UMIL V RAMOS

G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991

Principle: The Supreme Court held that rebellion is a continuing offense. Accordingly, a rebel
may be arrested at any time, with or without a warrant, as he is deemed to be in the act of
committing the offense at any time of day or night.

FACTS:

On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office,
about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a
gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male
"sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988
at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan
City. The wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon,"
twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was
disclosed later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this
verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM,
for security reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as
the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

HELD:

Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature
of continuing crimes.
PEOPLE V SUCRO

195 SCRA 388 MARCH 1991

Principle: It was held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears
the disturbances created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene thereof, he may effect an
arrest without a warrant. The offense is deemed committed in the presence of or within the view
of the officer.

FACTS:

Pat. Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo to monitor activities of Edison
SUCRO (accused). Sucro was reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel 2 meters away from
Regalado’s house. Sucro was monitored to have talked and exchanged things three times. These
activities are reported through radio to P/Lt. Seraspi. A third buyer was transacting with
appellant and was reported and later identified as Ronnie Macabante. From that moment,
P/Lt.Seraspi proceeded to the area. While the police officers were at the Youth Hostel in
Maagama St. Fulgencio told Lt. Seraspi to intercept. Macabante was intercepted at Mabini and
Maagama crossing in front of Aklan Medical center. Macabante saw the police and threw a tea
bag of marijuana on the ground. Macabante admitted buying the marijuana from Sucro in front
of the chapel.

The police team intercepted and arrested SUCRO at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans.
Recovered were 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from a cart inside the chapel and another
teabag from Macabante.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or Not arrest without warrant is lawful.

(2) Whether or Not evidence from such arrest is admissible.

HELD:

Search and seizures supported by a valid warrant of arrest is not an absolute rule. Rule 126, Sec
12 of Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything, which may be used as proff of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.(People v. Castiller) The failure of the police officers to secure a
warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge required from the surveillance was insufficient
to fulfill requirements for its issuance. However, warantless search and seizures are legal as long
as PROBABLE CAUSE existed. The police officers have personal knowledge of the actual
commission of the crime from the surveillance of the activities of the accused. As police officers
were the ones conducting the surveillance, it is presumed that they are regularly in performance
of their duties.
PEOPLE V RODRIGUEZA

205 SCRA 791 February 1992

Principle: Instead of arresting the suspect and taking him into custody after the sale, returned to
police headquarters and filed his report. It was only in the evening of the same day that the police
officer, without a warrant, arrested the suspect at the latter’s house where dried marijuana leaves
were found and confiscated. It was held that the arrest and the seizure were unlawful.

FACTS:

NARCOM agents staged a buy-bust operation, after gaining information that there was an
ongoing illegal traffic of prohibited drugs in Tagas, Albay. The participating agents were given
money treated with ultraviolet powder. One of the agents went to said location, asked for a
certain Don. Thereafter, the Don, herein accused, met with him and “a certain object wrapped in
a plastic” later identified as marijuana was given in exchange for P200. The agent went back to
headquarters and made a report, based on which, a team was subsequently organized and a raid
was conducted in the house of the father of the accused.

During the raid, the NARCOM agents were able to confiscate dried marijuana leaves and a
plastic syringe among others. There was no authorization by any search warrant. The accused
was found positive of ultraviolet powder. The lower court, considering the evidences obtained
and testimonies from the prosecution, found him guilty of violating the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the lower court was correct in its judgment.

HELD:

The NARCOM agents’ procedure in the entrapment of the accused failed to meet the
qualification that the suspected drug dealer must be caught red-handed in the act of selling
marijuana to a person posing as a buyer, since the operation was conducted after the actual
exchange. Said raid also violated accused’ right against unreasonable search and seizure, as the
situation did not fall in the circumstances wherein a search may be validly made even without a
search warrant, i.e. when the search is incidental to a lawful arrest; when it involves prohibited
articles in plain view. The NARCOM agents could not have justified their act by invoking the
urgency and necessity of the situation because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
reveal that the place had already been put under surveillance for quite some time. Had it been
their intention to conduct the raid, then they should, because they easily could, have first secured
a search warrant during that time. The Court further notes the confusion and ambiguity in the
identification of the confiscated marijuana leaves and other prohibited drug paraphernalia
presented as evidence against appellant:

CIC Taduran, who acted as the poseur buyer, testified that appellant sold him 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic bag. Surprisingly, and no plausible explanation has been
advanced therefor, what were submitted to and examined by the PCCL and thereafter utilized as
evidence against the appellant were the following items:

One (1) red and white colored plastic bag containing the following:

Exh. "A"—Thirty (30) grams of suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops contained inside a
transparent plastic bag.
Exh. "B"— Fifty (50) grams of suspected dried marijuana leaves and seeds contained inside a
white colored plastic labelled "Robertson".
Exh. "C"— Four (4) aluminum foils each containing suspected dried marijuana fruiting tops
having a total weight of seven grams then further wrapped with a piece of aluminum foil.
Exh. "D"— Five (5) small transparent plastic bags each containing suspected dried marijuana
fruiting tops having a total weight of seventeen grams.
Exh. "E"— One plastic syringe.

Evidently, these prohibited articles were among those confiscated during the so-called follow-up
raid in the house of Rodrigueza’s father. The unanswered question then arises as to the identity
of the marijuana leaves that became the basis of appellant's conviction. In People vs. Rubio, this
Court had the occasion to rule that the plastic bag and the dried marijuana leaves contained
therein constitute the corpus delicti of the crime. As such, the existence thereof must be proved
with certainty and conclusiveness. Failure to do so would be fatal to the cause of the prosecution.
Conviction is reversed and set aside and accused is acquitted.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V MOLINA

G.R. No. 133917, February 19, 2001

Principle: “reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise
in the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause to justify the arrest.

FACTS:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information regarding the
presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City. His informer pointed to the
motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of
the accused-appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested. In the morning
of August 8,1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an information that the alleged pusher will be
passing at NHA, Ma-a, Davao City.

He called for assistance at the PNP proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they would wait
for the alleged pusher to pass by. At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, a “trisikad” carrying the
accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the
pushers. The police officers then ordered the “trisikad” to stop. SPO1Pamplona introduced
himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag. Molina replied, “
Boss, if possible we will settle this.” SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag,
which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula and Molina
were handcuffed by the police officers. Accused-appellants contended that the marijuana allegedly
seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUE:

Whether or not marijuana is inadmissible in evidence for having been seized in violation of
appellants’ constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

HELD:

The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be carried out
in a reasonable fashion. The Constitution provides:

SEC. 2.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation
of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk
situations. As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid
warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless
arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a)when,
in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense(arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been
committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit);and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a
place where he is serving f i n a l j u d g m e n t o r i s t e m p o r a r i l y c o n f i n e d w h i l e h i s
case is pending, or has escaped wh ile being transferred from one
confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).

In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their
arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be
committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. The response of
Molina that “Boss, if possible we will settle this” is an equivocal statement which
standing alone will not constitute probable cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest. Note that
were it not for SPO1 Marino Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely
pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the subject of any
suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. SPO1 Paguidopon only learned Mula’s name and address after the
arrest. It is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-appellant Mula. It is worthy
to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by
his informer whilethey were on the side of the road.

These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant
Mula, considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him.
With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the
arrest. The Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the exceptions
allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on their person was likewise illegal.

Consequently, the marijuana seized by the peace officers could not be admitted as evidence.
WHEREFORE accused are ACQUITTED.
People v. Sy Chua,
G.R. Nos. 136066-67, February 4, 2003

Principle: It is necessary that two requisites concur: [1] the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he had just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and [2] such overt act is done in the presence or within the viewof the arresting
officer.

FACTS:

Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A.
6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of Ammunitions and Illegal
Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.

SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that accused-
appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles
City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group positioned themselves across
McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the hotel. The other group acted as their
back up.

Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just arrived and
parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from the car carrying a
sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly accosted him and introduced
themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled out his wallet, a small transparent
plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2
Nulud subjected him to a body search which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber
firearm bullets from his left back pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the
Zest-O box, he saw that it contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated
the small transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber
firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police
operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col. Guttierez
at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.

Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a different version
of the incident.

Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his son to
Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur Highway. He stopped
in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes and candies. While at the store,
he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside of his car. When he called the attention of
the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with
raised hands. The man later on identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest,
the policeman took out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the
policeman took his car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s
companions arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled
him away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.

Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about fifteen
minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the presence of
reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made to hold the box while
pictures were being taken.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet convicted him
for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to the Court.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and
(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly found on
him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

HELD:

The lower court believed that since the police received information that the accused will
distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its vicinities. The police officer
had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a search warrant. The search is valid
being akin to a “stop and frisk”.

The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful
arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of proof
before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used
as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there first be arrest
before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed. Accordingly, for this exception to
apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not
act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that
accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
“Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable
cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
“stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the
police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.

A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized that a
search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The foregoing
circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested
before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items found in his possession. The
apprehending police operative failed to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s
business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The
apprehending police officers only introduced themselves when they already had custody of
accused-appellant.

In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is applicable
to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by the police operatives
on accused-appellant.

Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NORMANDO DEL ROSARIO Y LOPEZ

G.R. No. 109633 July 20, 1994

Principle: The offense had not been “just” committed. Furthermore, the arresting officers had no
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense,
since they were not present and were not actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they became
aware of the identity of the driver of the getaway tricycle only during the custodial investigation.

FACTS:
Del Rosario was charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammutions and illegal sale of
regulated drugs.

Upon application of SPO3 Raymundo Untiveros of PNP Cavite, before RTC judge Arturo de
Guia issued a search warrant authorizing the search and seizure of an : undetermined quantity of
methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as shabu and its paraphernalia” in the
premises of appellant’s house. However, the search warrant was not implemented immediately
due to lack of police personnel to form the raiding team.

In the course of the search they found a black canister containing shabu, an aluminum foil, a
plastic .22 caliber, three set of ammunitions and three wallets containing the marked money.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there is a violation of the constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure

RULING:

The Supreme Court held that the accused cannot be convicted of the illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions. The search warrant implemented by the raiding party authorized only
the search and seizure of the described quantity of shabu and paraphernalia.

A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a fishing
expedition to seize and confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime.
The constitution itself and the Rules of Court specifically mandate that the search warrant must
particularly describe the things to be seized. Thus, the search warrant was no authority for the
police officers to seize the firearms which was not mentioned, much less described with
particularity, in the search warrant.

Neither may it maintain that the gun was seized in the course of an arrest, for as earlier observed,
accused arrest was far from regular and legal. Aid firearm, having been illegally seized, the same
is not admissible in evidence.
Go vs CA

G.R. No. 101837, February 11, 1992

Principle: When there is a statutory grant of the right to preliminary investigation, denial of the
same is an infringement of the due process clause

FACTS:

Rolito Go while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, nearly bumped Eldon
Maguan’s car. Go alighted from his car, shot Maguan and left the scene. A security guard at a
nearby restaurant was able to take down petitioner’s car plate number. The police arrived shortly
thereafter at the scene of the shooting. A manhunt ensued.

Six days after, petitioner presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to verify news
reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by two (2) lawyers. The
police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.

Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed the case to the lower court, setting and commencing
trial without preliminary investigation. Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right
to preliminary investigation as bail has been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has
been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112
of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which provides for the rules and procedure pertaining
to situations of lawful warrantless arrests.

Petitioner argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the police
station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly perpetrated. Thus, petitioner
argues, the crime had not been “just committed” at the time that he was arrested. Moreover, none
of the police officers who arrested him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and
accordingly none had the “personal knowledge” required for the lawfulness of a warrantless
arrest. Since there had been no lawful warrantless arrest, Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court which establishes the only exception to the right to preliminary investigation, could not
apply in respect of petitioner.

ISSUES:

Whether or not a lawful warrantless arrest had been effected by the San Juan Police in respect of
petitioner Go;

Whether petitioner had effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation

HELD:

1. No. The Court does not believe that the warrantless “arrest” or detention of petitioner in the
instant case falls within the terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which provides as follows:

“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person;

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In cases falling under
paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered
to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7.”

Petitioner’s “arrest” took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The “arresting”
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time petitioner
had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the “arrest” effected six (6) days after the shooting be
reasonably regarded as effected “when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed” within the
meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the “arresting” officers had any “personal
knowledge” of facts indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The
information upon which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting — one stated that petitioner was the gunman; another was able to
take down the alleged gunman’s car’s plate number which turned out to be registered in
petitioner’s wife’s name. That information did not, however, constitute “personal knowledge.”

It is thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within
the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.

2. No. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not believe that by posting bail, petitioner
had waived his right to preliminary investigation. In People v. Selfaison, the Court held that
appellants there had waived their right to preliminary investigation because immediately after
their arrest, they filed bail and proceeded to trial “without previously claiming that they did not
have the benefit of a preliminary investigation.”

In the instant case, petitioner Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary
investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary
investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered
his release on 12 July 1991. Accordingly, the Court cannot reasonably imply waiver of
preliminary investigation on the part of petitioner. In fact, when the Prosecutor filed a motion in
court asking for leave to conduct preliminary investigation, he clearly if impliedly recognized
that petitioner’s claim to preliminary investigation was a legitimate one.
PEOPLE V GERENTE

G.R. No. 95847-48 March 10, 1993

Principle: The warrantless arrest of Gerente only three hours after the killing was held valid,
since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of the victim and of the facts
indicating that Gerente and two others had killed the victim.

FACTS:

Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente,
together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking
marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the house of the
prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three men talking about
their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying,
"Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's
suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue,
papatayin natin mamaya."

Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00
p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed
the killing. At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela
Police Station received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He
went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the
hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the
skull caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police
Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the
mauling incident took place.

The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to
come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked
appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette
foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The
Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the court gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence
by the prosecution.
2. whether or nor the court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes
charged despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

HELD:

1.No. The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession
were valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.

Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:

'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:

"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;"

"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'

2. No. To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in
many instances."

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an
incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides:

"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant."

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested
may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S.
143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that
"the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the
arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his immediate control
may be seized."

There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having
conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of
Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted
by one person only.