & Manalastas Law Offices for
petitioner.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Together with the filing of an information charging Senator Juan
Ponce Enrile as having committed rebellion complexed with murder
1 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, government
prosecutors filed another information charging him for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 1829 with the Regional Trial Court of
Makati. The second information reads:
That on or about the 1st day of December 1989, at Dasmariñas
Village, Makati, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having reasonable
ground to believe or suspect that Ex-Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan has committed a crime, did then and there unlawfully,
feloniously, willfully and knowingly obstruct, impede, frustrate or
delay the apprehension of said Ex. Lt. Col. Gregorio "Gringo"
Honasan by harboring or concealing him in his house.
On March 2, 1990, the petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion (a) to hold
in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest pending personal
determination by the court of probable cause, and (b) to dismiss the
case and expunge the information from the record.
On March 16, 1990, respondent Judge Ignacio Capulong, as pairing
judge of respondent Judge Omar Amin, denied Senator Enrile's
Omnibus motion on the basis of a finding that "there (was) probable
cause to hold the accused Juan Ponce Enrile liable for violation of
PD No. 1829."
On March 21, 1990, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
and to Quash/Dismiss the Information on the grounds that:
(a) The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) The respondent court's finding of probable cause was devoid of
factual and legal basis; and
(c) The pending charge of rebellion complexed with murder and
frustrated murder against Senator Enrile as alleged co-conspirator
of Col. Honasan, on the basis of their alleged meeting on December
1, 1989 preclude the prosecution of the Senator for harboring or
concealing the Colonel on the same occasion under PD 1829.
On May 10, 1990, the respondent court issued an order denying the
motion for reconsideration for alleged lack of merit and setting
Senator Enrile's arraignment to May 30, 1990.
The petitioner comes to this Court on certiorari imputing grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by the respondent court in refusing to quash/ dismiss the
information on the following grounds, to wit:
I. The facts charged do not constitute an offense;
II. The alleged harboring or concealing by Sen. Enrile of Col.
Honasan in a supposed meeting on 1 December 1989 is absorbed
in, or is a component element of, the "complexed" rebellion
presently charged against Sen. Enrile as alleged co-conspirator of
Col. Honasan on the basis of the same meeting on 1 December
1989;
III. The orderly administration of Justice requires that there be only
one prosecution for all the component acts of rebellion;
IV. There is no probable cause to hold Sen. Enrile for trial for
alleged violation of Presidential Decree No. 1829;
V. No preliminary investigation was conducted for alleged violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1829. The preliminary investigation, held
only for rebellion, was marred by patent irregularities resulting in
denial of due process.
On May 20, 1990 we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the respondents from conducting further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 90-777 until otherwise directed by this Court.
The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the petitioner could
be separately charged for violation of PD No. 1829 notwithstanding
the rebellion case earlier filed against him.
Respondent Judge Amin sustained the charge of violation of PD No.
1829 notwithstanding the rebellion case filed against the petitioner
on the theory that the former involves a special law while the latter
is based on the Revised Penal Code or a general law.
The resolution of the above issue brings us anew to the case of
People v. Hernandez (99 Phil. 515 [1956]) the rulings of which were
recently repeated in the petition for habeas corpus of Juan Ponce
Enrile v. Judge Salazar, (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164, June 5,
1990). The Enrile case gave this Court the occasion to reiterate the
long standing proscription against splitting the component offenses
of rebellion and subjecting them to separate prosecutions, a
procedure reprobated in the Hernandez case. This Court recently
declared:
The rejection of both options shapes and determines the primary
ruling of the Court, which that Hernandez remains binding doctrine
operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other
offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means to its
commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that commutes
rebellion. (Emphasis supplied)
This doctrine is applicable in the case at bar. If a person can not be
charged with the complex crime of rebellion for the greater penalty
to be applied, neither can he be charged separately for two (2)
different offenses where one is a constitutive or component element
or committed in furtherance of rebellion.
The petitioner is presently charged with having violated PD No.
1829 particularly Section 1 (c) which states:
SECTION 1. The penalty of prison correccional in its maximum
period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos or both, shall be
imposed upon any person who knowingly or wilfully obstructs,
impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects and the
investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any
of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any
person he knows, or has reasonable ground to believe or suspect
has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to
prevent his arrest, prosecution and conviction.
xxx xxx xxx
The prosecution in this Makati case alleges that the petitioner
entertained and accommodated Col. Honasan by giving him food
and comfort on December 1, 1989 in his house. Knowing that
Colonel Honasan is a fugitive from justice, Sen. Enrile allegedly did
not do anything to have Honasan arrested or apprehended. And
because of such failure the petitioner prevented Col. Honasan's
arrest and conviction in violation of Section 1 (c) of PD No. 1829.
The rebellion charges filed against the petitioner in Quezon City
were based on the affidavits executed by three (3) employees of the
Silahis International Hotel who stated that the fugitive Col. Gregorio
"Gringo" Honasan and some 100 rebel soldiers attended the mass
and birthday party held at the residence of the petitioner in the
evening of December 1, 1989. The information (Annex "C", p. 3)
particularly reads that on "or about 6:30 p.m., 1 December, 1989,
Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan conferred with accused Senator
Juan Ponce Enrile accompanied by about 100 fully armed rebel
soldiers wearing white armed patches". The prosecution thereby
concluded that:
In such a situation, Sen. Enrile's talking with rebel leader Col.
Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house in the presence of about
100 uniformed soldiers who were fully armed, can be inferred that
they were co-conspirators in the failed December coup. (Annex A,
Rollo, p. 65; Emphasis supplied)
As can be readily seen, the factual allegations supporting the
rebellion charge constitute or include the very incident which gave
rise to the charge of the violation under Presidential Decree No.
1829. Under the Department of Justice resolution (Annex A, Rollo,
p. 49) there is only one crime of rebellion complexed with murder
and multiple frustrated murder but there could be 101 separate and
independent prosecutions for harboring and concealing" Honasan
and 100 other armed rebels under PD No. 1829. The splitting of
component elements is readily apparent.
The petitioner is now facing charges of rebellion in conspiracy with
the fugitive Col. Gringo Honasan. Necessarily, being in conspiracy
with Honasan, petitioners alleged act of harboring or concealing was
for no other purpose but in furtherance of the crime of rebellion thus
constitute a component thereof. it was motivated by the single intent
or resolution to commit the crime of rebellion. As held in People v.
Hernandez, supra:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political
order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to
achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or
motive. (p. 536)
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. It is described as a
vast movement of men and a complex net of intrigues and plots.
(People v. Almasan [CA] O.G. 1932). Jurisprudence tells us that
acts committed in furtherance of the rebellion though crimes in
themselves are deemed absorbed in the one single crime of
rebellion. (People v. Geronimo, 100 Phil. 90 [1956]; People v.
Santos, 104 Phil. 551 [1958]; People v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659
[1960]; People v. Lava, 28 SCRA 72 [1969]). In this case, the act of
harboring or concealing Col. Honasan is clearly a mere component
or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of the
rebellion. It cannot therefore be made the basis of a separate
charge. The case of People v. Prieto 2 (80 Phil., 138 [1948]) is
instructive:
In the nature of things, the giving of aid and comfort can only be
accomplished by some kind of action. Its very nature partakes of a
deed or physical activity as opposed to a mental operation. (Cramer
v. U.S., ante) This deed or physical activity may be, and often is, in
itself a criminal offense under another penal statute or provision.
Even so, when the deed is charged as an element of treason it
becomes Identified with the latter crime and can not be the subject
of a separate punishment, or used in combination with treason to
increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provides. Just as one can not be punished for possessing opium in
a prosecution for smoking the Identical drug, and a robber cannot
be held guilty of coercion or trespass to a dwelling in a prosecution
for robbery, because possession of opium and force and trespass
are inherent in smoking and in robbery respectively, so may not a
defendant be made liable for murder as a separate crime or in
conjunction with another offense where, as in this case, it is averred
as a constitutive ingredient of treason.
The prosecution tries to distinguish by contending that harboring or
concealing a fugitive is punishable under a special law while the
rebellion case is based on the Revised Penal Code; hence,
prosecution under one law will not bar a prosecution under the other.
This argument is specious in rebellion cases.
In the light of the Hernandez doctrine the prosecution's theory must
fail. The rationale remains the same. All crimes, whether punishable
under a special law or general law, which are mere components or
ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof, become absorbed
in the crime of rebellion and can not be isolated and charged as
separate crimes in themselves. Thus:
This does not detract, however, from the rule that the ingredients of
a crime form part and parcel thereof, and hence, are absorbed by
the same and cannot be punished either separately therefrom or by
the application of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. ... (People
v. Hernandez, supra, at p. 528)
The Hernandez and other related cases mention common crimes as
absorbed in the crime of rebellion. These common crimes refer to
all acts of violence such as murder, arson, robbery, kidnapping etc.
as provided in the Revised Penal Code. The attendant
circumstances in the instant case, however, constrain us to rule that
the theory of absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to
common crimes but also to offenses under special laws which are
perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense.
The conversation and, therefore, alleged conspiring of Senator
Ponce Enrile with Colonel Honasan is too intimately tied up with his
allegedly harboring and concealing Honasan for practically the
same act to form two separate crimes of rebellion and violation of
PD No. 1829.
Clearly, the petitioner's alleged act of harboring or concealing which
was based on his acts of conspiring with Honasan was committed
in connection with or in furtherance of rebellion and must now be
deemed as absorbed by, merged in, and Identified with the crime of
rebellion punished in Articles 134 and 135 of the RPC.
Thus, national, as well as international, laws and jurisprudence
overwhelmingly favor the proposition that common crimes,
perpetrated in furtherance of a political offense, are divested of their
character as "common" offenses, and assume the political
complexion of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients,
and consequently, cannot be punished separately from the principal
offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a
graver penalty. (People v. Hernandez, supra, p. 541)
In People v. Elias Rodriguez, 107 Phil. 659 [1960], the accused,
after having pleaded guilty and convicted of the crime of rebellion,
faced an independent prosecution for illegal possession of firearms.
The Court ruled:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Information in
Criminal Case No. 90-777 is QUASHED. The writ of preliminary
injunction, enjoining respondent Judges and their successors in
Criminal Case No. 90-777, Regional Trial Court of Makati, from
holding the arraignment of Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile and from
conducting further proceedings therein is made permanent.

An examination of the record, however, discloses that the crime with SO ORDERED.
which the accused is charged in the present case which is that of
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition is already absorbed as
a necessary element or ingredient in the crime of rebellion with
which the same accused is charged with other persons in a separate
case and wherein he pleaded guilty and was convicted. (at page
662)

xxx xxx xxx

[T]he conclusion is inescapable that the crime with which the

accused is charged in the present case is already absorbed in the
rebellion case and so to press it further now would be to place him
in double jeopardy. (at page 663)

Noteworthy is the recent case of Misolas v. Panga, (G.R. No. 83341,

January 30, 1990) where the Court had the occasion to pass upon
a nearly similar issue. In this case, the petitioner Misolas, an alleged
member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), was charged with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions in furtherance of
subversion under Section 1 of PD 1866. In his motion to quash the
information, the petitioner based his arguments on the Hernandez
and Geronimo rulings on the doctrine of absorption of common in
rebellion. The Court, however, clarified, to wit:

... in the present case, petitioner is being charged specifically for the
qualified offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition
under PD 1866. HE IS NOT BEING CHARGED WITH THE
COMPLEX CRIME OF SUBVERSION WITH ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. NEITHER IS HE BEING
SEPARATELY CHARGED FOR SUBVERSION AND FOR
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS. Thus, the rulings of the
Court in Hernandez, Geronimo and Rodriguez find no application in
this case.

The Court in the above case upheld the prosecution for illegal
possession of firearms under PD 1866 because no separate
prosecution for subversion or rebellion had been filed. 3 The
prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator
Ponce Enrile with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and
charge him with murder and multiple frustrated murder and also
violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the rebellion with murder
and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him for
rebellion in Quezon City and violation of PD 1829 in Makati. It should
be noted that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion
already filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a
case, the independent prosecution under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive

factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he
harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter
is a friend and former associate, the motive for the act is completely
different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives,
that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form
part of the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately

under PD 1829 in addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion
case. With this ruling, there is no need for the Court to pass upon
the other issues raised by the petitioner.
 G.R. No. 159085 February 3, 2004
SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO
NG MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO
MAGTUBO petitioners,
vs
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES,
GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES
EBDANE, respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 159103 February 3, 2004
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS
namely, SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO,
RENE B. GOROSPE, EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D.
MAPILE, petitioners,
vs
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON.
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and
HON. SECRETARY JOSE LINA, JR., respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 159185 February 3, 2004
REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP.
CELSO L. LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP.
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-
SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R. YUMUL-HERMIDA,
petitioners,
vs
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO,
respondents.
x------------------------x
G.R. No. 159196 February 3, 2004
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate,
petitioner,
vs
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY; SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS SECRETARY
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS
CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY
JOSE LINA, et al., respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered
ammunitions and explosives, some three hundred junior officers
and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City in
the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP,
the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the
President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP).1
In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later
in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both
declaring "a state of rebellion" and calling out the Armed Forces to
suppress the rebellion. Proclamation No. 427 reads in full:
PROCLAMATION NO. 427
DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, armed with high-powered firearms and explosives,
acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known
and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put
bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and
took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to
rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing
allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of
her powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of rebellion
punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and
unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government
service and outside the government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution,
whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by law, hereby confirm the existence of
an actual and on-going rebellion, compelling me to declare a state
of rebellion.
In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in
accordance with Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, calling
out the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to immediately carry out the necessary actions and measures
to suppress and quell the rebellion with due regard to constitutional
rights.
General Order No. 4 is similarly worded:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS
REBELLION
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, armed with high-powered firearms and explosives,
acting upon the instigation and command and direction of known
and unknown leaders, have seized a building in Makati City, put
bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support for, and
took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to
rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing
allegiance to the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, and depriving the
President of the Republic of the Philippines, wholly or partially, of
her powers and prerogatives which constitute the crime of rebellion
punishable under Article 134 et seq. of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines are being supported, abetted and aided by known and
unknown leaders, conspirators and plotters in the government
service and outside the government;
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution,
whenever it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-
in-Chief of all Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such
Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution as President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all the
armed forces of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation No.
427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to suppress and
quell the rebellion.
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
the Chief of the Philippine National Police and the officers and men
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due
regard to constitutional rights.
By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had
ended. After hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return
to barracks. The President, however, did not immediately lift the
declaration of a state of rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003,
through Proclamation No. 435:
DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED
TO EXIST
WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003,
a state of rebellion was declared;
WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27, 2003,
which was issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July
27, 2003, and pursuant to Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Police were directed to suppress and quell the rebellion;
WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police have effectively suppressed and quelled the
rebellion.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law, hereby declare that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist.
In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court
challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4.
In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et
al.),2 party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa
(PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does
not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed
forces.3 They further submit that, because of the cessation of the
Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the
proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite
period.4
Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon.
Executive Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of the Social
Justice Society (SJS), "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors
and bar reviewers."5 Like Sanlakas and PM, they claim that Section
18, Article VII of the Constitution does not authorize the declaration
of a state of rebellion.6 They contend that the declaration is a
"constitutional anomaly" that "confuses, confounds and misleads"
because "[o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such
proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional
right of private citizens."7 Petitioners also submit that the
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the
same Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a
report to Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial
law.8 Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances cannot
be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has
not delegated any such power to the President.9
In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-
Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo), petitioners brought suit as
citizens and as Members of the House of Representatives whose
rights, powers and functions were allegedly affected by the
declaration of a state of rebellion.10 Petitioners do not challenge the
power of the President to call out the Armed Forces.11 They argue,
however, that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a "superfluity,"
and is actually an exercise of emergency powers.12 Such exercise,
it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress
granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.13
In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner Senator
assails the subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted,
illegal and abusive exercise of a martial law power that has no basis
under the Constitution."14 In the main, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime
of rebellion.15
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions
have been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.16 In
addition, the Solicitor General questions the standing of the
petitioners to bring suit.17
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of
Proclamation No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has
ceased to exist, has rendered the case moot. As a rule, courts do
not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the
determination of "actual controversies."18 Nevertheless, courts will
decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet
evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case.
Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of
rebellion and called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the
rebellion through Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On
that occasion, "'an angry and violent mob armed with explosives,
firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, stones and other deadly weapons'
assaulted and attempted to break into Malacañang."20 Petitions
were filed before this Court assailing the validity of the President's
declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the
President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson
v. Perez and accompanying cases21 precluded this Court from
addressing the constitutionality of the declaration.
To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this
opportunity to finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a
state of rebellion in the exercise of the President's calling out power,
the mootness of the petitions notwithstanding.
Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members
of Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. In
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,22 this Court
recognized that:
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power
of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate
in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress
causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be
questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member
of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state
of rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise of
Congress' emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers'
legislative powers. Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is
a subterfuge to avoid congressional scrutiny into the President's
exercise of martial law powers.
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no
legal standing or locus standi to bring suit. "Legal standing" or locus
standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being challenged…. The gist
of the question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."23
Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:
2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important
plank in their programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend,
protect, uphold, and promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the
people, especially the poor and marginalized classes and sectors of
Philippine society. Petitioners are committed to defend and assert
human rights, including political and civil rights, of the citizens.
3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions
and mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to
peaceably assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression
under Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to
publicly ventilate their grievances and legitimate demands and to
mobilize public opinion to support the same.24 [Emphasis in the
original.]
Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the
Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this Court
rejected in Lacson v. Perez:
… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would
justify the resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not
subject to arrest. Thus, it cannot claim to be threatened by a
warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that its leaders, members, and
supporters are being threatened with warrantless arrest and
detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in
the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or
infringed, or whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion
or infringement.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for
declaratory relief, petitioner claiming that it[']s right to freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly is affected by the declaration
of a "state of rebellion" and that said proclamation is invalid for being
contrary to the Constitution.
However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords
little comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first
instance over such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the
Constitution limits the original jurisdiction of the court to cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
habeas corpus.25
Even assuming that petitioners are "people's organizations," this
status would not vest them with the requisite personality to question
the validity of the presidential issuances, as this Court made clear
in Kilosbayan v. Morato:26
The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of
independent people's organizations to enable the people to pursue
and protect, within the democratic framework, their legitimate and
collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful
means," that their right to "effective and reasonable participation at
all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making shall not
be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§15-16)
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real
parties in interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may
invoke the judicial power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in
cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the "case and
controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. This requirement lies at the
very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates
decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political
departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just
any party.27
That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens
does not necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may
bring suit where the act complained of directly involves the illegal
disbursement of public funds derived from taxation.28 No such
illegal disbursement is alleged.
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional
question only when he can show that he has personally suffered
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.29 Again, no such injury is alleged in this case.
Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that
the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions
must fail.
It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the
Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of
a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides:
Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion
or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period
not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit
a report in person or in writing to the Congress. The Congress,
voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its Members in
regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in
the same manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a
period to be determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion
shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or the extension thereof, and must promulgate
its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of the
jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil
courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege
of the writ.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to
persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or
directly connected with invasion.
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus
arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three days,
otherwise he shall be released. [Emphasis supplied.]
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
a "sequence" of "graduated power[s]."30 From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare
martial law. In the exercise of the latter two powers, the Constitution
requires the concurrence of two conditions, namely, an actual
invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the exercise of
such power.31 However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Zamora,32 "[t]hese conditions are not required in the
exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever
it becomes necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'"
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not
expressly prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion.
Note that the Constitution vests the President not only with
Commander-in-Chief powers but, first and foremost, with Executive
powers.
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: "The
executive power shall be vested in the President…." As if by
exposition, Section 17 of the same Article provides: "He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed." The provisions trace their
history to the Constitution of the United States.
The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S.
President executive and commander-in-chief powers have
remained in their original simple form since the Philadelphia
Constitution of 1776, Article II of which states in part:
Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America . . . .
....
Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States. . . .
....
Section 3. … he shall take care that the laws be faithfully
executed…. [Article II – Executive Power]
Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President of the
above-quoted provisions, as juxtaposed against the corresponding
action of the U.S. Supreme Court, is instructive. Clad with the
prerogatives of the office and endowed with sovereign powers,
which are drawn chiefly from the Executive Power and Commander-
in-Chief provisions, as well as the presidential oath of office, the
President serves as Chief of State or Chief of Government,
Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Foreign Relations and Chief of Public
Opinion.33
First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of State,
as the protector of the people, was President Andrew Jackson.
Coming to office by virtue of a political revolution, Jackson, as
President not only kept faith with the people by driving the patricians
from power. Old Hickory, as he was fondly called, was the first
President to champion the indissolubility of the Union by defeating
South Carolina's nullification effort.34
The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted did
not pacify the hotspurs from South Carolina. Its State Legislature
ordered an election for a convention, whose members quickly
passed an Ordinance of Nullification. The Ordinance declared the
Tariff Acts unconstitutional, prohibited South Carolina citizens from
obeying them after a certain date in 1833, and threatened secession
if the Federal Government sought to oppose the tariff laws. The
Legislature then implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive
laws aimed at any who sought to pay or collect customs duties.35
Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not be easy.
Technically, the President might send troops into a State only if the
Governor called for help to suppress an insurrection, which would
not occur in the instance. The President could also send troops to
see to it that the laws enacted by Congress were faithfully executed.
But these laws were aimed at individual citizens, and provided no
enforcement machinery against violation by a State. Jackson
prepared to ask Congress for a force bill.36
In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his position.
He wrote: ". . . when a faction in a State attempts to nullify a
constitutional law of Congress, or to destroy the Union, the balance
of the people composing this Union have a perfect right to coerce
them to obedience." Then in a Proclamation he issued on December
10, 1832, he called upon South Carolinians to realize that there
could be no peaceable interference with the execution of the laws,
and dared them, "disunion by armed force is treason. Are you ready
to incur its guilt?"37
The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and tight-rope
walkers. Soon, State Legislatures began to adopt resolutions of
agreement, and the President announced that the national voice
from Maine on the north to Louisiana on the south had declared
nullification and accession "confined to contempt and infamy."38
No other President entered office faced with problems so
formidable, and enfeebled by personal and political handicaps so
daunting, as Abraham Lincoln.
Lincoln believed the President's power broad and that of Congress
explicit and restricted, and sought some source of executive power
not failed by misuse or wrecked by sabotage. He seized upon the
President's designation by the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief,
coupled it to the executive power provision — and joined them as
"the war power" which authorized him to do many things beyond the
competence of Congress.39
Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the President's
independent power and duty under his oath directly to represent and
protect the people. In his Message of July 4, 1861, Lincoln declared
that "the Executive found the duty of employing the war power in
defense of the government forced upon him. He could not but
perform the duty or surrender the existence of the Government . . .
." This concept began as a transition device, to be validated by
Congress when it assembled. In less than two-years, it grew into an
independent power under which he felt authorized to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, issue the Emancipation
Proclamation, and restore reoccupied States.40
Lincoln's Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 troops.
Their first service, according to the proclamation, would be to
recapture forts, places and property, taking care "to avoid any
devastation, any destruction of or interference with property, or any
disturbance of peaceful citizens."41
Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President Lincoln's
report to use the war powers without the benefit of Congress. The
decision was handed in the celebrated Prize Cases42 which
involved suits attacking the President's right to legally institute a
blockade. Although his Proclamation was subsequently validated by
Congress, the claimants contended that under international law, a
blockade could be instituted only as a measure of war under the
sovereign power of the State. Since under the Constitution only
Congress is exclusively empowered to declare war, it is only that
body that could impose a blockade and all prizes seized before the
legislative declaration were illegal. By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme
Court upheld Lincoln's right to act as he had.43
In the course of time, the U.S. President's power to call out armed
forces and suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without
prior legislative approval, in case of invasion, insurrection, or
rebellion came to be recognized and accepted. The United States
introduced the expanded presidential powers in the Philippines
through the Philippine Bill of 1902.44 The use of the power was put
to judicial test and this Court held that the case raised a political
question and said that it is beyond its province to inquire into the
exercise of the power.45 Later, the grant of the power was
incorporated in the 1935 Constitution.46
Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the presidency
to mean that it made him the trustee of all the people. Guided by the
maxim that "Public office is a public trust," which he practiced during
his incumbency, Cleveland sent federal troops to Illinois to quell
striking railway workers who defied a court injunction. The injunction
banned all picketing and distribution of handbills. For leading the
strikes and violating the injunction, Debs, who was the union
president, was convicted of contempt of court. Brought to the
Supreme Court, the principal issue was by what authority of the
Constitution or statute had the President to send troops without the
request of the Governor of the State.47
In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al,48 the Supreme Court upheld the
contempt conviction. It ruled that it is not the government's province
to mix in merely individual present controversies. Still, so it went on,
"whenever wrongs complained of are such as affect the public at
large, and are in respect of matters which by the Constitution are
entrusted to the care of the Nation and concerning which the Nation
owes the duty to all citizens of securing to them their common rights,
then the mere fact that the Government has no pecuniary interest in
the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the Courts, or
prevent it from taking measures therein to fully discharge those
constitutional duties."49 Thus, Cleveland's course had the Court's
attest.
Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore Roosevelt
launched what political scientists dub the "stewardship theory."
Calling himself "the steward of the people," he felt that the executive
power "was limited only by the specific restrictions and prohibitions
appearing in the Constitution, or impleaded by Congress under its
constitutional powers."50
The most far-reaching extension of presidential power "T.R." ever
undertook to employ was his plan to occupy and operate
Pennsylvania's coal mines under his authority as Commander-in-
Chief. In the issue, he found means other than force to end the 1902
hard-coal strike, but he had made detailed plans to use his power
as Commander-in-Chief to wrest the mines from the stubborn
operators, so that coal production would begin again.51
Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even take over
the operation of vital utilities in the public interest was accepted. In
the Philippines, this led to the incorporation of Section 6,52 Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution, which was later carried over with
modifications in Section 7,53 Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution,
and thereafter in Section 18,54 Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that
the Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and
become more so when taken together with the provision on
executive power and the presidential oath of office. Thus, the
plenitude of the powers of the presidency equips the occupant with
the means to address exigencies or threats which undermine the
very existence of government or the integrity of the State.
In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late
Mme. Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine
President was vested with residual power and that this is even
greater than that of the U.S. President. She attributed this distinction
to the "unitary and highly centralized" nature of the Philippine
government. She noted that, "There is no counterpart of the several
states of the American union which have reserved powers under the
United States constitution." Elaborating on the constitutional basis
for her argument, she wrote:
…. The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three
departments of the government in this manner: "The legislative
power shall be vested in a Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." "The
executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines."
The judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such inferior courts as may be provided by law." These provisions
not only establish a separation of powers by actual division but also
confer plenary legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For as the
Supreme Court of the Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v.
Cabangis, "a grant of legislative power means a grant of all the
legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of
all the judicial power which may be exercised under the
government." If this is true of the legislative power which is
exercised by two chambers with a combined membership [at that
time] of more than 120 and of the judicial power which is vested in
a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not more appropriately apply
to the executive power which is vested in one official – the president.
He personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the
executive branch absent from the two other branches of
government. The president is not the chief of many executives. He
is the executive. His direction of the executive branch can be more
immediate and direct than the United States president because he
is given by express provision of the constitution control over all
executive departments, bureaus and offices.55
The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the backdrop of
the 1935 Constitution, the framers of which, early on, arrived at a
general opinion in favor of a strong Executive in the Philippines."56
Since then, reeling from the aftermath of martial law, our most recent
Charter has restricted the President's powers as Commander-in-
Chief. The same, however, cannot be said of the President's powers
as Chief Executive.
In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her
thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin,
upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled
predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the
President's
… unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with her
duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not
limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the
Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the
members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the
powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the
regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific
powers of the President, particularly those relating to the
commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general grant
of executive power.57 [Underscoring supplied. Italics in the original.]
Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs
in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same
time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed,
as the Solicitor General accurately points out, statutory authority for
such a declaration may be found in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance
Power), Book III (Office of the President) of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, which states:
SEC. 4. Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or
declaring a status or condition of public moment or interest, upon
the existence of which the operation of a specific law or regulation
is made to depend, shall be promulgated in proclamations which
shall have the force of an executive order. [Emphasis supplied.]
The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed
forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity.58
At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and
that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it.59
Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the
perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this
Court's mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the
declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any
legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not
written.
Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as
the dissenters in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration
of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or violate constitutionally
protected rights.60 Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution or automatically suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,61 then it is with more reason
that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about
these conditions.62 At any rate, the presidential issuances
themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion "with due regard
to constitutional rights."
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police
authorities may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise
unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, supra, majority of the Court held
that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion, the authorities may
only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion,
as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if
the circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by
petitioners is, thus, not based on the declaration of a 'state of
rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person may be subjected to a
warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or not the
President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites
for a valid warrantless arrest are present.
It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to
call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the
exercise of such power. While the Court may examine whether the
power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here
have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President
acted without factual basis.65
The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to
a declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the
report requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts in the "theater of war" or
that military authorities have taken over the functions of civil
government. There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political
rights. There is no indication that the President has exercised
judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that
the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial
law powers.
Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute
an indirect exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends
upon a grant of Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution:
Sec. 23. (1) ….
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may,
by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to
such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner
withdrawn by resolution of the Congress, such powers shall cease
upon the next adjournment thereof.
The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has
attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief
Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a
state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-
Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the
President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article
VI.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The fundamental issue in the petitions is the legality of Proclamation
No. 427 issued by the President on July 27, 2003 declaring a "state
of rebellion".
The majority affirmed the declaration is legal because the President
was only exercising a wedding of the "Chief Executive" and
"Commander-in-Chief" powers. U.S. jurisprudence and
commentators are cited discussing the awesome powers exercised
by the U.S. President during moments of crisis1 and that these
powers are also available to the Philippine President.2 Although the
limits cannot be precisely defined, the majority concluded that there
are enough "residual powers" to serve as the basis to support the
Presidential declaration of a "state of rebellion".3 The majority,
however, emphasized that the declaration cannot diminish or violate
constitutionally protected rights.4 They affirmed the legality of
warrantless arrests of persons who participated in the rebellion, if
circumstances so warrant5 with this clarification: "[i]n other words, a
person may be subjected to a warrantless arrests for the crime of
rebellion whether or not the President has declared a state of
rebellion, so long as the requisites for a valid warrantless arrest are
present."6
If the requisites for a warrantless arrests must still be present for an
arrest to be made, then the declaration is a superfluity. I therefore
shudder when a blanket affirmation is given to the President to issue
declarations of a "state of rebellion" which in fact may not be the
truth or which may be in affect even after the rebellion has ended.
Proclamation No. 427 was issued at 1:00 p.m. on July 27, 2003, at
the height of the occupation of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
Ayala Center, Makati City, by 323 junior officers and enlisted men
(Oakwood Incident),7 which began in the early morning of July 27,
2003.8 Shortly after, the President issued General Order No. 4,
ordering the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine
National Police to use reasonable force, and pay due regard to
constitutional rights, in putting down the rebellion.9 The Oakwood
incident ended peacefully that same evening when the militant
soldiers surrendered after negotiations.
From July 27 to August 1, 2003, "search and recovery" operations
were conducted. Throughout the Oakwood Incident, searches were
conducted in the non-occupied areas,10 and, with the recovery of
evidence, staging points for the Oakwood Incident were found in
Cavite, Makati and Mandaluyong.11 After the soldiers left at around
11:00 in the evening of July 27, a search was conducted around the
Oakwood premises.12 These searches expanded in scope on the
basis of recovered evidence.13
Ramon Cardenas, Assistant Executive Secretary in the previous
administration, was arrested, presented to the media in handcuffs
and brought for inquest proceedings before the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") in the morning of July 28.14 He was initially detained
at the Office of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Group ("CIDG"), and brought to the DOJ
in the afternoon of July 28.15 Cardenas was later charged with the
crime of rebellion,16 but as of this writing has been allowed bail.
On July 31, 2003, 4 days after the militant group had surrendered
peacefully, an official spokesperson from the DOJ declared that the
President's "indefinite" imposition of the "state of rebellion" would
make "warrantless arrests" a valid exercise of executive power.
The Court can take judicial notice that the police authorities were
releasing to media "evidence found" purporting to link personalities
in the political opposition, the most prominent of whom was Senator
Gringo Honasan. Even Senator Loi Ejercito and Mayor JV Ejercito's
names were being linked to the attempted uprising.
On August 1, 2003, the President issued Proclamation No. 435,
declaring that the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police had effectively suppressed and quelled
the rebellion, and, accordingly, that the "state of rebellion" had
ceased on that date.
The majority discussed only the abstract nature of the powers
exercised by the Chief Executive, without considering if there was
sufficient factual basis for the President's declaration of a "state of
rebellion" and when it ended. In taking this position, the majority is
returning, if not expanding, the doctrine enunciated in Garcia-Padilla
v. Enrile,17 which overturned the landmark doctrine in Lansang v.
Garcia.18 In Lansang, the Supreme Court upheld its authority to
inquire into the factual bases for the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and held that this inquiry raises a judicial
rather than a political question. In Garcia-Padilla, on the other hand,
the ponencia held that Lansang was no longer authoritative, and
that the President's decision to suspend the privilege is final and
conclusive upon the courts and all other persons.
These two cases were decided prior to the 1987 Constitution, which
requires this Court not only to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of government.19 This provision in the 1987
Constitution was precisely meant to check abuses of executive
power. Martial Law was still fresh in the minds of the delegates in
1987!lawphi1.nêt
The majority ignored the fact that the "state of rebellion" declared by
the President was in effect five days after the peaceful surrender of
the militant group.
The President's proclamation cites Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution as the basis for the declaration of the "state of
rebellion.".
Section 18 authorizes the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to call
out the Armed Forces, in order to suppress one of three conditions:
(1) lawless violence, (2) rebellion or (3) invasion.20 In the latter two
cases, i.e., rebellion or invasion, the President may, when public
safety requires, also (1) suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus, or (2) place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law.
The majority made it clear that exercise of the President's
Commander-in-Chief powers does not require the declaration of a
"state of rebellion" or a declaration of a "state of lawless violence"
or a "state of invasion". When any of these conditions exist, the
President may call out the armed forces to suppress the danger.
Thus, the declaration of a "state of rebellion" does not have any legal
meaning or consequence. This declaration does not give the
President any extra powers. It does not have any good purpose.
If the declaration is used to justify warrantless arrests even after the
rebellion has ended, as in the case of Cardenas, such declaration
or, at the least, the warrantless arrests, must be struck down.
Clearly defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code is the crime
of rebellion or insurrection, to wit:
ART. 134. Rebellion or insurrection – How committed. – The crime
of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking
up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from
the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the
Republic of the Philippines or any part thereof, of any body of land,
naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
On the other hand, a coup d' etat is defined as follows:
ART. 134-A. Coup d' etat. – How committed. – The crime of coup d'
etat is a swift attack accompanied by violence, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth, directed against the duly constituted authorities
of the Republic of the Philippines, or any military camp or
installation, communications networks, public utilities or other
facilities needed for the exercise and continued possession of
power, singly or simultaneously carried out anywhere in the
Philippines by any person or persons, belonging to the military or
police or holding any public office or employment, with or without
civilian support or participation, for the purpose of seizing or
diminishing state power.
Under these provisions, the crime of rebellion or insurrection is
committed only by "rising publicly or taking up arms against the
Government". A coup d' etat, on the other hand, takes place only
when there is a "swift attack accompanied by violence." Once the
act of "rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government"
ceases, the commission of the crime of rebellion ceases. Similarly,
when the "swift attack" ceases, the crime of coup d' etat is no longer
being committed.
Rebellion has been held to be a continuing crime,21 and the
authorities may resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected
of rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court.22 However, this doctrine should be applied to its proper
context – i.e., relating to subversive armed organizations, such as
the New People's Army, the avowed purpose of which is the armed
overthrow of the organized and established government. Only in
such instance should rebellion be considered a continuing crime.
When the soldiers surrendered peacefully in the evening of July 27,
the rebellion or the coup d' etat ended. The President, however, did
not lift the declaration of the "state of rebellion" until 5 days later, on
August 1, 2003.
defined, it is risky to concede and acknowledge the "residual
powers" to justify the validity of the presidential issuances. This can
serve as a blank check for other issuances and open the door to
abuses. The majority cite the exercise of strong executive powers
by U.S. President Andrew Jackson. Was it not President Jackson
who is said to have cynically defied the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling
(under Chief Justice Marshall) against the forcible removal of the
American Indians from the tribal lands by saying: "The Chief Justice
has issued his Decision, now let him try to enforce it?" Others quote
Madison as having gone further with: "With what army will the Chief
Justice enforce his Decision?"
WHEREFORE, I vote for Proclamation No. 427 and General Order
No. 4, issued on July 27, 2003 by Respondent President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, to be declared NULL and VOID for having been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. All other orders issued and action taken based on those
issuances, especially after the Oakwood incident ended in the
evening of July 27, 2003, e.g., warrantless arrests, should also be
declared null and void.

After the peaceful surrender, no person suspected of having

conspired with the soldiers or participated in the Oakwood incident
could be arrested without a warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Revised Rules of Court, which governs arrest without warrant,
provides as follows:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a

private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

xxxxxxxxx

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with section 7 of Rule 112.

Rule 113, Section 5, pars. (a) and (b) of the Rules of Court are
exceptions to the due process clause in the Constitution. Section 5,
par. (a) relates to a situation where a crime is committed or
attempted in the presence of the arresting officer.

Section 5, par. (b), on the other hand, presents the requirement of

"personal knowledge", on the part of the arresting officer, of facts
indicating that an offense had "just been committed", and that the
person to be arrested had committed that offense.

After the peaceful surrender of the soldiers on July 27, 2003, there
was no crime that was being "attempted", "being committed", or
"had just been committed." There should, therefore, be no occasion
to effect a valid warrantless arrest in connection with the Oakwood
Incident.

The purpose of the declaration and its duration as far as the

overeager authorities were concerned was only to give legal cover
to effect warrantless arrests even if the "state of rebellion" or the
instances stated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules are absent or
no longer exist.

Our history had shown the dangers when too much power is
concentrated in the hands of one person. Unless specifically
 G.R. No. L-1451 March 6, 1906
THE UNITED STATES,Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. AURELIO
TOLENTINO,Defendant-Appellant.
Rafael Palma and Gibbs and Kincaid for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
Aurelio Tolentino, the appellant in this case, was convicted upon an
information charging him with the crime of "uttering seditious words
and writings, publishing and circulating scurrilous libels against the
Government of the United States and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands, committed as follows: That said Aurelio
Tolentino, on or about the 14th day of May, 1903, in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, did unlawfully utter seditious words and
speeches and did write, publish, and circulate scurrilous libels
against the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which tend to obstruct the
lawful officers of the United States and the Insular Government of
the Philippine Islands in the execution of their offices, and which
tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for unlawful
purposes, and which suggest and incite rebellious conspiracies and
riots, and which tend to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
and order of the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands, which said seditious words
and speeches are false and inflammatory, and tend to incite and
move the people to hatred and dislike of the government established
by law within the Philippine Islands, and tend to incite, move, and
persuade great numbers of the people of said Philippine Islands to
insurrection, riots, tumults, and breaches of the public peace; which
said false, seditious, and inflammatory words and scurrilous libels
are in Tagalog language in a theatrical work written by said Aurelio
Tolentino, and which was presented by him and others on the said
14th day of May, 1903, at the "Teatro Libertad," in the city of Manila,
Philippine Islands, entitled 'Kahapon Ñgayon at Bukas' (Yesterday,
To-day, and To-morrow). An exact translation of the said drama is
included in the information, and various parts thereof are specially
assigned, which, in the opinion of the prosecution, were more
especially in violation of the statute in such cases made and
provided.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
It was proven at the trial beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused did in fact write the drama and the announcement thereof,
substantially as set out in the information, and did, with other
members of a theatrical company, of which he was director, utter
and publish the same substantially in manner and form as charged,
and as we understand it, the only question for decision is whether,
in writing, publishing, and uttering the drama, the accused was in
fact guilty of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine
Commission, upon which the information was
based.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This section is as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write,
publish, or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands,
or which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing
his office, or which tend to instigate others to cabal or meet together
for unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious
conspiracies or riots, or which tend to stir up the people against the
lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the
safety and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal
such evil practices, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
Counsel discussed at some length the question whether the drama
or any part of it was of a "scurrilous" nature in the legal acceptation
of the word, but for the purposes of this decision we do not deem it
necessary to make a finding on this point. In the case of the United
States vs. Fred L. Dorr and Edward F. O'Brien, 1 decided May 19,
1903, this court said:
The complaint appears to be framed upon the theory that a writing,
in order to be punishable as a libel under this section, must be of a
scurrilous nature and directed against the Government of the United
States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, and
must, in addition, tend to some one of the results enumerated in the
section, the article in question being described in the complaint as
"a scurrilous libel against the Government of the United States and
the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, which tends to
obstruct the lawful officers of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands in the execution of their
offices, and which tends to instigate others to cabal and meet
together for unlawful purposes, and which suggests and incites
rebellious conspiracies, and which tends to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities, and which disturbs the safety and
order of the Government of the United States and the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands." But it is a "a well-settled rule
in considering indictments that where an offense may be committed
in any of several different modes, and the offense, in any particular
instance, is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes
specified, it is sufficient to prove the offense committed in any one
of them, provide that it be such as to constitute the substantive
offense." (Com. vs. Kneeland, 20 Pick. Mass. 206, 215), and the
defendants may, therefore, be convicted if any one of the
substantive charges into which the complaint may be separated has
been made out.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Several allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense
are define in that section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or
speeches; (2) the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous
libels against the Government of the United States or the Insular
Government of the Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing, or
circulating of libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer
in executing his office; (4) or which tend to instigate others to cabal
or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or
incite rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the
community, the safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly
concealing such evil practices.
In accordance with the principles laid down in the preceding
paragraph the judgment of conviction in this case must be
sustained, if it appears from the evidence in the record that the
accused was guilty as charged of any one of those offenses. We are
all agreed that the publication and presentation of the drama directly
and necessarily tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together
for unlawful purposes, and to suggest and incite rebellious
conspiracies and riots and to stir up the people against the lawful
authorities and to disturb the peace of the community and the safety
and order of the Government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in view of the time,
place, and manner of its presentation, was to inculcate a spirit of
hatred and enmity against the American people and the
Government of the United States in the Philippines, and we are
satisfied that the principal object and intent of its author was to incite
the people of the Philippine Islands to open and armed resistance
to the constituted authorities, and to induce them to conspire
together for the secret organization of armed forces, to be used
when the opportunity presented itself, for the purpose of
overthrowing the present Government and setting up another in its
stead.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Counsel for the appellant insists that the intent of the accused to
commit the crime with which he is charged does not appear from
the evidence of record, and that the drama is, in itself, a purely
literary and artistic production wherein the legendary history of these
Islands and their future, as imagined by the author, are presented
merely for the instruction and entertainment of the
public.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This contention can not be maintained. The public presentation of

the drama took place in the month of May, 1903, less than two years
after the establishment of the Civil Government. The smouldering
embers of a wide-spread and dangerous insurrection were not yet
entirely extinguished, and here and there throughout the Islands
occasional outbreaks still required the use of the armed forces of
the Government for their suppression. A junta in the city of
Hongkong, composed of persons whose announced purpose and
object in organizing was the overthrow of the present Government,
was actively engaged in the endeavor to keep the people of these
Islands from peaceably accepting the authority of that Government,
and this junta, acting with confederates in the Philippines, was still
able to keep alive a certain spirit of unrest and uncertainty which it
hoped to fan into open revolt and rebellion at the first favorable
opportunity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The manner and form in which the drama was presented at such a
time and under such conditions, renders absurd the pretense that it
was merely or even principally a literary or artistic production, and
the clumsy devices, the allegorical figures, the apparent
remoteness, past and future, of the events portrayed, could not and
in fact were not intended to leave the audience in doubt as to its
present and immediate application, nor should they blind this court
to the true purpose and intent of the author and director of the
play.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

It is further contended that even though the accused were in fact

guilty as charged, the court erred in imposing an excessive and
unjust penalty, and in fixing the amount of the fine in dollars instead
of Philippine currency. As to the latter objection it is sufficient to say
that the use of the word "dollars" was in strict conformance with the
words of the statute, and that the equivalent of that word in
Philippine currency is fixed by law. The penalty was within the limits
prescribed by law, and we are not prepared to hold that the trial court
erred in the exercise of its discretion in imposing
it.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The judgment and sentence appealed from is affirmed, with the

costs against the appellant. So ordered.
 G.R. No. L-2990 December 17, 1951
OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
Carlos P. Garcia, Cosme P. Garcia and B.E. Enerio for
petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor Jesus A. Avanceña for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall
write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government
of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof
or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which
tend to stir up the people againts the lawful authorities or to disturb
the peace of the community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted
in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation of the above
article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals,
because according to said court.
"About the time compromised between June 9 and June 24, 1947,
both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as
if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended
form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely
standing on a barrel (Exhibit A, C-I). After securing copies of his
photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers
and weeklies of general circulation (Exhibit C, F, G, H, I), not only in
the Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and
abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he
made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto
Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation
of which letter or note in hereunder reproduced:
Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave
don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need them.
Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic
cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right to
burried among Christians.
But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe
me out of your lives.
My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I committed suicide, tell
them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of
Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.
And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point
out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that
here in the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers
and Mussolinis.lawphil.net
Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come
across one.
I committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government
under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty
government.
I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de
Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own
self.
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above
quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening
News, the Bisayas, Lamdang and other local periodicals and that he
had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said
pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed himself as
Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was shown hanging
by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree."
The latter is a scurrilous libel against the Government. 1 It calls our
government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested
with Nazis and a Fascistis i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce
dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to
remain loyal to the government. 2
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the
government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the
government are against the public peace, and are criminal not only
because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because
they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself
(See 19 Am. Law Rep. 1511). Regarded as seditious libels they
were the subject of criminal proceedings since early times in
England. (V op. cit.).
As explained by Paterson, 3 ". . . the great factors of government,
consisting of the Sovereign, the Parliament, the ministers of state,
the courts of justice, must be recognized as holding functions
founded on sound principles and to be defended and treated with
an established and well-nigh unalterable respect. Each of these
great institutions has peculiar virtues and peculiar weaknesses, but
whether at any one time the virtue or the weakness predominates,
there must be a certain standard of decorum reserved for all. Each
guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective, each burst of
indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference
towards the depository, for the time being, of every great
constitutional function. Hence another limit of free speech and
writing is sedition. And yet within there is ample room and verge
enough for the freest use of the tongue and pen in passing strictures
in the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority."
Naturally, when the people's share in the government was
restricted, there was a disposition to punish even mild criticism of
the ruler or the departments of government. But as governments
grew to be more representative, the laws of sedition became less
drastic and freedom of expression strife continue to be prohibited.
The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July
14, 1798 containing provisions parallel to our own article 142.
Analogous prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act of June 1917
and the seditious libel amendment thereto in May, 1918.
Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to
become a weapon of intolerance constraining the free expression of
opinion, or mere agitation for reform. But so long as there is a
sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part of the defendant
to produce illegal action-such legislation aimed at anarchy and
radicalism presents largely a question of policy. Our Legislature has
spoken in article 142 and the law must be applied.
In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the
fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech
secured by the Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to
speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose."
It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use
of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom. 4" So statutes against sedition have guaranty, although
they should not be interpreted so as to agitate for institutional
changes. 5
Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticize his
government officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade of
ideas" and to plead for its acceptance in "the competition of the
market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore
constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire government set-up. Such wholesale
attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the
government. In the article now under examination one will find no
particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is called
dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular
omissions or commissions are set forth. Instead the article drip with
male-violence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries
to arouse animosity towards all public servants headed by President
Roxas whose pictures this appellant would burn and would teach
the younger generation to destroy.
Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences the article
cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds
of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort
to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim
to martyrdom and what with is failure to particularize. When the use
irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on
creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply
and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the
constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire
governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the
reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the
Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government
obviously refer of least to the President, his Cabinet and the majority
of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis
were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be
upheld. 6
As heretofore stated publication suggest or incites rebellious
conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the
constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition who
may seek to silence the writer. 7 Which is the sum and substance
of the offense under consideration.
be very much better than the maladministration of said President
and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he
committed suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de
cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power." Knowing, that the
expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the
Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary execution by the knife",
the idea intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than
bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from
the administration of Roxas and his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a
question of fact, making the findings of the court of appeals
conclusive upon us. 9
Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or
assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet
and a majority of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself).
And such suggestion clinches the case against appellant.
In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matter
with several persons in a public place uttered theses words:
"Filipinos must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head" — referring to
the them Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty
of inciting to sedition in a judgment of this court published in Volume
45 of the Philippine Reports. That precedent is undeniably opposite.
Note that the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably
of speech. Adopting his own words we could say, "Here the person
maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine
Islands. His official position, like the President of the United States
and other high office, under form of government, instead of affording
immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite
abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the President
passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency.
More than a figure of speech was intended. There is a seditious
tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection
among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the
laws."
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there
being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him,
the decision will be affirmed with costs.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency

to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to
say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than those
provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which
press upon their minds. 8

"The idea of violence prevades the whole letter" says Justice

Paredes of the Court of Appeals. "The mere fact that a person was
so disgusted with his "dirty government" to the point of taking his
own life, is not merely a sign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to
arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its duly
constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter of the
situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the
banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks
against the law and the duly constituted authorities cannot but be
interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the
open defiance by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted
government, the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the
ruthless depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus
insinuating that a state on lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would
 G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO
VILLANUEVA, MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL,
FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners,
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN.
RAMON MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF ATTY. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE:
DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL.
EVARISTO CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO
DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding
Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon City,
respondents.
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA:
VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
vs.
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES
CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES,
respondents.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS
OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO
NAZARENO,petitioner,
vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE
STATION, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO
MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and
P/SGT. MALTRO AROJADO, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No.
83162.
Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:p
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the
above-entitled petitions, seeking reconsideration of the Court's
decision promulgated on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity)
which dismissed the petitions, with the following dispositive part:
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in
G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's
provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to
P10,000.00. No costs.
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with
the statement that the decision did not rule — as many
misunderstood it to do — that mere suspicion that one is Communist
Party or New People's Army member is a valid ground for his arrest
without warrant. Moreover, the decision merely applied long existing
laws to the factual situations obtaining in the several petitions.
Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership
therein be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if
these laws no longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people,
it is Congress as the elected representative of the people — not the
Court — that should repeal, change or modify them.
In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum,
maintain:
1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the
questioned arrests made without warrant, and in relying on the
provisions of the Rules of Court, particularly Section 5 of Rule 113
(Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests violated the
constitutional rights of the persons arrested;
2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and
Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be abandoned;
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions
made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and subversive
documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch
as those confessions do not comply with the requirements on
admissibility of extrajudicial admissions;
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation
of facts;
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be
deemed moot and academic.
We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of
the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under the Rules of
Court. 3 The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the
function of the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire
into the legality of one's detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the
detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners
was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision dated 9 July
1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant
were made in accordance with law. For, if the arrests were made in
accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from
such arrests also in accordance with law.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or
person has the power or authority to arrest anyo without a warrant
of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6 The
law expressly allowing arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5,
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court which states the grounds upon which
a valid arrest, without warrant, can be conducted.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrest has committed it; and
. . . (Emphasis supplied).
The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando
Dural (G.R. No. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that,
within the contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was
committing an offense, when arrested because Dural was arrested
for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed
organization, where membership penalized, 7 and for subversion
which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, 8 a
continuing offense, thus:
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses
committed in the furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or
incident thereto, or in connection therewith under Presidential
Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of continuing offenses
which set them apart from the common offenses, aside from their
essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide magnitude.
...
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which
includes armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government,
Dural did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of
arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural was identified as
one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM
policemen in their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2)
policemen in Caloocan City as part of his mission as a "sparrow"
(NPA member) did not end there and then. Dural, given another
opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen
anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government. It
is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is
perceived here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called
"common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which
generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are
anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the
same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding objective
of overthrowing organized government is attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere
suspicion by the arresting officers of his membership in the
CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause," as supported
by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.
Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said,
under the facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under
Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which
requires two (2) conditions for a valid arrestt without warrant: first,
that the person to be arrested has just committed an offense, and
second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested
is the one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will
be noted, refers to arrests without warrant, based on "personal
knowledge of facts" acquired by the arresting officer or private
person.
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests
without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion 9
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based
on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. 10 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded
on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest. 11
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the
other cases at bar.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988,
were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received
by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been
admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the
information further disclosed that the wounded man in the said
hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two
(2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988
at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining
St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same
information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital
management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of
Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to
the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was being treated
for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable
and with cause as it was based on actual facts and supported by
circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member
was truly in the said hospital. The actual facts supported by
circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31 January 1988,
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario,
Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second — a
wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon"
was actually then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital for a gunshot
wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie
Javellon" and his address entered in the hospital records were
fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers
merited their immediate attention and action and, in fact, it was
found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for
reconsideration, 13 believe that the confidential information of the
arresting officers to the effect that Dural was then being treated in
St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the attending doctor
and hospital management in compliance with the directives of the
law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.

As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with
acts done in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the
Court notes that the peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed
to have conducted the same in good faith, considering that law
enforcers are presumed to regularly perform their official duties. The
records show that the arresting officers did not appear to have been
ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the arrest,
without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the
requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after
Dural's arrest, without warrant, an information charging double
murder with assault against agents of persons in authority was filed
against Dural in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City (Criminal
Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly placed under judicial
custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting officers). On
31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now
on appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82),
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and
Vicky Ocaya (G.R. No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are
also justified. They were searched pursuant to search warrants
issued by a court of law and were found wit unlicensed firearms,
explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They were,
therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright
arrests without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court.
Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few davs after
their arrests without warrant, informations were filed in court against
said petitioners, thereby placing them within judicial custody and
disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his own petition fo
habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing of
these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the
custody of the authorities.
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases
are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information
imparted by a former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA
in Metro Manila and that a certain house occupied by one Renato
Constantine, located in the Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina
Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was being used as their safehouse;
that in view of this information, the said house was placed under
military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search
warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted;
that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not
produce any permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and
other communications equipment, and he admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP. 16
2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house
of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988, and
admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to
Renato Constantine and other members of the rebel group.
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a
consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his possession
papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of
her arrest, the military agents found subversive documents and live
ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged
to her. 18
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they
were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when they arrived
at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date;
that when the agents frisked them, subversive documents, and
loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show
a permit to possess them. 19
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without
warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises ofthe
house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of
the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of a search warrant
duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant
the agents of the PC-Intelligence and Investigation found
ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo,
Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled the military
agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information
given to the military authorities that two (2) safehouses (one
occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon)
were being used by the CPP/NPA for their operations, with
information as to their exact location and the names of Renato
Constantine and Benito Tiamzon as residents or occupants thereof.
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances
surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo and
Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the
information they had received was true and the persons to be
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes:
first: search warrant was duly issued to effect the search of the
Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a
person named Renato Constantine, who admitted that he was a
ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were
unlicensed firearms and communications equipment; third: at the
time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms,
ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted
ownership thereof as well as their membership in the CPP/NPA.
And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified
by their former comrades in the organization as CPP/NPA
members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding
informations were filed in court against said arrested persons. The
records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without
warrant made by the military agents in the Constantino safehouse
and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been
ill-motivated or irregularly performed.
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and
after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural, Buenaobra,
Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that
it would have been better for the military agents not to have acted
at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable
neglect of official duty and a cause for disciplinary action against the
peace officers involved.
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in
order to place them in the hands of executive and judicial authorities
upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the
alleged violation of law and to prosecute and secure the punishment
therefor. 21 An arrest is therefore in the nature of an administrative
measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without limitation
as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This
rule is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and
order in our communities.
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in
accordance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this
Court determines not whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty
of committing the crime for which they were arrested. 22 Not
evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the reason that can validly
compel the peace officers, in the performance of their duties and in
the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without warrant. 23
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the
law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth in Section 5,
Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested
persons are later found to be innocent and acquitted, the arresting
officers are not liable. 24 But if they do not strictly comply with the
said conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime
of arbitrary detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil
Code 26 and/or for other administrative sanctions.
In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested
without warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses:
that about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the
corner of Magsaysay Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa,
Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering of drivers and sympathizers,
where he said, among other things:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27
(Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press
conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 November
1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and
bus drivers) on 23 November 1988. 28 Espiritu was arrested without
warrant, not for subversion or any "continuing offense," but for
uttering the above-quoted language which, in the perception of the
arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and
regard the language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the
Constitution. But, then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during
the pre-trial or trial on the merits, that he was just exercising his right
to free speech regardless of the charged atmosphere in which it was
uttered. But, the authority of the peace officers to make the arrest,
without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, or soon
thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and
freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has,
in this case, tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes
of the arrest (not conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has
ordered the bail for Espiritu's release to be reduced from P60,000.00
to P10,000.00.
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu
case moot and academic. For Espiritu had before arraignment
asked the court a quo for re-investigation, the peace officers did not
appear. Because of this development, the defense asked the court
a quo at the resumption of the hearings to dismiss the case. Case
against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-68385) has been
provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning
of 14 December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of
men in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00
o'clock in the morning of 28 December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of
the suspects in the said killing, was arrested and he pointed to
Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during the killing of
Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), the
police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation.
29
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988,
while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only on 28
December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b)
of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December 1988 that the police
authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those
guilty in the killing of Bunye II and the arrest had to be made
promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and
despite the lapse of fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight.
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in
upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted several
facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows:
. . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without
warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala
and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit
the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is dock
eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but
the motion was denied by the trial court in an order dated 10 January
1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused,
Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this
Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24,
ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and
thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued
a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that
the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by
reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Metro Manila which liad taken cognizance of said
case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence
against him).
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and
Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them were filed
in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on
probable cause and supported by factual circumstances. They
complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They
were not arbitrary or whimsical arrests.
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since
been convicted by the court a quo for murder and sentenced to
reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to
the Court of Appeals where it is pending as of this date ( CA-G.R.
No. still undocketed).
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the
contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial admission.
In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30 that
he was an NPA courier. On the other hand, in the case of Amelia
Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed firearms, ammunition
and subversive documents found in her possession during her
arrest, belonged to her.
The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested
persons of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their
ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents
in their possession. But again, these admissions, as revealed by the
records, strengthen the Court's perception that truly the grounds
upon which the arresting officers based their arrests without
warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons
arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses,
in compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To
note these admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the
persons arrested are already guilty of the offenses upon which their
warrantless arrests were predicated. The task of determining the
guilt or innocence of persons arrested without warrant is not proper
in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the trial of the case on
the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan
vs. Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling
reason at this time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of
prevailing conditions where national security and liability are still
directly challenged perhaps with greater vigor from the communist
rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without warrant be
tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court.
will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are
enjoined to do the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant
so that if the conditions under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court,
as elucidated in this Resolution, are not met, then the detainee shall
forthwith be ordered released; but if such conditions are met, then
the detainee shall not be made to languish in his detention but must
be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted or
convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of

being a Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not
a ground for the arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court
predicated the validity of the questioned arrests without warrant in
these petitions, not on mere unsubstantiated suspicion, but on
compliance with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113,
Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress, are
probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and,
further, on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of
popularity or palatability to some groups, what is important is that
the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision

dated 9 July 1990, are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-34022 March 24, 1972
MANUEL MARTINEZ Y FESTIN petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JESUS P. MORFE OF THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, and THE CITY WARDEN OF MANILA,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. L-34046-7 March 24, 1972
FERNANDO BAUTISTA, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. FRANCISCO MA. CHANCO, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Baguio and Benguet, Second Judicial District, Branch
III, et al., respondents.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Amelito Mutuc, Reynaldo Villar, Alberto K.
Jamir Anacleto Badoy, Jr., Emmanuel Santos, Sedfrey Ordoñez,
Antonio Tupaz, Arturo Pacificador, Dominador F. Carillo, Antonio
Borromeo, Augusto Cesar Espiritu, Dandy K. Tupaz and Eugene A.
Tan for petitioner Manuel Martinez Y Festin.
Remulla, Perez and Estrella, Fernando P. Cabato and Gaudencio
N. Floresca for petitioner Fernando Bautista Sr.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Bernardo P. Pardo, Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A.
de Leon and Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza for respondents Judges.
Kaulayao V. Faylona, Manuel Imbong, Jacobo Gonzales, Fernando
P. Camaya, Jose Tablizo, Romeo Kahayon and Tomas P. Matic, Jr.
for respondents Pulido and Tamayo.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The question raised in these certiorari proceedings, one to which no
authoritative answer has been yielded by past decisions, is the
scope to be accorded the constitutional immunity of senators and
representatives from arrest during their attendance at the sessions
of Congress and in going to and returning from the same except in
cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace.1 Petitioners
Manuel Martinez y Festin2 and Fernando Bautista, Sr.,3 as delegate
of the present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they
consider to be the protection of the above constitutional provision, if
considered in connection with Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code
penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the
sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except
in case such member has committed a crime punishable under
[such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor."4 For under the
Constitutional Convention Act,5 delegates are entitled to the
parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative.6 Both
petitioners are facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed
against petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for falsification of a
public document and two informations against petitioner Fernando
Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor
General, on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above
proceedings,7 would dispute such a contention on the ground that
the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution
being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical
inference being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal
Code would expand such an immunity, it would be unconstitutional
or at the very least inoperative. A careful study of the above
constitutional provision, in the light of the proceedings of the
Constitutional Convention, adopting the then well-settled principle
under American law and of the purposes to be served by such an
immunity, persuade us that the stand taken by the Solicitor General
is correct. These certiorari proceedings cannot prosper.
The facts in both petitions for certiorari are not in dispute. Petitioner
Martinez y Festin8 alleged that on June 10, 1971, an information
against him for falsification a public document was filed. Its basis
was his stating under oath in his certificate of candidacy for delegate
to that Constitutional Convention that he was born on June 20, 1945,
when in truth and in fact he knew that he was born on June 20, 1946.
There was on July 9, 1971, a special appearance on his part
questioning the power of respondent Judge to issue a warrant of
arrest and seeking that the information be quashed. On the same
day, there was an order from the lower court suspending the release
of the warrant of arrest until it could act on such motion to quash.
Then came on July 22, 1971 an omnibus motion from him, with
previous leave of court, to quash the information, to quash the
warrant of arrest, or to hold in abeyance further proceeding in the
case. It was not favorably acted on. On August 21, 1971, respondent
Judge rendered an order denying the petitioner omnibus motion to
quash. In his belief that the information and the warrant of arrest in
this case are null and void, the petitioner did not post the required
bond. He was arrested by the City Sheriff in the afternoon of
September 6, 1971. At the time of the filing of the petition he was
confined at the City Jail in the custody of respondent City Warden
of Manila. He was on his way to attend the plenary session of the
Constitutional Convention. Such arrest was against his will and over
his protest. He was arraigned on September 9, 1971. There was at
such a time a motion by petitioner to reconsider the court's order of
August 21, 1971. It was denied in open court. On the very same day,
he filed the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus, but having
been released thereafter on bail on September 11, 1971, the petition
is now in the nature solely of a certiorari proceeding.9
As for petitioner Fernando Bautista, Sr., 10 it was alleged that he is
a duly elected and proclaimed delegate to the 1971 Constitutional
Convention. He took his oath of office and assumed the functions of
such office on June 1, 1971. He has continued since then to perform
the duties and discharge the responsibilities of a delegate. Two
criminal complaints, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 146(57) and
148(58), were directly filed with the Court of First lnstance of Baguio
and Benguet by a certain Moises Maspil, a defeated delegate-
aspirant who placed 15th in the order of votes garnered against the
petitioner, and his co-accused for alleged violation of Section 51 of
the Revised Penal Code in that they gave and distributed free of
charge food, drinks and cigarettes at two public meetings, one held
in Sablan and the other in Tuba, both towns being in Province of
Benguet. Respondent Presiding Judge conducted the preliminary
investigation of said criminal complaints. Thereafter on August 7,
1971, he issued an order for the filing of the corresponding
informations. Before a warrant of arrest in said criminal cases could
be issued, petitioner in a motion of August 14, 1971 invoked the
privilege of immunity from arrest and search, pursuant to Section 15
of Republic Act No. 6132, otherwise known as the 1971
Constitutional Convention Act, in relation to Sec. 15, Article VI of the
Constitution and Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent Judge, on the very same day, issued an order, holding
in abeyance the issuance of a warrant of arrest and setting the
hearing of said Motion on August 23, 1971. As scheduled on August
23, 1971, there was a hearing on such motion. Petitioner however
did not prevail notwithstanding his vigorous insistence on his claim
for immunity, a warrant of arrest being ordered on the same day. On
September 11, 1971, there was a motion to quash such order of
arrest filed by petitioner. He was unsuccessful, respondent Judge,
in an order of said date, ordering his immediate arrest. His petition
for certiorari and prohibition was filed with this Court on September
15, 1971. 11
What is thus sought by petitioners Martinez y Festin and Bautista,
Sr. is that the respective warrants of arrest issued against them be
quashed on the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity
they enjoy as delegates, ultimately traceable to Section 15 of Article
VI of the Constitution as construed together with Article 145 of the
Revised Penal Code, they are immune from arrest. In the case of
petitioner Martinez y Festin, he is proceeded against for falsification
of a public document punishable by prision mayor. 12 As for
petitioner Bautista, Sr., the penalty that could be imposed for each
of the Revised Election Code offense, of which he is charged, is not
higher than prision mayor. 13
The respondents in the above petitions were required to answer by
resolutions of this Court issued on September 10 and September
20, 1971, respectively. An answer on behalf of respondent Judge
Jesus P. Morfe in the case of petitioner Martinez y Festin was filed
on September 20, 1971 with an answer in intervention filed by
respondent Executive Sheriff of Manila and the Chief of Warrant
Division likewise filed on the same date. His petition was duly heard
on September 14, 1971, Delegate Estanislao A. Fernandez
vehemently pressing his claim to immunity. Thereafter on October
29, 1971, a memorandum, comprehensive in scope and persuasive
in its analysis of the constitutional question presented, was filed on
behalf of respondent Judge Morfe by Solicitor General Felix Q.
Antonio, two Assistants Solicitors General Bernardo P. Pardo and
Rosalio A. de Leon as well as Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. A
memorandum on behalf of President Diosdado Macapagal of the
Constitutional Convention, who was given permission to submit
such a pleading, was submitted on March 8, 1972 by the Committee
on Legal Affairs of the Constitutional Convention. 14
As for the petitions of Bautista, Sr., the answer on behalf of
respondent Judge was filed on September 29, 1971. When the
matter was heard on October 14, 1971, he appeared through
counsel, Delegate Juanito R. Remulla, while respondent Judge was
represented by Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and
Solicitor Vicente V. Mendoza. With the submission, on October 30,
1971, of an able memorandum on behalf of respondent judge,
again, by the same counsel from the Office of the Solicitor General
as well as a carefully-prepared memorandum of petitioner Bautista,
Sr., on December 1, 1971, the matter was deemed submitted for
adjudication.
As noted at the outset, certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants
of arrest issued against petitioner Martinez y Festin as well as
petitioner Bautista, Sr. Their reliance on the constitutional provision
which for them should be supplemented by what was provided for
in the Revised Penal Code is futile. There is no justification then for
granting their respective pleas.
No other conclusion is allowable consistently with the plain and
explicit command of the Constitution. As is made clear in Section 15
of Article VI, the immunity from arrest does not cover any
prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the peace. Treason
exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres
to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. 15 A felony is act or
omission punishable by law. 16 Breach of the peace covers any
offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special
statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace
must be maintained and any breach thereof renders one susceptible
to prosecution. Certainly then from the explicit language of the
Constitution, even without its controlling interpretation as shown by
the debates of the Constitutional Convention to be hereinafter
discussed, petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor
does Article 145 of the Revised Penal Code come to their rescue.
Such a provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the
Constitution became operative on November 15, 1935. As will be
shown, the repugnancy between such an expansion of the
congressional immunity and the plain command of the Constitution
is too great to be overcome, even on the assumption that the penalty
to which a public officer will be subjected in the event that he did
arrest one entitled thereto for an offense punishable by less than
reclusion temporal suffices to widen its scope. This is so considering
not only the history of such a Constitutional grant of immunity but
also its basic purpose and objective.
1. Even if the provision granting the legislative immunity of
freedom from arrest were clothed in language less clear, its history
precludes any other interpretation. As submitted to the
Constitutional Convention of 1934, the draft proposal was worded
as follows: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in all cases
except treason, open disturbance of public order, or other offense
punishable by death or imprisonment of not less than six years, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
National Assembly, and in going to and returning from the same."
On December 4, 1934, upon its being considered by the
Convention, an amendment was proposed by Delegate Aldeguer so
that it would read: "The Members of the National Assembly shall in
all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be
privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the
National Assembly, and in going and returning from the same."
What was sought by him was to retain the provision of the Philippine
Autonomy Act of 1916, with phraseology identical to that found in
the American Constitution.
He defended his proposal thus: "My amendment is not new. It is the
same phrase granting parliamentary immunity to the members of
the Parliament of England. It is the same phrase granting
parliamentary immunity to members of Congress. It is the same
phrase granting parliamentary immunity to members of the various
state legislators of the Union. Now, in reading the draft proposed by
the Sub-Committee of Seven, I found out that it is a broad rule. Mr.
President, the question is not whether we should grant privilege of
immunity to the members of the National Assembly ... " 17 He was
interrupted by a point of order raised, but he was allowed to
continue. He went on: "As I was saying, Mr. President and
Gentlemen of the Convention, the draft gives to the member of the
National Assembly more privileges than what the nature of the office
demands. My question is that if the members of the Congress of the
United States, if the members of the Parliament, if the members of
the various State Legislatures were able to perform their functions
as members of law-making bodies with the privileges and
immunities granted by the phrase "breach of peace." I wonder why
the members of the future National Assembly cannot perform their
duties with the same limitations and with the same privileges. Mr.
President and members the Convention, the history of
parliamentary immunity shows that it was never intended to exempt
members of the National Assembly from criminal arrest. When
American sovereignty was implanted into these Islands, a new
theory of government was implanted too. This theory of government
places every man equal before the eyes of the law. The grant of
certain privileges to any set of persons means the abrogation of this
principle of equality before the eyes of the law. Another reason, Mr.
President and Members of the Convention, is this: The State
Legislature is the agent of the State. The power or the right of the
Legislature to claim privileges is based on the right of self-
preservation. The right of the State to claim privileges is due to the
fact that it has the right to carry its function without obstacle. But we
must also remember that any Legislature is but the agent of the
State. The State is the principal. Any crime committed, whether such
crime is committed by a colorum or by a gangster, endangers the
State. Giving more privileges to an agent, which is the Legislature,
at the expense of the principal, which is the State, is not a sound
policy. So that, Mr. President, and Members of the Convention,
believing that under the phrase "breach of peace", our future
members of the Assembly can very well perform the duties
incumbent upon them. I submit my amendment for the consideration
of this Convention." 18
Delegate Manuel Roxas on behalf of the sub-committee of seven
did not object. As a matter of fact, he was for such amendment. He
considered it "well-founded" and was for such immunity complying
"with the wording of the [Philippine Autonomy Act] in this particular."
19 The Convention readily approved the amendment by
acclamation.
It does not admit of doubt therefore that the immunity from arrest is
granted by the Constitution was understood in the same sense it
has in American law, there being a similar provision in the American
Constitution. 20 Its authoritative interpretation in the United States
was supplied by the Williamson case, a 1908 decision. 21
According to the then Justice, later Chief Justice, White who penned
the opinion, "the term "treason, felony and breach of the peace," as
used in the constitutional provision relied upon, excepts from the
operation of the privilege all criminal offenses, ... " 22 He traced its
historical background thus: "A brief consideration of the subject of
parliamentary privilege in England will, we think, show the source
whence the expression "treason felony, and breach of the peace"
was drawn, and leave no doubt that the words were used in England
for the very purpose of excluding all crimes from the operation of the
parliamentary privilege, and therefore to leave that privilege to apply
only to prosecutions of a civil nature." 23 Story's treatise on the
Constitution was likewise cited, his view on the matter being quite
emphatic: "Now, as all crimes are offenses against the peace, the
phrase "breach of the peace" would seem to extend to all indictable
offenses, as well those which are in fact attended with force and
violence, as those which are only constructive breaches of the
peace of the government, inasmuch as they violate its good order."
24
As far as American constitutional law is concerned, both Burdick 25
and Willoughby 26 could use practically identical appraising such
immunity, the former stating that it "is not now of great importance"
and the latter affirming that it "is of little importance as arrest of the
person is now almost never authorized except for crimes which fall
within the classes exempt from the priviledge." The state of the
American law on this point is aptly summarizedby Cooley: "By
common parliamentary law, the members of the legislature are
privileged from arrest on civil process during the session of that
body, and for a reasonable time before and after, to enable them to
go to and return from the same."27 A prosecution for a criminal
offense, is thus excluded from this grant of immunity. So it should
be Philippine law, if deference were to be paid to what was explicitly
agreed upon in the Constitutional Convention.
2. Would it make a difference however in the availability of
the writs of certiorari sought by petitioners considering that Article
145 of the Revised Penal Code would impose upon any public
officer or employee who shall, while the Congress is in regular or
special session, arrest or charge any member thereof except in case
such member has committed a crime punishable by penalty higher
than prision mayor? 28 The assumption here indulged is that the
effect of the above in the Revised Penal Code was to expand the
grant of parliamentary immunity under the Philippine Autonomy Act,
although its literal language does not go that far. It is to be
remembered, however, that it took effect on January 1, 1932 before
the enforcement of the present Constitution in 1935. Considering
that both under the then organic law, the Philippine Autonomy Act
and equally so under the present Constitution, such a more
generous treatment accorded legislators exempting them from
arrest even if warranted under a penal law, the question as to
whether it did survive becomes unavoidable. It is our opinion that
the answer must be in the negative.
The Constitution is equally explicit on the following point: "All laws
of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall
remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution until
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the Congress of the
Philippines, and all references in such laws to the government or
officials of the Philippines shall be construed, in so far as applicable,
to refer to the Government and corresponding officials under this
Constitution." 29 In People v. Linsangan 30 decided in December,
1935, barely a month after the Constitution took effect, the
continued applicability of Section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code that would allow the prosecution of a person
who remains delinquent in the payment of cedula tax, 31 this Court,
in its opinion thru the pen of the then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Abad Santos, after setting forth that the Constitution prohibits the
imprisonment for debt on non-payment of poll tax, 32 held: "It seems
too clear to require demonstration that section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code is inconsistent with section 1, clause 12, of
Article III of the Constitution in that, while the former authorizes
imprisonment for non-payment of the poll or cedula tax, the latter
forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the Government of
the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised Administrative
Code became inoperative, and no judgment of conviction can be
based thereon." 33
So it was in De los Santos v. Mallare. 34 Again under the provision
of the Revised Administrative Code the President could remove at
pleasure any of the appointive officials under the Charter of the City
of Baguio. 35 Relying on such a provision, the then President
Quirino removed petitioner De los Santos who was appointed City
Engineer Baguio of on July 16, 1946, and chose in his place
respondent Gil R. Mallare. The Revised Administrative Code was a
legislation that dates back to 1917, 36 eighteen years before the
Constitution prohibited any officer or employee in the civil service
being removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.
37 Again this Court, in the light of aforecited provision in an opinion
of Justice Tuason, held: "So, unlike legislation that is passed in
defiance of the Constitution, assertive and menacing, the
questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code
does not need a positive declaration of nullity by the court to put it
out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent,
outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution
itself by express mandate before the petitioner was appointed." 38
In the language of the constitutional provision then that portion of
Article 145 penalizing a public official or employee who shall while
the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or search any
member thereof except in case he has committed a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code by a penalty higher than
prision mayor is declared inoperative.
The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and
fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full
recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and
likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital
responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their
conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech should
be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however,
it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without
justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal
offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance
in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is
likely to be no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a
delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, without the
need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an
unfortunate event come to pass, he is to be treated like any other
citizen considering that there is a strong public interest in seeing to
it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might
unjustly go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to
answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown around an accused
by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The
presumption of course is that the judiciary would main independent.
It is trite to say that in each and every manifestation of judicial
endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by

Delegate Manuel Martinez by Festin in L-34022 and the petitions for
certiorari and prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr. in L-
34046 and L-34047 are hereby dismissed. Without pronouncement
as to costs.
 G.R. Nos. L-37168-69 September 13, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DELFINO BELTRAN, alias Minong, DOMINGO HERNANDEZ,
alias Doming; CEFERINO BELTRAN, alias Ebing; MANUEL
PUZON alias Noling; CRESENCIO SIAZON, alias Ising; and
ROGELIO BUGARIN, alias Boy, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto P. Pagayatan for accused-appellants.
RELOVA, J.:
Accused-appellants Delfino Beltran, alias Minong; Rogelio Bugarin,
alias Boy; Cresencio Siazon, alias Ising; Manuel Puzon, alias
Noling; Domingo Hernandez, alias Doming; and, Ceferino Beltran,
alias Ebing, were indicted for murder and double attempted murder
with direct assault in the then Court of First Instance of Cagayan,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 158- S. Likewise, Delfino Beltran
was charged with attempted murder in Criminal Case No. 160-S.
After trial they were convicted and sentenced as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused DELFINO BELTRAN
alias Minong, ROGELIO BUGARIN alias Boy, CRESENCIO
SIAZON alias Ising, MANUEL PUZON alias Noling, DOMINGO
HERNANDEZ alias Doming and CEFERINO BELTRAN alias Ebing,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the death
of VICENTE QUIROLGICO. There being no mitigating
circumstance, the Court has no other alternative than to impose the
maximum penalty provided for by law. Accused Delfino Beltran,
Rogelio Bugarin, Cresencio Siazon, Manuel Puzon, Domingo
Hernandez and Ceferino Beltran are hereby sentenced to the
maximum penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of Vicente
Quirolgico the sum of P 12,000.00 for the loss of his life; P 75,000.00
as reimbursement for expenses covering medical funeral
embalming mausoleum and burial lot, and the further sum of P
50,000.00 for moral damages, jointly and severally and to pay the
costs, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, taking
into consideration the nature of the principal penalty imposed.
The Court likewise finds all the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of DOUBLE ATTEMPTED MURDER WITH
DIRECT ASSAULT and hereby imposes upon an of them the
penalty of RECLUSION TEMPORAL in its medium period and
orders them to undergo a prison term ranging from 14 years, 8
months and 1 day as minimum to 17 years and 4 months as
maximum and to pay the costs.
Under Crim. Case No, 160-S, accused DELFINO BELTRAN is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE and hereby sentence him to undergo a
prison term ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6
months and 20 days of prision correccional and to pay the costs.
(pp. 402-403, Record)
The People's evidence shows that in the evening of January 11,
1972, between 9:00 and 10:00, in Ballesteros, Cagayan, Ernesto
Alvarado was bringing Calixto Urbi home in a jeep. Passing by the
Puzon Compound, Delfino Beltran alias Minong, shouted at them,
"Oki ni inayo" (Vulva of your mother). They proceeded on their way
and ignored Delfino. After Alvarado had brought Urbi to his house
he went to the house of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico and reported
the matter. The newly elected Mayor told the Chief of Police that
something should be done about it.
They decided to go to the Puzon Compound with the intention to
talk to Delfino Beltran and his companions to surrender considering
that he knew them personally as all of them were once working for
Congressman David Puzon When they came near the compound,
they saw appellants Delfino Beltran, Rogelio Bugarin and Domingo
Hernandez and suddenly there was a simultaneous discharge of
gunfire, The mayor's son, Vicente, who was with them, cried: " I am
already hit, Daddy." As he fell, Vicente pushed his father and both
fell down. Mayor Quirolgico and Patrolman Rolando Tolentino also
suffered injuries. When the firing had stopped, they decided to bring
Vicente to the hospital. As the jeep left the compound three (3) men
came out of the Puzon Compound and fired at the fleeing vehicle.
They were Cresencio Siazon, Ceferino Beltran and Noling Puzon.
Likewise, Domingo Hernandez and Minong Beltran and Boy Bugarin
tried to give chase. After a while, all the six men returned inside the
compound.
An hour after admission to the hospital Vicente Quirolgico died.
Autopsy examination on the deceased Vicente Quirolgico showed
the following findings:
1. Gunshot wound. inlet wound at the posterior portion of
right Mid-axillary line, at the level of the 5th costal ribs at the back,
traversing the right side of the chest, harrowing the right lung, and
fracturing the four (4) postal ribs on the right side front causing an
outlet wound almost six (6) inches long over the right side of the
chest diagonally from above the right nipple downward near the right
mid-axillary line. The inlet has almost one (1) cm. diameter.
2. Gunshot, wound left knee inlet wound at the exterior and
posterior side of the left knee. almost (1) cm. diameter, directed
towards the medial side of the left knee, fracturing the left knee and
inlet wound two (2) inches long.
3. Gunshot wound of the right thigh, inlet wound, anterior on
front side of the right thigh at the middle thirds, measuring almost
one (1) cm. diameter.
4. Gunshot wound at the internal angle of the left eye inlet
wound almost one (1) cm. diameter, directed downwards and
medially traversing the right side of the face.
CAUSE OF DEATH: INTERNAL HEMORRHAGE secondary to
Gunshot wound of the chest and left eye. (Exh. "B", p. 10, Records).
and the examination on Mayor Quirolgico shows the following
injuries:
(1) Wound, gunshot, face right;
(2) Wound, gunshot, upper lips right;
(3) Wound, gunshot, leg, right;
(4) Wound, gunshot, big toe, right;
(5) Wound, gunshot, 2nd toe, right (Exh. "A-1", P. 22, Record)
and on Patrolman Rolando Tolentino, the following injuries:
(1) Wound, gunshot, amper fated index, middle and ring
fingers, right;
(2) Wound, lacerated, 1 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep lumbar region,
right;
(3) Wound, lacerated 1/4 cm. long, 1/3 cm. deep forearm, left.
(Exh. "A", p. 20, Record.)
On November 23, 1982, this Court, upon receipt of the information
of the death of appellant Cresencio Siazon alias Ising on February
17, 1982 due to "Cardio Respiratory Arrest Secondary to Carcinoma
Liver, Pulmonary Tuberculosis," from Mr. Ramon J. Liwag, Officer-
in-Charge, New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa, as well as the Comment
filed by the Solicitor General on the aforesaid information, Resolved
to dismiss the case insofar as the criminal liability of the deceased
Cresencio Siazon alias Ising is concerned.
Appellant Rogelio Bugarin claims that between 5:00 and 5:30 in the
afternoon of January 11, 1972,, the armed men inside the passing
jeep of Mayor Quirolgico fired at Rogelio Bugarin, who was then
standing at the main gate of Puzon Compound. After the armed men
had passed by, Rogelio Bugarin proceeded to the office of
Congressman Puzon where he met Ebing Beltran and Delfino
Beltran who both asked him about the gun reports. They just
dismissed the incident as no one was hurt. Rogelio Bugarin played
guitar while waiting for supper.
Around 10:30 in the evening of the same date, or after appellants
had taken their supper at Puzon Compound, they heard an unusual
sound which appeared to be a six by six truck that was bumped.
Thereafter, at about 12:00 midnight of the same day, Delfino
Beltran, posted himself as guard and positioned himself in front of
the gate of the Rural Bank. While at the place he saw a group of
persons, numbering more than ten, along the road in front of the
Rural Bank. Among the group of armed men, he was able to
recognize the Chief of Police of Ballesteros, Gavino Collado, holding
a swinging flashlight, Gerry, Bundok Usita and Bunti Pinzon. When
the group reached the gate of Puzon Compound, he peeped and
took hold of the gate with an iron chain. Accidentally, he dropped
the chain and it created a sound which caused the group of armed
men to fire upon his direction for about half an hour. In retaliation,
he loaded his gun following which he saw a man falling down from
the fence. As the firing continued, he stealthily mounted his gun on
top of the fence and fired the same.
When the firing ceased, he proceeded to the residence of
Congressman Puzon. In the sala, he saw Boy Bugarin, Doming
Hernandez, Ising Siazon, Noling Puzon, Ebing Beltran and
Floresida Amayon, conversing. Upon seeing him, his companions
asked him what was that firing all about. He told them that he traded
shots with a group of armed men. Thereafter, they hid in the
basement of the residence of the Congressman, staying there for
one whole day. The following day, Delfino Beltran surrendered to
Captain Retuta, while the rest escaped but thereafter surrendered.
The defense of appellant Delfino Beltran, alias Minong, is self-
defense; whereas appellants Rogelio Bugarin, alias Boy, Ceferino
Beltran, alias Ebing, and Manuel Puzon, alias Noling denied having
anything to do with the incident.
In this appeal, appellants contend that the trial court erred in: (1)
giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution; (2) holding that
conspiracy existed among them in the commission of the offense
charged in Criminal Case No. 158-S; (3) finding that treachery and
evident premeditation attended the commission of the crimes; (4)
not finding that appellant Delfino Beltran acted in self-defense; (5)
finding appellants guilty of attempted murder with direct assault on
Mayor Quirolgico and Pat. Rolando Tolentino; and (6) not
appreciating in favor of the appellants the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender.
On the first assigned error, We reiterate the established doctrine
that when the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court,
considering that it is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the hearing, unless it
had overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, might affect the result of the case.
The judgment of conviction is not bereft of evidence to support the
same. Hereunder are the testimonies of the prosecution's
eyewitnesses, namely:
Carmelita Collado who declared the following:
Q Will you inform the Honorable Court who was that one
shouting?
A Minong Beltran, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform the Court what was that?
A I heard the voice of Mr. Minong Beltran saying, 'Cida, Cida,
you bring out the guns now I have already shot at the BRQ jeep and
they are sure to come back.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Can you tell us what you saw at that time?
A I saw these three persons, Minong Beltran, Boy Bugarin
and Domingo Hernandez, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q What else did you see if any?
A When these three persons came out, they were already
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you inform this Court what was that?
A Upon coming out, Delfino Beltran ordered Doming
Hernandez to go to the right side of the old office of Congressman
Puzon and he also instructed Boy Bugarin to seek cover to the Rural
Bank.
xxx xxx xxx
Q During all these time that these were happening, the going
out of Doming Hernandez, of Bugarin; the ordering of Minong
Beltran to the two, did you see any other persons inside the
compound of Congressman Puzon aside from the three?
A After the three had placed themselves in their respective
positions, I saw persons coming out but I was not able to recognize
them. (tsn., pp. 5-7, 42-45, Nov. 18, 1972 hearing.)
Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico testified as follows:
Q And do you know what happened after you walked a few
steps to the south?
A When I was looking very well around the vicinity, at the
southern part of the Rural Bank about the corner of their fence, and
as I tried to look intently, I recognized the face of Minong Beltran.
xxx xxx xxx
Q At the precise moment, when you saw Minong Beltran at
the corner of the Rural Bank, what else happened if any?
A As I tried to look near them, that was the time when there
was a burst of gun fire, the direction of which was coming from the A Yes, sir. (tsn., pp. 59, 80, January 9, 1973 hearing)
place where they were staying.
The denial of appellants Rogelio Bugarin, Ceferino Beltran and
xxx xxx xxx Manuel Puzon cannot, therefore, prevail over their positive
Identification, as the perpetrators of the crime by the aforenamed
Q Will you inform this Honorable Court who the other men eyewitnesses who have not been shown to have any evil motive to
were at that time? testify falsely against them.

A Boy Bugarin and Domingo Hernandez. Moreover, the physical evidence, as testified to by Dr. Gregorio R.
Farin, Municipal Health Officer of Ballesteros, Cagayan, who
xxx xxx xxx conducted the post mortem examination on the body of the
deceased Vicente Quirolgico, shows that several firearms could
Q And after the shooting, there was the shout? have caused his wounds:

A At the lulling of the shooting, I heard the shout. Q Considering the nature of the injuries that were found on
the body of the deceased, could it be possible that several firearms
xxx xxx xxx could have caused these injuries?

Q And what were the words? A It is possible.

A 'Nala na si Mayor' (The mayor is already hit). (tsn., pp. 20, xxx xxx xxx
21, 31-32, 58-59, Nov. 17, 1972 hearing)
Q It is also possible that wounds Nos. 2, 3 and 4 were
Patrolman Rolando Usita stated that: caused by three different bullets, 3 different guns, different calibers?

Q You said that as the mayor was leaving the scene of the A Yes, sir. It is possible. (tsn., pp. 65-66, Nov. 17, 1972
incident, you saw three of the accused coming out of the hearing)
guardhouse, do you confirm that?
The foregoing testimony of Dr. Farin finds support from the findings
A Yes, sir. of witnesses Vicente de Vera, a Ballistician, and Lt. Col. Crispin
Garcia, Chief Chemistry Branch, both of the Philippine Constabulary
xxx xxx xxx Crime Laboratory, Camp Crame, Quezon City, who conducted
examinations on the empty shells and on the firearms, respectively,
Q And the persons who came out from this point according recovered from the premises of the Rural Bank and the Puzon
to you are the accused Ising Siazon, Ebing Beltran and Noling Compound. Vicente de Vera testified on direct examination, the
Puzon, do you confirm that? following:

A Yes, sir.
Q And after that the three other accused named as Doming
Hernandez, Boy Bugarin and Minong Beltran came out of the same
compound?
A No, sir. They came out from here. (tsn., pp. 84, 87,
February 19, 1973 hearing)
Q Under your findings No. 1, will you inform us your
conclusion?
A My conclusion was that the 27 fired cartridges marked as
CIS-1 to 27 were fired from the firearm marked as Exhibit 'R' (SIG
Natu Rifle).
Q Your other findings, please tell the Court.

Chief of Police Gavino Collado also pointed out the following:
Q May I see the sketch, your Honor?
A The mayor took this road in going to the hospital (witness
pointing to the Bonifacio Cortez Street), and as the jeep was going
westward, and reached this point, three men came out from this part
of the compound and they fired at the vehicle in which the mayor
and his son rode on.
A Under findings Nos. 2: Microscopic examination and comparison
of the 223 Cal. fired cartridge cases marked as CIS 28 to CIS 154
revealed the non-congruency of striations with the test cartridge
cases fired from the abovementioned 223 caliber M16 Armalite rifle
with Serial No. 527226. They further revealed the following:
1. CIS 28 to CIS 62 were fired from one (1) firearm;
2. CIS 63 to CIS 95 were fired from one (l) firearm;
3. CIS 96 to CIS 102 were fired from one (1) firearm;

xxx xxx xxx 4. CIS 103 to CIS 154 were fired from one (1) firearm

Q So that the Court would now understand from your
statement that it was only after the jeep of the mayor has left already
the scene when three persons came out from the gate of the Puzon
compound, that you saw for the first time these persons?
A Yes, sir.
Q May we know your conclusion of this findings of yours?
A My conclusion is that, the 223 Caliber fired cartridges
marked as CIS 28 to CIS 154 were fired from four different
firearms but not from the above-entioned 223 Cal. M16 Armalite with
SN-527226. (tsn., pp. 29-30, January 8, 1973 hearing)

Q And these persons were Identified as Ebing Beltran, and on cross-examination declared that:
Cresencio Siazon and Noling Puzon?
Q Supposing that there are three SIG rifles of the same
Serial number and the fired cartridges from this three guns have the
same number of similar characteristics or congruency of striations?
A They can have no similar characteristics.
Q Do you mean to say that for every SIG rifle there is its own
characteristics; that congruency of striations?
A That is correct. (tsn., p. 36, January 8, 1973 hearing)
whereas, Lt. Col. Crispin B. Garcia on the witness stand declared:
Q With this request for examination of certain articles, what
articles were actually submitted to you for examinations?
A Well one (1) rifle SIG, Switzerland made with SN-5721, the
barrel group bearing Serial Number 15721; the receiver group with
SN-5720 and the barrel link bearing SN-9641, and another firearm
(Exh. 'R').
Q Colonel aside from this article, Exhibit 'R', what other
articles or guns did you receive for examination?
A One Armalite with Serial No. 527226. (Exhibit 'S')
xxx xxx xxx
Q With reference to the first rifle which you have mentioned,
which is marked as Exhibit 'R', with different serial numbers, in the
barrel group, receiver group, and the barrel link, will you inform this
Honorable Court your findings?
A I found that the barrel of the Armalite is positive for the
presence of gunpowder, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q With reference to this Armalite, M15, marked as Exhibit
'S', in this particular case, will you tell us your findings about the
presence of gunpowder?
A Exhibit 'S', the barrel is positive of gunpowder. (tsn., pp.
52, 55, 57, & 58, January 8, 1973 hearing)
The above findings further confirm the truth of the statements of
eyewitnesses Gavino Collado, Patrolman Usita, Mayor Quirolgico
and Carmelita Collado that appellants traded shots with the Mayor's
group, using long or high powered guns.
Anent the second assigned error, We agree with the trial court's
finding on the existence of conspiracy. In the case at bar, the
sequence of events that transpired in the evening of January 11,
1972, from the time Delfino Beltran first fired upon the passing jeep
of Mayor Bienvenido Quirolgico, driven by witness Ernesto Alvarado
at around 9:00, the subsequent preparations for the arrival of the
Mayor as testified to by eyewitness Carmelita Collado, the shooting
on the other passing jeepney to further provoke the Mayor, and the
simultaneous and sudden firing at the Mayor's group which had just
arrived at about 12:00 midnight in the scene of the crime; the final
shooting of the fleeing Mayor; and, the simultaneous common
retreat and escape of all the accused, established the presence of
conspiracy. For conspiracy to exist, it is enough that at the time the
offense was committed, the participants had the same purpose and
were united in its execution, as may be inferred from the attendant
circumstances (People vs. Manalo, 133 SCRA 626). Further,
conspiracy does not require an agreement for an appreciable period
prior to the occurrence, as conspiracy legally exists if, at the time of
the offense, the accused had the same criminal purpose and were
united in its execution. Appellants' conduct and/or actuations before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged in Criminal
Case No. 158-S are circumstances proving conspiracy.
Conspiracy having established, the act of one is the act of all. It is
no longer necessary to specifically lay out the particular participation
of each participant.
Relative to the third assigned error, the trial court properly
appreciated the existence of the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation and treachery. From 9:00 in the evening to
12:00 midnight of the same day, appellants had three (3) long hours
to meditate and reflect on their evil design and they clung in their
determination to kill the Mayor, which fortunately failed.
Premeditation is present where there was a lapse of two hours from
the inception to execution.
The existence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery was
shown in the simultaneous and sudden firing by the accused on the
newly arrived Mayor's group, without warning. We are convinced
that they employed means, methods or forms which could have
tended directly or insured the accomplishment of their evil design
against the Mayor, with whom they have no personal grudge,
without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the
offended party had made. No one from herein appellants sustained
a scratch as they were really prepared for the coming Mayor.
With respect to the fourth assigned error, the claim of Delfino Beltran
that he had just acted in self-defense, suffice it to say, that the one
invoking this justifying circumstance must prove beyond reasonable
doubt that all the necessary requisites of self-defense are present,
namely: (1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the offended party;
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and, (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person defending himself. Delfino Beltran had not proved any one
of these. Thus, his claim of self-defense was properly dismissed by
the trial court.
Regarding the fifth assigned error, considering that Mayor
Quirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. Rolando Tolentino is a
policeman who at the time was in his uniform, and both were
performing their official duties to maintain peace and order in the
community, the finding of the trial court that appellants are guilty of
attempted murder with direct assault on the persons of Mayor
Quirolgico and Pat. Tolentino is correct.
Relative to the last assigned error, following Our latest ruling in
People vs. Nicolas Canamo, et al., G.R. No. 62043, promulgated on
August 13, 1985, We agree with appellants that they should be
credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, as
they in fact presented themselves voluntarily to the authorities.
However, this mitigating circumstance is offset by the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 158-S, with the modifications
that for lack of necessary votes, the penalty imposed upon
appellants Delfino Beltran alias Minong, Rogelio Bugarin alias Boy,
Manuel Puzon alias Noling, Domingo Hernandez alias Doming and
Ceferino Beltran alias Ebing, for the death of Vicente Quirolgico, is
reduced to Reclusion Perpetua, and that the indemnity to the heirs
of the deceased Vicente Quirolgico is increased to P30,000.00, the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED in an other respects.
For the double attempted murder with direct assault, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed on the aforesaid
appellants is reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.

In Criminal Case No. 160-S, applying also the Indeterminate

Sentence Law, the penalty imposed to the accused Delfino Beltran
is reduced to Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four
(4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

With costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 70639
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PEDRO DOLLANTES, HAMLET DOLLANTES, ALFREDO
DOLLANTES, LAURO DOLLANTES, MONICO DOLLANTES,
SIDRITO LOKESIO, MERLANDO DOLLANTES, HUGO
GRENGIA, DANNY ESTEBAN AND LEONILO VILLAESTER,
accused-appellants.
PARAS, J:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, 7th Judicial Region, Branch XL, in Criminal Case
No. 5832, convicting the nine (9) accused, Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet
Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio,
Merlando Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo
Villaester, all equally guilty of the complex crime of "Assault upon a
Person in Authority Resulting in Murder" and sentencing the
abovementioned accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, jointly and severally, the
sum of P30,000.00 to pay attomey's fees in the amount of P3,000.00
and to pay the costs.
All of the accused were charged as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1983 at nighttime, in the
Municipality of Tayasan, Province of Negros Oriental, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one
another with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to
kill did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and stab one Marcos Gabutero, Barangay Captain of
Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental, an agent of a person in
authority and which fact accused had full knowledge, while the latter
was in the lawful performance of his official duty or function as
Barangay Captain or on the occasion of such function, with a bolo
and hunting knives with which the accused were then armed and
provided, thereby inflicting the following wounds in the victim, viz:
1. Stab wound measuring three and a half (3 1/2) cm. in
length and half (1/2) cm. in width, ten (10) cm. depthness located at
the left anterior aspect of the trunk at the level of the 3rd intercostal
space, 5 cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was
oriented horizontally and directed vertically and slightly to the back.
Ventricle and lung tissue penetrated.
2. Stab wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in
width, eleven and a half (11 1/2) cm. depthness, located at the right
anterior aspect of the trunk, at the level of the 2nd intercostal space
about five (5) cm. away from the anterior and midline, the wound
was oriented horizontally and directed downward and slightly to the
back.
3. Incised wound five (5) cm. in length, 1 cm. in width located
at the left anterior aspect of the trunk about 26 cm. below the left
clavicle and four (4) cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound
was oriented obliquely.
4. Incised wound measuring two (2) cm. in length and one
(1) cm. in width, located at the right anterior aspect of the trunk about
twenty-one (21) cm. below the right clavicle and eight (8) cm. away
from the anterior line. The wound was oriented obliquely.
5. Incised wound measuring one and a half (1 1/2) cm. in
length, half (1/2) cm. in width located at the anterior aspect of the
upper extremity about nine (9) cm. above the wrist joint one and a
half (1 1/2) cm. away from the anterior mid-line and medially. The
wound was oriented vertically.
6. Incised wound measuring four (4) cm. in length, 1 cm. in
width located at the lateral aspect of the right upper extreme about
five (5) cm. above the elbow joint and five (5) cm. away from the
posterior midline laterally. The wound was oriented horizontally.
7. Through and through stab wound located at the left upper
extremity the wound of entrance measuring about three and a half
(3 1/2) cm. in length and one (1) cm. in width located at the posterior
aspect of the forearm above five (5) em. below the elbow joint, three
(3) cm. away from the anterior mid-line medially. The wound was
oriented vertically.
8. Incised wound measuring 3 cm. in length half (1/2) cm. in
width located at the lateral aspect of the left upper extremity about
five (5) cm. below the elbow joint and (5) cm. away from the
posterior mid-line. The wound was oriented horizontally.
9. Stab wound measuring one and one-half (1 1/2) cm. in
width and four (4) cm. depthness located at the left anterior aspect
of the trunk, about seven and a half (7 1/2) cm. above the ihac crest
and twelve (12) cm. away from the anterior mid-line. The wound was
oriented obliquely and directed downward, slightly to the right and
posteriority, perforating part of the intestine.
10. Stab wound measuring three (3) cm. in length, one (1) cm.
in width and seven and a half (7) cm. in depthness, located at the
left posterior of the trunk about three (3) cm. above the lower angle
of the scapula, and seven (7) cm. away from the posterior mid-line.
The wound was oriented obliquely and directed downward and
slightly to the left.
11. Stab wound measuring three(3) cm. in length, one (l) cm.
in width and twelve (12) cm. in depthness, located at the left
posterior aspect of the trunk about thirteen (13) cm. below the lower
angle of the scapula and six (6) cm. away from the posterior mid-
line. The wound was oriented obliquely and directed anteriority to
the left.
12. Hemothorax on the left pleural cavity, which wounds
caused the latter's untimely death.
Contrary to Art. 248, 148 and 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Information, Original Record, pp. 3-4)
The findings of facts of the trial court are as follows:
That deceased Marcos Gabutero at the time of his death was the
Barangay Captain of Barangay Maglihe, Tayasan, Negros Oriental;
that due to the approaching fiesta of barangay Maglihe, a dance was
held in said barangay in the evening of April 21, 1983; that while the
Barangay Captain was delivering a speech to start the dance, the
accused Pedro Dollantes went to the middle of the dancing floor,
making a dance movement known in the visayan as "nagkorantsa",
brandishing his knife and challenging everyone as to who was brave
among the people present; the Barangay Captain approached
Pedro Dollantes and admonished him to keep quiet and not to
disturb the dance. However, the accused, instead of heeding to the
advice of the Barangay Captain, stabbed the latter on the left arm;
that accused Hugo Grengia held the left hand of accused Pedro
Dollantes and Dionilo Garol was able to get from the hand of Pedro
Dollantes the hunting knife. Immediately thereafter, accused Hamlet
Dollantes, who rushed towards the Barangay Captain, stabbed the
Barangay Captain at the back and the other co-accused also took
turns in stabbing the Barangay Captain; the Barangay Captain at
that time was not armed. Except for the accused Hugo Grengia,
Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester who were merely holding
stones, the other co-accused participated in the stabbing incident.
When the Barangay Captain fell to the ground and died, the accused
in this case took turns in kicking the dead body of the Barangay
Captain and were dancing around said dead body; that the
Barangay Captain suffered eleven (11) wounds in the different parts
of his body, two of which happened to be at the back of his dead
body. According to the attending physician, Dr. Rogelio Kho who
examined the body of the deceased, the victim died of "Severe
hemorrhage and cardiac tamponade due to stab wounds."
(Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo, p. 75).
The evidence for the prosecution consisted principally of the
testimonies of Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero, Marciana Gabutero,
the wife of the deceased, Pat. Ricardo Barrera, Dr. Rogelio Kho who
conducted the post mortem examination of the deceased,
Ponsimillo Balasabas, the Municipal Treasurer of Tayasan, Negros
Oriental and Pat. Jose Amis of the Integrated National Police.
On the other hand, the defense presented the following witnesses:
Accused: Hugo Grengia, Leonilo Villaester, Danny Esteban, Alfredo
Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, and other witnesses: Machim
Dollantes and Tacio Fausto.After a careful evaluation of the
evidence, the trial court was convinced that all the accused in this
case conspired in the commission of the crime.
Thus on February 20, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision
finding all the accused guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a
person in authority resulting in murder. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of all the
accused beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby finds the
accused Pedro Dollantes, Hamlet Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes,
Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesia, Merlando
Dollantes, Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester,
guilty of the complex crime of assault upon a person in authority
resulting in murder, and hereby sentences the above-mentioned
accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify
the heirs of Marcos Gabutero, jointly and severally, the sum of Thirty
Thousand (P30,000.00) PESOS, to pay attorney's fees in the
amount of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos, and to pay the costs
of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED. (RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 79)
From the aforementioned decision, all the accused appealed.
Accused Hugo Grengia submitted a separate brief.
The appellant raised the following assignment of errors:
FIRST ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND
CREDIT TO THE BIASED, INCREDIBLE AND CONTRADICTORY
STATEMENTS OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES DIONILO
GAROL, BONIFACIO CERO AND MARCIANA GABUTERO AND
IN NOT CONSIDERING AT LEAST THE UNCONTRADICTED
TESTIMONY OF INDEPENDENT WITNESSES DOLLANTES AND
TACIO FAUSTO.
SECOND AND THIRD ERRORS
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE
EXPERT PROSECUTION WITNESS DR. ROGELIO R. KHO
WHICH IN EFFECT CONTRADICTS THE THEORY OF THE
PROSECUTION AND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DECIDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTS.
FOURTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FROM NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO
THE TESTIMONY OF ACCUSED HUGO GRENGIA, LEONILO
VILLAESTER alias "Laon," DANILO ESTEBAN, HAMLET
DOLLANTES, ALFREDO DOLLANTES AND THE TESTIMONY OF
INDEPENDENT WITNESSES TACIO FAUSTO AND MCLEAN
DOLLANTES.
FIFTH ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ASSAULT UPON A PERSON IN
AUTHORITY RESULTING TO MURDER AND SENTENCING
THEM TO SUFFER THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA
AND TO INDEMNIFY THE HEIRS OF MARCOS GABUTERO,
JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, THE SUM OF THIRTY THOUSAND
(P30,000.00) PESOS, and TO PAY THE COSTS OF THE
PROCEEDINGS. (Brief for Accused-Appellant, Rollo, p. 62)
In his separate brief, accused Hugo Grengia assigns the following
errors:
1. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to
the admission of accused-appellant Hamlet Dollantes that he was
the lone perpetrator of the alleged stabbing of victim Marcos
Gabutero.
2. The lower court erred in not considering the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, namely: Patrolman Ricardo Barrera, Dr.
Rogeho Kho which in effect buttressed the theory of the defense.
3. The lower court erred in not considering the entry in the
police logbook of the Tayasan Integrated National Police, dated
April 21, 1983, as testified to by Patrolman Jose Amis.
4. The lower court erred in holding that conspiracy exist in
perpetration of the felony.
5. The lower court erred in holding that the case of People
vs. Agag (L-64951, June 29, 1984) is applicable to the case at bar
to justify the conviction of the accused-appellants.
6. The lower court erred in not giving weight and credence to
the testimony of the defense witnesses.
7. Finally, the trial court erred in holding that the accused-
appellant herein is guilty of the crime charged. (Brief for
accusedappellant Hugo Grengia, pp. 1-2)
The appeal is without merit.
The issue hinges on the credibility of witnesses.
The accused were positively identified by three (3) prosecution eye
witnesses. They were: Dionilo Garol, Bonifacio Cero and Marciana
Gabutero, the wife of the victim. Except for the latter, the two other
witnesses Garol and Cero are not related to the victim or the
accused. The testimonies of these three (3) witnesses were
subjected to a lengthy cross-examination and were found credible
and free from material contradictions by the trial court (Rollo, p. 75).
Dionilo Garol who was six (6) meters away, saw clearly what
happened. He testified that when the Barangay Captain started to
deliver his speech, the accused Pedro Dollantes brandishing a knife
shouted "Who is brave here?" (TSN, page 6, Oct. 7, 1983). The
victim then approached to admonish him t the latter stabbed the
victim on the arm. Garol immediately approached the accused
Pedro Dollantes and tried to wrest the knife away from the hand of
the accused. The accused Hugo Grengia also tried to grab the knife
but it was Garol who succeeded. The accused Grengia then told him
"Do not try to intervene because you might be included in the plan."
(TSN, page 8, Oct. 17, 1983). Then Grengia made some signs by
nodding his head and the accused Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo
Dollantes rushed to and attacked the victim followed by the other
co-accused in this case who also rushed at and stabbed the victim.
He specified that accused Alfredo Dollantes, Lauro Dollantes,
Monico Dollantes and Sidrito Lokesio were carrying knives while the
accused Merlando Dollantes was carrying a bolo; and that they
stabbed the victim one after another. He said that the accused
Danny Esteban, Hugo Grengia andLeonilo Villaester were all
carrying stones which they threw at the store of the victim's wife
(TSN, pp. 7-10; Oct. 17, 1983).
This testimony was fully corroborated by another prosecution
eyewitness Bonifacio Cero who was about three (3) meters away
and whose narration tallied on all material ints with that of Dionilo
Garol as to what transpired that night. He stated further that when
he saw the Barangay Captain being stabbed he tried to approach
the group but he was held by Danny Esteban who said "do not try
to interfere, you are not a party to this. We have already gotten what
we have been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct. 18, 1983).
Thereafter, he ran away but Alfredo Dollantes, Pedro Dollantes and
Danny Esteban stoned him because they intended to kill him also.
He also testified that when he returned to the crime scene, he saw
Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and companions simultaneously
kicking the dead body and shouting "who is brave among here. "
Marciana Gabutero, the wife of the victim funy corroborated the
testimonies of Garol and Cero. She also added that Hugo Grengia
wanted to be a Barangay Captain and she happened to know that
as a fact, because he told the crowd not to long as Barangay
Captain. She also testified that the accused Leonilo Villaester
splashed one glass of tuba on the face of the deceased and that the
victim had had a misunderstanding with the Dollantes on a theft
case involving Hamlet Dollantes (Rollo, pp. 68-69).
It will be noted that the above witnesses were categorical and
straightforward when they stated that they saw appellants stab the
victim. They even specified the type of weapon used by each of said
appellants.
There is no possibility that they could have been mistaken in their
Identification for apart from being near the crime scene which was
well illuminated with two Petromax lamps (TSN, page 6, Oct. 19,
1983), these witnesses are familiar with the appellants since they
are all residents of the same locality. Furthermore, there is no
showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against
the appellants.
In fact, under similar circumstances, the Court has held that where
the scene of the stabbing was clearly lighted and no motive was
shown why prosecution witnesses would incriminate the appellants,
identification would be given full faith and credit (People v.
Escoltero, 139 SCRA 218).
The theory of the defense in this case is that it was only the accused
Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed the victim while the other accused
did not participate in the stabbing incident (Rollo, pp. 75-76).
In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellants
pointed out that there are certain inconsistencies that render the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses, incredible.
For one thing they claim that Dionilo Garol could not have een
Hamlet Dollantes stab the victim because as Garol himself stated,
when said accused rushed towards the victim, he ran away. The
evidence shows however, that Garol clearly testified that he saw au
of them stab the Barrio Captain, one after another and it was only
after the Barrio Captain fell to the ground that he ran towards the
municipal hall to report the incident to the police (TSN, page 11, Oct.
17, 1983).
Another circumstance allegedly raising grave doubts on the
credibility of Dionilo Garol was his failure to report to the police
authorities the fact of stoning (Rollo, pp. 71-72).
However, the fact of stoning was not the means used to kill the
victim and the omission of the same in the narration in the report
does not detract from the established fact that the victim was
stabbed several times which caused his death.
It was also pointed out that Dionilo Garol testified that the store of
the victim's wife was stoned while Bonifacio Cero also testified that
he was the one being stoned.
There appears to be no inconsistency between the two testimonies.
The fact that the store of the victim's wife was stoned does not
preclude the possibility that Bonifacio Cero was also stoned.
Finally, appellants maintain that Bonifacio Cero could not have seen
with precision the stabbing of the victim while he was being hugged
by Danny Esteban and he had a feeling that he would be killed by
the group. Much less could it be possiblefor accused Danny
Esteban, Leonflo Villaester, Sidrito Lokesio and Alfredo Dollantes
who were at the store of Severina Cadillero, to join in stabbing the
victim, the appellants argued (Rollo, pp. 73-74).
The records show that Cero testified that he saw appellants stab the
deceased before he was embraced by appellant Danny Esteban
who told him "do not interfere you are not a party to this. We have
already gotten what we have been aiming for." (TSN, page 12, Oct.
18, 1983). Clearly, the language is unmistakable that in that at said
point, the stabbing and the killing being described by all the
witnesses had already been accomphshed.
Indeed, if there be any inconsistency or contradictions in their
testimonies, the same are trivial and merely refer to minor matters
which do not affect credibility. They do not detract from the essential
facts or vital details of the crime pinpointing their criminal
responsibility (Appellee's Brief, p. 16). As held by this Court,
discrepancies in minor details are to be expected from an
uncoached witness (People v. Arbois, 138 SCRA 31). Such minor
variations would rather show the sincerity of the witnesses and the
absence of connivance between them to make their testimonies tally
in every respect (People v. Pielago, 140 SCRA 419, 423). Truth to
tell, such trivial differences constitute fail-safe reliability.
Accused Hugo Grengia claims that the trial court erred in not giving
weight to the admission of accused Hamlet Dollantes that he was
the lone perpetrator of the killing incident (Brief for Accused-
Appellant Hugo Grengia, p. 7). Thus the defense argues that the
accused Pedro Dollantes, Alfredo Dollantes, Merlando Dollantes,
Lauro Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio, Monico Dollantes and Leonilo
Villaester, did not stab the victim and were not at the scene of the
crime and that it was only accused Hamlet Dollantes who stabbed
the victim.
As found by the trial court, such claim is not supported by sufficient
evidence. On the contrary, an entry in the Police Logbook (Exhibit
"D") of the Integrated National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental,
shows that one Gloria Callao, wife of the accused Lauro Dollantes,
turned over to the police two (2) hunting knives owned by the
accused Hamlet Dollantes and Alfredo Dollantes. Moreover, as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, such theory is behed
by the Identification made by the prosecution witnesses and by the
number and location of the victim's wounds which are mute
evidence that several persons comn)itted the crime (People's Brief,
p. 17).
As repeatedly held by the Supreme Court, the claim of alibi by the
accused cannot prevail over positive Identification by credible
witnesses (People v. Tirol, 102 SCRA 58); more so where as in the
case at bar, it was not demonstrated that it was physically
impossible for the accused to have been at the scene of said crime
at the time of its commission (People v. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232).
On the other hand, the claim of Hamlet Dollantes of self-defense
when he stabbed the victim is not sustained by the records. As found
by the trial court, the victim was not armed at the time of the incident,
so that there was no danger to the life and limb of the accused. The
latter claims that he had to stab the victim who boxed him and would
not release his wounded hand (Rollo, p. 76). Apart from the obvious
disproportion of the means used to repel the alleged attack, three
witnesses of the prosecution testified that the accused Hamlet
Dollantes rushed towards the victim and stabbed the latter at the
back. Said testimonies were corroborated by the Post Mortem
Examination (Exhibit "A") and the Sketch (Exhibit "B") of the human
body of the victim which showed a stab wound at the back.
Furthermore, the nature, character, location and extent of the wound
suffered by the victim, negates the accused's claim of self-defense.
(People v. Tolentino, 54 Phil. 77). In fact, the eleven (11) wounds
suffered by "he victim are indicative of aggression (People v.
Somera, 83 Phil. 548; People v. Mendoza, L-16392, Jan. 30, 1965).
Accused-appellant Hugo Grengia submits that the prosecution
failed to prove the existence of conspiracy. Among others, he
pointed out that he was unarmed at the time of the incident, that his
name was not mentioned in the report made by Dionilo Garol to
Patrolman Barrera as to the perpetrators of the crime; that his name
was not included in the entry in the police logbook of the Integrated
National Police of Tayasan, Negros Oriental and that he had no
participation in the commission ofthe felony except the alleged
nodding of his head at a time when he was trying to wrest the knife
from Pedro Dollantes which is not an indication of conspiracy (Brief
for Grengia, pp. 13-16).
While it is true that the accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and
Leonilo Villaester did not participate in the stabbing, the lower court
finds them equally liable as principals with the other accused in this
case. They were found to be holding stones which they threw at the
store owned by the victim and his wife; they participated in kicking
and dancing around the dead body of the Barangay Captain and
although Grengia also tried to wrest the knife from Pedro Dollantes,
he clearly told Dionilo Garol when the latter succeeded in getting the
knife and was holding the hands of Pedro Dollantes, "do not try to
intervene here because you might be included in the plan." (TSN,
pp. 7-10, Octoer 17, 1983). Danny Esteban uttered the same
statements to Bonifacio Cero, saying "do not try to interfere you are
not a party to this. We have already gotten what we have been
aiming or." (TSN, pp. 9-14, October 18,1983).
Furthermore, as previously stated, while the victim was delivering a
speech, Hugo Grengia was telumg people not to listen to the victim
as he will not stay long as a Barangay Captain. It is also to be noted
that although he was a compadre of the victim, he never tried to help
the former while he was being stabbed and after the incident, he
never visited the victim's family.
Thus, the lower court found the existence of conspiracy as follows:
The accused Hugo Grengia, Danny Esteban and Leonilo Villaester
by their acts, aimed at the same object, and their acts, though
apparently independent, are in fact concerted and cooperative,
indicating closeness of personal association, concerted action and
concurrence of sentiments. The conduct of the defendants, before,
during and after the commission of the crime clearly shows that they
acted in concert. (People v. Emilio Agag, L-64951, June 29, 1984,
Justice Relova) There being conspiracy, the Court finds them guilty
of Murder. (Decision, Crim. Case No. 5832, Rollo p. 77)
In one case, this Court held "that while the acts done by the
petitioners herein vary from those of their co-accused, there is no
question that they were all prompted and linked by a common desire
to assault and retaliate against the group..... Thus, they must share
equal liability for all the acts done by the participants in the felonious
undertaking." (Pring v. Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 185-186
[1985]).
Appellant Hugo Grengia lays much stress on the testimony of Dr.
Rogeho Kho that it is possible that all the stab wounds were inflicted
by the same weapon, in a desperate effort to show that only one
person committed the crime and that there is no conspiracy.
The records show however, that said Doctor merely replied to he
questions propounded by the defense lawyer as to the different
possibilities on how the wounds of the victim may have been
inflicted. But testifying specifically on the case at bar, he
categorically stated that actually the wounds could be produced by
a single bladed weapon with different sizes but not necessarily only
a single bladed weapon.
Thus, the Doctor testified as follows:
Atty. Jayme:
Q Basing upon your physical findings, Doc, upon the victim
Marcos Gabutero, is it possible Doc, that in accordance with your
drawing that the wounds inflicted was caused by a single bladed
weapon, is it possible, Doctor, that this wound was caused by a
single bladed weapon? Is it possible that this. I repeat the question,
your Honor.
Q According to your drawing which is labelled "BS" which
according to you "blunt and sharp bladed weapon which is
practically single bladed weapon, according to your physical
findings there is similarly in the weapons used, could we say
practically, Doctor, that these stab wounds as well as those incised
wounds may be caused by one single-bladed weapon?
A Actually it could be produced by a single bladed weapon
with different sizes but not necessarily only a single bladed weapon.
Q According to you it was a single bladed weapon with
different or several sizes, now, what is your honest observation
upon your physical findings, what will be themaximum weapon
used? I have here a zerox copy for your own reference.
A With respect to the length of the wound there are two
wounds that have three em. in length, it could be possible that the
same kind of weapon or instrument has been used. This refers to
Wounds Nos.10 and 11. By the way, Sir, this refers to the stab
wounds because the size of the incised wounds is difficult to
determine.
Atty. Jayme:
Yes, the stab wounds only.

A It's hard to determine Wound No. 9 because the length is

not indicated here, so it is possible that there are 3 or 4 kinds of
instrument or weapons being used. (TSN, pp. 26- 27, December 15,
1983)

Appellant Hugo Garcia also emphasizes the testimony of Dr. Kho

that the latter did not observe any contusions on the body of the
deceased, obviously to disprove that appellants danceda round and
kicked the body after the victim was slain.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, "although the

examining doctor failed to find any contusion or abrasion on the
cadaver of the victim, nevertheless, such absence is not conclusive
proof that appellants did not kick the deceased. It might be possible
that kicks did not cause or produce contusions or abrasions or that
they were not noticed by the doctor." (Appellee's Brief, p. 22).
Moreover, the fact of dancing and kicking complained of, is only one
of the acts showing conspiracy, without which, conspiracy cannot
be said not to have been established.

The lower court also found that treachery was present in the
commission of the crime, and that the accused Alfredo Dollantes,
Lauro Dollantes, Monico Dollantes, Sidrito Lokesio and Merlando
Dollantes are as equally guilty as principals by direct participation.
These accused took turns in stabbing the victim. In fact the victim
was caught by surprise and did not have time to defend himself.

Finally, the records show that the Barangay Captain was in the act
of trying to pacify Pedro Dollantes who was making trouble in the
dance hall when he was stabbed to death. He was therefore killed
while in the performance of his duties. In the case of People v. Hecto
(135 SCRA 113), this Court ruled that "As the barangay captain, it
was his duty to enforce the laws and ordinances within the
barangay. If in the enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his
people who thereafter treacherously slew him the crime committed
is murder with assault upon a person in authority."

There is no qeustion that the trial court's conclusions on credibilitY

of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal. (People v.
Oliverio, 120 SCRA 22). After a careful review of the records, no
plausible reason could be found to disturb the findings of fact and of
law of the lower court in this case.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed decision is hereby

AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-31839 June 30, 1980
EDMUNDO S. ALBERTO, Provincial Fiscal and BONIFACIO C.
INTIA 1st Asst. Provincial Fiscal, both of Camarines Sur, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAFAEL DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Judge of the CFI of
Camarines Sur and ELIGIO ORBITA, respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminay injunction, to annul and set aside the order of the
respondent Judge, dated January 26, 1970, directing the
petitioners, Provincial Fiscal and Assitant Provincial Fiscal of
Camarines Sur, to amend the information filed in Criminal Case No.
9414 of the Court of First Instance of CamarinesSur, entitled: "The
People of the Philippines, plaintiff, versus Eligio Orbita, accused,"
so as to include, as defendants, Governor Armando Cledera and
Jose Esmeralda, assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur; as
well as the order dated February 18, 1970, denying the motion for
the reconsideration of the said order.
In Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, Eligio Orbita, a Provincial guard, is prosecuted for
the crime of Infedelity in the Custody of Prisoner, defined and
punished under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code, committed,
as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of September. 1968, in the barrio of
Taculod, municipality of Canaman, province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, being then a member of the Provincial Guard of
Camarines Sur and specially charged with the duty of keeping under
custody and vigilance detention prisoner Pablo Denaque, did then
and there with great carelessness and unjustifiable negligence
leave the latter unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving him
the opportunity to run away and escape, as in fact said detention
prisoner Pablo Denaque did run away and escape from the custody
of the said accused. 1
In the course of the trial thereof, or more particularly during the
cross-examination of prosecution witness Jose Esmeralda,
assistant provincial warden of Camarines Sur, the defense brought
forht and confronted the witness with a note, marked as exhibit,
purportedly written by Gov. Armando Cledera, asking Jose
Esmeralda to send five men to work in the construction of a fence
at his house at Taculod, Canaman, Camarines Sur, then leased by
the province and used as an official guest house. Jose Esmeralda,
declared, however, that he could not remember who ahnded the
note for him; that he was not sure as to genuineness of the signature
appearing therein and that he was not preszent when the note was
made and signed by Gov. Cledera. 2 Beleiving that the escape of
Pablo Denaque was made possible by the note of Gov. Cledera to
Jose Esmeralda and that Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty
of the offense for which tha accused Eligio Orbita had been charged,
the defense cousel filed a motion in court seeking the amendment
of the information so as to include Gov. cledera and Jose Esmeralda
as defendants therein. 3
Acting upon said motion, as well as the opposition of the prosecution
officers 4 and finding that "the court cannot grant the motion or order
the inclusion of Gov. Cledera and Lt. Esmeralda at this stage unless
an investigation is made," the respondent Judge directed the Fiscals
office, within 15 days from date, to cause the further investigation of
the case, taking into consideration the provisions of Article 156 in
relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the Revised Penal Code in order
to determine once and for all whether the Governor as jailer of the
Province and his assistant have any criminatory participation in the
circumstances of Pablo Denaque's escape from judicial custody. 5
In compliance with said order, the Fiscal set the reinvestigation of
the case for December 19, 1969. Summonses were issued to Gov.
Cledera Jose Esmeralda, Lorenzo Padua, the provincial warden,
and the accused Eligio Orbita to be present thereat. 6 Dr. went
thereat But, on the date set for the reinvestigation of the case, only
Gov. Cledera Jose Esmeralda and Lorenzo Padua appeared. The
accused Eligio Orbita did not appear. Neither was the note (Exhibit
2) produced. Since no additional evidence was presented, the Fiscal
manifested in Court on January 2, 1970 that "after conducting a
reinvestigation of the case and after a thorough and intelligent
analysis of the facts and law involved, no prima facie case against
Governor Cledera and Jose Esmeralda exist, hence, they cannot be
charged. 7
On January 19, 1970, the accused Eligio Orbita filed a "Motion for
Reconsideration" praying "that the Order of this Honorable Court
dated December 11, 1969 be, in that instead of ordering the Fiscal
to reinvestigate this case, on the basis of the evidence already
adduce during the trial of this case, he be ordered to amend the
information on to include Cledera and Esmeralda it appearing the
on record that their inclusion is warranted. 8
On January 26, 1970, the respondent Court issued the order
complained of, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in the light of the facts brought
about by the prosecuting fiscal let the charges be so amended by
including in the information the author or writer of Exhibit 2 and the
person or persons who carried out the said orders considering the
provisions of Article 156 in relation to Articles 223 and 224 of the
Penal Code. 9
The Fiscal filed a motion for the reconsideration of said order, 10
but the motion was denied on February 18, 1970. 11 Hence, the
instant recourse.
From the facts of the case, We are convinced that the respondent
Judge committed an error in ordering the fiscal to amend the
information so as to include Armando Cledera and Jose Esmeralda
as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur. It is the rule that a fiscal by the nature
of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to
support the allegations thereof. 12 Although this power and
prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence
at hand is sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person
committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to judicial review,
13 it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be
compelled to prosecute a case when he is in no position to do so
because in his opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence to
secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case.
The better procedure would be to appeal the Fiscal's decision to the
Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor.
Besides, it cannot be said that the Fiscal had capriciously and
whimsically refused to prosecute Cledera and Esmeralda.
In his order directing the Fiscal's office to conduct a further
reinvestigation of the case, the respondent Judge candidly ad.
muted that without a reinvestigation of the case, he cannot
determine once and for all whether or not to include Gov. Cledera
and Jose Esmeralda in the information. Pursuant thereto, a
reinvestigation was conducted by the fiscals office. Summonses
were issued. But, no additional fact was elicited since Eligio Orbita
did not appear thereat. Neither was the note (Exh. 2) presented and
produced. Gov. Cledera could not admit nor deny the genuineness
of the signature appearing in the note since it was not on hand. Such
being the case, the prosecuting officers had reason to refuse to
amend the information filed by them after a previous pre
examination and investigation.
Moreover, there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a
prima facie case against Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. The
order to amend the information is based upon the following facts:
1. Pablo Denaque, a detention prisoner for homicide, while
working at the Guest House of Governor Cledera on September 12,
1968;
2. The Governor's evidence at that time is being rented by
the province and its maintenance and upkeep is shouldered by the
province of Camarines Sur,
3. That neither Governor Cledera nor Lt. Jose Esmeralda
was charged or entrusted with the duty of conveying and the
detainee from the jail to the residence of the governor.
4. That the de worked at the Governor Is by virtue of an order
of the Governor (Exhibit 2) which was tsn by Lt. Esmeralda; and
5. That it was the accused Orbita who himself who
handpicked the group of Prisoners to work at the Governor's on 12,
1968. 14
Article 156 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 156. Delivering prisoners from jails. — The city Of arrests mayor
in its maximum period to prison correccional in its minimum Period
shall be imposed upon any person who shall remove from any jail
or penal establishment t any person confined therein or shall help
the escape of such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or
bribery.
If other means are used the penalty of arresto mayor shall be
imposed. If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of
said establishments by taking the guards by surprise, the same
penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.
The offenders may be committed in two ways: (1) by removing a
person confined in any jail or penal establishment; and (2) by
helping such a person to escape. To remove means to take away a
person from the place of his confinement, with or without the active
compensation of the person released To help in the escape of a
Person confined in any jail or penal institution means to furnished
that person with the material means such as a file, ladder, rope, etc.
which greatly facilitate his escape. 15 The offenders under this
article is usually committed by an outsider who removes from jail
any person therein confined or helps him escape. If the offender is
a public officer who has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is
liable for infidelity in the custody of prisoner defined and penalty
under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code. Since Gov. Cledera
as governor, is the jailer of the province, 16 and Jose Esmeralda is
the assistant provincial warden, they cannot be prosecuted for the
escape Of Pablo Denaque under Article 156 of the Revised Penal
Code. There is likewise no sufficient evidence to warrant their
prosecution under Article 223 of the Revised Penal Code, which
reads, as follows:
ART. 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion. — Any
Public officer who shall consent to the escape of a prisoner in his
custody or charge, shall be punished
1. By prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and temporary disqualification in its minimum period to
perpetual special disqualification, if the fugitive shall have been
sentenced by final judgment to any penalty.
2. By prision correccional in its minimum period and
temporary special disqualification, in case the fugitive shall not have
been finally convicted but only held as a detention prisoner for any
crime or violation of law or municipal ordinance.
In order to be guilty under the aforequoted provisions of the Penal
Code, it is necessary that the public officer had consented to, or
connived in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge.
Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part of the person in
charge is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of
faithlessness in the custody of the prisoner. If the public officer
charged with the duty of guarding him does not connive with the
fugitive, then he has not violated the law and is not guilty of the
crime. 17 For sure no connivance in the escape of Pablo Denaque
from the custody of the accused Eligio Orbita can be deduced from
the note of Gov. Cledera to Jose Esmeralda asking for five men to
work in the guest house, it appearing that the notes does not
mention the names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest
house; and that it was the accused Eligio Orbita who picked the men
to compose the work party.
Neither is there evidence to warrant the prosecution of Cledera and
Esmeralda under Article 224 of the Revised Penal Code. This article
punishes the public officer in whose custody or charge a prisoner
has escaped by reason of his negligence resulting in evasion is
definite amounting to deliberate non- performance of duty. 18 In the
constant case, the respondent Judge said:
We cannot, for the present be reconciled with the Idea that the
escape. of Denaque was facilitated by the Governor's or . his
assistants negligence. According to law, if there is any negligence
committed it must be the officer who is charged with the custody and
guarding of the ... 19
We find no reason to set aside such findings.
WHEREFORE, the orders issued on January 26, and February 18,
1970 in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur, entitled: "The People of the Philippines, plaintiff,
versus Eligio Orbita, accused are hereby annulled and set aside.
The respondent Judge or any other judge acting in his stead is
directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-27191 February 28, 1967
ADELAIDA TANEGA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. HONORATO B. MASAKAYAN, in his capacity as Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V, and the
CHIEF OF POLICE OF QUEZON CITY, respondents.
Ramon V. Sison for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Pressed upon us in this, an original petition for certiorari and
prohibition, is the problem of when prescription of penalty should
start to run. The controlling facts are:
Convicted of slander by the City Court of Quezon City petitioner
appealed. Found guilty once again by the Court of First Instance,1
she was sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor, to indemnify the
offended party, Pilar B. Julio, in the sum of P100.00, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the costs. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.2 We declined to review on certiorari.3
Back to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, said court, on
January 11, 1965, directed that execution of the sentence be set for
January 27, 1965. On petitioner's motion, execution was deferred to
February 12, 1965, at 8:30 a.m. At the appointed day and hour,
petitioner failed to show up. This prompted the respondent judge,
on February 15, 1965, to issue a warrant for her arrest, and on
March 23, 1965 an alias warrant of arrest. Petitioner was never
arrested.1äwphï1.ñët
Then, on December 10, 1966, petitioner, by counsel, moved to
quash the warrants of arrest of February 15, 1965 and March 23,
1965. Petitioner's ground: Penalty has prescribed.
On December 19, 1966, the respondent judge ruled that "the penalty
imposed upon the accused has to be served", rejected the plea of
prescription of penalty and, instead, directed the issuance of
another alias warrant of arrest. Hence, the present petition.
Arresto menor and a fine of P100.00 constitute a light penalty.4 By
Article 92 of the Revised Penal Code, light penalties "imposed by
final sentence" prescribe in one year. The period of prescription of
penalties — so the succeeding Article 93 provides — "shall
commence to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
service of his sentence".5
What then is the concept of evasion of service of sentence Article
157 of the Revised Penal Code furnishes the ready answer. Says
Article 157:
ART. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his imprisonment 6 by reason of final
judgment. However, if such evasion or escape shall have taken
place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows,
gates, walls, roofs or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys,
disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance with
other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall
be prision correccional in its maximum period.
Elements of evasion of service of sentence are: (1) the offender is
a convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which
consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades service of
sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.7 This must
be so. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict evades
"service of his sentence", by "escaping during the term of his
imprisonment by reason of final judgment." That escape should take
place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the provisions of
the second sentence of Article 157 which provides for a higher
penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken by means of
unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls, roofs, or
floors or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or
intimidation, or through connivance with other convicts or
employees of the penal institution, ... "8 Indeed, evasion of sentence
is but another expression of the term "jail breaking".9
A dig into legal history confirms the views just expressed. The Penal
Code of Spain of 1870 in its Article 134 — from whence Articles 92
and 93 of the present Review Penal Code originated — reads:
Las penas impuestas por sentencia firme prescriben:
Las de muerte y cadena perpetua, a los veinte años.
xxx xxx xxx
Las leves, al año.
El tiempo de esta prescripcion comenzara a correr desde el dia en
que se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme, o desde el
quebrantamiento de la condena si hubiera esta comenzado a
cumplirse. x x x
Note that in the present Article 93 the words "desde el dia en que
se notifique personalmente al reo la sentencia firme", written in the
old code, were deleted. The omission is significant. What remains
reproduced in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code is solely
"quebrantamiento de la condena". And, "quebrantamiento" or
evasion means escape.10 Reason dictates that one can escape
only after he has started service of sentence.
Even under the old law, Viada emphasizes, where the penalty
consists of imprisonment, prescription shall only begin to run when
he escapes from confinement. Says Viada:
El tiempo de la prescripcion empieza a contarse desde el dia en que
ha tenido lugar la notificacion personal de la sentencia firme al reo:
el Codigo de 1850 no expresaba que la notificacion hubiese de ser
personal, pues en su art. 126 se consigna que el termino de la
prescripcion se cuenta desde que se notifique la sentencia, causa
de la ejecutoria en que se imponga la pena respectiva. Luego
ausente el reo ya no podra prescribir hoy la pena, pues que la
notificacion personal no puede ser suplida por la notificacion hecha
en estrados. Dada la imprescindible necesidad del requisito de la
notificacion personal, es obvio que en las penas que consisten en
privacion de libertad solo porda existir la prescripcion quebrantando
el reo la condena pues que si no se hallare ya preso
preventivamente, debera siempre procederse a su encerramiento
en el acto de serle notifirada personalmente la sentencia.11
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment
imposed by final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should
escape during the term of such imprisonment.
Adverting to the facts, we have here the case of a convict who —
sentenced to imprisonment by final judgment — was thereafter
never placed in confinement. Prescription of penalty, then, does not
run in her favor.
For the reasons given, the Court resolved to dismiss the petition for
certiorari and prohibition. No costs. So ordered.
 G.R. No. L-1960 November 26, 1948
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORENTINO ABILONG, defendant-appellant.
Carlos Perfecto for appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor
Manuel Tomacruz for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
Florentino Abilong was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Manila with evasion of service of sentence under the following
information:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a convict
sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place
within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue
of final judgment rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946,
in criminal case No. B-4795 for attempted robbery, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said
sentence by going beyond the limits made against him and commit
vagrancy.
Contrary to law.
libertad" used in the Spanish text. It is equally clear that although
the Solicitor General impliedly admits destierro as not constituting
imprisonment, it is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the
sense that as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence of
destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. This
view has been adopted in the case of People vs. Samonte, No.
36559 (July 26, 1932; 57 Phil., 968) wherein this Court held, as
quoted in the brief of the Solicitor General that "it is clear that a
person under sentence of destierro is suffering deprivation of his
liberty and escapes from the restrictions of the penalty when he
enters the prohibited area." Said ruling in that case was ratified by
this Court, though, indirectly in the case of People vs. Jose de
Jesus, (45 Off. Gaz. Supp. to No. 9, p. 370)1, where it was held that
one evades the service of his sentence of destierro when he enters
the prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction, and he
cannot invoke the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law
which provides that its provisions do not apply to those who shall
have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion
of service of sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code
(Spanish text), in that during the period of his sentence of destierro
by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited from entering
the City of Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same
is hereby affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Upon arraignment he pleaded guilty and was sentenced to two (2)

years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, with
the accessory penalties of the law and to pay the costs. He is
appealing from that decision with the following assignment of error:

1. The lower court erred in imposing a penalty on the

accused under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, which does
not cover evasion of service of "destierro."

Counsel for the appellant contends that a person like the accused
evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally liable under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the
said Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons
who are imprisoned in a penal institution and completely deprived
of their liberty. He bases his contention on the word "imprisonment"
used in the English text of said article which in part reads as follows:

Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision

correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed
upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final
judgment.

The Solicitor General in his brief says that had the original text of
the Revised Penal Code been in the English language, then the
theory of the appellant could be uphold. However, it is the Spanish
text that is controlling in case of doubt. The Spanish text of article
157 in part reads thus:

ART. 157. Quebrantamiento de sentencia. — Sera castigado con

prision correccional en sus grados medio y maximo el sentenciado
que quebrantare su condena, fugandose mientras estuviere
sufriendo privacion de libertad por sentencia firme; . . . .

We agree with the Solicitor General that inasmuch as the Revised

Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in Spanish, the
Spanish text governs (People vs. Manaba, 58 Phil., 665, 668). It is
clear that the word "imprisonment" used in the English text is a
wrong or erroneous translation of the phrase "sufriendo privacion de
G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987
WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF
PARDONS AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
PRISONS, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of
petitioner Wilfredo S. Torres, presently confined at the National
Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. We issued the writ and during the
hearing and from the return filed by the respondents through the
Solicitor General, and other pleadings in this case, the following
facts emerged:
1. Sometime before 1979 (no more specific date appears in the
records before this Court), petitioner was convicted by the Court of
First Instance of Manila of the crime of estafa (two counts) and was
sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years,
ten (10) months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years,
nine (9) months and one (1) day, and to pay an indemnity of
P127,728.75 (Criminal Cases Nos. 68810, 91041 and F-138107).
These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R.
Nos. 14773-CR and 17694-CR). The maximum sentence would
expire on 2 November 2000.1
2. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded
against in the manner prescribed by law."2 Petitioner accepted the
conditional pardon and was consequently released from
confinement.
3. On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the "Board")
resolved to recommend to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its
recommendation to the President, the Board relied upon the
decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154
[1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil. 356
[1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March
1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner had been charged with twenty
counts of estafa in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-19672 and Q-20756,
which cases were then (on 21 May 1986) pending trial before the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City). The record before the
Board also showed that on 26 June 1985, petitioner had been
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Rizal (Quezon City) of the
crime of sedition in Criminal Case No. Q-22926; this conviction was
then pending appeal before the Intermediate Appellate Court. The
Board also had before it a letter report dated 14 January 1986 from
the National Bureau of Investigation ("NBI"), addressed to the
Board, on the petitioner. Per this letter, the records of the NBI
showed that a long list of charges had been brought against the
petitioner during the last twenty years for a wide assortment of
crimes including estafa, other forms of swindling, grave threats,
grave coercion, illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and
explosives, malicious mischief, violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 (interfering with
police functions). Some of these charges were Identified in the NBI
report as having been dismissed. The NBI report did not purport to
be a status report on each of the charges there listed and Identified.
4. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice wrote to the
President of the Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the
Board recommending cancellation of the conditional pardon
previously granted to petitioner.
5. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional
pardon of the petitioner.
6. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued
"by authority of the President" an Order of Arrest and
Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was accordingly
arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion
of his sentence.
Petitioner now impugns the validity of the Order of Arrest and
Recommitment. He claims that he did not violate his conditional
pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of the
twenty (20) counts of estafa charged in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
19672 and Q-20756 nor of the crime of sedition in Criminal Case
No. Q-22926.3 Petitioner also contends that he was not given an
opportunity to be heard before he was arrested and recommitted to
prison, and accordingly claims he has been deprived of his rights
under the due process clause of the Constitution.
The issue that confronts us therefore is whether or not conviction of
a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the
petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of
the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
This issue is not novel. It has been raised before this Court three
times in the past. This Court was first faced with this issue in Tesoro
Director of Prison.4 Tesoro, who had been convicted of the crime of
falsification of public documents, was granted a parole by the then
Governor-General. One of the conditions of the parole required the
parolee "not [to] commit any other crime and [to] conduct himself in
an orderly manner."5 Two years after the grant of parole, Tesoro
was charged before the Justice of the Peace Court of San Juan,
Rizal, with the crime of adultery said to have been committed with
the wife of Tesoro's brother-in-law. The fiscal filed with the Court of
First Instance the corresponding information which, however, was
dismissed for non-appearance of the complainant. The complainant
then went before the Board of Indeterminate Sentence and charged
Tesoro with violation of the conditions of his parole. After
investigation by the parole officer, and on the basis of his report, the
Board recommended to the President of the Philippines the arrest
and recommitment of the petitioner. Tesoro contended, among
other things, that a "judicial pronouncement to the effect that he has
committed a crime" is necessary before he could properly be
adjudged as having violated his conditional parole.
Addressing this point, this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice
Moran, held that the determination of whether the conditions of
Tesoro's parole had been breached rested exclusively in the sound
judgment of the Governor-General and that such determination
would not be reviewed by the courts. As Tesoro had consented to
place his liberty on parole upon the judgment of the power that had
granted it, we held that "he [could not] invoke the aid of the courts,
however erroneous the findings may be upon which his
recommitment was ordered."6 Thus, this Court held that by
accepting the terms under which the parole had been granted,
Tesoro had in effect agreed that the Governor-General's
determination (rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he
had breached one of the conditions of his parole by committing
adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and
conclusive upon him. In reaching this conclusion, this Court relied
upon Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code which
empowered the Governor-General
to grant to convicted prisoners reprieves or pardons, either plenary
or partial, conditional or unconditional; to suspend sentences
without parole, remit fines, and order the discharge of any convicted
person upon parole, subject to such conditions as he may impose;
and to authorize the arrest and recommitment of any such person
who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the condition or
conditions, of his pardon, parole or suspension of sentence.
(Emphasis supplied)
In Sales vs. Director of Prisons,7 the petitioner had been convicted
of the crime of frustrated murder. After serving a little more than two
years of his sentence, he was given a conditional pardon by the
President of the Philippines, "the condition being that he shall not
again violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines and that,
should this condition be violated, he shall be proceeded against in
the manner prescribed by law."8 Eight years after the grant of his
conditional pardon, Sales was convicted of estafa and sentenced to
three months and eleven days of arresto mayor. He was thereupon
recommitted to prison to serve the unexpired portion of his original
sentence. Sales raised before this Court two principal contentions.
Firstly, he argued that Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code had been repealed by Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
He contended, secondly, that Section 64 (i) was in any case
repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution (Article III
[1], 1935 Constitution). This Court, through Mr. Justice Ozaeta
speaking for the majority, rejected both contentions of Sales.
Sales held, firstly, that Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code did
not repeal Section 64 (i) Revised Administrative Code. It was
pointed out that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
which was enacted subsequent to the Revised Penal Code,
expressly preserved the authority conferred upon the President by
Section 64. The Court also held that Article 159 and Section 64 (i)
could stand together and that the proceeding under one provision
did not necessarily preclude action under the other. Sales held,
secondly, that Section 64 (i) was not repugnant to the constitutional
guarantee of due process. This Court in effect held that since the
petitioner was a convict "who had already been seized in a
constitutional was been confronted by his accusers and the
witnesses against him-, been convicted of crime and been
sentenced to punishment therefor," he was not constitutionally
entitled to another judicial determination of whether he had
breached the condition of his parole by committing a subsequent
offense. Thus:
[a] statute [like Section 64 (i)] supervenes to avoid the necessity for
any action by the courts in the premises. The executive clemency
under it is extended upon the conditions named in it, and he accepts
it upon those conditions. One of these is that the governor may
withdraw his grace in a certain contingency, and another is that the
governor shall himself determine when that contingency has arisen.
It is as if the convict, with full competency to bind himself in the
premises, had expressly contracted and agreed, that, whenever the
governor should conclude that he had violated the conditions of his
parole, an executive order for his arrest and remandment to prison
should at once issue, and be conclusive upon him. 9
In Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol,10 the petitioner had
been convicted of the crime of inciting to sedition. While serving his
sentence, he was granted by the President a conditional pardon "on
condition that he shall not again violate any of the penal laws of the
Philippines."11 Espuelas accepted the conditional pardon and was
released from confinement. Sometime thereafter, he was convicted
by the Justice of the Peace Court in Tagbilaran, Bohol, of the crime
of usurpation of authority. He appealed to the Court of First Instance.
Upon motion of the provincial fiscal, the Court of First Instance
dismissed the case provisionally, an important prosecution witness
not having been available on the day set for trial. A few months later,
upon recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the
President ordered his recommitment to prison to serve the
unexpired period of his original sentence.
The Court in Espuelas reaffirmed the continuing force and effect of
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. This Court,
quoting Tesoro and Sales, ruled that:
Due process is not necessarily judicial The appellee had had his day
in court and been afforded the opportunity to defend himself during
his trial for the crime of inciting to sedition, with which he was
charged, that brought about or resulted in his conviction, sentence
and confinement in the penitentiary. When he was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his
constitutional prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or
prisoner carrie[d] with it the authority or power of the Executive to
determine whether a condition or conditions of the pardon has or
have been violated. To no other department of the Government
[has] such power been intrusted. 12
The status of our case law on the matter under consideration may
be summed up in the following propositions:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and
conditions of a conditional pardon are purely executive acts which
are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of
a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be
either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a
judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of
a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by
final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process,
and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been
accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the
offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional
vice.
We do not believe we should depart from the clear and well
understood rules and doctrine on this matter.
It may be emphasized that what is involved in the instant case is not
the prosecution of the parolee for a subsequent offense in the
regular course of administration of the criminal law. What is involved
is rather the ascertainment of whether the convict has breached his
undertaking that he would "not again violate any of the penal laws
of the Philippines" for purposes of reimposition upon him of the
remitted portion of his original sentence. The consequences that we
here deal with are the consequences of an ascertained breach of
the conditions of a pardon. A convict granted conditional pardon,
like the petitioner herein, who is recommitted must of course be
convicted by final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or
crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for
such subsequent offense(s) can be imposed upon him. Again, since
Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code defines a distinct,
substantive, felony, the parolee or convict who is regarded as
having violated the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted
and convicted by final judgment before he can be made to suffer the
penalty prescribed in Article 159.1avvphi1
Succinctly put, in proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options:
(i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159
of the Revised Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision
correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who "having been
granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any
of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen
to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President's
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.

WHEREFORE, this Petition is hereby DISMISSED. No

pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. Nos. 115008-09. July 24, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANIEL
QUIJADA Y CIRCULADO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Daniel Quijada appeals from the decision of 30
September 1993 of Branch 1
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol convicting him of the two
offenses separately charged in two informations, viz., murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and illegal possession of
firearm in its aggravated form under P.D. No. 1866, and imposing
upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the first crime and an
indeterminate penalty ranging from seventeen years, four months,
and one day, as minimum, to twenty years and one day, as
maximum, for the second crime.[1]
The appeal was originally assigned to the Third Division of the Court
but was later referred to the Court en banc in view of the
problematical issue of whether to sustain the trial court's judgment
in conformity with the doctrine laid down in People vs. Tac-an,[2]
People vs. Tiozon,[3] People vs. Caling,[4] People vs. Jumamoy,[5]
People vs. Deunida,[6] People vs. Tiongco,[7] People vs.
Fernandez,[8] and People vs. Somooc,[9] or to modify the judgment
and convict the appellant only of illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form pursuant to People vs. Barros,[10] which this Court
(Second Division) decided on 27 June 1995.
The informations read as follows:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8178
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality
of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill
and without any justifiable motive, with treachery and abuse of
superior strength, the accused being then armed with a .38 cal.
revolver, while the victim was unarmed, suddenly attacked the
victim without giving the latter the opportunity to defend himself, and
with evident premeditation, the accused having harbored a grudge
against the victim a week prior to the incident of murder, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea with the use of the said firearm,
hitting the latter on his head and causing serious injuries which
resulted to his death; to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
the deceased.
Acts committed contrary to the provision of Art. 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, with aggravating circumstance of nighttime being
purposely sought for or taken advantage of by the accused to
facilitate the commission of the crime.[11]
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 8179
That on or about the 30th day of December, 1992, in the municipality
of Dauis, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep, carry and have in his
possession, custody and control a firearm (hand gun) with
ammunition, without first obtaining the necessary permit or license
to possess the said firearm from competent authorities which
firearm was carried by the said accused outside of his residence
and was used by him in committing the crime of Murder with
Diosdado Iroy y Nesnea as the victim; to the damage and prejudice
of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of P.D. No. 1866.[12]
Having arisen from the same incident, the cases were consolidated,
and joint hearings were had. The witnesses presented by the
prosecution were SPO4 Felipe Nigparanon (Acting Chief of Police
of Dauis, Bohol), SPO Gondalino Inte, Dr. Greg Julius Sodusta,
Rosita Iroy, and Teodula Matalinis. The defense presented as
witnesses Alfred Aranzado, Edwin Nistal, Julius Bonao, Saturnino
Maglupay, and the appellant himself.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General in the Brief for the Appellee as follows:
On 25 December 1992, a benefit dance was held at the Basketball
Court of Barangay Tinago, Dauis, Bohol. On this occasion, a fist
fight occurred between Diosdado Iroy and appellant Daniel Quijada
as the latter was constantly annoying and pestering the former's
sister. Rosita Iroy (TSN, Crim. Cases 8178 & 8179, June 8, 1993,
pp. 32-35; August 5, 1993, pp. 14-15).
In the evening of 30 December 1992, another benefit dance/disco
was held in the same place. This benefit dance was attended bv
Rosita Iroy, Ariel Dano, Teodora Badayos, Ado Aranzado, Largo
Iroy and Diosdado Iroy.
While Rosita Iroy and others were enjoying themselves inside the
dancing area, Diosdado Iroy, Eugene Nesnea and Largo Iroy, who
were then sitting at the plaza (the area where they positioned
themselves was duly lighted and was approximately four meters
from the dancing hall), decided to just watch the activities in the
dance hall directly from the plaza.
After dancing, Rosita Iroy decided to leave and went outside the
gate of the dance area. Subsequently, or around 11:30 of the same
night, while facing the direction of Diosdado Iroy, Rosita lroy saw
appellant surreptitiously approach her brother Diosdado Iroy from
behind. Suddenly, appellant fired his revolver at Diosdado Iroy,
hitting the latter at the back portion of the head. This caused Rosita
Iroy to spontaneously shout that appellant shot her brother; while
appellant, after shooting Diosdado Iroy, ran towards the cornfield.
Diosdado Iroy was immediately rushed by Elmer Nigparanon and
Largo Iroy to the hospital but the injury sustained was fatal. In the
meantime, Rosita Iroy went home and relayed to her parents the
unfortunate incident (TSN, Crim Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 8,
1993, pp. 9-22, inclusive of the preceding paragraphs).
At around midnight, the incident was reported to then Acting Chief
of Police Felipe Nigparanon by Mrs. Alejandra Iroy and her daughter
Teodula Matalinis. The police officer made entries in the police
blotter regarding the shooting and correspondingly, ordered his men
to pick up the appellant. But they were unable to locate appellant on
that occasion (TSN, Crim. Case Nos. 8178 & 8179, June 9, 1993,
pp. 2-6).
In the afternoon of 31 December 1992, appellant, together with his
father Teogenes Quijada went to the police station at Dauis, Bohol.
There and then, appellant was pinpointed by Elenito Nistal and
Rosita Iroy as the person who shot Diosdado Iroy. These facts were
entered in the police blotter as Entry No. 1151 (TSN, Crim. Case
Nos. 8178 & 8179, ibid. p. 14, June 14, 1993, pp. 4-6).[13]
The slug was embedded at the midbrain.[14] Diosdado Iroy died of
Cardiorespiratory arrest, secondary to tonsillar herniation,
secondary to massive intracranial hemorrhage, secondary to
gunshot wound, 1 cm. left occipital area, transacting cerebellum up
to midbrain.[15]

The firearm used by the appellant in shooting Diosdado Iroy was not
licensed. Per certifications issued on 26 April 1993, the appellant
was not a duly licensed firearm holder as verified from a
consolidated list of licensed firearm holders in the province[16] and
was not authorized to carry a firearm outside his residence.[17]
The appellant interposed the defense of alibi, which the trial court
rejected because he was positively identified by prosecution witness
Rosita Iroy. It summarized his testimony in this wise:
Daniel Quijada y Circulado, the accused in the instant cases,
declared that in the afternoon of December 30, 1992 he was in their
house At 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon he went to Tagbilaran City
together with Julius Bonao in a tricycle No. 250 to solicit passengers.
They transported passengers until 10:30 o'clock in the evening.
They then proceeded to the Tagbilaran wharf waiting for the
passenger boat Trans Asia Taiwan. Before the arrival of Trans Asia
Taiwan they had a talk with Saturnino Maglopay. They were able to
pick up two passengers for Graham Avenue near La Roca Hotel.
They then returned to the Tagbilaran wharf for the arrival of MV
Cebu City that docked at 12:10 past midnight. They had a talk with
Saturnino Maglopay who was waiting for his aunties scheduled to
arrive aboard MV Cebu City. They were not able to pick up
passengers which, as a consequence, they went home. They had
on their way home passengers for the Agora Public Market. They
arrived at the house of Julian Bonao at Bil-isan, Panglao, Bohol at
3:00 o'clock in the morning of December 31, 1992 where he passed
the night. He went home to Mariveles, Dauis, Bohol at 9:00 o'clock
in the morning.[18]
The trial court gave full faith and credit to the version of the
prosecution and found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crimes charged and sentenced him accordingly. It
appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery considering that the appellant shot the victim at the back
of the head while the latter was watching the dance. The dispositive
portion of the decision dated 30 September 1993 reads as follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, in Criminal Case No. 8178, the court
finds the accused Daniel Quijada guilty of the crime of murder
punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua,
with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.
In Criminal Case No. 8179, the Court finds the accused Daniel
Quijada guilty of the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm
and Ammunition punished under Sec. 1 of R.A. No. 1866 as
amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate
sentence from Seventeen (17) years Four (4) months and One (1)
day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and One (1) day, as
maximum, with the accessories of the law and to pay the cost.
The slug or bullet which was extracted from the brain at the back
portion of the head of the victim Diosdado Iroy is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government.
It appearing that the accused Daniel Quijada has undergone
preventive imprisonment he is entitled to the full time he has
undergone preventive imprisonment to be deducted from the term
of sentence if he has executed a waiver otherwise he will only be
entitled to 4/5 of the time he has undergone preventive
imprisonment to be deducted from his term of sentence if he has not
executed a waiver.[19]
On 29 October 1993, after discovering that it had inadvertently
omitted in the decision an award of civil indemnity and other
damages in Criminal Case No. 8178, the trial court issued an order
directing the appellant to pay the parents of the victim the amount
of P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son and
P10,000.00 for funeral expenses.[20] The order was to form an
integral part of the decision.
The decision was promulgated on 29 October 1993.[21]
The appellant forthwith interposed the present appeal, and in his
Brief, he contends that the trial court erred
I
. . . IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND GIVING
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND FELIPE NIGPARANON.
II
. . . IN NOT CONSIDERING THE TESTIMONIES OF DEFENSE
WITNESSES EDWIN NISTAL AND ALFRED ARANZADO, AND IN
DISREGARDING THE PICTORIAL EXHIBITS OF THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT PARTICULARLY THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF
DIOSDADO IROY, ROSITA IROY, EDWIN NISTAL, AND ALFRED
ARANZADO.
III
. . . IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT PROSECUTION
WITNESSES ROSITA IROY AND SP04 FELIPE NIGPARANON
HAD MOTIVES IN FALSELY TESTIFYING AGAINST ACCUSED-
APPELLANT.[22]
The appellant then submits that the issue in this case boils down to
the identity of the killer of Diosdado Iroy. To support his stand that
the killer was not identified, he attacks the credibility of prosecution
witnesses Rosita Iroy and SP04 Felipe Nigparanon. He claims that
the former had a motive "to put him in a bad light" and calls our
attention to her direct testimony that her brother Diosdado, the
victim, boxed him on the night of 25 December 1992 because he
allegedly "bothered her." He further asserts that Rosita could not
have seen the person who shot Diosdado considering their
respective positions, particularly Rosita who, according to defense
witnesses Nistal and Aranzado, was still inside the dancing area and
ran towards the crime scene only after Diosdado was shot. And, the
appellant considers it as suppression of evidence when the
prosecution did not present as witnesses Diosdado's companions
who were allegedly seated with Diosdado when he was shot.
As to SPO4 Nigparanon, the appellant intimates improper motives
in that the said witness is a neighbor of the Iroys, and when he
testified, a case for arbitrary detention had already been filed
against him by the appellant. The appellant further claims of alleged
omissions and unexplained entries in the police blotter.
Finally, the appellant wants us to favorably consider his defense of
alibi which, according to him, gained strength because of the lack of
evidence on the identity of the killer. Furthermore, he stresses that
his conduct in voluntarily going to the police station after having
been informed that he, among many others, was summoned by the
police is hardly the actuation of the perpetrator of the killing of
Diosdado Iroy -- specially so if Rosita Iroy's claim is to be believed
that moments after the shooting she shouted that Daniel Quijada
shot Diosdado Iroy.
In its Appellee's Brief, the People refutes every argument raised by
the appellant and recommends that we affirm in toto the challenged
decision.
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence
adduced by the parties, we find this appeal to be absolutely without
merit.
The imputation of ill-motive on the part of Rosita Iroy and the basis
therefor hardly persuade. The appellant was the one who was
boxed by and lost to Diosdado Iroy in their fight on the night of 25
December 1992. It is then logical and consistent with human
experience that it would be the appellant who would have forthwith
entertained a grudge, if not hatred, against Diosdado. No convincing
evidence was shown that Rosita had any reason to falsely implicate
the appellant in the death of her brother Diosdado.
The claim that Rosita could not have seen who shot her brother
Diosdado because, as testified to by defense witnesses Nistal and
Aranzado, she was inside the dancing hall and rushed to her brother
only after the latter was shot is equally baseless. The following
testimony of Rosita shows beyond cavil that she saw the assailant:
Q You said that you were initially dancing inside the dancing place
and you went out, about what time did you get out?
A 11:00 o'clock.
Q And you were standing about two (2) meters from Diosdado Iroy
until 11:30 when the incident happened?
A Yes, I was standing.
Q And where did you face, you were facing Diosdado Iroy or the
dancing area?
A I was intending to go near my brother. I was approaching and
getting near going to my brother Diosdado Iroy and while in the
process I saw Daniel Quijada shot my brother Diosdado Iroy.[23]
xxx xxx xxx
Q And in your estimate, how far was your brother Diosdado Iroy
while he was sitting at the plaza to the dancing place?
A More or less four (4) meters distance.
COURT:
From the dancing hall?
A Yes, your honor.
Q And in your observation, was the place where Diosdado Iroy was
sitting lighted or illuminated?
A Yes, sir.
Q What kind of light illuminated the place?
A I do not know what kind of light but it was lighted.
Q Was it an electric light?
A It is electric light coming from a bulb.
Q Where is that electric bulb that illuminated the place located?
A It was placed at the gate of the dancing place and the light from
the house.
Q You said gate of the dancing place, you mean the dancing place
was enclosed at that time and there was a gate, an opening?
A Yes, sir.
Q What material was used to enclose the dancing place?
A Bamboo.
Q And how far was the bulb which was placed near the entrance of
the dancing place to the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A Five (5) meters.
Q You mentioned also that there was a light coming from the house,
now whose house was that?
A The house of spouses Fe and Berto, I do not know the family
name.
Q Was the light coming from the house of spouses Fe and Berto an
electric light?
A Yes sir.
Q And in your estimate, how far was the source of light of the house
of Fe and Berto to the place where Diosdado Iroy was sitting?
A About six (6) meters distance.[24]
xxx xxx xxx
Q What was the color of the electric bulb in the gate of the dancing
place?
A The white bulb.[25]
The trial court disbelieved the testimony of Nistal and Aranzado. It
explicitly declared:
The factual findings of the Court in the instant case is anchored
principally in ". . . observing the attitude and deportment of
witnesses while listening to them speak (People vs. Magaluna, 205,
SCRA 266).
thereby indicating that on the basis of the witnesses' deportment
and manner of testifying, the declarations of Nistal and Aranzado
failed to convince the trial court that they were telling the truth.
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, especially
on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect. For, the trial court has the advantage of observing the
witnesses through the different indicators of truthfulness or
falsehood, such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous mutter of a
reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a ready reply;[26] or the
furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the hesitation, the
sincere or the flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the
yawn, the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization
of the solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.[27] The appellant
has miserably failed to convince us that we must depart from this
rule.
Neither are we persuaded by the claimed suppression of evidence
occasioned by the non-presentation as prosecution witnesses any
of the companions of Diosdado who were seated with him when he
was shot. In the first place, the said companions could not have
seen from their back the person who suddenly shot Diosdado. In the
second place, the testimony of the companions would, at the most,
only corroborate that of Rosita Iroy. Besides, there is no suggestion
at all that the said companions were not available to the appellant.
It is settled that the presumption in Section 3 (e), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Court that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse
if produced does not apply when the testimony of the witness is
merely corroborative or where the witness is available to the
accused.[28]
The alleged improper motive on the part of SP04 Nigparanon simply
because he is a neighbor of the Iroy; remains purely speculative, as
no evidence was offered to establish that such a relationship
affected SP04 Nigparanon's objectivity. As a police officer, he
enjoyed in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance
of his official duty.[29] As to the alleged omissions and unexplained
entries in the police blotter, the same were sufficiently clarified by
SP04 Nigparanon.
The defense of alibi interposed by the appellant deserves scant
consideration. He was positively identified by a credible witness. It
is a fundamental judicial dictum that the defense of alibi cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused.[30] Besides,
for that defense to prosper it is not enough to prove that the accused
was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been
at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[31] As
testified to by defense witness Julian Bonao, the Tagbilaran wharf,
where the appellant said he was, is only about eight to nine
kilometers away from the crime scene and it would take only about
thirty minutes to traverse the distance with the use of a tricycle.[32]
It was, therefore, not physically impossible for the appellant to have
been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Finally, the appellant asserts that if he were the killer of Diosdado
Iroy, he would not have voluntarily proceeded to the police station.
This argument is plain sophistry. The law does not find unusual the
voluntary surrender of offenders; it even considers such act as a
mitigating circumstance.[33] Moreover, non-flight is not conclusive
proof of innocence.[34]
The evidence for the prosecution further established with moral
certainty that the appellant had no license to possess or carry a
firearm. The firearm then that he used in shooting Diosdado Iroy
was unlicensed. He, therefore, committed the crime of aggravated
illegal possession of firearm under the second paragraph of Section
1 of P.D. No. 1866, which reads:
SEC. 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or
Possession of Firearms, Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition
-- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed.
In light of the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Tac-an,[35] and
reiterated in People vs. Tiozon,[36] People vs. Caling,[37] People
vs. Jumamoy,[38] People vs. Deunida,[39] People vs. Tiongco,[40]
People vs. Fernandez,[41] and People vs. Somooc,[42] that one
who kills another with the use of an unlicensed firearm commits two
separate offenses of (1) either homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code, and (2) aggravated illegal possession of
firearm under the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866,
we sustain the decision of the trial court finding the appellant guilty
of two separate offenses of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and
of aggravated illegal possession of firearm in Criminal Case No.
8179.
Although Tac-an and Tiozon relate more to the issue of whether
there is a violation of the constitutional proscription against double
jeopardy if an accused is prosecuted for homicide or murder and for
aggravated illegal possession of firearm, they at the same time laid
down the rule that these are separate offenses, with the first
punished under the Revised Penal Code and the second under a
special law; hence, the constitutional bar against double jeopardy
will not apply. We observed in Tac-an:
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy
protects one against a second or later prosecution for the same
offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another
and different offense, although arising from the same act or set of
acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case at bar, it
appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case
No. 4007 is that of unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm
penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the
Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that these two (2)
offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such
that in principle, the subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is
not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited second
jeopardy.
And we stressed that the use of the unlicensed firearm cannot serve
to increase the penalty for homicide or murder; however, the killing
of a person with the use of an unlicensed firearm, by express
provision of P.D. No. 1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm.
In Tiozon, we stated:
It may be loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense
penalized in said Section 1 because it is a circumstance which
increases the penalty. It does not, however, follow that the homicide
or murder is absorbed in the offense; otherwise, an anomalous
absurdity results whereby a more serious crime defined and
penalized in the Revised Penal Code is absorbed by a statutory
offense, which is just a malum prohibitum. The rationale for the
qualification, as implied from the exordium of the decree, is to
effectively deter violations of the laws on firearms and to stop the
"upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and safety due to
the proliferation of illegally possessed and manufactured firearms, x
x x." In fine then, the killing of a person with the use of an unlicensed
firearm may give rise to separate prosecutions for (a) violation of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and (b) violation of either Article 248
(Murder) or Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The
accused cannot plead one as a bar to the other; or, stated otherwise,
the rule against double jeopardy cannot be invoked because the first
is punished by a special law while the second, homicide or murder,
is punished by the Revised Penal Code.
In People vs. Doriguez, [24 SCRA 163, 171], We held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may
be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple
act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated
provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional
fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction
or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution
under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to
one of them is not obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although
both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some
important act which is not an essential element of the other.
In People vs. Bacolod [89 Phil. 621], from the act of firing a shot
from a sub-machine gun which caused public panic among the
people present and physical injuries to one, informations of physical
injuries through reckless imprudence and for serious public
disturbance were filed. Accused pleaded guilty and was convicted
in the first and he sought to dismiss the second on the ground of
double jeopardy. We ruled:
The protection against double jeopardy is only for the same offense.
A simple act may be an offense against two different provisions of
law and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact which
the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under one does not bar
prosecution under the other.
Since the informations were for separate offense[s] -- the first
against a person and the second against public peace and order --
one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double
jeopardy.
In Caling, we explicitly opined that a person charged with
aggravated illegal possession of firearm under the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 can also be separately
charged with and convicted of homicide or murder under the
Revised Penal Code and punished accordingly. Thus:
It seems that the Court a quo did indeed err in believing that there
is such a thing as "the special complex crime of Illegal Possession
of Unlicensed Firearm Used in Homicide as provided for and defined
under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866 as amended," and
declaring Caling guilty thereof. The legal provision invoked, "Sec. 1
of P.D. 1866, as amended," reads as follows:
"SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition
or Possession of Firearms [or] Ammunition or Instruments Used or
Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition.
- The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any
firearm, part of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument
used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed."
What is penalized in the first paragraph, insofar as material to the
present case is the sole, simple act of a person who shall, among
others, "unlawfully possess any firearm x x x (or) ammunition x x x."
Obviously, possession of any firearm is unlawful if the necessary
permit and/or license therefor is not first obtained. To that act is
attached the penalty of reclusion temporal, maximum, to reclusion
perpetua. Now, if "with the use of (such) an unlicensed firearm, a
"homicide or murder is committed," the crime is aggravated and is
more heavily punished, with the capital punishment.
The gravamen of the offense in its simplest form is, basically, the
fact of possession of a firearm without license. The crime may be
denominated simple illegal possession, to distinguish it from its
aggravated form. It is Aggravated if the unlicensed firearm is used
in the commission of a homicide or murder under the Revised Penal
Code. But the homicide or murder is not absorbed in the crime of
possession of an unlicensed firearm; neither is the latter absorbed
in the former. There are two distinct crimes that are here spoken of.
One is unlawful possession of a firearm, which may be either simple
or aggravated, defined and punished respectively by the first and
second paragraphs of Section 1 of PD 1866. The other is homicide
or murder, committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. The
mere possession of a firearm without legal authority consummates
the crime under P.D. 1866, and the liability for illegal possession is
made heavier by the firearm's use in a killing. The killing, whether
homicide or murder, is obviously distinct from the act of possession,
and is separately punished and defined under the Revised Penal
Code. (emphasis supplied)
In Jumamoy, we reiterated Caling and amplified the rationale on
why an accused who kills another with an unlicensed firearm can be
prosecuted and punished for the two separate offenses of violation
of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and for
homicide or murder under the Revised Penal Code. Thus:
Coming to the charge of illegal possession of firearms, Section 1 of
P.D. No. 1866 penalizes, inter alia, the unlawful possession of
firearms or ammunition with reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua. However, under the second paragraph
thereof, the penalty is increased to death if homicide or murder is
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm. It may thus be
loosely said that homicide or murder qualifies the offense because
both are circumstances which increase the penalty. It does not,
however, follow that the homicide or murder is absorbed in the
offense. If these were to be so, an anomalous absurdity would result
whereby a more serious crime defined and penalized under the
Revised Penal Code will be absorbed by a statutory offense, one
which is merely malum prohibitum. Hence, the killing of a person
with the use of an unlicensed firearm may give rise to separate
prosecutions for (a) the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and
(b) the violation of either Article 248 (Murder) or Article 249
(Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. The accused cannot plead
one to bar the other; stated otherwise, the rule against double
jeopardy cannot be invoked as the first is punished by a special law
while the second - Murder or Homicide - is punished by the Revised
Penal Code. [citing People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368, 379 (1991);
People vs. Doriguez, 24 SCRA 163 (1968)]. Considering, however,
that the imposition of the death penalty is prohibited by the
Constitution, the proper imposable penalty would be the penalty
next lower in degree, or reclusion perpetua. (emphasis supplied)
In Deunida, in discussing the propriety of the Government's action
in withdrawing an information for murder and pursuing only the
information for "Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearm," this Court
categorically declared:
At the outset, it must be stressed that, contrary to the prosecution's
legal position in withdrawing the information for murder, the offense
defined in the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does
not absorb the crime of homicide or murder under the Revised Penal
Code and, therefore, does not bar the simultaneous or subsequent
prosecution of the latter crime. The 1982 decision in Lazaro vs.
People, involving the violation of P.D. No. 9, which the investigating
prosecutor invokes to justify the withdrawal, is no longer controlling
in view of our decisions in People vs. Tac-an, People vs. Tiozon,
and People vs. Caling.
In Somooc, we once more ruled:
The offense charged by the Information is clear enough from the
terms of that document, although both the Information and the
decision of the trial court used the term "Illegal Possession of
Firearm with Homicide," a phrase which has sometimes been
supposed to connote a "complex crime as used in the Revised
Penal Code. Such nomenclature is, however, as we have ruled in
People vs. Caling, a misnomer since there is no complex crime of
illegal possession of firearm with homicide. The gravamen of the
offense penalized in P.D. No. 1866 is the fact of possession of a
firearm without a license or authority for such possession. This
offense is aggravated and the imposable penalty upgraded if the
unlicensed firearm is shown to have been used in the commission
of homicide or murder, offenses penalized under the Revised Penal
Code. The killing of a human being, whether characterized as
homicide or murder, is patently distinct from the act of possession
of an unlicensed firearm and is separately punished under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
The foregoing doctrine suffered a setback when in our decision of
27 June 1995 in People vs. Barros,[43] we set aside that portion of
the appealed decision convicting the appellant of the offense of
murder and affirmed that portion convicting him of illegal possession
of firearm in its aggravated form. We therein made the following
statement:
[A]ppellant may not in the premises be convicted of two separate
offenses [of illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form and
of murder], but only that of illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form, in light of the legal principles and propositions set
forth in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, to
which the Members of the Division, the ponente included, subscribe.
The pertinent portions of the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Florenz
D. Regalado referred to therein read as follows:
This premise accordingly brings up the second query as to whether
or not the crime should properly be the aggravated illegal
possession of an unlicensed firearm through the use of which a
homicide or murder is committed. It is submitted that an accused so
situated should be liable only for the graver offense of aggravated
illegal possession of the firearm punished by death under the
second paragraph of Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 1866, and
it is on this point that the writer dissents from the holding which
would impose a separate penalty for the homicide in addition to that
for the illegal possession of the firearm used to commit the former.
If the possession of the unlicensed firearm is the only offense
imputable to the accused, the Court has correctly held that to be the
simple possession punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua in the first paragraph of Section 1.
Where, complementarily, the unlicensed firearm is used to commit
homicide or murder, then either of these felonies will convert the
erstwhile simple illegal possession into the graver offense of
aggravated illegal possession. In other words, the homicide or
murder constitutes the essential element for integrating into
existence the capital offense of the aggravated form of illegal
possession of a firearm. Legally, therefore, it would be illogical and
unjustifiable to use the very same offenses of homicide or murder
as integral elements of and to create the said capital offense, and
then treat the former all over again as independent offenses to be
separately punished further, with penalties immediately following
the death penalty to boot.
The situation contemplated in the second query is, from the punitive
standpoint, virtually of the nature of the so-called, special complex
crimes," which should more appropriately be called composite
crimes, punished in Article 294, Article 297 and Article 335. They
are neither of the same legal basis as nor subject to the rules on
complex crimes in Article 48, since they do not consist of a single
act giving rise to two or more grave or less grave felonies nor do
they involve an offense being a necessary means to commit
another. However, just like the regular complex crimes and the
present case of aggravated illegal possession of firearms, only a
single penalty is imposed for each of such composite crimes
although composed of two or more offenses.
On the other hand, even if two felonies would otherwise have been
covered by the conceptual definition of a complex crime under
Article 48, but the Code imposes a single definite penalty therefor,
it cannot also be punished as a complex crime, much less as
separate offense, but with only the single penalty prescribed by law.
Thus, even where a single act results in two less grave felonies of
serious physical injuries and serious slander by deed, the offense
will not be punished as a delito compuesto under Article 48 but as
less serious physical injuries with ignominy under the second
paragraph of Article 265. The serious slander by deed is integrated
into and produces a graver offense, and the former is no longer
separately punished.
What is, therefore, sought to be stressed by such alternative
illustration, as well as the discussion on complex and composite
crimes, is that when an offense becomes a component of another,
the resultant crime being correspondingly punished as thus
aggravated by the integration of the other, the former is not to be
further separately punished as the majority would want to do with
the homicide involved in the case at bar.
With the foregoing answers to the second question, the third inquiry
is more of a question of classification for purposes of the other
provisions of the Code. The theory in Tac-an that the principal
offense is the aggravated form of illegal possession of firearm and
the killing shall merely be included in the particulars or, better still,
as an element of the principal offense, may be conceded. After all,
the plurality of crimes here is actually source from the very
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1866 which sought to
"consolidate, codify and integrate" the various laws and presidential
decrees to harmonize their provision" which must be updated and
revised in order to more effectively deter violators of said laws.
This would be akin to the legislative intendment underlying the
provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, wherein the principal
crime to be charged is still carnapping, although the penalty
therefore is increased when the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed. The same situation, with escalating
punitive provisions when attended by a killing, are found in the Anti-
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 and the Anti-Cattle
Rustling Law of 1974, wherein the principal crimes still are piracy,
highway robbery and cattle rustling. Also, in the matter of destructive
arson, the principal offense when, inter alia, death results as a
consequence of the commission of any of the acts punished under
said article of the Code.
In the present case, the academic value of specifying whether it is
a case of illegal possession of firearm resulting in homicide or
murder, or, conversely, homicide or murder through the illegal
possession and use of an unlicensed firearm, would lie in the
possible application of the provision on recidivism. Essentially, it
would be in the theoretical realm since, taken either way, the penalty
for aggravated illegal possession of a firearm is the single indivisible
penalty of death, in which case the provision on recidivism would
not apply. If, however, the illegal possession is not established but
either homicide or murder is proved, then the matter of recidivism
may have some significance in the sense that, for purposes thereof,
the accused was convicted of a crime against persons and he
becomes a recidivist upon conviction of another crime under the
same title of the Code.
Lastly, on the matter of the offense or offenses to be considered and
the penalty to be imposed when the unlawful killing and the illegal
possession are charged in separate informations, from what has
been said the appropriate course of action would be to consolidate
the cases and render a joint decision thereon, imposing a single
penalty for aggravated illegal possession of firearm if such
possession and the unlawful taking of life shall have been proved,
or for only the proven offense which may be either simple illegal
possession, homicide or murder per se. The same procedural rule
and substantive disposition should be adopted if one information for
each offense was drawn up and these informations were individually
assigned to different courts or branches of the same court.
Indeed, the practice of charging the offense of illegal possession
separately from the homicide or murder could be susceptible of
abuse since it entails undue concentration of prosecutorial powers
and discretion. Prefatorily, the fact that the killing was committed
with a firearm will necessarily be known to the police or prosecutorial
agencies, the only probable problem being the determination and
obtention of evidence to show that the firearm is unlicensed.
Now, if a separate information for homicide or murder is filed without
alleging therein that the same was committed by means of an
unlicensed firearm, the case would not fall under Presidential
Decree No. 1866. Even if the use of a firearm is alleged therein, but
without alleging the lack of a license therefor as where that fact has
not yet been verified, the mere use of a firearm by itself, even if
proved in that case, would not affect the accused either since it is
not an aggravating or qualifying circumstance.
Conversely, if the information is only for illegal possession, with the
prosecution intending to file thereafter the charge for homicide or
murder but the same is inexplicably delayed or is not consolidated
with the information for illegal possession, then any conviction that
may result from the former would only be for simple illegal
possession. If, on the other hand, the separate and subsequent
prosecution for homicide or murder prospers, the objective of
Presidential Decree No. 1866 cannot be achieved since the penalty
imposable in that second prosecution will only be for the unlawful
killing and further subject to such modifying circumstances as may
be proved.
In any event, the foregoing contingencies would run counter to the
proposition that the real offense committed by the accused, and for
which sole offense he should be punished, is the aggravated form
of illegal possession of a firearm. Further, it is the writer's position
that the possible problems projected herein may be minimized or
obviated if both offenses involved are charged in only one
information or that the trial thereof, if separately charged, be
invariably consolidated for joint decision. Conjointly, this is the
course necessarily indicated since only a single composite crime is
actually involved and it is palpable error to deal therewith and
dispose thereof by segregated parts in piecemeal fashion.
If we follow Barros, the conviction of the appellant for murder in
Criminal Case No. 8178 must have to be set aside. He should only
suffer the penalty for the aggravated illegal possession of firearm in
Criminal Case No. 8179.
The Court en banc finds in this appeal an opportunity to reexamine
the existing conflicting doctrines applicable to prosecutions for
murder or homicide and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm
in instances where an unlicensed firearm is used in the killing of a
person. After a lengthy deliberation thereon, the Court en banc
arrived at the conclusion that the rule laid down in Tac-an, reiterated
in Tiozon, Caling, Jumamoy, Deunida, Tiongco, Fernandez, and
Somooc is the better rule, for it applies the laws concerned
according to their letter and spirit, thereby steering this Court away
from a dangerous course which could have irretrievably led it to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers through
Judicial legislation. That rule upholds and enhances the lawmaker's
intent or purpose in aggravating the crime of illegal possession of
firearm when an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of
murder or homicide. Contrary to the view of our esteemed brother,
Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion in the case under consideration, Tac-an did not enunciate
an unfortunate doctrine or a "speciously camouflaged theory" which
"constitutes an affront on doctrinal concepts of penal law and assails
even the ordinary notions of common sense."
If Tac-an did in fact enunciate such an "unfortunate doctrine," which
this Court has reiterated in a convincing number of cases and for a
convincing number of years, so must the same verdict be made in
our decision in People vs. De Gracia,[44] which was promulgated
on 6 July 1994. In the latter case, we held that unlawful possession
of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may give rise to
separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
and also for a violation of Articles 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal
Code on rebellion. A distinction between that situation and the case
where an unlicensed firearm is used in homicide or murder would
have no basis at all. In De Gracia, this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado, made the following authoritative
pronouncements:
III. As earlier stated, it was stipulated and admitted by both parties
that from November 30, 1989 up to and until December 9, 1989,
there was a rebellion. Ergo, our next inquiry is whether or not
appellant's possession of the firearms, explosives and ammunition
seized and recovered from him was for the purpose and in
furtherance of rebellion.
The trial court found accused guilty of illegal possession of firearms
in furtherance of rebellion pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code which states that "any person merely
participating or executing the command of others in a rebellion shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period." The court
below held that appellant De Gracia, who had been servicing the
personal needs of Col. Matillano (whose active armed opposition
against the Government, particularly at the Camelot Hotel, was well
known), is guilty of the act of guarding the explosives and "molotov
bombs for and in behalf of the latter. We accept this finding of the
lower court.
The above provision of the law was, however, erroneously and
improperly used by the court below as a basis in determining the
degree of liability of appellant and the penalty to be imposed on him.
It must be made clear that appellant is charged with the qualified
offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion
under Presidential Decree No. 1866 which, in law, is distinct from
the crime of rebellion punished under Article 134 and 135 of the
Revised Penal Code. There are two separate statutes penalizing
different offenses with discrete penalties. The Revised Penal Code
treats rebellion as a crime apart from murder, homicide, arson, or
other offenses, such as illegal possession of firearms, that might
conceivably be committed in the course of a rebellion. Presidential
Decree No. 1866 defines and punishes, as a specific offense, the
crime of illegal possession of firearms committed in the course or as
part of a rebellion.
As a matter of fact, in one case involving the constitutionality of
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, the Court has explained
that said provision of the law will not be invalidated by the mere fact
that the same act is penalized under two different statutes with
different penalties, even if considered highly advantageous to the
prosecution and onerous to the accused. It follows that, subject to
the presence of requisite elements in each case, unlawful
possession of an unlicensed firearm in furtherance of rebellion may
give rise to separate prosecutions for a violation of Section 1 of
Presidential Decree No. 1866, and also a violation of Articles 134
and 135 of the Revised Penal Code on rebellion. Double jeopardy
in this case cannot be invoked because the first is an offense
punished by a special law while the second is a felony punished by
the Revised Penal Code with variant elements.
We cannot justify what we did in De Gracia with a claim that the
virtue of fidelity to a controlling doctrine, i.e., of Tac-an, had
compelled us to do so. Indeed, if Tac-an enunciated an "unfortunate
doctrine" which is "an affront on doctrinal concepts of penal law and
assails even the ordinary notions of common sense," then De
Gracia should have blazed the trail of a new enlightenment and
forthwith set aside the "unfortunate doctrine" without any delay to
camouflage a judicial faux pas or a doctrinal quirk. De Gracia
provided an excellent vehicle for an honorable departure from Tac-
an because no attack on the latter was necessary as the former
merely involved other crimes to which the doctrine in Tac-an might
only be applied by analogy. De Gracia did not even intimate the
need to reexamine Tac-an; on the contrary, it adapted the latter to
another category of illegal possession of firearm qualified by
rebellion precisely because the same legal principle and legislative
purpose were involved, and not because De Gracia wanted to
perpetuate an "unfortunate doctrine" or to embellish "the expanding
framework of our criminal law from barnacled ideas which have not
grown apace with conceptual changes over time," as the concurring
and dissenting opinion charges.
The majority now reiterates the doctrine in Tac-an and the
subsequent cases not because it has become hostage to the "inertia
of time [which] has always been the obstacle to the virtues of
change," as the concurring and dissenting opinion finds it to be, but
rather because it honestly believes that Tac-an laid down the correct
doctrine. If P.D. No. 1866 as applied in Tac-an is an "affront on
doctrinal concepts of penal laws and assails even the ordinary
notions of common sense," the blame must not be laid at the
doorsteps of this Court, but on the lawmaker's. All that the Court did
in Tac-an was to apply the law, for there was nothing in that case
that warranted an interpretation or the application of the niceties of
legal hermeneutics. It did not forget that its duty is merely to apply
the law in such a way that shall not usurp legislative powers by
judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the
guise of interpretation modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or
rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to
its terms.[45]
Murder and homicide are defined and penalized by the Revised
Penal Code[46] as crimes against persons. They are mala in se
because malice or dolo is a necessary ingredient therefor.[47] On
the other hand, the offense of illegal possession of firearm is defined
and punished by a special penal law,[48] P.D. No. 1866. It is a
malum prohibitum[49] which the lawmaker, then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, in the exercise of his martial law powers, so
condemned not only because of its nature but also because of the
larger policy consideration of containing or reducing, if not
eliminating, the upsurge of crimes vitally affecting public order and
safety due to the proliferation of illegally possessed and
manufactured firearms, ammunition, and explosives. If intent to
commit the crime were required, enforcement of the decree and its
policy or purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence, there is
conceded wisdom in punishing illegal possession of firearm without
taking into account the criminal intent of the possessor. All that is
needed is intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of
course, by animus possidendi. However, it must be clearly
understood that this animus possidendi is without regard to any
other criminal or felonious intent which an accused may have
harbored in possessing the firearm.[50]
A long discourse then on the concepts of malum in se and malum
prohibilum and their distinctions is an exercise in futility.
We disagree for lack of basis the following statements of Mr. Justice
Regalado in his Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, to wit:
The second paragraph of the aforestated Section 1 expressly and
unequivocally provides for such illegal possession and resultant
killing as a single integrated offense which is punished as such. The
majority not only created two offenses by dividing a single offense
into two but, worse, it resorted to the unprecedented and invalid act
of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then
creating another offense by using a component crime which is also
an element of the former.
It would already have been a clear case of judicial legislation if the
illegal possession with murder punished with a single penalty have
been divided into two separate offenses of illegal possession and
murder with distinct penalties. It is consequently a compounded
infringement of legislative powers for this Court to now, as it has
done, treat that single offense as specifically described by the law
and impose reclusion perpetua therefor (since the death penalty for
that offense is still proscribed), but then proceed further by plucking
out therefrom the crime of murder in order to be able to impose the
death sentence. For indeed, on this score, it is beyond cavil that in
the aggravated form of illegal possession, the consequential murder
(or homicide) is an integrated element or integral component since
without the accompanying death, the crime would merely be simple
illegal possession of a firearm under the first paragraph of Section
1.
The second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 does not
warrant and support a conclusion that it intended to treat "illegal
possession and resultant killing" (emphasis supplied) "as a single
and integrated offense" of illegal possession with homicide or
murder. It does not use the clause as a result or on the occasion of
to evince an intention to create a single integrated crime. By its
unequivocal and explicit language, which we quote to be clearly
understood:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the penalty of death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
the crime of either homicide or murder is committed NOT AS A
RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION of the violation of Section 1, but
WITH THE USE of an unlicensed firearm, whose possession is
penalized therein. There is a world of difference, which is too
obvious, between (a) the commission of homicide or murder as a
result or on the occasion of the violation of Section 1, and (b) the
commission of homicide or murder with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. In the first, homicide or murder is not the original purpose
or primary objective of the offender, but a secondary event or
circumstance either resulting from or perpetrated on the occasion of
the commission of that originally or primarily intended. In the
second, the killing, which requires a mens rea, is the primary
purpose, and to carry that out effectively the offender uses an
unlicensed firearm.
As to the question then of Mr. Justice Regalado of whether this
Court should also apply the rule enunciated here to P.D. No. 532
(Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974), P.D. No. 533
(Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974), and P.D. No. 534 (Defining
Illegal Fishing and Prescribing Stiffer Penalties Therefor), the
answer is resoundingly in the negative. In those cases, the
lawmaker clearly intended a single integrated offense or a special
complex offense because the death therein occurs as a result or on
the occasion of the commission of the offenses therein penalized or
was not the primary purpose of the offender, unlike in the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. Thus, (a) Section 3 of P.D.
No. 532 provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties. -- Any person who commits piracy or highway
robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by
competent court be punished by:
a. Piracy. - The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other
crimes are committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or
homicide is committed as a result or on the occasion of piracy, or
when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving
themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by firing upon or
boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
b. Highway Robbery/Brigandage.-- The penalty of reclusion
temporal in its minimum period shall be imposed. If physical injuries
or other crimes are committed during or on the occasion of the
commission of robbery or brigandage, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If
kidnapping for ransom or extortion, or murder or homicide, or rape
is committed as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of
death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
(b) Section 8 of P.D. No. 533 reads in part as follows:
SEC. 8. Penal provisions. -- Any person convicted of cattle rustling
as herein defined shall, irrespective of the value of the large cattle
involved, be punished by prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its medium period if the offense is committed
without violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things. If the offense is committed with violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed. If a person is seriously injured or killed as a result or on
the occasion of the commission of cattle rustling, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed. (emphasis supplied)
and (c) Section 3 of P.D. No. 534 reads as follows:
SECTION. 3. Penalties.-- Violations of this Decree and the rules and
regulations mentioned in paragraph (f) of Section 1 hereof shall be
punished as follows:
a. by imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, if explosives are used:
Provided, that if the explosion results (1) in physical injury to person,
the penalty shall be imprisonment from 12 to 20 years, or (2) in the
loss of human life, then the penalty shall be imprisonment from 20
years to life, or death;
b. by imprisonment from 8 to 10 years, if obnoxious or poisonous
substances are used: Provided, that if the use of such substances
results (1) in physical injury to any person, the penalty shall be
imprisonment from 10 to 12 years, or (2) in the loss of human life,
then the penalty shall be imprisonment from 20 years to life, or
death; x x x (emphasis supplied)
The unequivocal intent of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D.
No. 1866 is to respect and preserve homicide or murder as a distinct
offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code and to increase
the penalty for illegal possession of firearm where such a firearm is
used in killing a person. Its clear language yields no intention of the
lawmaker to repeal or modify, pro tanto, Articles 248 and 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, in such a way that if an unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of homicide or murder, either of these
crimes, as the case may be, would only serve to aggravate the
offense of illegal possession of firearm and would not anymore be
separately punished. Indeed, the words of the subject provision are
palpably clear to exclude any suggestion that either of the crimes of
homicide and murder, as crimes mala in se under the Revised Penal
Code, is obliterated as such and reduced as a mere aggravating
circumstance in illegal possession of firearm whenever the
unlicensed firearm is used in killing a person. The only purpose of
the provision is to increase the penalty prescribed in the first
paragraph of Section 1 -- reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to reclusion perpetua -- to death, seemingly because of the
accused's manifest arrogant defiance and contempt of the law in
using an unlicensed weapon to kill another, but never, at the same
time, to absolve the accused from any criminal liability for the death
of the victim.
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish
homicide or murder with death if either crime is committed with the
use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such use merely as a
qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have
been the intention of the lawmaker because the term "penalty" in the
subject provision is obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm and not the penalty for homicide or murder.
We explicitly stated in Tac-an:
There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as
an aggravating circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an
information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death
weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the
penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death ....
The essential point is that the unlicensed character or condition of
the instrument used in destroying human life or committing some
other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating
circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed
firearm as a qualifying circumstance. This would not be without
precedent. By analogy, we can cite Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179,
which amended the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (R.A. No. 6425).
The said section provides that when an offender commits a crime
under a state of addiction, such a state shall be considered as a
qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of the crime
and the application of the penalty under the Revised Penal Code.
In short, there is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 that manifests, even
vaguely, a legislative intent to decriminalize homicide or murder if
either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, or
to convert the offense of illegal possession of firearm as a qualifying
circumstance if the firearm so illegally possessed is used in the
commission of homicide or murder. To charge the lawmaker with
that intent is to impute an absurdity that would defeat the clear intent
to preserve the law on homicide and murder and impose a higher
penalty for illegal possession of firearm if such firearm is used in the
commission of homicide or murder.
Evidently, the majority did not, as charged in the concurring and
dissenting opinion, create two offenses by dividing a single offense
into two. Neither did it resort to the "unprecedented and invalid act
of treating the original offense as a single integrated crime and then
creating another offense by using a component crime which is also
an element of the former." The majority has always maintained that
the killing of a person with the use of an illegally possessed firearm
gives rise to two separate offenses of (a) homicide or murder under
the Revised Penal Code, and (b) illegal possession of firearm in its
aggravated form.
What then would be a clear case of judicial legislation is an
interpretation of the second paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866
that would make it define and punish a single integrated offense and
give to the words WITH THE USE OF a similar meaning as the
words AS A RESULT OR ON THE OCCASION OF, a meaning
which is neither born out by the letter of the law nor supported by its
intent. Worth noting is the rule in statutory construction that if a
statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation,[51]
leaving the court no room for any extended ratiocination or
rationalization of the law.[52]
Peregrinations into the field of penology such as on the concept of
a single integrated crime or composite crimes, or into the
philosophical domain of integration of the essential elements of one
crime to that of another would then be unnecessary in light of the
clear language and indubitable purpose and intent of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The realm of penology,
the determination of what should be criminalized, the definition of
crimes, and the prescription of penalties are the exclusive
prerogatives of the legislature. As its wisdom may dictate, the
legislature may even create from a single act or transaction various
offenses for different purposes subject only to the limitations set
forth by the Constitution. This Court cannot dictate upon the
legislature to respect the orthodox view concerning a single
integrated crime or composite crimes.
The only apparent obstacle to the imposition of cumulative penalties
for various acts is the rule on double jeopardy. This brings us to the
proposition in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Regalado that
the majority view offends the constitutional bar against double
jeopardy under the "same-evidence" test enunciated in People vs.
Diaz.[53] He then concludes:
In the cases now before us, it is difficult to assume that the evidence
for the murder in the first charge of aggravated illegal possession of
firearm with murder would be different from the evidence to be
adduced in the subsequent charge for murder alone. In the second
charge, the illegal possession is not in issue, except peripherally
and inconsequentially since it is not an element or modifying
circumstance in the second charge, hence the evidence therefor is
immaterial. But, in both prosecutions, the evidence on murder is
essential, in the first charge because without it the crime is only
simple illegal possession, and, in the second charge, because
murder is the very subject of the prosecution. Assuming that all the
other requirements under Section 7, Rule 117 are present, can it be
doubted that double jeopardy is necessarily present and can be
validly raised to bar the second prosecution for murder?
In fact, we can extrapolate the constitutional and reglementary
objection to the cases of the other composite crimes for which a
single penalty is imposed, such as the complex, compound and so-
called special complex crimes. Verily, I cannot conceive of how a
person convicted of estafa through falsification under Article 48 can
be validly prosecuted anew for the same offense or either estafa or
falsification; or how the accused convicted of robbery with homicide
under Article 294 can be legally charged again with either of the
same component crimes of robbery or homicide; or how the convict
who was found guilty of rape with homicide under Article 335 can be
duly haled before the court again to face charges of either the same
rape or homicide. Why, then, do we now sanction a second
prosecution for murder in the cases at bar since the very same
offense was an indispensable component for the other composite
offense of illegal possession of firearm with murder? Why would the
objection of non bis in idim as a bar to a second jeopardy lie in the
preceding examples and not apply to the cases now before us?
We are unable to agree to the proposition. For one, the issue of
double jeopardy is not raised in this case. For another, the so-called
"same-evidence" test is not a conclusive, much less exclusive, test
in double jeopardy cases of the first category under the Double
Jeopardy Clause which is covered by Section 21, Article III of the
Constitution and which reads as follows:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.
Note that the first category speaks of the same offense. The second
refers to the same act. This was explicitly distinguished in Yap vs.
Lutero,[54] from where People vs. Relova[55] quotes the following:
Thirdly, our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double jeopardy.
The first sentence of clause 20, Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, ordains that "no person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense." (italics in the original) The
second sentence of said clause provides that "if an act is punishable
by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." Thus, the
first sentence prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that
he is charged with different offenses, or the offense charged in one
case is not included in, or does not include, the crime charged in the
other case. The second sentence applies, even if the offenses
charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the
two charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has been
attached under one of the informations charging said offense, the
defense may be availed of in the other case involving the same
offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in
either case.
Elsewise stated, where the offenses charged are penalized either
by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the
important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged. The
constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only
where an identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the
subsequent offenses charged.[56] The question of identity or lack of
identity of offenses is addressed by examining the essential
elements of each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are
set out in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses
involved.[57]
It may be noted that to determine the same offense under the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States of America which reads:
[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .
the rule applicable is the following: "where the same act or
transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory
provisions, the test to be applied to determine whether there are two
offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of an
additional fact which the other does not."[58]
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution of the United
States of America was brought to the Philippines through the
Philippine Bill of 1 July 1902, whose Section 5 provided, inter alia:
[N]o person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment . . . .
This provision was carried over in identical words in Section 3 of the
Jones Law of 29 August 1916.[59] Then under the 1935
Constitution, the Jones Law provision was recast with the addition
of a provision referring to the same act. Thus, paragraph 20, Section
1, Article III thereof provided as follows:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same

offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction
or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution
for the same act.

This was adopted verbatim in Section 22, Article IV of the 1973

Constitution and in Section 21, Article III of the present Constitution.

This additional-element test in Lutero and Relova and in

Blockburger, Gore, and Missouri would safely bring the second
paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 out of the proscribed double
jeopardy principle. For, undeniably, the elements of illegal
possession of firearm in its aggravated form are different from the
elements of homicide or murder, let alone the fact that these crimes
are defined and penalized under different laws and the former is
malum prohibitum, while both the latter are mala in se. Hence, the
fear that the majority's construction of the subject provision would
violate the constitutional bar against double jeopardy is unfounded.

The penalty which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8179
for illegal possession of firearm in its aggravated form must,
however, be modified. The penalty prescribed by P.D. No. 1866 is
death. Since Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty next lower in degree,
reclusion perpetual must be imposed.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED, and the

challenged decision of 30 September 1993 of Branch 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bohol finding accused-appellant DANIEL
QUIJADA y CIRCULADO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder in Criminal Case No. 8178 and of illegal possession
of firearm in its aggravated form in Criminal Case No. 8179 is
AFFIRMED. The penalty imposed in the first case, as amended by
the Order of 29 October 1993, is sustained; however, the penalty
imposed in the second case is changed to Reclusion Perpetua from
the indeterminate penalty ranging from Seventeen (17) years, Four
(4) months, and One (1) day, as minimum, to Twenty (20) years and
One (1) day, as maximum.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961
It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine
SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, treasury notes of the Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words
vs. or signs contained" in which had been erased and or altered, with
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein
and his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is
P. N. Stuart del Rosario for petitioner. punishable under said Article 168, in relation to Article 166,
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3
Phil., 398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).
CONCEPCION, J.:
Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the decision
Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed, with costs against petitioner
Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by Sergio del Rosario. It is so ordered.
the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession of said
forged treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, and pay a fine of P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate part of the costs. On
appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except
insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate penalty which was
increased to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor. The
case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by Sergio del
Rosario.

It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario

the Philippine one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine
two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe that the same
were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in
fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government
one of the digits of each of which had been altered and changed,
the aforementioned defendants had succeeded in obtaining
P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23,
1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of more
counterfeit treasury notes of the Philippines. The only question
raised in this appeal is whether the possession of said Exhibits C,
E, G and H constitutes a violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appellant maintains that, being genuine treasury notes of our
government, the possession thereof cannot be illegal. We find no
merit in this pretense.lawphil.net

It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-

79692619 of Exhibit C, had been erased and changed so as to read
0 and that similar erasures and changes had been made in the
penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the last
digit in Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of
Serial No.
D-716329 of Exhibit H.

Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or

bank notes and other instruments of credit. — Unless the act be one
of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding
articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his
possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments
referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in
degree than that prescribed in said articles.

ART. 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery

referred to in this section may be committed by any of the following
means;

1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument

payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the appearance of
a true and genuine document.

2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any

means the figures, letters, words or signs contained therein.
 G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-
appellants.
Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente
for appellant Romualdez.
Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for appellant
Mabunay.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P.
Revilla, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of
falsification of public and official documents, committed, according
to the information, as follows:
That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands, the accused Estela Romualdez, who, by
appointment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, was
then taking part in the discharge of public functions as secretary to
the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices of the
Supreme Court, and by reason of said duty had under her care the
compositions and other papers and documents having reference to
the examinations for the admission of candidates to the bar held in
the months of August and September, 1926, which were then kept
in the archives of the said court, confabulating with her coaccused,
Luis Mabunay, and acting in common accord with him, who was
then one of the candidates who took the said Bar Examinations,
willfully, illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives of
the Supreme Court certain public and official documents, to wit: the
compositions, which were written, prepared and submitted by the
accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination. Once in possession of
the same, the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay,
conspiring together and acting in common accord, willfully, illegally,
and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the
correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in
Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the accused Luis
Mabunay, and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased
the grade of sixty-three (63%) given by correctors Jeronimo Samson
and Amado del Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written and
prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote seventy-
three (73%), and by means of these alterations the said accused
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able to change the
relative merits of those compositions, thereby attributing to the said
correctors, statements and declarations contrary to what they really
made, and the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay thus
succeeded by means of falsifications made by them in the aforesaid
public and official documents in making it appear that Luis Mabunay
obtained the general average required by the rules of the Supreme
Court, and in securing the latter's admission to the practice of law,
as in fact he was admitted, to the great prejudice of the public.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.
Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of
evidence, oral and documentary, the presentation of which
consumed considerable of the court's time.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are
not disputed either by the prosecution or by the defense:
The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the
recommendation of Justice Norberto Romualdez of the Supreme
Court of the Philippine Islands as his secretary on November 1,
1921, and continued as such until September 15, 1928.
The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly
admitted to the bar examinations held in 1926.
The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was
appointed to that office on July 11, 1912, acts every year as the
secretary ex oficio of the examination committee for admission to
the bar.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice
Norberto Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee for
admission to the bar in the year 1926, and upon recommendation of
Clerk Vicente Albert, he appointed the following as members of the
examination committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney
Francisco Ortigas, Civil Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno,
Mercantile Law; Attorney Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law; Judge
Jose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International
Law; Attorney-General Delfin Jaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney
Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.
Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a
committee of correctors was appointed, composed of the following
attorneys: Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director of Civil Service,
and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as
correctors in Civil Law; Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice
Johnson, and Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of Justice Malcolm, as
correctors in Mercantile Law; Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal,
and Remo, of the Bureau of Audits, as correctors in Penal Law;
Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of Audits and Alfonso Felix,
Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of
the Executive Bureau, and the accused Estela Romualdez, as
correctors in Political Law; Rufino Luna, of the Executive Bureau,
and Zoilo Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as correctors in
International Law; and Anatalio Mañalac, of the Bureau of Lands,
and Jeronimo Samson as correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of
illness, Mr. Remo was substituted by Jeronimo Samson as corrector
in Penal Law. All said correctors were designated by clerk of court
Albert with the approval of the chairman of the examination
committee.
The work of the members of the examination committee was limited
to the preparation of the questions in their respective subjects and
of a memorandum or note of the articles, legal provisions and
jurisprudence showing the sources from which the questions were
taken. The work of reviewing and grading the compositions was
entrusted to the correctors designated for each subject. Each
corrector was furnished with this note or memorandum, and a set of
rules, patterned after those of the Civil Service, was prepared by
corrector Amado del Rosario to guide the correctors in grading the
examination papers.
The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the
papers on the subject assigned to them, noting the grades given to
each answer, not on the composition, but in a separate note book,
which were later checked with the grades given by the other
corrector in the same subject, for the purpose of determining the
general average to be given to the composition.
The report of the examination committee on the final result of the
bar examination for the year 1926 was submitted, under date of
March 2, 1927, to the Supreme Court and was published on the fifth
of said month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there
appeared the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general
average of 75%. The grades of Mabunay in each subject, according
to the list Exhibit C-2, which was prepared after the publication of
the result of the examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile
Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 in Political Law, 86 in International Law,
64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises.
However, a later revision of the composition of Luis Mabunay
showed that the grades of seventy-three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-
1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2) had been
written on the first page of said compositions after striking out the
grades of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the composition in Civil
Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight (58) theretofore given to the
composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation of this
irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the
information in this case.
Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez
Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his
evidence tending to show the identity of the person who altered the
grades appearing on the first pages of the compositions Exhibits-B-
1 and B-2, the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with
the conformity of her attorneys made of record an admission as
follows (p. 395, s. n.):
"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73%
inclosed in parenthesis are in my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit
B-2 the words sixty-four and the figures 64% inclosed in parenthesis
appearing in said composition are also in my regular handwriting."
Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the
grades
In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez
that she was the person who wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-
1 and B-2 the words and figures alleged to have been falsified, it
now appears that the burden of establishing the authority under
which said changes and alterations were made is on the accused.
On this point the evidence for the defense tended to show that the
accused Estela Romualdez, both in her capacity as private
secretary of the chairman of the examination committee and as
corrector and at the same time supervisor of the correctors, was
authorized by said chairman to revise the compositions already
reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given by
them.
Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that
he considered the accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk
Samson as supervisors of the correctors; and explaining the powers
of the former he said (page 721, s. n.):
"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her
to understand that in order to do justice to the compositions, she
could review the compositions already graded by the other
correctors; provided, I want to add, that the new revision was done
in order to do justice to the compositions and before the names of
the candidates were known."
Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez
to the grades given by the corresponding correctors to compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness testified that said alterations
were made within the limits of the powers he had given to said
accused (pages 723, 726, s. n.).
For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness
in her own behalf, said that the chairman of the examining
committee, gave her to understand that she "was authorized to
correct any composition in any subject" in the bar examinations of
the year 1926 and that she had never corrected any composition
after the name of the corresponding candidate was identified (pages
782, 783, s. n.). She denied having known Luis Mabunay, and said
that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this
case (page 783, s. n.).
Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney
The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the
accused Estela Romualdez may be summarized in two following
propositions: 1st — that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the
examination committee, did not have authority to delegate to his
secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, the power to revise
compositions in subjects in which she was not a corrector and which
had already been graded by the other correctors, and much less the
power to alter or change the grades given to and written on said
compositions; 2nd — that granting that the chairman of the
examination committee had such authority, the accused Estela
Romualdez did not exercise the same in the manner prescribed by
said chairman, namely, in order to do justice to the compositions
and on the condition that the revision and the changes of grades
should be made before the names of the candidates, to whom the
compositions belonged, were known.
In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys
maintains that Justice Romualdez was appointed by the Supreme
Court as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year
1926, so that he would supervise the examinations in accordance
with law and the rules, and that precisely, in accordance with the
rules the chairman can not by himself exercise the individual powers
of the committee, among which were the powers to review, and to
change or alter the grades given to the compositions.
As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains
that the evidence adduced by the prosecution, specially the
testimony of the Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the accused
Estela Romualdez made the changes in the grades given by the
correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor
the accused Luis Mabunay, to whom she knew said compositions
belonged, thus violating the conditions imposed upon her by the
chairman of the examination committee when she was given said
authority.
As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also
maintains that the evidence for the prosecution shows that he was
in connivance with the accused Estela Romualdez in the alteration
by the latter of his grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the
purpose of raising to 75% the general average of 72.8 which he had
obtained.
Theory of the Defense
In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense
argues that the power of supervision given by Justice Romualdez to
his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is not contrary to law,
rules or precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said
Justice that the appointment of a committee of attorneys in
accordance with section 2 of the rules had not been followed by the
Supreme Court for a number of years prior to 1926, and that when
said court designated Justice Romualdez as chairman of the
examination committee without designating the examiners, it left
that function to said chairman, and conferred upon him ample
powers to do what in his judgment was most in line with justice and
the law, and that no Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to
determine the propriety or illegality of the procedure employed by
the chairman of the examination committee, or of the powers
conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman
was responsible only to the Supreme Court for his acts.
The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could
not have known to whom compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2
belonged at the time of making the alteration of the grades
appearing on the first pages thereof, because, according to the
testimony of said accused, corroborated by that of Catalina Pons,
who was one of those who helped in the preparation of the list of
candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes containing the names and the
identification numbers of the candidates were opened just one day
before the publication of the result of the examination, and that in
order to finish this work and to place the names of the candidates
on said list, they had to work continuously from 8 o'clock in the
morning until 8 o'clock in the evening on the day prior to the
publication of the result of the examinations.
Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties
Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a
witness for the defense, the court finds that the accused Estela
Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman of the examination
committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme
Court were considered by said chairman not only as correctors in
the subjects assigned to them but also as supervisors of the
correctors (page 721, s. n.), both of them with equal powers and
authority so that neither could consider himself superior to the other
(page 727, s. n.). It appears, however, that while the chairman of
the committee gave his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez,
to understand that she "was authorized to revise the compositions
already graded by the other correctors provided the new revisions
were made for the purpose of doing justice to the compositions and
that the same were mad before the names of the candidates were
known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the same with respect
to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo Samson, to whom he said nothing about
this matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the accused Estela
Romualdez had never informed the chairman of the committee
about the corrections or alterations made by her in compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did the latter examine said
compositions to determine whether or not their merits justified the
changes so made, and he only knew of said changes upon the filing
of the information against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For
her part, she made no report to the chairman of the examination
committee of any error or injustice committed by any corrector, and
she only told him during the progress of the work of grading the
papers that they were being graded very strictly and that "she feared
that some injustice might be committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for
that reason Justice Romualdez told his secretary, Estela
Romualdez, that "should a case of the kind come to her knowledge,
she should take special notice of the same in order to do justice,"
that is to say, if any person should bring to her attention any such
case in which, in her opinion, some injustice had been committed,
she was authorized to put things in order (page 781, s. n.), and the
revision in such cases was left to the judgment of his secretary
(page 780, s. n.).
The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice
Romualdez as chairman of the examination committee upon his
secretary, Estela Romualdez, gave her so ample a discretionary
power of supervision that in its exercise she should act
independently, not only of the correctors and of her cosupervisor
Jeronimo Samson, but also of the examination committee. Now,
granting that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the committee
appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar examinations of
1926, was authorized to confer such power of supervision upon his
secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner did she exercise that
power when she made the changes in the compositions in question?
The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own
admission, made the alterations of the grades originally given by the
correctors to compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is the only
person who could give an account of and explain the circumstances
under which said alterations were made. But said accused,
testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was not able to explain
how and under what circumstances she made those alterations.
When pressed by the fiscal during the cross-examination to state
the circumstances under which she came across those
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez
said: "If I were to make any statement with reference to the
circumstances under which I came across these compositions, you
would compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really remember"
(page 823, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did
not put her initials under or at the side of those alterations she made
on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to say, when
she saw the other compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and X-2)
bearing her initials which were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she
placed her initials on said compositions because she graded them
as corrector, and she did not put her initials on compositions Exhibits
B-1 and B-2 because she revised them in her capacity as supervisor
(pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also said, that, as corrector, she had
instructions to put her initials when writing the original grade on any
composition, but as supervisor "she was under no obligation" to put
her initials (page 830, s. n.) and that the chairman of the examination
committee "has not gone into such minor details" (page 831, s. n.).
Upon being questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the altered
grade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the same line and immediately
before the initials of the correctors she said: "Because on that
occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836, s. n.). Neither does the
accused remember whether or not she exercised her supervisory
authority with respect to the other five compositions forming part of
those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and when
asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase given
by her to the grades originally given to said compositions had the
effect of raising the general average of the compositions of the same
candidate to 75%, the accused answered that "the fiscal ought to
know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848, s.
n.). With these answers and others appearing in her testimony, the
accused instead of giving a satisfactory explanation of her conduct,
has demonstrated that with the encouragement given by Justice
Romualdez to the effect that the new revision of the compositions
was left to her discretion (page 780, s. n.) she assumed that the
powers exercised by her in the bar examinations of 1926 were such
that she could revise any composition in any subject already graded
and increase or decrease the grades given by the correctors; in
other words, that she could, at her pleasure, do or undo the work
done by the correctors without the necessity of accounting to
anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping a note or
memorandum of the compositions so revised and the alteration of
the grades.
The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in
reviewing, in his capacity as chairman of the examination
committee, the compositions of the candidates who filed motions for
reconsideration of the grades given them, after the publication of the
result of the examinations, performed his work with such diligence
and zeal that he noted in a memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only
the grades given to each answer of the candidate, but also the total
grade obtained by the candidate in the revision, together with such
other data which would explain the increase of the grades of this or
that candidate.
The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his
secretary to understand that she had such unlimited powers, or that
the Supreme Court in designating said Justice as chairman of the
bar examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to
confer such powers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed
fact that his designation was made so that he should conduct the
examinations in accordance with law and the rules.
But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered
the grades given by the correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 she acted in the exercise of the powers conferred upon her by
the chairman of the examination committee, is there any ground in
support of her claim that she made those alterations only to do
justice to the compositions, and without knowing the name of the
candidate to whom they belonged?
Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the
prosecution, Juan Villaflor, which, according to the defense is not
worthy of credit because of the contradictions and inconsistencies
therein noted, the record contains other evidence establishing
certain facts from which such knowledge can be inferred.
It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the
compositions numbering over 8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was
prepared in pencil. This list was prepared with the intervention of the
said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by
Catalina Pons, Juan Villaflor and the accused Estela Romualdez.
However, before the preparation of this list, sometime during the first
day of February, 1927, the sealed envelopes containing the
identification numbers attached to each composition were opened.
Said numbers were written either on the upper part of each envelope
or on the first page of the composition, and that work lasted several
days (pages 162, 163, s. n.). In the list Exhibit C-1 the numbers of
the candidates contained in the envelopes attached to the
compositions were first written (page 166, s. n.), and then the grades
in each subject, followed by the general average (pages 71, 184, s.
n.), leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page
166, s. n.). Deputy Clerk Samson wrote on an adding machine the
grades in each composition as they were read out by one of the
helpers, and then the corresponding general average as computed
by him (page 71, s. n.), and, at the same time, Josephine Stevens
wrote said grades in the space corresponding to each subject (page
188, s. n.). The roll of paper used by Deputy Clerk Samson on the
adding machine was presented as Exhibit C-6.
After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and
the general average of each candidate, who was theretofore known
by his identification number only, was prepared, the envelopes
containing the names corresponding to the identification numbers
written on said list were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk,
and the names of the candidates were inserted in said list by those
who assisted in the preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.)
among whom was the accused Estela Romualdez, who admitted,
upon cross-examination, having written many of the names
appearing on several pages of said list (pages 859-861, s. n.). After
said list Exhibit C-1 was prepared the examination committee
submitted to the Supreme Court a report recommending the
admission to the bar and not only for those candidates with a
general average of 75% or more, but also of those who had obtained
a general average of 70 or more but below 75%, and said automatic
increase was ordered noted on said list Exhibit C-1. However, this
recommendation was not approved by the Supreme Court on the
ground that said automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s.
n.), and for that reason the clerk of court, Mr. Albert, instructed his
deputy, Mr. Samson, to prepare another list containing only the
names of the candidates who had originally obtained a general
average of 75% without having obtained less than 60% in any
subject, and in pursuance thereof the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was
prepared (page 77, s. n.), which was approved by the Supreme
Court and published on March 5, 1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is
included with an average of 75%.
Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the
examinations the list Exhibit C-2 was prepared in the same form as
Exhibit C-1 taking the grades directly from the compositions; while
one of the helpers read them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on
the adding machine and computed the general average of each
candidate. The roll of paper used by Deputy Samson on this
occasion was also presented and marked as Exhibit C-7.
Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and
C-2, were kept in the office of Justice Romualdez and were only
taken out when the investigation of the irregularities in the
examinations of 1926 was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in
the course of that investigation it was discovered that the grades of
candidate Luis Mabunay, identified with number 898 in roll Exhibit
C-6 and in the list Exhibit C-1, which had been prepared
simultaneously, did not agree, because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows
that the grade in Civil Law of candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit
C-1 shows that the grade of the same candidate is 73; and while roll
Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade of candidate No. 898 was 58 (in
Remedial Law), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in the same
subject), a difference also being noted between the general average
of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit C-6, which is 72.8%, and his general
average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages 73, 74, s. n.). This
discovery led to the revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in
the examinations of 1926, which were united to his personal record
(Exhibit B), which showed that the grades given to, and written by
the respective correctors on the compositions of said candidate in
Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been
altered, and further, that the grades that appeared on said
compositions before the alterations were identical with those that
appeared on the roll, Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of
said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers 73, 64, and
75 in the columns corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and
General Average, respectively, were written after erasing with
rubber what was there originally written. It may also be noted, upon
an examination of the alterations appearing on the first pages of
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally written
by the correctors, authenticated by their initials, had been stricken
out in such a way that it is difficult to make out said original grades,
leaving, however, intact, the initials of the correctors.
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and
altered the grades written by the correctors on the first pages of
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to make it appear that
said alterations had been made by the correctors themselves;
second, that said alterations were made after the grades written by
the correctors had been noted on the adding machine in roll Exhibit
C-6 and on the list Exhibit C-1 which were prepared simultaneously;
third, that after said alterations had been made, and in order that the
grades so altered should agree with the grades already written on
the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law were
erased with rubber, and in place thereof were written the grades
now appearing in said compositions. The accused Estela
Romualdez having admitted that she was the author of such
alterations, the only logical inference from her admission and the
facts above set out, is that she was also the person who erased not
only the grades originally written by the correctors on the
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also those appearing in the
columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the list
Exhibit C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades now
appearing in said columns, and which agree with those written by
her on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2. Now, if the accused
Estela Romualdez erased in the manner stated the grades originally
written, and substituted for them the grades now appearing in said
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as well as in the columns
corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-
1, it cannot be doubted that in making such erasures and alterations
she not only acted with the intent of concealing her identity, but she
also knew the number and the name of the candidate to whom said
composition belonged, because at that time the numbers and the
names of the candidates were already written on the list Exhibit C-
1, and that list was kept in the office of Justice Romualdez (page 83,
s. n.), were she had complete and absolute control as private
secretary and supervisor of the examinations.
Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay
Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says
that one Luis Mabunay called up the accused Estela Romualdez on
the telephone a few days before the publication of the results of the
examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing
the participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is
other evidence for the prosecution establishing certain facts which
show strong indications that he operated in the act before or at the
time of its execution by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond
a reasonable doubt that the accused Luis Mabunay was one of the
candidates who took the bar examinations in 1926; that the general
average obtained by him, according to the computation appearing
on the roll Exhibit C-6 of the adding machine and that originally
written in the list Exhibit C-1 was 72.8%; that after the Supreme
Court denied the recommendation of the examination committee
that all grades from and between 70% and 75% be automatically
raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of
successful candidates which was published on March 5, 1927
(Exhibit C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the increase of
these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit
B-2), which was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the
grades theretofore given by the correctors.
It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show
that she had no motive whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis
Mabunay, testified that she did not know him and that the first time
she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case. However,
in view of her inability to explain why precisely the compositions of
said Luis Mabunay had been benefited by the revision, and in view
of the admission of Justice Romualdez that the power to revise
conferred upon Estela Romualdez could be exercised by her in the
compositions already graded by the correctors in all cases of
injustice which came to her knowledge, or which might be brought
to her attention (page 781, s. n.), her testimony lacks foundation,
because it is absurd to believe that her revision of the compositions
of her coaccused Luis Mabunay was due only and solely to a happy
coincidence.
Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the
evidence for the prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the
amount of P600 from his savings account in the Philippine Trust
Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days before
the publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which,
when correlated with the deposit of the sum of P400 made by the
accused Estela Romualdez in her current account (Exhibit H) with
the Bank of the Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said March,
1927, may, perhaps, give an explanation of the motive of said
accused for increasing the grades of Mabunay with just the
necessary points to reach the lowest passing general average. It is
also true that Estela Romualdez testified that said amount had been
sent to her by her cousin named Prisca Magpayo Redona from the
province for the purchase of merchandise for sale at the latter's
store (page 791, s. n.), but the testimony in that respect was not
corroborated either by her said cousin, or by any other persons
mentioned by her as the bearers of said amount, or by the
corresponding check or postal money order, as she had done when
referring other deposits in the bank.
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the
allegations of the information are sufficiently supported by the
evidence and that the accused, Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as
principal and the latter as accomplice, of the crime of falsification of
official documents with which they are charged and, therefore, a
judgment is rendered sentencing Estela Romualdez, who was a
Government employee at the time of the commission of the crime,
to suffer, in accordance with article 300 of the Penal Code, as
amended by section 1 of Act No. 2712, six years and one day of
prision mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to pay a fine
of 1,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in view of the
nature of the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty of perpetual
disqualification from public office; and her coaccused Luis Mabunay,
who was a private individual with respect to said examination, to
suffer, under the provisions of article 301 as amended by section 2
of Act No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the penalty of four
months and one day of arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties
of the law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half part
of the costs.
The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the
following assignments of error:
I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela
Romualdez, guilty of the crime of "falsification of public and official
documents" and in sentencing her to suffer imprisonment without
due process of law, contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August
29, 1916, entitled "An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of
the United States as to the future Political Status of the People of
the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More Autonomous
Government for those Islands".
II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela
Romualdez, was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact
made on the composition papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 of the Government, and in denying full credit to the
uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez,
chairman of the bar examining committee for the year 1926,
concerning the authority granted her.
III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused
Estela Romualdez a fair and impartial trial.
The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial
court committed the following errors:
I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted
testimony of Justice Romualdez with reference to his authority as
chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, to
confer upon the accused Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact
conferred upon her, in connection with said examination.
II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony
of Justice Romualdez as to the fact that he, as chairman of the bar
examination committee of 1926, really and truly conferred upon the
accused Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that
examination.
III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela
Romualdez did not exercise the powers conferred upon her by the
chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, within the limits
fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading of
the compositions be made in order to do justice thereto, and before
the names of the corresponding candidates were known.
IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela
Romualdez changed the general average and the grades of
candidate Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial law on the list
Exhibit C-1.
V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony
of Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as
Exhibits 26 and 27, containing the opinion of said lawyers as to the
grades to which said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly
entitled.
VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used
the same powers exercised by the accused in the bar examination
of 1926.
VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis
Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded them, the court erred in
concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the
information.
VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar
examination committee of 1926, was not authorized by the Supreme
Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez the powers which she
exercised in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she
altered the grades of said compositions willfully and feloniously.
IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela
Romualdez intended to conceal her identity when she revised and
regraded compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela
Romualdez, in exercising her powers as supervisor of the correctors
in said bar examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-
2 only, in order to regrade them.
XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and
regrading said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that
she had received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay the sum of
P400.
XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed
the offense of falsification with which she is charged, the lower court
erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay participated in its
commission.
In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys
for the appellants filed a joint memorandum on July 10, 1929. The
Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the People of the
Philippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.
The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom,
Justice Romualdez, was disqualified to sit in this case. Upon a
consideration of the case on its merits, four justices were in favor of
affirming the decision of the trial court and the same number were
in favor of acquitting the defendants. The court being unable to
reach a decision in the usual course, an attempt was made on
February 11, 1930 to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by the
following resolution:
The court having under consideration again the case of People vs.
Romualdez, et al., No. 31012, those participating being all the
members of the court, except Mr. Justice Romualdez, who was
disqualified, it was moved that following precedents elsewhere,
particularly in the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that
when there is an equal division in the court and there is no prospect
of a change in the vote the judgment appealed from stand affirmed,
and in accordance with the action taken in the case of Nacionalista
Party vs. Municipal Board of Manila, No. 21265 — the judgment in
the case at bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Avanceña and Messrs.
Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns voted in favor of the motion.
Messrs. Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real voted
against the motion. Mr. Justice Johnson based his dissent on the
peculiar statutory provisions in force in the Philippine Islands. For
want of a majority, the motion was lost.
The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the
case until the further order of the court.
On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the
case against him be considered separately and he be absolved from
the complaint. This motion was denied by the court. He renewed his
motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the
ground that no severance had been asked for in the lower court, and
for the further reason that there was a prospect that the membership
of the court would soon be increased.
The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and
due to the death or retirement of three justices only six of the former
members remained. On June 23, 1932 Courtney Whitney as
attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case
be set for a rehearing before the court as newly constituted. This
motion was granted. On July 2, 1932 he filed a motion for the
dismissal of the information, alleging that because of the inability of
the court to reach a determination from the facts as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she had
been denied her right to a speedy trial. This motion was denied.
After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez
filed an additional memorandum, to which the Attorney-General filed
a reply.
Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela
Romualdez maintain that even if the lower court's findings of fact be
justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to sustain that any
criminal offense, recognized under the laws of the Philippine
Islands, has been committed." They contend that the appointment
of the committee of attorneys by Justice Romualdez to read and
grade the examination papers was not warranted by law, and that
therefore the alteration by the defendant Estela Romualdez, under
the circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades in
question did not constitute a crime.
The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the
defense, completely refutes this contention. He testified that the bar
examining committee was composed of two groups of attorneys:
Those that were appointed to prepare the questions, and those that
were appointed to grade the papers. He further testified that the
court was informed of the way in which the examination was
conducted and that it approved thereof. There were more than a
thousand candidates and some eight thousand papers. According
to the contention of appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneys
appointed to prepare the questions or the court itself could lawfully
grade these papers. Such a contention is clearly untenable. The
attorneys that prepared the questions did not intervene in the
grading of the papers, but they prepared a key to the questions,
which served the other group of attorneys, the readers or
"correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of
the "correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys that
prepared the questions, and the intervention of the two groups of
attorneys was perfectly regular and valid.
It is also contended that the examination papers which the
defendant Estela Romualdez altered were not public or official
documents. That contention is likewise without merit. As stated by
her attorneys, the examination of candidates for admission to the
bar is a judicial function. It cannot therefore be maintained with any
show of reason that the papers submitted by the candidates in the
course of the examination were not public and official documents,
or that the alteration, under the circumstances alleged in the
information, of the grades given to such papers by the "correctors"
was not a crime. (In re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court
refers to the falsification of his examination papers as "falsification
of public documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41,
where the conviction of Castro for the falsification of his examination
papers was affirmed.)
In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one
of its members each year make all the necessary arrangements for
the bar examination, the Chief Justice in 1926 designated Justice
Romualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he appointed
one group of attorneys to prepare the questions and another group
to grade the papers. If any of these attorneys were designated by
the clerk of the court, it was with the advice and consent and on the
authority of Justice Romualdez.
The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300
and 301 of the Penal code in the ordinary acceptation of the words.
It has a technical meaning, and according to article 300 may be
committed in the following eight ways:
1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature,
or rubric.
2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in
any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate.
3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act
or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them.
4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
5. By altering true dates.
6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning.
7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to
be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
by including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original.
8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the
issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book.
The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She
made the alterations in the grades in such a way as to make it
appear that the "correctors" had participated therein, because she
blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and
increased grades opposite their initials, without indicating by her
own initials that she had made the alterations. She in that way
attributed to the "correctors" statements other than those in fact
made by them. Her only explanation of why she altered the grades
in that way was that it pleased her to do so.
A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E.,
725, and is referred to in the American Bar Association Journal for
August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in the Massachusetts
Senate prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of
applicants for admission to the bar by any person not a member of
the board of bar examiners. The Senate wished to know whether
such a bill, if enacted, would be an unconstitutional interference with
the functions of the Judicial Department, and asked the Justices of
the Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion. They replied
that such a law would be unconstitutional. In the course of the
opinion they said: "If the judicial department decides that the
marking of the written examinations may be performed by
competent persons not members of the board but acting under the
direction of such members, that pertains directly to the
ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite
attribute of the judicial department and not an immaterial incident."
It was also stated that the plan of employing assistants to aid the
bar examiners in marking the papers had been approved by the
Supreme Judicial Court.
In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela
Romualdez maintains that the trial court erred in not finding that she
was fully authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the
examination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in
denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of Justice
Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar examining committee for
the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.
In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez
ever gave the accused the authority which she claims to have
received; and in the second place, even if it be assumed that he
gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance
with the terms thereof.
The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez
regarded his secretary, Estela Romualdez, and the deputy clerk,
Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves "correctors" as
supervisors of the other "correctors", and that he authorized Estela
Romualdez to revise any grade to correct an injustice, without
consulting or notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the
"correctors' who had graded the paper, without requiring her to initial
the alteration, or to make any record thereof or any report to him or
to anybody else.
Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct
the examination in accordance with the law and the Rules of Court.
He himself had no such authority as he is alleged to have given his
secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in
accordance with the law, and it is inconceivable that he would
without any warrant of law give or attempt to give his secretary the
unlimited authority which she claims to have received, thereby
enabling her to alter at will any grade or any paper, without making
any record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere statement of
such a claim shows that it is preposterous.
No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice
Romualdez was regarded by him as a supervisor of equal rank with
Estela Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he was
regarded as a supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity.
Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been
granted to the accused Estela Romualdez.
It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not
even a positive statement. Justice Romualdez testified that he
believed that on a certain occasion he gave his secretary to
understand that if a case should be brought to her attention she
might revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so long as she did
not know the name of the candidate to whom the paper belonged.
When asked where she was when the pretended authority was
given to her, the accused could not remember.
There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent
Samson from revising the revision of Estela Romualdez, because
she did not initial the changes made by her, and he was supposed
to be a supervisor of equal rank.
If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela
Romualdez was given the authority which she claims to have
received, nevertheless she was not authorized to change the grades
now in question, because when she made the changes she already
knew that the papers belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay.
The evidence fully sustaining that conclusion is carefully set forth by
the trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The testimony
of Justice Romualdez to the effect that the accused acted within the
authority granted her in changing the grades in question was a mere
expression of opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on
the court. The accused Estela Romualdez did not even attempt to
explain under what circumstances she raised the grades of her
coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general
average of 75 per cent. She did not confer with the "correctors" who
had graded the papers in question. She di not attempt to explain
how she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to revise
the grades in question, how she happened to pick these two papers
out of eight thousand. She could not point to any other grades that
had been altered by her.
Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela
Romualdez also alleges that she freely and voluntarily admitted
from the start of the trial of her case that the alterations had been
made by her, and concludes therefrom that she acted in good faith.
We cannot agree either with the statement of fact or the conclusion.
The accused Estela Romualdez did not admit that the alterations
were made by her until after the prosecuting attorney had presented
three hundred and fifty pages of testimony and announced his
readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations
were in the handwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that
before the trial defendant's attorney from the fiscal's office a
photograph that had been made for the purpose of comparing a
specimen of defendant's handwriting and that of the altered grades.
The fact that the defendant Estela Romualdez made the alterations
under the circumstances which we have mentioned, when she
already knew that the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any
contention that she acted in good faith.
In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this
court said:
When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established
by competent evidence, criminal intent may be and will be
presumed, unless such intent is rebutted by the introduction of
evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily
disclosing the absence of such criminal intent.
The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela
Romualdez is that the trial court erred in failing to extend to her a
fair and impartial trial. We shall not waste much time on this
assignment of error, which is utterly without merit. The record itself
completely refutes any such contention. If the learned trial judge
erred, it was in permitting the attorneys for the defendants too great
latitude in arguing their objections. Arguments four and five pages
long were incorporated into the stenographic record of the evidence.
The record shows a most unjustifiable attack on the good faith of
the fiscal and a persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his
evidence against the accused.
The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error.
They are for the most part embraced in the assignments of error of
his coaccused which we have already considered. These remain
only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his fifth
assignment of error it is alleged that the lower court erred in not
admitting the expert testimony of attorneys Wm. J. Rhode,
Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting Exhibits 26
and 27, which contain the opinion of said attorneys as to the correct
grades which the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2
deserved.
The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the
testimony of these three attorneys on the ground that it was not the
best evidence, and suggested that the defense might call the
members of the examining committee that prepared the questions
in Remedial Law and Civil Law and the key thereto. The attorneys
for the defense did not see fit to adopt the suggestion of the court.
It is not true therefore that the lower court deprived the accused of
an opportunity of showing that the examination papers in question
deserved the increased grades which the defendant Estela
Romualdez gave them. The attorneys that prepared the questions
and the key to the answers were certainly the persons best qualified
to decide whether or not the questions were correctly answered.
The opinion of other attorneys, who had nothing to do with the
examination, would only lead to confusion. We find no merit in this
assignment of error.
The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in
insinuating that the motive of the accused Estela Romualdez in
reviewing and regrading the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her
co-accused Luis Mabunay.
The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the
accused Estela Romualdez committed the crime of falsification
imputed to her in the information, the court erred in concluding that
the accused Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.
For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two
assignments of error together.
In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to
show that Estela Romualdez ever reviewed the examination papers
of her coaccused. So far as the evidence shows, she merely raised
his grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy coincidence",
to use her own words, a passing mark. She could not or would not
enlighten the court as to why she raised the grades of Luis Mabunay
so as to enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already stated, the
record does not show that she raised the grades of any other
candidate.
The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous
examinations, and that he failed in the examination in question,
receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar examining
committee recommended that not only those having the required
general average of 75 per cent be admitted, but also that those who
had received between 70 and 75 per cent. This is referred to in the
record as "an automatic increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary,
and was disapproved by the Supreme Court, and the committee
was directed to prepare a new list and to include therein only those
who had obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The name of
Luis Mabunay was included in the new list submitted three days
later, notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a general
average of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez
had in the meantime raised the grades now in question so that he
appeared to have obtained the general average required for
admission to the bar.
The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew
P600 from the Philippine Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927
Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the Philippine
Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any
evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew P600 from the bank
immediately after the first list was disapproved.
In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice
Moreland speaking for the court said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the
State. If he does not perform that duty he may not always expect
the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which
he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he
is hardy indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so
when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from
the State the very means by which it may assist him.
In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing,
295, 316), Chief Justice Shaw laid down the following rule:
When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending
to support the charge, and it is apparent that the accused is so
situated that he could offer evidence of all the facts and
circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that
the suspicious circumstances can be accounted for consistency with
his innocence, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural conclusion
is, that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would tend to
sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied, and only in
cases where it is manifest that proofs are in the power of the
accused, not accessible to the prosecution.
Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid
to her by her mother and only P10 by her brother, but she could not
satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400 came from. She said
it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the
purchase of goods, but she could not name the person that brought
the money to her, or explain why she deposited it in the bank. She
did not attempt to show that she had paid it out by means of checks
for the purchase of goods for her cousin. She did not call her cousin
as a witness.
An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him
because of failure to produce evidence. The inference, unless the
failure to produce evidence is explained away, is that the tenor of
the specific unproduced evidence would not support the party's
case. (U. S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)
In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following
rules as stated by Dean Wigmore in his work on Evidence, Vol. IV,
p. 3148:
The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own
testimony, is open to inference against a party accused, with the
same limitations applicable to civil parties. Here the effect of the
burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the
burden is on the prosecution, and that the accused is not required
by any rule of law to produce evidence; but nevertheless he runs
the risk of an inference from nonproduction. This seeming paradox,
which has been already sufficiently noticed in treating of the general
principle, has misled a few courts to deny that any inference may be
drawn.
The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were
made for the sole use and benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay.
They were made willfully and illegally, and after the Supreme Court
had rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per
cent. The alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed,
and he withdrew the money after he had time to learn from his
coaccused that he had failed. It was under those circumstances
incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to present evidence to show
for what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank.
As this court said in the case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil.,
42):
When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party
who has it in his power to offer evidence of all the facts as they
existed and rebut the inferences which the circumstances in proof
tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural
conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would
support the inferences against him, and the court is justified in acting
upon that conclusion.
The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point.
Felipe del Rosario failed for the third time in the bar examination of
1926. He then filed a motion for the revision of his grades, based on
an alleged mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and
he was admitted to the bar. It was subsequently found that
alterations had been made in his examination papers, and he and
Juan Villaflor were prosecuted for the falsification of a public
document. Villaflor assumed full responsibility for the commission of
the crime, and testified that Del Rosario did not know anything about
the making of the alterations. The trial court acquitted Del Rosario,
but upon a view of the case for the purpose of taking disciplinary
actin against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the court in banc,
said:
It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them
believe that Felipe del Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal
machinations culminating in the falsification of public documents, of
which he was the sole beneficiary.
The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.
In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused
was charged with the falsification of a public document. The
evidence showed that in the Register of Attorneys the name of an
attorney had been erased, and that the accused had written his own
name in that space, although he had not admitted to the bar. The
accused contended that he wrote his name in the register under the
direction of an employee of the court, and that he acted in good faith.
He was convicted, and on appeal the decision was affirmed. This
court in its decision said: "The trial court suggests in the opinion that
the offense committed required the participation of some unfaithful
employee of the court. But this fact, as the court found, did not
lessen the criminal responsibility of the appellant."
It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together
and acted in common accord in the commission of the crime. As the
Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can seldom be proved except
by circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one of
the conspirators are the acts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)
The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a
conspiracy may be, and, from the secrecy of the crime, usually must
be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts and circumstances which,
taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of
some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed
by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently
independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment,
a conspiracy may be inferred though no actual meeting among them
to concert means is proved. Evidence of actual participation, rather
than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of
acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of others is relevant to
show the criminal intention of the passive party, and generally the
smallest degree of consent or collusion among parties lets in the act
or words of one against the others. (Underhill on Criminal Evidence,
pp. 795, 796.)
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial
court are fully justified by the evidence.
As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official
position in committing the crime, the trial court found her guilty of a
violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No.
2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision
mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine
of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer perpetual disqualification to hold any
public office.

The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full

extent, or from six years and one day to twelve years, and the
penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the same, and there
being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the
commission of the crime, the penalty should be imposed in the
medium degree, which is from eight years and one day to ten years.
The penalty imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is
therefore increased to eight years and one day of prision mayor.

The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an

accomplice under article 301 of the Penal Code, the crime not being
connected with the performance of his duties as an employee of the
Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day
of arresto mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, and
to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency. The defendants were each sentenced to pay one-half
of the costs.

We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was
merely an accomplice. He was a conspirator and coprincipal of
Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301 of the Penal
Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the
maximum degree, but that has been changed by the Revised Penal
Code to prision correccional in the medium and maximum degrees,
and the medium degree of that penalty is from three years, six
months, and twenty-one days to four years, nine months and ten
days. The prison sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased
to three years, six months, and twenty- one days of prision
correccional.

The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In

all other respects it is affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981 prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay
fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2.000) without subsidiary
SALUD P. BERADIO, petitioner, imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, The penalties herein imposed shall be served successively with the
respondents. maximum duration of the sentences not to exceed threefold the
length of tune corresponding to one penalty imposed upon tier in
accordance with Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
DE CASTRO, J.:
As to charges of falsification on July 12, 1973 in Criminal Case No.
By petition for review on certiorari, Salud P. Beradio, an election CCC-0260, and on May 30, 1973, the Court finds no sufficient
registrar of the COMELEC in Rosales, Pangasinan, who was Evidence to hold the accused liable. Consequently, the accused is
convicted on four (4) counts of the crime of falsification of public or hereby absolved therefrom.
official documents of the seven (7) separate informations filed
against her for making false entries in her daily time records, The facts pertinent to the specified dates of falsification as found by
elevates to the Court, the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA- the Court of Appeals are as follows:
G. R. No. 20319 to 20322 promulgated on September 18, 1978,
affirming in toto the judgment of conviction rendered on July 30, ... On the following particular dates, as reflected in her daily time
1976 by the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan records (Exhs. "D" to "H"), BERADIO reported her attendance in
City. The dispositive portion of the decision of the lower court reads office and actual hours of work performed as:
as follows:
On
FOR THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION, and with the prosecution
not having established by proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt 1) March 15, 1973
of the herein accused and for insufficiency of evidence or the lack
of it, the Court hereby finds. as it so holds, accussed Salud P. 7:35 a.m.
Beradio NOT GUILTY of the charges in Criminal cases Nos. CCC-
0258, CCC-0259, and CCC-0263; consequently, she is hereby 12:00 n.;
acquitted therefrom with costs de oficio; and decreeing the bail
bonds posted for her provisional release in these cases cancelled
and discharged.
1:00 p.m. to
On the other hand, however, the Court so finds and holds accused
Salud P. Beradio GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of 5:00 p.m.
falsification of public or official document as charged in Criminal
Case No. CCC-0260 as to entry on July 13, 1973 only, Criminal 2) March 23, 1973
Case No. CCC-0261; Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 as to entry on
May 28, 1973 only, and Criminal Case No. CCC-0264, defined and 7:30 a.m.
penalized under Article 17 1, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal
Code, and absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and 12:00 n ;
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Act, hereby accordingly
sentences said Salud P. Beradio to serve an indeterminate prison
term in the following manner, to wit:
1:00 p.m. to
a) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 — a prison term of from TWO
(2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision 5:00 p.m.
correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to 3) May 28, 1973
pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) but without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and, to pay the cost; 7:45 a.m.

b) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0261 — a prison term of from TWO 12:00 n;

(2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in 1:00 p.m. to
case of insolvency, and to pay the cost;
5:00 p.m.
c) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 - a prison term of from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision 4) June 6, 1973
correcional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to 7:30 a.m.
pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost. 12:00 n ;

d) In Criminal Case No. CCC-026-1 — a prison term of from TWO

(2) YEARS, FOUR(4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and 0NE (1) DAY of 1:00 p.m. to

5:00 p.m.
5) June 22, 1973
7:35 a.m.
12:00 n ;
1:00 p.m. to
5:00 p.m.
6) July 13,1973
8:00 a.m.
12:00 n ;
1:00 p.m. to
5:00 p.m.
The veracity of the foregoing reports were negated by the following:
1) On March l5, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the
applicants at the initial hearing and reception of evidence in land
Registration Case No. 19-R before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Rosales, in both morning and afternoon
sessions (Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "K-2").
2) In the morning of March 23, 1973, BERADIO appeared as
counsel for the petitioner in the hearing of Special Proceedings No.
24-R (summary settlement of the estate of Vicente Oria, Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, at Resales, which was
called first in open court and later, in chambers (Exhs. "M" and M-1
").
3) On May 28, 1973, in the same case, Sp. Proc. No. 24-R,
BERADIO again appeared as counsel for the petitioner in the same
court which held sessions from 8:45 to 11:45 (Exh. "M").
4) In the morning of June 6, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel
for the defendant in CAR Case No. 19882-.TP '73, entitled "Pepito
Felipe vs. Ismael Pontes and Camilo Tamce before CAR Branch 11
in Tayug, Pangasinan (Exh. "J"). Minutes of the pre-trial conference
which the appellant attended are manifest in the pre-trial order that
was dictated in open court (Exh. "J-1").
5) In the morning of June 22, 1973, Beradio appeared in Sp.
Proc. No. 24-R before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch XIV at Rosales (Exh. "M").
6) In the morning of July 13, 1973, Beradio appeared as
counsel for plaintiff at the pre-trial conference of Civil Case No.
137R, "Venancia Diaz vs. Armando Ordonio" before Branch XIV of
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Exhs. "L" to "I-3").
It is thus clear that while in the six abovementioned dates, BERADIO
made it appear in her daily time records that she was in her office
and performed her work on the dates and hours she specified, the
facts were that she was elsewhere attending court sessions. 2
From the said decision of the Court of Appeals and the denial of her
motion for reconsideration on November 28, 1978, Salud Beradio
filed the instant petition for review on certiorari to the Court. We
asked the Solicitor General to comment on the petition and
thereafter, We resolved to give due course to said petition it
appearing that the issues raised are, in the main questions of law
rendered novel by the peculiar circumstances of the case. Thus, he
raised the following legal issues:
WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER TAKEN IN
THE LIGHT OF THE PROVISION OF ARTICLE 171, PARAGRAPH
4, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS LEGAL AND PROPER.
II
WHETHER THE PETITIONER COULD STILL BE LEGALLY AND
PROPERLY PROSECUTED FOR AN OFFENSE WHERE SHE
WAS NO LONGER A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
III
WHETHER PETITIONER !S UNDER LEGAL OBLIGATION TO
FILL UP AND SUBMIT TIME RECORD.
IV
ASSUMING THAT SHE IS, DO THE STATEMENTS THEREIN
REFLECTED IN HER TIME RECORD BEAR ANY' COLOR OF
TRUTH'.
V
WHETHER DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN FALSIFICATION
OF PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL DOCUMENT IS TOTALLY OF NO
MOMENT.
VI
IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT. UNDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE LAW AND WELL-SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ACQUITTAL
ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
Salud P. Beradio, petitioner, is a lady-lawyer appointed as an
election registrar of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on
February 1, 1964 (Exhibits A and A-1). In 1972 and 1973, she was
stationed in Resales, Pangasinan, as Chief of Office, Office of the
Election Registrar, COMELEC holding office beside the municipal
building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 o'clock to 5:00
o'clock in the afternoon. As the nature of her job was field work, she
was required to fill up and submit to the COMELEC's main office in
Manila her daily time records after having been counter-signed by
her provincial supervisor. 3
On March 29, 1973, the COMELEC by resolution (Exhibits 1 and 1-
A, CCC-0261) granted her request for permission to appear as
counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the case before the
Court of Agrarian Relations in Rosales, Pangasinan. 4
During her assignment as Election Registrar of Rosales,
Pangasinan, one Raymundo Valdez filed with the COMELEC,
sometime in September, 1973, an administrative complaint charging
her of unauthorized practice of law. On the other hand, Salud
Beradio tendered her resignation as Election Registrar of Rosales,
Pangasinan, which, by COMELEC resolution (Exhibit B) of October
25, 1973, was accepted and made to retroact on the close of office
hours on September 30, 1973. She was duly granted clearance by
all the offices of the COMELEC, and she received her retirement
benefits under the law.
Raymundo Valdez made an inquiry with the COMELEC on the
status of his administrative case against Salud P. Beradio, and upon
being informed of her separation from the service, he initiated the
filing of criminal charges against Salud Beradio on grounds of
falsification of daily time records defined and penalized under Article
17 1, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code as falsification of
public documents. In the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan where he lodged the criminal charges, Jose Peralta,
and his wife Paz de Guzman-Peralta, trial attorney of Agrarian Legal
Assistance (DAR) submitted affidavits in support of the charges
against Salud P. Beradio.
On August 4, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed seven
(7) separate informations all dated July 7, 1975 with the Circuit
Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City, charging Salud
P. Beradio with falsification of public or official documents for
making false entries in her daily time .records on: 1) October 12,
1972 in Criminal Case CCC-0258; 2) September 4, 1973 in Criminal
Case CCC-0259; 3) July 12 and 13, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-
0260; 4) June 6 and 22, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0261; 5) May
28 and 30, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0262; 6) April 3, 1973 in
Criminal Case CCC-0263; and 7) March 15 and 23, 1973 in Criminal
Case CCC-0264 that she submitted to the Commission on Election
in Manila. 5 The separate informations allege that petitioner was
absent the whole day on the days mentioned therein but to the
"damage and prejudice of the National Government," she made it
appear in her time records that she was not so absent from the
office, when in fact she well knew that on such date or time she was
in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Resales,
Pangasinan, appearing in her cases .
While petitioner raised the above-quoted legal issues which, to Us,
point to the more basic issues inherent in acts mala in se as contra
distinguished from mala prohibita, We narrowed down these issues,
for proper disposition of the instant case, into whether or not the
alleged acts of falsification of public documents imputed against the
petitioner were tainted with criminal intent (dolo), and whether or not
the act of alleged false narration of facts in the daily time record
bears, under the law, some semblance of colorable truth. This We
did in full considerations of the peculiar circumstances which render
the instant case novel in some respects, worthy of pronouncements
from this Court.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a conviction of the
offense of falsification of public or official documents, defined and
penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code, the requisite elements thereof must be clearly established,
namely: 1) the offender makes in a document false statements in a
narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of
the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely
false, and 4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was
made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. 6
Of weight in Our criminal justice system is the principle that the
essence of an offense is the wrongful intent (dolo), without which it
cannot exist. 7 Actus non facit reum nisi mens set rea, the act itself
does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so. Article 3
of the Revised Penal Code clearly indicates that malice or criminal
intent (dolo) in some form is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offenses defined in the Code, except in those cases where the
element required is negligence (culpa).
On one point, however, the claim of the petitioner that she is not
under strict obligation to keep and submit a time record is not at all
empty with justification. While it is true, as held by the respondent
court, 8 that the obligation to disclose the literal truth in filling up the
daily time record is required of all officers and employees in the civil
service of the government in accordance with Civil Service Rule XV,
Executive Order No. 5, Series of 1909, this vague provision,
however, is rendered clear by Section 4, Rule XV of the Civil Service
Rule, dated December 3, 1962, later Memorandum Circular No. II,
Series of 1965 which exempt from requirements of keeping and
submitting the daily time records three categories of public officers,
namely: 1) Presidential appointees; 2) chiefs and assistant chiefs of
agencies; and 3) officers in the three branches of the government.
Clearly thus, petitioner as Chief of theOffice, Office ofElection
Registrar, COMELEC in the municipality of Rosales, Pangasinan
exercising supervision over four (4) subordinate employess, would
fall under the third category aforementioned. An Election Registrar
of the municipality performing the powers, dutied , responsibilities of
the COMELEC, a constitutional body, in the conduct of national or
local election, referenda, and plebiscites, in aparticular voting district
may be regarded as an officer who rank higher thab such chiefs or
assistant chiefs of agencies although he may not be a presidential
appointee. Notwithstan ding such an exemption, if the election
registrars of the various municipalities all throughout the country,
who occassionaly work more than ordinary eight-hours on the last
day of the registration or on lection day, are keeping and submitting
the daily time records to the main office in Manila, it may be only to
the sake of adminstrative procedural convenience or as a matter of
practice, but by reason of strict legal obligation.
On the main point, assuming, however, that petitioner is under strict
legal obligation to keep and submit the daily time records, We are
definitely inclined to the view that the alleged false entries made in
the time records on the specified dates contained in the information
do not constitute falsification for having been made with no malice
or deliberate intent. Noteworthy is the fact that petitioner
consistently did not dispute, but admitted in all candor her
appearances in six (6) different ways, on March 15, March 23, May
28, June 22, July 13,, all in 1973 before the Court of First Instance,
Branch XIV, Rosales, Pangasinan, in the aforementiones cases,
claiming that she did not reflect this absences in her daily time
records because they were for few minute-duration, the longest was
on March 15, 1973 being for forty-five (45) minutes; they could be
absorbed within the allowed coffee breaks of 30 minutes in the
morning and in the afternoon; that as Chief of Office, and all Election
Registrars of the COMELEC for that matter, she is allowed to have
one (1) day leave during week days provided she worked on a
Saturday: and that her brief absences did not in any way interfere
with or interrupt her official duties as an Election Registrar. Above
all, petitioner categorically emphasized that her appearances in
court were duly authorized by the COMELEC, which in certain
instances were as counsel de oficio, and no remuneration
whatsoever from her clients was received by her,
Finding that the justifications claimed by Beradio as unavailing, the
Court of Appeals ruled that her various appearances in court were
not on official business, and the permission granted her by the
COMELEC was to appear in behalf of her relatives, and she was
still obligated to reflect in her daily time records only the hours when
she was actually in the office. 9
We are not convinced. The Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, in
Rosales, Pangasinan, is only two (2) meters from her own office as
Election Registrar in the said municipality. She had standing
authority to act as de oficio counsel given by the COMELEC
evidently in furtherance of the free legal aid service program of the
Integrated Bar, and an Identical policy of the Government itself, 10
especially as COMELEC lawyers, before any election had been held
during the regime of martial law, did not have much office work to
keep them busy. This state of virtual absence of electoral activities
is what prompted COMELEC to authorize its lawyers to take active
part in the free legal aid program above adverted to, if to do so would
not unduly interfere with their work. In recognition of the long
standing policy of the COMELEC in response to the legal aid
program of the Government 11 and the "free access to the courts"
provision of the 1973 Constitution, 12 the COMELEC, by Resolution
No. 1401, 13 formally created the Legal Assistance Office thereby
constituting all COMELEC lawyers with rank of division chief and
below as COMELEC Legal Assistance Officers. Even prior to the
formal creation of the Legal Assistance Office, the liberal policy of
the COMELEC in allowing its Election Registrars to act as counsel
in areas where there are no lawyers available is, indeed, laudable.
Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the instant case, no
criminal intent to commit the crime with which she is charged can be
imputed against the petitioner. In the information, it was alleged that
the petitioner was not in her office for the full office hours from 8:00
a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the specified
dates therein as she was then busy attending her cases in court. On
the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution belies its allegation of
the wholeday absence in office as Election Registrar. Records
reveal that petitioner had stayed in court for only 5, 30, 40 or 45
minutes a day for her appearances therein, at no instance
exceeding one (1) hours.
If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the six days in question
making it appear that she attended her office from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00
noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. there is more than color of
truth in the entry made. It is not shown that she did not report first to
her office as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, before
going to the courtroom just two (2) meters away. Petitioner thus
likened her appearance to going out for the usual coffee breaks. The
comparison is not even apt for during the while she appeared in
court, she was rendering service more, if not wholly, for the public
good, than just for her own well-being as when she goes out for
snack during the coffee-break period. The court being only two (2)
meters away from her office, she did not even have to go so far as
when one goes out for snack. What is more, everytime she
appeared in court, she surely must have made this fact officially of
record in the court proceedings, something which is not done with
leaving the office room for coffee breaks. In fine, the entries in
petitioner's daily time records were not absolutely false. The alleged
false entry may be said to have a color of truth, not a downright and
willful falsehood which alone would constitute falsification as a
crime. 14 As Cuello Calon stated: "La mera inexacted tio es
bastante para integrar este delito (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal 6th
Ed. Vol. 11, p. 216, cited in People vs. Villena, et al., 51 O.G. 5691;
People vs. La Corte, CA-G. R. No. 05818-CR; U.S. vs. Bayot, 10
Phil. 518)."
In thus preparing her daily time record the way she did, it was
evidently in her belief in her belief that she was just making of record
the fact that, as was her honest opinion, she was entitled to receive
her full pay even for those days she appeared in court, rendering
what she felt was no less a public service, being in furtherance of a
public policy on free legal assistance. As a lawyer, and as in officer
of the court, she, for one, aids in the administration of justice,
oathbound servant of society whose duty is not solely for the benefit
of her clients but for the public, particularly in the administration of
justice. The court a quo itself recognize, that the COMELEC
registrars, at that time, are directed to appear as counsel de oficio
when there are no lawyers to represent the parties in litigation. 15 If
petitioner is not at all appointed as counsel de oficio strictly in
accordance with the Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, it is an
undisputed fact, as reflected in court records, that petitioner, true to
her oath, acted as counsel in certain cases. On this point, if one fills
up his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis of the time so
indicated therein, she is merely making an honest claim for the pay
corresponding to the time so indicated, no intent to commit the crime
of falsification of public document can be ascribed to her. In the case
of the herein petitioner, she was only submitting a time record she
knew would be the basis for computing the pay she honestly felt she
deserved for the period indicated. Indeed, the time record is
required primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of serving as basis
for the determination of the amount of pay an employee is entitled
to receive for a given period.
Further, on the issue of malus animus or criminal intent, it was ruled
by the court a quo, confirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals,
that in falsification of public document, in contradistinction to private
document, the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is
unnecessary, for, what is penalized is the undermining or
infringement of the public faith and the violation of the truth as
therein solemnly proclaimed, invoking the case of People vs. Po
Giok Te, 96 Phil. 918. Arguing against this ruling, petitioner cited the
case of People us. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48, which the ponente in the
instant case upheld in the case of People vs. Motus, CA-G.R. No.
18267-CR when he was in the Court of Appeals, that although the
Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, htis
Court emphasized that "it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that
the change in th epublic document must be such as to affect the
integrity of the same or change in the public document must be such
as to affect the integrity of the same or change the effects which it
would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could not
exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime
which is required by Article 1 (now Article 3) of the Penal Code.
We find the petitioner's stand tenable. the evident purpose of
requiring government employees to keep time record is to show
their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly. Closely
adhering tot he policy of no work no pay, a daily time record is
primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss tot he
government as would result in instances where it pays an employee
for no work done. The integrity of the daily time record as an official
document, however, remains untarnished if the damages sought to
be prevented has not been produced. As this ponente observed in
the case of People v. Motus, supra while it is true that a time record
is an official document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not
pervert its avowed purpose as when it does not cause damage to
the government. It may be different in the case of a public document
with continuing interest affecting the public welfare which is naturally
damaged if that document is falsified where the truth is necessary
for the safeguard and protection of that general interest. In the
instant case, the time records have already served their purpose.
They have not caused any damage to the government or third
person because under the facts duly proven, petitioner may be said
to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper
permission from her superiors. They may now even be condemned
as having no more use to require their continued safe- keeping.
Public interest has not been harmed by their contents, and
continuing faith in their verity is not affected.
As pointed out, the obligation to make entries in the daily time
records of officers and employees in the Government service is a
matter of administrative procedural convenience in the computation
of salary for a given period, characteristically, not an outright and
strict measure of professional discipline, efficiency, dedication,
honestly and competence.
Under the proven and admitted facts, petitioner-appellant surely is
entitled to receive the pay as if she had stayed in her office the whole
period covered by the official hours prescribed. ,She had perhaps
made herself even more useful in the general benefit of the public
than if she had remained practically Idle in her office as Election
Registrar with perhaps no work at all to attend to, its is generally the
case long before elections take place, specially during the martial
law regime. The COMELEC must have been fully cognizant of the
legal implications of the peculiar facts and circumstances that
obtained in this case, when it gave petitioner full clearance after she
presented her resignation when an administrative charge was filed
against her by the same complainant as in the criminal charge. The
courts, in the present criminal prosecution, should do no less. It
would be too harsh and cruel for the courts to punish petitioner not
only with imprisonment but with general disqualification and
possible disbarment, for an act or omission which she performed or
failed to perform without any criminal intent. Such an insignificant
transgression, if ever it is one, would not beam the scales of justice
against the petitioner, for courts must always be, as they are, the
repositories of fairness and justice. It is inconceivable that a person
who, without any attempt to conceal her appearances in court for
this is a matter always made officially of record in the court
proceedings, emphatically, not for his own private gain, but
animated by the zeal of service not wanting in public benefit, and as
an officer of the court, petitioner could have acted with a deliberate
criminal intent. Moreover, what she stated in her daily time record,
as earlier observed, had more than a mere color of truth to exclude
such act from the pale of the criminal offense of falsification of public
document with which she is charged.

WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of petitioner not to have been

established beyond reasonable doubt, the judgment of conviction
rendered by respondent court in affirming that of the trial court is
hereby reversed, and petitioner, acquitted of the crime charged, with
costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22, 1982
PILAR S. LUAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Nos. 22414-16 CR which affirmed the decision of The Court of First
Instance of Samar, Branch X, convicting the petitioner of three
counts of falsification of commercial documents in Criminal Cases
Nos. 599, 600 and 601.
The facts are stated in the poorly written decision of the Court of
Appeals thus:
Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district office of Laoang II,
Northern Samar, died at the G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital at around
7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 24, 1972 after he was
confined in said hospital since January 3, 1972.
Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased's
salary warrants [Exhibits A (599), A (600) and A (601)] to the
Superintendent of schools at Catarman Northern Samar who in turn
forwarded them to the District Supervisor, Florencio Guillermo. A
payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks.
The paychecks delivered, Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-
warrant registers certifying that on his official oath, each employee
whose name appeared on the rolls had received the salary warrant
indicated opposite his name on February 7, 1972, February 17,
1972 and February 25, 1972, respectively, and returned the same
to Jose Figueroa, the District Administrative Officer of Northern
Samar.
Exhibit A (599) was personally received by Pilar S. Luague, while
Exhibit A (600) was received by Glen S. Luague. Exhibit A (601)
was received by Edmundo Echano, a relative of Iliuminado Luague
and who claimed to be employed in the Office of the District
Supervisor.
Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he
asked appellant to return the treasury warrants issued in the name
of her husband Iluminado Luague, further claiming that appellant
promised to do so, but actually did not. Upon the receipt of the xerox
copies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of Public Schools,
Guillermo discovered that the treasury warrants in question had
been encashed by appellant and Glen Luague with different local
stores at Laoang. Exhibit A (599) was cleared on February 22, 1972,
while Exhibit A (600) was deposited to the account of a certain Lee
and/or Nicol Chu, Jr. at Philippine Bank of Communications; and
Exhibit A (601) was deposited to the account of Colgate-Palmolive
Philippines, Inc. Appellant admitted having endorsed the treasury
warrants by means of which she was able to encash the same.
For signing the name of her husband Iluminado Luague as payee
on three treasury warrants for purposes of endorsement, appellant
stands charged with the crime of Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Document. [Note: The appellant was charged with
three counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial document but
was convicted of falsification only.]
It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well as in the Court of
Appeals that she acted in good faith or had no criminal intent when
she cashed her deceased husband's paychecks. As stated in the
decision of the Court of Appeals:
Appellant puts up the defense of good faith in signing theme of her
deceased husband in the treasury warrants in question.
Her version: The late Iluminado Luague was on leave from January
3 to February 9, 1972, as evidenced by his approved application for
sick leave. On January 23, 1972, the Principal, Jose Infante, while
visiting Iluminado Luague in the hospital, handed to Luague a check
representing his differentials. Luague in turn handed over the check
to his wife, the herein appellant, who was then present. Before
Infante left, he informed the Luague spouses that Luague's pay
check for the second half of January 1972 had arrived and advised
Mrs. Luague to get the same from Florencio Guillermo so that she
could use it to pay for medicine and hospital expenses of her
husband.
Iluminado Luague instructed her [his (sic)] wife to get the check from
Florencio Guillermo. Appellant went to the house of Guillermo in the
afternoon of January 23, 1972. Guillermo asked her to sign the
name of her husband on the payroll warrant register and counter-
sign with her initials. Guillermo then handed her the treasury warrant
[Exhibit A (599)].
Iluminado Luague died on January 24, 1972. From the proceeds of
the warrants they received were paid the amount the Luague family
owed the drugstores owned by Amor Carandang, Purisima Saba
and Luz Tan. A treasury warrant was also paid to Edward Kam from
whom they bought construction materials for the tomb of the
deceased and to Ong Kiat store for the payment of materials used
for the coffin of the late Iluminado Luague which were purchased on
credit.
Upon the instruction of Amor Carandang and on her belief and upon
suggestion of Florencio Guillermo himself that the warrants could be
used to settle their financial obligations incurred by the
hospitalization and death of her late husband, appellant indorsed
the said treasury warrants by signing the name of Iluminado
Luague.
Heirs of deceased government employees are entitled to whatever
unpaid salaries the deceased employee failed to receive. Appellant
claims that it was upon this honest belief that she endorsed the
treasury warrants of her late husband to defray for the necessary
expenses incurred due to the latter's hospitalization, funeral and
burial.
The Court of Appeals did not reject the petitioner's version, except
in respect of the date when the first paycheck was delivered. In
affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals followed
the simplistic procedure of applying literally the letter of the law,
namely: there was falsification because the petitioner "signed her
husband's name in indorsing the treasury warrants in question." The
Court of Appeals failed to take into account the following facts: That
the petitioner signed her husband's name to the checks because
they were delivered to her by no less than her husband's district
supervisor long after the husband's death which was known to the
supervisor; that she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the
expenses of her husband's last illness and his burial; and that she
believed that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment
for her husband's vacation and sick leave credits the money value
of which exceeded the value of the checks. In the fight of these
circumstances, We cannot ascribe criminal intent to the petitioner.
We sustain her claim that she acted in good faith.
During the hearing, it was brought out that the government did not
sustain any financial loss due to the encashment of the checks
because the petitioner's husband had accumulated vacation and
sick leaves the money value of which exceeded the value of the
three paychecks and the value of the checks was simply deducted
from the money value of the leaves. This explains why the petitioner
was not convicted of estafa but of falsification only. While we do not
mean to imply that if there is no damage there can be no falsification,
We do say that the absence of damage is an element to be
considered to determine whether or not there is criminal intent.

We notice here the lack of compassion on the part of the prosecuting

fiscal, the trial judge, and the Court of Appeals. Even the Solicitor
General who is alert in seeking to correct improper convictions by
trial courts has somehow misappreciated the evidence in this case.

The accused is a poor widow who was obviously in a state of

bewilderment due to the recent death of her husband when she
cashed the paychecks. She was also in dire need of money to settle
the expenses for her husband's last illness and his burial. A
compassionate attitude repeatedly urged by the First Lady, Mrs.
Imelda R. Marcos, would have been highly in order under the
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the decision of the

Court of Appeals is reversed; the petitioner is acquitted of the
charges against her. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-67472 July 3, 1987
DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Under separate informations both dated September 20, 1982, the
Office of the Tanodbayan charges Dario Cabigas y Cacho and
Benedicto Reynes y Lopez on two (2) counts, with the crime of
Falsification of Official Documents allegedly committed in the
following manner:
(1) Criminal Case No. 6529
That on or about March 29, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez,
both public officers being then employed as Securities Custodian
and Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of
the Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation, conspiring together, taking advantage of
their official position and committing the crime herein charged in
relation to their Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify ... Securities Delivery Receipt dated March 9,
1982 ... evidencing, among others, receipt by them in their official
capacity of Treasury Bills bearing Serial No. A-000064 up to
A000082 of the 795th series, by then and there making alterations
and/or intercalations thereon to the effect that only treasury bills
bearing SN-A-000064 to A-000076 were received by them on March
9, 1982, for the purpose of hiding or concealing the loss while in
their custody of six (6) treasury bills bearing SN-A-000077 to A-
000082 of the 795th series, thereby changing the meaning of said
Securities Delivery Receipt.
(2) Criminal Case No. 6938
That on or about March 30, 1982 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, both public
officers, being then employed as Securities Custodian and
Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, Makati Branch, a government-owned and/or controlled
corporation, conspiring together, and taking advantage of their
official positions and committing the crime herein charged in relation
to their office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify the Daily Report of Securities/Documents under custody
dated March 30, 1982, which is an official document evidencing the
securities transactions and/or operations of the Makati Branch of the
aforenamed bank, and which it was their official duty to prepare and
submit to their superiors, by then and there indicating in said
document, for the purpose of hiding the loss or disappearance while
in their custody of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series, with face
value of P500,000.00 each, that the beginning balance of securities
under their custody as to volume was 1,533 pieces, when, the
ending balance as to volume in the previous day's report was 1,539
pieces and that the beginning balance as to face value in the
previous day's report was P610,095,000.00 and thereafter falsely
stating in the footnote of the same document that the reduction was
due to "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82"
the truth being that the six (6) pieces of treasury bills with aggregate
face value of P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously entered in either
the Securities Delivery Receipt or the Daily Report of Securities
/Documents under Custody, both dated March 9, 1982, but were
discovered to have been missing after an inventory conducted by
accused on March 20, 1982, thereby making an untruthful statement
in a narration of facts in violation of par. 4 of Articles 171 of the
Revised Penal Code.
After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its
decision in both cases, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. 6529 ACQUITTING the accused Dario
Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de
officio and ordering their bail bonds in the said case cancelled.
2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:
a) Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Falsification of a Public
or Official Document defined and penalized under Article 171,
paragraph No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code without any mitigating
or aggravating circumstances; and applying the indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine of
P2,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
b) ACQUITTING accused Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de
officio, an ordering his bail bond cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
The instant petition is an appeal, interposed by herein petitioner
Dario Cabigas y Cacho from the foregoing decision in Criminal Case
No. 6938.
The following pertinent facts are not disputed: Petitioner Dario
Cabigas is the Securities Custodian of the Securities Section of the
Land Bank of the Philippines assigned to its branch at Makati, Metro
Manila. Assisting him in his work is Benedicto Reynes, the securities
receiving clerk. The Fund Management Department (FMD) of the
Land Bank of the Philippines is engaged in money market and
securities trading transactions. The securities which are in the form
of treasury notes and bills are in turn deposited with the Securities
Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch.
On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department, delivered to
the Securities Section, Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, for safekeeping, 112 pieces of treasury notes and
treasury bills worth P46,000,000.00 and for which a copy of the
Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) Exh. D, was issued to the Fund
Management Dept. while the original of the same was retained by
the Securities Section. Included in the securities received on March
9, 1982 are 19 pieces of treasury bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to
A-000082, 795th series, in the denomination of P500,000.00 each,
or a total amount of P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities,
the accused would prepare the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) evidencing the
securities transactions and operations of the Makati Branch of the
Land Bank of the Philippines. This has been the routine procedure
being adopted by the accused in the performance of his duty as a
Security Custodian.
On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury notes
and bills deposited with them, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the
loss of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series with a total value of
P3,000,000.00. Upon verification that Securities Delivery Receipt
(SDR) dated March 9, 1982, Exhibit C, was the source document of
the missing securities which were delivered to them for safekeeping,
accused Reynes crossed out with a red ink in the said document the
last two digits "82" and the addition after them of the figure "76" on
the serial numbers A-000064 to A-000082 of the 19 treasury bills of
the 795th series with a total maturity value of P9,500,000.00. Then
at the bottom of the SDR Cabigas placed the notation "For
adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82." Then upon Cabigas'
suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch manager,
Aurora Pigram When the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 was
prepared, the number of treasury bills of the 795th series stood at
1,539 pieces with a total face value of P610,095,000.00.
The following day, Reynes prepared a draft report for March 30,
1982 by Carrying forward the ending balance of the treasury bills of
the 795th series reflected in the DR SDUC dated March 29, 1982.
However, instead of following the draft prepared by Reynes,
Cabigas prepared his own report-DR SDUC (Exh. "G ") dated March
30, 1982 wherein he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills of the
795th series with a total amount of P607,095,000.00 which the latter
claimed to be the number of securities of the 795th series in his
possession at the time of the preparation of said report. At the
bottom of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas place the notation
"Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated March 9, 1982"
as legend of the asterisk (*) sign which appears after the figure
"1,533."
On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be
authenticating with the Central Bank of the Philippines a treasury bill
of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082 in the amount of
P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered
that the Land Bank of the Philippines Makati Branch Manager,
Aurora Pigram was the one who negotiated the said treasury bill
with the Gainsbo Commodities. Further investigation revealed that
the five (5) missing treasury bills with series numbers A-000077 to
A-000081 were negotiated by Pigram with the Home Savings Bank
to secure a loan. The Land Bank immediately sought the assistance
of the NBI in investigating the case. On May 24, 1982, Cabigas and
Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the investigation,
Cabigas and Reynes were arrested for having allegedly conspired
together in falsifying the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) dated
March 9, 1982 (Exh. "C") and the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents under custody (DR SDUC) Exh. G dated
March 30, 1982 and for which the corresponding informations were
filed with the Sandiganbayan. Both accused were acquitted in
Criminal Case No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho
was convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938, while his co-accused was
acquitted therein.
In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho, the Sandiganbayan
stated in its now assailed Decision that
In the case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on Securities/Documents
Under Custody (DR SDUC) for March 30, 1982, the alleged
falsification consists of the following entries (figures) pertaining to
treasury bills: "1,533", "607,095,000.00", "1,533 and
607,095,000.00 "marked on the document as Exhibit G-1, and the
legend of the asterisk (*) sign at the bottom portion reading,
"Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" marked
as Exhibit G-2. The numbers "1,533" and "607,095,000.00"
represent the volume and the total face/maturity value, respectively,
of the treasury bills supposedly in the custody of the Securities
Section as of March 30, 1982. Those entries were falsifications, the
prosecution maintains, because the correct number of treasury bills
deposited with the Securities Section as of that date was 1,539
valued at P610,095,000.00; that the said figures were altered to
"1,533 and 607,095,000.00," respectively, to conceal the loss or
disappearance of 6 treasury bills worth P3,000,000.00, and that the
footnote at the bottom portion of the document (Exh. G-2) was
written to attribute the reduction in the number of treasury bills from
"1,539" to "1,533" to mistake or error in the entries in the Securities
Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C).
The discrepancy in the figures is indeed apparent. In the DR SDUC
for March 29, 1982 (Exh. F), the ending balance on the number of
treasury bills at the close of office hours on that day was 1,539
pieces with a total face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00 (Exh. F-
1). Accordingly, the beginning balance on the number of the same
treasury bills on the following day, March 30, 1982, must also be
1,539 pieces with a total face/Maturity value of P610,095,000.00.
But as it was made to appear in the DR SDUC for March 30, 1982
(Exhs. G and G-1), the beginning and ending balances on the
number and value of treasury bills for that date were 1,533 pieces
and P607,095,000.00 maturity value.1avvphi1
The question now is, who caused the alterations and what was
caused the alteration and what was the purpose behind them.
xxx xxx xxx
By changing the original figures in the draft of the DR SDUC from
"1,539" and "610" to "1,533" and "607" respectively, and causing
Reynes to type the final copy of the DR SDUC on the basis of the
corrected draft Cabigas caused the document to show that the
treasury bills in their custody as of March 30, 1982 were 1,533
pieces with a total face/maturity value of P607,095,000.00. By
placing, likewise, an asterisk (*) sign after the figure "1,533" and
writing the words "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated
3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign, Cabigas caused to make
it appear that the discrepancy of 6 treasury bills valued at
P3,000,000.00 was due to error in the entries in the Securities
Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982(Exh. C). Considering that the
said SDR of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C) did not contain any error but
reflected the number of securities received by them on that day, it is
obvious that Cabigas made the alterations in Exhibit G and the
misleading footnote (Exh. G-2) in order to suppress, hide or conceal
the fact that the 6 treasury bills comprising the discrepancy were lost
while in their custody.
The alterations amounted to falsification of Exhibit G, a public or
official document, under paragraph No. 4, Article 171, of the
Revised Penal Code, by making untruthful statements in a narration
of facts. As Securities Custodian, Cabigas was under obligation to
disclose in the said document the correct number and total maturity
value of the securities under his official custody as of March 30,
1982.
It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par.
No. 4 of Article 171, which reads-"by making untruthful statements
in a narration of facts,"-the following elements must concur-
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in
a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him;
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
(d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made
with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person.
Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not
present in the case at bar. The correction of the figure from 1,539 to
1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of treasury under
custody is not falsification because it was made to speak the truth
(US vs. Mateo, 25 Phil. 324). The placing of an asterisk (*) sign after
the figure "1,533" and writing the words, "Adjustment on erroneous
entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" as legend of the asterisk sign,
contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, was not effected to
hide or conceal the fact that the missing 6 treasury bills were lost. It
would be far more difficult to detect or discover the loss if there was
no asterisk or footnote in the DR SDUC Exh. G. In fact, the evidence
discloses that immediately upon discovery of the loss on March 29,
1982, petitioner reported the matter to his immediate supervisor,
Estela L. Espiritu and Branch Manager of the Securities Section,
Aurora Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of motive on the part
of petitioner to conceal the said loss.

Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report on

Securities/Documents under Custody (DR SDUC) is a form purely
devised and adopted by him. This form was never required, neither
was it introduced nor prescribed by the Land Bank. Petitioner,
therefore, was not under "legal obligation" to disclose in the DR
SDUC or SDR, the correct number and total maturity value of the
securities under their official custody as of a given date. It is purely
optional on the part of petitioner to use the said forms.

The Honorable Solicitor General recommends that the accused be

acquitted because —

There is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982, Exh.
G, for the alleged falsification of which petitioner was convicted in
Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the submission of which was or is
required by law. In the petition for review, petitioner points out that
as testified by him the form was not an official form of the Land Bank.
The form was his own initiative adopted "for our own convenience
and also for reference purposes." Petitioner therefore, was not
under legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth by said DR
SDUC. In the absence of such obligation and of the alleged wrongful
intent, defendant cannot be legally convicted of the crime of
falsification of public document with which he is charged. (People
vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333).

WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the

Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 6938 is hereby REVERSED
and another one rendered ACQUITTING the petitioner, Dario
Cabigas y Cacho.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO
QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON and defendant-
appellant.
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,
vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants.
* Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.
Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the
prosecution's theory is that in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the
provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with Juan Samson
y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan
City, and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an
accomplice, used six (6) forged provincial vouchers in order to
embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of
P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the
upper part with the legend "ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of
the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is supposed to be
signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the
governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed
paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a certificate to be signed by the creditor.
It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that the expenses "were
actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1
was not signed presumably because it is not relevant to the
purchase of materials for public works projects.
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have
been lawfully incurred. It is signed by the provincial engineer.
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and
payment, appropriations and funds being available therefore." This
is signed by the provincial treasurer.
Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher
No. 10724 dated February 28, 1969, reads:
I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be
paid in the amount of sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven
and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check, provided there is
sufficient fund cover the payment.
This is signed by the auditor.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that
the account mentioned in the provincial engineer's certification "was
paid in the amount and on the date shown below and is chargeable
as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the
provincial treasurer signs two part of the voucher.
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of
the signed by the creditor. As accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt
reads (it was signed according to the prosecution by Juan Samson,
a point which is disputed by him):
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego,
Province of Pangasinan the sum of seven hundred twenty-seven
pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment of the above stated
account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by Check No.
.................................
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin
of the six vouchers below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov.
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated
February 28, 1969, evidences the payment of PI 6,727.52 to the
Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for lumber and
hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in
Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along the
Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The voucher makes reference to
invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following
intances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio
Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the
Carried Construction Supply Co The alleged official receipt No.
3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is forged.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never
delivered by the company to the provincial government
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting
requisition and issue voucher (RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29,
1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma the
signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla
senior civil engineer; Rodolfo P. Mencias, supervising civil engineer
Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting provincial engineer, and Ricardo B.
Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office. These four
office denied that their signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A
and B, are their genuine signatures.
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B,
containing the words "Approved: For and By Authority of the
Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of Equipment", is not
the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply
Co. dated February 18, 1969, containing a description and the
prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is fake
because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant
manager, the company's invoice No. 3327 was issued to the
Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1). Oropilla denied that his
alleged signature on Exhibit B is his signature.
(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher
(Exh. K), were also forged. Those documents are the taxpayer's
cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is due on
the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates
as to the samples of lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried
Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a
district forester, denied that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are
his signatures.
(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's
office, denied that his signature on the left margin is his signature
(Exh. A-10).
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is
incontrovertible.
Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers
evidencing supposed payments of certain amounts to the Carried
Construction Supply Co. for lumber and hardware materials
supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified.
These five vouchers are the following:
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the
payment of P14,571.81 for number and hardware materials
allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the Urbiztondo-
Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the
payment of P5,187.28 'or lumber and hardware materials allegedly
used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge at the UminganTayug
Road (Exh. P)
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the
payment of P6,290.60 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly
used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-Guimba
Road (Exh. Q).
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the
payment of P9,769.64 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly
used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-San
Manuel Road (Exh. R).
(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the
Payment of P4,501.38 for lumber and hardware materials allegedly
used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-Guimba
Road (Exh. S).
As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias,
and Primicias declared that their signatures in the said five vouchers
are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-carried the
said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial
auditor's office the papers supporting the said vouchers after the
vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those supporting papers
could not be presented in evidence.
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried
Construction Supply Co., testified that the lumber and hardware
materials mentioned in the five vouchers were never delivered by
his company to the provincial government. The charge invoices
mentioned in the said vouchers were cancelled invoices issued to
the Mountain Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the
bridges were fictitious.
The company's cashier testified that the company never received
the payments for the lumber and hardware materials. The receipts
evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are fake official
receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts
(Exh. LL to LL-7) bearing the serial numbers of the fake receipts.
The genuine receipts do not refer to transactions with the provincial
government.
Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers.
He used to be an employee of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned
and worked with several firms doing business with the provincial
government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried
Construction Supply Co. He represented that firm in its dealings with
the offices of the governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer
and provincial treasurer. He was personally known to those
provincial officials and the employees of their offices (21-22
Sendaydiego's brief).
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective
supporting papers, were hand-carried by Samson. He delivered the
papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the provincial
engineer's office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's
office. Marcelo Crusade, a laborer in that office who performed the
chore of recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded Vouchers
Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas initials
appear on the upper lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the
date 4/17/69.
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that
he presented them to the provincial t r's office. Crusade said that
after Samson had presented the said papers to him, Samson
brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial
treasurer's office for processing and for the latter's signature (Exh.
WW).
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the
provincial auditor's office. He asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record
the same (Exh. CC).
Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial
treasurer, to initialled the voucher After Rosete had initialled the
vouchers, Samson went to the provincial treasurer's office where
the amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to
him in cash (instead of by check) as representative of the Carried
Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE). He received the payments on
March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as shown
on the face of the vouchers.
The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said
six vouchers are admittedly authentic. Sendaydiego signed the
vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's defense is
that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures
therein of the provincial office concerned were genuine because the
voucher had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.
Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the
six vouchers showing that he received from Sendaydiego the
amounts covered thereby as representative of the lumber and
hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers
to the provincial s treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson).
Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures are genuine.
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and
Quirimit were charged with malversation through falsification in
three docketed as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No.
10724 dated February 28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X),
L-33252.
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers
Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871 dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15,
1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28, P6,290.60, P9,769-
64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-
33253.
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No.
11955 dated April 29, 1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now
L-33254.
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found
Sendaydiego and Samnson guilty of malversation through
falsification of public or official documents imposing each of the
following penalties:
(1)In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve
years, ten months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen
years, two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity the
provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;
(2)In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and a fine of P29,748.90 and to indemnify solidarily the provincial
government of Pangasinan in the same amount; and
(3)In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve
years, ten months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen
year two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal as
maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to indemnify solidarity the
provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount.
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal
liability was dismissed. Death extinguished his criminal liability
remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977 dismissing Sendaydiego's
appeal read s follows:
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his
appeal or before the judgment of conviction rendered against him
by the lower court became final and executory extinguished his
criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the personal or
imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary
penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal,
4th Ed., 565).
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability
survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final
judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the
Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with
the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its
reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct
from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil.
1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies
before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be
dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided' in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment
had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs.
Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds
improperly disbursed although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil.
583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal
of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts
complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against
him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article
30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of
attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487
and in the brief for said appellant, there is no specific assignment of
error affecting the civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10)
days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether
or not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed
judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted
for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is
concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to
Sendaydiego's brief, he had a wife and ten children named Arturo,
Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo, Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo
and Manolo (deceased).
The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by
adding thereto the following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of
Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of
showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for
which his estate would be liable for which his estate would be liable.
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of
Sendaydiego's death, it is not necessary to resolve his first two
assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition of reclusion
perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued
that there is no complex crime of malversation through falsification
committed by negligence.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court
erred in allowing private prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to
prosecute the case thereby allegledly subjecting the accused to
proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and
political self-interest.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board
actually handled the prosecution of the case from the preliminary
investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up to the termination
of the trial on July 29, 1970.
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel
for the accused auditor inquired whether Atty. Millora was
authorized by the provincial board to act as private prosecutor in
representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party.
Atty. Millora replied that there was a board resolution designating
him as a private prosecutor.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints
manifested to the trial court that he had authorized Atty. Millora to
act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and
the others as private prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion
in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of Criminal Case No.
23350).
After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower
court, the provincial fiscal of Pangasinan and the city final of
Dagupan City filed three informations against the accused all dated
November 4, 1969.
At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city
fiscal, an assistant provincial fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private
prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal moved "that
the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the
examination subject to our (the fiscal's) control and supervision".
The trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty.
Urbiztondo be authorized to examine the prosecution witnesses
under his supervision and control The trial court granted the motion
(155 tsn).
The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city
fiscal or an assistant fiscal were present together with the private
prosecutor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was
substantial compliance with the rule that the criminal action should
be "prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal" and that
"the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court
(Sec.4, Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683, Revised Administrative
Code).
The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of
reclusion perpetua "could have been the result of the undue
publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which attended the
proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels
any doubt as to its impartiality. The evidence in the three cases is
mainly documentary. The unassailable probative value of the
documents involved rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive
factor on which the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction.
Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had
rendered moot the issue as to the propriety of the imposition of
reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion perpetua
cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed
were not complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's
counsel refer to the trial court's conclusion that Sendaydiego and
Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation
through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in
signing the six vouchers, evinced "malice or fraud and that there
must have been connivance between" the two.
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson.
Donato N. Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer, testified that,
contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his initial to paragraph 3
of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to
that unusual procedure because the interested party, Samson who
hand-carried the vouchers, approached Rosete after he (Samson)
had conferred with the provincial treasurer and Samson told Rosete
to initial the voucher because it was areglado na (already settled)
since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3,
1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's
contention that the trial court erred in finding that he signed the
questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his initial in them.
After the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it
was only ministerial (75 tsn July 3, 1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in
the vouchers that the amounts covered thereby should be paid in
cash. That indication was made by means of the symbol "A-1-1"
placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account
Number". The bookkeeper was in. instructed by Samson to place
that symbol Samson told him that he (Samson) had an
understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment should
be made in cas. There were instances when the treasurer insisted
on payment by check to creditors other than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the
provincial treasurer where the cashier was summoned to make the
cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh. EE). As noted
by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made
in the treasurer's office when that was a ministerial chore of the
cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no
power of attorney from the Carried Construction Supply Co.
authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in the vouchers
for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the
payments were received, was blank. The treasurer did not bother to
have a witness to attest to the payments or to require the exhibition
of Samson's residence certificate.
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character
of the six vouchers would have been unmasked by the supposed
creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if the payments had been
made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks
would have returned them to the treasurer because it knew that
there was no reason to make any payments at all. The trial court
said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with
Samson.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there
was a conspiracy between the provincial and Samson as shown by
the fact that the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid to
Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was
testified to by Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness
on how and where the payments were made. However, Ulanday
died before the preliminary investigation was started. On May 27,
1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the
provincial , stating that he paid to Samson the amounts covered by
five vouchers in the of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh.
13).
Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made
to Samson in the treasurers inner office because his table was near
the main door of the treasurers office or was about fifteen meters
away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the
treasurers office because the cashier was oned by means of a
buzzer (long buzz), and when the cashier came out of the
treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to
the treasurer (malversation is a crime which can be committed by
means of dolo or culpa and the penalty in either case is the same).
This argument does not deserve serious consideration because the
facts proven by the prosecution show that he had a tieup with
Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned
vouchers.
The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the
trial court acquitted the auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration
follows as a matter of course. We see no merit in that contention
because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is
not the same as its evidence against the auditor. For that reason the
auditor was charged only as an accomplice, whereas, the treasurer
was charged as a principal. The auditor based his defense on the
undeniable fact that the treasurer had approved the six vouchers
"for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon by the
auditor. In short, the auditor was misled by the treasurer's
certification which the auditor apparently assumed to have been
made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary
and oral evidence and an unprejudiced consideration of the
arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability was
established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil
liability fo his estate for the amounts malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He
contends that the trial court erred in disregarding the expert
testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are not his signature;
in finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds
thereof, and in relying on circumstantial evidence as proof of
conspiracy.
As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello
should have inhibited himself "in fairness to the accused, in the
interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza" because he had
conducted the preliminary investigation.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's
insinuation that he was prejudiced by the fact that Judge, who
conducted the preliminary investigation, was the one who tried the
case and convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His
conduct of the trial does not show that he had already prejudged
their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of
First Instance to conduct a preliminary investigation, does not
disqualify it from trying the case after it had found probable cause
and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the
corresponding information. The rule assumes that the Judge, who
conducted the preliminary investigation, could impartially try the
case on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and
narrow-minded insomuch that they would invariably be iron-bound
by their findings at the preliminary investigation.
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a
preliminary investigation and then tries the case on the merits, is
similar to a situation where an inferior court conducts a preliminary
investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and tghe inferior
court. In such a case, the inferior court after terminating the
preliminary investigation is not obligated (por delivadeza) to remand
the case to the Court of First Instance for trial. The inferior court has
the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil.
350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil.
196). The assumption is that the inferior court can try the case
without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G.
Fernandez, retired chief of the Constabulary crime laboratory, a
handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are not his
signatures.
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged
genuine signatures (exemplars) of Samson have fundamental
differences. The expert concluded that the questioned signatures
and the exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and
the same person (Exh. 20).
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and
analysing the evidence and contentions of the parties, we find that
the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted by the trial court)
there are radical differences between the questioned and authentic
signatures.
But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the
questioned signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand in
the writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed
genuine signatures found in his residence certificates, income tax
returns and the genuine office receipt of the Carried Construction
Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The
surname Samson is encircled.
On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's
transactions with the provincial government are in angular form; his
surname is not encircled, and the questioned signatures terminate
in angular and horizontal strokes.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six
vouchers evidenced fictitious transactions, he used therein his fake
signature, or the signature which is different from his signature in
genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake
official receipts of the Carried Construction Supply Co., stating that
the amounts covered by the six vouchers were received by him
(Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person may have
two forms of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970).
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest
intention of denying the same as and when necessary (Mehta,
Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts, pp.
4th Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of
Samson in the six vouchers were Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn
July 31, 1969).
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned
signatures of Samson in the vouchers were written by only one
person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the
representative or collector of the supposed creditor, Carried
Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to
the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then
back to the treasurer's office for payment. He actually received the
cash payments. Under those circumstances, Samson is presumed
to be the forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified
document and be made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it
and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material
author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering
of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the
forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the
capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with
the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs.
Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs.
Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs.
Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in
possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is
presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258,
December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions
with the provincial government and another form of signatures of his
valid transactions or papers shows the deviousness of the
falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego
signed the certification in the first voucher, Exhibit K, stating that
proceeds thereof were paid to
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the
other five forged vouchers, Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).
As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on
page 19 of his brief, that "the trial court made absolutely no finding
of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson and Sendaydiego, is
not correct.
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the
circumstance that Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of
his assistant shows that there was "malice or fraud" on the part of
Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and
Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the vouchers were paid to
Samson in Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the cashier's
office (p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's brief). The trial
court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash
shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he
had received the proceeds of the vouchers is not well taken. The
trial court's finding on that point is based on very strong
circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that
Samson signed the vouchers).
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total
sum of P57,048. 23 paid under the six vouchers "was really
misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are genuine
(although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and
that there is no proof that the amounts covered thereby were not
paid for the construction materials shown in the six vouchers were
never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the
declaration of Jabanes, the assistant manager of Carried
Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the materials
shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company
(Exh. HH).
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was
employed as cashier of the carried Construction Supply Co., denied
that Samson turned over to the company the proceeds of the six
vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company
from Sendaydiego. The six vouchers appear to be fake principally
because they evidence fictitious sales of construction materials.
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there
was no malversation after Sendaydiego admtte that Samson
acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from Treasurer
Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the
finding as to his guilt is based on a shaky foundation or is predicated
on circumstances which wre not proven, is not correct.
Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial
treasurer wants to base his exculpation on his belief that in the six
vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials in the provincial
engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the
auditor had approved the vouchers. The tresurer claimed that he
acted in good faith in approving the payments of the proceeds of the
vouchers to Samson as the representative of the supplier, Carried
Construction Co.
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the
vouchers, denied that he received the said amounts from the
cashier of the treasurer's office.
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be
resolved in the light of the inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-
carried the voucehrs and followed up their processing in the offices
of the provicial government the construction materials described in
the six vouchers and denied having received from Samson the
prices of the alleged sales.
The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six
vouchers and in the six receipts (Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the
provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted in good faith or
having committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were
in cahoots to defraud the provincial government and to camouflage
the defraudation by means of the six vouchers which have some
genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic but
which were intrinsically fake.
Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex
crimes of malversation through falsification of public documents
were committed in this case. That assumption is wrong.
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex.
Separate crimes of falsification and malversation were committed.
These are not cases where the execution of a single act constitutes
two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used
as a means to commit malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the
malversation. It is settled that if the falsification was resorted to for
the purpose of hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354;
People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671; People vs. Geralde 52 Phil.
1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the
instant cases, the municipal treasurer made it appear in two official
payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that some persons worked
as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In
that way, the two amounts covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and
P271.60, were appropriated and taken from the municipal funds. As
a matter of fact, no such work was done in the said street project
and the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not performed any
labor.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation
did not constitute a complex crime because the falsifications were
not necessary means for the co on of the malversations. Each
falsification and each malversation constituted independent
offenses which must be punished separately.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two
malversations. Four distinct penalties were imposed.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the
money forming part of the road and bridge could have malversed or
misappropriated it without falsifiying any voucher. The falsification
was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.
The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing
offense impelled by a single criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The
falsification of six vouchers constitutes six separate or distinct
offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher
constitutes a separate crimes of malversation were committed.
Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the said twelve
offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification
because he was in possession of the forged vouchers and he used
them in order to receive public monies from the provincial treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he
conspired with the provincial treasurer in committing those offenses.
The trial court correctly ruled that a private person conspiring with
an accountable public officer in committing malversation is also
guilty of malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs.
Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs.
Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking
part in the commission of parricide or qualified theft. In such cases,
the stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft but only of
murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by reason
of paragraph 3, article 62 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs.
Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is
punished in article 172(1) of the Revised Penal Code by prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than P5,000.
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38,
respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 11869 and 11872 (Exh. P
and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of the Revised
Penal Code is prision mayor minimum and medium.
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64,
respectively covered by vouchers Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and
R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article 217 is prision mayor
maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K
and O), the penalty provided in paragraph 4 of article 217 is
reclusion temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount
malversed should be added to the imprisonment penalty.
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium
peiod since there are no modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and
685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an indeterminate
sentence.
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of
a public document and six crimes of malversation.
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to
the following penalties:
For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R
and S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years of prison correccional minimum, as minimum, to four (4) years
of prision correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
three thousand pesos.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher
No. 10724 (Exh. K), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal
Case NO. 23349, L-33252).
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher
No. 11995 (Exh. O), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify
the province of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No.
23351, L-33254).
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher
No. 11870 (Exh. Q), Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate
penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to
pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-
33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher
No. 11871 (Exh. R), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to
thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to
pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-
33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher
No. 11869 (Exh. P), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to
pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-
33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher
no. 11872 (Exh. S), Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum;
to pay a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-
33253).
In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold
limit provided for in article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be
observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677), meaning that the
maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years to seventeen (17)
years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or thirty-six (36) years
to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).
The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty
(40) years (Penultimate par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil.
362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and 69 Phil.
58).
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify
the province of Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.
Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said
indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal Code). Samson should pay one-
half of the costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989
MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then
municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of falsification
of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the Revised Penal Code
filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the
Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:
That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of
Angadanan, Province of Isabela, and within the preliminary
jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused Manuel L. Siquian,
being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking
advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare and, sign a false
document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An official communication
to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is
required by law in order to support the appointment of a certain
Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of clerk in the Office of the
Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating and
making it appear in said document that there was such a position
existing and that funds therefore were available. When in truth and
in fact, as said accused well-know (sic), there was no such position
or item and no funds were available for said position in the Fiscal
Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, nor was there any special
ordinance creating said position and appropriating the necessary
funds therefor.
x x x municipal council of Angadanan.
[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense
charged and the trial of the case ensued. The facts as found by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:
It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa
Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went
to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of
Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the
office of the Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal
Hall of Angadanan to ask information if there was any vacancy.
When she was informed that there was, she went to see the
accused in his house.
The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he
accompanied her to the office of the Municipal Secretary, Emilio
Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so, the
accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day
and that she should be included in the budget. The accused then
accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer, Calo
Battung the treasurer agreed that she could report for work.
One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the
Municipal Secretary. He was there. When she went to the accused,
she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to work for her
appointment papers.
She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of
the Municipal Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the accused.
x x x
Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others,
of the availability of funds CS Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975,
issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian, pursuant to the
requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975,
addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh. "C").
x x x
Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975,
and promptly began to work on the same day. Her monthly salary
was P 120.00. She rendered services for the months of July, August,
September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B",
"B-l" to "B-5"). She was not, however, paid. As early as October
1975, she went to the Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but
she was told that there was no money yet. In November 1975, she
went to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer.
She went to the treasurer who told her that there was no money.
because of this, she went to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the
Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic) information
regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren
Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she
had complete appointment papers. hereafter, she filed her verified
complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused. Her complaint
is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").
It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of
Angadanan, Isabela, failed to enact the annual budget for the
municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l", and "H-
2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for
the previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh.
"H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year
1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal
Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the
In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-
enacted for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, there was no new item or
appropriation for the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal
Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the
office of the Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla
for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2") for 1974- 1975, was filled up as early
as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed Clarita G.
Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the
new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the
Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up by the appointment
of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits
"K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was
held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the
accused, but she resigned (Exhs. "K" and "K-l").
x x x
[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]
After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and decreed:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document as
charged in the information, the Court hereby sentences said
accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic)
as minimum to SEVEN YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and
to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with
law and the evidence and is hereby therefore affirmed. Costs
against the accused- appellant.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]
Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision
and the acquittal of petitioner Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends
that the respondent court has decided a question of substance not
in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision
of the trial court convicting him of the crime of falsification despite
the following
A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of
the prosecution's principal witness, shows the absence of criminal
intent on the part of the accused.
B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of
his position as Municipal Mayor when he made the allegedly falsified
certification.
C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available"
is not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law.
D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of
law when the trial court proceeded with the trial in his absence
despite a pending petition for change of venue with the Supreme
Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]
Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.
The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any public officer,
employee or notary who, taking advantage of his official position,
shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . .
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled
that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must
concur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts;
(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the
facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false
Cabigas v. People, G.R. No. 67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.
All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner,
a public officer, being then the mayor of the municipality of
Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in the narration
of facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection
with the appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The
certification, having been issued by a public official in the exercise
of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi, 34
Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service
Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received the
document issued by petitioner. Since the certification was prepared
by petitioner in accordance with the standard forms prescribed by
the government (specifically the Civil Service Commission) pursuant
to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public
document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil.
209 (1908)] falsification of which is punishable under Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such document was
committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available for
the position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew
that, in reality, the position itself did not even exist and no funds had
been appropriated therefor.
Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained
no narration of facts but rather a conclusion of law is not meritorious.
The respondent court, upholding the Solicitor General's arguments,
correctly ruled as follows:
Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any
process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination of facts
stated but by the application of the artificial rules of law to the facts
pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law
Dict., p. 362].
From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the
certification by the appellant that 'funds for the position are available'
does not require the application of the artificial rules of law. To certify
that funds are available for the position what one should do was (sic)
to refer to the budget and plantilla of personnel of the applicable
fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds are allocated
therefor.
In the present case, despite the presence of the records which
shows that there is no position and funds therefor referred to in the
certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data provided by the
records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available"
[Rollo, p. 41).
It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to
enact the annual budget of the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-
1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the last fiscal year, 1974-
1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal
Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget
for the Municipality of Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-
1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the Municipal Secretary
in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa
Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation made
in the Annual Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such
position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in his certification
utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made
in the document is met when there exists not even an iota of
colorable truth in what is declared in the narration of facts [U.S. v.
Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it
can be seen that the first and third requirements laid down in the
Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.
The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the
civil service rules and regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the
Preparation of Appointment for Original Appointment (Exhs. "D" and
"D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the position to be
filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer
who has been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer
authorized by law to issue this certification which is designated as
Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said
certification which includes information as to the availability of the
funds for the position being filled up.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to
injure a third person is not necessary when the falsified document
is a public document. This has already been authoritatively decreed
in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The
Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful
intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an
essential element of the crime of falsification of public document.
The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of
public and private documents has been stated by the Court in this
wise: "In the falsification of public or official documents, whether by
public officials or private persons, it is unnecessary that there be
present the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the
reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal
thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction
of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To,
supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48 (1924)]. In
falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling
consideration is the public character of a document and the
existence of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the
intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial [People v.
Pacana, supra].
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the
prosecution shows the absence of criminal intent on his part must
be denied. While this Court has declared good faith as a valid
defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604
(1907)], such defense cannot serve to exonerate the petitioner since
the element of good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in the
case at bar.
Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor
of Angadanan, Isabela presides at all meetings of the municipal
council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code] and signs
all ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council
[Section 2624 (c), Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus
aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-
1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of Angadanan,
Isabela which was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan,
Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that
under the Municipal Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there
were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to the municipal
secretary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he
even affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of these
documents; i.e. Ordinance No. V and Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp. 27-
32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of the
availability of funds for the questioned position since at the time he
issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year 1975- 1976
had already commenced and no new ordinance creating the new
position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted
by the municipal council.
In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held
criminally liable for his act of issuing the absolutely false certification
as to the availability of funds for the subject position. The law
considers his act criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement
in a narration of facts in a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised
Penal Code]. Criminal intent and the will to commit a crime are
presumed to exist on the part of the person who executes an act
which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United
States v. Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption
that petitioner committed the act with criminal intention, which arose
from proof of his commission of the unlawful act, stands unrebutted.
Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage
of his official position in falsifying the document should likewise be
rejected. This essential element of falsification of a public document
by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his office or use
the influences prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in
committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)].
Abuse of public office is considered present when the offender
falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which
consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the
preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911);
People v. Santiago Uy, 101 Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of
petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing the certification
necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.
Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the
trial court when it proceeded with the trial of the case in the absence
of the petitioner despite a pending petition for change of venue with
the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful and thorough
review of the record reveals that petitioner had been afforded due
process when the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner,
granted continuances to enable the defense to present its evidence
although the prosecution had rested its case as early as December
7, 1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]
It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process
is not lack of previous notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-48097 & 49035,
December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down
this criterion to determine whether an accused in a criminal case
has been properly accorded due process of law:
. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction and proceeded against under the orderly processes of
law, and only punished after inquiry and investigation, upon notice
to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded
within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due
process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21,
1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946);
Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded
the chance to present evidence on his behalf but due to his
repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings, the trial
court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence
presented by the prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will
be deemed to have waived his right to be present during the trial
[Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right
to adduce evidence on his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33
(1958).]
It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme
Court. However, on the date set for the hearing of the petitioner's
urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court due to
the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to
appear [See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p.
428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto, one of the counsel for the
petitioner, manifested before the trial court that he was - withdrawing
as counsel for his client for the reason that he has lost contact with
the latter who already went abroad [See Original Records, p. 435].
Hence, the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its decision on
the basis solely of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law
and settled jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and the instant
petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]
192 SCRA 521
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON.
FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON and FEDERICO DE
GUZMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered
by Judge Manuel Castañeda on January 28, 1976 dismissing
Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, and the order rendered in the same case on March 22,
1976 by his successor, the herein public respondent, denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order of
dismissal.
Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano
Carrera and his brother, Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel
of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley, Pangasinan, registered
in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special
power of attorney before Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr.,
naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his lawful
attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent
mortgaged the parcel of land with the People's Bank and Trust
Company in Dagupan City using the said special power of attorney,
and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the
mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and the
mortgage contract were duly registered in the Registry of Deeds of
Pangasinan on February 13, 1964.:- nad
After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage
account not having been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said
mortgage and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica and Vileta
Quinto who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181 for
said property. In January, 1972, complainant allegedly discovered
that their property was already registered in the name of said Ramon
Serafica when the latter filed on said date an action for the ejectment
of the former from the premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru
falsification of a public document was filed against private
respondent in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the
information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of
Dagupan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, being then a
private individual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 47682, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally falsify and forge the signature of one MARIANO F.
CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing and making it appear
that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA, signed and affixed his
signature in the said Power of Attorney, which is a public document,
when as a matter of fact and in truth, said MARIANO F. CARRERA,
did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor gave his
permission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification, with
intent of gain and by means of fraud and other deceits, the said
accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified public
document (Power of Attorney) did succeed in securing the loan from
the People's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine
currency, without the knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F.
CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount
of P4,250.00, and other consequential damages." 2
After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the
case proceeded to trial and the prosecution presented complainant
Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig from the Office of the
Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness,
Col. Jose G. Fernandez, a handwriting expert, gave his partial
testimony but the same was not continued as counsel for private
respondent moved for and was granted leave to file a motion to
dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein
it was alleged that the crime charged would not lie due to the partial
testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect that he authorized
private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the land
owned by him and his brother. Said partial testimony of complainant
was quoted, with the emphasized portions, as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your
property at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.
Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?
A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know
the reason why it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the
Bank?
A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went
to Manila and he asked me to sign a document as a witness and I
asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de
Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land
which belongs to me, my brother said.
Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to
you in Manila and asked you to sign a power of attorney authorizing
de Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that land owned by
you and your brother. Do you have any document to show that?
xxx
ATTY. DIAZ:
Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if
shown to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your
Honor, for the purpose of identification, and may we request that it
be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This document consist
(sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as
Exhibit B and the second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two.
Will you tell this Honorable Court what is this?
A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to
sign, sir.
xxx

(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends
that there is no sufficient basis for the charge and this fact warrants
the dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since
more than ten (10) years had elapsed from the time the crime was
committed. Since the information charges the complex crime of
estafa thru falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall
be that for the more serious crime which shall be applied in its
maximum period, as provided for by Article 48 of the Penal Code.
The more serious crime in the present case is the falsification of the
public document which is punishable with prision correccional in its
medium and maximum period and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00.
Prision correccional being a correctional penalty, the same
prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in
the case merely alleged the date of the commission of the crime
which was February 5, 1964 and the information was filed only on
March 29, 1974. This being the case, private respondent claims that
more than ten (10) years has passed from the commission of the
crime to the filing of the information. No other allegation having been
made as to the discovery of the alleged crime, private respondent
claimed that the period of prescription commenced on the day on
which the crime was committed. He asserts that, from the date
appearing in the transfer certificate of title covering the land
mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage documents were duly
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February
13, 1984, hence the alleged crime became public knowledge on the
same date. To support his theory, private respondent made the
following citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the
commission of the crime if it is known at the time of its commission.:-
cralaw
"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be
discovered, because the entire series of transactions was by public
instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in
connection with said transaction was known to the offended party
when it was committed and the period of prescription commenced
to run from the date of its commission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40
O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by Justice Luis B.
Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-712)." 5
The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera
shows that what was intended was an authority to mortgage only
the one-half portion pertaining to his brother and he was only
quoting what his brother told him when he said that ". . . this is an
authority to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the
half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time
since the date to be considered should not be the date of registration
of the alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964. It argued that
the crime was actually discovered only in January, 1972 when
Ramon S. Serafica filed an action to eject complainant from the
premises, which fact was not alleged in the information because it
was considered by the prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter
which would not be in accord with the legal truism that an
"information must allege only ultimate facts and not evidentiary
matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private
respondent, petitioner submits that "(t)he same has only a
persuasive effect and not to be considered as an interpretation of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code as the same is the sole
prerogative of the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castañeda of the
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the
case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime had
prescribed. The People's motion for reconsideration was denied by
the succeeding Presiding Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from
both orders of the trial court. In a resolution dated May 13, 1976,
this Court required the prosecution to file a petition for review on
Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter,
said petition for review and the corresponding comment and reply
of the parties having been filed, on February 21, 1977 the Court
resolved to treat said petition as a special civil action and required
petitioner and private respondent to submit their respective
memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the
resolution of the following issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal
because the private respondent would thereby be placed in double
jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public
document filed against the private respondent has sufficient ground
to exist in law and in fact; and,
3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case
is already extinguished by prescription. 11
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse.
As enunciated in People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after
arraignment and plea of the defendant to a valid information shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any
attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
complaint or information (Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal
by the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case)
by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the
dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the
defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3)
the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal
so that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have
to be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings, to
determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant." 12
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a
public document has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law, we
hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a public document may be
a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document
is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has
already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not
being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or
commercial documents. The damage to another is caused by the
commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document,
hence, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document
is only a necessary means to commit the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact
that what was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half portion
pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion pertaining to
complainant, otherwise complainant would not have quoted his
brother's words. The theory of petitioner and the findings of public
respondent are substantially the same. We agree that the offense
charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the findings of
the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony
of complainant Mariano Carrera and of the record, as regards the
first ground, the court finds that the contention of the defense that
the authorization given to him to mortgage the whole property is not
sustained by the evidence because a cursory study of the answer
made by the witness complainant clearly shows that what was
intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining
only to Severo Carrera, excluding that portion pertaining to said
complainant. (T.S.N.. pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In other
words, the alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to
get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land referred to
the share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on the
following quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an
authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on
the half portion of the land which belongs to me, my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted
testimony. He merely quoted his brother Severo Carrera to whom
the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted by
Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the
charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document, the
resolution of the issue on prescription is, however, determinative of
the validity of the impugned orders of public respondent.: nad
the document was registered with the Register of Deeds is not
without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in
interpreting the phrase "from the discovery" found in Article 1391 of
the Civil Code which authorizes annulment, in case of mistake or
fraud, within four years from the time of the discovery of the same,
the Court also held that the discovery must be reckoned to have
taken place from the time the document was registered in the
Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration is a notice
to the whole world and this should apply to both criminal and civil
cases.: nad
We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the
application of said rule on constructive notice in the interpretation of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would most certainly be
favorable to private respondent herein, since the prescriptive period
of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, that is, from the
time the questioned documents were recorded in the Registry of
Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was
registered on February 13, 1964. The criminal information against
private respondent having been filed only on March 29, 1974, or
more than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with which private
respondent was charged has indubitably prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit
and the challenged orders of public respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a
complex crime is that for the most serious component offense, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. In the crime of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the
falsification which carries with it the correctional penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not
more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes
punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years
pursuant to Article 90 of the Code, and Article 91 thereof states that
the prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on which
the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents . . ."

The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special

power of attorney registered in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan
City on February 13, 1964 authorizing private respondent to
mortgage a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 47682 in order to secure a loan of P8,500.00 from the People's
Bank and Trust Company. The information for estafa thru
falsification of a public document was filed only on March 29, 1974.
We reject petitioner's claim that the ten-year period commenced
when complainant supposedly discovered the crime in January,
1972 by reason of the ejectment suit against him.

People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule

that registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world.
The record is constructive notice of its contents as well as all
interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are
charged with knowledge of what it contains. On these
considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc.,
et al., 16 to the effect that in the crime of falsification of a public
document the prescriptive period commences from the time the
offended party had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after
 G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991
MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
KV. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.
FERNAN, C.J.:
On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard,
Mandaluyong, Rizal, petitioner Michael T. Dava, then holder of non-
professional driver's license No. 14744271 with official receipt No.
7023037,2 bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and
Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to former and physical injuries to
the latter.
As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to
Mandaluyong Police headquarters where his driver's license was
confiscated by Cpl. Daniel Severino who later submitted Dava's
driver's license to the fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal. license was
thereafter presented as prosecution evidence in criminal case for
homicide and serious physical injuries reckless imprudence filed
against Dava in the then Court First Instance of Rizal in Pasig.3
On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the
father of Dolores, saw Dava driving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-
type) car with plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's driver's
license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic violation
receipt had been issued to Dava, Roxas sought the help of then
Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in apprehending Dava for
driving without a license.4 The Ministry of Defense later indorsed
Roxas' request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol
Group (CHPG).
At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo
Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya of the CHPG saw the maroon
Volkswagen car described by Roxas parked in front of the Uniwide
Department Store near the then Nation theater in Cubao, Quezon
City. When the driver and his companion arrived, Lising and Viduya
confronted them and asked the driver for his license. They were
shown non-professional driver's license No. 27068875 with official
receipt No. 06058706 issued by Agency 2L Pampanga in the name
of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license,
Dava informed them that his officemate had secured it for him.
Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame,
Quezon City for questioning. Dava refused to give a statement upon
the advice of his lawyer. Lising then submitted a spot report to Col.
Maristela stating therein that "subject had violated Section 31 of RA
4136 for false representation in the application of a driver's license
intended to be used as a legal license."7 In his affidavit of
apprehension dated November 16, 1978, Lising stated that he was
'about to book him for violation of Section 31 of Rep. Act 4136, when
subsequent investigation revealed that the Driver's License above-
mentioned is a Fake and a Falsity' and therefore a case for
falsification and use of falsified documents under Section 172 of the
Revised Penal Code should be filed against Dava.8 Lising
concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he
compared it with the xerox copy of Dava's license which was
attached to the record of the criminal case in Pasig, the signatures
and the dates of birth indicated in the two licenses did "not tally."9
Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document
was filed against Dava in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch V at Quezon City.10 One of the prosecution witnesses was
Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT). He testified that hen was then the registrar of
the said office when Dava's driver' license was brought to him by
lawyer Jose Francisco who was interested in knowing whether it
was genuine or fake and if was issued by the Angeles City agency
of the BLT. He examine it and found out that it was "fake or illegally
issued" because form No. 2706887 was one of the fifty (50) forms
which had been reported missing from their office sometime in
November, 1976 and that it was never issued to any applicant for a
license.11 He added that any license that was not included their
office index card was considered as "coming from illegal source' and
"not legally issued by any agency."12
Vinluan stated that although the form used for the license was
genuine,13 the signature of the issuing official was fake.14 He
"believed" certain persons had been apprehended for
"plasticization" of licenses outside their office15 and that sometime
November, 1976, agents of the National Bureau of Investigation
raided the house of a certain person who had in his possession
some of the forms which had been missing from office.16 He
concluded that the license was fake because the form was issued
by the central office to the Angeles agency, the license appeared on
its face to have been issued the San Fernando, Pampanga
agency.17
Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then
Court of Appeals18 which affirmed the lower court's decision on
January 29, 1982. Dava filed a motion for reconsideration of the said
decision contending that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the
case. On April 27, 1982, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside its decision and issued a resolution the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered
and set aside, and another judgment shall be entered annulling the
proceedings in the court a quo without prejudice to the refiling of the
charges with the proper court. (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)
Consequently, the case was refiled with the Regional Trial Court of
Pampanga, Branch 47 at San Fernando as Criminal Case No. 2422.
The information for falsification of a public document reads as
follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and for sometime prior
thereto, in the municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused MICHAEL T. DAVA, a private individual, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to
be falsified, a Non-Professional Driver's license with Serial No.
2706887 covered by Official Receipt No. 0605870, dated January
24, 1978, a public document, by making it appear that the
signatories therein who are officials of the Pampanga LTC Agency
participated in the preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact they
did not so participate and the accused made use of the same
knowing it to be falsified.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio Roxas who testified
on how he saw Dava driving a car and that, knowing that Dava's
license had been confiscated as a result of the filing of the homicide
and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence case, he
thereafter sought the assistance of then Minister Enrile in
apprehending Dava for driving without a license.19 For his part,
Domingo Lising, who apprehended Dava, narrated in court how he
first saw Daya driving a car along Banahaw and N. Domingo Sts. in
Quezon City until he finally confronted Dava at the vicinity of the
Araneta Coliseum and confiscated his driver's license. As earlier
stated, he conclude that the driver's license shown to him by Dava
was fake because he noticed that, when compared with the license
attached to record of the criminal case filed against Dava, the
license confiscated bore a different signature and date of birth.20
Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that
he investigated the traffic incident along Shaw Boulevard on
October 19, 1975 which involved Dava and the two relatives of
Antonio Roxas. He himself confiscated Dava's no professional
driver's license No. 1474427 which he later turn over to the fiscal's
office.21
In the course of Severino's testimony, the defense counsel informed
the court that, upon a resolution of the Court of Appeals, Dava was
allowed by the lower court having jurisdiction over Criminal Case
No. 16474 to withdraw his driver's license 1474427 from the records
of said case.22 When confronted by the court, Dava volunteered
that he withdrew said license in December, 1982 and surrendered it
to the BLT Western District Office so that he could renew his
license.23 Hence, the evidence presented before the Court was a
mere xerox copy of said license24 which also bears a notation that
Dava received original driver's license and its receipt on December
15, 1982.25
Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San Fernando
Pampanga branch of the BLT and whose name appears registrar
thereof in official receipt No. 0605870 which was supposed to be
attached to Dava's driver's license No. 270688 admitted that the
form of the said license was genuine although he could not tell
whether its contents were likewise genuine because it was "opened"
and "spliced."26 He asserted, however, that since the said form "did
not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed" over
his name, said license was "not OK".27
Martin said that he was informed by the property section of the BLT
regional office that the number in the license was one of "the
numbers requisitioned by (the) Angeles City agency."28 He affirmed
that drivers license No. 2706887 "was not issued by (their)
agency"29 although when recalled to the stand, he admitted that the
"2L" filled in the space for "Agency Code No." on the face of license
No. 2706887 referred to the San Fernando agency.30 Martin also
confirmed the genuineness of official receipt No. 0605870 although
it was his assistant who signed it for him31 and affirmed that the
amount of P10.00 indicated therein had been collected and received
by his office.32
Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to the Angeles City
office of the BLT to see its chief and inquire about the number of
driver's license issued to Dava and whether said office had indeed
issued them. According to him, the head of the office, Caroline
Vinluan, advised him to verify from the index card in the possession
of the License Division head whether the Angeles City agency had
indeed issued Dava's license.33 Thereafter, the officer-in-charge of
the License Division of the BLT in East Avenue, Quezon City,
Leonardo R. Medina, issued a certification dated December 24,
1979 to the effect that non-professional drivers license No. 2706887
in the name of Dava was "not registered in (their) Index Card."34
Francisco also informed the court that Carolino Vinluan, the former
head of the Angeles City BLT agency, had died on May 12, 1980.35
He offered in evidence Vinluan's death certificate as Exh. J.
Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript
of stenographic notes of the testimony of Carolino Vinluan which
was taken on January 8, 1980 at the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-
10759 before the then Court of First Instance Rizal, Branch V at
Quezon City. It was marked as Exh. K said exhibit was part of the
record of Criminal Case No. 10759 which was transmitted to the
Regional Trial Court Pampanga.36
The defense presented only one witness: Felizardo Manalili. A
friend of Dava and his former co-trainee at the Sandoz Philippines,
a pharmaceutical firm, Manalili testified that Dava quested him to
secure a driver's license for him because he had none. Manalili went
to the San Fernando office of the Land Transportation Commission
(LTC) where he used to secure own license. At the LTC branch
office, he was "approached"37 the fixers who roamed around the
compound. When he as them how much it would cost to secure a
driver's license, he told that it would amount to P70 .00.38 He
agreed to pay amount and gave the fixers the personal data of
Dava.39
After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the license which was inside
a plastic jacket. (Manalili identified the license as Exh. B.) He
examined it and found out that it looked "like a genuine and
authentic driver's license" to him. The license, which opened and
unsealed, bore a signature in the portion which showed the name
Romeo Edu and contained all the personal data of Dava. Because
it did not bear the signature of Dava Manalili immediately gave the
license to Dava and told him to sign it immediately. Dava did so in
Manalili's presence.40
On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a decision41 finding
that the license in question was "fake or spurious", that was not duly
issued by any proper government licensing age and that the
accused directly participated in the commission of the falsification
or caused said falsification. The court took into account the facts
that Dava was "in dire need' of a license because of his work as a
detailman; that he received his genuine license from the court only
on December 15, 1982, and that Dava himself personally requested
his friend, Manalili, to secure the license for him. It arrived at the
conclusion that since Dava was the possessor or user of the fake
license, he himself was the forger or the one who caused its forgery
or falsification. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused
Michael T. Dava guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the
came of Falsification of a Public Document, as defined and
penalized under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code, and considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentences him under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of one (1)
year and eight (8) months of prision correecional as minimum, to
four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional as maximum; and to pay a fine of Two Thousand Five
Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus the costs of
this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dava appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court,42 which
on September 30, 1985 affirmed in in toto the decision of the trial
court. On February 27, 1986, the appellate court denied Dava's
motion for the reconsideration of said decision finding that no new
grounds had been raised therein. Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari.
Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the courts below on the
testimony of Carolino Vinluan on the ground that being a part of the
annulled proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-10759, it may not be
considered as admissible in evidence as it cannot qualify as a
"testimony at a former trial" under the provisions of Section 41, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.

We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious. The resolution of
the then Intermediate Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR,
expressly annulled the proceedings had in Criminal Case No. Q-
10759 for lack of jurisdiction of the Quezon City court over the case.
That ruling is founded on solid jurisprudence. We had time and
again held that in the absence of proof that the party raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by estoppel,43 a decision
rendered by a court without jurisdiction is a total nullity.44 Being
worthless in itself, all the proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless.45 Hence, the testimony of Vinluan is not only
inadmissible in evidence but may well be considered as totally
nonexistent.
With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan out of the way, is
there sufficient evidence to warrant the conviction of petitioner for
the crime charged?
The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made
it appear in his driver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of the
Pampanga LTC agency participated" in in-preparation and with
having used the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified.
The charges therefore are found on the provisions of Article 172 (1)
of the Revised Penal Code which punishes any private individual
who shall commit any the falsification enumerated in Article 171
specifically paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of causing
it to appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any
act proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. The
information also charges Dava with having knowingly used a false
document under the last paragraph of Article 172.
The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that
he had no driver's license, asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one
for him. Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who used to get his
own driver's license in San Fernando, Pampanga, was able to
secure petitioner's driver's license No. 2706887 through fixers at the
Land Transportation Commission (LTC) agency in said locality.46
On January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his license at the said
office by paying the amount of P10.00 for which he was issued
official receipt No. 0605870.47
In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to
present an official receipt showing that at the previous year the
licensee had paid for his driver's license to any agency of the LTC,
and to pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did not involve
the issuance of "another form," a driver did not have to fill up an
application form for the renewal of a license. The said agency would
then issue an official receipt evidencing the renewal of the license
but the driver's license itself would not be changed.48
Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887
together with official receipt No. 86432149 were presented to the
San Fernando LTC agency, the personnel therein issued official-
receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although the receipt
was not personally signed by office registrar Victor Martin but by his
assistant, the receipt50 was genuine and the amount indicated
therein was actually paid to and collected by the San Fernando
agency.51 The driver's license itself may not have been issued by
said agency52 but its form was likewise genuine. However,
according to Martin, it was 'not OK' because it "did not emanate"
from his office and "a facsimile was not printed over" his name
therein.53 Moreover, according to the officer-in-charge of the
license Division of the Bureau of Land Transportation in East
Avenue, Quezon City, non-professional driver's license No.
2706887 in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa "is not registered" in
their index card.54
Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was
a spurious one, the evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the
actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there are pieces of evidence
which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification
and made use of the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so.
The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in
transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized
under the last paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender
knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false
document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos.
1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such document (not in judicial
proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage
to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage.55
Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond
reason doubt in this case.
It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili
to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not
at any time been issued a driver's license.56 Through this
misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the dire
necessity of obtaining a driver's license the shortest time possible to
enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was
able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with
"fixers" in securing the subject driver's license. For indeed, there
was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so short a
without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated,
Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere desire
to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he
knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for
the license even if the legal fee then was only P15.00.57 As it was
in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no choice but to
seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and not petitioner
who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from
the charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a
principal by inducement in the commission of said crime.
Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his
second driver's license No. 2706887. Having already obtained a
driver's license, he knew that it was not legally possible for him to
secure another one. Otherwise, there would have been no need for
him to misrepresent to his friend Manalili that he was not then a
holder of a driver's license. But even with this misrepresentation,
petitioner cannot even begin to believe that Manalili would be able
to secure a driver's license through legal means in about an hour's
time.58 The patent irregularity in obtaining driver's license No.
2706887 was more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an
ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its genuineness and
authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified that he himself was surprised
when the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the driver's license
of Michael Dava on November 4, 1976, a few hours after he had
sought the fixer's assistance.59 In those days, all plastic jackets
emanated from the LTC Central Office, which accounted for the
delay in the release of the license applied for. Under these
circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded man" would say that
petitioner did not know that his license was a fake.60
A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles
171 and 172. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public
document the moment it is accomplished.61 Thus, when driver's
license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and
the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was
affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the driver's license
became a public document.
The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the
fact that when petitioner was apprehended by Lising on April 12,
1978 it was in his possession and it was what he presented Lising
to show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who did
his job with the use of a car, it is probable that from November 4,
1976 (its date of issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner used
driver's license No. 2706887.

The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth

element of damage caused to another person or at least an intent
to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification of
public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the
violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth
proclaimed therein.62

In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following

ruling in People vs. Sendaydiego,63 should be applied in his favor:

The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified

document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it
and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material
author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering
of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the
forgery that the user or possessor may be proven to have the
capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with
the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery (U.S. vs.
Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 PMI. 754; People vs.
Domingo, 49 Phil. 28: People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People vs.
Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). In the absence of a satisfactory
explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document
and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs.
Court of Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People
vs. Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the

Sendaydiego case is not absolute as it is subject to the exception
that the accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is
in possession of a false document.64 His explanation, however, is
unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend,
Manalili. As stated above, Manalili himself could not have acted on
his own accord without the prodding of petitioner.

We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role

of fixers in government agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary
evil" who could do things fast for the right amount. He is "not
necessarily involved in the commission of forgery or falsification of
official documents" and he shares his fees with "insiders."65

Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government

licensing agencies. Why they proliferate is a sad commentary not
only on our bureaucracy but also on our own people. While not all
fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple serve as
"facilitators," they nonetheless provide sources for exploitation of
the unknowing common people who transact business with the
government and for corruption of the gullible government
employees. Their unwanted presence must be dealt with
accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken by our government
agencies the better for all of us.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is

hereby affirmed. Let a copy of this decision be served on that
Department of Transportation and Communication. Cost against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988
MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
YAP, C.J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 01119 entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Melencio Gigantoni y Javier," promulgated on
November 13, 1985, which affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 159, Pasig, Metro Manila, finding the accused
guilty of usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code with modification of the penalty by reducing the same
to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor to one (1) year
and one (1) day of prision correccional, after crediting the accused
with a mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary confession of
guilt.
Petitioner Melencio Gigantoni y Javier, was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, Pasig, with the crime of usurpation of
authority in violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code upon
an information alleging that the crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th and 15th day of May, 1981, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who
is not a bonafide agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and falsely represented
himself as a bonafide agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary,
said accused, knowing fully well his representation to be false.
After arraignment during which the accused pleaded not guilty and
after trial, the lower court rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty as charged. On appeal to the appellate court, the judgment
was affirmed with modification only as to the penalty imposed.
The facts of the case, as recited in the decision of the appellate
court, are as follows:
During the period material to this case, or in 1981, accused-
appellant Melencio Gigantoni was an employee of Black Mountain
Mining Inc. and Tetra Management Corporation, which are both
private companies doing business in the Philippines .... On May 14,
1981, as an employee of said companies, Gigantoni went to the
office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) at Vernida Building, Legaspi
Street, Makati, Metro Manila, allegedly to conduct verification of
some travels made by Black Mountain's officials. Upon reaching the
said PAL office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal
officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case, and
requested that he be shown the PAL records particularly the
passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering the
period February 1 to 3 1981. He explained that he was then at the
tracking stage of aforementioned kidnapping case. ... To further
convince the PAL officials of his supposed mission, Gigantoni
exhibited his Identification card purporting to show that he was a
PC-CIS agent. ... Thereupon, his aforesaid request was granted,
and PAL legal officer Atty. Conrado A. Boro showed to him the
requested PAL records. Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the
requested manifest ...and the used PAL tickets of one Cesar
(Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor, and that of a certain Daisy
Britanico, an employee of Black Mountain. Thereafter, he left the
PAL premises.
When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL general counsel
Ricardo Puno, Jr., inquired from Atty. Boro about Gigantoni's
purpose in securing copies of PAL records. They then became
suspicious of the accused" real identity prompting them to conduct
verification from the PC-CIS office. They subsequently learned from
General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent
since June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from the service for
gross misconduct ... brought about by the extortion charges filed
against him and his final conviction by the Sandiganbayan for the
said offense.... Upon discovering the foregoing, Atty. Puno
immediately alerted the NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to
the PAL office the following day. ...
On May 15, 1981, when Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office,
he was brought by Atty. Puno to their conference room while
awaiting for the arrival of the NBI agents who were earlier contacted.
In the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security, Gigantoni was
confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real Identity. He later admitted
that he was no longer with the CIS; that he was working for the Black
Mountain Mining Corporation; and that he was just checking on a
claim for per diem of one of their employees who had travelled. ...
Upon the arrival of NBI agents Teodoro Pangilinan, Lolito Utitco and
Dante Crisologo, Attys. Puno and Boro turned over the person of
Gigantoni to the NBI. They also submitted a complaint affidavit
against Gigantoni .... On that same day, after the investigation,
arrest and booking conducted by the NBI, Gigantoni was charged
before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, thru its office in
Makati, with the crime of Usurpation of Authority.
The petitioner-accused raised substantially the same errors on
appeal to respondent appellate court, to wit:
1. The appellate court erred in interpreting that presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed, its applicable in the case
at bar;
2. The appellate court erred in its interpretation of the difference
between suspension and dismissal.
The gist of petitioner's contention is that he could not be guilty of the
crime charged because at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, he was still a CIS agent who was merely suspended and
was not yet informed of his termination from the service.
Furthermore, he avers that the receipt by him of the notice of
dismissal, if there was any, could not be established on mere
presumption of law that official duty has been regularly performed.
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or
official functions, under which the petitioner was charged, punishes
any person: (a) who knowingly and falsely represents himself to be
an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of
the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who,
under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to
any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or any foreign government or any agency thereof,
without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the
crime of usurpation of authority under which the petitioner stands
charged, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of
official functions.
The question before us is—did petitioner knowingly and falsely
represent himself as an agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary?
Petitioner admits that he received a notice of his suspension from
the CIS effective June 20, 1980. This admission is supported by the
record (Annex "D") which shows the letter of Lt. Col. Sabas Edades
to petitioner, dated June 23, 1980, regarding said action. Said
official letter was also sent to the Commissioner of the Merit
Systems Board, Civil Service Commission, the Minister of National
Defense and the Commanding General of the CIS. However, as to
petitioner's alleged dismissal effective June 20, 1980, he denies
having been informed thereof. The record is bereft of any evidence
or proof adduced by the prosecution showing that the dismissal was
actually conveyed to petitioner. That is why the court, in convicting
him, relied on the disputable presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed, that is, that it is presumed that he was duly
notified of his dismissal.
The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly
notified of his dismissal from the service negatives the charge that
he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself to be a CIS agent.
The constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overturned
by competent and credible proof and never by mere disputable
presumptions, as what the lower and appellate courts did when they
presumed that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal by
applying the disputable presumption "that official duty has been
regularly performed." It was not for the accused to prove a negative
fact, namely, that he did not receive the order of dismissal. In
criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense charged lies on
the prosecution. Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to
establish by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely
represented himself as a CIS agent, by presenting proof that he
knew that he was no longer a CIS agent, having been duly notified
of his dismissal. It is essential to present proof that he actually knew
at the time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was
already dismissed from the service. A mere disputable presumption
that he received notice of his dismissal would not be sufficient.
The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes
no difference whether the accused was suspended or dismissed
from the service, "for both imply the absence of power to represent
oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an
office to which he knowingly was deprived of " (Emphasis supplied).
The observation of the Solicitor General is correct if the accused
were charged with usurpation of official function (second part of
Article 177), but not if he is charged merely with usurpation of
authority (first part of Article 177). The information charges the
accused with the crime of usurpation of authority for "knowingly and
falsely representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative
of any department or agency of the Philippine Government."
Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not
been shown that the information given by PAL to the accused was
confidential and was given to him only because he was entitled to it
as part of the exercise of his official function. He was not charged in
the information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the
record of the case that the information, which was not claimed to be
secret and confidential, was readily made available to the accused
because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a CIS agent.
And this was the only offense with which he was charged in the
information, that he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be
a CIS agent.
Premises considered, the decision of the respondent Appellate
Court affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial
Court is reversed and set aside. Petitioner-accused, Melencio
Gigantoni y Javier is hereby aquitted of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984
CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Felipe O. Pascual for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review and reverse a decision of
the Intermediate Appellate Court.
In the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Corazon Legamia
was accused of using an alias in violation of Commonwealth Act No.
142, as amended. The information against her reads:
That on or about November 4th, 1974, and for sometime prior and
subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully use the substitute
or alias name CORAZON L. REYES, which is different from
Corazon Legamia y Rivera with which she was christened or by
which she has been known since childhood, nor as a pseudonym
for literary purpose and without having been previously authorized
by a competent Court to do so; that it was discovered only on or
about November 4th, 1974. (Rollo, pp. 11-12.)
She was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to an
indeterminate prison term of only (1) year, as minimum, to two (2)
years, as maximum; to pay a fine a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to pay the costs. The
trial court recommended, however, that she be extended executive
clemency. On appeal to the Intermediate Appellate Court, the
sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence the instant petition.
The facts:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from
November 8, 1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During
their live-in arrangement they produced a boy who was named
Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18,
1971.
From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's
death, Corazon was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself
as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.
Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural
Credit Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly
after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with
the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter
was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment
of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was also signed
"Corazon L. Reyes."
For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio,
Felicisima Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which
led to Corazon's prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to
Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which is due to each legitimate
child in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code" per advice
given by Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado of the Agricultural Credit
Administration to Felicisima. (Rollo, pp. 14-15.)
The law:
Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary,
cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in
athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted
practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry,
or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of an alien,
with which he was registered in the Bureau of Immigration upon
entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not
been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been
baptized have one year from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name
shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. (As
amended by R.A. No. 6085.)
The issue:
Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated?
The resolution:
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent
herself as the wife and use the name of the man she is living with
despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The
practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly
frowned upon. A number of women can be Identified who are living
with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The
woman publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his
family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And
yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No.
142 because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding
society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the law must
be construed.
In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost
20 years. He introduced her to the public as his wife and she
assumed that role and his name without any sinister purpose or
personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his
death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years
was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have
meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because
some of them probably had their own Corazons.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside; the
petitioner is acquitted of the charge. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990
REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 934 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District, Branch VI, San Fernando,
Pampanga, petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of
Falsification of Official Document committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of December 1972, in the Municipality
of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Reolandi M. DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos
High School and, therefore, a public employee, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit falsification of official
documents, to wit: by executing and filing in the office of the Civil
Service Commission of said municipality a Personal Data Sheet, CS
Form No. 212(65), an official document, stating and malting it
appear therein that he was a fourth year Bachelor of Arts student in
1950-54 at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which
document is a requirement for his reappointment as School
Administrative Assistant I of the Jose Abad Santos High School and
wherein the academic requirement to said Position is at least a
fourth year college undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the said
accused well knew that the statement is false and he did not reach
the fourth year in a Bachelor of Arts degree course, and
consequently, by reason of said untruthful narration of facts, his
appointment to the said position was approved by the Civil Service
Commission.
All contrary to law. (p. 44, Rollo)
After trial following a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, petitioner
was found guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the
accused Reolandi M. Diaz guilty as charged of the crime of
falsification of official document penalized under Article 171,
paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and he is therefore
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Costs against the accused. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid judgment of conviction to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, said appeal being docketed thereat
as CA-G.R. No. 24580- Cr.
In its Decision promulgated on April 7,1983, the respondent court
modified the trial court's decision by increasing the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment in the event of non-payment
of the fine due to insolvency, but affirmed the verdict of conviction in
all other respects. The pertinent and dispositive portions of
respondent court's decision read:
The penalty for the offense of falsification of an official document
committed under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code is (prision mayor) and a fine not to exceed P5,000.00. The
correct penalty that should be imposed on the appellant applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is imprisonment of Two (2) Years,
Four (4) Months and One (1) Day of (prison correctional) as
minimum to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of (prision mayor) as
maximum In cam of non-payment of the fine of P1,000.00 due to
insolvency, the appellant should be subject to subsidiary
imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and
the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the
decision appealed from is affirmed in all other respects with costs
against accused- appellant' (P. 68, Rollo)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the
present recourse.
It is the contention of petitioner that he is entitled to an acquittal
because—
1. The findings of the lower court adopted by the respondent
intermediate Appellate Court that he was not a fourth year A-B.
College student is contrary to the evidence presented.
2. The respondent intermediate Appellate Court gravely
commuted an error of law in convicting him as he did not have any
legal obligation to state in CS Form 212 that he was a fourth year
college student.
3. The Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave
abuse of discretion in finding that the transcript of records (Exhibit I)
is spurious.
Upon the following facts, found by both the trial court and
respondent Intermediate Appellate Court, to have been sufficiently
and satisfactorily established by the evidence on record, it appears
that petitioner Reolandi Diaz was a senior clerk at the Jose Abad
Santos High School in San Fernando, Pampanga.
In 1972 he sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant
I of the same school and as one of the requirements for appointment
to said position, filled up the prescribed personal information sheet,
Civil Service Form 212, and swore to the truth and veracity of the
data and information therein furnished by him before the proper
administering officer. As one of the required informations, he
indicated in Exh "A" that his highest educational attainment was
Fourth Year A.B. (Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued or obtained at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges, respectively, during the
years 1950 to 1954 inclusive. On the basis thereof, he was extended
an appointment as School Administrative Assistant I (Exh. "B"). His
personal information sheet (Exh. "A") together with his appointment
paper (Exh. "B"), the certification as to the availability of funds for
the position (Exh. "C") and the resolution of the Provincial Board of
Pampanga creating the position (Exh. "D") were all forwarded to the
Civil Service Commission for the approval of petitioner's
appointment.
But contrary to petitioner's claim that his highest educational
attainment was Fourth Year A.B. which he allegedly took at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges during the years 1950 to
1954, he was never enrolled at the Cosmopolitan Colleges which
later became the Abad Santos Educational Institution and still later
the Ortanez University-at any time during the period covering the
years from 1950 to 1954, inclusive as certified to by the Registrar of
Ortanez University, Mr. Atilano D. Solomon. Likewise, petitioner was
never a student at the Harvardian Colleges in Tondo, during the first
quarter of school year 1953-1954, inclusive, as certified to by the
school's President, Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap.
Neither did petitioner ever enroll as a collegiate student at the
Harvardian Colleges in San Fernando, Pampanga after he finished
his secondary course in the same school in June 1950, as certified
to by its Executive Director, Atty. Arnulfo Garcia.
Also, the name of petitioner was not included in all the enrollment
lists of college students submitted to the then Bureau of Private
Schools of the Department of Education by the Harvardian Colleges
at San Fernando, Pampanga and at Tondo, Manila, during the
period during which petitioner claimed to have been enrolled. The
same thing is true with the list submitted by the Cosmopolitan
Colleges to the said bureau.
The petitioner did not take the witness stand. He only presented in
evidence an alleged transcript of record (Exh. 1) purporting to show
that he took up collegiate courses at the Philippine Harvardian
College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the
school year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of school year 1953-
1954 which transcript of record was allegedly signed by Mrs.
Virginia King vda. de Yap, for and in behalf of the then President of
the school, Ildefonso Yap. But Mrs. Virginia Yap, testifying for the
prosecution disowned the said signature. Besides, at the bottom
portion of the transcript is a printed notation reading — this is only
valid with the college seal and signature of Pres. Ildefonso D. Yap.
Exhibit "I" lacks the imprint of the college seal and the signature of
President Ildefonso Yap himself. No other corroborating piece of
evidence was presented by petitioner.
Contrary to petitioner's posture, there was ample, solid and
conclusive evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove that he
was not a fourth year A.B. undergraduate.
It was clearly established that the statement made by the accused
— that he reached fourth year A.B. and that he studied for this
course (Liberal Arts) at the Cosmopolitan Colleges and the
Harvardian Colleges from the years 1950-1954, is devoid of truth.
The records of these colleges do not at all reveal that petitioner was
even enrolled at any time from 1950 to 1954 in its College of Liberal
Arts. His name does not appear and could not be found in the
enrollment lists submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools by these
colleges.
While the petitioner in his defense presented an alleged transcript
(Exh. purporting to show that he took up collegiate course at the
Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from the
first quarter of the school year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of
the school year 1953-1954, both the trial court and the respondent
court correctly disregarded said transcript as having emanated from
a spurious source. The transcript presented lacks the authenticating
marks-the imprint of the college seal and the signature of the
President of the college.
As correctly observed by the trial court —
It is also quite significant to note in this score that the accused in his
defense failed to present any corroborating piece of evidence which
will show that he was indeed enrolled in the Philippine Harvardian
Colleges from the first quarter of the school year 1953- 1954. If he
had enrolled as a student during this period of time and he was
positive that the transcript of records issued to him and in his
possession is genuine and valid, it could have been easy for him to
introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the testimony of any of his
classmates or teachers in the different subjects that he took to
support his claim that he studied and passed these collegiate
courses at the said school. But this he failed to do despite all the
opportunities open to him and in the face of damning evidence all
showing that he had not really enrolled in this school or in the other
school mentioned by him the personal information sheet that he filed
up as requirement for his appointment. (p. 53, Rollo)
Following the doctrine laid down, however, in the case of People v.
Rufo B. Cruz, No. L-15132, May 25,1960,108 Phil. 255 and the
earlier case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, the
crime committed under the foregoing facts, is perjury. This offense,
as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and
corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter. The said
article provides —
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn
affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall
testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an
oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the
three preceding articles of this section shall suffer respective
penalties provided therein.
In that case of People v. Cruz, supra, the accused Rufo B. Cruz
failed up an application form (Civil Service Form No. 2) for the
patrolman examination. He stated therein that he had never been
accused, indicted or tried for violation of any law, ordinance or
regulation before any court, when in truth and in fact, as the accused
well knew, he had been prosecuted and tried before the Justice of
the Peace of Cainta, Rizal, for different crimes. The application was
signed and sworn to by him before the municipal mayor of Cainta,
Rizal.
This Court in that case held:
This article is similar to Section 3 of Act No. 1697 of the Philippine
Commission, which was formerly the law punishing perjury. Under
said section 3 of that Act, this Court, in the case of United States v.
Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119), held that a person, who stated under
oath in his application to take police examination that he had never
been convicted of any crime, when as a matter of fact he has
previous convictions, committed perjury. The facts in that case are
almost exactly analogous to those in the present, and we find no
reason, either in law or in the arguments of the Solicitor General to
modify or reverse the conclusion of this Court therein. More so,
because all the elements of the offense of perjury defined in Art. 183
of the Revised Penal Code concur in the present case.
The elements of the crime of perjury are —
(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or
executed an affidavit upon a material matter.
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a
competent officer, authorized to receive and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity
is required by law or made for a legal purpose.
All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar.
Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code carries a lesser
penalty. The penalty for this crime is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period. Since there is
no mitigating and aggravating circumstance the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the penalty should be from four (4) months of arresto mayor
as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional
as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision

appealed from is modified as follows:

(a) The accused Reolandi Diaz is found guilty of the crime of

perjury defined and penalized under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal
Code; and

(b) The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of

from four (4) months of arrests mayor as minimum to one (1) year
and one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. L-40203 August 21, 1990
PATERNO J. OUANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO B. ECHAVEZ,
respondents.
De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices and Fiel Manalo for petitioner.
Arturo M. Tolentino and Asuncion, Asuncion, Arcol & Kapunan Law
Offices for respondents.
NARVASA, J.:
The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land with an
area of about 3,710 square meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu,
Identified as Philippine Railway Lot No. 3-A-1 It was covered by
Torrens Title No. 7618 in the name of the registered owner,
Rehabilitation 'Finance Corporation (RFC), now the Development
Bank of the Philippines (DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are lands
belonging to Francisco Echavez, private respondent herein, and
petitioner Paterno J. Ouano. What will have to be resolved are the
conflicting claims over this lot by the vendee thereof, Echavez, and
Ouano.
The property was offered for sale by public bidding by the RFC on
April 1, 1958.1 Actually this was the second public bidding
scheduled for the property. The first 2 in which both Ouano and
Echavez participated, together with others was nullified on account
of a protest by Ouano. 3
Now, it appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and
Echavez orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid, and that
if it was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to
their adjoining properties. To ensure success of their enterprise,
they also agreed to induce the only other party known to be
interested in the property-a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to
desist from presenting a bid.4 They broached the matter to Mrs.
Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact
withdraw from the sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as
reimbursement for its expenses. 5
As expected, the highest bid submitted, and thus accepted by the
RFC, was that of Francisco Echavez, who offered P27,826.00 for
the land .6 Echavez paid the sum of P5,565.00 representing 20%
deposit of the prefferred price. 7
A week later, Echavez sent a letter to Ouano regarding the
P2,000.00 paid by the latter's wife to the Bonsucan group. 8 It said:
Because the owner of the money which I deposited for your share
has stipulated that today is the last day for the return of his money
... I would like to request you that for the P2,000.00 which you have
advanced to Mrs. Bonsucan and company, I will just give you 250
sq. meters right in front of your house at P8.05 per sq. meter ... (N.B.
250 x P8.05 equals P2,012.50.)
Still later, or two weeks after Echavez won the bid, a document
simply entitled "Agreement," was signed by him and Ouano. 9 That
document, prepared by Echavez in his own handwriting, reads as
follows: 10 |par KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
Inasmuch as it was Francisco B. Echavez who won in the public
bidding held at the RFC office for Lot 3-A-1 last April, 1958, it is
hereby agreed between us, Francisco B. Echavez and Paterno J.
Ouano, that we share the said lot between us according to the
herein sketch:
(Sketch omitted ...)
That each of us takes care in paying direct to the RFC office Cebu
Branch, the installments, interests and amortizations on a ten-year
plan in our respective names, such that we would request the RFC
to have the said Lot 3-A-1 subdivided into two portions: A portion of
Lot 3-A-1 for Francisco B. Echavez to contain 1882.5 sq. m. more
or less depending on the actual survey based on the above sketch,
and another portion of Lot 3-A-1 for Paterno J. Ouano to contain
1827.5 sq. m. more or less also based on the above sketch.
That they have agreed to share proportionately all legal expenses
that may be assessed and incurred in connection with the
acquisition of the said lot in case such expenses are levied as a
whole against Francisco B. Echavez, but if such expenses are
levied separately after the RFC consents to the subdivision and
registration in our respective names our share of the said lot, then
we take care individually of paying such expenses if there be any.
In witness whereof, we hereby set our hand and sign this agreement
this 15th day of April, 1958 at Mandawe, Cebu, Philippines, subject
to the approval of the RFC, Cebu Branch and Manila.
On the same day that the "Agreement" was executed, Echavez set
down in writing a computation of the sharing of expenses of his joint
venture with Ouano, viz.: 11
1827.5 — No. of sq. meters for Paterno Ouano 7.50 91375 127925
P13706.25 .20 P 2741.25
-1016.55 — Share of Echavez for the P2,000.00 given to Mrs.
Bonsucan & Companions
P1,724.70 — Balance payable by Mr. Ouano to FB Echavez for the
deposit made by the latter at the RFC. This is subject to the approval
of the RFC, Cebu Branch.
Mandawe, April 15, 1958.
(Sgd.) F.B. ECHAVEZ.
Thereafter, on various dates, Ouano and/or his wife delivered sums
of money to Echavez aggregating P1,725.00, obviously in payment
of the balance indicated in Echavez's computation just mentioned,
viz.: P500.00 on April 19,1958, another P500.00 on April 20, and
P725.00 on April 27,1958. Receipts therefor were given by
Echavez, all similarly worded to the effect that the money was being
received "as part of their reimbursement for the deposit (of
P5,565.00) I have made with the RFC for Lot 3-A-1 which I won in
the bidding and which lot I have consented to share with Mr. Paterno
J. Ouano, subject to the approval of the RFC. 12
However, the RFC never approved the sharing agreement between
Echavez and Ouano concerning Lot 3-A-1. It approved the sale of
the lot to Echavez only, on May 9, 1958, on the condition that the
purchase price of P27,825.00 be paid in cash. Apparently Echavez
found great initial difficulty in complying with this condition. It took all
of four years, and patient negotiation and diligent effort on his part,
for him ultimately to acquire title to the property, which came about
in December, 1963. His travails are succinctly narrated by the Trial
Court as follows: 13
... Apparently, the successful bidder was caught flatfooted, for he
was not able to comply with this condition, notwithstanding the fact
that he has been making efforts to acquire the property (See Exhibit
21, letter of March 29, 1958; also Exhibit 22). So, he exerted much
effort to change the terms of the sale from cash to monthly
amortization plan (Exhs. 24 and 10). But the Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation was adamant. The terms of the bid giving the option to
pay the balance of the purchase price either in cash or within ten
years on monthly amortization plan at 6% interest notwithstanding,
said Corporation denied defendant's request in a letter dated
September 18, 1958 signed by Chairman Romualdez (Exh. 11).
This went on for more than 4-½ years, with none of the parties
herein having secured the conformity of the RFC or DBP to a
novation of the original terms of the sale. Thus, the said sale was
finally cancelled, and the deposit of P5,549.72 made by the
defendant to the RFC forfeited as of April 4, 1962 (Exh. 12).
However, on July 18, 1962, upon request of the defendant, this
cancellation was considered under the condition, among others, that
the price of the sale of P27,825.00 be payable 20% down and the
balance in 5 years at 8% interest per annum on the monthly
amortization plan, commencing retroactively on June 9, 1958, and
that a payment of P2,000.00 be applied to the total arrearages of
P25,799.00, which had to be paid within 90 days. The defendant
paid on August 28, 1962 a further amount of P2,000.00. On
September 3, 1962, the deed of conditional sale, covering the
property in question, was entered into by the DBP and the defendant
(Exh. D, same as Exh. 4), culminating in the signing of the
corresponding promissory note dated September 7,1962 (Exh. E,
same as Exh. 5). It is admitted that the defendant is now the
registered owner of the property, after having fully paid P29,3218.87
on account of the price to the Development Bank of the Philippines,
as per Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 9,1963 (Exhs. 14
and 34).
It was pursuant to the absolute sale of December 9, 1963 just
mentioned, that a Torrens title (TCT No. 10776) was issued in
Echavez's name. 14
Ouano, in his turn, tried to have DBP either accept and implement
his sharing agreement with Echavez, or allow him to pay the full
price of the lot in Echavez's behalf. By his own account, he sent a
letter dated June 3, 1 963 to the DBP, "handcarried by his wife,"
"requesting among others, that he be permitted to pay immediately
either for his share in the aforesaid lot comprising 1,828 sq. meters
at the bid price of P7.50 per sq. meter including charges, or for the
whole lot;" and that he in fact tried to make such payment but the
Bank turned down his request.15
Shortly after his representation with the DBP were rebuffed more
precisely on June 24, 1963, months before the deed of absolute sale
was executed by the DBP in Echavez's favor Paterno J. Ouano filed
suit for "specific performance and reconveyance" in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu against Francisco Echavez and the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).16
In his complaint,17 Ouano recited substantially the facts just related,
and further alleged that —
... on June 3, 1963 plaintiffs wife and his attorney conferred with
defendant ... Echavez for the purpose of again requesting said
defendant to sign a document which would be notarized and to
permit plaintiff to pay for his share direct to the defendant DBP, but
said defendant refused and instead informed them that there had
been no agreement regarding joint bidding and joint ownership of
Lot 3-A-l.
The complaint was amended a few weeks later, chiefly to allege that
DBP was on the point of rescinding its contract with Echavez; and
that Ouano's offer to the DBP to pay in Echavez's behalf the price
of the lot in full (P28,206.61), had been rejected; and that
consequently, and "to show his good faith," he had consigned the
amount with the Court "for and in behalf of defendant ... Echavez.18
The amended complaint specifically prayed that —
1) pending trial, and upon such bond as may be fixed by the
Court, a writ of preliminary injunction issue to restrain Echavez and
RFC "from rescinding, cancelling or in any way terminating the
conditional sale contract with respect to Lot 3-A-1 TCT 7618;"
2) after trial, Echavez be ordered" to sign an agreement in
accord with Annex A and the foregoing allegations which should be
notarized;"
3) by virtue of aforesaid agreement and his deposit in Court
of P28,206.61, Ouano be declared as "legally subrogated to the
rights, interest and participation of defendant ... Echavez in Lot 3-A-
1 to the extent of 1,828.5 sq. m.
4) Echavez be ordered to reimburse Ouano P14,358.37
corresponding to defendant ... Echavez' share of 1,882.5 sq. m.
5) should Echavez be unable to pay said amount within 15
days, Ouano be declared "legally subrogated to the rights, interest
and participation of ... Echavez in Lot 3-A-1 to the extent of 1,882.5
sq. m.;"
6) DBP be ordered to consider the deposit made by Ouano
for and in behalf of Echavez as "complete and valid payment of Lot
3 — A-1 and to execute the necessary documents of sale in (the
former's) favor ... for 1,827.5 sq. m. and in favor of ... Echavez for
1,882.5 sq. m.
7) DBP be ordered to hold the deed of sale in favor of
Echavez for 1,882 sq. m. in abeyance until the latter has reimbursed
Ouano "the amount of P14,385.3 7 corresponding to ... Echavez's
share of 1,882.5 sq. m and should Echavez be unable to do so
within 15 days, DBP be ordered to "execute said deed of sale in
favor of plaintiff and
8) Echavez be ordered to pay Ouano P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees, P5,000.00 as moral damages, and P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
The DBP moved to dismiss the amended complaint, alleging that no
cause of action was therein stated against it.19 The Court found the
motion to be well taken, overruled Ouano's opposition thereto,
dismissed the amended complaint and dissolved the writ of
preliminary injunction, by Order dated August 27, 1963. 20 It
subsequently denied Ouano's motion for reconsideration. 21 Ouano
appealed but on learning of the absolute sale of Lot 3-A-1 executed
by DBP in Echavez's favor on December 9, 1963-which according
to him rendered moot the case for legal subrogation and injunction
as far as DBP was concerned he withdrew the appeal and moved
instead for admission of a second amended complaint, 22 which the
Court admitted in the absence of opposition thereto. In the second
amended complaint, dated January 4, 1964, 23 the DBP was no
longer included as a party. Echavez was the sole defendant. The
second amended complaint adverted to the dismissal of the case as
against the DBP and additionally alleged that Echavez, "in gross
and evident bad faith, mortgaged the whole of Lot 3-A-1 to one Dr.
Serafica." It prayed particularly that Echavez be commanded:
1. To execute a public document embodying and confirming
the oral contract of joint ownership of Lot 3-A-1, TCT 7618, of April
1, 1958 between plaintiff and defendant...;
2. To execute a deed of reconveyance of 1,827.5 sq. m. of
Lot 3-A-1 ... after reimbursement of the sum of P14,821.24 by the
plaintiff;
3. To pay plaintiff P1,000 as attorney's fees, P5,000.00 as
moral damages, P5,000.00 as exemplary damages and the
expenses of litigation; and
4. To pay the costs.
Trial ensued after which the Trial Court rendered judgment on June
29,1968. It found that the sharing agreement between Ouano and
Echavez could not be enforced in view of the absence of consent of
the RFC (DBP) which the latter never gave; apart from this, the
agreement had an unlawful cause and hence could "Produce no
effect whatever" in accordance with Article 1352 of the Civil Code,
because involving a felony defined in Article 185 of the Revised
Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 185. Machinations in public auctions. — any person
who shall solicit any gift or promise as a consideration for refraining
from taking part in any public auction, and any person who shall
attempt to cause bidders to stay away from an auction by threats,
gifts, promises, or any other artifice, with intent to cause the
reduction of the price of the thing auctioned, shall suffer the penalty
of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine ranging from
10 to 50 per centum of the value of the thing auctioned.
The decision accordingly dismissed the Second Amended
Complaint, ordered Ouano, "to vacate the portion of Lot No. 3-A-1
he occupied pursuant to Exhibit C," and also dismissed Echavez's
counterclaim.
Ouano appealed to the Court of Appeals. Here he fared no better.
He enjoyed initial success, to be sure. Judgment was promulgated
on February 28, 1974" setting aside the Trial Court's judgment, and
directing: (a) Echavez "to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
plaintiff of 1827. 5 square meters as the latter's share in the property
in controversy and (b) Ouano "to pay defendant the amount of
P14,821.24 representing the cost of his share." However, on a
second motion for reconsideration presented by Echavez, the
Appellate Court, on November 21, 1974, reconsidered its decision
of February 28, 1974 and entered another "affirming in toto the
decision appealed from without costs.25 This second decision found
that the documentary evidence 26 preponderantly established that
"the parties have manifested their intention to subordinate their
agreement to the approval of the RFC." "Consequently," the
decision stated,
... had the plaintiffs and defendant's proposal been accepted by the
RFC (DBP) two separate contracts, covering the two segregated
lots according to the sketch would have come into existence, to be
executed by the RFC separately in favor of the pi plaintiff and the
defendant. But unfortunately, the RFC disapproved the proposal as
the sale was to be for cash. As a result, the obligatory force of the
'agreement' or the consent of the parties, which was subordinated
to the taking effect of the suspensive condition that the agreement
be subject to the approval of the RFC never happened. This being
the case, the agreement never became effective. The rule is settled
that:
When the consent of a party to a contract is given subject to the
fulfillment of a suspensive condition, the contract is not perfected
unless the condition is first complied with' (Ruperto vs. Cosca 26
Phil. 227).
And when the obligation assumed by a party to a contract is
expressly subjected to a condition, the obligation cannot be
enforced against him unless the condition is complied with (Wise &
Co. vs. Kelly, 37 Phil. 696; Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine
Trust Co., 68 Phil. 48).
At best, the non-fulfillment of the suspensive condition has the effect
of negating the conditional obligation. It has been held that what
characterizes a conditional obligation is the fact that its efficacy or
obligatory force is subordinated to the happening of a future and
uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take
place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had
never existed Gaite vs. Fonacier, L-11827, July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA
831).
Motions for reconsideration and for oral argument filed by Ouano
were denied by Resolutions dated February 6, February 11, and
February 21, 1975, the last containing a suggestion "that appellant
go to the Higher Court for relief. 27
Ouano is now before this Court, on appeal by certoriari to seek the
relief that both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals have
declined to concede to him. In this Court, he attempts to make the
following points, to wit:
1. The verbal agreement between the parties to acquire and
share the land in proportion to their respective abutting properties,
and executed by the immediate occupation by the parties of their
respective shares in the land, is a perfected consensual contract
and not "a mere promise to deliver something subject to a
suspensive condition" (as ruled in the second decision of the Court
of Appeals); hence the petitioner is entitled to compel private
respondent to execute a public document for the registration in his
name of the petitioner's share in the land in question pursuant to Art.
1315 of the Civil Code (as held in the first decision of the Court of
Appeals).
2. The agreement to acquire and share the land was not
subject to a suspensive condition.
3. Assuming in gratia argumenti the agreement to be subject
to a suspensive condition, since the condition consisted in obtaining
the approval of the RFC-a third party who could not in any way be
compelled to give such approval the condition is deemed
constructively fulfilled because petitioner had done all in his power
to comply with the condition, and private respondent, who also had
the duty to get such approval, in effect prevented the fulfillment of
the condition by doing nothing to secure the approval.
4. The circumstances show that Echavez clearly acted in bad
faith, and it is unjust to allow him to benefit from his bad faith and
ingenious scheme.
Two material facts, however, about which Ouano and Echavez are
in agreement, render these questions of academic interest only,
said facts being determinative of this dispute on an altogether
different ground. These facts are:
1) that they bad both orally agreed that only Echavez would
make a bid at the second bidding called by the RFC, and that if it
was accepted, they would divide the property in proportion to their
adjoining properties; and
2) that to ensure success of their scheme, they had also
agreed to induce the only other party known to be interested in the
property a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from
presenting a bid, 28 as they did succeed in inducing Mrs.
Bonsucan's group to withdraw from the sale, paying said group
P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses. 29
These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed.
Ouano and Echavez had promised to share in the property in
question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining from taking part
in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact
succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction.
in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned In
so doing, they committed the felony of machinations in public
auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal
Code, supra.

That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record,
as is the fact that thereby only one bid that of Echavez was entered
for the 'land in consequence of which Echavez eventually acquired
it. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the parties
not only have no action against each other but are both liable to
prosecution and the things and price of their agreement subject to
disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in
accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the
Civil Code.

Article 1409 of said Code declares as "inexistent and void from the
beginning" those contracts, among others, "whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy," or "expressly prohibited ... by law." Such contracts
"cannot be ratified "the right to set up the defense of illegality
(cannot) be waived;" and, Article 1410 adds, the "action or defense
for the declaration of the inexistence ... (thereof) does not
prescribe." Furthermore, according to Article 1411 of the same Code
30 —

... When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object
of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense, both
parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each
other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the
Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a
crime shall be applicable to the things or the price of the contract.

xxx xxx xxx

The dismissal of Ouano's action by both the Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals was thus correct, being plainly in accord with the
Civil Code provisions just referred to.31 Article 1411 also dictates
the proper disposition of the land involved, i.e., "the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was
committed," as mandated by the provisions of Article 45 of the
Revised Penal Code, this being obviously the provision "of the Penal
Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime"
that Article 1411 makes "applicable to the things or the price of the
contract."

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is

MODIFIED, so that in addition to affirming the Trial Court's judgment
dismissing Ouano's complaint and Echavez's counterclaim in Civil
Case No. R-8011, Lot No. 3-A-1 subject of said case is ordered
FORFEITED in its entirety in favor of the Government of the
Philippines. No pronouncement as to costs. Let copy of this
Decision be furnished the Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.