Senga Evid 1

SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners, - versus - ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177809
Present:
CARPIO MORALES, J.,* CHICO-NAZARIO,** Acting Chairperson, NACHURA, PERALTA, and ABAD,*** JJ.
Promulgated:
October 16, 2009
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300:[1] (1) reversing the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 274, Paraaque City in Civil Case No. 04-0052;[2] and (2) reinstating and affirming in toto the decision
of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 78, of the same city in Civil Case No. 2001-315.[3]
First, we sift through the varying facts found by the different lower courts.
The facts parleyed by the MeTC show that respondent Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building, a commercial building,
located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City.
On July 6, 2001, Rosalie filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses
Latip). Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by Spouses
Latip, as lessees thereof.
The contract of lease reads:
CONTRACT OF LEASE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:
ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Filipino, of legal age, married with office at 2/F JOFERXAN Building, F.B. Harrison St., Brgy. Baclaran, Paraaque City, and
hereinafter referred to as the LESSOR,
- and -
OMAR LATIEF marriage to MOSHIERA LATIEF, also both Filipino, of legal age with address at 24 Anahan St. RGV Homes Paraaque City, and
hereinafter referred to as the LESSEES.
WITNESSETH
1. That the LESSOR is the owner of the commercial building erected at the lot of the Toribio G. Reyes Realty, Inc. situated at 158 Quirino Ave.
corner Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran in Paraaque Ctiy;
2. That LESSOR hereby leases two (2) cubicles located at the 1st & 2nd Floor, of said building with an area of 56 square meters under the
following terms and conditions, to wit:
a. That the monthly rental of the two (2) cubicles in PESOS, SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00), Philippine Currency. However, due to unstable
power of the peso LESSEES agrees to a yearly increase of ten (10%) percent of the monthly rental;
b. That any rental in-arrears shall be paid before the expiration of the contract to the LESSOR;
c. That LESSEES agree to pay their own water and electric consumptions in the said premises;
d. That the LESSEES shall not sub-let or make any alteration in the cubicles without a written permission from the LESSOR. Provided, however,
that at the termination of the Contract, the lessee shall return the two cubicles in its original conditions at their expenses;
e. That the LESSEES agree to keep the cubicles in a safe and sanitary conditions, and shall not keep any kinds of flammable or combustible
materials.
f. That in case the LESSEES fail to pay the monthly rental every time it falls due or violate any of the above conditions shall be enough ground
to terminate this Contract of Lease. Provided, further, that, if the LESSEES pre-terminate this Contract they shall pay the rentals for the unused
month or period by way of liquidated damages in favor of the LESSOR.
3. That this Contract of Lease is for six (6) yrs. only starting from December _____, 1999 or up to December ______, 2005.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have hereunto affixed their hands this ___th day of December, 1999 at City of Manila, Philippines.
(sgd.) (sgd.)
ROSALIE PALAA-CHUA MOSHIERA LATIEF
LESSORLESSEE
(sgd.)
OMAR LATIEF
LESSEE
SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
1. Daisy C. Ramos 2. Ferdinand C. Chua
Republic of the Philippines)

C i t y o f M a n i l a )s.s.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
BEFORE ME, a Notary Public for and in the City of Manila personally appeared the following persons:
Rosalie P. Chua with CTC No. 05769706 at Paraaque City on 2/1/99; Moshiera Latief with CTC No. 12885654 at Paraaque City on 11/11/99;
Omar Latief with CTC No. 12885653 Paraaque City on Nov. 11, 1999.
known to me and to me known to be the same persons who executed this instrument consisting of two (2) pages duly signed by them and the
two (2) instrumental witnesses and acknowledged to me that the same is their free and voluntarily acts and deeds.
IN FAITH AND TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I have hereunto affixed my hand and Notarial Seal this ____th day of December, 1999 at the City of
Manila, Philippines.
Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS

Page No. _____ NOTARY PUBLIC
Book No. LXV Until December 31, 2000
Series of 1999 PTR # 374145-1/11/99/-Mla.
IBP # 00262-Life Member[4]
A year after the commencement of the lease and with Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the
spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not
heed Rosalies demand, she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims. They averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already been paid in full as
evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00. The three (3) receipts, in Rosalies handwriting, read:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at
158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]aque City. ROFERLAND[5] Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK
______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua
2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
Received by
3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99
____(sgd.)___
Received by:[6]
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in Roferxane Bldg. Having
in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg.,
which was still under construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles.
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for the completion of
five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the
subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and the subsequent filing of a complaint against
them.
The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [Spouses Latip] and all persons claiming rights under them are hereby ordered to VACATE the property
subject of this case located at the 1st and 2nd floors of a Roferxane Building situated at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner Redemptorist Road,
Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. The [Spouses Latip] are also ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P720,000.00) as rent arrearages for the period of December 1999 to December 2000 and thereafter to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of
SEVENTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P72,000.00) per month from January 2001 to December 2002, plus ten percent (10%) increase for each and
every succeeding years thereafter as stipulated in paragraph 2(a) of the Contract of Lease x x x, until the [Spouses Latip] have completely
vacated the leased premises subject of this lease. Finally[,] the [Spouses Latip] are hereby ordered to PAY [Rosalie] the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as attorneys fees and TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) per [Rosalies] appearance in Court as appearance
fee and to PAY the cost of this suit.
[Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In stark contrast, the RTC reversed the MeTC and ruled in favor of Spouses Latip. The RTC did not give credence to the contract of lease, ruling
that it was not notarized and, in all other substantial aspects, incomplete. Further on this point, the RTC noted that the contract of lease
lacked: (1) the signature of Ferdinand Chua, Rosalies husband; (2) the signatures of Spouses Latip on the first page thereof; (3) the specific
dates for the term of the contract which only stated that the lease is for six (6) y[ea]rs only starting from December 1999 or up to December
2005; (4) the exact date of execution of the document, albeit the month of December and year 1999 are indicated therein; and (5) the
provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts.
The RTC believed the claim of Spouses Latip that the contract of lease was modified and supplemented; and the entire lease rentals for the
two (2) cubicles for six (6) years had already been paid by Spouses Latip in the amount of P2,570,000.00. As to Rosalies claim that her receipt
of P2,570,000.00 was simply goodwill payment by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights, the
RTC shot this down and pointed out that, apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. On the
whole, the RTC declared an existent lease between the parties for a period of six (6) years, and already fully paid for by Spouses Latip. Thus,
Spouses Latip could not be ejected from the leased premises until expiration of the lease period.
The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the appealed decision of the [MeTC] dated January 13, 2004 is reversed as judgment is hereby
rendered for the [Spouses Latip] and against [Rosalie], ordering the latter to pay the former
(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the sum of PhP250,000.00 plus PhP3,000.00 per court appearance as and for attorneys fees; and
(4) costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.[8]
In yet another turn of events, the CA, as previously mentioned, reversed the RTC and reinstated the decision of the MeTC. The CA ruled that
the contract of lease, albeit lacking the signature of Ferdinand and not notarized, remained a complete and valid contract. As the MeTC had,
the CA likewise found that the alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective. On the issue of whether the
amount of P2,570,000.00 merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of
Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to the appellate court, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn
Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Thus,
ruling on Rosalies appeal, the CA disposed of the case:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of RTC Paraaque City Branch 274
dated September 24, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the January 13, 2004 decision of the MeTC is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED
en toto.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.
The singular issue for our resolution is whether Spouses Latip should be ejected from the leased cubicles.
As previously adverted to, the CA, in ruling for Rosalie and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial notice of the alleged
practice of prospective lessees in the Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
We disagree.
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro[10] is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts
with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in
the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction
of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual form of evidence will be dispensed with if
knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed.
But judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not
authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is
taken only of those matters which are commonly known.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common knowledge of every person.[11]
We reiterated the requisite of notoriety for the taking of judicial notice in the recent case of Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[12]
which cited State Prosecutors:
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction
of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said
that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable
of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of
the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other
publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are such of universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as
forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular
facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is
dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court took judicial notice of
does not meet the requisite of notoriety. To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the
lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of
common knowledge or notoriously known.
We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount
of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review
before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie
as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule
129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will
not be disputed by the parties.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the
stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What need not be proved.
Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in
State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.
Ultimately, on the issue of whether Spouses Latip ought to be ejected from the leased cubicles, what remains in evidence is the documentary
evidence signed by both parties the contract of lease and the receipts evidencing payment of P2,570,000.00.
We need not be unduly detained by the issue of which documents were executed first or if there was a novation of the contract of lease. As
had been found by the RTC, the lease contract and the receipts for the amount of P2,570,000.00 can be reconciled or harmonized. The RTC
declared:
Definitely, the parties entered into a lease agreement over two (2) cubicles of the 1st and 2nd floors of Roferxane (Roferland) Building, a
commercial building located at 158 Quirino Avenue, corner Redemptorist Road, Baclaran, Paraaque City and belonging to [Rosalie]. The lease
agreement is for a term of six (6) years commencing in December 1999 up to December 2005. This agreement was embodied in a Contract of
Lease x x x. The terms of this lease contract, however, are modified or supplemented by another agreement between the parties executed and
or entered into in or about the time of execution of the lease contract, which exact date of execution of the latter is unclear.[13]
We agree with the RTCs holding only up to that point. There exists a lease agreement between the parties as set forth in the contract of lease
which is a complete document. It need not be signed by Ferdinand Chua as he likewise did not sign the other two receipts for P500,000.00 and
P70,000.00, respectively, which contained only the signature of Rosalie. Besides, it is undisputed that Rosalie owns and leases the stalls in
Roferxane Bldg.; thus, doing away with the need for her husbands consent. The findings of the three lower courts concur on this fact.
The contract of lease has a period of six (6) years commencing in December 1999. This fact is again buttressed by Spouses Latips admission
that they occupied the property forthwith in December 1999, bearing in mind the brisk sales during the holiday season.
On the conflicting interpretations by the lower courts of the receipts amounting to P2,570,000.00, we hold that the practice of payment of
goodwill money in the Baclaran area is an inadequate subject of judicial notice. Neither was Rosalie able to provide sufficient evidence that,
apart from the belatedly submitted Joint Affidavit of the stallholders of Roferxane Bldg., the said amount was simply for the payment of
goodwill money, and not payment for advance rentals by Spouses Latip.
In interpreting the evidence before us, we are guided by the Civil Code provisions on interpretation of contracts, to wit:
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that
are different from those which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual.
The RTC was already on the right track when it declared that the receipts for P2,570,000.00 modified or supplemented the contract of lease.
However, it made a quantum leap when it ruled that the amount was payment for rentals of the two (2) cubicles for the entire six-year period.
We cannot subscribe to this finding. To obviate confusion and for clarity, the contents of the receipts, already set forth above, are again
reproduced:
1. I received the amount of P2,000,000.00 (two million pesos) from [O]mar Latip & Moshi[e]ra Latip for the payment of 2 cubicles located at
158 Quirino Ave. corner Redemptorist Rd.[,] Baclaran P[ara]que City. ROFERLAND Bldg. with the terms 6 yrs. Contract.
P2,000,000.00 ______(sgd.)______
CHECK # 3767924 Rosalie Chua
FAR EAST BANK
______(sgd.)______
Ferdinand Chua
2. Received cash
P500,000.00
From Moshiera Latip
(sgd.)
12/10/99 Rosalie Chua
Received by
3. Received cash
P70,000.00 from
Moshiera Latip
12-11-99
___(sgd.) ____
Received by:[14]
There is nothing on the receipts and on record that the payment and receipt of P2,570,000.00 referred to full payment of rentals for the whole
period of the lease. All three receipts state Rosalies receipt of cash in varying amounts. The first receipt for P2,000,000.00 did state payment
for two (2) cubicles, but this cannot mean full payment of rentals for the entire lease period when there are no words to that effect. Further,
two receipts were subsequently executed pointing to the obvious fact that the P2,000,000.00 is not for full payment of rentals. Thus, since the
contract of lease remained operative, we find that Rosalies receipt of the monies should be considered as advanced rentals on the leased
cubicles. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Rosalie demanded payment of the lease rentals only in 2000, a full year after the
commencement of the lease.
Finally, we note that the lease ended in 2005. Consequently, Spouses Latip can be ejected from the leased premises. They are liable to Rosalie
for unpaid rentals on the lease of the two (2) cubicles in accordance with the stipulations on rentals in the Contract of Lease. However, the
amount of P2,570,000.00, covering advance rentals, must be deducted from this liability of Spouses Latip to Rosalie.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89300 is REVERSED.
The petitioners, spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip, are liable to respondent Rosalie Chua for unpaid rentals minus the amount of
P2,570,000.00 already received by her as advance rentals. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle (retired), with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and Regalado E. Maambong
(retired), concurring; rollo, pp. 43-56.
[2] Penned by Presiding Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, CA rollo. pp. 36-43.
[3] Penned by Presiding Judge Jansen R. Rodriguez, CA rollo, pp. 44-49.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 72-73.
[5] Except for this designation in the receipt, the building where the leased cubicles are located is referred to in the records as Roferxane Bldg.
[6] CA rollo, pp. 99, 102, 103.
[7] Id. at 48-49.
[8] Id. at 42.
[9] Rollo, p. 55.
[10] A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236 SCRA 505, 521-522.
[11] Emphasis supplied.
[12] G.R. No. 152392, May 26, 2005, 459 SCRA 147, 162.
[13] CA rollo, p. 40.
[14] Supra note 6.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 145169 May 13, 2004
SIENA REALTY CORPORATION, as represented by LYDIA CO HAO and LILIBETH MANLUGON, petitioner, vs. HON. LOLITA GAL-LANG, as Presiding
Judge of the RTC of Manila, Branch 44; ANITA CO NG in trust for ROCKEFELLER NG; and the COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL 13th DIVISION,
respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Challenged via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court is the September 13, 2000 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 59096, Siena Realty Corporation, as represented by Lydia Co Hao and Lilibeth Manlugon v. Hon. Lolita O.
Gal-lang, as Presiding Judge of Br. 44 of the RTC of Manila, and Anita Co Ng in trust for Rockefeller Ng.
Since the petition attributes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in the issuance of subject resolution, what should
have been filed was one for certiorari under Rule 65. On this score alone, the petition must be denied due course.
But even if technicality were set aside, just the same the petition fails.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals on June 7, 2000 or allegedly on the 60th day from their receipt of the
March 23, 2000 Order of Branch 44 of the Manila Regional Trial Court denying their motion for Reconsideration of said court’s Order
dismissing, on motion of private respondent, their complaint.
The Court of Appeals, by Resolution1 of June 20, 2000, dismissed petitioner’s petition for certiorari, however, for being filed out of time, it
holding that:
Per records, it appears that petitioners had only until May 29, 2000 within which to file the Petition for Certiorari considering the following:
1. Petitioners received a copy of the October 20, 1999 Order denying their [counsel’s] Notice of Withdrawal [and likewise denying petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dismissing their complaint] on November 8, 1999;
2. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the October 20, 1999 Order on November 17, 1999; and that
3. Petitioners received a copy of the March 23, 2000 Order denying their motion for reconsideration on April 8, 2000.
The instant petition was filed on June 7, 2000 or nine (9) days late.
Thus, for being belatedly filed, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Petitioners thereupon filed (on July 10, 2000) a motion for reconsideration2 of the above-said June 20, 2000 Order of the appellate court.
In the meantime, this Court issued in A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC (Reglamentary Period to File Petitions for Certiorari and Petition for Review on
Certiorari) a Resolution dated August 1, 2000 approving the amendment to the following provision of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure:
SECTION 4. Where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order, resolution
sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless
otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed
shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less
than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The amendment to Sec. 4, Rule 65, which took effect on September 1, 2000, reads:
SECTION 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period
shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
The Court of Appeals, acting on petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration of its Order of June 20, 2000, denied, by Resolution of September 13,
2000,3 said motion in this wise:
xxx
From the argument espoused by petitioners’ counsel, it appears that he overlooked the provision of second paragraph of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended per Supreme Court Circular dated July 21, 1998, which provides as follows:
"If the petitioner had filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration after notice of said judgment, order or resolution, the period herein fixed
shall be interrupted. If the motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the remaining period, but which shall not be less
than five (5) days in any event, reckoned from notice of such denial. No extension of time shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days."
Verily, the sixty (60) day period within which to file a Petition for Certiorari is not counted from the date of the receipt of the denial of Motion
for Reconsideration, but from the date of the receipt of the questioned order or decision, except that such 60-day period is interrupted upon
the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, for reason above-stated, the instant motion is DENIED. Consequently, the present Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED with
finality. (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, the petition at bar, petitioners challenging the September 13, 2000 Resolution of the appellant court as having been
. . . ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AS IT WAS MADE WITHOUT TAKING PRIOR JUDICIAL NOTICE OF SUPREME COURT A.M. NO. 00-
2 - 03 SC WHICH RESOLUTION TOOK EFFECT ON SEPTEMBER 1, 2000, AND WHICH AMENDED THE SECOND PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 4, RULE 65
OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.4 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner’s argument is well-taken.
Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence reads:
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. – A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Even if petitioner did not raise or allege the amendment in their motion for reconsideration before it, the Court of Appeals should have taken
mandatory judicial notice of this Court’s resolution in A.M. Matter No. 00-02-03 SC. The resolution did not have to specify that it had
retroactive effect as it pertains to a procedural matter. Contrary to private respondent’s allegation that the matter was no longer pending and
undetermined, the issue of whether the petition for certiorari was timely filed was still pending reconsideration when the amendment took
effect on September 1, 2000, hence, covered by the its retroactive application.
The amendatory rule in their favor notwithstanding, petitioners’ petition fails as stated early on. The order of the trial court granting private
respondent’s Motion to Dismiss the complaint was a final, not interlocutory, order and as such, it was subject to appeal,5 not a petition for
certiorari. At the time petitioners filed before the appellate court their petition for certiorari on the 60th day following their receipt of the
October 20, 1999 Order of the trial court denying their Motion for Reconsideration of its dismissal order, the said October 20, 1999 Order had
become final and executory after the 15th day following petitioners’ receipt thereof.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo at 39-40.
2 Id. at 105-107.
3 Id. at 37-38.
4 Id. at 22.
5 Sec. 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

B.E. SAN DIEGO, INC., Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS and JOVITA MATIAS, Respondents.
G.R. No. 159230
Present:
*NACHURA, J., **BRION, Acting Chairperson, VILLARAMA, JR., ***MENDOZA, and SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
October 18, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Petitioner B. E. San Diego, Inc. (B.E. San Diego) filed before the Court a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the September 25, 2002
decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 50213. The CA decision reversed the June 22, 1995 decision[3] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Malabon, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 1421-MN.[4] The RTC in turn granted the complaint for recovery of possession[5]
instituted by B. E. San Diego against private respondent Jovita Matias (Matias).
THE FACTS
B.E. San Diego alleged that it is the registered owner of a parcel of land (subject property) located in Hernandez Street, Catmon, Malabon,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-134756 of the Register of Deeds of Caloocan, and delineated as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13, with
an area of 228 square meters. B. E. San Diego claimed that Matias has been occupying the subject property for over a year without its
authority or consent. As both its oral and written demands to vacate were left unheeded, B. E. San Diego filed a complaint for the recovery of
possession of the subject property against Matias on March 15, 1990 before the RTC.[6]
In her answer to the complaint, Matias alleged that she and her family have been living on the subject property since the 1950s on the basis of
a written permit issued by the local government of Malabon in 1954.[7] Matias stated that she and her family have introduced substantial
improvements on the subject property and have been regularly paying realty taxes thereon. She further claimed that she is a legitimate
beneficiary of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1517[8] and PD No. 2016,[9] which classified the subject property as part of the Urban Land Reform
Zone (ULRZ) and an Area for Priority Development (APD).
More importantly, she questioned B. E. San Diegos claim over the subject property by pointing out that the title relied on by B. E. San Diego
(TCT No. T-134756) covers a property located in Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, while the subject property is actually located in Barrio Catmon,
Malabon. Matias thus claimed that the property she is occupying in Barrio Catmon is different from the property that B. E. San Diego seeks to
recover in the possessory action before the RTC.[10]
The RTC found no issue as to the identity of the property, ruling that the property covered by B. E. San Diegos TCT No. T-134756, located in
Barrio Tinajeros, is the same property being occupied by Matias, located in Barrio Catmon. The RTC took judicial notice of the fact that Barrio
Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros. It found that the Approved Subdivision Plan and tax declarations showed that the subject
property is located in Barrio Catmon, Malabon. The RTC thus declared that B. E. San Diego sufficiently proved its right to recover possession of
the subject property on the basis of its TCT No. T-134756. As opposed to B. E. San Diegos clear right, it found Matias claimed of possession
over the subject property as a long-time occupant and as a beneficiary of PD Nos. 1517 and 2016 unfounded.[11]
On appeal, the CA disagreed with the RTCs findings. It considered the discrepancy in the location significant and declared that this should have
prompted the RTC to require an expert witness from the concerned government agency to explain the matter. Since it was undisputed that
Matias was in actual possession of the subject property at the time of the filing of the complaint, the CA declared that her possession should
have been upheld under Article 538 of the Civil Code.[12] The CA also upheld Matias possession based on PD Nos. 1517 and 2016. [13]
As its motion for reconsideration of the CAs judgment was denied,[14] B. E. San Diego filed the present petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
B. E. San Diego contends that the CA erred in reversing the RTCs finding on the sole basis of a discrepancy, which it claims has been explained
and controverted by the evidence it presented. It assails the CA decision for failing to consider the following evidence which adequately show
that the property covered by its TCT No. T-134756 is the same property occupied by Matias:
a. TCT No. T-134756 issued in the name of B. E. San Diego, covering a property delineated as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13;
b. Approved Subdivision Plan showing Lot No. 3, Block No. 3 is situated in Barrio Catmon, Malabon;
c. Tax Declaration No. B-005-00296 issued in the name of B. E. San Diego, referring to a property covered by TCT No. T-134756;
d. Testimonial evidence of B. E. San Diegos witness that the property described in TCT No. T-134756 is the same property occupied by
Matias; and
e. Judicial notice taken by the RTC of Malabon, based on public and common knowledge, that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio
Tinajeros, Malabon.
B. E. San Diego also alleges that Matias is estopped from alleging that the property she is occupying is different from the property covered by
its TCT No. T-134756. Matias previously moved to dismiss its complaint for recovery of possession of the subject property (accion publiciana),
raising res judicata as ground.[15] She alleged that the accion publiciana[16] is barred by the judgment in an earlier ejectment case,[17] as
both involved the same parties, the same subject matter, and the same cause of action. The ejectment case involved a parcel of land covered
by TCT No. T-134756, located at Hernandez Street, Barrio Catmon, Malabon; Matias never questioned the identity and location of the property
in that case.[18] B. E. San Diego thus contends that Matias, by raising the ground of res judicata, has impliedly admitted there is no difference
in the subject matter of the two actions and, thus, could no longer question the identity and location of the subject property.
In controverting B. E. San Diegos petition, Matias relies on the same points that the CA discussed in its decision.
THE COURTS RULING
The Court finds the petition meritorious.

From the errors raised in the petition, what emerges as a primary issue is the identity of the subject matter of the case whether the subject
property that Matias occupies is the same as the property covered by B. E. San Diegos title. Our reading of the records discloses that the two
are one and the same.
B. E. San Diegos TCT No. T-134756 refers to a property located in Barrio Tinajeros, Malabon, but the subject property sought to be recovered
from Matias is in Barrio Catmon, Malabon. In ruling for Matias, the CA declared that this discrepancy should have been explained by an expert
witness, which B. E. San Diego failed to present.
The Court, however, does not find the testimony of an expert witness necessary to explain the discrepancy. The RTC declared that the
discrepancy arose from the fact that Barrio Catmon was previously part of Barrio Tinajeros. The RTC has authority to declare so because this is
a matter subject of mandatory judicial notice. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court[19] includes geographical divisions as among matters
that courts should take judicial notice of. Given that Barrio Tinajeros is adjacent to Barrio Catmon,[20] we find it likely that, indeed, the two
barrios previously formed one geographical unit.
Even without considering judicial notice of the geographical divisions within a political unit, sufficient evidence exists supporting the RTCs
finding that the subject property B. E. San Diego seeks to recover is the Barrio Catmon property in Matias possession. TCT No. T-134756
identifies a property in Barrio Tinajeros as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13. Although B. E. San Diegos tax declaration refers to a property in Barrio
Catmon, it nevertheless identifies it also as Lot No. 3, Block No. 13, covered by the same TCT No. T-134756. Indeed, both title and the tax
declaration share the same boundaries to identify the property. With this evidence, the trial court judge can very well ascertain the facts to
resolve the discrepancy, and dispense with the need for the testimony of an expert witness.[21]
Additionally, we agree with B. E. San Diego that Matias can no longer question the identity of the property it seeks to recover when she
invoked res judicata as ground to dismiss the accion publiciana that is the root of the present petition. An allegation of res judicata necessarily
constitutes an admission that the subject matter of the pending suit (the accion publiciana) is the same as that in a previous one (the
ejectment case).[22] That Matias never raised the discrepancy in the location stated in B.E. San Diegos title and the actual location of the
subject property in the ejectment suit bars her now from raising the same. Thus, the issue of identity of the subject matter of the case has
been settled by Matias admission and negates the defenses she raised against B. E. San Diegos complaint.
We then proceed to resolve the core issue of the accion publiciana who between the parties is entitled possession of the subject property.
Notably, the judgment in the ejectment suit that B. E. San Diego previously filed against Matias is not determinative of this issue and will not
prejudice B. E. San Diegos claim.[23] While there may be identity of parties and subject matter, there is no identity of cause of action between
the two cases; an action for ejectment and accion publiciana, though both referring to the issue of possession, differ in the following manner:
First, forcible entry should be filed within one year from the unlawful dispossession of the real property, while accion publiciana is filed a year
after the unlawful dispossession of the real property. Second, forcible entry is concerned with the issue of the right to the physical possession
of the real property; in accion publiciana, what is subject of litigation is the better right to possession over the real property. Third, an action
for forcible entry is filed in the municipal trial court and is a summary action, while accion publiciana is a plenary action in the RTC.[24]
B. E. San Diego anchors it right to possess based on its ownership of the subject property, as evidenced by its title. Matias, on the other hand,
relies on (1) the 1954 permit she secured from the local government of Malabon, (2) the Miscellaneous Sales Application, (3) the tax
declarations and realty tax payments she made annually beginning 1974, (4) her standing as beneficiary of PD Nos. 1517 and 2016, and (5) her
long possession of the subject property since 1954 up to the present. Unfortunately for Matias, her evidence does not establish a better right
of possession over B. E. San Diegos ownership.
The settled doctrine in property law is that no title to register land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.[25] Even if the possession is coupled with payment of realty taxes, we cannot apply in Matias case the rule
that these acts combined constitute proof of the possessors claim of title.[26] Despite her claim of possession since 1954, Matias began paying
realty taxes on the subject property only in 1974 when B. E. San Diego filed an ejectment case against her husband/predecessor, Pedro
Matias.[27] Considering these circumstances, we find Matias payment of realty taxes suspect.
Matias cannot rely on the Miscellaneous Sales Application and the local government permit issued in her favor; neither establishes a clear right
in favor of Matias over the subject property. A sales application, in the absence of approval by the Bureau of Lands or the issuance of a sales
patent, remains simply as an application that does not vest title in the applicant.[28] The local government permit contained only a statement
of the local executive that the case between the local government and B. E. San Diego was decided by a trial court in favor of the former.[29]
The CA erroneously upheld Matias claim of possession based on PD Nos. 1517 and 2016. Matias is not a qualified beneficiary of these laws. The
tenants/occupants who have a right not to be evicted from urban lands does not include those whose presence on the land is merely tolerated
and without the benefit of contract, those who enter the land by force or deceit, or those whose possession is under litigation. [30] At the time
of PD 1517s enactment, there was already a pending ejectment suit between B. E. San Diego and Pedro Matias over the subject property.
Occupants of the land whose presence therein is devoid of any legal authority, or those whose contracts of lease were already terminated or
had already expired, or whose possession is under litigation, are not considered tenants under the [PD Nos. 1517].[31] The RTC correctly ruled
that Matias cannot be considered a legitimate tenant who can avail the benefits of these laws no matter how long her possession of the
subject property was.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the September 25, 2002 decision and May 20, 2003 resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50213. The June 22, 1995 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malabon in Civil Case No. 1421-MN is
REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-24.

[2] Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao and Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria
concurring, id. at 29-35.
[3] Penned by Judge (now CA Associate Justice) Bienvenido L. Reyes, records, pp. 329-338.
[4] Also assailed in the present petition is the May 20, 2003 resolution of the CA, denying B. E. San Diegos motion for reconsideration of the
September 25, 2002 decision, rollo, p. 37.
[5] Records, pp. 2-4. [6] Id. at 2-4.
[7] Payahag dated December 24, 1954, id. at 277.
[8] Entitled Proclaiming Urban Land Reform in the Philippines and Providing for the Implementing Machinery Thereof, Section 6 of which
grants preferential rights to landless tenants/occupants to acquire land within urban land reform areas.
[9] Entitled Prohibiting the Eviction of Occupant Families from Land Identified and Proclaimed as Areas for Priority Development (APD) or as
Urban Land Reform Zones and Exempting Such Land from Payment of Real Property Taxes, Section 2 of which prohibits the eviction of
qualified tenants/occupants.
[10] Records, pp. 12-16. [11] Id. at 336-339.
[12] Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession.
Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer
in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
[13] Rollo, pp. 33-34. [14] Supra note 4. [15] Records, pp. 61-63. [16] Civil Case No. 1421-MN.
[17] Civil Case No. 668-87 is one of the four ejectment cases instituted by B. E. San Diego against the Matias family before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 56.
[18] The RTC denied Matias motion to dismiss in its Order dated March 5, 1991, records, pp. 95-96. The CA dismissed Matias certiorari petition
(CA-G.R. No. 26172) assailing the denial of her motion to dismiss in its Order dated October 10, 1991, id. at 124.
[19] RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Section 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of
evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of
nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts
of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical
divisions.
[20] Malabon City map at http://www.kabeetmaps.com/flash/detail.php?name_id=1124592.
[21] Expert witnesses are not allowed to give opinion evidence if from the other evidence available, the judge can be put in possession of the
facts. Such evidence, if permitted, would result in the substitution of the judgment of experts for that of the court, R. Francisco, Evidence
(1994 ed.), pp. 351-352, citing McBain, California Evidence Manual, p. 278.
[22] For res judicata to apply, there must be (1) a former judgment or order that is final and executory, (2) rendered by a court that has
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties, (3) the former judgment or order was resolved on the merits, and (4) there is identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action between the first and second actions, see Agustin v. de los Santos, G.R. No. 168139, January 20,
2009, 576 SCRA 576, 586.
[23] The Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Malabon, Branch 56, granted B. E. San Diegos ejectment complaint against Matias (see rollo, pp. 41-
44). The RTC of Malabon, Branch 72, reversed the MTCs decision after finding that B. E. San Diegos complaint failed to allege that it had prior
physical possession of the property (see records, pp. 64-66).
[24] Regis v. CA, G. R. No. 153914, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 611, 620; see also Custodio v. Corrado, G. R. No. 146082, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA
500.
[25] PD No. 1529, Section 47.
[26] Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia
of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least
constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property, Director of Lands v. CA, G.R. No.
103949, June 17, 1999, 308 SCRA 317, 324-325, citing Republic v. CA, 258 SCRA 712 (1996).
[27] Civil Case No. 3667.
[28] Javier v. CA, G. R. No. 101177, March 28, 1994, 231 SCRA 498, 507.
[29] Supra note 7.
[30] Estreller v. Ysmael, G. R. No. 170264, March 13, 2009, 581 SCRA 247, 256.
[31] Ibid.
SECOND DIVISION
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, Petitioner,- versus - BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON,Respondents.
G.R. No. 177407
Promulgated:
February 9, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated September 22, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza),
which, in turn, assailed the Orders[2] issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in
1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests.
The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing.
Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or
incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of
the removal of private respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also
named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her
Exhibits A to D, which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she
was operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:
EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 2 as it was actually
originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal
complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the
ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked as
Annex 2 to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer
to this complaint;
EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex 3 as it was actually
likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection
with the criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation
of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of the
document marked as Annex 3 which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended as such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated
March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.
EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 4, on which are handwritten
entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex 16, on which are handwritten
entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final
report of the same examination which is the document appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr.
Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked as
Annex 4 is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked as Annex 1 is a certified photocopy. Both
documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that which are written on Exhibit D.
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are
inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are
hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004.
It reads:
The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of [herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents]
De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they
may serve in the resolution of this case.
Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons stated in his comment/objections to the
formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it should first admit the
evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can determine whether
the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x x x.[3]
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders which
admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004
WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004
OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT
AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A PROPERTY
RIGHT OR ONES LIVELIHOOD.[4]
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence
the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that
completely or finally disposes of the case.[5] At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. Embedded in the CAs finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of
whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not been properly
identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the
exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the
BOM.[6] Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence,[7] in connection with evidence which may
appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found
relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding them or ignoring them.[8]
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same
pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals[9] teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand,
the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is
misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these
proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence
which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.[10]
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate,
the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated
on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999,
filed in connection with Edithas medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These
exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City,
which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled
her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their
proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the
time of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.[11]
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact.[12] Thus, they likewise
provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and
discretionary.[13] Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology,[14] include the structural make-up and composition of
living things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as
with most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the
fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office.
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right
functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously
discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the
exhibits offered in evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. To further drive home the point, the
anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed.[15] Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the
Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new
building.[16] Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter,
the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
[1] Penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (a retired member of this Court), with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enrique, Jr. and Vicente S.E.
Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp. 95-106.
[2] Dated May 26, 2004 and October 8, 2004, respectively; id. at 408-411.
[3] Id. at 95-99.

[4] Id. at 677-678.
[5] Raymundo v. Isagon Vda. de Suarez, G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 384, 403-404.
[6] Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 451 Phil. 839, 845-846 (2003).
[7] Francisco, EVIDENCE RULES 128-134 (3rd ed. 1996), p. 9.
[8] Id., citing People v. Jaca, et al., 106 Phil. 572, 575 (1959).
[9] 358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998).
[10] Rollo, p. 101.
[11] RULES OF COURT, Rule 129, Sec. 1.
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
[14] Science of life, definition of Websters Third New International Dictionary.
[16] TSN, July 17, 2003; rollo, pp. 347-348.
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, - versus - OSCAR M. DOCUMENTO, Appellant.
G.R. No. 188706
Promulgated: March 17, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.:
On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] dated August 13, 2008, affirming the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) Decision[3] dated June 9,
2003, finding appellant Oscar Documento guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of Rape.
Documento was charged before the RTC with two (2) counts of Rape, as defined and punished under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, in
separate Informations, which read:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6899
That sometime on April 22, 1996 at Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with his
daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659).
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6900
That sometime on October 15, 1995 at Barangay Antongalon, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with the use of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with his daughter AAA, a minor, 16 years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659).[4]
Upon arraignment, Documento pled not guilty. Subsequently, however, he changed his earlier plea to one of guilt. As such, the RTC ordered a
re-arraignment and entered appellants plea of guilt to the charges.
Thereafter, the prosecution presented evidence consisting of the testimonies of private complainant herself, AAA, her mother, BBB, and Dr.
Johann A. Hugo. Their testimonies established the following:
1. Documento started sexually molesting his daughter, AAA, in 1989 when she was ten (10) years old. Eventually, AAA became pregnant and
gave birth in 1993.
2. Documento raped AAA on a number of occasions in the houses of Barsilisa Morada, Documentos relative, and Aida Documento, both
located in Butuan City. During each incident, Documento hit and hurt AAA physically. He likewise threatened to kill her if she told anyone of
the rape.
3. AAAs mother, BBB, who was working in Manila from 1994 to 1996, went to Barsilisa and asked for help in locating Oscar and AAA. BBB
testified that she had not seen nor heard from the two since April 7, 1994, when Documento brought their daughters AAA and CCC to Tubod,
Lanao del Norte, for a vacation. Thereafter, Documento left CCC in Tubod and brought AAA with him to Santiago, Agusan del Norte.
4. When BBB found out from their relatives that AAA got pregnant and gave birth, she suspected that Documento was the culprit. Upon
learning that Documento and AAA were in Butuan City, she went to the Butuan Police Station and requested assistance in securing custody of
AAA. As soon as Documento was arrested, AAA informed the police that Documento raped her.
5. Dr. Hugo testified on the genital examination he conducted on AAA, and affirmed the medical certificate he issued with the following
findings:
Physical exam: HEENT with in normal limits.

C/L with in normal limits.
CVB with in normal limits.
ABD Soft; NABS
GU (-) KPS
Genitalia - Parrous
- Healed vaginal laceration
- Vaginal introitus; admits 2 finger[s]
with ease
- Hymen with pemnants caruncula
multiforma
Labs; Vaginal Smear; Negative for Spermatozoa.[5]

Documento testified as the sole witness for the defense. He asseverated that he pled guilty to the crime of Rape only because Prosecutor
Hector B. Salise convinced him to do so. Documento contended that he did not rape AAA, and that, to the contrary, they had a consensual,
sexual relationship. He further alleged that the incident did not happen in Butuan City, but in Clarin, Misamis Occidental. Finally, on cross-
examination, Documento disowned the handwritten letters he had supposedly written to his wife and to AAA, asking for their forgiveness.
The RTC rendered judgment convicting Documento of both counts of Rape, to wit:
WHEREFORE, as a consequence of the foregoing, this Court finds accused Oscar M. Documento GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the two
(2) counts of rape and correspondingly sentences him:
1. To suffer the penalty of DEATH in each of the two (2) rape cases filed against him - Criminal Case No. 6899 and Criminal Case No. 6900;
2. To indemnify the victim, AAA, in the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, respectively, for each count of rape in accordance with recent jurisprudence.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused Oscar M. Documento from Butuan City Jail to the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
Let the records of these cases be forwarded immediately to the Supreme Court for mandatory review.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Consistent with our ruling in People v. Mateo,[7] Documentos appeal was remanded to the CA.
Ruling on the appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs conviction, but changed the penalty imposed on Documento from death penalty to reclusion
perpetua, and increased the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00 for each count of Rape. The fallo of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision finding appellant Oscar Documento guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of the crime of rape and
ordering him to indemnify the victim for each count of rape the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is increased to P75,000.00 for each count of rape and that in
lieu of the death penalty, appellant Oscar Documento is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of rape
without possibility of parole.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Hence, this appeal, assigning the following errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING THE CASE WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OVER THE CRIME
CHARGED AS THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE TWO (2) COUNTS OF RAPE WERE PERPETRATED IN BUTUAN CITY.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONDUCT A SEARCHING INQUIRY INTO THE VOLUNTARINESS AND FULL COMPREHENSION BY
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PLEA.[9]
We find no cogent reason to disturb Documentos conviction. We affirm the CA, but with modification.
On the issue of the trial courts territorial jurisdiction over the crime, we completely agree with the appellate courts ruling thereon. Contrary to
the insistence of Documento that the prosecution failed to establish that the two (2) counts of Rape were perpetrated in Butuan City, the CA
pointed to specific parts of the records which show that, although AAA did not specifically mention Butuan City in her testimony, the incidents
in the present cases transpired in Barangay Antongalon and on Ochoa Avenue, both in Butuan City.
First. AAA in her Sworn Statement dated April 24, 1996 answered the prosecutors question in this wise:
15. Q : Right after you arrived [in] Butuan City, did your father molest you or rape you?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : When was that?

A : From the month of October 15, 1995 when we stayed [in] Barangay Antongalon, Butuan City, and the last happened in the evening of April
22, 1996 [on] Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City.
Second. The Resolution dated May 3, 1996 of Hector B. Salise, Second Assistant City Prosecutor, states that:
There were many places they stayed and several sexual intercourse that took place which this office has no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation but only on the incidents of rape that took place [in] Antongalon, Butuan City on October 15, 1995 and [on] Ochoa Avenue,
Butuan City on April 22, 1996.
Third. The two (2) Informations dated May 8, 1996, clearly state that the crimes charged against appellant were perpetrated in Barangay
Antongalon and Ochoa Avenue, Butuan City on October 15, 1995 and April 22, 1996, respectively.
Fourth. The inclusion of the two Barangays in the City of Butuan is a matter of mandatory judicial notice by the trial court. Section 1 of Rule
129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.[10]
Documento avers that his conviction for Rape must be reversed because the trial court did not properly conduct a searching inquiry on the
voluntariness and full comprehension of his plea of guilt.
We disagree.
It is true that the appellate court noted the trial courts failure to conduct the prescribed searching inquiry into the matter of whether or not
Documentos plea of guilt was improvidently made. Nonetheless, it still found the conviction of appellant proper. Its disquisition on
Documentos plea of guilt is in point.
Nothing in the records of the case at bench shows that the trial court complied with the guidelines [set forth by the Supreme Court in a
number of cases] after appellants re-arraignment and guilty plea. The questions propounded to appellant during the direct and cross-
examination likewise fall short of these requirements. x x x.
xxxx
The questions propounded were clearly not compliant with the guidelines set forth by the High Court. The appellant was not fully apprised of
the consequences of his guilty plea. In fact, as argued by appellant, the trial court should have informed him that his plea of guilt would not
affect or reduce the imposable penalty, which is death as he might have erroneously believed that under Article 63, the death penalty, being a
single indivisible penalty, shall be applied by the court regardless of any mitigating circumstances that might have attended the commission of
the deed. Moreover, the trial court judge failed to inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea.
With the trial courts failure to comply with the guidelines, appellants guilty plea is deemed improvidently made and thus rendered
inefficacious.
This does not mean, however, that the case should be remanded to the trial court. This course of action is appropriate only when the
appellants guilty plea was the sole basis for his conviction. As held in People v. Mira, -
Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellants guilty plea, we are not inclined to remand the case to the trial court as suggested
by appellant. Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the judgment. If the trial court
relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
merely on the guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of the offense charged.[11]
On the whole, we find that the appellate court committed no reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling convicting Documento.
Lastly, on the matter of the appellate courts award of exemplary damages, we increase the award from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00 in line with
prevailing jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated August 13, 2008 in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 00285 is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is hereby increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The Decision is affirmed in all other
respects.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja, with Associate Justices Mario V. Lopez and Elihu A. Ybaez, concurring; rollo, pp. 5-26.
[2] Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch 5.
[3] Penned by Judge Augustus L. Calo, CA rollo, pp. 21-38.
[4] Rollo, p. 6.
[5] Id. at 8.
[6] CA rollo, p. 38.
[7] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[8] Rollo, pp. 25-26.
[9] CA rollo, p. 50.
[10] Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[11] Id. at 13-16.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149724. August 19, 2003]
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES, represented herein by its Secretary, HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. DENR
REGION 12 EMPLOYEES, represented by BAGUIDALI KARIM, Acting President of COURAGE (DENR Region 12 Chapter), respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the Resolutions dated May 31, 2000[1] of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for certiorari
in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896, and its Resolution dated August 20, 2001[2], which denied the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi,
issued a Memorandum[3] directing the immediate transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly
Marbel), South Cotabato. The Memorandum was issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary
Antonio H. Cerilles, which reads in part:
Subject: Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of Administrative Units in the Regional and Field Offices:
Pursuant to Executive Order No. 192, dated June 10, 1987 and as an interim administrative arrangement to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in delivering its services pending approval of the government-
wide reorganization by Congress, the following redefinition of functions and realignment of administrative units in the regional and field
offices are hereby promulgated:
Section 1. Realignment of Administrative Units:
The DENR hereby adopts a policy to establish at least one Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative
Unit per Congressional District except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the National Capital Region (NCR). The
Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby authorized to realign/relocate existing CENROs and implement this policy in accordance with
the attached distribution list per region which forms part of this Order. Likewise, the following realignment and administrative arrangements
are hereby adopted:
xxxxxxxxx
1.6. The supervision of the Provinces of South Cotabato and Sarangani shall be transferred from Region XI to XII.[4]
Respondents, employees of the DENR Region XII who are members of the employees association, COURAGE, represented by their Acting
President, Baguindanai A. Karim, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato, a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary
injunction.
On December 8, 1999, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioner from implementing the assailed Memorandum.
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, defendants DENR Secretary Antonio H. Cerilles and Regional Executive Director Israel C. Gaddi are hereby ordered to cease and
desist from doing the act complained of, namely, to stop the transfer of DENR [Region] 12 offices from Cotabato City to Korandal (Marbel),
South Cotabato.
xxx xxx xxx.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Dismiss, raising the following grounds:
I.
The power to transfer the Regional Office of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) is executive in nature.
II.
The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on Executive Order No. 429, which reorganized Region XII.
III.
The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in the Case of Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255.
IV.
Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is Executive in Nature citing Chiongbian, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain this petition.[6]
On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
CONSEQUENTLY, order is hereby issued ordering the respondents herein to cease and desist from enforcing their Memorandum Order dated
November 15, 1999 relative to the transfer of the DENR Regional Offices from Region 12 to Region 11 at Koronadal, South Cotabato for being
bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on their part, and they are further
ordered to return back the seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to Cotabato City.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 10, 2000. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was filed before the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 58896. The petition was dismissed outright for: (1) failure to submit a written explanation why
personal service was not done on the adverse party; (2) failure to attach affidavit of service; (3) failure to indicate the material dates when
copies of the orders of the lower court were received; (4) failure to attach certified true copy of the order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration; (5) for improper verification, the same being based on petitioners knowledge and belief, and (6) wrong remedy of certiorari
under Rule 65 to substitute a lost appeal.[8]
The motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution dated August 20, 2001.[9] Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of
errors:
RULES OF PROCEDURE CAN NOT BE USED TO DEFEAT THE ENDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE
II
THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DATED 14 JANUARY 2000 WHICH WAS AFFIRMED IN THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS DATED 31 MAY 2000 AND 20 AUGUST 2001 IS PATENTLY ILLEGAL AND SHOULD BE NULLIFIED, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. RESPONDENTS HAVE NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER AS THEY HAVE NO RIGHT TO CAUSE THE DENR REGION 12 OFFICE TO
REMAIN IN COTABATO CITY.
B. THE STATE DID NOT GIVE ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED.
C. THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DATED 14 JANUARY 2000 IS CONTRARY TO THE RULE OF PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS.
D. IN ANY EVENT, THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT DATED 14 JANUARY 2000 IS CONTRARY TO THE LETTER AND INTENT OF EXECUTIVE
ORDER NO. 429 AND REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734.
E. THE DETERMINATION OF THE PROPRIETY AND PRACTICALITY OF THE TRANSFER OF REGIONAL OFFICES IS INHERENTLY EXECUTIVE, AND
THEREFORE, NON-JUSTICIABLE.[10]
In essence, petitioner argues that the trial court erred in enjoining it from causing the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices, considering
that it was done pursuant to DENR Administrative Order 99-14.
The issues to be resolved in this petition are: (1) Whether DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid; and (2)
Whether the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR.
Prefatorily, petitioner prays for a liberal application of procedural rules considering the greater interest of justice.
This Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures ensure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Time and again, courts have been
guided by the principle that the rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as rules of procedure are used
only to help secure and not to override substantial justice.[11] Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within the power of this Court to suspend the rules, or except a particular case from its operation.[12]
Despite the presence of procedural flaws, we find it necessary to address the issues because of the demands of public interest, including the
need for stability in the public service and the serious implications this case may cause on the effective administration of the executive
department. Although no appeal was made within the reglementary period to appeal, nevertheless, the departure from the general rule that
the extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal is justified because the execution of the assailed
decision would amount to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.[13]
Petitioner maintains that the assailed DAO-99-14 and the implementing memorandum were valid and that the trial court should have taken
judicial notice of Republic Act No. 6734, otherwise known as An Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, and its
implementing Executive Order 429,[14] as the legal bases for the issuance of the assailed DAO-99-14. Moreover, the validity of R.A. No. 6734
and E.O. 429 were upheld in the case of Chiongbian v. Orbos.[15] Thus, the respondents cannot, by means of an injunction, force the DENR XII
Regional Offices to remain in Cotabato City, as the exercise of the authority to transfer the same is executive in nature.
It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of
the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in
cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless
disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.[16]
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which
reads:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
However, as head of the Executive Department, the President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers personally
all the time. He may delegate some of his powers to the Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts personally.[17]
In Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Zamora,[18] this Court upheld the continuing authority of the President to carry out the reorganization in any
branch or agency of the executive department. Such authority includes the creation, alteration or abolition of public offices.[19] The Chief
Executives authority to reorganize the National Government finds basis in Book III, Section 20 of E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, viz:
Section 20. Residual Powers. Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the
President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the President
in accordance with law.
Further, in Larin v. Executive Secretary,[20] this Court had occasion to rule:
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is
Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish
offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of
these two decrees is unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.
So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated
to his cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department. Thus, in DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot,[21] we held that the
President through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the DOTC Secretary may legally and validly decree the reorganization of
the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region, with the
concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.
Similarly, in the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from
Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of
the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
The trial court should have taken judicial notice of R.A. No. 6734, as implemented by E.O. No. 429, as legal basis of the Presidents power to
reorganize the executive department, specifically those administrative regions which did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM. It is
axiomatic that a court has the mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining whether the allegations in a complaint
establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of
the questions before it.[22] In resolving the motion to dismiss, the trial court should have taken cognizance of the official acts of the legislative,
executive, and judicial departments because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the
political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the
laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis supplied)
Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides:
SECTION 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by
the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90)
days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote
for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however, That the President may, by
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Pursuant to the authority granted by the aforequoted provision, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued on October 12, 1990 E.O. 429,
Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao. Section 4 thereof provides:
SECTION 4. REGION XII, to be known as CENTRAL MINDANAO, shall include the following provinces and cities:
Provinces
Sultan Kudarat
Cotabato
South Cotabato
Cities
Cotabato
General Santos
The Municipality of Koronadal (Marinduque) in South Cotabato shall serve as the regional center.
In Chiongbian v. Orbos, this Court stressed the rule that the power of the President to reorganize the administrative regions carries with it the
power to determine the regional centers. In identifying the regional centers, the President purposely intended the effective delivery of the
field services of government agencies.[23] The same intention can be gleaned from the preamble of the assailed DAO-99-14 which the DENR
sought to achieve, that is, to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the DENR in delivering its services.
It may be true that the transfer of the offices may not be timely considering that: (1) there are no buildings yet to house the regional offices in
Koronadal, (2) the transfer falls on the month of Ramadan, (3) the children of the affected employees are already enrolled in schools in
Cotabato City, (4) the Regional Development Council was not consulted, and (5) the Sangguniang Panglungsond, through a resolution,
requested the DENR Secretary to reconsider the orders. However, these concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to
its legality. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or
the legislative department,[24] for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to
encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or
wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments.[25]
The Supreme Court should not be thought of as having been tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the entire bureaucracy.
Unless there is a clear showing of constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Courts
exercise of the judicial power, pervasive and limitless it may seem to be, still must succumb to the paramount doctrine of separation of
powers.[26] After a careful review of the records of the case, we find that this jurisprudential element of abuse of discretion has not been
shown to exist.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58896
dated May 31, 2000 and August 20, 2001, as well as the decision dated January 14, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City, Branch
15, in Civil Case No 389, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction, which enjoined the petitioner from enforcing the
Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive Director, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), abroad, on official business.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrardo M. Vasquez and Eriberto V. Rosario, Jr.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez and concurred in by Associate Justices Eriberto V. Rosario, Jr. and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.
[3] Rollo, p. 81. [4] Id., pp. 82-85.
[5] Id., p. 99. [6] Id., p. 8.
[7] Id., p. 80. [8] Id., pp. 40-41.
[9] Id., pp. 43-45. [10] Id., p. 4.
[11] Reyes v. Pepito, G.R. No. 131686, 18 March 2002.
[12] Coronel v. Desierto, G.R. No. 149022, 8 April 2003.
[13] Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corporation, G.R. No. 147465, 30 January 2002, citing Ruiz v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 101566, 26 March 1993, 220 SCRA 490.
[14] Providing for the Reorganization of the Administrative Regions in Mindanao and for other purposes.
[15] 315 Phil. 251 [1995].
[16] Joson v. Executive Secretary Reuben Torres, G.R. No. 131255, 20 May 1998, 290 SCRA 279, 303.
[17] Id.
[18] 413 Phil. 281, 295 [2001].
[19] DOTC Secretary v. Mabalot, G.R. No. 138200, 27 February 2002.
[20] 345 Phil. 962, 979 [1997].
[21] Supra.
[22] Peltan Development, Inc. v. CA, 336 Phil. 824, 834 [1997].
[23] E.O. No. 429.
[24] Separate Opinion, Panganiban, J., Garcia v. Corona, 378 Phil. 848, 876 [1999].
[25] Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 151-A Phil. 35 [1973].
[26] Separate Opinion, Vitug, J., Republic v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 664 [1997].
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117029. March 19, 1997]
PELTAN DEVELOPMENT, INC., PATROCINIO E. MARGOLLES, EDGARDO C. ESPINOSA, VIRGINIA E. VILLONGCO, LUCIA E. LAPERAL, NORMA C.[1]
ESPINOSA, TERESITA E. CASAL and ALICE E. SOTTO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ALEJANDRO Q. REY and JUAN B. ARAUJO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In resolving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, should the Court of Appeals invoke a Supreme Court decision
promulgated after such motion was filed by defendants and ruled upon by the trial court? Is such invocation violative of the rule that motions
to dismiss based on lack of cause of action should be ruled upon only on the basis of the allegations of the complaint? Who are the real
parties-in-interest in an action to cancel a Torrens certificate of title?
Petitioners challenge the Decision[2] of public respondent[3] in CA-G.R. CV No. 28244 promulgated on June 29, 1994, which ruled as
follows:[4]
WHEREFORE, the appealed order dated August 22, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is ordered to try the case on plaintiffs
(herein private respondents) complaint/amended complaint against all defendants (herein petitioners).
Let the original record of the case be returned to the court of origin.
In a Resolution[5] promulgated on September 2, 1994, Respondent Court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The order reversed by public respondent had been issued by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 112, in Civil Case No. LP-8852-P. The
order in part ruled:[6]
Considering the arguments and counter-arguments urged by the parties in this case, particularly on the nature and effect of the action filed by
plaintiffs, the Court is inclined to grant the Motion to Dismiss filed by defendant Peltan Development Corporation on the basis of the Supreme
Court ruling in Gabila vs. Barriga, 41 SCRA 131. The ultimate result of the cancellation prayed for by the plaintiffs, if granted by this Court,
would be to revert the property in question to the public domain. Therefore, the ultimate beneficiary of such cancellation would be the
Government. Since the Government can only be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, which has repeatedly refused to institute or
join an action for cancellation of defendants titles, then, the real party in interest cannot be said to have instituted the present action. It is the
Government, not the plaintiffs which is the real party in interest. Plaintiffs not being the real party in interest, they have no cause of action
against the defendants.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted and this case is hereby dismissed, without prejudice to plaintiffs pursuing administrative
relief in the proper government agencies concerned.
The Facts
The facts, as found by public respondent, are undisputed by the parties, to wit:[7]
On February 20, 1981 plaintiffs (herein private respondents) filed against eleven (11) defendants (herein petitioners) a complaint captioned for
Cancellation of Titles and Damages. On December 15, 1981, the complaint was amended by including or impleading as the twelfth defendant
the City Townhouse Development Corporation. Omitting the jurisdictional facts, the allegations in the amended complaint are quoted
hereunder:
II
Plaintiffs are applicants for a free patent over a parcel of land comprising an area of 197,527 square meters, more or less, situated in Barrio
Tindig na Manga, Las Pias, Metro Manila.
III
Prior to the filing of their petition for free patent, plaintiffs had for many years been occupying and cultivating the aforestated piece of land
until their crops, houses and other improvements they introduced thereon were illegally bulldozed and destroyed by persons led by defendant
Edgardo Espinosa x x x Thereafter, the same persons forcibly and physically drove out plaintiffs therefrom.
IV
Plaintiffs filed their petition for issuance of free patent covering the aforesaid property with the Bureau of Lands in May 1976, as a result of
which they were issued by the Lands Bureau Survey Authority No. 54 (IV-1) on December 16, 1976.
Accordingly, and on the strength of the aforesaid authority to survey, plaintiffs had the property surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Regino L.
Sobrerinas, Jr. on December 20-21, 1976.
VI
During the years that plaintiffs were occupying, cultivating, planting and staying on the aforestated parcel of land, neither x x x one of the
defendants was in possession thereof.
VII
The processing and eventual approval of plaintiffs free patent application or petition over the subject piece of land have, however, been
obstructed and/or held in abeyance, despite the absence of any opposition thereto, because of the alleged existence of several supposed
certificates of title thereon, x x x of the defendants, namely:
Peltan Development, Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-17992
xxx xxx xxx
VIII
The aforestated transfer certificates of title of the abovenamed defendants, plaintiffs discovered, and therefore they hereby allege, were all
derived from an alleged Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 supposedly issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal and registered in the name of
the Spouses Lorenzo Gana and Maria Juliana Carlos in 1929 allegedly pursuant to Decree No. 351823 issued by the Court of First Instance of
Rizal in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 672.
IX
Plaintiffs, however, subsequently discovered, after a thorough research, that the alleged Original Certificate of Title No. 4216 of the Spouses
Lorenzo Gana and Juliana Carlos whence all the transfer certificates of title of the x x x abovenamed defendants originated and/or were
derived from was FICTITIOUS and/or SPURIOUS x x x
xxx xxx xxx
Being, thus, derived and/or having originated from a FICTITIOUS and/or SPURIOUS original certificate of title (OCT No. 4216), as herein above
shown, ALL the aforestated transfer certificates of title of the x x x abovenamed defendants are, logically and imperatively, FAKE, SPURIOUS
and/or NULL AND VOID as well. Hence, they all must and should be CANCELED.
xxx xxx xxx
XIV
Before they decided to institute this action, plaintiffs informed, indeed they warned, the defendants that their so-called titles over the parcels
of land or portions thereof covered by plaintiffs free patent application and/or petition are either fake, spurious or void for reasons
aforestated. But the defendants simply ignored plaintiffs admonitions.
XV
Accordingly, plaintiffs were compelled to retain the services of the undersigned counsel to file this complaint not only because they have been
materially and substantially prejudiced by the existence of defendants spurious titles, but also because as citizens and taxpayers of this country
they have a legitimate interest in the disposition of alienable lands of the State, as well as the right to question any illegitimate, unlawful or
spurious award, disposition or registration thereof to protect not just their interest but also the public.
XVI
Because of the defendants illegal titling of the parcel of land or portions thereof covered by plaintiffs free patent application, and particularly
by the unlawful disturbance of plaintiffs possession thereof and destruction of plaintiffs plants and dwellings thereon, which was caused
and/or directed by the defendants Edgardo Espinosa and Pat C. Margolles, said defendants should be ordered to pay plaintiffs actual or
compensatory damages in such amount as may be proven during the trial of this case. (Original Records, Vol. I, pp. 202-214)
On the basis of the foregoing allegations, the prayer in the amended complaint states:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing, judgment (should) be rendered:
1. Canceling the transfer certificates of titles of the defendants as specified in par. VII hereof and/or declaring them null and void for having
originated or being derived from a fictitious, spurious or void original certificates of title.
2. Ordering defendants Edgardo Espinosa and Pat C. Margolles to pay plaintiffs actual or compensatory damages as may be proven during the
trial of this case. And
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs appropriate amount of exemplary damages and reasonable amount of attorneys fees, as well as to
pay the costs.
Plaintiffs further respectfully pray for such other reliefs just and equitable in the premises. (Original Records, Vol. I, p. 215)
xxx xxx xxx

On April 3, 1985, defendant Peltan Development Corporation (Peltan, for brevity) filed a Motion For Preliminary Hearing on Affirmative
Defenses mainly on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against defendant Peltan. It is alleged in the motion that plaintiffs
are not the real parties in interest in the action as they do not assert any present and subsisting title of ownership over the property in
question. Invoking the case of Gabila vs. Barriga, L-28917, promulgated on September 30, 1971, the defendant Peltan contends that the action
being one for cancellation of the certificates of title the Government, through the Solicitor General not a private individual like plaintiff Gabila
was the real party in interest.
On April 27, 1989 plaintiffs filed their opposition to defendant Peltans aforesaid motion in which plaintiffs reasserted their cause of action as
set forth in their complaint, and pointed to the trial court the pertinent averments in their action showing their rights and interests or claims
that had been violated which thus placed them in the status of a real party in interest. Subsequently, defendant Peltan filed its reply to
plaintiffs opposition, with plaintiffs submitting their rejoinder thereto. Then finally defendant Peltan filed its comment on the rejoinder.
On August 22, 1989, the trial court dismissed the complaint. Holding that the plaintiffs were not the real parties-in-interest, the RTC ruled that
they had no cause of action against the defendants. The order was reversed by public respondent. Hence, this petition for review.
In a motion filed before this Court on March 8, 1996, petitioners prayed for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens annotated on their
titles under Entry No. 210060/T-12473-A. The notice was caused by Private Respondent Alejandro Rey because of the pendency of Civil Case
No. LP-8852-P, the dismissal of which is the issue at bench.[8]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court, holding that the two elements of a cause
of action were present in the complaint, to wit: 1) the plaintiffs primary right and 2) the delict or wrongful act of the defendant violative of that
right. The CA held that private respondents had a right over the property as shown by the allegation that they had been occupying the
landholding in question and that they had applied for a free patent thereon; and that petitioners committed a delict against private
respondents by forcibly driving them out of the property, and delaying the processing and approval of their application for free patent because
of the existence of petitioners transfer certificates of title derived from OCT No. 4126.[9] The CA further held that the RTC should have treated
the case as an accion publiciana to determine who as between the parties plaintiffs and defendants have a better right of possession.[10]
Stressing that only the facts alleged in the complaint should have been considered in resolving the motion to dismiss, Respondent CA held that
the trial court had erred in accepting the allegations of herein petitioners that private respondents requests for the Solicitor General to file an
action to annul OCT No. 4216 had been repeatedly denied.
Public respondent also rejected the application of the Gabila[11] ruling to the case at bar. It reasoned:[12]
True, plaintiffs in their complaint prayed inter alia for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of the defendants for being derived
from a spurious or false original certificate of title. Relying on the case of Gabila vs. Barriga, supra, defendants argued that the ultimate result
of a favorable decision on complaints of such nature is for the lands to revert back to the ownership of the state, and hence, such actions may
only be instituted by the Government through the Solicitor Generel (sic). This argument is misplaced. Firstly, unlike the Gabila case, the herein
plaintiffs in their complaint did not assert and pray for reversion. Secondly, the prayer for cancellation of the defendants Torrens titles does
not negate nor eliminate the presence of the elements of plaintiffs cause of action on the basis of the allegations in the complaint, as already
discussed. Thirdly, the prayer of a complaint is not a material factor in determining the relief grantable, which rests upon the facts proved
(Lacson vs. Diaz, 47 O.G. No. 12 Supp. 377, Aug. 4, 1950, No. L-2839). Precisely, as a matter of practice, complaints filed in court usually contain
a general prayer for other relief which may be just and equitable in the premises like the complaint in the case at bar. Fourthly, in the Gabila
case, the Supreme Court did not affirm the trial courts dismissal order. Instead, per dispositive portion of the decision, it ordered the setting
aside of the appealed dismissal order and directing the return of the records of the case to the trial court with admonition to the party
interested to formally implead the Bureau of Lands with notice to the Solicitor General. Obviously, the posture of defendants Peltan is not
entirely supported by the Gabila case.
The Issues
Petitioners assign the following errors committed by public respondent:[13]
a. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents cause of action for the nullification of OCT No. 4216 on the ground that it is
fake/spurious when the Supreme Court had already ruled in G.R. No. 109490 and in G.R. No. 112038 that OCT No. 4216 is genuine and valid --
and in disregarding and refusing to pass upon the said squarely applicable decisions of this Honorable Court;
b. Ordering the trial court to proceed on private respondents cause of action for damages for the supposed acts of the private respondents
Margolles and Espinosa despite non-payment of the jurisdictional docket fees when this cause of action had already prescribed -- and in
disregarding and refusing to pass upon the squarely applicable Manchester ruling;
c. In not applying the Gabila ruling to dismiss the subject complaint considering that respondents do not even pretend to have any title or right
to the subject property to authorize them to ask for a free patent thereon since it is already (a) private property covered by petitioners torrens
title derived from OCT No. 4216 issued in 1929.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition and reverse the public respondent.

What Determines Cause of Action?
It is a well-settled rule that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.[14] In the resolution of a
motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint must be considered. The test in cases like
these is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein.[15]
Hence, it has been held that a motion to dismiss generally partakes of the nature of a demurrer which hypothetically admits the truth of the
factual allegations made in a complaint.[16]
It is axiomatic nonetheless that a court has a mandate to apply relevant statutes and jurisprudence in determining whether the allegations in a
complaint establish a cause of action. While it focuses on the complaint, a court clearly cannot disregard decisions material to the proper
appreciation of the questions before it. In resolving a motion to dismiss, every court must take cognizance of decisions this Court has rendered
because they are proper subjects of mandatory judicial notice as provided by Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (Emphasis supplied.)
The said decisions, more importantly, form part of the legal system,[17] and failure of any court to apply them shall constitute an abdication of
its duty to resolve a dispute in accordance with law, and shall be a ground for administrative action against an inferior court magistrate.
In resolving the present complaint, therefore, the Court is well aware that a decision in Margolles vs. CA,[18] rendered on 14 February 1994,
upheld the validity of OCT No. 4216 (and the certificates of title derived therefrom), the same OCT that the present complaint seeks to nullify
for being fictitious and spurious. Respondent CA, in its assailed Decision dated 29 June 1994, failed to consider Margolles vs. CA. This we
cannot countenance.
In finding that the complaint stated a cause of action, Public Respondent CA recognized that private respondent had a valid right over the
property in question, based on their actual possession thereof and their pending application for a free patent thereon. The linchpin of this
right, however, is the validity of OCT No. 4216. In other words, private respondents right is premised on the allegation that the title of herein
petitioners originated merely from the fictitious and/or spurious OCT No. 4216.
Because it had failed to take cognizance of Margolles vs. CA, the CA was unable to consider that the legality of OCT No. 4216. As adverted to
earlier, Margolles vs. CA upheld the validity of this title and the titles derived therefrom by, among others, Petitioner Peltan Corporation.
Clearly, private respondents possession of the land, and their pending application for a free patent thereon, did not not vest in them a right
superior to the valid title of petitioner originating from OCT No. 4216. Indeed, private respondents can invoke no right at all against the
petitioners. Accordingly, the first element of a cause of action, i.e., plaintiffs right, is not present in the instant case.
In this light, the CAs treatment of the present suit as an accion publiciana to determine which one among the parties had a better right over
the property is but an exercise in redundancy. As discussed above, the same issue has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court in Margolles.
The Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the assailed CA decision. It was incumbent upon Respondent CA to take judicial notice
thereof and apply it in resolving this case. That the CA did not is clearly a reversible error.
Furthermore, allowing repeated suits seeking to nullify OCT No. 4216, like the present case, will bring to naught the principle of indefeasibility
of titles issued under the Torrens system of land registration.[19] Thus, in a resolution[20] dated 10 August 1994, the First Division of this
Court, applying the Margolles ruling, dismissed a petition for review involving herein petitioner Peltan Corporation which had raised as issue
the validity of OCT No. 4216. The Court, in the case at bench, can do no less. Subjecting OCT No. 4216 to further scrutiny, as proposed in the
amended complaint, is no longer an available option.
Are Private Respondents the Real Parties-in-Interest?
The Court also holds that private respondents are not the proper parties to initiate the present suit. The complaint, praying as it did for the
cancellation of the transfer certificates of title of petitioners on the ground that they were derived from a spurious OCT No. 4216, assailed in
effect the validity of said title. While private respondents did not pray for the reversion of the land to the government, we agree with the
petitioners that the prayer in the complaint will have the same result of reverting the land to the government under the Regalian doctrine.[21]
Gabila vs. Barriga ruled that only the government is entitled to this relief. The Court in that case held:
The present motion to dismiss is actually predicated on Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court, i.e., failure of the complaint to state
a cause of action, for it alleges in paragraph 12 thereof that the plaintiff admits that he has no right to demand the cancellation or amendment
of the defendants title, because, even if the said title were canceled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced therein, or of the
portion thereof affected by the amendment, would revert to the public domain. In his amended complaint the plaintiff makes no pretense at
all that any part of the land covered by the defendants title was privately owned by him or by his predecessors-in-interest. Indeed, it is
admitted therein that the said land was at all times a part of the public domain until December 18, 1964, when the government issued a title
thereon in favor of defendant. Thus, if there is any person or entity to relief, it can only be the government.
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own averments negate the existence of such right, for it would appear therefrom that whatever right might
have been violated by the defendant belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff. Plaintiff-appellant argues that although his complaint is
captioned as one for cancellation of title, he has nevertheless stated therein several causes of action based on his alleged rights of possession
and ownership over the improvements, on defendant-appellees alleged fraudulent acquisition of the land, and on the damages allegedly
incurred by him (plaintiff-appellant) in relation to the improvements. These matters are merely ancillary to the central issue of whether or not
defendant-appellees title should be canceled or amended, and they may not be leaned upon in an effort to make out a cause of action in
relation to the said focal issue. Indeed, the principal relief prayed for in the amended complaint is the cancellation or amendment of
defendant-appellees title.[22]
Nonpayment of Docket Fees
As we have already ruled that the private respondents are not the real parties in interest, we find no more need to pass upon the question of
nonpayment of filing fees.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of private respondents in Civil Case
No. LP-8852-P is DISMISSED. The notice of lis pendens, annotated in the titles of petitioners because of Civil Case No. LP-8852-P, is ordered
CANCELED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., J., concurs but only on ground that private respondents are not the real party in interest.
[1] The middle initial is E in the case of Margolles vs. Court of Appeals, 230 SCRA 97, February 14, 1994.
[2] Rollo, pp. 28-38.
[3] Thirteenth Division composed of Justice Alfredo Marigomen, ponente, and Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez and Ruben T. Reyes,
concurring.
[4] Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[5] Ibid., p. 40.
[6] Ibid., pp. 32-33.
[7] Ibid., pp. 28-32.
[8] Ibid., pp. 166-169.
[9] CA Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 33-34.
[10] Ibid., p. 8; Rollo, p. 35.
[11] Supra.
[12] Rollo., pp. 35-36.
[13] Ibid., p. 7.
[14] Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282, 285, February 29, 1988.
[15] Galvez vs. Tuason, 10 SCRA 344, February 29, 1964; Mindanao Realty Corp. vs. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814, November 30, 1962; Uy Chao vs. De
la Rama Steamship Co., Inc., 6 SCRA 69, September 29, 1962; Zobel vs. Abreu, et al., 98 Phil. 343 (1956); De Jesus, et al., vs. Belarmino, et al.,
95 Phil. 365 (1954).
[16] Perpetual Savings Bank & Trust Co. vs. Fajardo, 223 SCRA 720, June 28, 1993.
[17] Article 8 of the Civil Code provides that [J]udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines.
[18] Supra.
[19] See, Widows & Orphans Association vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 360, August 7, 1992.
[20] Goldenrod, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals and Peltan Development, Inc., G.R. No. 112038, August 10, 1994.
[21] Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or
timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the state. . . . Regalian doctrine is enunciated in the case of Piero,
Jr. vs. Director of Lands, 57 SCRA 386, June 14, 1974.
[22] 41 SCRA at 135-136, September 30, 1971
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129058. March 29, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PAULINO SEVILLENO Y VILLANUEVA alias TAMAYO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
By pleading guilty to the rape and killing of a 9-year old girl a death sentence would seem inevitable. But a mere plea of guilt is not sufficient
for conviction as the court must first assure itself that the accused fully understood the consequences of his plea. In the instant case, the trial
court failed to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of his admission of guilt and that he fully comprehended the implications
thereof. As the court a quo inadequately discharged its duty of conducting a searching inquiry, the plea of guilt to a capital offense therefore
inevitably became null and void.[1]
On 22 July 1995, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Paulino Sevilleno y Villanueva alias Tamayo went to Barangay Guadalupe, San Carlos
City. He brought with him bread and ice candy for his 9-year old and 8-year old nieces, Virginia and Norma, both surnamed Baquia. He then
invited Virginia to accompany him to Sitio Guindali-an "to see (a) beta show."[2] To reach the place, Paulino and Virginia passed through the
sugarcane fields.
At around 11:00 o'clock that same morning, Rogelio Baquia, father of Virginia and Norma, arrived. Not seeing Virginia in their house, Rogelio
asked Norma where her sister was. After learning from her that Virginia had gone with accused Paulino to Sitio Guindali-an, Rogelio
immediately set out to look for them.
Rogelio failed to find his daughter upon reaching Sitio Guindali-an; instead, he bumped into the accused. When asked about Virginia the
accused denied knowing where she was. However, Rogelio noticed that the accused had nail scratches on his neck and a wound on his left
cheek.
Rogelio continued his search. He was accompanied by Eugenio Tiongson, a relative of the accused. The next day they met the accused at the
house of the former barangay captain of Sitio Guindali-an, Paeng Lopez. Eugenio asked Paulino where Virginia was. This time the accused
replied that she was in a sugarcane field known as "Campo 9," still a part of Guadalupe, like Sitio Guindali-an. Accompanied by some police
officers, Rogelio and Eugenio proceeded to "Campo 9." There they found Virginia covered with dried leaves, her dress raised to her armpits;
the lower portion of her torso was naked; her legs were spread apart. She had wounds on various parts of her body. She was dead.[3]
Dr. Arnel Laurence Q. Portuguez, City Health Officer of San Carlos City, autopsied the body of Virginia. His postmortem examination showed
these findings: linear abrasion over hematoma, 3.0 x 2.0 cm., right superior anterior neck; linear abrasion over hematoma, 2.5 x 3.0 cm., left
superior anterior neck; hematoma 9.0 x 4.0 cm., right inguinal area; hematoma 9.0 x 5.0 cm., left inguinal area; superficial hymenal laceration
0.5 cm., at 12 o'clock position, with clot formation at intuitus; abrasion 5.5 x 4.0 cm., left superior gluteal area; abrasion 5.0 x 3.0 cm., right
superior gluteal area; abrasion 6.0 x 2.0 cm., right inferior lateral gluteal area; vaginal smear showing absence of sperm cells except pus cells
and epithelial cells. Cause of death: asphyxia secondary to strangulation.[4] Based on his findings, Dr. Portuguez concluded that Virginia was
raped and then strangled to death.
When news of the gruesome rape and killing spread around the community, the local residents immediately arrested the accused Paulino
Sevilleno and turned him over to the police authorities. Thereafter, on 25 July 1995, the accused was charged with rape with homicide for
having carnal knowledge of Virginia Baquia, a minor, 9 years of age, by means of force, violence and intimidation and against her will, and after
ravishing her, with intent to hide his identity and to prevent discovery thereof, with intent to kill, strangled her which directly caused her
death.[5]
The arraignment where the accused was represented by Atty. Vic Agravante of the Public Attorney's Office proceeded thus -
Court: Call the case x x x x
Interpreter: Appearances?.
Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government, ready for arraignment.
Atty. Agravante: Respectfully appearing for the accused, ready, you Honor.
Court: Arraign the accused.
Stenographer's Observation: Accused was arraigned in a Cebuano language duly known and understood by him, pleaded GUILTY.
COURT (to accused): Do you understand your plea of guilty?
Accused: Yes, sir.
Q. Do you know that your plea of guilty could bring death penalty?
A. Yes, sir.
Court (to Pros. Tabinas): You still have to present your evidence.
Pros. Tabinas: Yes, your honor.[6]
The hearing for the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution was scheduled on 31 August 1995. It was however reset several times. On
10 October 1995 the accused manifested that he had no counsel. Thus, the trial court ordered the Public Attorney's Office to provide a counsel
de oficio for him. The next hearing was set on 21 November 1995.[7]
On 28 October 1995, taking advantage of typhoon "Pepang" that struck the island of Negros, the accused escaped from detention, of which
the Presiding judge was accordingly informed.
The records show that Atty. Vic Agravante assisted the accused during the arraignment only. In the succeeding hearings, Atty. Danilo
Pabalinas, another lawyer of PAO, represented the accused. But after the escape Atty. Pabalinas sought permission from the court to be
released from his duty to assist the accused. The court then directed that the accused be tried in absentia and counsel was relieved from his
responsibility to his client and the court.[8]
The prosecution presented the examining physician as well as Maria Lariosa and Norma Baquia. Notably, these witnesses were not cross-
examined because, as already adverted to, Atty. Pabalinas earlier excused himself from the case. Neither did the court appoint another
counsel for the accused.
The next hearing was set on 30 January 1996. However, for various reasons, the hearing was reset to 13 March 1996, 21 April 1996, 18 June
1996 and 17 July 1996.
Meanwhile, on 10 July 1996 the Jail Warden of San Carlos City reported to the court that the accused had been recaptured.[9]
Atty. Florentino Saldavia, also of PAO, was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused. On 17 July 1996 the prosecution presented Rogelio
Baquia as its last witness. Atty. Saldavia cross-examined Rogelio but his questions were only considered token, and even irrelevant. Then the
prosecution rested.
On 28 August 1996, the date set for the presentation of the evidence for the defense, Atty. Saldavia moved that the hearing be reset as he was
not feeling well. On 19 November 1996, Atty. Saldavia again moved for postponement and the hearing was reset to 3 December 1996 on
which date, instead of presenting evidence, Atty. Saldavia manifested that he was submitting the case for decision but invoking the plea of
guilt of the accused as a mitigating circumstance. As recorded, the hearing proceeded thus -
Court: Call the case x x x x
Interpreter: Appearances.
Pros. Tabinas: Appearing for the government.
Atty. Saldavia: For the accused. Your honor please, this is already the turn of the defense to present evidence. He already pleaded GUILTY. We
have no mitigating circumstance to prove except the plea of guilty. I believe there is no need of presenting evidence, he already pleaded guilty.
Court: (to Atty. Saldavia): You will rest the case?
Atty. Saldavia: Yes, your honor.
Pros. Tabinas: You will invoke the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty?
Atty. Saldavia: Yes.
Pros. Tabinas: We have no objection to that.
Court: Order.
When this case was called for the presentation of evidence for the accused, counsel for the accused manifested that he had no evidence to
present in favor of the accused except the plea of GUILTY made in open court.
In view thereof, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for decision based on the evidence presented by the prosecution without the
accused presenting evidence in his behalf except the plea of GUILTY which is admitted by the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.[10]
On 6 March 1997 the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos City, rendered its decision finding the accused guilty of rape with homicide and
sentencing him to death and to pay the heirs of Virginia Baquia -P50,000.00 plus costs.[11]
This case is now on automatic review. The defense contends that the court a quo erred in convicting the accused and imposing upon him the
penalty of death as it failed to observe the required procedure for cases where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense when
arraigned.[12] The defense also argues that the arraignment conducted by the trial court was null and void as it did not conduct a "searching
inquiry" before accepting the plea of guilt and sentencing the accused to death. It concludes that since the arraignment was fatally defective
and not in accordance with law, the case must be remanded to the court of origin for the proper arraignment of the accused before the capital
punishment may be imposed.
We sustain the defense. Under Sec. 3, Rule 116, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when the accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. It must also
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of his culpability. If the accused so desires he may also present evidence in his
behalf. This procedure is mandatory and a judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.[13]
The questions propounded by the trial judge during arraignment hardly satisfied the requisite searching inquiry. Regrettably, there were only
two (2) questions propounded to the accused: First. Do you understand your plea of guilt? Second. Do you know that your plea of guilt could
bring death penalty? In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially where he is an ignorant person with
little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the
material allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge himself
but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full
significance and consequences of his plea.[14]
In the instant case, the trial court did not bother to explain the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide with which the accused
was charged. On the same note, the trial judge also failed to inform the accused the certainty by which the death penalty would be imposed
on him and the fact that he would also be made to indemnify the heirs of his victim. As a result, the accused was not properly accorded his
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation leveled against him.[15] Thus, it is with apprehension that ruling for
the affirmance of the decision in this case will prejudice the due observance of the fundamental requirements of fairness and due process.[16]
The constitutional rights of the accused are for the protection of the guilty and of the innocent alike. Only with the assurance that even the
guilty shall be given the benefit of every constitutional guaranty can the innocent be secure in the same rights.[17]
Trial courts must exercise meticulous care in accepting a plea of guilty in a capital offense. Judges are duty-bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty he understands fully the meaning of his plea and the import of his inevitable conviction.[18]
Courts must proceed with more care where the possible punishment is in its severest form - death - for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irrevocable. Experience has shown that innocent persons have at times pleaded guilty.[19] Only a clear, definite and unconditional
plea of guilty by the accused must be accepted by trial courts.[20] There is no such rule which provides that simply because the accused
pleaded guilty to the charge that his conviction should automatically follow.[21] A judge should always be an embodiment of competence.[22]
As an administrator of justice, it is imperative that the trial judge carry out his duties ably and competently so as not to erode public
confidence in the judiciary.
It is quite unfortunate that Attys. Vic Agravante, Danilo Pabalinas and Florentino Saldavia, all of PAO, were remiss in their duties as defenders
of the accused. Atty. Agravante did not take time to explain to his client the nature of the crime of which he was charged and the gravity of the
consequences of his plea. Instead, he readily agreed to the accused pleading guilty to a capital offense. In the succeeding hearings, Atty.
Pabalinas was supposed to assist the accused ably but miserably failed. When the case was called and appearances noted, the trial judge
informed the parties that the accused had escaped from detention. It was then that the prosecution and the defense, including the trial court,
agreed that the accused would be tried in absentia. Then, at this juncture, Atty. Pabalinas sought to be relieved of his responsibilities as
counsel de oficio which, unfortunately, the court also granted. The court proceeded with the presentation of three (3) prosecution witnesses
who testified but were never cross-examined because Atty. Pabalinas already left the courtroom, apparently with the consent of the trial
court. Nobody was assigned to replace Atty. Pabalinas. Consequently, not only was the accused tried in absentia, he was also tried without the
assistance of counsel.
When the prosecution rested its case, Atty. Saldavia of the PAO asked for the postponement of the succeeding hearings not only once but
thrice allegedly because he was not feeling well. Interestingly, when the time came for him to adduce evidence in behalf of the accused, he
manifested that since his client had already pleaded guilty he would no longer present any evidence. He only invoked the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty.
The plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance is misplaced. Not under any circumstance would any admission of guilt affect or reduce the
death sentence.[23] Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of death when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a
homicide is committed. Death is a single indivisible penalty and corollary to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which a single
indivisible penalty is prescribed, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance that may have
attended the commission of the offense.
The court below also erred in disregarding the testimony of Norma Baquia "for the reason that her testimony failed to establish that the
incident happened within the territorial jurisdiction of this court."[24] The court did not consider her testimony purportedly because she only
testified that her sister Virginia went with the accused to Guindali-an without specifying as to what municipality or city it was part of.[25]
Again, this is error. Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court requires courts to take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the
existence and geographical divisions of our country. There is only one Sitio Guindali-an, Brgy. Guadalupe, San Carlos City (Negros Occidental).
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their
duties. All three (3) of them displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client. They lacked vigor and dedication to their work. Atty.
Agravante did not explain to the accused the nature of the crime of which he was charged and the consequences of his plea. Atty. Pabalinas,
instead of assisting the accused, hastily left the courtroom after obtaining leave while the prosecution was presenting its three (3) witnesses.
Resultingly, all three (3) witnesses were never cross-examined. On the other hand, Atty. Saldavia moved for the postponement of the
scheduled hearings during which he was supposed to present evidence for the defense; worse, on the last scheduled hearing he submitted the
case for decision without presenting evidence. In short, no evidence was ever presented for the defense. And, as if to compound his deficiency
with ignorance, Atty. Saldavia relied on his client's plea of guilt in the mistaken belief that it would modify and reduce to reclusion perpetua
the imposable penalty of death.
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his client with utmost dedication, competence and
diligence. He must not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively liable.[26]
Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect, much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused.
Instead, they haphazardly performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the accused Sevilleno, however
guilty he might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably, this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely
and faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility; otherwise, commission of any similar act in the future will be
severely sanctioned.
WHEREFORE, the 6 March 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Br. 57, San Carlos City (Negros Occidental), in Crim. Case No. 129058,
convicting the accused PAULINO SEVILLENO Y VILLANUEVA alias Tamayo of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to DEATH is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper arraignment and trial of the accused until terminated.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-
Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] People v. Bulalake, 106 Phil. 767 (1959).

[2] TSN, 21 November 1995, p. 11.
[3] TSN, 17 July 1996, p. 10.
[4] Exhibit A, Records, p. 11.
[5] Rollo, p. 10.
[6] TSN, 15 August 1995, pp. 1-2.
[7] Records, p. 33.
[8] Id., p. 39.
[9] Id., p. 72.
[10] TSN, 3 December 1996, pp. 1-2.
[11] Rollo, p. 26.
[12] Id., p. 49.
[13] People v. Dayot, G.R. No. 88281, 10 July 1990, 187 SCRA 641.
[14] See Note 1.
[15] People v. Estomaca, G.R. Nos. 117485-86, 22 April 1996, 256 SCRA 429.
[16] People v. Gonzaga, No. L-48373, 30 January 1984, 127 SCRA 158.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] People v. Albert, G.R. No. 114001, 14 December 1995, 251 SCRA 136.
[20] Ibid.
[21] People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 80845, 14 March 1994, 231 SCRA 264.
[22] Rule 1.01, Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[23] See Note 15, p. 434.
[24] Rollo, p. 23.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Rule 18.03, Canon 18, Code of Professional Responsibility.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 209386 December 8, 2014
MEL CARPIZO CANDELARIA, Petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated January 31, 2013 and the Resolution3 dated September 3, 2013
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 which affirmed the conviction of petitioner for the crime of Qualified Theft.
The Facts
In the morning of August 23, 2006, Viron Transit Corporation (Viron) ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel (diesel fuel) allegedly worth
P497,000.00 from United Oil Petroleum Phils. (Unioil), a company owned by private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao (Lao).4 Petitioner Mel
Carpizo Candelaria (Candelaria), a truck driver employed by Lao, was dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel in Laon Laan, Manila.5
However, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao through a phone call that it had not yet received its order.
Upon inquiry, Lao discovered that Candelaria, together with his helper Mario Romano (Romano), also an employee of Unioil, left the company
premises at 12:50 in the afternoon of the same day on board a lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 to deliver Viron’s diesel fuel order.
When Lao called Candelaria on his mobile phone, she did not receive any response.6
Thereafter, or at around 6 o’clock inthe evening of the same day, Romano returned alone to Unioil’s office and reported that Candelaria poked
a balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the incident to the Anti Carnapping Section of the Manila Police District (MPD), as well as to Camp
Crame.7
After a few days, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents found the abandoned lorry truck in Calamba, Laguna, emptied of the diesel
fuel.8 Under the foregoing premises, Lao filed a complaint for Qualified Theft against Candelaria, docketed as Crim. Case No. 08-259004.9 Lita
Valera (Valera), Lao’s mother, and Jimmy Magtabo10 Claro (Claro), employed as dispatcher and driver of Unioil, corroborated Lao’s allegations
on material points. More specifically, Claro verified that it was Candelaria who was tasked todeliver the diesel fuel to Viron on August 23, 2006,
which likewise happened to be Candelaria’s last trip.11
In his defense, Candelaria demurred to the prosecution’s evidence,12 arguing that there was no direct evidence that linked him to the
commission of the crime, as Lao had no personal knowledge as to what actually happened to the diesel fuel.13 Moreover, the information
relayed by Romano is considered hearsay due to his untimely demise.14
The RTC Ruling
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 (RTC) convicted Candelaria of Qualified Theft in a Decision15 dated June 21, 2011,
having found a confluence of all the elements constituting the abovesaid crime, to wit: (a) there was a taking of personal property; (b) said
property belonged to another; (c) the taking was done with intent to gain; (d) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (e) the
taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things; and (f) the theft was committed
by a domestic servant with abuse of confidence.16
In convicting Candelaria, the RTC took the following circumstances into consideration: (a) on August 23, 2006, Candelaria was the driver of the
truck with plate number PTA-945, loaded with 14,000 liters of diesel fuel valued at P497,000.00, for delivery to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (b)
Viron did not receive the diesel fuel; (c) Lao reported the incident to Camp Crame and the MPD; and (d) the following day, August 24, 2006,
the same truck was found abandoned and emptied of its load in Calamba, Laguna.17 On the basis of the foregoing, the RTC concluded that
Candelaria was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
Consequently, it sentenced Candelaria to suffer the indeterminate penalty of fourteen (14) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered him to indemnify Lao the amount of
P497,000.00 as the value of the stolen diesel fuel, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.18
Dissatisfied, Candelaria elevated his conviction to the CA.19
The CA Ruling
In a Decision20 dated January 31, 2013, the CA affirmed Candelaria’s conviction, ruling that a finding of guilt need not always be based on
direct evidence, but may also be based on circumstantial evidence, or "evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in
issue may be established by inference."21 In this regard, and considering that the crime of theft in this case was qualified due to grave abuse
of confidence, as Candelaria took advantage of his work, knowing that Lao trusted him to deliver the diesel fuel to Viron,22 the CA affirmed
the ruling of the RTC. Citing jurisprudence,23 it observed that theft by a truck driver who takes the load of his truck belonging to his employer
is guilty of Qualified Theft.24
However, while the CA affirmed Candelaria’s conviction as well as the prison sentence imposed by the RTC, it modified the amount which he
was directed to indemnify Lao, fixing the same at P14,000.00 in the absence of any supporting documents to prove that the diesel fuel was
indeed worth P497,000.00.25
Aggrieved, Candelaria filed a motion for reconsideration26 which was eventually denied in a Resolution27 dated September 3,2013, hence,
this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The main issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Candelaria guilty of the crime of Qualified Theft on the basis
of circumstantial evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 31028 in relation to Article 30929 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are:
(a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner’s consent; (e) it be accomplished without the use of violence
or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the
RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.30
In this case, there is a confluence of all the foregoing elements. Through the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, it was sufficiently
established that the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel loaded into the lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 driven by Candelaria for delivery to Viron
on August 23, 2006 was taken by him, without the authority and consent of Lao, the owner of the diesel fuel, and that Candelaria abused the
confidence reposed upon him by Lao,as his employer.
Candelaria maintains that he should be acquitted considering that his conviction was based merely on circumstantial evidence, as well as on
hearsay evidence, i.e., Lao’s testimony with regard to the allegation of the deceased helper Romano that Candelaria poked a balisongat him on
August 23, 2006.31
The Court is not convinced.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.32
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, tothe exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the same time, inconsistent with any other
hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis
consistent with innocence.33
Here, the RTC, as correctly affirmed by the CA, found that the attendant circumstances in this case, as duly established by the prosecution’s
evidence, amply justify the conviction of Candelaria under the evidentiary threshold of proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. These
circumstances are: (a) on August 23, 2006, Viron ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Lao’s Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was
given the task of delivering the same to Viron in Laon Laan, Manila; (c) Candelaria and his helper Romano left the company premises on the
same day on board the lorry truck bearing plate number PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon of the
same day, Viron informed Lao that its order had not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed toreply to Lao’s phone calls; (f) later in the day,
Romano returned to the Unioil office sans Candelaria and reported that the latter threatened him with a weapon; (g) Lao reported the incident
tothe MPD and Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently found in Laguna, devoid of its contents; and (i) Candelaria had not
reported back to Unioil since then.34
Threading these circumstances together, the Court perceives a congruent picture that the crime of Qualified Theft had been committed and
that Candelaria had perpetrated the same. To be sure, this determination is not sullied by the fact that Candelaria’s companion, Romano, had
died before he could testify as to the truth of his allegation that the former had threatened him with a balisongon August 23, 2006. It is a
gaping hole in the defense that the diesel fuel was admittedly placed under Candelaria’s custody and remains unaccounted for.Candelaria did
not proffer any persuasive reason to explain the loss of said goods and merely banked on a general denial, which, as case law holds, is an
inherently weak defense due to the ease by which it can be concocted.35 With these, and, moreover, the tell-tale fact that Candelaria has not
returned or reported back to work at Unioil since the incident, the Court draws no other reasonable inference other than that which points to
his guilt.Verily, while it is true that flight per seis not synonymous with guilt,36 unexplained flight nonetheless evinces guilt or betrays the
existence of a guilty conscience,37 especially when taken together with all the other circumstantial evidence attendant in this case. Thus, all
things considered, Candelaria’s conviction for the crime of Qualified Theft stands.
The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon the value of the thing stolen. To provethe value of the stolen property
for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty under Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, as amended, the Court explained in People v. Anabe38 that
the prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate."39 In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of
such estimate, the courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case.40 In Merida v. People (Merida),41 which applied the doctrine enunciated in People v. Dator (Dator),42
the Court deemed it improper to take judicial notice of the selling price of narraat the time of the commission of its theft, as such evidence
would be "unreliable and inconclusive considering the lack of independent and competent source of such information."43
However, in the more recent case of Lozano v. People (Lozano),44 the Court fixed the value of the stolen magwheels at P12,000.00 as the
"reasonable allowable limit under the circumstances,"45 notwithstanding the uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant therein.
Lozanocited, among others, the case of Francisco v. People46 (Francisco) where the Court ruled that "the trial court can only take judicial
notice of the value of goods which are matters of public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable demonstration,"47 further explaining
that the value of jewelry, the stolen items in the saidcase, is neither a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable
demonstration.48
In this case, Candelaria has been found guilty of stealing diesel fuel. Unlike in Francisco, where the Court had no reference to ascertain the
price of the stolen jewelry, or in Merida and Dator, where the Court refused to take judicial notice of the selling price of lumber and/or narra
for "lack of independent and competent source" of the necessary information at the time of the commission of the theft, the value of diesel
fuel in this case may be readily gathered from price lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE). In this regard, the value of diesel fuel
involved herein may then be considered as a matter of public knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules on discretionary judicial
notice.49 To note, "judicial [notice], which is based on considerations of expediency and convenience, displace[s] evidence since, being
equivalent to proof, it fulfills the object which the evidence is intended to achieve."50
While it is true that the prosecution had only presented the uncorroborated testimony of the private complainant, Lao, to prove that the value
of the diesel fuel stolen is P497,000.00, the Court – taking judicial notice of the fact that the pump price of diesel fuel in August 2006 (i.e., the
time of the commission of the crime) is within the range of P37.60 to 37.86 per liter51 – nonetheless remains satisfied that such amount must
be sustained. As the value of the goods may independently and competently be ascertained from the DOE’s price publication, adding too that
the defense had not presented any evidence to contradict said finding nor cross examined Lao anent her proffered valuation, the Court,
notwithstanding the solitary evidence of the prosecution, makes this determination following the second prong set by case law – and that is,
to fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case. Verily, such circumstances militate against applying
the alternative of imposing a minimum penalty and, more so, the CA’s arbitrary valuation of P14,000.00, since the basis for which was not
explained. Therefore, for purposes of fixing the proper penalty for Qualified Theft in thiscase, the value of the stolen property amounting to
P497,000.00 must be considered. Conformably with the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the proper penalty to be imposed upon
Candelaria is reclusion perpetua,52 without eligibility for parole,53 to conform with prevailing law and jurisprudence.54
A final word. Courts dealing with theft, as well as estafa cases, would do well to be mindful of the significance of determining the value of the
goods involved, or the amounts embezzled in said cases as they do not only entail the proper resolution of the accused’s civil liability (if the
civil aspect has been so integrated) but also delimit the proper penalty to be imposed. These matters, through the trial court’s judicious
direction, should be sufficiently passed upon during trial and its finding thereon be amply explained in its verdict. Although an appeal of a
criminal case throws the entire case up for review,55 the ends of justice, both in its criminal and civil senses, demand nothing less but
complete and thorough adjudication in the judicial system’s every level. Truth be told, the peculiar nature of these cases provides a distinctive
opportunity for this ideal to be subserved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 31, 2013 and the Resolution dated September 3, 2013 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR. No. 34470 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that petitioner Mel Carpizo Candelaria is: (a) sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole; and (b) ordered to indemnify private complainant Jessielyn Valera Lao the amount
of P497,000.00 representing the value of the stolen property.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES**
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes
* Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1899 dated December 3, 2014.
** Designated Acting Member per Special Order No. 1892 dated November 28, 2014.
1 Rollo, pp. 12-27.
2 Id. at 33-44. Penned by Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon with Associate Justices Stephen C. Cruz and Myra V. Garcia-Fernandez,
concurring.
3 Id. at 46-47. 4 Id. at 34-35. 5 Id. at 35. 6 Id. 7 Id. 8 Id. 9 Id. at 34 and 63.
10 "Montalbo" in some parts of the records.
11 Rollo, p. 36. 12 Id. at 36 and 64.
13 Id. at 56. 14 Id. at 56-57.
15 Id. at 63-65. Penned by Judge Amor A. Reyes.
16 Id. at 64-65.
17 Id. at 65. In the Petition, Accused-Appellant’s Brief, and CA Decision, it was mentioned that the abandoned lorry truck was found 3-4 days
after the incident. (Id. at 15, 35, and 53.)
18 Id.
19 Through a Notice of Appeal dated September 14, 2011. (CA rollo, p. 12.)
20 Rollo, pp. 33-44. 21 Id. at 39. 22 Id. at 41.
23 Cariaga v. CA, 411 Phil. 214 (2001).
24 Id. at 230. 25 Rollo, pp. 42-43.
26 On March 13, 2011; id. at 81-84.
27 Id. at 46-47.
28 Art. 310. Qualified theft.— The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property
stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the plantation, fish taken from a
fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular
accident or civil disturbance.
29 Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not
exceed twenty years. Insuch cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayoror reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does
not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does
not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayorin its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but
does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable.
8. Arresto menorin its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the
offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
30 Zapanta v. People, G.R. No. 170863, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 25, 33-34.
31 Rollo, pp. 20-22.
32 See Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court.
33 People v. Anabe, G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010, 630 SCRA 10, 21, citing People v. Castro, 587 Phil. 537, 544-545 (2008).
34 Rollo, pp. 63-64.
35 See People vs. Watiwat, 457 Phil. 411, 425 (2003).
36 Cf. People v. Villareal, G.R. No. 201363, March 18, 2013, 693 SCRA 549, 560.
37 People v. Turtoga, 432 Phil. 703, 720 (2002); citation omitted.
38 Supra note 33.
39 See id. at 31-32, citing Merida v. People, 577 Phil. 243, 258-259 (2008).
40 Id. at 32.
41 Supra note 39. 42 398 Phil. 109 (2000).
43 Supra note 39, at 259 (see footnote 43 therein).
44 G.R. No. 165582, July 9, 2010, 624 SCRA 596.
45 Id. at 613.
46 478 Phil. 167 (2004).
47 Id. at 187, citing People v. Marcos, 368 Phil. 143, 167-168 (1999). 48 Id.
49 Section 2, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
50 People v. Martinez, 340 Phil. 374 (1997).
51 See Prevailing Retail Prices ofPetroleum Products in Metro Manila As of August 8, 2006
<https://www.doe.gov.ph/retail-pump-prices/retail-pump-prices-metro-manila?start=75> (visited November 4, 2014). At the very least,
therefore, the value of the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel stolen from Lao amounted to 526,400.00, pegged from the minimum price of 37.60 per
liter.
52 People v. Mirto,G.R. No. 193479, October 19, 2011, 659 SCRA 796, 814, citing People v. Mercado, 445 Phil. 813, 828 (2003).
53 "[U]nder Resolution No. 24-4-10, those convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetuaare disqualified from the benefit of parole."
(See People v. Manicat, G.R. No. 205413, December 2, 2013) See also Rule 2.2 of Resolution No. 24-4-10 entitled "RE: AMENDING AND
REPEALING CERTAIN RULES AND SECTIONS OF THE RULES ON PAROLE AND AMENDED GUIDELINES FOR RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY OF THE 2006 REVISED MANUAL OF THE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE."
54 [P]ursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 [entitled AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES]
which states that ‘persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be reduced to reclusion perpetuaby
reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the "Indeterminate Sentence Law," as amended’."
(See People v. Gunda, G.R. No. 195525, February 5, 2014.)
55 "[A]n appeal in criminal cases throws open the entire case for review and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct any error, as
may be found in the appealed judgment, whether assigned as an error or not." (People v. Balacano, 391 Phil. 509, 525-526 [2000], citing
People v. Reñola, 367 Phil. 415, 436 [1999] and People v. Medina, 360 Phil. 281, 299 [1998].)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155110. March 31, 2005]
HABAGAT GRILL Through LOUIE BIRAOGO, Proprietor/Manager, petitioner, vs. DMC-URBAN PROPERTY DEVELOPER, INC., respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Entitlement to physical or material possession of the premises is the issue in an ejectment suit. The two forms of ejectment suits -- forcible
entry and unlawful detainer -- may be distinguished from each other mainly by the fact that in forcible entry, the plaintiffs must prove that
they were in prior possession of the premises until they were deprived thereof by the defendants; in unlawful detainer, the plaintiffs need not
have been in prior physical possession.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the April 12, 2002 Decision[2] and the August 19, 2002
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 53524. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the petition, the Court REVERSES the appealed Decision and renders judgment:
1. Commanding [Petitioner] Louie Biraogo and all persons acting for and in his behalf or by his authority to remove the Habagat Grill and all
improvements he has introduced into the lot in question and to vacate said lot; and
2. Ordering said [petitioner] to pay the [respondent] P10,000.00 monthly compensation for the occupation of the land in question until the
possession from December 1, 1993 of said property shall have been completely restored to the [respondent]; and
3. Ordering [petitioner] to pay [respondent] P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.[4]
The assailed Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
The Facts
The antecedents were ably summarized by the CA as follows:
On June 11, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. acquired and became the owner of a residential lot situated in Matina, Davao City and covered by
TCT No. T-82338. This lot shall henceforth be called the lot in question. On June 13, 1981, David M. Consunji, Inc. transferred said lot to its
sister company, the DMC Urban Property Developers, Inc. (DMC) in whose favor TCT No. T-279042 was issued. Alleging that Louie Biraogo
forcibly entered said lot and built thereon the Habagat Grill in December, 1993, DMC filed on March 28, 1994 a Complaint for Forcible Entry
against Habagat Grill and/or Louie Biraogo. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1233-D-94 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Branch 4, in Davao City. The Complaint alleged that as owner DMC possessed the lot in question from June 11, 1981 until December 1, 1993;
that on that day, December 1, 1993, Louie Biraogo, by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered into the lot in question and
constructed the Habagat Grill thereon, thus illegally depriving DMC of the possession of said lot since then up to the present; that the
reasonable rental value of said lot is P10,000.00 a month.
Louie Biraogo in his Answer denied illegally entering the lot in question. He averred that Habagat Grill was built in 1992 inside Municipal
Reservation No. 1050 (Presidential Proclamation No. 20) and so DMC has no cause of action against him. Since one of the vital issues in the
case was the location of Habagat Grill, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities constituted a team composed of three members, one a Geodetic
Engineer representing the DMC, another Geodetic Engineer representing Biraogo and the third from the DENR which was tasked with the duty
of determining where precisely was Habagat Grill located, on the lot in question or on Municipal Reservation No. 1050. Biraogo was directed
by the court to furnish the team with a copy of Municipal Reservation No. 20. Biraogo never complied. Worse, his designated Geodetic
Engineer Panfilo Jayme never took oath as such and did not participate in the Relocation survey. The ones who conducted the survey were
Engr. Edmindo Dida of the DENR and Engr. Jose Cordero, DMCs representative. After conducting the relocation survey on March 30, 1998,
engineers Dida and Cordero submitted their report to the Court specifically stating that the Habagat Grill Restaurant was occupying 934 square
meters of the lot in question.
After necessary proceedings, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered a Decision on August 6, 1998 dismissing the case on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action. DMC appealed from said Decision to the Regional Trial Court and the same was docketed in
Branch 12, in Davao City as Civil Case No. x x x 26,860.98. On February 16, 1999, said court rendered judgment affirming the appealed
Decision. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but was denied in the courts Order dated April 21, 1999.[5]
Consequently, respondent interposed an appeal to the CA.
Granting respondents appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled that the court of origin had jurisdiction over the Complaint for Forcible Entry.[6] The
CA gave greater weight to the testimony of respondents real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, that Habagat Grill had been built on
December 1, 1993.[7] The appellate court opined that his testimony was credible, because he had personal knowledge of the facts he had
testified to -- it was his task to know such matters. On the other hand, it was not clear in what capacity petitioners witness, Samuel Ruiz, came
to know of the facts he had testified to.[8] The CA further held that the minutes of the Urban Planning and Economic Development hearings --
submitted by petitioner to prove the construction of Habagat Grill in 1992 -- were immaterial, as these referred to another establishment.[9]
The CA faulted petitioner for not presenting any other documentary evidence to establish the date of Habagat Grills construction.[10] It added
that the court of origin had improperly adjudged the subject property as part of the public domain. The appellate court explained that the
lower court could take cognizance of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, but not of the situational relation between the property covered by the
Proclamation and the land in question. The CA further criticized petitioner for not presenting any evidence to show the basis of the latters
alleged authority to build Habagat Grill on the property.[11]
Hence, this Petition.[12]
The Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:
1. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Honorable Court of First Level has no jurisdiction over
this case as petitioners possession and occupation of the lot where Habagat Grill was constructed on the subject premises was yet in 1992 or
for more than one (1) year prior to the filing of this case on April 7, 1994 and that respondents predecessor (David M. Consunji, Inc.) had not
been in prior and physical possession of the subject premises, as a matter of fact, it failed to allege the same in its Complaint in this case; and
2. That, with due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Complaint of respondents predecessor (David M.
Consunji, Inc.) in this case failed to state a valid cause of action as the lot referred to therein is not particularly described and is different from
the lot on which the Habagat Grill was constructed.[13]
Simplified, the issues are (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the case, and (2) whether respondent alleged a sufficient cause of action in
its Complaint.
This Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction
Petitioner argues that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case, because mere allegation of ownership did not, by itself, show
that respondent had prior possession of the property.[14]
We disagree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by the allegations pleaded in the complaint.[15] As long as these allegations
demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This
principle holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of action thus alleged, in which instance the court -- after
acquiring jurisdiction -- may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.
The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads thus:
SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when. Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the
possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any
contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time
within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the
person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.
In the present case, the Complaint filed before the trial court on March 28, 1994, stated:
2. That [respondent] had been in lawful and peaceful possession of a residential lot at Tulip Drive, Ecoland and Subdivision covered by TCT T-
82338 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City being owner thereof, since June 11, 1981, until the day and incident in the following paragraph
hereof.
3. That on or about December 1, 1993, [petitioner] by means of strategy and stealth, unlawfully entered and occupied a portion of said
residential lot and constructed what is now known as the Habagat Grill, thereby illegally depriving [respondent] of the possession of the
premises.[16]
Notably, petitioner alleged (1) prior possession, (2) deprivation thereof by strategy and stealth, and (3) the date such unlawful deprivation
started, which was less than one year from the filing of the Complaint. Considering the presence in the Complaint of all the necessary
allegations,[17] the trial court evidently acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
Date of Entry
Petitioner further contends that, as determined by the court of origin and the regional trial court, respondent has not adduced preponderance
of evidence to prove that this case was filed within the one-year prescriptive period.[18] Petitioner presented the testimony of a certain
Samuel Ruiz and offered the minutes of the hearings conducted by the Urban Planning and Economic Development (UPED) to prove that the
construction of the Habagat Grill began in 1992.[19]
Respondent counters that the CA properly relied on the testimony of the formers real property manager, Bienamer Garcia, as he had personal
knowledge of the facts.[20] On the other hand, the two trial courts allegedly relied on the hearings conducted by the UPED in resolving that
petitioner had been in possession of the property since 1992. Respondent avers that those hearings referred to a restaurant located 330
meters away, not to Habagat Grill.[21]
The determination of the date of entry into the subject lot is a question of fact. This Court has held in a long line of cases that the review of
cases brought before it via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to errors of law. Findings of fact by the CA are conclusive except in a number
of instances, one of which is when its factual findings are contrary to those of the courts below, as in the present case.[22]
The appellate court held that the minutes of the UPED hearing pertained to matters relating to a different establishment, the Kawayan
Restaurant.[23] Thus, the UPED minutes did not have any material bearing on the resolution of the present case. Consequently, the
determination of the date of entry into the subject lot boils down to the appreciation of the testimonies of Garcia and Ruiz.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the
other.[24] Where the evidence presented by one side is insufficient to ascertain the claim, there is no preponderance of evidence.[25] In
criminal cases in which the quantum of evidence required is greater than in civil cases, the testimony of only one witness -- if credible,
straightforward, and worthy of belief -- is sufficient to convict.[26] With more reason then, Garcias testimony, if clear and positive, may be
sufficient to establish respondents claim.
Under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, among the facts and circumstances to be considered by the court in determining which of
the presented evidence has superior weight is the witnesses means and opportunity to know the facts to which they testify.[27]
The extent of such means and opportunity are determined by the following considerations:
First, the Actor Rule. This rule maintains that a persons recollection of his own acts and of the attendant circumstances is more definite and
trustworthy than another persons recollection of it, especially if it was an act done in the performance of a duty, or if the other persons
testimony is little more than an expression of opinion or judgment. Apart from comparative tenacity of memory, the actor usually knows
better than any one else what he did or did not do, and his testimony is generally, but not always, entitled to superior weight on that account.
Thus, the execution and attestation of a will or other legal document may be so far regarded as the act of the lawyer who superintends the
transactions and knows the formalities required by law, and his testimony to the circumstances will generally outweigh that of a non-
professional witness.
The Actor Rule has been applied in a multitude of admiralty cases and any other cases where a persons testimony concerning his own conduct
conflicts with the testimony of a non-participating observer or with inconclusive inferences from facts proved, especially where the actor
witness testifies to an act which the duties of his employment required him to perform. But it said that the testimony of one who evidently
speaks rather to his custom than to his acts on the particular occasion will hardly suffice to put him in the category of those who are specially
favored by the Actor Rule.
Second, the witness who had the greater interest in noticing and remembering the facts is to be believed in preference to the one that had a
slighter interest to observe or was wholly indifferent. Interest has effect on the power of observation of witness. Thus, it has been held that it
was not remarkable that witnesses would not have observed traces of blood along the route through which the deceased was taken because
said witnesses had no reason to suspect that the crime was not committed in the place where the dead body was found. Similarly, the failure
of witnesses to notice whether or not there were houses at the place where they say the accused maltreat the offended party was attributed
as due to the fact that their attention was concentrated to what they say, and they had no interest in knowing whether or not there were
houses in or around the place.
Third, the witness who gives reasons for the accuracy of his observations is preferred to him who merely states the fact to be so, without
adverting to any circumstances showing that his attention was particularly called to it. Thus, the testimony of the crew of a vessel that their
light on the night of a collision was red, and nothing more, was easily overcome by testimony of witnesses on the other vessel that the light
was white, not red, and that fact was a matter of remark among them when the light was observed.
Fourth, the witness in a state of excitement, fear, or terror is generally incapable of observing accurately. This is so because, if men perceive
the most insignificant facts in the most diverse ways, even when it is impossible that these facts should produce on the observer any emotion
preventing him from observing with absolute calm, even much more will their impressions be diversified under circumstances calculated to
produce in the onlookers excitement, fear or terror.
Fifth, intoxication tends to impair accuracy both of observation and memory of a witness.[28] (Citations omitted)
Based on the foregoing criteria, the testimony of Garcia must be given greater weight, considering that it was his task -- as the real property
manager of respondent -- to know about matters involving the latters properties. In contrast, it was not explained how Ruiz could be deemed
competent and credible in his testimony as to those matters.
The lower courts dismissed the testimony of Garcia -- regardless of how clear, positive and straightforward it was -- solely on the ground that
he was not a disinterested witness. True, he was an employee of respondent; relationship, however, will not by itself determine the true worth
of ones testimony.[29] The essential test is whether such testimony is disencumbered, credible, and in accord with human experience.[30] It
cannot easily be dismissed by the mere invocation of the witness relationship with respondent. In sum, we have no reason to disagree with the
CAs evaluation that, being credible, Garcias direct testimony was sufficient to establish respondents claim that petitioner had entered the
premises on December 1, 1993.
Second Issue:
Cause of Action
Petitioner avers that no cause of action was alleged by respondent, as shown by the following circumstances: (1) the latters property was not
encroached upon by Habagat Grill, which had allegedly been constructed on a portion of land owned by the City Government of Davao;[31]
and (2) respondent failed to prove that its predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property.[32]
On the other hand, respondent argues that the trial court indiscriminately ignored the Report of the survey team that had been constituted to
determine the exact location of Habagat Grill. Respondent further contends that the trial court erred in taking judicial notice of the metes and
bounds of the property covered by Presidential Proclamation No. 20.[33] Although the lower court may take judicial notice of PD No. 20, it
may not do so in regard to the metes and bounds of Times Beach. Neither, may it claim knowledge of the situational relation between the land
in question and Times Beach.
Location of the Property
We agree with respondent. Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because
they already know them.[34] Its object is to save time, labor and expense in securing and introducing evidence on matters that are not
ordinarily capable of dispute or actually bona fide disputed, and the tenor of which can safely be assumed from the tribunals general
knowledge or from a slight search on its part.
Indeed, municipal courts may take judicial notice of the municipal ordinances in force in the municipality in which they sit.[35] Such notice,
however, is limited to what the law is and what it states.[36] As can be gleaned from its discussions, the trial court took judicial notice of the
existence of Presidential Proclamation No. 20, which declared Times Beach a recreation center. The MTC also took judicial notice of the
location of the beach, which was from the shoreline to the road towards the shoreline. On the basis of these premises, the trial court resolved
that the lot on which petitioners restaurant was located should necessarily be inside Times Beach, which was owned by the City of Davao.
Hence, it was the City -- not respondent -- that had a cause of action against petitioner. To arrive at this conclusion, the MTC made its own
estimate of the location of the metes and bounds of the property mentioned by the law.[37]
The location of Habagat Grill cannot be resolved by merely taking judicial notice of Presidential Proclamation No. 20; such location is precisely
at the core of the dispute in this case. Moreover, considering respondents allegation that the supposed lot covered by the Ordinance has been
lost due to inundation by the sea, we cannot fathom how the trial court could have known of the actual location of the metes and bounds of
the subject lot.
Neither may the MTC take discretionary judicial notice under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, because the exact boundaries of the
lot covered by that law are not a matter of public knowledge capable of unquestionable demonstration. Neither may these be known to judges
because of their judicial functions.
Hence, the CA was correct in disregarding the findings of the trial courts, because they had erred in taking judicial notice of the exact metes
and bounds of the property. The appellate court aptly relied on the Report submitted by the survey team that had been constituted by the trial
court, precisely for the purpose of determining the location of Habagat Grill in relation to respondents lot.
Prior Possession
Finally, petitioner avers that respondent failed to prove that the latters predecessor-in-interest had prior possession of the property.[38]
Conversely, respondent alleges that its predecessor was in prior physical possession of the property as the registered owner thereof since June
11, 1981.[39] Again, we rule for respondent.
There is only one issue in ejectment proceedings: who is entitled to physical or material possession of the premises; that is, to possession de
facto, not possession de jure? Issues as to the right of possession or ownership are not involved in the action; evidence thereon is not
admissible, except only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession.[40]
The two forms of ejectment suits -- forcible entry or unlawful detainer -- may be distinguished from each other mainly by the fact that in
forcible entry, the plaintiffs must prove that they were in prior possession of the premises until they were deprived thereof by the defendant;
in unlawful detainer, the plaintiff need not have been in prior physical possession.[41]
Spouses Benitez v. CA[42] has held that possession can be acquired not only by material occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject
to the action of ones will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are
donations, succession, x x x execution and registration of public instruments, and the inscription of possessory information titles.[43] For one
to be considered in possession, one need not have actual or physical occupation[44] of every square inch of the property at all times. In the
present case, prior possession of the lot by respondents predecessor was sufficiently proven by evidence of the execution and registration of
public instruments and by the fact that the lot was subject to its will from then until December 1, 1993, when petitioner unlawfully entered the
premises and deprived the former of possession thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 12-33.
[2] Id., pp. 37-42. Seventeenth Division. Penned by Justice Hilarion L. Aquino (Division chairperson), with the concurrence of Justices Edgardo
P. Cruz and Amelita G. Tolentino (members).
[3] Id., pp. 54-55.
[4] Assailed CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 42.
[5] Id., pp. 1-2 & 37-38. [6] Id., pp. 3 & 39.[7] Ibid.[8] Ibid.[9] Ibid.[10] Ibid.[11] Id., pp. 5 & 41.
[12] The case was deemed submitted for decision on May 22, 2003, upon this Courts receipt of respondents Memorandum, signed by Antonio
P. Avelino (respondents general administration manager) assisted by Atty. Inobobby P. Pinili. Petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Lucilo
B. Sarona Jr., was received by this Court on May 20, 2003.
[13] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 8; rollo, p. 109. Original in upper case.
[14] Id., pp. 13 & 114.
[15] Lizo v. Carandang, 73 Phil. 649, August 17, 1942.
[16] Complaint, p. 1; rollo, p.63.
[17] See Herrera v. Bollos, 374 SCRA 107, January 18, 2002.
[18] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 10; rollo, p. 111.
[19] Ibid.
[20] RTC Decision, p. 3; rollo, p. 79.
[21] Respondents Memorandum, pp. 15-16; rollo, pp. 136-137.
[22] Siguan v. Lim, 318 SCRA 725, November 19, 1999.
[23] Petitioners Memorandum, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 39-40.
[24] Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil. 184, January 12, 1912; Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. CA, 173 SCRA 619, May 29,
1989; Metro Manila Transit Corp. v. CA, 223 SCRA 521, June 21, 1993.
[25] Sapu-an v. CA, 214 SCRA 701, October 19, 1992.
[26] People v. Candado, 84 SCRA 508, August 1, 1978; People v. Ferrer, 325 Phil. 269, March 14, 1996; People v. Sotto, 325 Phil. 646, March 29,
1996; People v. Canuzo, 325 Phil. 840, March 29, 1996.
[27] SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may
also consider the number of witnesses though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
[28] Francisco, Basic Evidence, 2nd ed. (1999), pp. 493-494.
[29] People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283, January 19, 1995; People v. Magsombol, 322 Phil. 196, January 23, 1996; People v. Magallano, 334 Phil.
276, January 16, 1997.
[30] People v. Gapasan, 312 Phil. 964, March 29, 1995; People v. Reyes, 312 Phil. 304, March 9, 1995.
[32] Id., pp. 3-4 & 104-105.
[33] It declared Times Beach as a recreation site in Davao City. CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 41.
[34] Francisco, supra, p. 23.
[35] Id., p. 25.
[36] United States v. Pons, 34 Phil. 729, August 12, 1916.
[37] MTC Decision, pp. 2-3; rollo, pp. 73-74.
[39] Respondents Memorandum, pp. 20-21; rollo, pp. 141-142.
[40] Pitrague v. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5, September 17, 1952.
[41] Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372, May 10, 1994; Javelosa v. Court of Appeals, 333 Phil. 331, December 10, 1996.
[42] 334 Phil. 216, January 16, 1997 (citing Pharma Industries, Inc. v. Pajarillaga, 100 SCRA 339, October 17, 1980).
[43] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, (1992 ed.), p. 262.
[44] Spouses Benitez v. Court of Appeals, supra.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 135695-96. October 12, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203,
finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice.
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City Prosecutors Office two separate complaints for
incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged:
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:
That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being the father of complainant MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latters will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded Not Guilty to the charges.
The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
Appellants defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape charges against him since he and his
daughter, had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her for going out whenever he was not at home.[3]
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the
pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
c) To pay the costs.
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -
a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the
penalty of death;
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
(2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the
pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
(3) To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[4]
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainants version of what accused did to her.
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that private complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13
year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living with her
father, the herein accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.
xxx
That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 oclock in the evening, she was in the house together with her father. But before she went to sleep,
her father was already lying down on the mat while herself (sic) just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside him. However,
when she was already sleeping, she noticed that her father who was already undressed was beside her and was embracing her. Then, he
undressed her which she resisted but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after that, he inserted his
penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and was
very painful.
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the time asking by saying (sic) : Does it feel good? And
at the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry with her
when she contradicted his statement.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she felt intense pain that she cried and told him to pull
it out but did not accede and in fact, said: Why will I pull it out when it feels so good(?)
That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to heaven if she did not get married, her father just
stayed there and continued smoking while she cried.
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her father was just smoking and squatting. That after she
finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep when her father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her, she
placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and was able to take her womanhood again by using a very
sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her neck which made her afraid.
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her fathers place and went to her neighbor by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told her
what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to report the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the policemen, she
went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and after her medical examination, she was brought back by the police and
was investigated by them.[5]
Appellants claim that the complainants charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court, which found him twice guilty of rape. Now
before us, appellant assails his double conviction, simply contending that:[6]
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.
Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch
repairman near Gals Bakery in Mandaue City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 oclock that evening. On November 7,
1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have raped his daughter because when the incidents
allegedly transpired, he went to work and naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings.[7]
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the trial courts decision, with the recommendation
that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of the penalty of death imposed in each of these cases
before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its review of the records, including the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense. Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.[8] But here we find no room to disturb the trial courts judgment
concerning appellants guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.
Appellants defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial
involving his freedom and his life. Against the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative matters,[9] such defense is not only
trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the positive identification by the victim of
the appellant as the violator of her honor.[10] Indeed, we find that private complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant with ravishing
her. The victims account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent.[11] Her testimony never wavered even after
it had been explained to her that her father could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court.[12]
In a prosecution for rape, the complainants credibility is the single most important issue. [13] The determination of the credibility of witnesses is
primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first hand the
demeanor of the witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to form an accurate impression and conclusion. [14] Absent any
showing that certain facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if considered could affect the result of the case, or that the trial courts
finding are clearly arbitrary, the conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and the judgment rendered affirmed.[15]
Moreover, we note here that private complainants testimony is corroborated by medical findings that lacerations were present in her
hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the private complainant yielded the following results:
Genitalia: grossly female
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Labia Majora: coaptated
Labia Minora: -do-
Fourchette: U-shaped
Vestibule: pinkish
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 oclock position(s).
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
Vagina:
Walls: pinkish
Ruganities: prominent
Uterus: small
Cervix: closed
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
Smears:
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Gram staining of vaginal disc.[16]
Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainants private parts meant a history of sexual congress on her
part.[17] According to her, the lacerations may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into complainants genitals. The examining
physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be inferred from complainants U-shaped fourchette since the fourchette of a female
who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse is V-shaped.[18] While Dr. Acebes conceded under cross-examination, that the existence of the
datum U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and absolutely mean that there was sexual intercourse or contact because it can be caused
by masturbation of fingers or other things,[19] nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants
claim that she was raped by appellant.
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had quarreled with him after he had castigated
her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution did not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with private
complainant. He urges us to consider the charges filed against him as the result of his frequent castigation of her delinquent behavior.[20]
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for incestuous rape is of such a nature that a
daughters accusation must be taken seriously. It goes against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as
well as her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor.[21] More so, where her
charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes imputed to him considering that he and his wife
had ten children to attend to and care for. This argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his wife, and
private complainant was the only child who lived with him.[22] As pointed out by the Solicitor General, appellant was thus free to do as he
wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter.[23]
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his
defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the
consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as shown by the following testimony of the victim on cross-
examination:
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be sentenced to death?
A : Yes.
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
A (Witness nodding.)
xxx
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in case your father would be found guilty, two death
sentences will be imposed against him?
A: Yes.
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
A: I want this to proceed.[24]
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct?
Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,[25] penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her father as
qualified rape[26] and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual congress;
(2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consent[27] and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the additional elements
that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim.[28]
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victims father.[29] But the victims age was not properly and
sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted
that she did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She further said that her birth certificate was likewise
with her mother. In her own words, the victim testified - [30]
COURT TO WITNESS
Q: When were you born?
A: I do not know.
Q: You do not know your birthday?
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her.
COURT: Proceed.
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request for judicial notice that the victim here is below 18
years old.
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know
them.[31] Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court
provides when court shall take mandatory judicial notice of facts -
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice of facts -
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is not always nor necessarily isolated or
secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense of rape can and has been committed in places where people congregate, e.g.
inside a house where there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in the same room which the victim is
sharing with the accuseds sister.[32]
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipinas inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish
her honor and virtue.[33]
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of professional and scientific knowledge. For
example, in People v. Alicante,[34] the trial court took judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the birth of
twin baby boys as premature since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example would be facts which are ascertainable from
the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court notices were received by a party.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the court can take judicial notice of a fact
pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which requires that -
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of
any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsels admission, thereof acceding to the prosecutions
motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of
such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon
showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that the rape committed was statutory rape. The
mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26, 1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12,
1984. Although no birth certificate was presented because the victims birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal certificate was
duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the mothers testimony coupled with the presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to
establish that the victim was below 12 at the time of the rape.
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be convicted of simple rape, and not statutory rape,
because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape. The
prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was no showing that the said documents were
lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not correct
for the trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial evidence from
the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,[35]we stressed that the prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim,
even though it is not contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. In People v. Cula,[36] we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18
when the rape was committed in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the case was bereft of any
independent evidence thereon, such as the victims duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainants age,
appellant could not be convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v. Veloso,[37] the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at
the time of the rape. It held that the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victims age other than
through the testimony of her father and herself.
Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate
here what the Court has held in Javier without any dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victims age by independent proof is a bar to
conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J., independent proof of the actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and
essential so as to remove an iota of doubt that the case falls under the qualifying circumstances for the imposition of the death penalty set by
the law.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for
the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659,
is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7, 1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil indemnity. However, the award of another
P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code for each count is
imprecise. In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need for pleading or proof as to the basis
thereof.[38] Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a different amount. Appellant being the father of
the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find that the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an
aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that
generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance
in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353.The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the
nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory. [39] However, in this case, the special qualifying
circumstance of relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death
sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages are called
for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with perverse tendency
or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters. [40]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203, is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Records, p. 1. [2] Rollo, p. 8.

[3] Supra Note 1, at 61. See also TSN, August 18, 1998, pp. 3-4. [4] Supra Note 1, at 63-64.
[5] Id. at 59-61. [6] Supra Note 2, at 59-60. [7] Rollo, p. 61.
[8] People v. Acala, 307 SCRA 330, 347 (1999). [9] Ibid.
[10] People v. Losano, 310 SCRA 707, 723 (1999).
[11] TSN, June 23, 1998, pp. 6-12, 18-19.
[12] TSN, June 24, 1998, pp. 4-5.
[13] People v. Akhtar, 308 SCRA 725, 735 (1999).
[14] People v. Mijano, 311 SCRA 81, 87 (1999).
[15] People v. Ernesto Sevilla, G.R. No. 126199, December 8, 1999, pp. 12-13.
[16] Supra Note 1. at 35.
[17] TSN, June 10, 1998, p.9
[18] Ibid. [19] Id. at 10.
[20] People v. Pedres, 306 SCRA 579, 590 (1999).
[21] Supra Note 11 at 6. See also TSN, August 18, 1998, pp. 5-6.
[22] Supra Note 2, at 104
[23] Ibid.
[24] TSN, June 24, 1998, pp. 4-5.
[25] The relevant portions of said provision read: When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:

1) By using force or intimidation;
2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
xxx
The death penalty shall be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x"
[26] Regalado, Justice Florenz R., Criminal Law Compendium, First Ed. 2000, p. 483.
[27] People v. Mahinay, 302 SCRA 455, 476 (1999).
[28] People v. Silvano, 309 SCRA 362, 378 (1999).
[29] TSN, August 18, 1998, p. 5.
[30] TSN, June 23, 1998, pp. 16-17. See also Rollo, p. 24.
[31] 31 C.J.S. 509.
[32] People v. Villar, G.R. No. 127572, January 19, 2000, pp. 10-11; People v. Geromo, G.R. No. 126169, December 21, 1999, p. 6;
People v. Sandico, 307 SCRA 204, 214-215 (1999); People v. Sangil, 276 SCRA 532 (1997).
[33] People v. Tao, G.R. No. 133872, May 5, 2000, p. 11; People v. Alquizalas, 305 SCRA 367, 375 (1999); People v. Lapinoso, 303 SCRA 664, 676
(1999).
[34] G.R. No. 127026-27, May 31, 2000, p. 27.
[35] 311 SCRA 122, 140-141 (1999).
[36] G.R. No. 133146, March 28, 2000. Both Javier and Cula were cited in People vs. Bali-Balita, G.R. No. 134266, September 15, 2000. Gonzaga-
Reyes, J. opined that it would not have been difficult for the trial court to take judicial notice that the victim is under 18 years of age, since she
testified about 4 months after the rape, that she was only 10 years and 4 months old at the time of the rape. But see Separate Opinion therein
of Bellosillo, J., insisting on the strict requirement of independent proof of age; and that no serious doubt as to the victims age is not a
substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt.
[37] G.R. No. 130333, April 12, 2000.
[38] People v. Flores, 311 SCRA 170, 185 (1999); People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 41 (1998).
[39] People v. Manhuyod, Jr., 290 SCRA 257, 277 (1998).
[40] People v. Alitagtag, 309 SCRA 325, 339 (1999).
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 136247 & No. 138330. November 22, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANUEL LIBAN, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
"He eats his own children,"[1] Nerissa so described her father, accused-appellant Manuel Liban, as she tearfully recounted before the trial court
the details of her dire experience.
At early age, Nerissa Liban and her two other sisters were virtually left on their own. They were still little when their mother left the sleepy
town of Caricaran, Sorsogon, for what she thought to be the green pastures of Manila to augment her husband's measly income from selling
empty bottles. Letters from her, including some sums of money, regularly came at first but soon dwindled.After the last letter asking them to
pray for the success of her bid to work in Japan, the family never heard from her again. Her three daughters Leonarda, private complainant
Nerissa, and Hilda - were left to the custody of her husband whose strange notion of discipline was to strike, pinch, and bite his daughters. Far
worse, he would turn to them to sate the appetite of his loins whetted by his wife's absence.
The first rape occurred on 06 November 1995 when Leonarda spent the night at the house of an aunt. The young Nerissa and eight-year old
Hilda, left behind by her, were already in bed when their father arrived home drunk. He demanded food but when Nerissa set the table for
him, he threw the food away and slapped her. Reeling from the blow, Nerissa fell on her back. She was in this position when the accused
placed himself on top of her. He then removed her panty and, pressing a knife on her, inserted his penis into her vagina and then had her. All
that Nerissa could do was to cry in pain. His lust satisfied, he told her to put back on her clothes. The next morning, at about seven o'clock,
Nerissa left the house and went to see her aunt with whom she stayed for a week until her father came to fetch her. She felt that she had no
choice but to reluctantly go with him. The following night, he again raped her. Manuel Liban would eventually continue raping his daughter on
seven different occasions within a one-year period, the specific dates of some of which Nerissa could no longer distinctly remember.
The last rape took place on 15 October 1996. The three sisters were already asleep. When Nerissa awoke, she found herself tied and
naked. Her father then mounted her and inserted his organ into her vagina. She wanted to shout but she was gagged. When her father had
left, Leonarda came and untied her. Manuel Liban later came back and seeing Nerissa already unbound, he lashed her to the
window. Leonarda told her that their father was also doing the same thing to her. Crying, the two sisters made plans to escape and proceeded
to the house of their maternal aunts, remaining there for a while.
When school started, Nerissa also took Hilda away for fear that their father would do "the same thing" to the young sibling. Tormented by her
traumatic encounters, Leonarda left for Manila.Other than Leonarda, Nerissa never told a soul about the rape incidents. On one occasion,
while attending church services, she met her friend Manay Luisa. Unable to contain her pent-up anguish, Nerissa blurted out to Luisa her cruel
experience. Luisa advised her to see a doctor for check-up to ascertain whether her frequent bouts with dizziness indicated possible
pregnancy. The medical certificate[2] issued by Dr. Ma. Humilde Janaban attested to private complainant's non-virgin state and the presence of
vaginal lacerations caused by sexual intercourse. The doctor told Nerissa, to her relief, that she was not expecting.
In December that year, Nerissa was accompanied by her Tia Nora to the police headquarters to lodge a complaint against her
father. Informations were filed against Manuel Liban for two counts of rape committed against Nerissa Liban, one on 06 November 1995,
docketed Criminal Case No. 97-4363, and the second on 15 October 1996, docketed Criminal Case No. 97-4362, that read:
"INFORMATION[3]
(Criminal case No. 97-4363)
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses MANUEL LIBAN, of Barangay Caricaran, Bacon, Sorsogon, of RAPE defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
"That on or about 9:00 P.M. of November 6, 1995 at Barangay Caricaran, Bacon, Sorsogon, the above-named accused with lewd designs, by
means of force and intimidation and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over his 12-year old daughter NERISSA P. LIBAN, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, had sexual intercourse with the said victim against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
"The offense is attended by the alternative aggravating circumstance of relationship, the accused being the father and direct ascendant of the
victim.
"ACT CONTRARY TO LAW."
"INFORMATION[4]
(Criminal Case No. 97-4362)
"The undersigned Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses MANUEL LIBAN, of Barangay Caricaran. Bacon, Sorsogon of RAPE defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised PenalCode, committed as follows:
"That on or about 9:00 P.M. of October 15, 1996 at Barangay Caricaran, Bacon, Sorsogon, the above-named accused with lewd designs, by
means of force and intimidation and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over his 12 year old daughter NERISSA P. LIBAN, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, had sexual intercourse with the said victim against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
"The offense is attended by the alternative aggravating circumstance of relationship, the accused being the father and direct ascendant of the
victim.
"ACT CONTRARY TO LAW."
In his defense, appellant testified that, on both dates of 06 November 1995 and 15 October 1996, he was resting at their house with his
youngest daughter, Hilda, while Nerissa was with her friends, Eden Desoyo and a certain Embang, both residents of Cogon, Bacon, located
about half a kilometer away from their house. Manuel asserted that Nerissa had always spent her time in the company of friends and that,
since January 1993, Nerissa had been living with her peers. Manuel could not think of any reason why Nerissa would turn against him, except
for the possibility of his daughter having been brainwashed by his in-laws. Manuel explained that the enmity between him and his in-laws had
started when he demanded, through the barangay captain of Caricaran, the return of his daughter Leonarda who had gone to Laguna, without
his prior knowledge and permission, to find work with the help of his in-laws. During an ensuing confrontation, an in-law, one Winefreda
Pulvorido, accused him of raping his daughters.
In Criminal Case No. 97-4362, the trial court ruled to acquit accused Manuel Liban; it explained:
"The matter of the feet of the complainant being tied when the accused was on top of her was not clearly explained, thus; creating reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court that when said accused was on top of the complainant and her feet were tied together, it became physically
impossible for a sexual intercourse to take place. When two or more interpretations are possible, that interpretation which is favorable or
beneficial to the accused must be adopted. In this particular instance, the Court honestly believes that when the feet of the victim were tied
together, rape upon the victim cannot take place, hence on reasonable doubt, the accused must necessarily be acquitted." [5]
In Criminal Case No. 97-4363, however, the court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape penalized under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as so amended by Section 11 of Republic Act ("R.A.") No. 7659, and imposed upon him the penalty of
death -
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the COURT finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE under Article 335 as
amended by Sec. II, R.A. 7659 in Criminal Case No. 97-4363 and hereby sentences him the maximum penalty of death and to pay the offended
party the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages, and the amount of P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost.
"As to Crim. Case No. 97-4362, on reasonable doubt, the accused is hereby acquitted.
"With cost de oficio."[6]
The case has been forwarded to this Court for its review. Closely examining the records, the Court finds hardly anything of substance or
significance that can warrant a reversal of the finding of the court a quo that indeed accused-appellant has violated his own daughter.
The testimony of private complainant was unflinching and straightforward. With tears of anguish, she was able to convincingly narrate the
ordeal she had been through. No nefarious motive was shown that would have impelled her to testify falsely against her own father. She
testified thusly:
"Q. When did the first time that he raped you happen?
"A. On November 6, 1995.
"Q. Where did that happen?
"A. In the house of Magno.
"Q. Who were your companions in that house?
"A. We, the siblings and our father.
"Q. Who owns that house?
"A. Magno.
"Q. And you are only renting that place?
"A. We borrowed it.
"Q. Let us go to that incident that you said that your father raped you on November 6. What time did that rape happen?
"A. Between 9:00 o'clock and 10:00 o'clock in the evening.
"Q. What were you doing then?
"A. I was asleep.
"Q. Then what happened?
"A. When my father arrived, he was drunk and he asked food, so I set the table for him, but when I set the table for him, he threw the food
away.
"Q. What happened after that?
"A. He slapped me and I fell down on my back and when I fell down on my back, he placed himself on top of me.
"Q. What were you wearing at that precise time?
"A. I was wearing a skirt and my upper dress was a T-shirt with red stripes.
"Q. Now, let us go this one by one. After you fell, what did your father do to you?
"A. When I fell on my back, he removed my panty.
"Q. What else happened after he removed your panty?
"A. He inserted his penis to my vagina.
"Q. What were you doing while your father was doing these things to you?
"A. I was crying.
"Q. And did you not try to ward him off?
"A. I tried to move away but he poked his knife on me.
"Q. What did you feel after your father inserted his penis into your vagina?
"A. It was very painful.
"Q. You said that you were then with your siblings. Were they awakened?
"A. My youngest sister was with me because my elder sister was sleeping in the house of my auntie.
"Q. How old was your youngest sister?
"A. Eight (8) years old.
"Q. Now, after your father had carnal knowledge with you, what did he do?
"A. He told me to dress up and the following morning, I went away."[7]
Nerissa Liban appeared to have fully understood the impact of her decision to file the charges against her father -
"Q. Do you understand that the person you are accusing of having raped you is your father?
"A. Yes, ma'am.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Q. And do you understand that if found guilty, your father could be sentenced to death?
"A. Yes, ma'am.
"Q. Now, what do you feel about the consequences of your filing a complaint against your father?
"A. Good for him because he is `eating his own children.'"[8]
Manuel Liban, in this appeal, no longer persists in assailing the veracity of his daughter's account of the rape; instead, he bewails the death
sentence, his lone assignment of error being that -
"THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION
TO PROVE THE REAL AGE OF THE VICTIM."[9]
Citing the cases of People vs. Ernesto Perez[10] and People vs. Amado Sandrias Javier,[11] accused-appellant asks the Court to reduce the penalty
of death imposed upon him to reclusion perpetua.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as so amended by Section 11 of Republic Act 7659, has placed in the category of a "heinous" offense
punishable by death the rape of a minor by her own father. This extreme penalty is to be imposed when the following circumstances
concur, i.e., 1) there is sexual congress without consent; 2) the offender is the father, stepfather, ascendant, guardian or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the victim or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim; and 3) the victim is
under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the crime. [12] In looking at the attendance of the above conditions the Court has
consistently taken an extremely careful stance. With regard, particularly, to the minority of the victim, the Court has belabored the matter on
end.
In People vs. Ernesto Perez,[13] the Court reduced the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua for the failure of the prosecution to specifically
state in the information the age of the victim.The Court deemed the omission to be constitutionally fatal. Perez equated the imposition of the
death penalty in the face of such oversight as being a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges so as to adequately
prepare him for his defense, a flaw that could not be cured simply by introducing evidence therefor.
In People vs. Melencio Bali-balita,[14] the victim, Ella Magdasoc, testified that she was eleven years old, having been born on 12 April 1987,
when she was raped by the accused on 26 August 1992. Although no birth certificate or other official document to prove the age of the victim
was presented in evidence, the testimony of the victim about her age, however, was corroborated by her half-sister, Miriam Gozum, who
declared that, indeed, Ella was eleven years old at the time of the rape. Bali-balita considered the testimony of the two sisters, along with her
physical appearance at the time of trial and the fact that no conflicting piece of evidence on her actual age was given that could place the
matter in any serious doubt, to be sufficient in establishing the minority of the victim.[15]
In People vs. Amado Sandrias Javier,[16] the lack of objection on the part of the defense pertaining to the age of the victim was held not to
exempt the prosecution from presenting the birth certificate of the private complainant upon the premise that the alleged age of the private
complainant, at the time of the commission of the offense, was sixteen or just two years shy from the majority age of
eighteen. Javier explained that in an "age of modernism," there would hardly be much difference between a sixteen-year old lass and an
eighteen-year old girl on physical features and attributes.
People vs. Cula[17]reiterated Javier when this Court lowered the penalty in a case of rape committed on a 16-year old victim on the ground that
the prosecution did not present any independent proof of age, such as a birth certificate, and for the failure by the trial court to make a
categorical finding on the matter. Cula stressed that it was the burden of the prosecution to prove, with certainty, the fact that the victim was
below eighteen years at the time of commission of the rape to justify the imposition of the death penalty, and that the failure of the accused-
appellant to there present testimony or proof to the contrary did not exonerate the prosecution from its burden.
People vs. Tipay[18] held that the presentation of a birth certificate was not indispensable to prove minority; thus, the minority of a victim who
was well below the age of ten, being quite manifest, could enable the court to take judicial notice thereof. Tipay thought to only be crucial
years the age range of fifteen to seventeen years where minority might not always be "indubitable."
In People vs. Tundag,[19] the victim testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rape but later admitted that she did not know
exactly when she was born. The manifestation by the prosecution of its inability to secure a copy of the victims birth certificate, as well as its
motion that judicial notice be taken of the fact that the victim was below eighteen years old at that time, was not sanctioned by this Court to
be sufficient in establishing the victim's minority. Not even absence of contest from the defense, the Court said, could exempt the prosecution
from this burden.Tundag stressed that the minority of the victim should also be proven with equal certainty as the crime itself to justify a
conviction of rape in its qualified form. Tundag went on to say that the age of the victim, without qualification, was not a matter of judicial
notice, whether mandatory[20] or discretionary.[21] Citing People vs. Rebancos,[22] and People vs. Vargas,[23] both of which cases required the
presentation of independent proof on the age of private complainants whose ages were said to be nine and ten years old, respectively, at the
time of rape, Tundag ruled that the evident tender age of the victim in a crime of rape committed by a relative did not excuse the prosecution
from the need to present a birth certificate or, in its absence, an independent piece of evidence, sufficient for the purpose.[24]
The Court here emphasizes that the severity, as well as the irreversible and final nature, of the penalty of death once carried out makes the
decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules of procedure and evidence. It is to be recognized that, due
to variable circumstances, no two cases are really ever alike that, at times, may easily mislead one to perceive the Court to be
giving, albeit inaccurately, vacillating rulings. Relative particularly to the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim in incestuous rape
cases, the Court has consistently adhered to the idea that the victim's minority must not only be specifically alleged in the information but
must likewise be established beyond reasonable doubt during trial. Neither the obvious minority of the victim, nor the absence of any contrary
assertion from the defense, can exonerate the prosecution from these twin requirements. Judicial notice of the issue of age, without the
requisite hearing conducted under Section 3,[25] Rule 129, of the Rules of Court, would not be considered enough compliance with the law. The
birth certificate of the victim or, in lieu thereof, any other documentary evidence, like a baptismal certificate, school records and documents of
similar nature, or credible testimonial evidence, that can help establish the age of the victim should be presented. While the declaration of a
victim as to her age, being an exception to the hearsay proscription, would be admissible under the rule on pedigree, the question on the
relative weight that may be accorded to it is another matter. Corroborative evidence would be most desirable or even essential when
circumstances warrant.
In the instant case, save for the bare testimony of the victim that she was ten years old at the time of the first rape,[26] nothing else could be
elicited from the records to ascertain the correct age of the victim.
In sum, the Court upholds the decision of the trial court convicting Manuel Liban of the crime of rape but must reduce, on account of the
insufficiency of proof on the qualifying circumstance of minority of the victim, the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua. With respect to the
civil liability, the Court sustains the award of P50,000.00[27] as civil indemnity and of P10,000.00 as moral damages[28] but increases the
exemplary damages from P10,000.00 to P20,000.00 in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence.[29]
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Manuel Liban, guilty of rape is AFFIRMED but the sentence
of death therein imposed by it is reduced toreclusion perpetua. The awards of civil liability in favor of the victim are SUSTAINED except for the
exemplary damages of P10,000.00 which is hereby increased to P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] TSN, Nerissa Liban, 12 August 1997, p. 15.

[2] Exh. A, Records of Crim. Case No. 97-4363, p. 3.
[3] Records, People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Liban, Criminal Case No. 97-4363, p. 15.
[4] Records, People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Liban, Criminal Case No. 97-4362, p. 3.
[5] Rollo, p. 13.
[6] Rollo, p. 14.
[7] TSN, Nerissa Liban, 12 August 1997, pp. 4-6.
[8] Ibid., pp. 14-15. [9] Rollo, p. 32.
[10] 296 SCRA 17.
[11] G.R. No. 126096, 26 July 1999.
[12] In cases where the victim is below seven years old, her offender is meted the mandatory penalty, regardless of whether he is a relative or
not.
[13] 296 SCRA 17.
[14] G.R. No. 134266, 15 September 2000.
[15] Mr. Justice Josue Bellosillo, in a separate opinion, insisted on the strict requirement of an "independent" proof of age.
[16] G.R. No. 126096, 26 July 1999.
[17] G.R. No. 133146, 28 March 2000.
[18] G.R. No. 131472, 28 March 2000.
[19] G.R. No. 135695-96, 12 October 2000.
[20] Mandatory judicial notice only pertains to the following --- the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government, and symbols of nationality, the law of the nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world, and their seals, the political
constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time and the geographical divisions. (Section 1, Rule 129, Rules of Court)
[21] Discretionary judicial notice only pertains to matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. (Section 2, Rule 129, Rules of Court).
[22] 172 SCRA 426.
[23] 257 SCRA 603.
[24] In Tundag however, the victims baptismal certificate, coupled with the testimony of her mother, was held as a sufficient independent proof
of age. In contrast, People versus Vargas dismissed the testimony of the victim and her aunt as to the victims age, and the trial court judges
personal evaluation of the victims age based on her personal appearance to be inadequate.
[25] Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of
[26] Although the information stated that she was twelve years old.
[27] In People vs. Victor (292 SCRA 186), we have laid down the rule that if the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law, the indemnity for the victim shall be increased from P50,000.00 to
P75,000.00. Absent the qualified circumstance of minority of victim, actual compensatory damages is maintained at P50,000.00.
[28] In line with People vs. Senen Prades (293 SCRA 411), on the thesis that the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings of
complainant which constitute the bases for moral damages are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at trial by the victim since the
Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility.
[29] In line with People vs. Amado Sandrias Javier (supra), to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior from
sexually abusing their own daughters.

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165987 March 31, 2006
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR, Petitioners, vs. JOSEFINA M. HALASAN, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to nullify the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757, as well as the
Resolution2 dated June 28, 2004 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
On January 30, 1998, the children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for Partition 3 before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, who claimed to
be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor, one of the children of the deceased Alfelor Spouses. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 26,047-98,
was raffled to Branch 17 of said court.
On October 20, 1998, respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention,4 alleging as follows:
1. That she has legal interest in the matter of litigation in the above-entitled case for partition between plaintiffs and defendants;
2. That she is the surviving spouse and primary compulsory heir of Jose K. Alfelor, one of the children and compulsory heirs of Telesforo I.
Alfelor whose intestate estate is subject to herein special proceedings for partition;
3. That herein intervenor had not received even a single centavo from the share of her late husband Jose K. Alfelor to the intestate estate of
Telesforo K. Alfelor.
WHEREFORE, movant prays that she be allowed to intervene in this case and to submit attached Answer in Intervention. 5
Josefina attached to said motion her Answer in Intervention, 6 claiming that she was the surviving spouse of Jose. Thus, the alleged second
marriage to Teresita was void ab initio for having been contracted during the subsistence of a previous marriage. Josefina further alleged that
Joshua and Maria Katrina were not her husband’s children. Josefina prayed, among others, for the appointment of a special administrator to
take charge of the estate. Josefina attached to her pleading a copy of the marriage contract 7 which indicated that she and Jose were married
on February 1, 1956.
Since petitioners opposed the motion, the judge set the motion for hearing. Josefina presented the marriage contract as well as the Reply-in-
Intervention8 filed by the heirs of the deceased, where Teresita declared that she knew "of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor
with that of the herein intervenor" on February 1, 1956.9However, Josefina did not appear in court.
Teresita testified before the RTC on February 13, 2002.10 She narrated that she and the deceased were married in civil rites at Tagum City,
Davao Province on February 12, 1966, and that they were subsequently married in religious rites at the Assumption Church on April 30, 1966.
Among those listed as secondary sponsors were Josefina’s own relatives–Atty. Margarito Halasan, her brother, and Valentino Halasan, her
father.11 While she did not know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been previously married to Josefina and that the two did
not live together as husband and wife. She knew that Josefina left Jose in 1959. Jose’s relatives consented to her (Teresita’s) marriage with
Jose because there had been no news of Josefina for almost ten years. In fact, a few months after the marriage, Josefina disappeared, and Jose
even looked for her in Cebu, Bohol, and Manila. Despite his efforts, Jose failed to locate Josefina and her whereabouts remained unknown.
Teresita further revealed that Jose told her that he did not have his marriage to Josefina annulled because he believed in good faith that he
had the right to remarry, not having seen her for more than seven years. This opinion was shared by Jose’s sister who was a judge. Teresita
also declared that she met Josefina in 2001, and that the latter narrated that she had been married three times, was now happily married to
an Englishman and residing in the United States.
On September 13, 2002, Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order12 denying the motion and dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent
was not able to prove her claim. The trial court pointed out that the intervenor failed to appear to testify in court to substantiate her claim.
Moreover, no witness was presented to identify the marriage contract as to the existence of an original copy of the document or any public
officer who had custody thereof. According to the court, the determinative factor in this case was the good faith of Teresita in contracting the
second marriage with the late Jose Alfelor, as she had no knowledge that Jose had been previously married. Thus, the evidence of the
intervenor did not satisfy the quantum of proof required to allow the intervention. Citing Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals,13 the RTC ruled that
while Josefina submitted a machine copy of the marriage contract, the lack of its identification and the accompanying testimony on its
execution and ceremonial manifestation or formalities required by law could not be equated to proof of its validity and legality.
The trial court likewise declared that Teresita and her children, Joshua and Maria Katrina, were the legal and legitimate heirs of the late Jose K.
Alfelor, considering that the latter referred to them as his children in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities, among others. Moreover, the
oppositor did not present evidence to dispute the same. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of intervenor, Josephina (sic) Halasan through counsel, not sufficient to prove a preponderance of evidence
and compliance with the basic rules of evidence to proved (sic) the competent and relevant issues of the complaint-in-intervention, as legal
heir of the deceased Jose K. Alfelor, the complaint (sic) of intervention is ordered dismiss (sic) with cost[s] de oficio.
On the other hand, finding the evidence by Teresita Sorongon Aleflor, oppositor through counsel sufficient to proved (sic) the requirement of
the Rules of Evidence, in accordance with duly supporting and prevailing jurisprudence, oppositor, Teresita Sorongon Alfelor and her children,
Joshua S. Alfelor and Maria Katrina S. Alfelor, are declared legal and legitimate Heirs of the late Jose K. Alfelor, for all purposes, to entitled (sic)
them, in the intestate estate of the latter in accordance to (sic) law, of all properties in his name and/or maybe entitled to any testate or
intestate proceedings of his predecessor-[in]-interest, and to receive such inheritance, they are legally entitled, along with the other heirs, as
the case maybe (sic).13
Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be
proved. She pointed out that Teresita admitted in her Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999 that she (Teresita) knew of Jose’s previous
marriage to her. Teresita also admitted in her testimony that she knew of the previous marriage. 16 Since the existence of the first marriage was
proven in accordance with the basic rules of evidence, pursuant to paragraph 4, Article 80 of the New Civil Code, the second marriage was void
from the beginning. Moreover, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that the person entitled to claim
good faith is the "spouse present" (thus, the deceased Jose and not Teresita). Josefina concluded that if the validity of the second marriage
were to be upheld, and at the same time admit the existence of the second marriage, an absurd situation would arise: the late Jose Alfelor
would then be survived by two legitimate spouses.
The trial court denied the motion in its Order17 dated October 30, 2002.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose, in considering the bigamous
marriage valid and declaring the second wife as legal heir of the deceased. Josefina also stressed that Articles 80 and 83 of the New Civil Code
provide for a presumption of law that any subsequent marriage is null and void. She insisted that no evidence was presented to prove that she
had been absent for seven consecutive years before the second marriage.
In their comment, Teresita and her children countered that anyone who claims to be the legal wife must show proof thereof. They pointed out
that Josefina failed to present any of the following to prove the fact of the previous marriage: the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, the
couple’s public and open cohabitation as husband and wife after the alleged wedding; the birth and the baptismal certificates of children
during such union, and other subsequent documents mentioning such union. Regarding Teresita’s alleged admission of the first marriage in her
Reply in Intervention dated February 22, 1999, petitioners claim that it was mere hearsay, without probative value, as she heard of the alleged
prior marriage of decedent Jose Alfelor to Josefina only from other persons, not based on her own personal knowledge. They also pointed out
that Josefina did not dispute the fact of having left and abandoned Jose after their alleged marriage in 1956, and only appeared for the first
time in 1988 during the filing of the case for partition of the latter’s share in his parents’ estate. They further pointed out that Josefina does
not even use the surname of the deceased Alfelor. Contrary to the allegations of Josefina, paragraph 2, Article 83 of the Civil Code, now Article
41 of the Family Code, is applicable. Moreover, her inaction all this time brought to question her claim that she had not been heard of for more
than seven years.
In its Decision dated November 5, 2003, the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally
and in writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial
admission no longer requires proof. Consequently, there was no need to prove and establish the fact that Josefa was married to the decedent.
Citing Santiago v. De los Santos,18 the appellate court ruled that an admission made in a pleading cannot be controverted by the party making
such admission, and is conclusive as to such party; and all contrary or inconsistent proofs submitted by the party who made the admission
should be ignored whether objection is interposed by the other party or not. The CA concluded that the trial court thus gravely abused its
discretion in ordering the dismissal of Josefina’s Complaint-in-Intervention. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed orders, having been issued with grave abuse of discretion are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. Resultantly, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Davao City, is ordered to admit petitioner’s complaint in intervention and to
forthwith conduct the proper proceeding with dispatch. No costs.
SO ORDERED.19
Thus, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the ruling of the appellate court.
Petitioners limit the issue to the determination of whether or not the CA erred in ordering the admission of private respondent’s intervention
in S.P. Civil Case No. 26,047-98. They insist that in setting aside the Orders of the trial court, dated September 13, 2002 and October 30, 2002,
the CA completely disregarded the hearsay rule. They aver that while Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides that an
admission does not require proof, such admission may be contradicted by showing that it was made through palpable mistake. Moreover,
Teresita’s statement in the Reply-in-Intervention dated February 22, 1999, admitting knowledge of the alleged first marriage, is without
probative value for being hearsay.
Private respondent, for her part, reiterates that the matters involved in this case fall under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of
Evidence, and thus qualify as a judicial admission which does not require proof. Consequently, the CA did not commit any palpable error when
it ruled in her favor.
Petitioners counter that while Teresita initially admitted knowledge of Jose’s previous marriage to private respondent in the said Reply-in-
Intervention, Teresita also testified during the hearing, for the purpose, that the matter was merely "told" to her by the latter, and thus should
be considered hearsay. They also point out that private respondent failed to appear and substantiate her Complaint-in-Intervention before the
RTC, and only submitted a machine copy of a purported marriage contract with the deceased Jose Alfelor.
The issue in this case is whether or not the first wife of a decedent, a fact admitted by the other party who claims to be the second wife,
should be allowed to intervene in an action for partition involving the share of the deceased "husband" in the estate of his parents.
The petition is dismissed.
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-
Intervention filed in the RTC, to wit:
1.1. Plaintiff Teresita S. Alfelor admits knowledge of the previous marriage of the late Jose K. Alfelor, with that of the herein intervenor were
married on February 1, 1956;20
Likewise, when called to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late husband had been previously married to another.
To the Court’s mind, this admission constitutes a "deliberate, clear and unequivocal" statement; made as it was in the course of judicial
proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission.21 A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof;22 production of evidence is dispensed with.23 A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the
field of controversy.24 Consequently, an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are
conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the
party or not.25 The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot
subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded.26
On the matter of the propriety of allowing her motion for intervention, the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court is Section 1, Rule
19, which provides:
SEC. 1. Who may intervene. – A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court
or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may
be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of
the parties; (3) or an interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of
property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. 27Intervention is "a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted
by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting
the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a
suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, by which such
person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right of interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings."28
Considering this admission of Teresita, petitioners’ mother, the Court rules that respondent Josefina Halasan sufficiently established her right
to intervene in the partition case. She has shown that she has legal interest in the matter in litigation. As the Court ruled in Nordic Asia Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals:29
x x x [T]he interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct
and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Otherwise, if persons
not parties to the action were allowed to intervene, proceedings would become unnecessarily complicated, expensive and interminable. And
this would be against the policy of the law. The words "an interest in the subject" means a direct interest in the cause of action as pleaded, one
that would put the intervenor in a legal position to litigate a fact alleged in the complaint without the establishment of which plaintiff could
not recover.30
In Uy v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court allowed petitioners (who claimed to be the surviving legal spouse and the legitimate child of the
decedent) to intervene in the intestate proceedings even after the parties had already submitted a compromise agreement involving the
properties of the decedent, upon which the intestate court had issued a writ of execution. In setting aside the compromise agreement, the
Court held that petitioners were indispensable parties and that "in the interest of adjudicating the whole controversy, petitioners’ inclusion in
the action for partition, given the circumstances, not only is preferable but rightly essential in the proper disposition of the case."32
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, the case of Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals33 is not in point, as the Court therein did not discuss the propriety
of allowing a motion for intervention, but resolved the validity of a marriage. In relying on the merits of the complaint for partition, the Court
ultimately determined the legitimacy of one of the petitioners therein and her entitlement to a share in the subject properties.
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74757 is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court, Branch
17, Davao City, is ORDERED to admit respondent Josefina Halasan’s Complaint-in-Intervention and forthwith conduct the proper proceedings
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (Chairman) and Hakim S. Abdulwahid,
concurring; rollo, pp. 38-47.

2 Rollo, p. 48. 3 Id. at 49-59.
4 CA rollo, pp. 40-42. 5 Id. at 41.6 Id. at 43-47. 7 Id. at 53. 8 Id. at 48-52.
9 Id. at 48. 10 Order dated September 13, 2002, id. at 13.
11 CA rollo, p. 14. 12 Id. at 13-20.
13 G.R. No. 96740, March 25, 1999, 305 SCRA 138.
14 CA rollo, p. 20. 15 Id. at 21-28.
16 TSN, 13 February 2002, pp. 9-10, 18-19, 22, 27; CA rollo, pp. 23-26.
17 CA rollo, p. 29.
18 G.R. No. L-20241, November 22, 1974, 61 SCRA 146, 149.
19 Rollo, p. 47.
20 CA rollo, p. 48.
21 In Re Lefkas General Partners No. 1017, 153 B.R. 804 (N.D.Ill. 1993).
22 Sherill v. W.C.A.B. (School Dist. of Philadelphia), 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 492 (1993).
23 Re Marriage of Maupin, 829 S.W.2d 125 (1992).
24 Mobil Oil Co. v. Dodd, 515 S.W.2d 350 (1974).
25 Elayda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 49327, July 18, 1999, 199 SCRA 349, 353, citing Joe’s Radio Electric Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 104
Phil. 333 (1958).

26 Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227, 232 (1948), citing McDaniel v. Apacible, 44 Phil 248 (1922).
27 First Philippine Holdings Corporation v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 88345, February 1, 1996, 253 SCRA 30, 38.
28 Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila, Br. 39, G.R. No. 89909, September 21, 1990, 189 SCRA 820, 824.
29 451 Phil. 482 (2003).
30 Id. at 492-493.
31 G.R. No. 102726, May 27, 1994, 232 SCRA 579.
32 Id. at 585.
33 Supra note 13.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131592-93. February 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.: JPUNO
With the passage of Republic Act No. 8294 on June 6, 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered, not as
a separate crime, but merely a special aggravating circumstance.
In the case at bar, appellant JULIAN CASTILLO y LUMAYRO was charged with Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms in two (2) separate
Informations, thus:
Criminal Case No. 45708:
"That on or about the 14th day of November, 1995 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, armed with a
handgun, with deliberate intent and without justifiable motive, with evident premeditation, by means of treachery and with a decided purpose
to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally shoot, hit and wound Rogelio Abawag with the said gun, with which herein accused
was then provided at the time, thereby causing upon said Rogelio Abawag bullet wounds on vital parts of his body, which caused his
instantaneous death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]
Criminal Case No. 45709: HTML
"That on or about the 14th day of November, 1995 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, with
deliberate intent and without justifiable motive, have in his possession and control one (1) Homemade .38 caliber revolver without serial
number (and) three (3) live ammunitions without the authority and permit to possess or carry the same.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[2]
The scene of the crime was the then on-going construction site of Gaisano Building in Lapaz, Iloilo City. On November 14, 1995, at about 8
a.m., ROBERTO LUSTICA, a construction worker, was on the last rung of the stairs on the third floor of the Gaisano building when he saw his
co-worker ROGELIO ABAWAG being closely pursued by accused JULIAN CASTILLO, a lead man in the same construction site. During the chase,
the accused pointed a gun at Abawag and shot him. Abawag, then about a half meter away from the accused, fell on his knees beside a pile of
hollow blocks.[3]
FRANKLIN ACASO, a mason working on the third floor of the Gaisano building, heard the first shot. Initially, he did not pay attention to it as he
thought that the sound came from one of their construction equipments. Seconds later, he heard a second shot and a person screaming:
"Ouch, that is enough!" When he looked towards the direction of the sound, he saw the accused in front of Abawag, about a meter away,
pointing a .38 caliber revolver at the latter. Abawag was then leaning on a pile of hollow blocks, pleading for mercy. The accused shot Abawag
a third time despite the latter's imploration. The accused then fled, leaving Abawag lifeless.[4]
The management of Gaisano reported the shooting incident to the police authorities who immediately rushed to the scene of the crime. JUN
LIM, alias "Akoy," brother-in-law of the victim and also a construction worker at the Gaisano, volunteered to go with the police and assist
them in locating the accused. yacats
The police, accompanied by Akoy, proceeded to Port San Pedro where they saw the accused on board a vessel bound for Cebu. When they
boarded the vessel, Akoy positively identified the accused to the police as the assailant. The accused attempted to escape when the police
identified themselves but the police caught up with him. Upon inquiry, the accused denied complicity in the killing of Abawag. The police
found in his possession a .38 caliber handmade revolver, three (3) empty shells and three (3) live ammunitions. Further inquiry revealed that
the accused owned the gun but had no license to possess it. The police then took the accused into custody and charged him for the murder of
Abawag and for illegal possession of firearm.[5]
The self-defense theory hoisted by the accused who testified solely for the defense was not given credence by the trial court. Thus, he was
convicted of Homicide, as the prosecution failed to prove the alleged qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and
of Illegal Possession of Firearm, aggravated by homicide. The trial court disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding the accused guilty of the crimes of homicide and illegal possession of firearm aggravated by
homicide beyond the shadow of the doubt, he is hereby sentenced as follows:
"1) For the crime of homicide, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum;
"2) For illegal possession of firearm which is aggravated by homicide, he is sentenced to a penalty of death;
"3) To pay the family of his victim P50,000.00 as indemnity and another P50,000.00 as moral damages; and
"4) To pay the cost.
"SO ORDERED."[6] (emphasis supplied)
On automatic review by this Court, appellant impugns solely his conviction for illegal possession of firearm for which he was sentenced to the
supreme penalty of death.
Prefatorily, we stress that although the appellant himself does not refute the findings of the trial court regarding the homicide aspect of the
case, the Court nevertheless made a thorough examination of the entire records of the case, including the appellant's conviction for homicide,
based on the settled principle that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review. Our evaluation leads us to conclude that the
trial court's ruling on the homicide aspect is clearly supported by the records. Thus, we shall concentrate on the appellant's lone assignment of
error with respect to his conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearm. olanski
P.D. 1866, which codified the laws on illegal possession of firearms, was amended on June 6, 1997 by Republic Act 8294. Aside from lowering
the penalty for said crime, R.A. 8294 also provided that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
shall be considered as a special aggravating circumstance.[7] This amendment has two (2) implications: first, the use of an unlicensed firearm
in the commission of homicide or murder shall not be treated as a separate offense, but merely as a special aggravating circumstance;second,
as only a single crime (homicide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm) is committed under the law, only
one penalty shall be imposed on the accused.[8]
Prescinding therefrom, and considering that the provisions of the amendatory law are favorable to herein appellant, the new law should be
retroactively applied in the case at bar.[9] It was thus error for the trial court to convict the appellant of two (2) separate offenses, i.e.,
Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearms, and punish him separately for each crime. Based on the facts of the case, the crime for which the
appellant may be charged is homicide, aggravated by illegal possession of firearm, the correct denomination for the crime, and not illegal
possession of firearm, aggravated by homicide as ruled by the trial court, as it is the former offense which aggravates the crime of homicide
under the amendatory law.
The appellant anchors his present appeal on the assertion that his conviction was unwarranted as no proof was adduced by the prosecution
that he was not licensed to possess the subject firearm. In their Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Appellee's Brief, the Solicitor General
joined cause with the appellant.[10] haideem
We agree.
Two (2) requisites are necessary to establish illegal possession of firearms: first, the existence of the subject firearm, and second, the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus
probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Information lies with the prosecution.[11]
The first element -- the existence of the firearm -- was indubitably established by the prosecution. Prosecution eyewitness Acaso saw appellant
shoot the victim thrice with a .38 caliber revolver.[12]Appellant himself admitted that he did not turn over the gun to the security guards in the
building after the shooting.[13] The same gun was recovered from the appellant and offered in evidence by the prosecution. However, no proof
was adduced by the prosecution to establish the second element of the crime, i.e., that the appellant was not licensed to possess the firearm.
This negative fact constitutes an essential element of the crime as mere possession, by itself, is not an offense. The lack of a license or permit
should have been proved either by the testimony or certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosives Unit that the accused
was not a licensee of the subject firearm[14] or that the type of firearm involved can be lawfully possessed only by certain military
personnel.[15] Indeed, if the means of proving a negative fact is equally within the control of each party, the burden of proof is on the party
averring said negative fact. As the Information alleged that the appellant possessed an unlicensed gun, the prosecution is duty-bound to prove
this allegation. It is the prosecution who has the burden of establishing beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime charged,
consistent with the basic principle that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty.[16] Thus, if the non-existence of some fact is
a constituent element of the crime, the onus is upon the State to prove this negative allegation of non-existence.[17] kirsten
Hence, in the case at bar, although the appellant himself admitted that he had no license for the gun recovered from his possession, his
admission will not relieve the prosecution of its duty to establish beyond reasonable doubt the appellant's lack of license or permit to
possess the gun. In People vs. Solayao,[18] we expounded on this doctrine, thus:
"x x x (b)y its very nature, an 'admission is the mere acknowledgement of a fact or of circumstances from which guilt may be inferred, tending
to incriminate the speaker, but not sufficient of itself to establish his guilt.' In other words, it is a statement by defendant of fact or facts
pertinent to issues pending, in connection with proof of other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt, but which is, of itself, insufficient to
authorize conviction. From the above principles, this Court can infer that an admission in criminal cases is insufficient to prove beyond doubt
the commission of the crime charged.
"Moreover, said admission is extrajudicial in nature. As such, it does not fall under Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Court which
states:
'An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the trial or other proceedings in the same case does not require proof.'
"Not being a judicial admission, said statement by accused-appellant does not prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm. It does not even establish a prima facie case. It merely bolsters the case for the prosecution but does not stand as
proof of the fact of absence or lack of a license." (emphasis supplied) CODES
Additionally, as pointed out by both the appellant and the Solicitor General, the extrajudicial admission was made without the benefit of
counsel. Thus, we hold that the appellant may only be held liable for the crime of simple homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
We come now to the penalty. The crime of homicide is penalized by reclusion temporal.[19] There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime, the penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed in its medium period, i.e., from
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision mayor, i.e., from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, as minimum, to
reclusion temporal in its medium period of from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months, as maximum.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant Julian Castillo y Lumayro is found guilty of Homicide. He is
sentenced to imprisonment of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor as minimum to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and
nine (9) days of reclusion temporal as maximum. However, the civil indemnity and moral damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the
victim in the total amount of one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos are affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-
Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.6/27/00 3:06 PM
[1] Rollo, p. 1.
[2] Original Records, p. 1.
[3] July 31, 1996 TSN, pp. 2-4, 10.
[4] July 24, 1996 TSN, pp. 3-11.
[5] May 22, 1996 TSN, pp. 8-22; July 3, 1996 TSN, pp. 3-9.
[6] Decision, dated February 25, 1997; Rollo, pp. 15-22.
[7] Section 1, par. 3.
[8] People vs. Molina, 292 SCRA 742, 779-783 (1998)
[9] Article 22, Revised Penal Code.
[10] Rollo, pp. 71-85.
[11] People vs. Eubra, 274 SCRA 180 (1997); People vs. Villanueva, 275 SCRA 489 (1997); People vs. Mallari, 265 SCRA 456 (1996); People vs.
Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 (1991)

[12] July 24, 1996 TSN, at p. 6.
[13] October 16, 1996 TSN, p. 15.
[14] People vs. Villanueva, supra.
[15] People vs. Mesal, 244 SCRA 166 (1995)
[16] 29 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 180-181.
[17] Underhills Criminal evidence, 4th edition, p. 70.
[18] 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
[19] Article 249, Revised Penal Code.
TAN VS PEOPLE
FIRST DIVISION G.R. No. 182864, January 12, 2015

EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC., Petitioner, v. BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP., & MITSUI SUMITOMO INSURANCE CO., LTD., Respondents.
D E C I S I O N PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 of the Decision2 of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 88744
dated 31 January 2008, modifying the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) by upholding the liability of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. (ESLI)
but absolving Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) from liability and deleting the award of attorney’s fees.
The facts gathered from the records follow:
On 29 December 2004, BPI/MS Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS) and Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company Limited (Mitsui) filed a
Complaint3 before the RTC of Makati City against ESLI and ATI to recover actual damages amounting to US$17,560.48 with legal interest,
attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
In their complaint, BPI/MS and Mitsui alleged that on 2 February 2004 at Yokohama, Japan, Sumitomo Corporation shipped on board ESLI’s
vessel M/V “Eastern Venus 22” 22 coils of various Steel Sheet weighing 159,534 kilograms in good order and condition for transportation to
and delivery at the port of Manila, Philippines in favor of consignee Calamba Steel Center, Inc. (Calamba Steel) located in Saimsim, Calamba,
Laguna as evidenced by a Bill of Lading with Nos. ESLIYMA001. The declared value of the shipment was US$83,857.59 as shown by an Invoice
with Nos. KJGE-03-1228-NT/KE3. The shipment was insured with the respondents BPI/MS and Mitsui against all risks under Marine Policy No.
103-GG03448834.
On 11 February 2004, the complaint alleged that the shipment arrived at the port of Manila in an unknown condition and was turned over to
ATI for safekeeping. Upon withdrawal of the shipment by the Calamba Steel’s representative, it was found out that part of the shipment was
damaged and was in bad order condition such that there was a Request for Bad Order Survey. It was found out that the damage amounted to
US$4,598.85 prompting Calamba Steel to reject the damaged shipment for being unfit for the intended purpose.
On 12 May 2004 at Kashima, Japan, Sumitomo Corporation again shipped on board ESLI’s vessel M/V “Eastern Venus 25” 50 coils in various
Steel Sheet weighing 383,532 kilograms in good order and condition for transportation to and delivery at the port of Manila, Philippines in
favor of the same consignee Calamba Steel as evidenced by a Bill of Lading with Nos. ESLIKSMA002. The declared value of the shipment was
US$221,455.58 as evidenced by Invoice Nos. KJGE-04-1327-NT/KE2. The shipment was insured with the respondents BPI/MS and Mitsui
against all risks under Marine Policy No. 104-GG04457785.
On 21 May 2004, ESLI’s vessel with the second shipment arrived at the port of Manila partly damaged and in bad order. The coils sustained
further damage during the discharge from vessel to shore until its turnover to ATI’s custody for safekeeping.
Upon withdrawal from ATI and delivery to Calamba Steel, it was found out that the damage amounted to US$12,961.63. As it did before,
Calamba Steel rejected the damaged shipment for being unfit for the intended purpose.
Calamba Steel attributed the damages on both shipments to ESLI as the carrier and ATI as thearrastre operator in charge of the handling and
discharge of the coils and filed a claim against them. When ESLI and ATI refused to pay, Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim for the total
amount of the cargo against BPI/MS and Mitsui as cargo insurers. As a result, BPI/MS and Mitsui became subrogated in place of and with all
the rights and defenses accorded by law in favor of Calamba Steel.
Opposing the complaint, ATI, in its Answer, denied the allegations and insisted that the coils in two shipments were already damaged upon
receipt from ESLI’s vessels. It likewise insisted that it exercised due diligence in the handling of the shipments and invoked that in case of
adverse decision, its liability should not exceed P5,000.00 pursuant to Section 7.01, Article VII 4 of the Contract for Cargo Handling Services
between Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) and ATI.5 A cross-claim was also filed against ESLI.
On its part, ESLI denied the allegations of the complainants and averred that the damage to both shipments was incurred while the same were
in the possession and custody of ATI and/or of the consignee or its representatives. It also filed a cross-claim against ATI for indemnification in
case of liability.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
To expedite settlement, the case was referred to mediation but it was returned to the trial court for further proceedings due to the parties’
failure to resolve the legal issues as noted in the Mediator’s Report dated 28 June 2005.7chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On 10 January 2006, the court issued a Pre-Trial Order wherein the following stipulations were agreed upon by the
parties:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Parties admitted the capacity of the parties to sue and be sued;
2. Parties likewise admitted the existence and due execution of the Bill of Lading covering various steel sheets in coil attached to the
Complaint as Annex A;
3. Parties admitted the existence of the Invoice issued by Sumitomo Corporation, a true and faithful copy of which was attached to the
Complaint as Annex B;
4. Parties likewise admitted the existence of the Marine Cargo Policy issued by the Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Company, Limited, copy
of which was attached to the Complaint as Annex C;
5. [ATI] admitted the existence and due execution of the Request for Bad Order Survey dated February 13, 2004, attached to the
Complaint as Annex D;
6. Insofar as the second cause of action, [ESLI] admitted the existence and due execution of the document [Bill of Lading Nos.
ESLIKSMA002, Invoice with Nos. KJGE-04-1327-NT/KE2 and Marine Cargo Policy against all risks on the second shipment] attached to the
Complaint as Annexes E, F and G;
7. [ATI] admitted the existence of the Bill of Lading together with the Invoices and Marine Cargo Policy. [It] likewise admitted by [ATI]
are the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes attached to the Complaint as Annexes H, H-1 and J.8
The parties agreed that the procedural issue was whether there was a valid subrogation in favor of BPI/MS and Mitsui; and that the
substantive issues were, whether the shipments suffered damages, the cause of damage, and the entity liable for reparation of the damages
caused.9chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Due to the limited factual matters of the case, the parties were required to present their evidence through affidavits and documents. Upon
submission of these evidence, the case was submitted for resolution. 10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
BPI/MS and Mitsui, to substantiate their claims, submitted the Affidavits of (1) Mario A. Manuel (Manuel),11 the Cargo Surveyor of Philippine
Japan Marine Surveyors and Sworn Measurers Corporation who personally examined and conducted the surveys on the two shipments; (2)
Richatto P. Almeda,12 the General Manager of Calamba Steel who oversaw and examined the condition, quantity, and quality of the shipped
steel coils, and who thereafter filed formal notices and claims against ESLI and ATI; and (3) Virgilio G. Tiangco, Jr., 13 the Marine Claims
Supervisor of BPI/MS who processed the insurance claims of Calamba Steel. Along with the Affidavits were the Bills of Lading 14covering the
two shipments, Invoices,15 Notices of Loss of Calamba Steel,16 Subrogation Form,17Insurance Claims,18 Survey Reports,19 Turn Over Survey of
Bad Order Cargoes20 and Request for Bad Order Survey. 21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ESLI, in turn, submitted the Affidavits of Captain Hermelo M. Eduarte, 22 Manager of the Operations Department of ESLI, who monitored in
coordination with ATI the discharge of the two shipments, and Rodrigo Victoria (Rodrigo), 23 the Cargo Surveyor of R & R Industrial and Marine
Services, Inc., who personally surveyed the subject cargoes on board the vessel as well as the manner the ATI employees discharged the coils.
The documents presented were the Bills of Lading, Secretary’s Certificate24 of PPA, granting ATI the duty and privilege to provide arrastre and
stevedoring services at South Harbor, Port of Manila, Contract for Cargo Handling Services, 25 Damage Report26 and Turn Over Report made by
Rodrigo.27 ESLI also adopted the Survey Reports submitted by BPI/MS and Mitsui. 28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Lastly, ATI submitted the Affidavits of its Bad Order Inspector Ramon Garcia (Garcia) 29 and Claims Officer Ramiro De Vera.30 The documents
attached to the submissions were the Turn Over Surveys of Bad Cargo Order, 31 Requests for Bad Order Survey,32 Cargo Gatepasses issued by
ATI,33 Notices of Loss/Claims of Calamba Steel34 and Contract for Cargo Handling Services.35chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On 17 September 2006, RTC Makati City rendered a decision finding both the ESLI and ATI liable for the damages sustained by the two
shipments. The dispositive portion reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [BPI/MS and Mitsui] and against [ESLI Inc.] and [ATI], jointly and severally ordering the
latter to pay [BPI/MS and Mitsui] the following:
1. Actual damages amounting to US$17,560.48 plus 6% legal interest per annum commencing from the filing of this complaint, until the
same is fully paid;
2. Attorney’s fees in a sum equivalent to 20% of the amount claimed;
3. Costs of suit.36
Aggrieved, ESLI and ATI filed their respective appeals before the Court of Appeals on both questions of fact and
law.37chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Before the appellate court, ESLI argued that the trial court erred when it found BPI/MS has the capacity to sue and when it assumed
jurisdiction over the case. It also questioned the ruling on its liability since the Survey Reports indicated that the cause of loss and damage was
due to the “rough handling of ATI’s stevedores during discharge from vessel to shore and during loading operation onto the trucks.” It invoked
the limitation of liability of US$500.00 per package as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 65 or the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act
(COGSA).38chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On the other hand, ATI questioned the capacity to sue of BPI/MS and Mitsui and the award of attorney’s fees despite its lack of justification in
the body of the decision. ATI also imputed error on the part of the trial court when it ruled that ATI’s employees were negligent in the ruling of
the shipments. It also insisted on the applicability of the provision of COGSA on limitation of liability. 39chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In its Decision,40 the Court of Appeals absolved ATI from liability thereby modifying the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portions
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appeal of ESLI is DENIED, while that of ATI is GRANTED. The assailed Judgment dated September 17, 2006 of Branch 138, RTC
of Makati City in Civil Case No. 05-108 is hereby MODIFIED absolving ATI from liability and deleting the award of attorney’s fees. The rest of the
decision is affirmed.41
Before this Court, ESLI seeks the reversal of the ruling on its liability.
At the outset, and notably, ESLI included among its arguments the attribution of liability to ATI but it failed to implead the latter as a party to
the present petition. This non-inclusion was raised by BPI/MS and Mitsui as an issue42 in its Comment/Opposition43 and
Memorandum:44chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
For reasons known only to [ESLI], it did not implead ATI as a party respondent in this case when it could have easily done so. Considering the
nature of the arguments raised by petitioner pointing to ATI as solely responsible for the damages sustained by the subject shipments, it is
respectfully submitted that ATI is an indispensable party in this case. Without ATI being impleaded, the issue of whether ATI is solely
responsible for the damages could not be determined with finality by this Honorable Court. ATI certainly deserves to be heard on the issue but
it could not defend itself because it was not impleaded before this Court. Perhaps, this is the reason why [ESLI] left out ATI in this case so that
it could not rebut while petitioner puts it at fault.45
ESLI in its Reply46 put the blame for the non-exclusion of ATI to BPI/MS and Mitsui:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[BPI/MS and Mitsui] claim that herein [ESLI] did not implead [ATI] as a party respondent in the Petition for Review on Certiorari it had filed.
Herein Petitioner submits that it is not the obligation of [ESLI] to implead ATI as the same is already the look out of [BPI/MS and Mitsui]. If
[BPI/MS and Mitsui] believe that ATI should be made liable, they should have filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the Honorable Court of
Appeals. The fact that [BPI/MS and Mitsui] did not even lift a finger to question the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals goes to show
that [BPI/MS and Mitsui] are not interested as to whether or not ATI is indeed liable. 47
It is clear from the exchange that both [ESLI] and [BPI/MS and Mitsui] are aware of the non-inclusion of ATI, the arrastre operator, as a party to
this review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals. By blaming each other for the exclusion of ATI, [ESLI] and [BPI/MS and Mitsui] impliedly
agree that the absolution of ATI from liability is final and beyond review. Clearly, [ESLI] is the consequential loser. It alone must bear the
proven liability for the loss of the shipment. It cannot shift the blame to ATI, thearrastre operator, which has been cleared by the Court of
Appeals. Neither can it argue that the consignee should bear the loss.
Thus confined, we go to the merits of the arguments of ESLI.
First Issue: Liability of ESLI
ESLI bases of its non-liability on the survey reports prepared by BPI/MS and Mitsui’s witness Manuel which found that the cause of damage
was the rough handling on the shipment by the stevedores of ATI during the discharging operations. 48 However, Manuel does not absolve ESLI
of liability. The witness in fact includes ESLI in the findings of negligence. Paragraphs 3 and 11 of the affidavit of witness Manuel attribute fault
to both ESLI and ATI.
3. The vessel M.V. “EASTERN VENUS” V 22-S carrying the said shipment of 22 coils of various steel sheets arrived at the port of Manila and
discharged the said shipment on or about 11 February 2004 to the arrastre operator [ATI]. I personally noticed that the 22 coils were roughly
handled during their discharging from the vessel to the pier of [ATI] and even during the loading operations of these coils from the pier to the
trucks that will transport the coils to the consignees’s warehouse. During the aforesaid operations, the employees and forklift operators of
[ESLI] and [ATI] were very negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes.
x x x x
11. The vessel M.V. “EASTERN VENUS” V 25-S carrying the said shipment of 50 coils of various steel sheets arrived at the port of Manila and
discharged the said shipment on or about 21 May 2004 to the arrastre operator [ATI]. I personally noticed that the 50 coils were roughly
handled during their discharging from the vessel to the pier of [ATI] and even during the loading operations of these coils from the pier to the
trucks that will transport the coils to the consignees’s warehouse. During the aforesaid operations, the employees and forklift operators of
[ESLI] and [ATI] were very negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes.49 (Emphasis supplied).
ESLI cannot rely only on parts it chooses. The entire body of evidence should determine the liability of the parties. From the statements of
Manuel, [ESLI] was negligent, whether solely or together with ATI.
To further press its cause, ESLI cites the affidavit of its witness Rodrigo who stated that the cause of the damage was the rough mishandling by
ATI’s stevedores.
The affidavit of Rodrigo states that his functions as a cargo surveyor are, (1) getting hold of a copy of the bill of lading and cargo manifest; (2)
inspection and monitoring of the cargo on-board, during discharging and after unloading from the vessel; and (3) making a necessary report of
his findings. Thus, upon arrival at the South Harbor of Manila of the two vessels of ESLI on 11 February 2004 and on 21 May 2004, Rodrigo
immediately boarded the vessels to inspect and monitor the unloading of the cargoes. In both instances, it was his finding that there was
mishandling on the part of ATI’s stevedores which he reported as the cause of the damage. 50chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Easily seen, however, is the absence of a crucial point in determining liability of either or both ESLI and ATI – lack of determination whether the
cargo was in a good order condition as described in the bills of lading at the time of his boarding. As Rodrigo admits, it was also his duty to
inspect and monitor the cargo on-board upon arrival of the vessel. ESLI cannot invoke its non-liability solely on the manner the cargo was
discharged and unloaded. The actual condition of the cargoes upon arrival prior to discharge is equally important and cannot be disregarded.
Proof is needed that the cargo arrived at the port of Manila in good order condition and remained as such prior to its handling by ATI.
Common carriers, from the nature of their business and on public policy considerations, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by them. Subject to certain exceptions enumerated under Article 173451 of the Civil Code, common
carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods. The extraordinary responsibility of the common carrier lasts
from the time the goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of, and received by the carrier for transportation until the same are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the person who has a right to receive
them.52chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In maritime transportation, a bill of lading is issued by a common carrier as a contract, receipt and symbol of the goods covered by it. If it has
no notation of any defect or damage in the goods, it is considered as a “clean bill of lading.” A clean bill of lading constitutes prima
facie evidence of the receipt by the carrier of the goods as therein described. 53chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Based on the bills of lading issued, it is undisputed that ESLI received the two shipments of coils from shipper Sumitomo Corporation in good
condition at the ports of Yokohama and Kashima, Japan. However, upon arrival at the port of Manila, some coils from the two shipments were
partly dented and crumpled as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes No. 67982 dated 13 February 200454 and Turn Over
Survey of Bad Order Cargoes Nos. 6836355 and 6836556 both dated 24 May 2004 signed by ESLI’s representatives, a certain Tabanao and
Rodrigo together with ATI’s representative Garcia. According to Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargoes No. 67982, four coils and one skid
were partly dented and crumpled prior to turnover by ESLI to ATI’s possession while a total of eleven coils were partly dented and crumpled
prior to turnover based on Turn Over Survey Bad Order Cargoes Nos. 68363 and 68365.
Calamba Steel requested for a re-examination of the damages sustained by the two shipments. Based on the Requests for Bad Order Survey
Nos. 5826757 and 5825458 covering the first shipment dated 13 and 17 February 2004, four coils were damaged prior to turnover. The second
Request for Bad Order Survey No. 5865859 dated 25 May 2004 also affirmed the earlier findings that eleven coils on the second shipment were
damaged prior to turnover.
In Asian Terminals, Inc., v. Philam Insurance Co., Inc.,60 the Court based its ruling on liability on the Bad Order Cargo and Turn Over of Bad
Order. The Receipt bore a notation “B.O. not yet t/over to ATI,” while the Survey stated that the said steel case was not opened at the time of
survey and was accepted by the arrastre in good order. Based on these documents, packages in the Asian Terminals, Inc. case were found
damaged while in the custody of the carrier Westwind Shipping Corporation.
Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination constitutes a prima
facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the deterioration, loss, or destruction of the
goods happened, the transporter shall be held responsible.61 From the foregoing, the fault is attributable to ESLI. While no longer an issue, it
may be nonetheless state that ATI was correctly absolved of liability for the damage.
Second Issue: Limitation of Liability
ESLI assigns as error the appellate court’s finding and reasoning that the package limitation under the COGSA 62 is inapplicable even if the bills
of lading covering the shipments only made reference to the corresponding invoices. Noticeably, the invoices specified among others the
weight, quantity, description and value of the cargoes, and bore the notation “Freight Prepaid” and “As Arranged.” 63ESLI argues that the value
of the cargoes was not incorporated in the bills of lading64 and that there was no evidence that the shipper had presented to the carrier in
writing prior to the loading of the actual value of the cargo, and, that there was a no payment of corresponding freight. 65 Finally, despite the
fact that ESLI admits the existence of the invoices, it denies any knowledge either of the value declared or of any information contained
therein.66chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
According to the New Civil Code, the law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall govern the liability of the common
carrier for their loss, destruction or deterioration.67 The Code takes precedence as the primary law over the rights and obligations of common
carriers with the Code of Commerce and COGSA applying suppletorily. 68chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The New Civil Code provides that a stipulation limiting a common carrier’s liability to the value of the goods appearing in the bill of lading is
binding, unless the shipper or owner declares a greater value. 69 In addition, a contract fixing the sum that may be recovered by the owner or
shipper for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods is valid, if it is reasonable and just under the circumstances, and has been fairly
and freely agreed upon.70chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
COGSA, on the other hand, provides under Section 4, Subsection 5 that an amount recoverable in case of loss or damage shall not exceed
US$500.00 per package or per customary freight unless the nature and value of such goods have been declared by the shipper before
shipment and inserted in the bill of lading.
In line with these maritime law provisions, paragraph 13 of bills of lading issued by ESLI to the shipper specifically provides a similar
restriction:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The value of the goods, in calculating and adjusting any claims for which the Carrier may be liable shall, to avoid uncertainties and difficulties in
fixing value, be deemed to the invoice value of the goods plus ocean freight and insurance, if paid, Irrespective of whether any other value is
greater or less, and any partial loss or damage shall be adjusted pro rata on the basis of such value; provided, however, that neither the Carrier
nor the ship shall in any event be or become liable for any loss, non-delivery or misdelivery of or damage or delay to, or in connection with the
custody or transportation of the goods in an amount exceeding $500.00 per package lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods not
shipped in packages, per customary freight unit, unless the nature of the goods and a valuation higher than $500.00 is declared in writing by
the shipper on delivery to the Carrier and inserted in the bill of lading and extra freight is paid therein as required by applicable tariffs to obtain
the benefit of such higher valuation. In which case even if the actual value of the goods per package or unit exceeds such declared value, the
value shall nevertheless be deemed to be the declared value and any Carrier’s liability shall not exceed such declared value and any partial loss
or damage shall be adjusted pro-rata on the basis thereof. The Carrier shall not be liable for any loss or profit or any consequential or special
damage and shall have the option of replacing any lost goods and replacing o reconditioning any damage goods. No oral declaration or
agreement shall be evidence of a value different from that provided therein. 71chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
Accordingly, the issue whether or not ESLI has limited liability as a carrier is determined by either absence or presence of proof that the nature
and value of the goods have been declared by Sumitomo Corporation and inserted in the bills of lading.
ESLI contends that the invoices specifying the weight, quantity, description and value of the cargo in reference to the bills of lading do not
prove the fact that the shipper complied with the requirements mandated by the COGSA. It contends that there must be an insertion of this
declaration in the bill of lading itself to fall outside the statutory limitation of liability.
ESLI asserts that the appellate court erred when it ruled that there was compliance with the declaration requirement even if the value of the
shipment and fact of payment were indicated on the invoice and not on the bill of lading itself.
There is no question about the declaration of the nature, weight and description of the goods on the first bill of lading.
The bills of lading represent the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties and obligations. It is the best evidence of the intention of the
parties which is to be deciphered from the language used in the contract, not from the unilateral post facto assertions of one of the parties, or
of third parties who are strangers to the contract.72 Thus, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is deemed to
contain all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than
the contents of the written agreement.73chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As to the non-declaration of the value of the goods on the second bill of lading, we see no error on the part of the appellate court when it
ruled that there was a compliance of the requirement provided by COGSA. The declaration requirement does not require that all the details
must be written down on the very bill of lading itself. It must be emphasized that all the needed details are in the invoice, which “contains the
itemized list of goods shipped to a buyer, stating quantities, prices, shipping charges,” and other details which may contain numerous
sheets.74 Compliance can be attained by incorporating the invoice, by way of reference, to the bill of lading provided that the former
containing the description of the nature, value and/or payment of freight charges is as in this case duly admitted as evidence.
In Unsworth Transport International (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,75 the Court held that the insertion of an invoice number does not in itself
sufficiently and convincingly show that petitioner had knowledge of the value of the cargo. However, the same interpretation does not
squarely apply if the carrier had been advised of the value of the goods as evidenced by the invoice and payment of corresponding freight
charges. It would be unfair for ESLI to invoke the limitation under COGSA when the shipper in fact paid the freight charges based on the value
of the goods. In Adams Express Company v. Croninger,76 it was said: “Neither is it conformable to plain principles of justice that a shipper may
understate the value of his property for the purpose of reducing the rate, and then recover a larger value in case of loss. Nor does a limitation
based upon an agreed value for the purpose of adjusting the rate conflict with any sound principle of public policy.” Conversely, but for the
same reason, it is unjust for ESLI to invoke the limitation when it is informed that the shipper paid the freight charges corresponding to the
value of the goods.
Also, ESLI admitted the existence and due execution of the Bills of Lading and the Invoice containing the nature and value of the goods on the
second shipment. As written in the Pre-Trial Order,77 the parties, including ESLI, admitted the existence and due execution of the two Bills of
Lading78together with the Invoice on the second shipment with Nos. KJGE-04-1327-NT/KE279 dated 12 May 2004. On the first shipment, ESLI
admitted the existence of the Invoice with Nos. KJGE-031228-NT/KE380 dated 2 February 2004.
The effect of admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he
voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority. 81chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A review of the bill of ladings and invoice on the second shipment indicates that the shipper declared the nature and value of the goods with
the corresponding payment of the freight on the bills of lading. Further, under the caption “description of packages and goods,” it states that
the description of the goods to be transported as “various steel sheet in coil” with a gross weight of 383,532 kilograms (89.510 M3). On the
other hand, the amount of the goods is referred in the invoice, the due execution and genuineness of which has already been admitted by
ESLI, is US$186,906.35 as freight on board with payment of ocean freight of US$32,736.06 and insurance premium of US$1,813.17. From the
foregoing, we rule that the non- limitation of liability applies in the present case.
We likewise accord the same binding effect on the contents of the invoice on the first shipment.
ESLI contends that what was admitted and written on the pre-trial order was only the existence of the first shipment’ invoice but not its
contents and due execution. It invokes admission of existence but renounces any knowledge of the contents written on
it.82chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial
admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall
control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. In Bayas v. Sandiganbayan,83 this Court
emphasized that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made
them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed
to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.84
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,85 this Court declared that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is
dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
what was pleaded.86 (Citations omitted)
The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section 4,
of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a judicial admission requires no proof. 87chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It is inconceivable that a shipping company with maritime experience and resource like the ESLI will admit the existence of a maritime
document like an invoice even if it has no knowledge of its contents or without having any copy thereof.
ESLI also asserts that the notation “Freight Prepaid” and “As Arranged,” does not prove that there was an actual declaration made in writing of
the payment of freight as required by COGSA. ESLI did not as it could not deny payment of freight in the amount indicated in the documents.
Indeed, the earlier discussions on ESLI’s admission of the existence and due execution of the invoices, cover and disprove the argument
regarding actual declaration of payment. The bills of lading bore a notation on the manner of payment which was “Freight Prepaid” and “As
Arranged” while the invoices indicated the amount exactly paid by the shipper to ESLI.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, we DENY the Petition for Review on Certiorari. The Decision dated 31 January 2008 and Resolution dated 5 May 2008 of the
Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 88744 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
Sereno, C.J., (Chairman), Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta,*and Reyes,** JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 Rule on Civil Procedure, Rule 45.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court) with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Homachuelos and
Lucas P. Bersamin (also a member of this Court) concurring. Rollo, pp. 43-50.
3 Complaint. Records, pp. 1-5.
4Rollo, pp. 170-171. 5 Answer of ATI. Records, pp. 23-27. 6 Answer of ESLI. Id. at 38-47.
7 Mediator’s Report. Id. at 91.
8 As embodied in the Pre-Trial Order. Id. at 98-99.
9 Id. at 99. 10 Id. 11 Id. at 145-147. 12 Id. at 102-104. 13 Id. at 129-131. 14 Id. at 105 and 116. 15 Id. at 106-110 and 117-123. 16 Id. at 124-127.
17 Id. at 128. 18 Id. at 133-136 and 140-143. 19 Id. at 149-154. 20 Id. at 157-159. 21 Id. at 148.
22 Compliance/Manifestation. Id. at 169-171.
23 Id. at 173-176. 24 Id. at 178-179. 25 Id. at 180-205. 26 Id. at 207 and 210-210-A. 27 Id. at 208 and 210-212. 28 Id. at 149-154. 29 Id. at 215-217.
30 Id. at 224-227. 31 Id. at 218 and 221. 32 Id. at 219-220 and 223. 33 Id. at 228-232. 34 Id. at 233 and 273. 35 Id. at 235-261.
36Rollo, pp. 131-137.
37 Records, pp. 284-285 and 287.
38 Appellant’s Brief of ESLI. Rollo, pp. 71-106.
39 Appellant’s Brief of ATI. Id. at 107-130.
40 Id. at 43-50.41 Id. at 49-50. 42 Id. at 302. 43 Id. at 300-307. 44 Id. at 401-414. 45 Id. at 302.v46 Id. at 308-326. 47 Id. at 312.
48 Petition for Review on Certiorari. Id. at 15. 49 Records, pp. 145-146. 50 Id. at 173-176.
51 Art. 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

(1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning or other natural disaster or calamity;
(2) Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
(3) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
(4) The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and
(5) Order or act of competent public authority.
52Asian Terminals, Inc. v. Philam Insurance Co., Inc. (Now Chartis Philippines Insurance, Inc.), G.R. No. 181163, 181262 and 181319, 24 July 2013
citing Philippines First Insurance Co., Inc. v. Wallem Phils. Shipping, Inc., G.R. No. 165647, 26 March 2009, 582 SCRA 457, 466-467.
53Lorenzo Shipping Corp. v. Chubb and Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 147724, 8 June 2004, 431 SCRA 266, 279-280 citing Aguedo F. Agbayani,
Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines, Vol. IV, 1987 ed., p. 119 citing further Government of the
Philippine Island v. Ynchausti & Co., 40 Phil. 219, 213 (1919); 28 Am Jur 2d 264 and Westway Coffee Corp. v. M/V Netuno, 675 F.2d 30, 32
(1982).
54 Records, pp. 218.
55 Id. at 221. 56 Id. at 222. 57 Id. at 219. 58 Id. at 220. 59 Id. at 223. 60 Supra note 52.
61Belgian Overseas Chartering and Shipping N.V. v. Philippine First Insurance Co., Inc., 432 Phil. 567, 579 (2002); Tabacalera Insurance Co. v.
North Front Shipping Services, Inc., 338 Phil. 1024, 1029-1030 (1997).
62 On 16 April 1936, the Philippine Government adopted the U.S. COGSA by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 65 and was made applicable to all
contracts for the carriage of goods by sea to and from Philippine ports in foreign trade provided that it would but be construed as a repealing
law of the Code of Commerce.
63 Petition for Review on Certiorari. Rollo, pp. 30-31.
64 Id. at 31. 65 Id. at 33. 66 Id. at 34.
67 New Civil Code, Article 1753.
68 Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code of
Commerce and by special laws.

69 New Civil Code, Article 1749.
70 New Civil Code, Art. 1750.
71 Bill of Lading. Records, p. 105.
72Chua Gaw v. Chua, 574 Phil. 640, 657 (2008) citing Arwood Induestries, Inc. v. D.M. Consunji, Inc., 442 Phil. 203, 212 (2002); Herbon v.
Palad, 528 Phil. 130, 142 (2006).

73 Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 9.
74 Glossary of Shipping Terms, United States of America, Department of Transportation, Maritime
Administration, http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/Glossary-final.pdf (visited 3 April 2014)

75 G.R. No. 166250, 26 July 2010, 625 SCRA 357, 368.
76 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314 (1913); as reiterated in H. E. Heacock Company v. Macondray & Co. Inc., 42 Phil. 205, 210 (1921)
which ruled that, “A limitation of liability based upon an agreed value to obtain a lower rate does not conflict with any sound principle of
public policy; and it is not conformable to plain principles of justice that a shipper may understate value in order to reduce the rate and then
recover a larger value in case of loss.” [Adams Express Co. v. Croninger 226 U.S. 491, 492;Reid v. Fargo (130 C.C.A., 285); Jennings v. Smith (45
C.C.A., 249); George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells, Fargo and Co. (236 U.S., 278); Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-Marcus Co.227 U.S., 469]
77 Records, pp. 98-99. 78 Id. at 9 and 13. 79 Id. at 14. 80 Id. at 10.
81Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Velarde, 482 Phil. 193, 202 (2004).
82Rollo, p. 34.
83 440 Phil. 54 (2002).
84 Id. at 69.
85 520 Phil. 982 (2006).
86 Id. at 991; Constantino v. Heirs of Constantino, Jr., G.R. No. 181508, 2 October 2013.
87SCC Chemicals Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 405 Phil. 514, 522-523 (2001).
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181508 October 2, 2013
OSCAR CONSTANTINO, MAXIMA CONSTANTINO and CASIMIRA MATURINGAN, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR., represented by ASUNCION LAQUINDANUM, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 31 May 2007 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329, which reversed the 27 October 2003 Decision2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18 of Malolos City,
Bulacan, in a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022-02653 & 1002655,
With Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction & Damages docketed as Civil Case No. 630-M-99.
The facts
This involves a controversy over a parcel of land claimed to be part of an estate which needed to be proportionally subdivided among heirs.
Pedro Constantino, Sr., (Pedro Sr.) ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned several parcels of land, one of which is an
unregistered parcel of land declared for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration 20814 3consisting of 240 square meters situated at Sta.
Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan. Pedro, Sr., upon his death, was survived by his six (6) children, namely: 1) PEDRO CONSTANTINO, JR. (Pedro Jr.), the
grandfather of the respondents; 2) ANTONIA CONSTANTINO, who later died without issue; 3) CLARA CONSTANTINO, who also later died
without issue; 4) BRUNOCONSTANTINO, who was survived by his 6 children including petitioner Casimira Constantino-Maturingan; 5)
EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, who is survived by his daughter Maura; and 6) SANTIAGO CONSTANTINO, who was survived by his five (5) children
which includes petitioner Oscar Constantino.4
On 17 June 1999, respondents Asuncion Laquindanum (Asuncion)and Josefina Cailipan (Josefina), great grandchildren of Pedro Sr., in
representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint5
against petitioners Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira Maturingan, grandchildren of Pedro Sr., for the nullification of a
document denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" dated 10 August 1992, 6Tax Declaration Nos. 96-10022 (02653)7 and 96-10022
(02655)8 and reinstatement of Tax Declaration No. 208149 in the name of Pedro Sr.
In the said complaint, respondents alleged that sometime in October 1998, petitioners asserted their claim of ownership over the whole parcel
of land (240 sq m) owned by the late Pedro Sr., to the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof. Upon verification,
respondents learned that a Tax Declaration No. 02010-2170-33235 in the name of petitioner Oscar Constantino and his cousin Maxima
Constantino was unlawfully issued, which in effect canceled Tax Declaration No. 20814 in the name of their ancestor Pedro Sr. The issuance of
the new tax declaration was allegedly due to the execution of a simulated, fabricated and fictitious document denominated as "Pagmamana sa
Labas ng Hukuman," wherein the petitioners misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr. It was further alleged that
subsequently, the subject land was divided equally between petitioners Oscar and Maxima resulting in the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 96-
10022-0265310 in the name of Oscar, with an area of 120sq m and the other half in the name of Maxima covered by Tax Declaration No. 96-
10022-02652.11 The share of Maxima was eventually conveyed to her sister, petitioner Casimira in whose name a new Tax Declaration No. 96-
10022-0265512 was issued.
Thus, respondents sought to annul the "Pagmamana sa Labas ngHukuman" as well as the Tax Declarations that were issued on the basis of
such document.
The petitioners, on the other hand, averred in their Answer With Counterclaim13 that Pedro Sr., upon his death, left several parcels of land,
namely: 1) a lot with an area of 240 sq m covered by Tax Declaration No.20814; 2) a lot with an area of 192 sq m also situated at Sta.
Monica,Hagonoy, Bulacan, previously covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534; and 3)an agricultural land with an area of Four (4) hectares, more
or less. The petitioners claimed that the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" pertaining to the 240 sq m lot was perfectly valid and
legal, as it was a product of mutual and voluntary agreement between and among the descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr.
Further, petitioners alleged that the respondents have no cause of action against them considering that the respondents’ lawful share over the
estate of Pedro Sr., had already been transferred to them as evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver 14 dated 5
December 1968,executed by Angelo Constantino, Maria Constantino (mother of respondent Asuncion), Arcadio Constantino and Mercedes
Constantino, all heirs of Pedro Jr. In the said deed, respondents adjudicated unto themselves to the exclusion of other heirs, the parcel of land
with an area of 192 sq m by misrepresenting that they were "the only legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr. Thus, petitioners claimed that in the manner
similar to the assailed "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman," they asserted their rights and ownership over the subject 240 sq m lot without
damage to the respondents.
In essence, petitioners position was that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which led to the issuance of Tax Declaration
No.9534 was acquiesced in by the other heirs of Pedro Sr., including the petitioners, on the understanding that the respondent heirs of Pedro
Jr. would no longer share and participate in the settlement and partition of the remaining lot covered by the "
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
On 15 August 2000, pre-trial conference15 was conducted wherein the parties entered into stipulations and admissions as well as identification
of the issues to be litigated. Thereupon, trial on the merits ensued.
On 27 October 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision16 in favor of the respondents finding that:
As a result of execution of "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated December 5, 1968 (Exh. "2") executed by the heirs of Pedro
Constantino, Jr., a son of Pedro Constantino, Sr. and the subsequent execution of another deed denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman" dated August 10, 1992 (Exh. "E") executed by the heirs of Santiago and Bruno Constantino, also other sons of Pedro Constantino,
Sr., to the exclusion of the other heirs, namely, those of ANTONIA, CLARA, and EDUARDO CONSTANTINO, both plaintiffs and defendants acted
equally at fault. They are in pari delicto, whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies recovery by either one of them. (See:Yu Bun
Guan v. Ong, 367 SCRA 559). Parties who are equally guilty cannot complain against each other. (Sarmiento v. Salud, 45 SCRA 213.)
Supplementing the law on the matter, that is, the provision of Article 19 of the New Civil Code whereby every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith, is the legal maxim
that "he who comes to court to demand equity must come with clean hands." (LBC Express, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 602).
Although, plaintiffs-heirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr., including Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina Cailipan, are not parties or signatories to the
"Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated December 5, 1968, they are successors-in-interest of Pedro Constantino, Jr. They areconsidered
"privies" to said deed, and are bound by said extrajudicial settlement. (See: Cabresos v. Tiro, 166 SCRA 400). In other words, they are "PRIVIES
IN ESTATE". (Correa v. Pascual, 99 Phil. 696, 703).
Consequently, plaintiffs are now estopped from claiming otherwise. (See: PNB v. CA, 94 SCRA 357). They are estopped to share in the real
property subject matter of this case. In fine, they are not entitled to the reliefs prayed for.1âwphi1 (Communication Materials & Design, Inc. v.
CA, 260 SCRA 673).
With respect to alleged damages claimed by plaintiffs against defendants in their Complaint and counterclaim for damages by defendants
against plaintiffs in their Answer, both claims are hereby dismissed for lack of valid factual and legal foundations.
Disposition
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises and disquisition, the deed denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" of August10,
1992 and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02653 in the name of Oscar Constantino and Tax Declaration No. 96-10022-02655 in the name of
Casimira C. Maturingan (from Maxima Constantino to Casimira C. Maturingan) stand. Plaintiffs’ Complaint for nullification thereof with
damages is hereby DISMISSED.17
Not convinced, the respondents appealed the afore quoted decision to the Court of Appeals (CA) raising, among others, the erroneous
application by the trial court of the doctrine of "in pari delicto" in declaring the validity of the document "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
In its 31 May 2007 Decision,18 the CA ruled in favor of the respondents heirs of Pedro, Jr., declaring that the "Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver" dated 5 December 1968 they executed covering the 192 sq mlot actually belongs to Pedro Jr., hence, not part of the estate of Pedro
Sr. The CA rationated in this wise:
The 192 square meters lot which was adjudicated in the "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" dated 5 December 1968 among the heirs of
Pedro Jr. namely Angelo, Maria, Arcadio and Mercedes is a property belonging to Pedro Jr. although there is a typographical error in that the
name of Pedro Jr. was inadvertently typed only as Pedro Constantino. It is clear from the reading of the document that a typographical error
was committed because the four (4) children of PedroJr. by Felipa dela Cruz were specifically identified. Further, during the presentation of
evidence of the plaintiffs-appellants, it was rebutted that Pedro Sr. had six (6) legitimate children namely: Pedro Jr., Antonia, Clara, Santiago,
Bruno and Eduardo19 and Pedro Jr. had four (4).20
Thus, the CA went on to state that the respondents, heirs of Pedro Jr., did not adjudicate the 192 sq m lot unto themselves to the exclusion of
all the other heirs of Pedro Sr. Rather, the adjudication in the document entitled "Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver dated 5 December 1968
pertains to a different property and is valid absent any evidence to the contrary. Hence, it is erroneous for the trial court to declare the parties
in pari delicto.
The Issue
The petitioners now question the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the failure of the CA to appreciate the existence of
misrepresentation in both documents, thereby ignoring the propriety of the application of the in pari delicto doctrine. Likewise assailed is the
erroneous disregard by the CA of stipulations and admissions during the pre-trial conference on which the application of the doctrine of in pari
delicto was based.
Our Ruling
Latin for "in equal fault," in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are guilty of a crime. Neither courts of law nor equity
will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an illegal agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto.21 Under the pari
delicto doctrine, the parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no action against each other, and it shall leave the
parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio
defendentis."22
When circumstances are presented for the application of such doctrine, courts will take a hands off stance in interpreting the contract for or
against any of the parties. This is illustrated in the case of Packaging Products Corporation v. NLRC, 23 where this Court pronounced that:
This Court cannot give positive relief to either petitioner or respondent because we are asked to interpret and enforce an illegal and immoral
arrangement. (See Articles 1409, 1411, and 1412 of the Civil Code). Kickback arrangements in the purchase of raw materials, equipment,
supplies and other needs of offices, manufacturers, and industrialists are so widespread and pervasive that nobody seems to know how to
eliminate them. x x x.
Both the petitioners and the private respondent are in pari delicto. Neither one may expect positive relief from courts of justice in the
interpretation of their contract. The courts will leave them as they were at the time the case was filed.24
As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the Civil Code, which state that:
Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a criminal offense,
both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted.
xxx xxx
Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be
observed:
xxx xxx
1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the
performance of the other’s undertaking;
xxx xxx.
The petition at bench does not speak of an illegal cause of contract constituting a criminal offense under Article 1411. Neither can it be said
that Article 1412 finds application although such provision which is part of Title II, Book IV of the Civil Code speaks of contracts in general, as
well as contracts which are null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 1409 of the Civil Code – such as the subject contracts, which as claimed,
are violative of the mandatory provision of the law on legitimes.
We do not dispute that herein parties, through the Deeds they separately executed deprived each other of rightful shares in the two lots
subject of the separate contracts – that is, if the two (2) parcels of land subject matter thereof, form part of the estate of the late Pedro Sr.
It is asserted by the petitioners that their execution in 1992 of the contract denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" which
excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with an underlying agreement with the other heirs including Maria Constantino, daughter of Pedro Jr.
and grandmother of respondents.25 The agreement was for the other heirs to recognize the 192 square meters lot subject matter of the
"Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" executed in 1968 as the share of the heirs of Pedro Sr. in the estate of Pedro Sr., Petitioners respected
such agreement, as in fact, Maria Laquindanum and that of her heirs, herein respondents, were not disturbed in their possession or ownership
over the said parcel of land; thus, the heirs of Pedro Jr. were said to have acquiesced 26to the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman" and the
underlying agreement and therefore they have no recourse or reason to question it taking cue from the doctrine of in paridelicto. This was the
basis of the trial court’s findings that respondents are now estopped from claiming otherwise.27
We find that the trial court erroneously applied the doctrine.
This is not to say, however, that the CA was correct in upholding the validity of the contract denominated as "Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman." The CA decision being, likewise, based on pari delicto, is also incorrect.
Finding the inapplicability of the in pari delicto doctrine, We find occasion to stress that Article 1412 of the Civil Code that breathes life to the
doctrine speaks of the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract with an illegal cause or object which does not constitute a criminal
offense. It applies to contracts which are void for illegality of subject matter and not to contracts rendered void for being simulated,28 or those
in which the parties do not really intend to be bound thereby. Specifically, in pari delicto situations involve the parties in one contract who are
both at fault, such that neither can recover nor have any action against each other.
In this case, there are two Deeds of extrajudicial assignments unto the signatories of the portions of the estate of an ancestor common to
them and another set of signatories likewise assigning unto themselves portions of the same estate. The separate Deeds came into being out
of an identical intention of the signatories in both to exclude their co-heirs of their rightful share in the entire estate of Pedro Sr. It was, in
reality, an assignment of specific portions of the estate of Pedro Sr., without resorting to a lawful partition of estate as both sets of heirs
intended to exclude the other heirs.
Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The inapplicability is dictated not only by the fact that two deeds, not one contract,
are involved, but because of the more important reason that such an application would result in the validation of both deeds instead of their
nullification as necessitated by their illegality. It must be emphasized that the underlying agreement resulting in the execution of the deeds is
nothing but a void agreement. Article 1409 of the Civil Code provides that:
ART. 1409. The following contracts are in existent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law; morals, good customs, public order or public policy;
xxx xxx xxx
Corollarily, given the character and nature of the deeds as being void and in existent, it has, as a consequence, of no force and effect from the
beginning, as if it had never been entered into and which cannot be validated either by time or ratification.29
That said, we cannot give credence to the contention of respondents that no fault can be attributed to them or that they are free from the
effects of violation of any laws arising from the supposed unlawful agreement entered into between Maria Laquindanum, their predecessor-in-
interest, and the other heirs, including petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not signatories to said agreement, thus, the lack of
any binding effect to them. Respondents argued and set forth as an issue during the trial that they were not signatories to any of the contract
or privies to such an arrangement. It is not disputed, however, that respondents are successors-in-interest of Maria Laquindanum, one of the
signatories in the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver who was also allegedly in agreement with the petitioners.
On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents are "privies" to Maria Laquindanum. By the term "privies" is meant those
between whom an action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to the said action. 30 This Court, in Correa v. Pascual,31 had
occasion to explain that "privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and donee, grantor and grantee, joint
tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their respective assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee.
A privy in estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in question by purchase; one who takes by conveyance." In fine,
respondents, as successors-in-interest, derive their right from and are in the same position as their predecessor in whose shoes they now
stand. As such successors, respondents’ situation is analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago Land Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,32reiterating Fetalino v. Sanz33 where this Court held:
As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in the case
before the property was transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in any event, have been bound by the
judgment against his predecessor.34
Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver
which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is applicable to respondents who merely succeeded Maria.
This notwithstanding, it must however be shown that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver, referred to a property owned by Pedro
Sr. There is such basis from the facts of this case.
The records show that apart from respondent Asuncion Laquindanums’s statement that the parcel of land subject matter of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of the estate of Pedro Sr., their common ancestor, no other evidence was offered to support it.
The CA in giving credence to the respondents’ claim, merely relied on the alleged typographical error in the Deed. The basis for the CA’s
conclusion was the inclusion of the wife of Pedro Jr. and that of their children, which the CA considered as proof that the property was owned
by Pedro Jr. and not part of the estate of Pedro Sr. As pointed out by the petitioners, the mention of the names of the children of Pedro Jr. in
the Extrajudicial Settlement is not proof that the subject of the deed is the property of Pedro Jr. Meant to exclude all the other heirs of Pedro
Sr., only the children of Pedro Jr. appeared in the Extrajudicial Settlement as heirs.
Weak as the reasoning is, the CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the respondents during the pre-trial conference where
they stipulated that the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 consisting of 192 sq. m belongs to Pedro Sr. 35
A portion of the admission and stipulations made by both parties during the pre-trial is hereunder quoted, thus:
Respondents’ admissions:
"1. That the land covered by Tax Declaration No. 9534 previously owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr. was transferred to Maria Constantino under
Tax Declaration No. 9535; (highlighting ours)
1. The existence of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver per Doc. No.319, Page No. 44, Book No. 11, Series of 1968 by Notary Public Romerico
Flores, Jr."
Clearly, the above stipulation is an admission against respondents’ interest of the fact of ownership by Pedro Sr. of the 192 sq m lot covered by
Tax Declaration No. 9534, which was transferred to respondents’ mother, the daughter of Pedro Jr. Such that, in one of the issues submitted to
be resolved by the trial court, this was included: "Whether or not the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver" is enforceable against the
plaintiffs, thus curing the legal infirmities, if any, of the "Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman"36 – an issue earlier mentioned.
Judicial admissions are legally binding on the party making the admissions. Pre-trial admission in civil cases is one of the instances of judicial
admissions explicitly provided for under Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court, which mandates that the contents of the pre-trial order shall
control the subsequent course of the action, thereby, defining and limiting the issues to be tried. In Bayas, et. al. v. Sandiganbayan, et.
al.,37 this Court emphasized that:
Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made
them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. 38 Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be
allowed to rescind them unilaterally, it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. 39 (Highlighting ours)
Moreover, in Alfelor v. Halasan,40 this Court declared that:
A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge the fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof; production of evidence is
dispensed with. A judicial admission also removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. Consequently, an admission made in the
pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to such party, and all proofs to the contrary or
inconsistent therewith should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not. The allegations, statements or admissions
contained in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position contrary of or inconsistent with
what was pleaded.41 (Citations omitted)
We are aware that the last paragraph of Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court serves as a caveat for the rule of conclusiveness of judicial
admissions – for, in the interest of justice, issues that may arise in the course of the proceedings but which may not have been taken up in the
pre-trial can still be taken up.
Section 7, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 7. Record of pre-trial. – The proceedings in the pre-trial shall be recorded.1awp++i1 Upon the termination thereof, the court shall issue
an order which shall recite in detail the matters taken up in the conference, the action taken thereon, the amendments allowed to the
pleadings, and the agreements or admissions made by the parties as to any of the matters considered. Should the action proceed to trial, the
order shall, explicitly define and limit the issues to be tried. The contents of the order shall control the subsequent course of the action, unless
modified before trial to prevent injustice.
In addition, Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, provides that:
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may
be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
As contemplated in the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, the general rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon
the party making it and the dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable
mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by
denying that he made such an admission.42
However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and during the trial. While denying ownership by Pedro Sr. of
the 192 sq m lot, respondent Asuncion Laquindanum, when placed on the stand, offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of land
was acquired by Pedro Jr. A portion of her testimony43is hereto reproduced as follows:
"ATTY. DOMINGO:
Q: Do you know if as part of the estate of the late Pedro Constantino, Sr. is another parcel of land also situated at Sta. Maria, Hagonoy, Bulacan
with an area of 192 square meters?
A: It is not owned by Pedro Constantino, Sr., sir. It is our property owned by Pedro Constantino, Jr. that was inherited by my mother Maria
Constantino.
Q: And do you know how Pedro Constantino, Jr. acquired that parcel of land, the one that you mentioned a while ago?
A: Kinagisnan ko na po yong lupang yon pagkabata pa na yon e amin." (Highlighting ours)
The above assertion of denial is simply a self-serving declarationunsupported by evidence. This renders conclusive the stipulations made
during the pre-trial conference. Consequently, respondents are bound by the infirmities of the contract on which they based their right over
the property subject matter thereof. Considering that the infirmities in the two deeds relate to exclusion of heirs, a circumvention of an heir’s
right to his or her legitime, it is apt to reiterate our ruling in Neri v. Heirs of Hadji Yusop Uy,44 disposing that:
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of Sale in favour of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Annunciation should have participated. Considering that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly excluded and that then minors Rosa and
Douglas were not properly represented therein, the settlement was not valid and binding upon them and consequently, a total nullity.
(Highlighting ours)
Further highlighting the effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement of estate, the case of Segura v. Segura,45elucidated thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned.
The rule covers only partition. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule "no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof." As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs, it was not correct for the trial court
to hold that their right to challenge the partition had prescribed after two years from its execution x x x.
In light of the foregoing, while both parties acted in violation of the law on legitimes, the pari delicto rule, expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo
malo non oritur action" and "in pari delicto potior est condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and
leaves them where they are, does not apply in this case. (Underline supplied) 46 As held in De Leon v. CA:47
In the ultimate analysis, therefore, both acted in violation of laws. However, the pari delicto rule expressed in the maxims "Ex dolo malo non
oritur action" and "In pari delicto potior est condition defendentis," which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves
them where they are does not apply in this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been accomplished and to adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to
put a premium to the circumvention or the laws, positive relief should be granted to Macaria. Justice would be served by allowing her to be
placed in the position in which she was before the transaction was entered into.
Accordingly, in order not to put a premium to the circumvention or the laws as contemplated by the parties in the instant case, we must
declare both contracts as void. Indeed, any circumvention of the law cannot be48countenanced.
WHEREFORE, the 31 May 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 81329 is hereby REVERSED. The Pagmamana sa Lahas ng
Hukuman and Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver are hereby declared void without prejudice to the partition of the estate of Pedro
Constantino Sr. with the full participation of all the latter's heirs.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Edgardo F.
Sundiam. CA rollo, 40-53.

2 Penned by Judge Victoria C. Fernandez-Bernardo, records, pp. 190-194.
3 Exhibit "F," id. at 10.
4 Id. at 3-4. 5 Id. at 2-8.
6 Exhibit "E," id. at 11.
7 Exhibit "C," id. at 14.
8 Exhibit "D," id. at 16.
9 Exhibit "F," id. at 10.
10 Id. at 98. 11 Id. at 99. 12 Id. at 101 13 Id. at 24-28. 14 Id. at 30-31. 15 Id. at 70-71. 16 Id. at 190-194. 17 Id. at 193-194.
18 Rollo, pp. 32-45.
19 TSN, 23 October 2000, pp. 4-7.
20 Rollo, page 41.
21 A law Dictionary, Adapted to the Constitution and Laws of the United States. By John Bouvier. Published 1856.
22 Ubarra v. Mapalad, A.M. No. MTJ-91-622, 22 March 1993, 220 SCRA 224, 235.
23 236 Phil. 225 (1987).
24 Id. at 234-235.
25 Answer with Counterclaim filed by defendants, herein petitioners, records, pp. 24-28.
26 Id. at 26.
27 Page 5 of the Decision dated 27 October 2003, id. at 194.
28 Lecture Notes on Civil Code by Professor Ruben F. Balane, p. 352.
29 Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. IV, Tolentino, 1973 Ed., p. 592, also cited in Tongoy v. Court of Appeals, 208 Phil. 95, 113 (1983).
30 Cabresos v. Judge Tiro, 248 Phil. 631, 636-637 (1988).
31 99 Phil. 696, 703 (1956) quoting 50 C.J., 407 and 33 Words and Phrases, 800.
32 334 Phil. 741, 747 (1997).
33 44 Phil. 691(1923).
34 Id. at 694.
35 Records, pp. 70-71.
36 Id. at 71.
37 440 Phil. 54 (2002).
38 Id. at 69, citing Schreiber v. Rickert, 50 NE 2d 879, 13 October 1943.
39 Id.
40 520 Phil. 982 (2006).
41 Id. at 991.
42 Florentino Atillo, III v. Court of Appeals, et. al., 334 Phil. 546, 552 (1997).
43 TSN, 23 November 2000, p. 6.
44 G.R. No. 194366, 10 October 2012, 683 SCRA 553, 560.
45 Id. at 561 citing Segura v. Segura 247-A Phil. 449, 456 (1988).
46 De Leon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80965, 6 June 1990, 186 SCRA 345, 359.
47 Id.
48 Magsalin v. National Organization of Working Men, et. al., 451 Phil. 254, 262 (2003).
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 119053. January 23, 1997.]
FLORENTINO ATILLO III, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMANCOR, INC., and MICHELL LHUILLIER, respondents.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 3677 promulgated on August 4,
1994 affirming in toto the decision of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City in Civil Case No. CEB-9801 entitled "Florentino L. Atillo
III versus Amancor, Inc. and Michell Lhuillier".
The material antecedents are as follows:
On August 15, 1985, respondent Amancor, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as AMANCOR for brevity), a corporation then owned and controlled by
petitioner Florentino L. Atillo III, contracted a loan in the amount of P1,000,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, secured by real
estate properties owned by the petitioner.[1] Before the said loan could be paid, petitioner entered into a Memorandum of Agreement dated
June 14, 1988 (Annex "A" of the Complaint) with respondent Michell Lhuillier (hereinafter referred to as LHUILLIER for brevity) whereby the
latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. As a consequence of the foregoing transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER each became owner of
47% of the outstanding shares of stock of AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining 6%. [2]
In view of the urgent and immediate need for fresh capital to support the business operations of AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLIER
executed another Memorandum of Agreement on February 13, 1989 (Annex "B" of the Complaint) by virtue of which LHUILLIER undertook to
invest additional capital in AMANCOR.[3] As an addendum to the foregoing, a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by
the petitioner and LHUILLIER on March 11, 1989.[4] Relevant to the case at bar is a stipulation in the said Supplemental Memorandum of
Agreement which provides as follows:
"4. F.L. Atillo III may dispose off (sic) his properties at P. del Rosario St., Cebu City which may involve pre-payment of AMANCOR'S mortgage
loan to the bank estimated at 300,000.00 and while AMANCOR may not yet be in the position to re-pay said amount to him, it shall pay the
interests to him equivalent to prevailing bank rate."[5]
Pursuant to this stipulation, petitioner assumed AMANCOR' s outstanding loan balance of P300,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust
Company. After offsetting the amount ofP300,000.00 with some of the accounts that petitioner had with AMANCOR, the amount which
remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89. Because of the failure of AMANCOR to satisfy its obligation to repay petitioner, the latter
filed a complaint for collection of a sum of money docketed as Civil Case No. Ceb-9801 against AMANCOR and LHUILLIER before Branch 7 of
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
At the pre-trial conference, petitioner, AMANCOR and LHUILLIER, assisted by their respective counsels, stipulated on the following:
"1. That the parties admit the due execution and genuineness of the Memorandum of Agreement dated 14 June 1988 (Annex A), the
Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B) and Supplemental Agreement dated 11 March 1989 (Annex C);
2. That the defendants admit that the claim of the plaintiff amounted to P199,888.89 as of October 1, 1990;"[6]
and submitted the following issues to be resolved by the trial court:
"a. From the aforesaid Annexes A, B and C, is Michell J. Lhuillier personally liable to the plaintiff?
b. What rate of interests shall the defendant corporation and Michell J. Lhuillier, if the latter is liable, pay the plaintiff?"[7] (Underscoring
supplied.)
On the basis of the stipulation of facts and the written arguments of the parties, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner,
ordering AMANCOR to pay petitioner the amount ofP199,888.89 with interest equivalent to the bank rate prevailing as of March 11, 1989.
LHUILLIER was, however, absolved of any personal liability therefor.[8]
It is from the trial court's conclusion of non-liability that petitioner appealed to respondent court, arguing therein that as LHUILLIER signed the
Memorandum of Agreement without the official participation nor ratification of AMANCOR, LHUILLIER should have been declared jointly and
severally liable with AMANCOR.[9]
The respondent court found petitioner's contention bereft of merit and held in part that:
"Contrary to plaintiffs-appellants (sic) allegation, the indebtedness of P199,888.89 was incurred by defendant AMANCOR, INC., alone. A
thorough study of the records shows that plaintiff's cause of action for collection of a sum of money arose from "his payment of the defendant
corporation's outstanding loan balance of P300,000.00 with Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company" x x x. Considering the allegations in the
complaint and those contained in the Memorandum of Agreement, the respondent court properly ruled that the liability was incurred by
defendant AMANCOR, INC., singly. We grant that if plaintiff really believes that the indebtedness was incurred by defendant Lhuillier in his
personal capacity, he should not have offsetted (sic) some of his accounts with the defendant corporation, x x x. As it is, plaintiff could have
ofted (sic) to sue defendant Lhuillier in his personal capacity the whole amount of indebtedness and not implead the defendant corporation as
co-defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
x x x [T]he indebtedness was incurred by the defendant corporation as a legal entity to pay the mortgage loan. Defendant Lhuillier acted only
as an officer/agent of the corporation by signing the said Memorandum of Agreement."[10]
Aggrieved by the decision of respondent court, petitioner brought this instant petition submitting the following issue for the resolution of this
Court:
"When a party, by his judicial admissions, has affirmed that he has personal liability in a certain transaction, may a court rule against such an
admission despite clear indications that it was not affected by mistakes palpable or otherwise?"[11]
Petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal liability in his Answer wherein he stated that:
"3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally without the official participation of Amancor, Inc.
xxx xxx xxx
3.14 . Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded (sic) to the personal agreement between plaintiff and
Lhuillier through no fault of the latter, the corporation is not bound and the actionable documents are, at most, unenforceable insofar as the
subject claim of plaintiff is concerned."[12]
And on the basis of such admission, petitioner contends that the decision of the respondent court absolving LHUILLIER of personal liability is
manifest error for being contrary to law, particularly Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court which provides that:
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission
may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made."
Petitioner would want to further strengthen his contention by adverting to the consistent pronouncement of this Court that: "x x x an
admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs
submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not x x x." [13]
We find petitioner's contention to be without merit and the reliance on the general rule regarding judicial admissions enunciated by the
abovementioned provision of law and jurisprudence misplaced.
As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it
and does not require proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when
it is shown that no such admission was in fact made.[14] The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made
such an admission.
"For instance, if a party invokes an 'admission' by an adverse party, but cites the admission 'out of context', then the one making the admission
may show that he made no 'such' admission, or that his admission was taken out of context.
This may be interpreted as to mean 'not in the sense in which the admission is made to appear.' That is the reason for the modifier
'such'."[15] [Underscoring supplied.]
Here, petitioner appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in paragraph 3.11 of his Answer "out of context". Petitioner is
seemingly misleading this Court by isolating paragraph 3.11 of the said Answer from the preceding paragraphs. A careful scrutiny of the
Answer in its entirety will show that paragraph 3.11 is part of the affirmative allegations recounting how LHUILLIER was persuaded to invest in
AMANCOR which was previously owned and managed by petitioner.[16] Paragraph 3.11 has reference to the fact that in all investments made
with AMANCOR through stock purchases, only petitioner and LHUILLIER dealt with each other. [17] It is more than obvious that paragraph 3.11
has nothing to do with the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner which is the subject of the present case. Contrary to petitioner's allegations,
LHUILLIER had categorically denied personal liability for AMANCOR's corporate debts, and in the succeeding paragraphs of the said Answer
asserted the following:
"3.12. As evident in the wordings of par. 12 of the Actionable Memorandum of Agreement dated 13 February 1989 (Annex B) and par. 4 of the
actionable Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement dated 11 March 1989 (Annex C), Lhuillier did not engage to personally pay the
corporate loans secured by plaintiff's property as to release the property to plaintiff. On the contrary, as explicitly stated in the aforesaid par. 4
of Annex C, ". . . while Amancor may not yet be in the position to repay said amount to him, IT shall pay the interests to him equivalent to
prevailing bank rate."
"3.13. At most, therefore, Lhuillier x x x only agreed, for the corporation to repay plaintiff the amount of the pre- terminated corporate loans
with the bank and, pending improvement of Amancor's finances, for said corporation to pay interest at prevailing bank rate. x x
x."[18] (Underscoring supplied.)
Furthermore, petitioner was well aware that LHUILLIER had never admitted personal liability for the said obligation. In fact, in delineating the
issues to be resolved by the trial court, both parties submitted for the determination of the court, the question of whether or not LHUILLIER is
personally liable for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner.[19] Moreover, as correctly observed by respondent court, if petitioner really
believed that the liability was incurred by LHUILLIER in his personal capacity, then he should not have offset his accounts with those of
AMANCOR's. The foregoing act of petitioner is a clear indication that he recognized AMANCOR and not LHUILLIER as the obligor.
Granting arguendo that LHUILLIER had in fact made the alleged admission of personal liability in his Answer, We hold that such admission is
not conclusive upon him. Applicable by analogy is our ruling in the case of Gardner vs. Court of Appeals which allowed a party's testimony in
open court to override admissions he made in his answer. Thus:
"The fact, however, that the allegations made by Ariosto Santos in his pleadings and in his declarations in open court differed will not militate
against the findings herein made nor support the reversal by respondent court. As a general rule, facts alleged in a party's pleading are
deemed admissions of that party and are binding upon it, but this is not an absolute and inflexible rule. An answer is a mere statement of fact
which the party filing it expects to prove, but it is not evidence. As ARIOSTO SANTOS himself, in open court, had repudiated the defenses he
had raised in his ANSWER and against his own interest, his testimony is deserving of weight and credence. Both the Trial Court and the
Appellate Court believed in his credibility and we find no reason to overturn their factual findings thereon." [20] (Underscoring supplied.)
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial admissions in a party's pleading, the trial court is still given
leeway to consider other evidence presented. This rule should apply with more reason when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for
resolution of the trial court on the basis of the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts entered into during the pre-
trial conference, the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's liability shall be based on the Memoranda of Agreement designated
as ANNEXES "A", "B" and "C" of the Complaint. Thus, the trial court correctly relied on the provisions contained in the said Memoranda of
Agreement when it absolved LHUILLIER of personal liability for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner.
Furthermore, on the basis of the same evidence abovementioned, respondent court did not err when it refused to pierce the veil of corporate
fiction, thereby absolving LHUILLIER of liability for corporate obligations and deciding the question in this wise:
"The separate personality of the corporation may be disregarded, or the veil of corporation fiction may be pierced and the individual
shareholder may be personally liable (sic) to the obligations of the corporation only when the corporation is used as a cloak or cover for fraud
or illegality, or to work an injustice, or where necessary to achieve equity or when necessary for the protection of the creditors. This situation
does not obtain in this case.In the case at bar, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that defendant Lhuillier acted otherwise than what is required
of him as an agent of a corporation. It does not appear either that defendant-appellee Michel (sic) Lhuillier is jointly and severally liable with
AMANCOR INC. absent an express stipulation to that effect and sans clear and convincing evidence as to his personal liability."[21]
The foregoing pronouncement is based on factual findings of the lower court which were upheld by the respondent court, and which are thus,
conclusive upon us pursuant to the well established rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals, supported by substantial evidence on the
record, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.[22]
ACCORDINGLY, finding no reversible error, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED and this petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
[1] Complaint dated January 11, 1991, p. 1; Records, p. 1.

[2] Ibid., Annex "A"; Records, p. 5. [3] Ibid., Annex "B"; Records, p. 9.
[4] Ibid., Annex "C"; Records, p. 12 [5] Ibid.
[6] Decision dated December 17, 1991, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[7] Ibid. [8] Ibid., p. 4; Rollo, p. 16.
[9]Petition in G.R. No. 119053 dated February 28, 1995, pp. 6-7.
[10] Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 36777 dated August 5, 1994, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 16-17.
[11] Supra, p. 1; Rollo, p. 2.
[12] Ibid., pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 6-7;
[13] Elayda vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 349, 353; De Jesus vs. IAC, 175 SCRA 559; Santiago vs. de los Santos, 61 SCRA 146; Sta. Ana vs.
Maliwat, 21 SCRA 1018; and Joe's Radio Electric Supply vs. Alto Electronics Corp., 104 Phil. 333.
[14] Supra.
[15] Paras, Rules of Court Annotated, p. 66, citing the Minutes of the Revision Committee.
[16] Answer dated May 31, 1991, pp. 2-7; Rollo, pp. 60-65.
[17] Ibid. [18] Ibid. at pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 64-65.
[19] Supra.
[20] Gardner vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA 585,600.
[21] Supra., p. 5; Rollo, p. 17.
[22] Guinsatao vs. Court of Appeals, 218 SCRA 708; Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 603; Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. vs. Court
of Appeals, 235 SCRA 39; Tan Chun Suy vs. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 151.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 131516. March 5, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On complaint of Cyra May Francisco Buenafe, accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa y Guinto was charged with Rape before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously removing her panty, kissing her lips and vagina and thereafter rubbing his penis and
inserting the same to the inner portion of the vagina of the undersigned complainant, 3 years of age, a minor, against her will and without her
consent.[1]
Arraigned on January 15, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.[2]
From the testimonies of its witnesses, namely Cyra May,[3] her mother Gloria Francisco Buenafe, Dr. Cristina V. Preyra, and SPO4 Catherine
Borda, the prosecution established the following facts:
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her house in Quezon City, Cyra May, then only three and a half years
old, told her, Mama, si kuya Ronnie lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak sa puwit at sa bibig ko.
Kuya Ronnie is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes house boy, who was sometimes left with Cyra May at home.
Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused-appellant did those things to her, to which she answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked
Cyra May what else he did to her, and Cyra May indicated the room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.
As on the night of November 20, 1995 accused-appellant was out with Glorias husband Col. Buenafe,[4] she waited until their arrival at past
11:00 p.m. Gloria then sent accused-appellant out on an errand and informed her husband about their daughters plaint. Buenafe thereupon
talked to Cyra May who repeated what she had earlier told her mother Gloria.
When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether what Cyra May had told them was true. Ronnie readily
admitted doing those things but only once, at 4:00 p.m. of November 17, 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria
slapped accused-appellant several times.
Since it was already midnight, the spouses waited until the following morning to bring accused-appellant to Camp Karingal where he admitted
the imputations against him, on account of which he was detained. Glorias sworn statement[5] was then taken.[6]
Recalling what accused-appellant did to her, Cyra May declared at the witness stand: Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa
bunganga, thus causing her pain and drawing her to cry. She added that accused-appellant did these to her twice in his bedroom.
Dr. Ma. Cristina V. Preyra, the Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the Biological Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory who examined Crya May, came up with her report dated November 21, 1995,[7] containing the following findings and conclusions:
FINDINGS:
GENERAL AND EXTRA GENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and soft.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated with congested and abraded labia minora presenting in
between. On separating the same is disclosed an abraded posterior fourchette and an elastic, fleshy type intact hymen. External vaginal orifice
does not admit the tip of the examining index finger.
xxx
CONCLUSION:
Subject is in virgin state physically.
There are no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of examination. (Emphasis supplied.)
By Dr. Preyras explanation, the abrasions on the labia minora could have been caused by friction with an object, perhaps an erect penis. She
doubted if riding on a bicycle had caused the injuries.[8]
The defenses sole witness was accused-appellant, who was 28 and single at the time he took the witness stand on June 9, 1997. He denied
having anything to do with the abrasions found in Cyra Mays genitalia, and claimed that prior to the alleged incident, he used to be ordered to
buy medicine for Cyra May who had difficulty urinating. He further alleged that after he refused to answer Glorias queries if her husband
Buenafe, whom he usually accompanied whenever he went out of the house, was womanizing, Gloria would always find fault in him. He
suggested that Gloria was behind the filing of the complaint. Thus:
q- According to them you caused the abrasions found in her genital?
a- That is not true, sir.
q- If that is not true, what is the truth?
a- As I have mentioned earlier that before I started working with the family I was sent to Crame to buy medicine for the daughter because she
had difficulty in urinating.
q- Did you know why the child has difficulty in urinating?
a- No, I do not know, sir.
q- And how about the present complaint filed against you, the complaint filed by the mother of the victim?
a- I did not do it, sir.
q- What is the truth, what can you say about this present complaint filed against you?
a- As I said Mrs. Buenafe got mad at me because after I explained to her that I was going with her gusband (sic) to the children of the husband
with a former marriage.[9]
Finding for the prosecution, Branch 96 of the Quezon City RTC rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused RONNIE RULLEPA y GUINTO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, and he is
accordingly sentenced to death.
The accused is ordered to pay CYRA MAE BUENAFE the amount of P40,000.00 as civil indemnity.
Costs to be paid by the accused.[10] (Italics in the original.)
Hence, this automatic review, accused-appellant assigning the following errors to the trial court:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONSIDERING AS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ADMISSION.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED ON (sic) RULING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS SILENCE DURING TRIAL AMOUNTED TO AN IMPLIED ADMISSION
OF GUILT.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
IV
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH UPON THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[11] (Emphasis supplied.)
Accused-appellant assails the crediting by the trial court, as the following portion of its decision shows, of his admission to Gloria of having
sexually assaulted Cyra May:
In addition, the mother asserted that Rullepa had admitted Cyra Ma[y]s complaint during the confrontation in the house. Indeed, according to
the mother, the admission was even expressly qualified by Rullepas insistence that he had committed the sexual assault only once, specifying
the time thereof as 4:00 pm of November 17, 1995. That qualification proved that the admission was voluntary and true. An uncoerced and
truthful admission like this should be absolutely admissible and competent.
xxx
Remarkably, the admission was not denied by the accused during trial despite his freedom to deny it if untrue. Hence, the admission became
conclusive upon him.[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
To accused-appellant, the statements attributed to him are inadmissible since they were made out of fear, having been elicited only after Cyra
Mays parents bullied and questioned him. He thus submits that it was error for the trial court to take his failure to deny the statements during
the trial as an admission of guilt.
Accused-appellants submission does not persuade. The trial court considered his admission merely as an additional ground to convince itself
of his culpability. Even if such admission, as well as the implication of his failure to deny the same, were disregarded, the evidence suffices to
establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The plain, matter-of-fact manner by which Cyra May described her abuse in the hands of her Kuya Ronnie is an eloquent testament to the
truth of her accusations. Thus she testified on direct examination:
q- Do you recall if Ronnie Rullepa did anything to you?
a- Yes, sir.
q- What did he do to you?
a- Sinaksak nya ang titi sa pepe ko, sa puwit ko, at sa bunganga
q- How many times did he do that to you?
a- Twice, sir.
xxx
q- Do you remember when he did these things to you?
a- Opo.
q- When was that?
a- When my mother was asleep, he put he removed my panty and inserted his penis inside my vagina, my anus and my mouth, sir.
xxx
q- After your Kuya Ronnie did those things to you what did you feel?
a- Sabi nya ganito (Witness putting her finger in her lips) Nasaktan po ako at umiyak po ako.
q- Did you cry because of hurt?
a- Yes.
q- What part of your body hurt?
a- Pepe ko po. When I went to the bathroom to urinate, I felt pain in my organ, sir.[13]
Cyra May reiterated her testimony during cross-examination, providing more revolting details of her ordeal:
q- So, you said that Kuya Ronnie did something to you what did he do to you on November 17, 1995?
a- Sinaksak nga yong titi nya. He inserted his penis to my organ and to my mouth, sir.
xxx
q- When you said that your kuya Ronnie inserted his penis into your organ, into your mouth, and into your anus, would you describe what his
penis?
a- It is a round object, sir.
C o u r t:
Is this titi of your kuya Ronnie a part of his body?
a- Opo.
q- Was that in the head of kuya Ronnie?
a- No, sir.
q- Which part of his body that titi located?
(Witness pointing to her groin area)
C o u r t:
Continue
xxx
q- Why were you in that room?
a- Gusto nya po matulog ako sa kuwarto niya.
q- When you were in that room, what did Kuya Ronnie do to you?
a- Hinubo po niya ang panty ko.
q- And after he remove your panty, what did Kuya Ronnie do, what did he do to you?
a- He inserted his penis to my organ, sir.
q- Why did kuya Ronnie, was kuya Ronnie already naked or he was already wearing any clothing?
a- Still had his clothing on, sir.
q- So, where did his penis, saan lumabas ang penis ni Kuya Ronnie?
a- Dito po, (Witness referring or pointing to her groin area)
xxx
q- So, thats the and at the time, you did not cry and you did not shout for help?
a- Sabi nya po, not to make any noise because my mother might be roused from sleep.
q- How long was kuya Ronnie did that to you?
a- Matagal po.
q- After kuya Ronnie scrub his penis to your vagina, what other things did he do?
a- After that he inserted his penis to my mouth, and to my anus, sir.
q- You did not complain and you did not shout?
a- I cried, sir.[14]
Accused-appellant draws attention to the statement of Cyra May that he was not in the house on November 17 (1995), as reflected in the
following transcript of her testimony:
q- Is it not a fact that you said a while ago that when your father leaves the house, he [was] usually accompanied by your kuya Ronnie?
a- Opo.
q- Why is it that Kuya Ronnie was in the house when you father left the house at that time, on November 17?
a- He was with Kuya Ronnie, sir.
q- So, it is not correct that kuya Ronnie did something to you because your kuya Ronnie [was] always with your Papa?
a- Yes, sir.[15]
The above-quoted testimony of Cyra May does not indicate the time when her father Col. Buenafe left their house on November 17, 1995 with
accused-appellant and, thus, does not preclude accused-appellants commission of rape on the same date. In any event, a young child is
vulnerable to suggestion, hence, her affirmative response to the defense counsels above-quoted leadingquestions.
As for the variance in the claim regarding when Gloria was informed of the rape, Gloria having testified that she learned of it on November 20,
1995[16] while Cyra May said that immediately after the incident, she awakened her mother who was in the adjacent room and reported
it:[17] This is a minor matter that does not detract from Cyra Mays categorical, material testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis into
her vagina.
Accused-appellant goes on to contend that Cyra May was coached, citing the following portion of her testimony:
q- Yong sinabi mong sinira nya ang buhay mo, where did you get that phrase?
a- It was the word of my Mama, sir.[18]
On the contrary, the foregoing testimony indicates that Cyra May was really narrating the truth, that of hearing her mother utter sinira niya
ang buhay mo.
Accused-appellants suggestion that Cyra May merely imagined the things of which he is accused, perhaps getting the idea from television
programs, is preposterous. It is true that the ordinary child is a great weaver of romances, and her imagination may induce (her) to relate
something she has heard or read in a story as personal experience. [19] But Cyra Mays account is hardly the stuff of romance or fairy
tales. Neither is it normal TV fare, if at all.
This Court cannot believe that a victim of Cyra Mays age could concoct a tale of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and
undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, not to mention the trauma of public trial.[20]
Besides, her testimony is corroborated by the findings of Dr. Preyra that there were abrasions in her labia minora, which she opined, could
have been caused by friction with an erect penis.
This Court thus accords great weight to the following assessment of the trial court regarding the competency and credibility of Cyra May as a
witness:
Her very tender age notwithstanding, Cyra Ma(y) nonetheless appeared to possess the necessary intelligence and perceptiveness sufficient to
invest her with the competence to testify about her experience. She might have been an impressionable child as all others of her age are but
her narration of Kuya Ronnies placing his titi in her pepe was certainly one which could not be considered as a common childs tale. Her
responses during the examination of counsel and of the Court established her consciousness of the distinction between good and bad, which
rendered inconceivable for her to describe a bad act of the accused unless it really happened to her.Needless to state, she described the act of
the accused as bad. Her demeanor as a witness manifested during trial by her unhesitant, spontaneous, and plain responses to questions
further enhanced her claim to credit and trustworthiness. [21] (Italics in the original.)
In a futile attempt at exculpation, accused-appellant claims that even before the alleged incident Cyra May was already suffering from pain in
urinating. He surmises that she could have scratched herself which caused the abrasions. Dr. Preyra, however, was quick to rule out this
possibility. She stated categorically that that part of the female organ is very sensitive and rubbing or scratching it is painful. [22] The abrasions
could not, therefore, have been self-inflicted.
That the Medical-Legal Officer found no external signs of recent application of any form of trauma at the time of the examination does not
preclude accused-appellants conviction since the infliction of force is immaterial in statutory rape.[23]
More. That Cyra May suffered pain in her vagina but not in her anus despite her testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis in both
orifices does not diminish her credibility. It is possible that accused-appellants penis failed to penetrate her anus as deeply as it did her vagina,
the former being more resistant to extreme forces than the latter.
Accused-appellants imputation of ill motive on the part of Gloria is puerile. No mother in her right mind would subject her child to the
humiliation, disgrace and trauma attendant to a prosecution for rape if she were not motivated solely by the desire to incarcerate the person
responsible for the childs defilement.[24] Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a mother would stoop so low as to subject her daughter to
physical hardship and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to assuage her own hurt feelings.[25]
Alternatively, accused-appellant prays that he be held liable for acts of lasciviousness instead of rape, apparently on the basis of the following
testimony of Cyra May, quoted verbatim, that he merely scrubbed his penis against her vagina:
q- Is it not a fact that kuya Ronnie just made some scrubbed his penis into your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And when he did not actually penetrated your vagina?
a- Yes, sir.[26]
Dr. Preya, however, found abrasions in the labia minora, which is directly beneath the labia majora,[27] proving that there was indeed
penetration of the vagina, not just a mere rubbing or scrubbing of the penis against its surface.
In fine, the crime committed by accused-appellant is not merely acts of lasciviousness but statutory rape.
The two elements of statutory rape are (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) that the woman is below twelve years
of age.[28] As shown in the previous discussion, the first element, carnal knowledge, had been established beyond reasonable doubt. The same
is true with respect to the second element.
The victims age is relevant in rape cases since it may constitute an element of the offense. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659,[29] provides:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
x x x.
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age x x x.
x x x.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
x x x.
Furthermore, the victims age may constitute a qualifying circumstance, warranting the imposition of the death sentence. The same Article
states:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity with the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
x x x.
4. when the victim is x x x a child below seven (7) years old.
x x x.
Because of the seemingly conflicting decisions regarding the sufficiency of evidence of the victims age in rape cases, this Court, in the recently
decided case of People v. Pruna,[30]established a set of guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as a qualifying
circumstance, to wit:
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the
date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear
and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
respecting pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall
be sufficient under the following circumstances:
a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old;
b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old;
c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victims mother or relatives concerning the victims
age, the complainants testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
6. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, this Court in the Pruna case held that the therein accused-appellant could only be sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua since:
x x x no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as a baptismal certificate of LIZETTE, was presented to prove her age. x x x.
x x x.
However, the Medico-Legal Report relied upon by the trial court does not in any way prove the age of LIZETTE, for there is nothing therein
which even mentions her age. Only testimonial evidence was presented to establish LIZETTEs age. Her mother, Jacqueline, testified (that the
victim was three years old at the time of the commission of the crime).
xxx
Likewise, LIZETTE testified on 20 November 1996, or almost two years after the incident, that she was 5 years old. However, when the defense
counsel asked her how old she was on 3 January 1995, or at the time of the rape, she replied that she was 5 years old. Upon further question
as to the date she was born, she could not answer.
For PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be established with certainty that
LIZETTE was below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the severity of the death penalty, especially
its irreversible and final nature once carried out, makes the decision-making process in capital offenses aptly subject to the most exacting rules
of procedure and evidence.
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTEs exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other
authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is appreciated
against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not excuse the prosecution from discharging its
burden. That the defense invoked LIZETTEs tender age for purposes of questioning her competency to testify is not necessarily an admission
that she was below 7 years of age when PRUNA raped her on 3 January 1995. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be convicted of qualified
rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
However, conformably with no. 3 (b) of the foregoing guidelines, the testimony of LIZETTEs mother that she was 3 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape, or rape of a girl below 12 years of age. Under the
second paragraph of Article 335, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, in relation to no. 3 of the first paragraph thereof, having carnal knowledge of a
woman under 12 years of age is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion perpetua,
and not death penalty. (Italics in the original.)
Several cases[31] suggest that courts may take judicial notice of the appearance of the victim in determining her age. For example, the Court,
in People v. Tipay,[32] qualified the ruling inPeople v. Javier,[33] which required the presentation of the birth certificate to prove the rape victims
age, with the following pronouncement:
This does not mean, however, that the presentation of the certificate of birth is at all times necessary to prove minority. The minority of a
victim of tender age who may be below the age of ten is quite manifest and the court can take judicial notice thereof. The crucial years pertain
to the ages of fifteen to seventeen where minority may seem to be dubitable due to ones physical appearance. In this situation, the
prosecution has the burden of proving with certainty the fact that the victim was under 18 years of age when the rape was committed in order
to justify the imposition of the death penalty under the above-cited provision. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, a handful of cases[34] holds that courts, without the requisite hearing prescribed by Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court,[35] cannot take judicial notice of the victims age.
Judicial notice signifies that there are certain facta probanda, or propositions in a partys case, as to which he will not be required to offer
evidence; these will be taken for true by the tribunal without the need of evidence. [36] Judicial notice, however, is a phrase sometimes used in
a loose way to cover some other judicial action. Certain rules of Evidence, usually known under other names, are frequently referred to in
terms of judicial notice.[37]
The process by which the trier of facts judges a persons age from his or her appearance cannot be categorized as judicial notice. Judicial notice
is based upon convenience and expediency for it would certainly be superfluous, inconvenient, and expensive both to parties and the court to
require proof, in the ordinary way, of facts which are already known to courts. [38] As Tundag puts it, it is the cognizance of certain facts which
judges may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, where the provisions
governing judicial notice are found, is entitled What Need Not Be Proved. When the trier of facts observes the appearance of a person to
ascertain his or her age, he is not taking judicial notice of such fact; rather, he is conducting an examination of the evidence, the evidence
being the appearance of the person. Such a process militates against the very concept of judicial notice, the object of which is to do away with
the presentation of evidence.
This is not to say that the process is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court; on the contrary, it does. A persons appearance, where relevant, is
admissible as object evidence, the same being addressed to the senses of the court. Section 1, Rule 130 provides:
SECTION 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in
issue, it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court.
To be sure, one author writes, this practice of inspection by the court of objects, things or persons relevant to the fact in dispute, has its roots
in ancient judicial procedure.[39] The author proceeds to quote from another authority:
Nothing is older or commoner in the administration of law in all countries than the submission to the senses of the tribunal itself, whether
judge or jury, of objects which furnish evidence. The view of the land by the jury, in real actions, of a wound by the judge where mayhem was
alleged, and of the person of one alleged to be an infant, in order to fix his age, the inspection and comparison of seals, the examination of
writings, to determine whether they are ()blemished,() the implements with which a crime was committed or of a person alleged, in a bastardy
proceeding, to be the child of another, are few illustrations of what may be found abundantly in our own legal records and textbooks for seven
centuries past.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)
A persons appearance, as evidence of age (for example, of infancy, or of being under the age of consent to intercourse), is usually regarded as
relevant; and, if so, the tribunal may properly observe the person brought before it. [41] Experience teaches that corporal appearances are
approximately an index of the age of their bearer, particularly for the marked extremes of old age and youth. In every case such evidence
should be accepted and weighed for what it may be in each case worth. In particular, the outward physical appearance of an alleged minor
may be considered in judging his age; a contrary rule would for such an inference be pedantically over-cautious.[42] Consequently, the jury or
the court trying an issue of fact may be allowed to judge the age of persons in court by observation of such persons. [43] The formal offer of the
person as evidence is not necessary. The examination and cross-examination of a party before the jury are equivalent to exhibiting him before
the jury and an offer of such person as an exhibit is properly refused. [44]
This Court itself has sanctioned the determination of an aliens age from his appearance. In Braca v. Collector of Customs,[45] this Court ruled
that:
The customs authorities may also determine from the personal appearance of the immigrant what his age is. The person of a Chinese alien
seeking admission into the Philippine Islands is evidence in an investigation by the board of special inquiry to determine his right to enter; and
such body may take into consideration his appearance to determine or assist in determining his age and a finding that the applicant is not a
minor based upon such appearance is not without evidence to support it.
This Court has also implicitly recognized the same process in a criminal case. Thus, in United States v. Agadas,[46] this Court held:
Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had never purchased a cedula; and that he was going to purchase a cedula the
following january. Thereupon the court asked this defendant these questions: You are a pretty big boy for seventeen. Answer: I cannot tell
exactly because I do not remember when I was born, but 17 years is my guess. Court: If you are going to take advantage of that excuse, you
had better get some positive evidence to that effect. Answer: I do not remember, as I already stated on what date and in what year I was
born. The court, in determining the question of the age of the defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:
The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he was about 17 years of age, but judging by his appearance he is a youth 18
or 19 years old. He has shown that he has no positive information on the subject and no effort was made by the defense to prove the fact that
he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of article 9, paragraph 2, of the Penal code, which fact it is held to be incumbent upon the defense
to establish by satisfactory evidence in order to enable the court to give an accused person the benefit of the mitigating circumstance.
In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz., 1984) Estavillo testified, when the case was tried in the court below, that he then was only
16 years of age. There was no other testimony in the record with reference to his age. But the trial judge said: The accused Estavillo,
notwithstanding his testimony giving his age as 16 years, is, as a matter of fact, not less than 20. This court, in passing upon the age of Estavillo,
held:
We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with reference to the age of Estavillo from the latters personal appearance. There is
no proof in the record, as we have said, which even tends to establish the assertion that this appellant understated his age. * * * It is true that
the trial court had an opportunity to note the personal appearance of Estavillo for the purpose of determining his age, and by so doing reached
the conclusion that he was at least 20, just two years over 18. This appellant testified that he was only 16, and this testimony stands
uncontradicted. Taking into consideration the marked difference in the penalties to be imposed upon that age, we must, therefore, conclude
(resolving all doubts in favor of the appellants) that the appellants ages were 16 and 14 respectively.
While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he was 17 years of age, yet the trial court reached the conclusion, judging from the
personal appearance of Rosario, that he is a youth 18 or 19 years old. Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited, we must conclude
that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with reference to the question whether Rosario was, in fact 18 years of age at the time the
robbery was committed.This doubt must be resolved in favor of the defendant, and he is, therefore, sentenced to six months of arresto
mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one day of presidio mayor. x x x.
There can be no question, therefore, as to the admissibility of a persons appearance in determining his or her age. As to the weight to accord
such appearance, especially in rape cases,Pruna laid down guideline no. 3, which is again reproduced hereunder:
and credible, of the victims mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
Under the above guideline, the testimony of a relative with respect to the age of the victim is sufficient to constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt in cases (a), (b) and (c) above. In such cases, the disparity between the allegation and the proof of age is so great that the court can
easily determine from the appearance of the victim the veracity of the testimony. The appearance corroborates the relatives testimony.
As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the persons appearance, as object evidence of her age, loses probative
value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, following Agadas, supra, such doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused.
This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, the victims mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the
extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime
itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victims age in the present case spells the difference between life and death.[47]
In the present case, the prosecution did not offer the victims certificate of live birth or similar authentic documents in evidence. The victim and
her mother, however, testified that she was only three years old at the time of the rape. Cyra Mays testimony goes:
q- Your name is Cyra Mae is that correct?
a- Yes, sir.
q- And you are 3 years old?
a- Yes, sir.[48]
That of her mother goes:
Q How old was your daughter when there things happened?
A 3 and years old.
Q When was she born?
A In Manila, May 10, 1992.[49]
Because of the vast disparity between the alleged age (three years old) and the age sought to be proved (below twelve years), the trial court
would have had no difficulty ascertaining the victims age from her appearance. No reasonable doubt, therefore, exists that the second
element of statutory rape, i.e., that the victim was below twelve years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, is present.
Whether the victim was below seven years old, however, is another matter. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old
can easily be mistaken for an underdeveloped seven-year old. The appearance of the victim, as object evidence, cannot be accorded much
weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below seven years old at the time of the commission of the offense,
accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to suffer the death penalty. Only the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him.
In line with settled jurisprudence, the civil indemnity awarded by the trial court is increased to P50,000.00. In addition, Cyra May is entitled to
an award of moral damages in the amount ofP50,000.00.[50]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 96, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Ronnie
Rullepa y Guinto is found GUILTY of Statutory Rape, defined and punished by Article 335 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is ordered to pay private complainant, Cyra May Buenafe y Francisco, the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and
Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, and Corona, JJ., on leave.
[1] Records at 1.
[2] Id. at 12.
[3] Also appears in the records as Cyra Mae.
[4] Col. Buenafes first name is not indicated in the records.
[5] Exhibit A.
[6] TSN, May 20, 1996 at 5-11.
[7] Exhibit C.
[8] TSN, March 13, 1997 at 4-11.
[9] TSN, June 6, 1997 at 6-7.
[10] Records at 104.
[11] Rollo at 49-50.
[13] TSN, November 15, 1996 at 5-8.
[14] TSN, January 7, 1997 at 7-10.
[15] Id. at 6.
[16] TSN, May 20, 1996 at 6.
[17] TSN, January 7, 1997 at 11-12.
[18] Id. at 14.
[19] SALONGA, J.R., PHILIPPINE LAW ON EVIDENCE (3RD ED.) 193.
[20] People v. Baygar, 318 SCRA 358 (1999).
[22] TSN, March 13, 1997 at 10.
[23] People v. Samodio, G. R. Nos. 134139-40, February 15, 2002.
[24] People v. Perez, 319 SCRA 622 (1999).
[25] People v. Marcelo, 305 SCRA 105 (1999).
[26] TSN, January 7, 1997 at 11.
[27] People v. Marcelo, supra, Note 25.
[28] People v. Bato, 325 SCRA 671 (2000).
[29] AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

[30] G.R. No. 138471, October 10, 2002.
[31] Vide People v. Bali-balita, 340 SCRA 450 (2000); People v. Rivera, 362 SCRA 153 (2001); People v. Abao, G.R. No. 142728, January 23, 2002.
[32] 329 SCRA 52 (2000).
[33] 311 SCRA 122 (1999).
[34] Vide People v. Tundag, 342 SCRA 704 (2000); People v. Liban, 345 SCRA 453 (2000); People v. Lachica, G.R. No. 143677, May 9, 2002.
[35] SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
After the trial, and before judgment or an appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of
[36] 9 WIGMORE, J. H., A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW (3RD ED.) 2565.
[37] Id. at 2566.
[38] 5 MORAN M.V., COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT (1980 ED.) 38.
[39] SALONGA, supra, NOTE 19, AT 89.
[40] Ibid. citing THAYER, CASES ON EVIDENCE (2ND) 720.
[41] 4 WIGMORE AT 1154.
[42] 2 WIGMORE AT 222, cited in People v. Montalvo (482 P. 2d 205), Watson v. State (140 N.E.2d 109), and State v. Fries (17 N.W.2d 578).
[43] 32 C.J.S. Evidence 609.
[44] Ibid., cited in Watson v. State, supra, Note 42.
[45] 36 Phil. 930 (1917). Vide also Tan Beko vs. Insular Collector of Customs, 26 Phil. 254 (1913); Lim Cheng vs. Collector of Customs, 42 Phil. 876
(1920).
[46] 36 Phil. 246 (1917).
[47] People v. Quezada, G. R. No. 135551-58, January 30, 2002.
[48] TSN, January 7, 1997 at 4.
[49] TSN, May 20, 1996 at 11.
[50] People v. Rafales, 323 SCRA 13 (2000).
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE G.R. No. 157177

ISLANDS,
Petitioner, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
JESUSA P. REYES and
CONRADO B. REYES, Promulgated:
Respondents. February 11, 2008
x------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul the Decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 29, 2002 as well as its Resolution [2] dated February 12, 2003, which affirmed with
modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 142, in Civil Case No. 91 -3453, [3] requiring Bank
of Philippine Islands (petitioner) to return to spouses Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B. Reyes (respondents) the amount
of P100,000.00 plus interest and damages.
The conflicting versions of the parties are aptly summarized by the trial court, to wit:
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote
Branch to open an ATM account, she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling every depositor with a
deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as its prize to be raffled every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the bank
and in charge of the new accounts and time deposits characteristically described as having homosexual inclinations. They
were entertained by Capati and were made to sit at a table occupie d by a certain Liza.
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which
shall be withdrawn from her exiting savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233 -2433-88 and the
other P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her existing savings
account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati pre pared the papers with the correct
amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was filling up the signature cards and several other
forms.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the plaintiff was seating and informed the
latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the figure two (2)
into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00 in cash in
two bundles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same.
Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no.
0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller's booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 0235 -0767-48
reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express tell er card from said bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United States (Exhs. T, U- U-1) and returned to Manila on January 31,
1991 (Exhs. V-V-1).
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her statement of account sent to her by BPI bank that her ATM
account only contained the amount of P100,000.00 with interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager assured her that they would look into the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructe d Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update her savings account passbook at the BPI
with the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer cover of said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be
updated and when the same was returned, Luna noticed that the deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated
at the back portion thereof.
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the latter saw the validation, she got angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated, whereupon the manager assured her that the
matter will be investigated into.
When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank, Mrs. Reyes sent two (2) demand letters thru her lawyer
demanding return of the missing P100,000.00 plus interest (Exhs. B and C). The same was received by defendant on July 25,
1991 and October 7, 1991, respectively.
The last letter prompted reply from defendant inviting plaintiff to sit down and discuss the problem.
The meeting resulted to the bank promising that Capati will be submitted to a lie detector test.
Plaintiff, however, never learned of the result of said test. Plaintiff filed this instant case.
Defendant on the other hand claimed that Bank of the Phili ppine Island admitted that Jesusa Reyes had effected a fund
transfer in the amount of P100,000.00 from her ordinary savings account to the express teller account she opened
on December 7, 1990 (Exhs. 3 to 3-C), however, it was the only amount she deposited and no additional cash deposit
ofP100,000.00 was made. That plaintiff wanted to effect the transfer of P200,000.00 but the balance in her account was not
sufficient and could not accommodate the same. Plaintiff thereafter agreed to reduce the amount to be withdrawn
from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with plaintiffs signature superimposed on said corrections; that the original copy of the
deposit slip was also altered from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00, however, instead of plaintiff signing the same, the clerk-in-
charge of the bank, in this case Cicero Capati, signed the alteration himself for Jesusa Reyes had already left without signi ng
the deposit slip. The documents were subsequently machine validated for the amount of P100,000.00 (Exhs. 2 and 4).
Defendant claimed that there was actually no cash involved with the transactions which happened on December 7, 1990 as
contained in the banks teller tape (Exhs.1 to 1 -C).
Defendant further claimed that when they subjected Cicero Capati to a lie detector te st, the latter passed the same with
flying colors (Exhs. 5 to 5-C), indicative of the fact that he was not lying when he said that there really was no cash
transaction involved when plaintiff Jesusa Reyes went to the defendant bank on December 7, 1990; def endant further alleged
that they even went to the extent of informing Jesusa Reyes that her claim would not be given credit (Exh. 6) considering tha t
no such transaction was really made on December 7, 1990. [4]
On August 12, 1994, the RTC issued a Decision [5] upholding the versions of respondents, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado Reyes and against
defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands ordering the latter to:
1. Return to plaintiffs their P100,000.00 with interest at 14% per annum from December 7, 1990;
2. Pay plaintiffs P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
2. Pay plaintiffs P350,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3. Pay plaintiffs P250,000.00 for and attorney's fees. [6]
The RTC found that petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa deposited only P100,000.00 instead of P200,000.00 was hazy;
that what should control was the deposit slip issued by the bank to respondent, for there was no chance by which respondent
could write the amount of P200,000.00 without petitioner's employee noticing it and making the necessary corrections; that
it was deplorable to note that it was when respondent Jesusa's bankbook was submitted to be updated after the lapse of
several months when the alleged error claimed by petitioner was corrected; that Article 1962 of the New Civil Code provides
that a deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing bel onging to another with the obligation of safely
keeping it and of returning the same; that under Article 1972, the depositary is obliged to keep the thing safely and to retu rn
it when required to the depositor or to his heirs and successors or to the perso n who may have been designated in the
contract.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA which in a Decision dated October 29, 2002 affirmed the RTC decision with
modification as follows:
Nonetheless, the award of 14% interest per annum on the missing P100,000.00 can stand some modification. The interest
thereon should be 12% per annum, reckoned from May 12, 1991, the last day of the five day -grace period given by plaintiff-
appellees' counsel under the first demand letter dated May 6, 1991 (Exhibit B), or counted from May 7, 1991, the date when
defendant-appellant received said letter. Interest is demandable when the obligation consist in the payment of money and
the debtor incurs in delay.
Also, we have to reduce the P1 million award of moral damages to a reasonable sum of P50,000.00. Moral damages are not
intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of a defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain
means, diversion, or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffer ing he has undergone, by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. The award of moral damages must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.
In addition, we have to delete the award of P350,000.00 as exemplary damages. The absence of malice and bad f aith, as in
this case, renders the award of exemplary damages improper.
Finally, we have to reduce the award of attorney's fees to a reasonable sum of P30,000.00, as the prosecution of this case has
not been attended with any unusual difficulty.
WHEREFORE, with the modifications thus indicated, the judgment appealed from is in all other respects AFFIRMED. Without
costs. [7]
In finding petitioner liable for the missing P100,000.00, the CA held that the RTC correctly gave credence to the testimonies
of respondent Jesusa and Joan Reyes to the effect that aside from the fund transfer of P100,000.00 from Jesusa's savings
account, Jesusa also made a cash de posit of P100,000.00 in the afternoon of December 7, 1990; that it is unlikely for these
two to concoct a story of falsification against a banking institution of the stature of petitioner if their claims were not t rue;
that the duplicate copy of the deposit slip showed a deposit of P200,000.00; this, juxtaposed with the fact that it was not
machine-validated and the original copy altered by the bank's clerk from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00 with the altered amount
validated, is indicative of anomaly; that eve n if it was bank employee Cicero Capati who prepared the deposit slip, Jesusa
stood her ground and categorically denied having any knowledge of the alteration therein made; that petitioner must account
for the missing P100,000.00 because it was the author of the loss; that banks are engaged in business imbued with public
interest and are under strict obligation to exercise utmost fidelity in dealing with its clients, in seeing to it that the fu nds
therein invested or by them received are properly accounted for and duly posted in their ledgers.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated February 12, 2003.
Hence, the present petition on the following grounds:
A. In affirming the decision of the trial court holding BPI liable for the amount of P100,000.00 representing an alleged
additional deposit of respondents, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion by resolving the issue based
on a conjecture and ignoring physical evidence in favor of testimonial eviden ce.
B. The Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in holding BPI liable to respondents for
the payment of interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
C. This Honorable Court gravely abused its discretion, being as it is contrary to law, in holding BPI liable for moral damages
and attorney's fees at the reduced amounts of P50,000.00 and P30,000.00, respectively. [8]
The main issue for resolution is whether the CA erred in sustaining the RTC's finding that respondent Jesusa made an initial
deposit of P200,000.00 in her newly opened Express Teller account on December 7, 1990.
The issue raises a factual question. The Court is not a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of
law that may have been committed by the lower courts. [9] As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court when affirmed by
the CA are final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed on appeal by this Court, as long as they are borne out by the record
or are based on substantial evidence. [10] Such rule however is not absolute, but is subject to well -established exceptions,
which are: 1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 2) when th ere is a grave abuse of
discretion; 3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; 4) when the judgment of the CA
is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6) when the CA, in making its findings,
went beyond the issues of the case, and those findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 7)
when the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court; 8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; 9) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not
disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and 10) when the findings of
fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. [11] We hold that this
case falls under exception Nos. 1, 3, 4, and 9 which constrain us to resolve the factual issue.
It is a basic rule in evidence that each party to a case must prove his own affirmative allegations by the degree of evidence
required by law. [12] In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of
evidence, [13] or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It does
not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of the other sid e, and
that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other. [14]
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for determining preponderance of evidence, thus:
SECTION 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined .- In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish
his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or super ior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses' manner of testifying,
their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, t he nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their
personal credibility so far as the same legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider th e number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
For a better perspective on the calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who had heard
and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies
himself, the trial judge or the appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to assess the credibility o f
witnesses on the basis of their demeanor.
Hence, to arrive at the truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses' testimonies and examined the pieces
of evidence on record.
After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find that respondents failed
to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of P200,000.00 in her
Express Teller account.
Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset, respondent Jesusa told Capati that she was opening an
Express Teller account for P200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and transfer P100,000.00 from her savings account to
her new account, and that she had an additional P100,000.00 cash. However, these assertions are not borne out by the other
evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that Capati prepared a withdrawal slip [15] for P200,000.00. This is contrary to
the claim of respondent Jesusa that she instructed Capati to make a fund transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings
account to the Express Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip. We find it strange
that she would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was to withdraw only P100,000.00 from her savings
account and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.
Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip without looking at the amount i ndicated therein fails
to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course of business and taking ordinary care of her
concerns, [16] would make sure that she would check the amount written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her
signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for her signature is very near the space where the amount
of P200,000.00 in words and figures are written; thus, she could not have failed to notice that the amount of P200,000.00 was
written instead of P100,000.00.
The fact that respondent Jesusa initially intended to transfer the amount of P200,000.00 from her savings account to her new
Express Teller account was further established by the teller's tape presented as petitioner's evidence and by the testimony o f
Emerenciana Torneros, the teller who had attended to respondent Jesusa's transactions.
The teller's tape, [17] Exhibit 1 unequivocally shows the following data:
151159 07DEC90 1370 288A 233324299
151245 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388

***200000.00 [18]
BIG AMOUNT
151251 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***200000.00
151309 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
PB BALANCE ERROR
BAL. 229,257.64
151338 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388

***200000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151344 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***200000.00
151404 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***200000.00
TOD
151520 07DEC90 1601 288A 233320145

***2000.00
151705 07DEC90 1789 288A 233324299
***22917.00
151727 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.00
BIG AMOUNT
151730 07DEC90 1601 288J 233243388
***100000.00
151746 07DEC90 1601 288A 233243388
***100000.00 [19]
151810 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076748
151827 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076748
***100000.00 ***100000.00 [20]
151903 07DEC90 1301 288A 233282405

151914 07DEC90 1690 288A 235008955
***1778.05
152107 07DEC90 1601 288A 3333241381
***5000.00
152322 07DEC90 1601 288A 233314374
***2000.00
152435 07DEC90 1370 288A 235076764
152506 07DEC90 1790 288A 235076764
***4000.00 ***4000.00
152557 07DEC90 1601 288A 233069469
***2000.00
152736 07DEC90 1601 288A 233254584
***2000.00
152849 07DEC90 0600 288A 231017585
***3150.00 686448
152941 07DEC90 1790 288A 3135052255
***2800.00 ***2800.00
153252 07DEC90 1601 288A 233098264
(Emphasis supplied)
The first column shows the exact time of the transactions; the second column shows the date of the transactions; the third
column shows the bank transaction code; the fourth column shows the teller's code; and the fifth column shows the client' s
account number. The teller's tape reflected various transactions involving different accounts on December 7, 1990 which
included respondent Jesusa's Savings Account No. 233243388 and her new Express Teller Account No. 235076748. It shows
that respondent Jesusa's initial intention to withdraw P200,000.00, not P100,000.00, from her Savings Account No.
233324299 was begun at 3 o'clock, 12 minutes and 45 seconds as shown in Exhibit 1 -c.
In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified that when she was processing respondent Jesusa's withdrawal
in the amount of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the transaction because there was a discrepancy; [21] thus, the word BIG
AMOUNT appeared on the tape. Big amount means that the amount was so big for her to approve, [22] so she keyed in the
amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to process the withdrawal using an officer's override with the latter's
approval. [23] The letter J appears after Figure 288 in the fourth column to show that she overrode the transaction. She then
keyed again the amount ofP200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her computer rejected the
transaction, because the balance she keyed in based on respondent Jesusa's passbook was wrong; [24] thus appeared the
phrase balance error on the tape, and the computer produced the balance of P229,257.64, and so she keyed in the
withdrawal of P200,000.00. [25] Since it was a big amount, she again had to override it, so she could process the
amount. However, the withdrawal was again rejected for the reason TOD, overdraft, [26] which meant that the amount to be
withdrawn was more than the balance, considering that there was a debited amount of P30,935.16 reflected in respondent
Jesusa's passbook, reducing the available balance to only P198,322.48. [27]
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of respondent Jesusa's balance. [28] Capati then
motioned respondent Jesusa to the teller's cage; and when she was already in front of the teller's cage, Torneros told her
that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of overdraft; thus, respondent Jesusa decided to just
withdraw P100,000.00. [29]
This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the superimposition of the figure 1 on the figure 2 and the change o f
the word two to one to show that the withdrawn amount from respondent Jesusa's savings account was only P100,000.00,
and that respondent Jesusa herself signed the alterations.
The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount of P100,000.00 by fund transfer was resumed at 3 o'clock 17
minutes and 27 seconds; but since it was a big amount, there was a need to override it again, and the withdrawal/fund
transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27 seconds, the amount ofP100,000.00 was deposited to respondent
Jesusa's new Express Teller Account No. 235076748.
The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the amount
of P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account, to be transferred as her initial deposit to her
new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance in her savings account, and finally the fund transfer of the
amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller account. We give great evidentiary weight to the
teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's computer terminal, which records the teller's daily transactio ns in
the ordinary course of business, and there is no showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's
claim.
Respondent Jesusa's bare claim, although corroborated by her daughter, that the former deposited P100,000.00 cash in
addition to the fund transfer of P100,000.00, is not established by physical evidence. While the duplicate copy of the deposit
slip [30] was in the amount of P200,000.00 and bore the stamp mark of teller Torneros, such duplicate copy failed to show that
there was a cash deposit of P100,000.00. An examination of the deposit slip shows that it did not contain any entry in the
breakdown portion for the specific denominations of the cash deposit. This demolishes the testimonies of respondent Jesusa
and her daughter Joan.
Furthermore, teller Torneros's explanation of why the duplicate copy of the deposit slip in the amount of P200,000.00 bore
the teller's stamp mark is convincing and consistent with logic and the ordinary course of business. She testified that Capati
went to her cage bringing with him a withdrawal slip for P200,000.00 signed by respondent Jesusa, two copies of the deposit
slip for P200,000.00 in respondent Jesusa's name for her new Express Teller account, and the latter's savings passbook
reflecting a balance of P249,657.64 [31] as of November 19, 1990. [32] Thus, at first glance, these appeared to Torneros to be
sufficient for the withdrawal of P200,000.00 by fund transfer. Capati then got her teller's stamp mark, stamped it on the
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, and gave the duplicate to respondent Jesusa, while t he original copy [33] of the deposit slip
was left in her cage. [34] However, as Torneros started processing the transaction, it turned out that respondent Jesusa's
balance was insufficient to accommodate the P200,000.00 fund transfer as narrated earlier.
Since respondent Jesusa had signed the alterat ion in the withdrawal slip and had already left the teller's counter thereafter
and Capati was still inside the teller's cage, Torneros asked Capati about the original deposit slip and the latter told her, Ok
naman iyan, [35] and Capati superimposed the figures 1 on 2 on the deposit slip [36] to reflect the initial deposit of P100,000.00
for respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller account and signed the alteration. Torneros then machine-validated the deposit
slip. Thus, the duplicate copy of the deposit slip, which bore To rneross stamp mark and which was given to respondent Jesusa
prior to the processing of her transaction, was not machine -validated unlike the original copy of the deposit slip.
While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by Ca pati and not by respondent Jesusa herself was a
violation of the bank's policy requiring the depositor to sign the correction, [37] nevertheless, we find that respondents failed
to satisfactorily establish by preponderance of evidence that indeed there was an additional cash of P100,000.00 deposited to
the new Express Teller account.
Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and i t ranks high in our hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence. [38] We have, on many occasions, relied principally upon physical evidence in ascertaining the tr uth. Where the
physical evidence on record runs counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we consistently rule that
the physical evidence should prevail. [39]
In addition, to uphold the declaration of the CA that it is unlikely for respondent Jesusa and her daughter to concoct a fals e
story against a banking institution is to give weight to conjectures and surmises, which we cannot countenance.
In fine, respondents failed to establish their claim by preponderance of evidence.
Considering the foregoing, we find no need to tackle the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 2002 as well as its Resolution
dated February 12, 2003 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondents, together with the
counterclaim of petitioner, is DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
* In lieu of Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario, per Special Order No. 484 dated January 11, 2008.
[1] CA rollo, pp. 109-117; penned by Justice Renato C. Dacudao, concurred in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria and Danilo B. Pine; docketed as
CA- G.R. CV No. 47862.
[2] Id. at 133.
[3] Entitled Jesusa P. Reyes and Conrado B. Reyes v. Bank of Philippine Islands.
[4] Records, pp. 220-222.
[5] Id. at 219-225; per Judge Gil P. Fernandez, Sr. [6] Id. at 224-225.
[7] CA rollo, pp. 116-117. [8] Rollo, pp. 30-31. [9] Id.
[10] Prudential Bank v. Lim, G.R. No. 136371, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 485, 491.
[11] Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112550, February 5, 2001, 351 SCRA 145.
[12] REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Sec. 1.

[13] REVISED RULES ON EVIDENCE, Rule 133, Sec. 1.
[14] Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 432 Phil. 1052, 1061 (2002), citing Rivera v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 734 (1998).
[15] Records, p.21, Exhibit 4.
[16] Rule 131, Sec. 3(d).
[17] Records, p. 154, Exhibit 1.
[18] Exhibit 1-c.
[19] Exhibit 1-b.
[20] Exhibit 1-a.
[21] TSN, May 4, 1993, p. 10.
[22] Id [23] Id.
[24] TSN, April 27, 1993, p. 15.
[25] Id. at 16. [26] Id. at 20.
[27] Records, p. 73, Exhibit D-2.
[28] TSN, April 27, 1993, p. 19.
[29] Id. [30] Records, p. 6, Exhibits A and 7.
[31] Records, p. 73; Exhibits D-2 and D-2 a; the entry shows P243,657.64.
[32] TSN, April 27, 1993, pp. 10-12. [33] Records, p. 22. Exhibits W, W-1, 2 and 2-A.
[34] TSN, April 27, 1993, pp. 10-12.
[35] TSN, May 4, 1993, p. 28.
[36] TSN, April 27, 1993, p. 20.
[37] TSN Nov. 10, 1992, pp 59-60.
[38] See Jose v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118441-42, January 18, 2000, 322 SCRA 25, 31, citing People v. Uycoque, G.R. No. 107495, July 31,
1995, 246 SCRA 769 (1995).
[39] Id. citing People v. Vasquez, G.R. No. 102366, October 3, 1997, 280 SCRA 160.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015
RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Even men can become victims of rape.
Before us is a criminal case for rape through sexual assault committed against a 10-year-old boy. Accused Richard Ricalde (Ricalde) was
charged with rape as described under the second paragraph of Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, committed "[b ]y any person who,
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person." 1
This is a Petition for Review2 assailing the Court of Appeals’ August 28, 2013 Decision3 affirming Ricalde’s conviction for rape through sexual
assault and January 15, 2014 Resolution4 denying reconsideration.
The Provincial Prosecutor of Biñan, Laguna filed an Information charging Ricalde of rape through sexual assault:
That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserting [sic]
his penis into the anus of XXX who was then ten (10) years of age against his will and consent, to his damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, 2002.6 The prosecution presented the victim (XXX),7 his mother, and the
medico-legal as witnesses, while the defense presented Ricalde as its sole witness. 8
The facts as found by the lower courts follow.
On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years
old,10 is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old.11
After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. 12 He slept on the sofa while XXX slept on the living
room floor.13
It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his anus." 14 He saw that Ricalde
"fondled his penis."15 When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. 16 He also told his
mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.17
XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he remained silent.18 She asked
him to leave.19
XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to report the incident to the Sta. Rosa police station.20 The
police referred them to the municipal health center for medical examination.21 Dr. Roy Camarillo examined22 XXX and found no signs of recent
trauma in his anal orifice23 that was also "NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa."24
On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the Sta. Rosa police station, leading to the criminal complaint
filed against Ricalde.25
Ricalde denied the accusations.26 He testified that he met XXX during the 2001 town fiesta of Calaca, Batangas and learned that XXX’s mother
is the cousin of his cousin Arlan Ricalde.27 He and XXX became textmates, and XXX invited him to his house.28 On January 30, 2002, XXX’s
mother picked him up to sleep at their house. 29 He slept at 10:00 p.m. on the living room sofa while XXX slept on the floor.30 He denied the
alleged rape through sexual assault.31
The Regional Trial Court in its Decision32 dated June 20, 2011 found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape through sexual assault:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Richard Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual assault and, accordingly,
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as
minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay [XXX] the sums of 50,000.00 as moral damages and
50,000.00 as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.33
The Court of Appeals in its Decision34 dated August 28, 2013 affirmed the conviction with the modification of lowering the amounts of
damages awarded:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2011 of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, in Crim. Case No. 11906-B, is
AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant RICHARD RICALDE is ordered to pay the victim civil
indemnity in the amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos and moral damages likewise in the amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00)
Pesos, both with interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.35
Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his acquittal.36
Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the medico-legal testified that he found "no physical signs or external
signs of recent trauma [in XXX’s] anus,"37 or any trace of spermatozoa.38 He contends that physical evidence "ranks high in [the court’s]
hierarchy of trustworthy evidence." 39
Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his
anal orifice.40 XXX was also able to immediately push him away.41 Thus, no push and pull movement happened that would explain XXX’s
alleged stomach ache.42 Petitioner submits that the alleged stomach ache was an attempt to aggravate the charge against him.43
Petitioner argues that XXX’s inconsistent testimony raises reasonable doubt on his guilt. 44 XXX claimed that he immediately pushed petitioner
away, but in another instance, he testified as follows: "I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold his
penis. He was also playing with my penis."45 XXX also stated in his salaysay that "the penis reached only the periphery of his anal orifice."46
Third, XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that petitioner was wearing pants with the zipper open.47 Petitioner
submits that performing anal coitus while wearing pants with an open zipper poses a challenge — the risk of injuring the sexual organ or
having pubic hair entangled in the zipper. 48 Petitioner argues that the court must consider every circumstance favoring the innocence of an
accused.49
Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have applied the "variance doctrine" in People v.
Sumingwa,50 and the court would have found him guilty for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal
Code.51 The petition then enumerated circumstances showing possible homosexual affections between petitioner and XXX. 52 These include the
fact that they were textmates and that petitioner played with XXX’s penis.53
Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX mistook as penetration. 54 XXX could also have mistaken the
"overreaching fingers as a male organ trying to enter his [anus]." 55 Assuming these acts took place, these would only be considered as acts of
lasciviousness.56
The People of the Philippines counters that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime charged.
The Comment57 discussed that it is neither improbable nor contrary to human experience that XXX’s mother allowed her son to be left alone
with a stranger.58 Petitioner was not a complete stranger, and she could not have foreseen such abuse since "rape by sexual assault or any
form of sexual abuse of a boy by a grown man is fairly uncommon in our culture."59
Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s findings deserves scant consideration.60 The Comment quoted People v. Penilla61 in that "[a] medical
examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to
convict the accused of the crime."62 In any case, the medico-legal testified on the sphincter’s flexibility and how an insertion into the anal
orifice would not necessarily cause injury.63
Lastly, the prosecution established all elements of rape through sexual assault based on XXX’s clear and categorical testimony.64 Petitioner’s
defense of mere denial cannot outweigh positive testimony.65 Consequently, petitioner’s contention that the incident only amounts to acts of
lasciviousness lacks merit.66
The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt petitioner Richard Ricalde’s guilt for the crime
of rape through sexual assault.
We affirm petitioner’s conviction with modification on the penalty imposed.
The Anti-Rape Law of 199767 classified rape as a crime against persons68 and amended the Revised Penal Code to include Article 266-A on rape
through sexual assault:
Article 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is Committed—
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his
penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis
supplied)
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object rape,"69 "gender-free rape,"70 or "homosexual
rape."71 The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice."72
Jurisprudence holds that "the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the probative
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if not conclusive effect." 73
The trial court found that XXX’s "straightforward, unequivocal and convincing testimony" 74 sufficiently proved that petitioner committed an
act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into XXX’s anal orifice.75 There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse
petitioner.76 The Court of Appeals accorded great weight to the trial court’s findings and affirmed petitioner’s conviction. 77
No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts’ findings.
First, petitioner’s argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXX’s testimony fails to convince.
In a long line of cases,78 this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims. Their "[y]outh and immaturity are
generally badges of truth and sincerity."79 XXX, then only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner.80
This court has also held that "[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of
abuse."81
Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object being
inserted into his anal orifice.
This contradicts petitioner’s earlier statement in his appellant’s brief82 that "[a]lthough it is true that the Supreme Court, in a long line of cases,
did not rule out the possibility of rape in cases where the victim remained physically intact at the time she or he was physically examined, still,
it bears stressing that in the instant case, the private complainant testified that the accused-appellant’s penis fully penetrated his anus."83
The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXX’s testimony in that he "felt something was inserted in [his] anus."84
Q: That early morning of January 31, 2002, while you were sleeping at your house, do you recall any unusual incident that happened to you?
A: Yes sir, I felt something was inserted in my anus.
....
Q: When you said that you felt something was inserted in your anus, what did you do?
A: I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold his penis. He was also playing with my penis.
Q: So when you said he was inserting his penis to your anus and he was even playing with your private part, who is this person you are
referring to as "he"?
A: Richard, sir.85
In People v. Soria,86 this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal orifice for the court to
find that rape through sexual assault was committed:
We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital.
What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require "AAA" to identify the instrument or object
that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process.87
Second, petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit.
The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict
the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human nature.
This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the possibility of convictions for rape based on the
victim’s credible lone testimony.88
In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding of trauma in the anal orifice does not remove the possibility of an insertion
considering the flexibility of the sphincter:
Q: Now, a while ago you testified that he was sodomized and your findings states [sic] that you did not find any congestion or abrasion, can
you explain to this court why you stated in your findings that you did not find any congestion or abrasion?
A: Again, based on my examination[,] there were no external signs of recent trauma to the anus. It should be realized that the sphincter, that is
the particular portion of the anus controlling the bowel movement, it exhibits a certain flexibility such that it can resist any objected [sic]
inserted and that area is very vascular, meaning to say, it is rich in blood supply, such that any injuries would be healed in 24 hours or less than
24 hours, sir?89
Lastly, we address petitioner’s invocation of the "variance doctrine" citing People v. Sumingwa. 90 Section 4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120
of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the "variance doctrine":
SEC. 4. Judatgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is
necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.
In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with qualified rape but was convicted for the lesser offense of acts
of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 91 since "there was no penetration, or even
an attempt to insert [the accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina."92
In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during trial. The prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.
XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus."93 The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ distinguishes an act of
lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v. Bonaagua94 discussed this distinction:
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even its slightest contact
with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus,
touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not
the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed
out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of
the victim, however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus,
in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for
convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.95 (Emphasis supplied)
People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape involves a woman victim.
Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest penetration to the victim’s anal orifice
consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.
The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an "assault on human
dignity."96
People v. Quintos97 discussed how rape causes incalculable damage on a victim’s dignity, regardless of the manner of its commission:
The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are relevant only insofar as these define the manners of commission of
rape. However, it does not mean that one manner is less heinous or wrong than the other. Whether rape is committed by nonconsensual
carnal knowledge of a woman or by insertion of the penis into the mouth of another person, the damage to the victim’s dignity is incalculable.
Child sexual abuse in general has been associated with negative psychological impacts such as trauma, sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-
destructive behavior, emotional pain, impaired sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties. Hence, one experience of sexual abuse should not
be trivialized just because it was committed in a relatively unusual manner.
"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order." Crimes are punished as retribution so
that society would understand that the act punished was wrong.
Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message that one experience of rape is relatively trivial or less
serious than another. It attaches different levels of wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a
person’s will and body. In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater or less in heinousness than another may be of
doubtful constitutionality.
However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result was not raised in this case. Acknowledging that every
presumption must be accorded in favor of accused in criminal cases, we have no choice but to impose a lesser penalty for rape committed by
inserting the penis into the mouth of the victim.98 (Citations omitted)
We affirm petitioner’s conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower court to the penalty under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 7610 known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act": 99
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.— Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpertua shall be imposed upon the following:
....
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3,
for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case maybe: Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;
(Emphasis supplied)
The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines "lascivious conduct": [T]he intentional touching, either directly or
through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. 100
In People v. Chingh,101 the accused was charged with rape "for inserting his fingers and afterwards his penis into the private part of his minor
victim[.]"102 The Court of Appeals found the accused guilty of two counts of rape: statutory rape and rape through sexual assault. 103 This court
modified the penalty imposed for rape through sexual assault to the penalty provided in Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610,
discussing as follows:
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10) years old. This calls for the application of R.A. No.
7610, or "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which defines sexual abuse of children
and prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5(b), Article III, to wit:
....
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the above-quoted provision of law,
Armando was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through
Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years
of age, and considering further that Armando’s act of inserting his finger in VVV’s private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the
appropriate imposable penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than the one who commits Rape
Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the
intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite
the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons below
eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition." 104 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Thus, "for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, [the accused Chingh was] sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6)
months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum."105
The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5(b) "for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period." This penalty is higher than the imposable penalty of prision correccional for acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.
In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty when the victi m is a child.
The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his birth certificate, and this was admitted by the
defense.106 His age of 10 years old was alleged in the Information.107 The higher penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v.
Chingh, applies in this case.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act No. 7610). It is a progression from the Revised Penal
Code to provide greater protection for children. Justice Velasco suggests that this is not so. He anchors his view on his interpretation that
Republic Act No. 7610 requires a showing that apart from the actual coerced sexual act on the 10-year-old, the child must also be exploited by
prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate on grounds of verba legis and ratione legis.
The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that "children . . . who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any
adult . . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . . are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." The label "children
exploited in . . . other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject of coercion and sexual intercourse.
Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who is liable and the penalty to be imposed. The person who engages in sexual
intercourse with a child already coerced is liable.
It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a child as child abuse. The proposal of Justice Velasco implies that there has to be
other acts of a sexual nature other than the rape itself that will characterize rape as child abuse. One count of rape is not enough. Child abuse,
in his view, is not yet present with one count of rape.
This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial insensitivity to the purpose of the law. If we adopt his view, it would amount to our
collective official sanction to the idea that a single act of rape is not debilitating to a child. That a single act of rape is not a tormenting memory
that will sear into a child’s memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or her of the trust that will enable him or her to have full and
diverse meaningful interactions with other human beings. In my view, a single act of sexual abuse to a child, by law, is already reprehensible.
Our society has expressed that this is conduct which should be punishable. The purpose and text of the law already punish that single act as
child abuse.
Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.
Justice Velasco further observes that the right to due process of the accused will be violated should we impose the penalty under Republic Act
No. 7610. I disagree.
The Information was clear about the facts constitutive of the offense. The facts constitutive of the offense will suggest the crime punishable by
law. The principle is that ignorantia legis non excusat. With the facts clearly laid out in the Information, the law which punishes the offense
should already be clear and the accused put on notice of the charges against him.
Additionally, there is no argument that the accused was not represented by counsel. Clear from the records is the entry and active
participation of his lawyer up to and including this appeal.
On the award of damages, we maintain the amount of 30,000.00 in favor of XXX as a victim of rape through sexual assault, consistent with
jurisprudence.108
This court has stated that "jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the information that the prevailing amount awarded as civil
indemnity to victims of simple rape committed by means other than penile insertion isP30,000."109
This statement considered the prevailing situation in our jurisprudence where victims of rape are all women.1âwphi1However, as in this case,
men can also become victims of rape through sexual assault, and this can involve penile insertion.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 34387 dated August 28, 2013 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that for rape
through sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and
twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral
damages likewise in the amount of P30,000.00, both with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
* Designated acting member per S.0. No. 1910 dated January 12, 2015.
1 Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997) introduced this new provision.
2 Rollo, pp. 10–24. The Petition was filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
3 Id. at 31–40. The Decision was penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr. of the First Division.

4 Id. at 42–43. The Resolution was penned by Associate Justice Rodil V. Zalameda and concurred in by Presiding Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and
Associate Justice Ramon M. Bato, Jr.

5 Id. at 32 and 54.
6 Id.
7 The fictitious initials "XXX" represent the victim-survivor’s real name. In People v. Cabalquinto (533 Phil. 703 (2006) [Per J. Tinga , En Banc]),
this court discussed the need to withhold the victim’s real name and other information that would compromise the victim’s identity, applying
the confidentiality provisions of: (1) Republic Act No. 7610 (Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act and its implementing rules; (2) Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004) and its implementing
rules; and (3) this court’s October 19, 2004 Resolution in A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC (Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children).
8 Id. at 32 and 55. 9 Rollo, pp. 33 and 55. 10 Id. at 20. 11 Id. at 12. 12 Id. at 33 and 55.
13 Id. 14 Id. at 55.15 Id. 16 Id. at 33 and 55.17 Id. at 33. 18 Id. at 33 and 55. 19 Id.
20 Id. 21 Id. at 33.
22 Id. at 55. Dr. Camarillo examined XXX at the Regional Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna.
23 Id. at 33 and 57. 24 Id. at 33. 25 Id. at 33 and 55. 26 Id. at 34. 27 Id. at 34 and 57. 28 Id. 29 Id. at 34 and 58. 30 Id. at 33 and 55.
31 Id. at 34.
32 Id. at 54–64. The Decision was penned by Presiding Judge Wilhelmina B. Jorge-Wagan, Branch 34, Regional Trial Court, Calamba, Laguna.
33 Id. at 64. 34 Id. at 31–40. 35 Id. at 39–40. 36 Id. at 23. 37 Id. at 16. 38 Id.
39 Id. at 17, quoting Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Reyes, et al., 568 Phil. 188, 204 (2008) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division].
40 Id. at 17. 41 Id. 42 Id. 43 Id. 44 Id. at 21.
45 Id. at 60, citing TSN, September 11, 2003.
46 Id. at 21. 47 Id. at 18. 48 Id. 49 Id.
50 618 Phil. 650, 668 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
51 Rollo, p. 19.
52 Id. at 20–21.
53 Id. at 20. 54 Id. at 21.
55 Id. 56 Id.
57 Id. at 124–138.
58 Id. at 129.
59 Id. at 128.
60 Id. at 129.
61 G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 141, 166 [Per J. Perez, Second Division].
62 Id. at 130.
63 Id. at 38 and 130.
64 Id. at 131–132.
65 Id. at 135.
66 Id. at 131–132.
67 Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997).
68 Rep. Act No. 8353 (1997), sec. 2.
69 People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428, 454 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing People v. Silvano, 368 Phil. 676, 696 (1999) [Per Curiam, En Banc].
70 People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428, 454 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Deliberations of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 950, Special Law on
Rape, August 6, 1996, pp. 12–15; Deliberations of the House of Representatives, Committee on Revision of Laws and Committee on Women on
House Bill No. 6265 entitled "An Act to Amend Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Defining and Penalizing the Crime of
Sexual Assault," August 27, 1996, pp. 44–50; See also People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 206095, November 25, 2013, 710 SCRA 571, 580 [Per J.
Mendoza, Third Division].
71 People v. Abulon, 557 Phil. 428, 454 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], citing Deliberations of the Senate on Senate Bill No. 950, Special Law on
Rape, August 6, 1996, pp. 12–15.

72 Pielago v. People, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 476, 488 [Per J. Reyes, First Division].
73 People v. Vitero, G.R. No. 175327, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 54, 64–65 [Per J. Leonardo-De Castro, First Division].
74 Rollo, p. 59.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 62.
77 Id. at 36–37.
78 See Pielago v. People, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013, 693 SCRA 476, 488 [Per J. Reyes, First Division]; Campos v. People, 569 Phil. 658,
671 (2008) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division], quoting People v. Capareda, 473 Phil. 301, 330 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division];
People v. Galigao, 443 Phil. 246, 260 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
79 People v. Oliva, 616 Phil. 786, 792 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division], citing People v. De Guzman, 423 Phil. 313, 331 (2001) [Per Curiam,
En Banc].
80 Rollo, pp. 37 and 62.
81 People v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 191065, June 13, 2011, 651 SCRA 791, 802 [Per J. Sereno (now C.J.), Third Division].
82 Rollo, pp. 44–53.
83 Id. at 50–51.
84 Id. at 59, citing TSN, September 11, 2003.
85 Id. at 59–60, citing TSN, September 11, 2003.
86 G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA 483 [Per J. Del Castillo, Second Division]. Justice Brion penned a dissenting opinion.
87 Id. at 504–505.
88 People v. Colorado, G.R. No. 200792, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA 660, 673 [Per J. Reyes, First Division], citing People v. Balonzo, 560 Phil.
244, 259–260 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division]; See also People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 188352, September 1, 2010, 629 SCRA 784,
799 [Per J. Mendoza, Second Division].
89 Rollo, p. 38, citing TSN, January 22, 2003, p. 9.
90 618 Phil. 650 (2009) [Per J. Nachura, Third Division].
91 Id. at 666.
92 Id. at 667.
93 Rollo, p. 59, citing TSN, September 11, 2003.
94 G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011, 650 SCRA 620 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
95 Id. at 640.
96 People v. Jalosjos, 421 Phil. 43, 54 (2001) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, En Banc].
97 G.R. No. 199402, November 12, 2014 [Per J. Leonen, Second Division].
98 Id.
99 Rep. Act No. 7610 was approved on June 17, 1992.
100 See Garingarao v. People, G.R. No. 192760, July 20, 2011, 654 SCRA 243, 254 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division]; See also People v. Chingh, G.R.
No. 178323, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 573, 587 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
101 G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011, 645 SCRA 573 [Per J. Peralta, Second Division].
102 Id. at 577.
103 Id. at 580
104 Id. at 586–588.
105 Id. at 589.
106 Rollo, p. 62.
107 Id. at 54.
108 See People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 206095, November 25, 2013, 710 SCRA 571, 588 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]; People v. Lomaque, G.R.
No. 189297, June 3, 2013, 697 SCRA 383, 410 [Per J. DelCastillo, Second Division]; Pie/ago v. People, G.R. No. 202020, March 13, 2013, 693
SCRA 476, 488 and 489 [Per J. Reyes, First Division]; People v. Soria, G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012, 685 SCRA483, 508 [Per J. Del
Castillo, Second Division].
109 People v. Dominguez, G.R. No. 191065, June 13, 2011, 651 SCRA 791, 806 [Per J. Sereno (now C.J.), Third Division], citing People v. Soriano,
436 Phil. 719, 757 (2002) [Per Curiam, En Banc], People v. Palma, 463 Phil. 767, 784 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], People v. Olaybar, 459 Phil.
114, 129 (2003) [Per J. Vitug, En Banc], People v. Suyu, 530 Phil. 569, 597 (2006) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., First Division], People v. Hermocilla, 554
Phil. 189, 212 (2007) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, Third Division], People v. Fetalino, 552 Phil. 254, 279 (2007) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Third Division],
People v. Senieres, 547 Phil. 674, 689 (2007) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division], Flordeliz v. People, 628 Phil. 124, 143 (2010) [Per J. Nachura, Third
Division], People v. Alfonso, G.R. No. 182094, August 18, 2010, 628 SCRA 431, 452 [Per J. Del Castillo, First Division].
SECOND DIVISION
THE CONSOLIDATED BANK AND TRUST G.R. No. 143338

CORPORATION (SOLIDBANK),
P e t i t i o n e r,
Present:
PUNO,
- versus Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
DEL MONTE MOTOR WORKS, INC., NARCISO G. CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
MORALES,[1] AND SPOUSE,
R e s p o n d e n t s. Promulgated:
July 29, 2005

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 16886 entitled, The Consolidated Bank &
Trust Corporation (SOLIDBANK) v. Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., Narciso O. Morales and Spouse promulgated on 25 November 1999 and of the
Resolution of the appellate court dated 11 May 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. Said decision and resolution affirmed the
order dated 28 December 1987 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27, Manila.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On 13 June 1984, petitioner filed before the RTC of Manila a complaint[3] for recovery of sum of money against respondents, impleading the
spouse of respondent Narciso O. Morales (respondent Morales) in order to bind their conjugal partnership of gains. Petitioner, a domestic
banking and trust corporation, alleges therein that on 23 April 1982, it extended in favor of respondents a loan in the amount of One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as evidenced by a promissory note executed by respondents on the same date. Under the promissory note, respondents
Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. (respondent corporation) and Morales bound themselves jointly and severally to pay petitioner the full amount
of the loan through twenty-five monthly installments of P40,000.00 a month with interest pegged at 23% per annum. The note was to be paid
in full by 23 May 1984. As respondents defaulted on their monthly installments, the full amount of the loan became due and demandable
pursuant to the terms of the promissory note. Petitioner likewise alleges that it made oral and written demands upon respondents to settle
their obligation but notwithstanding these demands, respondents still failed to pay their indebtedness which, as of 09 March 1984, stood
at P1,332,474.55. Petitioner attached to its complaint as Annexes A, B, and C, respectively, a photocopy of the promissory note supposedly
executed by respondents, a copy of the demand letter it sent respondents dated 20 January 1983, and statement of account pertaining to
respondents loan.
On 31 October 1984, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Declare the Defendants in Default which was opposed by the defendants upon the
ground that they were never served with copies of the summons and of petitioners complaint.
On 23 November 1984, respondent corporation filed before the trial court a manifestation attaching thereto its answer to petitioners
complaint which states the following:
2- That it denies generally and specifically the allegations contained in paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 thereof for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of the matters therein alleged, the truth being those alleged in the Special and
Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow contained;
3- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a first special and affirmative defense, defendant herein states that the promissory note in question is
void for want of valid consideration and/or there was no valuable consideration involved as defendant herein did not receive any
consideration at all;
4- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a second special affirmative defense, defendant herein alleges that no demand has ever been sent to
nor received by herein defendant and if ever demands were made, denies any liability as averred therein.
5- ANSWERING FURTHER, and by way of a third special and affirmative defense, defendant herein avers that the complaint states no cause of
action and has no basis either in fact or in law;
VERIFICATION
I, JEANETTE D. TOLENTINO, of legal age, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, depose and state:
That I am the Controller of Del Monte Motor Works, Inc., one of the defendants in this case.
That for and in behalf of the defendant corporation, I caused the preparation of the above-narrated answer.
That I have read the contents thereof and they are true of my own knowledge.
(SGD) JEANNETTE D. TOLENTINO[4]
On 06 December 1984, respondent Morales filed his manifestation together with his answer wherein he likewise renounced any liability on the
promissory note, thus:
1. He ADMIT[S] paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of the complaint with a qualification in paragraph 3 thereof that he has long been separated from his
wife and the system governing their property relations is that of complete separation of property and not that of conjugal partnership of
gain[s];
2. He [DENIES], generally and specifically, the allegations contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 thereof, for lack of knowledge and
information sufficient to form a belief and as to the truth of the matter therein averred, the truth being those alleged in the Special And
Affirmative Defenses hereinbelow pleaded;
SPECIAL AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
4. He has never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint in his personal and/or individual capacity as such;
5. That the said promissory note is ineffective, unenforceable and void for lack of valid consideration;
6. That even admitting, argumenti gratia, the validity and execution of the questioned promissory note, still, defendant herein cannot be
bound personally and individually to the said obligations as banking procedures requires, it being a standard operating procedure of all known
banking institution, that to hold a borrower jointly and severally liable in his official as well as personal capacity, the borrower must sign a
Suretyship Agreement or at least, a continuing guarranty with that of the corporation he represent(s) but which in this case is wanting;
7. That transaction/obligation in question did not, in any way, redound/inure to the benefit of the conjugal partnership of gain, as there is no
conjugal partnership of gain to speak with, defendant having long been separated from his wife and their property relation is governed by the
system of complete separation of property, and more importantly, he has never signed the said promissory note in his personal and individual
capacity as such;
VERIFICATION
That I, NARCISO MORALES, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law, hereby depose and declare that:
I am one of the named defendant[s] in the above-entitled case;
I have cause[d] the preparation of the foregoing Answer upon facts and figures supplied by me to my retained counsel; have read each and
every allegations contained therein and hereby certify that the same are true and correct of my own knowledge and information.
(SGD) NARCISO MORALES

Affiant[5]
On 26 December 1984, the trial court denied petitioners motion to declare respondents in default and admitted their respective answers.[6]
During the trial on the merits of this case, petitioner presented as its sole witness, Liberato A. Lavarino (Lavarino), then the manager of its
Collection Department. Substantially, Lavarino stated that respondents obtained the loan, subject of this case, from petitioner and due to
respondents failure to pay a single monthly installment on this loan, petitioner was constrained to send a demand letter to respondents; that
as a result of this demand letter, Jeannette Tolentino (Tolentino), respondent corporations controller, wrote a letter to petitioner requesting
for some consideration because of the unfavorable business atmosphere then buffeting their business operation; that Tolentino enclosed to
said letter a check with a face value of P220,020.00 to be discounted by petitioner with the proceeds being applied as partial payment to their
companys obligation to petitioner; that after receipt of this partial payment, respondents obligation again became stagnant prompting
petitioner to serve respondents with another demand letter which, unfortunately, was unheeded by respondents. Lavarino also identified the
following exhibits for petitioner: photocopy of the duplicate original of the promissory note attached to the complaint as Exhibit
A;[7]petitioners 20 January 1983 demand letter marked as Exhibit B;[8] Tolentinos letter to petitioner dated 10 February 1983 and marked as
Exhibit C;[9] and the 09 March 1984 statement of account sent to respondents marked as Exhibit D.[10]
On 26 September 1985, petitioner made its formal offer of evidence. However, as the original copy of Exhibit A could no longer be found,
petitioner instead sought the admission of the duplicate original of the promissory note which was identified and marked as Exhibit E.
The trial court initially admitted into evidence Exhibit E and granted respondents motion that they be allowed to amend their respective
answers to conform with this new evidence.[11]
On 30 September 1985, respondent corporation filed a manifestation and motion for reconsideration[12] of the trial courts order admitting into
evidence petitioners Exhibit E. Respondent corporation claims that Exhibit E should not have been admitted as it was immaterial, irrelevant,
was not properly identified and hearsay evidence. Respondent corporation insists that Exhibit E was not properly identified by Lavarino who
testified that he had nothing to do in the preparation and execution of petitioners exhibits, one of which was Exhibit E. Further, as there were
markings in Exhibit A which were not contained in Exhibit E, the latter could not possibly be considered an original copy of Exhibit A. Lastly,
respondent corporation claims that the exhibit in question had no bearing on the complaint as Lavarino admitted that Exhibit E was not the
original of Exhibit A which was the foundation of the complaint and upon which respondent corporation based its own answer.
Respondent Morales similarly filed a manifestation with motion to reconsider order admitting as evidence Exhibit E [13] which, other than
insisting that the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note were not established as far as he was concerned, essentially raised
the same arguments contained in respondent corporations manifestation with motion for reconsideration referred to above.
On 06 December 1985, the trial court granted respondents motions for reconsideration. [14] Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of this
order which was denied by the court a quo on 20 December 1985.[15]
On 26 December 1985, respondents separately filed their motions to dismiss on the similar ground that with the exclusion of Exhibits A and E,
petitioner no longer possessed any proof of respondents alleged indebtedness. [16]
On 08 April 1986, petitioner filed a motion[17] praying that the presiding judge, Judge Ricardo D. Diaz, of the court a quo inhibit himself from
this case maintaining that the latter rushed into resolving its motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order of 06 December 1985 thereby
depriving it the opportunity of presenting proof that the original of Exhibit A was delivered to respondents as early as 02 April 1983. Such haste
on the part of the presiding judge, according to petitioner, cast doubt on his objectivity and fairness. This motion to inhibit was denied by the
trial court on 06 August 1987.[18]
In an order dated 28 December 1987,[19] the case before the trial court was dismissed, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant case against defendants Del Monte Motor Works, Inc. and Narciso O. Morales and spouse, is hereby DISMISSED, with
costs against the plaintiff.
The trial courts finding was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the assailed decision now before us. The dispositive portion of the appellate
courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated December 28, 1987 dismissing
plaintiff-appellant['s] complaint is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the plaintiff-appellant.[20]
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration dated 14 December 1999 which was denied for lack of merit in a resolution of the
Court of Appeals promulgated on 11 May 2000.[21]
Aggrieved by the appellate courts ruling, petitioner now seeks redress from this Court imputing the following errors on the Court of Appeals:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS DENIED THE MATERIAL ALLEGATIONS
OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANKS COMPLAINT, DESPITE THE PRESENCE OF INDUBITABLE FACTS CLEARLY POINTING TO THE FACT THAT SAID
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ADMITTED THE GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE SUBJECT PROMISSORY NOTE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE EXCLUSION OF EXHIBIT E, THE SECOND ORIGINAL OF THE
PROMISSORY NOTE, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ORIGINAL OF EXHIBIT A (XEROX COPY OF THE DUPLICATE ORIGINAL OF THE PROMISSORY
NOTE) WAS ACTUALLY IN THE POSSESSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, THUS WARRANTING THE ADMISSION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED HIMSELF FROM
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF AND FROM TRYING AND DECIDING THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING HIS PERCEIVED AND MANIFEST BIAS AND
PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THE GRAVE PREJUDICE OF PETITIONER SOLIDBANK. [22]
The petition is meritorious.

In resolving the case against petitioner, the appellate court held that contrary to petitioners stance, respondents were able to generally and
specifically deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note, thus:
There can be no dispute to the fact that the allegations in the answer (Record, p. 20, 26-27), of both defendants, they denied generally and
specifically under oath the genuineness and due execution of the promissory note and by way of special and affirmative defenses herein states
that he (MORALES) never signed the promissory note attached to the complaint (Exh. A) in his personal and/or individual capacity. Moreover,
what appears in the record (Record, p. 20) was an admission of paragraphs 1 & 2 but they deny generally and specifically the rest of the
allegations. It would be considered that there is a sufficient compliance of the requirement of the law for specific denial. [23]
We hold otherwise.
The pertinent portion of the Rules of Court on the matter provides:
SEC. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted
unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath
does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of
the original instrument is refused.[24]
In the case of Permanent Savings and Loan Bank v. Mariano Velarde,[25] this Court held that
. . . Respondent also denied any liability on the promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount stated therein, and the loan
documents do not express the true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these allegations in his denial under oath, stating that the
promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that
it did not truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the defenses
Respondents denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. In the early case of Songco vs. Sellner,[26] the Court
expounded on how to deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, viz.:
. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated.
Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any issue as to its
genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks
to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either.[27]
In this case, both the court a quo and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents were able to specifically deny the allegations in
petitioners complaint in the manner specifically required by the rules. In effect, respondents had, to all intents and purposes, admitted the
genuineness and due execution of the subject promissory note and recognized their obligation to petitioner.
The appellate court likewise sustained the ruling of the trial court that the best evidence rule or primary evidence must be applied as the
purpose of the proof is to establish the terms of the writing meaning the alleged promissory note as it is the basis of the recovery of the money
allegedly loaned to the defendants (respondents herein).[28]
The best evidence rule is encapsulated in Rule 130, Section 3, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
The best evidence rule, according to Professor Thayer, first appeared in the year 1699-1700 when in one case involving a goldsmith, Holt, C. J.,
was quoted as stating that they should take into consideration the usages of trade and that the best proof that the nature of the thing will
afford is only required.[29] Over the years, the phrase was used to describe rules which were already existing such as the rule that the terms of
a document must be proved by the production of the document itself, in preference to evidence about the document; it was also utilized to
designate the hearsay rule or the rule excluding assertions made out of court and not subject to the rigors of cross-examination; and the
phrase was likewise used to designate the group of rules by which testimony of particular classes of witnesses was preferred to that of
others.[30]
According to McCormick, an authority on the rules of evidence, the only actual rule that the best evidence phrase denotes today is the rule
requiring the production of the original writing[31] the rationale being:
(1) that precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, since a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights,
(2) that there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting, and (3) as respects
oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally. In the light of these dangers of mistransmission, accompanying the use of written copies or of
recollection, largely avoided through proving the terms by presenting the writing itself, the preference for the original writing is justified.[32]
Bearing in mind that the risk of mistransmission of the contents of a writing is the justification for the best evidence rule, we declare that this
rule finds no application to this case. It should be noted that respondents never disputed the terms and conditions of the promissory note thus
leaving us to conclude that as far as the parties herein are concerned, the wording or content of said note is clear enough and leaves no room
for disagreement. In their responsive pleadings, respondents principal defense rests on the alleged lack of consideration of the promissory
note. In addition, respondent Morales also claims that he did not sign the note in his personal capacity. These contentions clearly do not
question the precise wording[33] of the promissory note which should have paved the way for the application of the best evidence rule. It was,
therefore, an error for the Court of Appeals to sustain the decision of the trial court on this point.
Besides, the best evidence rule as stated in our Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is not absolute. As quoted earlier, the rule accepts of
exceptions one of which is when the original of the subject document is in the possession of the adverse party. As pointed out by petitioner in
its motion to inhibit, had it been given the opportunity by the court a quo, it would have sufficiently established that the original of Exhibit A
was in the possession of respondents which would have called into application one of the exceptions to the best evidence rule.
Significantly, and as discussed earlier, respondents failed to deny specifically the execution of the promissory note. This being the case, there
was no need for petitioner to present the original of the promissory note in question. Their judicial admission with respect to the genuineness
and execution of the promissory note sufficiently established their liability to petitioner regardless of the fact that petitioner failed to present
the original of said note.[34]
Indeed, when the defendant fails to deny specifically and under oath the due execution and genuineness of a document copied in a complaint,
the plaintiff need not prove that fact as it is considered admitted by the defendant. [35] In the case of Asia Banking Corporation v. Walter E.
Olsen & Co.,[36] this Court held that
Another error assigned by the appellant is the fact that the lower court took into consideration the documents attached to the complaint as a
part thereof, without having been expressly introduced in evidence. This was no error. In the answer of the defendants there was no denial
under oath of the authenticity of these documents. Under Section 103 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the authenticity and due execution of
these documents must, in that case, be deemed admitted. The effect of this is to relieve the plaintiff from the duty of expressly presenting
such documents as evidence. The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without the introduction of evidence,
the facts admitted by the parties.[37]
Anent petitioners allegation that the presiding judge of the court a quo should have inhibited himself from this case, we resolve this issue
against petitioner.
In order for this Court to sustain a charge of partiality and prejudice brought against a judge, there must be convincing proof to show that he
or she is, indeed, biased and partial. Bare allegations are not enough. Bias and prejudice are serious charges which cannot be presumed
particularly if weighed against a judges sacred obligation under his oath of office to administer justice without respect to person and do equal
right to the poor and the rich.[38] There must be a showing of bias and prejudice stemming from an extrajudicial source resulting in an opinion
in the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.[39]
In this case, as petitioner failed to proffer any evidence indicating that Judge Diaz was guilty of bias and prejudice, we affirm the Court of
Appeals holding that there was no cogent reason for him to disqualify himself from this case.
Finally, Rule 33, Section 1, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure states the rule on the effect of judgment on demurrer to evidence. It reads:
SECTION 1. Demurrer to evidence.- After the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion is denied, he shall have the right to
present evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.
A demurrer to evidence abbreviates judicial proceedings, it being an instrument for the expeditious termination of an action. Caution,
however, must be exercised by the party seeking the dismissal of a case upon this ground as under the rules, if the movants plea for the
dismissal on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, he loses his right to adduce evidence. If the
defendants motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence is granted and the order is subsequently reversed on appeal, judgment is rendered
in favor of the adverse party because the movant loses his right to present evidence. [40] The reviewing court cannot remand the case for
further proceedings; rather, it should render judgment on the basis of the evidence presented by the plaintiff. [41]
Under the promissory note executed by respondents in this case, they are obligated to petitioner in the amount of One Million Pesos, this
being the amount of loan they obtained on 23 April 1982. In addition, they also bound themselves to pay the 23% interest per annum on the
loan; and a penalty charge of 3% per annum on the amount due until fully paid. Respondents likewise agreed to pay attorneys fees equivalent
to 10% of the total amount due, but in no case less than P200.00, plus costs of suit with both these amounts bearing a 1% interest per month
until paid. Costs against respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals decision dated 25 November 1999 as well as its Resolution of 11 May 2000, affirming
the order of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 27, dated 28 December 1987, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents are
ordered to pay One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) plus 23% interest per annum, penalty charge of 3% interest per annum, and 10% of the
amount due as attorneys fees together with a 1% interest per month until fully paid. The sum ofP220,020.00 which was the value of the
postdated check given
by respondents to petitioner as partial payment should be deducted from the amount due from respondents.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
[1] Narciso O. Morales in the Decision of the Court of Appeals.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole with Associate Justices Ramon A. Barcelona and Demetrio G. Demetria concurring;
Rollo, pp. 9-26.
[3] Records, pp. 1-6.
[4] Records, pp. 20-21.
[5] Records, pp. 26-27.
[6] Records, p. 34.
[7] Records, p. 72.
[8] Records, p. 73.
[9] Records, p. 75.
[10] Records, p. 76.
[11] Records, p. 79.
[12] Records, pp. 80-83.
[13] Records, pp. 84-90.
[14] Records, p. 118.
[15] Records, p. 148.
[16] Records, pp. 150-165.
[17] Records, pp. 195-200.
[18] Records, pp. 233-238.
[19] Records, pp. 244-252.
[20] Rollo, p. 25.
[21] Rollo, p. 28.
[22] Rollo, p. 42.
[23] Rollo, p. 18.
[24] Rule 8, Section 8, Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
[25] G.R. No. 140608, 23 September 2004, 439 SCRA 1.
[26] G.R. No. 11513, 04 December 1917, 37 Phil. 254.
[27] Supra, note 25, pp. 8-9.
[28] Records, p. 250.
[29] IV Evidence in Trials at Common Law, John Henry Wigmore, p. 399 (1972 Ed.).
[30] Id. at 400.
[31] Handbook of the Law of Evidence, Charles T. McCormick, p. 409 (1954 Ed.).
[32] Id. at 410.
[33] Evidence, Edward W. Cleary, p. 416 (4th Ed.).
[34] Supra, note 25 at 10; Hornales v. The National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. No. 118943, 10 September 2001, 364 SCRA 778; SCC
Chemicals Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 128538, 28 February 2001, 353 SCRA 70.
[35] VII The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines (Evidence), Vicente J. Francisco, p. 9 (1997 Ed.)
[36] G.R. No. 24488, 28 December 1925, 48 Phil. 529.
[37] Id. at 532.
[38] People of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 129120, 02 July 1999, 309 SCRA 705.
[39] Soriano v. Angeles, G.R. No. 109920, 31 August 2000, 339 SCRA 366.
[40] Quebral v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101941, 25 January 1996, 252 SCRA 353.
[41] Radiowealth Finance Company v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739, 06 July 2000, 335 SCRA 288.
SECOND DIVISION
RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA, G.R. No. 177407

Petitioner,
Present:
NACHURA,
Acting Chairperson,
PERALTA,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,*
VILLARAMA, JR.,** and
MENDOZA, JJ.
Promulgated:
BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA SIOSON,
Respondents. February 9, 2011
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1] dated September 22, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza (Atienza),
which, in turn, assailed the Orders[2] issued by public respondent Board of Medicine (BOM) in Administrative Case No. 1882.
The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.
Due to her lumbar pains, private respondent Editha Sioson went to Rizal Medical Center (RMC) for check-up on February 4, 1995. Sometime in
1999, due to the same problem, she was referred to Dr. Pedro Lantin III of RMC who, accordingly, ordered several diagnostic laboratory tests.
The tests revealed that her right kidney is normal. It was ascertained, however, that her left kidney is non-functioning and non-visualizing.
Thus, she underwent kidney operation in September, 1999.
On February 18, 2000, private respondents husband, Romeo Sioson (as complainant), filed a complaint for gross negligence and/or
incompetence before the [BOM] against the doctors who allegedly participated in the fateful kidney operation, namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr.
Pedro Lantin, III, Dr. Gerardo Antonio Florendo and petitioner Rico Rommel Atienza.
It was alleged in the complaint that the gross negligence and/or incompetence committed by the said doctors, including petitioner, consists of
the removal of private respondents fully functional right kidney, instead of the left non-functioning and non-visualizing kidney.
The complaint was heard by the [BOM]. After complainant Romeo Sioson presented his evidence, private respondent Editha Sioson, also
named as complainant there, filed her formal offer of documentary evidence. Attached to the formal offer of documentary evidence are her
Exhibits A to D, which she offered for the purpose of proving that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time she
was operated. She described her exhibits, as follows:
EXHIBIT A the certified photocopy of the X-ray Request form dated December 12, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 2 as it was actually
originally the Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter affidavit filed with the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection with the criminal
complaint filed by [Romeo Sioson] with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation of the results of the
ultrasound examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be the same as or identical to the certified photocopy of the document marked as
Annex 2 to the Counter-Affidavit dated March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III, on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer
to this complaint;
EXHIBIT B the certified photo copy of the X-ray request form dated January 30, 1997, which is also marked as Annex 3 as it was actually
likewise originally an Annex to x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, IIIs counter-affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City in connection
with the criminal complaint filed by the herein complainant with the said office, on which are handwritten entries which are the interpretation
of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit happens to be also the same as or identical to the certified photo copy of the
document marked as Annex 3 which is likewise dated January 30, 1997, which is appended as such Annex 3 to the counter-affidavit dated
March 15, 2000, filed by x x x Dr. Pedro Lantin, III on May 4, 2000, with this Honorable Board in answer to this complaint.
EXHIBIT C the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated March 16, 1996, which is also marked as Annex 4, on which are handwritten
entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination.
EXHIBIT D the certified photocopy of the X-ray request form dated May 20, 1999, which is also marked as Annex 16, on which are handwritten
entries which are the interpretation of the results of the examination. Incidentally, this exhibit appears to be the draft of the typewritten final
report of the same examination which is the document appended as Annexes 4 and 1 respectively to the counter-affidavits filed by x x x Dr.
Judd dela Vega and Dr. Pedro Lantin, III in answer to the complaint. In the case of Dr. dela Vega however, the document which is marked as
Annex 4 is not a certified photocopy, while in the case of Dr. Lantin, the document marked as Annex 1 is a certified photocopy. Both
documents are of the same date and typewritten contents are the same as that which are written on Exhibit D.
Petitioner filed his comments/objections to private respondents [Editha Siosons] formal offer of exhibits. He alleged that said exhibits are
inadmissible because the same are mere photocopies, not properly identified and authenticated, and intended to establish matters which are
hearsay. He added that the exhibits are incompetent to prove the purpose for which they are offered.
Dispositions of the Board of Medicine
The formal offer of documentary exhibits of private respondent [Editha Sioson] was admitted by the [BOM] per its Order dated May 26, 2004.
It reads:
The Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence of [Romeo Sioson], the Comments/Objections of [herein petitioner] Atienza, [therein respondents]
De la Vega and Lantin, and the Manifestation of [therein] respondent Florendo are hereby ADMITTED by the [BOM] for whatever purpose they
may serve in the resolution of this case.
Let the hearing be set on July 19, 2004 all at 1:30 p.m. for the reception of the evidence of the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the abovementioned Order basically on the same reasons stated in his comment/objections to the
formal offer of exhibits.
The [BOM] denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioner in its Order dated October 8, 2004. It concluded that it should first admit the
evidence being offered so that it can determine its probative value when it decides the case. According to the Board, it can determine whether
the evidence is relevant or not if it will take a look at it through the process of admission. x x x.[3]
Disagreeing with the BOM, and as previously adverted to, Atienza filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the BOMs Orders which
admitted Editha Siosons (Edithas) Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit.
Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE:
WHETHER PETITIONER ATIENZA AVAILED OF THE PROPER REMEDY WHEN HE FILED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DATED 06 DECEMBER 2004
WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO ASSAIL THE ORDERS DATED 26 MAY 2004 AND 08 OCTOBER 2004
OF RESPONDENT BOARD.
II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT
AND INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BY RESPONDENT BOARD, WHICH CAN RESULT IN THE DEPRIVATION OF PROFESSIONAL LICENSE A PROPERTY
RIGHT OR ONES LIVELIHOOD.[4]
We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.
Petitioner is correct when he asserts that a petition for certiorari is the proper remedy to assail the Orders of the BOM, admitting in evidence
the exhibits of Editha. As the assailed Orders were interlocutory, these cannot be the subject of an appeal separate from the judgment that
completely or finally disposes of the case.[5] At that stage, where there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, the only and remaining remedy left to petitioner is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on the ground of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
However, the writ of certiorari will not issue absent a showing that the BOM has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion. Embedded in the CAs finding that the BOM did not exceed its jurisdiction or act in grave abuse of discretion is the issue of
whether the exhibits of Editha contained in her Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence are inadmissible.
Petitioner argues that the exhibits formally offered in evidence by Editha: (1) violate the best evidence rule; (2) have not been properly
identified and authenticated; (3) are completely hearsay; and (4) are incompetent to prove their purpose. Thus, petitioner contends that the
exhibits are inadmissible evidence.
We disagree.
To begin with, it is well-settled that the rules of evidence are not strictly applied in proceedings before administrative bodies such as the
BOM.[6] Although trial courts are enjoined to observe strict enforcement of the rules of evidence,[7] in connection with evidence which may
appear to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, we have held that:
[I]t is the safest policy to be liberal, not rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admitting them unless plainly irrelevant,
immaterial or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are thereafter found
relevant or competent; on the other hand, their admission, if they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding them or ignoring them.[8]
From the foregoing, we emphasize the distinction between the admissibility of evidence and the probative weight to be accorded the same
pieces of evidence. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. Court of Appeals[9] teaches:
Admissibility of evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is to be considered at all. On the other hand,
the probative value of evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.
Second, petitioners insistence that the admission of Edithas exhibits violated his substantive rights leading to the loss of his medical license is
misplaced. Petitioner mistakenly relies on Section 20, Article I of the Professional Regulation Commission Rules of Procedure, which reads:
Section 20. Administrative investigation shall be conducted in accordance with these Rules. The Rules of Court shall only apply in these
proceedings by analogy or on a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. Technical errors in the admission of evidence
which do not prejudice the substantive rights of either party shall not vitiate the proceedings.[10]
As pointed out by the appellate court, the admission of the exhibits did not prejudice the substantive rights of petitioner because, at any rate,
the fact sought to be proved thereby, that the two kidneys of Editha were in their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated
on, is presumed under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
xxxx
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
The exhibits are certified photocopies of X-ray Request Forms dated December 12, 1996, January 30, 1997, March 16, 1996, and May 20, 1999,
filed in connection with Edithas medical case. The documents contain handwritten entries interpreting the results of the examination. These
exhibits were actually attached as annexes to Dr. Pedro Lantin IIIs counter affidavit filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City,
which was investigating the criminal complaint for negligence filed by Editha against the doctors of Rizal Medical Center (RMC) who handled
her surgical procedure. To lay the predicate for her case, Editha offered the exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their
proper anatomical locations at the time of her operation.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of Edithas exhibits, that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the
time of her operation, need not be proved as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice.[11]
Unquestionably, the rules of evidence are merely the means for ascertaining the truth respecting a matter of fact. [12] Thus, they likewise
provide for some facts which are established and need not be proved, such as those covered by judicial notice, both mandatory and
discretionary.[13] Laws of nature involving the physical sciences, specifically biology,[14] include the structural make-up and composition of living
things such as human beings. In this case, we may take judicial notice that Edithas kidneys before, and at the time of, her operation, as with
most human beings, were in their proper anatomical locations.
Third, contrary to the assertion of petitioner, the best evidence rule is inapplicable. Section 3 of Rule 130 provides:
1. Best Evidence Rule
The subject of inquiry in this case is whether respondent doctors before the BOM are liable for gross negligence in removing the right
functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. As previously
discussed, the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through the
exhibits offered in evidence.
Finally, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence of the anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. To further drive home the point, the
anatomical positions, whether left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through a belated
ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence, such as copies of the exhibits, is allowed. [15] Witness Dr. Nancy Aquino testified that the
Records Office of RMC no longer had the originals of the exhibits because [it] transferred from the previous building, x x x to the new
building.[16] Ultimately, since the originals cannot be produced, the BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer of evidence and, thereafter,
the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87755 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
[1] Penned by Presiding Justice Ruben T. Reyes (a retired member of this Court), with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enrique, Jr. and Vicente S.E.
Veloso, concurring; rollo, pp. 95-106.
[2] Dated May 26, 2004 and October 8, 2004, respectively; id. at 408-411.
[3] Id. at 95-99.

[4] Id. at 677-678.
[5] Raymundo v. Isagon Vda. de Suarez, G.R. No. 149017, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 384, 403-404.
[6] Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., 451 Phil. 839, 845-846 (2003).
[7] Francisco, EVIDENCE RULES 128-134 (3rd ed. 1996), p. 9.
[8] Id., citing People v. Jaca, et al., 106 Phil. 572, 575 (1959).
[9] 358 Phil. 38, 59 (1998).
[10] Rollo, p. 101.
[14] Science of life, definition of Websters Third New International Dictionary.
[16] TSN, July 17, 2003; rollo, pp. 347-348.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 152881. August 17, 2004]
ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Engr. Bayani Magdayao of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 20549 affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, Branch 8, convicting the petitioner of violation of Batas Pambansa
(B.P.) Blg. 22.
The Antecedents
An Information was filed charging petitioner with violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on September 16, 1993, the accusatory portion of which reads:
On or about September 30, 1991, at Dipolog City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
knowing fully well that he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank, Philippine National Bank, Dipolog Branch, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, draw, issue and deliver to one RICKY OLVIS, in payment of his obligation to the latter, PNB
Check No. 399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the amount of SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P600,000.00), Philippine Currency, which
check, however, when presented for payment with PNB-Dipolog Branch, was dishonored and refused payment for the reason that it was
drawn against insufficient funds, and despite repeated demands made by the private complainant on the accused, the latter, failed to make
good the checks value, to the damage and prejudice of RICKY OLVIS in the aforestated amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
When arraigned, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.
When the case for trial was called on June 7, 1995 for the prosecution to adduce its evidence, the petitioner and his counsel were absent. On
motion of the prosecution, the court allowed it to adduce evidence. The prosecution presented the private complainant, Ricky Olvis, who
testified on direct examination that on September 30, 1991, the petitioner drew and issued to him Philippine National Bank (PNB) Check No.
399967 dated September 30, 1991 in the amount of P600,000.00. The said check was drawn against the latters account with the PNB, Dipolog
City Branch, and issued in payment of the petitioners obligation with Olvis. The latter deposited the check on October 1, 1991 in his account
with the BPI-Family Bank, Dipolog City Branch, but the drawee bank dishonored the check for the reason Drawn Against Insufficient Funds
stamped on the dorsal portion of the check. Olvis testified that when informed that his check was dishonored, the petitioner pleaded for time
to pay the amount thereof, but reneged on his promise. Olvis then filed a criminal complaint against the petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
on September 4, 1992, docketed as I.S. No. 92-368. The petitioner again offered to repay Olvis the amount of the obligation by retrieving the
dishonored check and replacing the same with two other checks: one forP400,000.00 and another for P200,000.00 payable to Olvis. Taking pity
on the petitioner, he agreed. He then returned the original copy of the check to the petitioner, but the latter again failed to make good on his
promise and failed to pay the P600,000.00.
The prosecution wanted Olvis to identify the petitioner as the drawer of the check, but because of the latters absence and that of his counsel,
the direct examination on the witness could not be terminated. The prosecution moved that such direct examination of Olvis be continued on
another date, and that the petitioner be ordered to appear before the court so that he could be identified as the drawer of the subject check.
The trial court granted the motion and set the continuation of the trial on June 13, 1997. In the meantime, the prosecution marked a
photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967 as Exhibit A, and the dorsal portion thereof as Exhibit A-1.
After several postponements at the instance of the petitioner, he and his counsel failed to appear before the court for continuation of trial.
They again failed to appear when the case was called for continuation of trial on November 21, 1995. The prosecution offered in evidence the
photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, which the court admitted. The trial court, thereafter, issued an Order declaring the case submitted for
decision.[4] The petitioner filed a motion for a reconsideration of the Order, which the trial court denied on January 26, 1996.
The petitioner then filed an Omnibus Supplemental Motion and to Allow Him to Adduce Evidence alleging, inter alia, that:
h) Despite the absence of the original, with only a xerox copy of the PNB Check worth P600,000.00, and further stressing that the same was
paid, the prosecutor insisted, against the vigorous objection of accused, in filing the case in Court. Plenty of water passed under the bridge
since then;[5]
In its Opposition to the said motion, the prosecution averred that it dispensed with the presentation of the original of the dishonored check
because the same had been returned to the petitioner. It also pointed out that the petitioner failed to object to the presentation of the
photocopy of the dishonored check.
In a Special Manifestation, the petitioner insisted that the photocopy of the subject check was inadmissible in evidence because of the
prosecutions failure to produce the original thereof. On July 8, 1996, the trial court issued an Order denying the petitioners motion. The
petitioners motion for reconsideration thereon was, likewise, denied by the trial court.
On January 29, 1996, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of the crime charged. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of the accused established beyond reasonable doubt, the herein accused, Engr. Bayani Magdayao is convicted of
the crime charged against him for Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, as principal by direct participation, and pursuant to Section 1 thereof
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of six (6) months of arresto mayor and to pay the costs. The accused is further
ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of P600,000.00 corresponding to his obligation due to the private offended party.
SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner assigned the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME CHARGED SOLELY ON THE BASIS OF THE FOLLOWING EVIDENCE:
A. MACHINE OR PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF PNB CHECK NO. 399967 DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 1991;
B. WORD DAIF AT THE BACK OF THE PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF SAID CHECK;
C. UNCORROBORATED ORAL TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WITHOUT HIM BEING POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE COMPLAINANT OR OTHER
WITNESS.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT RENDERED THE DECISION WITH ALLEGED FINDINGS OF FACTS NOT SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CIVIL INDEMNITY TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS.[7]
On December 21, 2001, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court. The appellate court also denied the petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
In his petition at bar, the petitioner merely reiterates the errors he ascribed to the RTC in his appeal before the CA, and prays that the
decisions of the trial and appellate courts be set aside.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
On the first three assignments of error, the petitioner avers that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged because of the following: (a) the photocopy of PNB Check No. 399967, adduced in evidence by the prosecution, is inadmissible in
evidence under Rule 129, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Evidence; hence, has no probative weight; b) the prosecution failed to present the
BPI-Family Bank teller to testify on the presentment of PNB Check No. 399967 and the dishonor thereof; and (c) the prosecution failed to
prove that it was he who drew and delivered the dishonored check to the private complainant, and that he was properly notified of the
dishonor of the said check. The petitioner also asserts that there was no legal basis for the award of the amount of P6,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
We rule against the petitioner.
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 for which the petitioner was charged, reads:
Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds. Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at
the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full upon presentment,
which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same
reason had not the drawer without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall
in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
To warrant the petitioners conviction of the crime charged, the prosecution was burdened to prove the following essential elements thereof:
(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[8]
The gravamen of the offense is the act of making or issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon presentment for
payment.[9] As to the second element, knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of the funds in or credit
with the bank to cover the check upon its presentment refers to the state of mind of the drawer; hence, it is difficult for the prosecution to
prove. The law creates a prima facie knowledge on the insufficiency of funds or credit, coincidental with the attendance of the two other
elements. As such, Section 2 provides:
SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by the drawee
because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima
facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee.
We agree with the petitioner that it was incumbent upon the prosecution to adduce in evidence the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967 to
prove the contents thereof, more specifically the names of the drawer and endorsee, the date and amount and the dishonor thereof, as well
as the reason for such dishonor. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence specifically provides that when the subject of inquiry is
the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original thereof. The purpose of the rule requiring the
production by the offeror of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it
and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse
party for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose and defeat. [10] As long as the original evidence can be had, the
court should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature, such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the
original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible
evidence and barren of probative weight.[11]
Furthermore, under Section 3(b), Rule 130 of the said Rules, secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted when the original is in the
custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice. To
warrant the admissibility of secondary evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the adverse party, Section 6 of
Rule 130 provides that the adverse party must be given reasonable notice, that he fails or refuses to produce the same in court and that the
offeror offers satisfactory proof of its existence:
When original document is in adverse partys custody or control. If the document is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party, he
must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.
The mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission
of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party
to produce the document.[12] The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the
presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce
the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary
evidence may be admitted.[13]
In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he
returned it to the petitioner upon the latters offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00 and
the other for P200,000.00. However, the petitioner still failed to satisfy his obligation to Olvis:
Q Sometime in the month of May 1991, do you remember that (sic) you have any transaction with the accused?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was the transaction about?
A It was about our joint venture in Ipil.
Q What did the accused in this case issue to you?
A He issued me a check worth six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00).
Q If the photostatic copy of the check [would] be presented to you, would you be able to identify it?
A Yes, Sir.
Q I am showing to you a photostatic copy of PNB Dipolog Branch Check # 399967 with a maturity date on September 30, 1991 in the amount
of six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00), is this the check issued to you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Here is a signature at the bottom corner of this check, whose signature is this?
A Bayani Magdayao[s].
Q In other words, this check was issued for a valuable consideration in connection with the project you have in Ipil?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What did you do with the check?
A I deposited this in BPI-Family Bank, but it was drawn against insufficient fund.
Q When did you deposit the check?
A Sometime in October.
Q October, what year?
A In 1991, Sir.
Q Within a reasonable period from the maturity date of the check, you caused it to be deposited?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And this check was dishonored by the depository bank, that the account to which it was drawn does not have sufficient fund, is that
indicated in this check?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Where is that indication of dishonor for lack of sufficient fund?
A Here, Sir.
INTERPRETER: Witness pointing to the check.
ATTY. CO:
We pray, Your Honor, that the photostatic copy of the check be marked as Exhibit A. The reason why it was dishonored, found at the back of
this check, indicated as DAIF meaning to say: Drawn Against Insufficient Fund be marked as Exhibit A-1.
Q After being informed that the check was dishonored by the drawee bank, what did you do?
A I went to Magdayaos house and asked for payment but he refused to pay.
Q When you say Magdayao, are you referring to the accused in this case, Bayani Magdayao?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It appears that this is merely a photostatic copy of the check, where is the original of the check?
A Magdayao replaced the original check worth six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00), and he gave me another check worth four hundred
thousand pesos (P400,000.00) and two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00).
Q At the time the accused in this case replaced this check worth six hundred thousand (P600,000.00), was the case already pending before the
City Fiscals Office or before this Honorable Court?
A Yes, Sir, it is pending.
Q Until now the amount of six hundred thousand pesos (P600,000.00) has not been paid to you?
A Yes, Sir.[14]
In his Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the trial court, the petitioner admitted that he received the original copy of the dishonored check
from the private complainant[15] and that he caused the non-payment of the dishonored check.[16] The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the
need for the production of the original copy of PNB Check No. 399967, and the fact that the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a
photocopy thereof because the original was in his possession. In fact, in the Omnibus Supplemental Motion dated February 8, 1996, and in his
Special Manifestation filed on May 28, 1996, the petitioner complained of the prosecutions violation of the best evidence rule. The petitioner,
however, never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce the same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of
the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do following his
numerous unjustified postponements as shown by the records.
There was no longer a need for the prosecution to present as witness the employee of the drawee bank who made the notation at the dorsal
portion of the dishonored check[17] to testify that the same was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. The petitioner
had already been informed of such fact of dishonor and the reason therefor when Olvis returned the original of the check to him. In fact, as
shown by the testimony of Olvis, the petitioner drew and issued two other separate checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other
for P200,000.00, to replace the dishonored check.
Because of his dilatory tactics, the petitioner failed to adduce evidence to overcome that of the prosecutions.
The petitioners contention that Olvis failed to identify him as the drawer of the subject check is nettlesome. It bears stressing that Olvis was
ready to identify the petitioner after his direct examination, but the latter and his counsel inexplicably failed to appear. The direct examination
of Olvis had to be continued to enable him to point to and identify the petitioner as the drawer of the check. This is shown by the transcript of
the stenographic notes taken during the trial, viz:
ATTY. CO:
Considering that the accused is not present, Your Honor, I would like to manifest that the private offended party be given the opportunity to
identify the accused for purposes of this case.[18]
The trial court issued an Order on June 7, 1995, directing the petitioner, under pain of contempt, to appear before it to enable Olvis to identify
him:
After the declaration of the first and only witness for the prosecution, the private prosecutor prayed to set the case for continuation of the
trial, and ordering the defendant to appear to allow the prosecution to establish his identity.
Set the case for continuation of the trial on June 13, 1995, ordering the accused to appear personally for purposes of his identification in court
under pain of contempt if he fails to comply unjustifiably with this order. The defense shall be allowed to cross examine the witness for the
prosecution if desired, otherwise, his right of cross-examination shall be considered waived completely.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The petitioner defied the Order of the court and failed to appear as directed, and as gleaned from the records
(14) June 7, 1995 The accused and counsel did not appear; hence, the prosecution was allowed to present its evidence ex-parte. The private
complainant was presented to testify in the direct-examination, reserving the right of cross-examination on the part of the accused, and
setting the case for the purpose on June 13, 1995.
(15) June 13, 1995 The accused did not appear, but the defense counsel requested for a resetting of the cross-examination to be conducted.
The request was granted over the objection of the prosecution, and set the continuation of the trial to August 31, 1995.
(16) August 31, 1995 As in previous occasions, the accused did not appear and defense counsel requested for another resetting, and despite
the vigorous opposition by the prosecution, the trial was postponed to October 3, 1995, with the understanding that if the accused will not
appear, it would be taken to mean that he waived his right to cross-examination and to present evidence in his defense.
(17) October 3, 1995 Atty. Narciso Barbaso appeared as a new counsel for the accused but requested that he be allowed to read first the
transcript of the direct testimony of the plaintiffs witness to be cross-examined. The request was granted, and the trial was reset to November
21, 1995.
(18) November 21, 1995 The accused and his counsel both did not appear. The prosecution formally offered Exh. A in evidence, and upon its
admission, the prosecution rested its case, and prayed that as stated in the previous order of the court dated August 31, 1995, the case shall
be considered submitted for judgment, which request was granted.
(19) December 7, 1995 The defense filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated November 21, 1995. The court required the defense
to file a supplemental motion stating the nature of its evidence to be presented if allowed to enable the court to determine the merit of the
motion for reconsideration, but despite the lapsed (sic) of the period set by the court, the accused did not comply; hence, the denial of the
motion for reconsideration, and set the case for promulgation of the judgment on February 19, 1996.
(20) Then came the Omnibus Supplemental Motion, etc., by the accused dated February 8, 1996, and by reason thereof, the promulgation of
the judgment set on February 19, 1996, was held in abeyance.
(21) The defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused dated February 27, 1996, and which was granted by the order
of the court dated March 1, 1996.
[(22)] May 28, 1996 A Special Manifestation dated May 21, 1996 in support of the Omnibus Supplemental Motion filed thru another lawyer
appearing as a new counsel for the accused, now under consideration.[20]
Contrary to the petitioners claim, the trial court did not award P6,000.00 as civil indemnity in favor of Olvis; it ordered the petitioner to pay
him P600,000.00, the amount of the subject check. Having failed to pay the amount of the check, the petitioner is liable therefor and should be
ordered to pay the same to the private complainant in this case. [21]
On the second assigned error, the petitioner faulted the trial court for imposing a penalty of imprisonment instead of a penalty of fine, and
cites SC Circular No. 12-2000 to bolster his contention. He suggests that since he is merely a first offender, he should be sentenced to pay a
fine double the amount of the check.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, objects to the petitioners plea on the ground that when the latter drew and issued the
dishonored check to the private complainant, he knew that the residue of his funds in the drawee bank was insufficient to pay the amount
thereof.
Considering the facts and circumstances attendant in this case, we find the petitioners plea to be barren of merit. Administrative Circular No.
13-2001 provides:
It is, therefore, understood that:
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of BP 22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case,
determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interest of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment
would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal
Code on subsidiary imprisonment.[22]
The records show that despite the numerous opportunities given to him by the trial court, the petitioner refused to adduce any evidence in his
behalf. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners appeal to be devoid of merit. Considering the factual milieu in this case, there is
every reason for the Court to reject the plea for a penalty of fine and maintain the penalty of imprisonment the trial court imposed on the
petitioner.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
[1] Penned by Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals), with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Bienvenido
L. Reyes, concurring.
[2] Penned by Judge Pacifico M. Garcia.
[3] Records, p. 1. [4] Records, pp. 110-111.
[5] Id. at 128. [6] Id. at 301-302. [7] CA Rollo, p. 31.
[8] Wong vs. Court of Appeals, 351 SCRA 100 (2001).
[9] Meriz vs. People, 368 SCRA 524 (2001).
[10] Francisco, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, Volume VII, Part I, 1990 ed., p. 133.
[11] Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro vs. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 733 (1996).
[12] Supra, note 10 at 169. [13] Id. at 170. [14] TSN, 7 June 1995, pp. 3-7.
[15] Records, p. 33. [16] Id. at 34.
[17] Exhibit A-1. [18] TSN, 7 June 1995, pp. 6-7.
[19] Records, p. 96. [20] Id. at 169-170.
[21] Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[22] Rollo, p. 132.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 146710-15. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. ANIANO DESIERTO, in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON GONZALES, VOLUNTEERS AGAINST CRIME
AND CORRUPTION, GRAFT FREE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, INC., LEONARD DE VERA, DENNIS FUNA, ROMEO CAPULONG and ERNESTO B.
FRANCISCO, JR., respondent.
[G.R. No. 146738. March 2, 2001]
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
On the line in the cases at bar is the office of the President. Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada alleges that he is the President on leave while
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo claims she is the President. The warring personalities are important enough but more transcendental are
the constitutional issues embedded on the parties dispute. While the significant issues are many, the jugular issue involves the relationship
between the ruler and the ruled in a democracy, Philippine style.
First, we take a view of the panorama of events that precipitated the crisis in the office of the President.
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected
Vice-President. Some (10) million Filipinos voted for the petitioner believing he would rescue them from lifes adversity. Both petitioner and the
respondent were to serve a six-year term commencing on June 30, 1998.
From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by a plethora of problems that slowly but surely eroded his popularity. His
sharp descent from power started on October 4, 2000. Ilocos Sur Governos, Luis Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, went on air
and accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords.[1]
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage. The next day, October 5, 2000, Senator Teofisto Guingona Jr, then the Senate Minority
Leader, took the floor and delivered a fiery privilege speech entitled I Accuse. He accused the petitioner of receiving some P220 million
in jueteng money from Governor Singson from November 1998 to August 2000. He also charged that the petitioner took from Governor
Singson P70 million on excise tax on cigarettes intended for Ilocos Sur. The privilege speech was referred by then Senate President Franklin
Drilon, to the Blue Ribbon Committee (then headed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel) and the Committee on Justice (then headed by Senator
Renato Cayetano) for joint investigation.[2]
The House of Representatives did no less. The House Committee on Public Order and Security, then headed by Representative Roilo Golez,
decided to investigate the expos of Governor Singson. On the other hand, Representatives Heherson Alvarez, Ernesto Herrera and Michael
Defensor spearheaded the move to impeach the petitioner.
Calls for the resignation of the petitioner filled the air. On October 11, Archbishop Jaime Cardinal Sin issued a pastoral statement in behalf of
the Presbyteral Council of the Archdiocese of Manila, asking petitioner to step down from the presidency as he had lost the moral authority to
govern.[3] Two days later or on October 13, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines joined the cry for the resignation of the
petitioner.[4] Four days later, or on October 17, former President Corazon C. Aquino also demanded that the petitioner take the supreme self-
sacrifice of resignation.[5] Former President Fidel Ramos also joined the chorus. Early on, or on October 12, respondent Arroyo resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Services[6] and later asked for petitioners resignation.[7] However, petitioner strenuously
held on to his office and refused to resign.
The heat was on. On November 1, four (4) senior economic advisers, members of the Council of Senior Economic Advisers, resigned. They were
Jaime Augusto Zobel de Ayala, former Prime Minister Cesar Virata, former Senator Vicente Paterno and Washington Sycip.[8] On November 2,
Secretary Mar Roxas II also resigned from the Department of Trade and Industry. [9] On November 3, Senate President Franklin Drilon, and
House Speaker Manuel Villar, together with some 47 representatives defected from the ruling coalition, Lapian ng Masang Pilipino.[10]
The month of November ended with a big bang. In a tumultuous session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment[11] signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of Representatives to the Senate. This
caused political convulsions in both houses of Congress. Senator Drilon was replaced by Senator Pimentel as Senate President. Speaker Villar
was unseated by Representative Fuentabella.[12] On November 20, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the
petitioner. Twenty-one (21) senators took their oath as judges with Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., presiding. [13]
The political temperature rose despite the cold December. On December 7, the impeachment trial started.[14] the battle royale was fought by
some of the marquee names in the legal profession. Standing as prosecutors were then House Minority Floor Leader Feliciano Belmonte and
Representatives Joker Arroyo, Wigberto Taada, Sergio Apostol, Raul Gonzales, Oscar Moreno, Salacnib Baterina, Roan Libarios, Oscar
Rodriguez, Clavel Martinez and Antonio Nachura. They were assisted by a battery of private prosecutors led by now Secretary of Justice
Hernando Perez and now Solicitor General Simeon Marcelo. Serving as defense counsel were former Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, former
Solicitor General and Secretary of Justice Estelito P. Mendoza, former City Fiscal of Manila Jose Flamiano, former Deputy Speaker of the House
Raul Daza, Atty. Siegfried Fortun and his brother, Atty. Raymund Fortun. The day to day trial was covered by live TV and during its course
enjoyed the highest viewing rating. Its high and low points were the constant conversational piece of the chattering classes. The dramatic
point of the December hearings was the testimony of Clarissa Ocampo, senior vice president of Equitable-PCI Bank. She testified that she was
one foot away from petitioner Estrada when he affixed the signature Jose Velarde on documents involving a P500 million investment
agreement with their bank on February 4, 2000.[15]
After the testimony of Ocampo, the impeachment trial was adjourned in the spirit of Christmas. When it resumed on January 2, 2001, more
bombshells were exploded by the prosecution. On January 11, Atty. Edgardo Espiritu who served as petitioners Secretary of Finance took the
witness stand. He alleged that the petitioner jointly owned BW Resources Corporation with Mr. Dante Tan who was facing charges of insider
trading.[16] Then came the fateful day of January 16, when by a vote of 11-10[17] the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second
envelop which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde.
The public and private prosecutors walked out in protest of the ruling. In disgust, Senator Pimentel resigned as Senate President.[18] The ruling
made at 10:00 p.m. was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. By midnight, thousands had assembled
at the EDSA Shrine and speeches full of sulphur were delivered against the petitioner and the eleven (11) senators.
On January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a letter to Speaker Fuentebella tendering their collective resignation. They also filed their
Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance with the impeachment tribunal.[19]Senator Raul Roco quickly moved for the indefinite
postponement of the impeachment proceedings until the House of Representatives shall have resolved the issue of resignation of the public
prosecutors. Chief Justice Davide granted the motion.[20]
January 18 saw the high velocity intensification of the call for petitioners resignation. A 10-kilometer line of people holding lighted candles
formed a human chain from the Ninoy Aquino Monument on Ayala Avenue in Makati City to the EDSA Shrine to symbolize the peoples
solidarity in demanding petitioners resignation. Students and teachers walked out of their classes in Metro Manila to show their
concordance. Speakers in the continuing rallies at the EDSA Shrine, all masters of the physics of persuasion, attracted more and more
people.[21]
On January 19, the fall from power of the petitioner appeared inevitable. At 1:20 p.m., the petitioner informed Executive Secretary Edgardo
Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, had defected. At 2:30 p.m., petitioner agreed to the
holding of a snap election for President where he would not be a candidate. It did not diffuse the growing crisis. At 3:00 p.m., Secretary of
National Defense Orlando Mercado and General Reyes, together with the chiefs of all the armed services went to the EDSA Shrine.[22] In the
presence of former Presidents Aquino and Ramos and hundreds of thousands of cheering demonstrators, General Reyes declared that on
behalf of your Armed Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing our support to
this government.[23]A little later, PNP Chief, Director General Panfilo Lacson and the major service commanders gave a similar stunning
announcement.[24] Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries, and bureau chiefs quickly resigned from their
posts.[25] Rallies for the resignation of the petitioner exploded in various parts of the country. To stem the tide of rage, petitioner announced
he was ordering his lawyers to agree to the opening of the highly controversial second envelop. [26] There was no turning back the tide. The tide
had become a tsunami.
January 20 turned to be the day of surrender. At 12:20 a.m., the first round of negotiations for the peaceful and orderly transfer of power
started at Malacaangs Mabini Hall, Office of the Executive Secretary. Secretary Edgardo Angara, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Ramon
Bagatsing, Political Adviser Angelito Banayo, Asst. Secretary Boying Remulla, and Atty. Macel Fernandez, head of the presidential Management
Staff, negotiated for the petitioner. Respondent Arroyo was represented by now Executive Secretary Renato de Villa, now Secretary of Finance
Alberto Romulo and now Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez. [27] Outside the palace, there was a brief encounter at Mendiola between pro
and anti-Estrada protesters which resulted in stone-throwing and caused minor injuries. The negotiations consumed all morning until the news
broke out that Chief Justice Davide would administer the oath to respondent Arroyo at high noon at the EDSA Shrine.
At about 12:00 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. [28] At 2:30 p.m.,
petitioner and his family hurriedly left Malacaang Palace.[29] He issued the following press statement:[30]
20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines. While
along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation
as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001, he signed the following letter:[31]
Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise
the powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
A copy of the letter was sent to former Speaker Fuentebella at 8:30 a.m., on January 20.[32] Another copy was transmitted to Senate President
Pimentel on the same day although it was received only at 9:00 p.m.[33]
On January 22, the Monday after taking her oath, respondent Arroyo immediately discharged the powers and duties of the Presidency. On the
same day, this Court issued the following Resolution in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC, to wit:
A.M. No. 01-1-05-SC In re: Request of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to Take her Oath of Office as President of the Republic of the
Philippines before the Chief Justice Acting on the urgent request of Vice-President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to be sworn in as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, addressed to the Chief Justice and confirmed by a letter to the Court, dated January 20, 2001, which request was
treated as an administrative matter, the court Resolved unanimously to confirm the authority given by the twelve (12) members of the Court
then present to the Chief Justice on January 20, 2001 to administer the oath of office to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President
of the Philippines, at noon of January 20, 2001.
This resolution is without prejudice to the disposition of any justiciable case that maybe filed by a proper party.
Respondent Arroyo appointed members of her Cabinet as well as ambassadors and special envoys.[34] Recognition of respondent Arroyos
government by foreign governments swiftly followed. On January 23, in a reception or vin d honneur at Malacaang, led by the Dean of the
Diplomatic Corps, Papal Nuncio Antonio Franco, more than a hundred foreign diplomats recognized the government of respondent
Arroyo.[35] US President George W. Bush gave the respondent a telephone call from the White House conveying US recognition of her
government.[36]
On January 24, Representative Feliciano Belmonte was elected new Speaker of the House of Representatives. [37] The House then passed
Resolution No. 175 expressing the full support of the House of Representatives to the administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Philippines.[38] It also approved Resolution No. 176 expressing the support of the House of Representatives to the
assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations
and expressing its support for her administration as a partner in the attainment of the nations goals under the Constitution. [39]
On January 26, the respondent signed into law the Solid Waste Management Act. [40] A few days later, she also signed into law the Political
Advertising Ban and Fair Election Practices Act.[41]
On February 6, respondent Arroyo nominated Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., as her Vice President.[42] the next day, February 7, the Senate
adopted Resolution No. 82 confirming the nomination of Senator Guingona, Jr. [43] Senators Miriam Defensor-Santiago, Juan Ponce Enrile, and
John Osmea voted yes with reservations, citing as reason therefore the pending challenge on the legitimacy of respondent Arroyos presidency
before the Supreme Court. Senators Teresa Aquino-Oreta and Robert Barbers were absent.[44] The House of Representatives also approved
Senator Guingonas nomination in Resolution No. 178.[45] Senator Guingona took his oath as Vice President two (2) days later.[46]
On February 7, the Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated.[47] Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago stated for the record that she voted against the closure of the impeachment court on the
grounds that the Senate had failed to decide on the impeachment case and that the resolution left open the question of whether Estrada was
still qualified to run for another elective post.[48]
Meanwhile, in a survey conducted by Pulse Asia, President Arroyos public acceptance rating jacked up from 16% on January 20, 2001 to 38%
on January 26, 2001.[49] In another survey conducted by the ABS-CBN/SWS from February 2-7, 2001, results showed that 61% of the Filipinos
nationwide accepted President Arroyo as replacement of petitioner Estrada. The survey also revealed that President Arroyo is accepted by 60%
in Metro Manila, by also 60% in the balance of Luzon, by 71% in the Visayas, and 55% in Mindanao. Her trust rating increased to 52%. Her
presidency is accepted by majorities in all social classes:
58% in the ABC or middle-to-upper classes, 64% in the D or mass, and 54% among the Es or very poor class.[50]
After his fall from the pedestal of power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the
Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. These are: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000 for
bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption on November 17, 2000 for
plunder, forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for government Employees,
etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc. on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4) OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et al., on November 28, 2000 for
malversation of public funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder, etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de Vera, et
al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder, indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46, and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1758 filed by Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges against the petitioner. It is
chaired by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as members, viz: Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor
Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel Laureso. On January 22, the panel issued an Order directing the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set. On February 5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a petition for prohibition with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in Case
Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755, 1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Thru another counsel, petitioner, on February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo
Warranto. He prayed for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines
temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution. Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the Court, on the same day,
February 6, required the respondents to comment thereon within a non-extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001. On February 13, the
Court ordered the consolidation of GR Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the respondents comments on or before 8:00 a.m.
of February 15.
On February 15, the consolidated cases were orally argued in a four-hour hearing. Before the hearing, Chief Justice Davide, Jr.,[51] and
Associate Justice Artemio Panganiban[52] recused themselves on motion of petitioners counsel, former Senator Rene A. Saguisag. They
debunked the charge of counsel Saguisag that they have compromised themselves by indicating that they have thrown their weight on one
side but nonetheless inhibited themselves. Thereafter, the parties were given the short period of five (5) days to file their memoranda and two
(2) days to submit their simultaneous replies.
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent motion for copies of resolution and press statement for Gag Order on respondent
Ombudsman filed by counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the President vacant and that
neither did the Chief Justice issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for contempt to refrain from making
any comment or discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from resolving or deciding the criminal
cases pending investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from news reports
that the respondent Ombudsman may immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held
on February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at bar moot and academic.[53]
The parties filed their replies on February 24. On this date, the cases at bar were deemed submitted for decision.
The bedrock issues for resolution of this Court are:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II
Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an
Acting President.
III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the
negative and on the assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I
Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question
Private respondents[54] raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this
Court to decide. They contend that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration. They stress
that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14 th President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been recognized by foreign governments. They submit that
these realities on ground constitute the political thicket which the Court cannot enter.
We reject private respondents submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact
latitude still splits the best of legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20thcentury, the political question doctrine which rests on the
principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law. [55] In the United
States, the most authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case
of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz:
x x x Prominent on the surface on any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility
of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretions; or the impossibility of a courts undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on question. Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal for non
justiciability on the ground of a political questions presence.The doctrine of which we treat is one of political questions, not of political cases.
In the Philippine setting, this Court has been continuously confronted with cases calling for a firmer delineation of the inner and outer
perimeters of a political question.[57] Our leading case is Tanada v. Cuenco,[58]where this Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, held that political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure. To a great degree, the 1987
Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to
settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government.[59]Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the thou shalt nots of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its
jurisdiction.[60] With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision
did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution
trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid language
to x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas corpus) or the extension thereof x x x.
Respondents rely on the case of Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. President Corazon C. Aquino, et al.[61] and
related cases[62] to support their thesis that since the cases at bar involve the legitimacy of the government of respondent Arroyo, ergo, they
present a political question. A more cerebral reading of the cited cases will show that they are inapplicable. In the cited cases, we held that the
government of former President Aquino was the result of a successful revolution by the sovereign people, albeit a peaceful one. No less than
the Freedom Constitution[63] declared that the Aquino government was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
people in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended. It is familiar learning that the legitimacy of a government sired by
a successful revolution by people power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. In
checkered contrast, the government of respondent Arroyo is not revolutionary in character. The oath that she took at the EDSA Shrine is the
oath under the 1987 Constitution.[64] In her oath, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. Indeed, she has
stressed that she is discharging the powers of the presidency under the authority of the 1987 Constitution.
In fine, the legal distinction between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II is clear. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power
of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of
assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra
constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra
constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to
judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the
freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA People Power II is not
inappropriate.
Freedom of speech and the right of assembly are treasured by Filipinos. Denial of these rights was one of the reasons of our 1898 revolution
against Spain. Our national hero, Jose P. Rizal, raised the clarion call for the recognition of freedom of the press of the Filipinos and included it
as among the reforms sine quibus non.[65] The Malolos Constitution, which is the work of the revolutionary Congress in 1898, provided in its
Bill of Rights that Filipinos shall not be deprived (1) of the right to freely express his ideas or opinions, orally or in writing, through the use of
the press or other similar means; (2) of the right of association for purposes of human life and which are not contrary to public means; and (3)
of the right to send petitions to the authorities, individually or collectively. These fundamental rights were preserved when the United States
acquired jurisdiction over the Philippines. In the instruction to the Second Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900 issued by President
McKinley, it is specifically provided that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peaceably assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. The guaranty was carried over in the Philippine Bill, the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902 and the Jones Law, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1966.[66]
Thence on, the guaranty was set in stone in our 1935 Constitution,[67] and the 1973[68] Constitution. These rights are now safely ensconced in
section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble
and petition the government for redress of grievances.
The indispensability of the peoples freedom of speech and of assembly to democracy is now self-evident. The reasons are well put by
Emerson: first, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual fulfillment; second, it is an essential process for advancing
knowledge and discovering truth; third, it is essential to provide for participation in decision-making by all members of society; and fourth, it is
a method of achieving a more adaptable and hence, a more stable community of maintaining the precarious balance between healthy
cleavage and necessary consensus.[69] In this sense, freedom of speech and of assembly provides a framework in which the conflict necessary
to the progress of a society can take place without destroying the society.[70] In Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,[71] this
function of free speech and assembly was echoed in the amicus curiae brief filed by the Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar
Association which emphasized that the basis of the right of assembly is the substitution of the expression of opinion and belief by talk rather
than force; and this means talk for all and by all.[72] In the relatively recent case of Subayco v. Sandiganbayan,[73] this Court similarly stressed
that "... it should be clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition for redress of
grievances, all should listen. For in a democracy, it is the people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of
certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, [74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental
powers under section 11[76] of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve
the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,[77] the doctrine
has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . Thus, respondents
invocation of the doctrine of political is but a foray in the dark.
II
Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President
We now slide to the second issue. None of the parties considered this issue as posing a political question. Indeed, it involves a legal question
whose factual ingredient is determinable from the records of the case and by resort to judicial notice. Petitioner denies he resigned as
President or that he suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant when respondent
Arroyo took her oath as president.
The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the Constitution which provides:
Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of the President, the Vice President shall become the
President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and
Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as President
until President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x.
The issue then is whether the petitioner resigned as President or should be considered resigned as of January 20, 2001 when respondent took
her oath as the 14th President of the Republic. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are
beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. [78] The validity of a resignation
is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacaang Palace in the
Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo.Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the expos
of Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in
the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially
was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3
of the House of Representatives. Soon, petitioners powerful political allies began deserting him.Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social
Welfare. Senate President Drilon and Former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic
advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the
eleven (11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before
the night of January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew
exponentially.Rallies and demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.
As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the
Final Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer.[79] The Angara Diary
reveals that in morning of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to
crate an ad hoc committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the
presidential residence and exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.)[80] An hour
later or at 2:30, p.m., the petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal
for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the
presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner
and dramatically announced the AFPs withdrawal of support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The
seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president. According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to
consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.[81] Petitioner did nor disagree but listened intently.[82] The sky was falling fast on the
petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal
a sweetener by saying that petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to support him and his family. [83] Significantly, the
petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would never leave the country.[84] At 10:00
p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week in the palace.[85] This is proof
that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-day grace period he
could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.
The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo
para magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power.[86] There was no defiance to the
request. Secretary Angara readily agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of
power. The resignation of the petitioner was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful
Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the
guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the
petitioner.[87] Again, we note that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this
fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary
shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:
xxx
I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period
promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.
If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.
The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very
tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)
I just want to clear my name, then I will go.[88]
Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.
The second round of negotiation resumed at 7:30 a.m. According to the Angara Diary, the following happened:
Oppositions deal
7:30 a.m. Rene arrives with Bert Romulo and (Ms. Macapagals spokesperson) Rene Corona. For this round, I am accompanied by Dondon
Bagatsing and Macel.
Rene pulls out a document titled Negotiating Points. It reads:
1. The President shall sign a resignation document within the day, 20 January 2001, that will be effective on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, on
which day the Vice President will assume the Presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
2. Beginning today, 20 January 2001, the transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence, and persons
designated by the Vice president to various positions and offices of the government shall start their orientation activities in coordination with
the incumbent officials concerned.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police shall function under the Vice President as national military and police
effective immediately.
4. The Armed Forces of the Philippines, through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the security of the president and his family as approved by
the national military and police authority (Vice President).
5. It is to be noted that the Senate will open the second envelope in connection with the alleged savings account of the President in the
Equitable PCI Bank in accordance with the rules of the Senate, pursuant to the request to the Senate President.
Our deal
We bring out, too, our discussion draft which reads:
The undersigned parties, for and in behalf of their respective principals, agree and undertake as follows:
1. A transition will occur and take place on Wednesday, 24 January 2001, at which time President Joseph Ejercito Estrada will turn over the
presidency to Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
2. In return, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed security and safety of their person and property throughout their natural
lifetimes. Likewise, President Estrada and his families are guaranteed freedom from persecution or retaliation from government and the
private sector throughout their natural lifetimes.
This commitment shall be guaranteed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) through the Chief of Staff, as approved by the national
military and police authorities Vice President (Macapagal).
3. Both parties shall endeavor to ensure that the Senate siting as an impeachment court will authorize the opening of the second envelope in
the impeachment trial as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to President Estrada.
4. During the five-day transition period between 20 January 2001 and 24 January 2001 (the Transition Period), the incoming Cabinet members
shall receive an appropriate briefing from the outgoing Cabinet officials as part of the orientation program.
During the Transition Period, the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under Vice President (Macapagal) as national
military and police authorities.
Both parties hereto agree that the AFP chief of staff and PNP director general shall obtain all the necessary signatures as affixed to this
agreement and insure faithful implementation and observance thereof.
Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex A heretofore attached to
this agreement.[89]
The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of
negotiation, the resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to
be undertaken by the parties during and after the transition period.
According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then
signed by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United
Opposition. However, the signing by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. The Angara Diary narrates the
fateful events, viz:[90]
xxx
11:00 a.m. Between General Reyes and myself, there is a firm agreement on the five points to effect a peaceful transition. I can hear the
general clearing all these points with a group he is with. I hear voices in the background.
Agreement
The agreement starts: 1. The President shall resign today, 20 January 2001, which resignation shall be effective on 24 January 2001, on which
day the Vice President will assume the presidency of the Republic of the Philippines.
xxx
The rest of the agreement follows:
2. The transition process for the assumption of the new administration shall commence on 20 January 2001, wherein persons designated by
the Vice President to various government positions shall start orientation activities with incumbent officials.
3. The Armed Forces of the Philippines through its Chief of Staff, shall guarantee the safety and security of the President and his families
throughout their natural lifetimes as approved by the national military and police authority Vice President.
4. The AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) shall function under the Vice President as national military and police authorities.
5. Both parties request the impeachment court to open the second envelope in the impeachment trial, the contents of which shall be offered
as proof that the subject savings account does not belong to the President.
The Vice President shall issue a public statement in the form and tenor provided for in Annex B heretofore attached to this agreement.
xxx
11:20 a.m. I am all set to fax General Reyes and Nene Pimentel our agreement, signed by our side and awaiting the signature of the United
Opposition.
And then it happens. General Reyes calls me to say that the Supreme Court has decided that Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo is President and will be
sworn in at 12 noon.
Bakit hindi naman kayo nakahintay? Paano na ang agreement (Why couldnt you wait? What about the agreement)? I asked.
Reyes answered: Wala na, sir (Its over, sir).
I asked him: Di yung transition period, moot and academic na?
And General Reyes answer: Oo nga, i-delete na natin, sir (Yes, were deleting that part).
Contrary to subsequent reports, I do not react and say that there was a double cross.
But I immediately instruct Macel to delete the first provision on resignation since this matter is already moot and academic. Within
moments, Macel erases the first provision and faxes the documents, which have been signed by myself, Dondon and Macel to Nene Pimentel
and General Reyes.
I direct Demaree Ravel to rush the original document to General Reyes for the signatures of the other side, as it is important that the
provision on security, at least, should be respected.
I then advise the President that the Supreme Court has ruled that Chief Justice Davide will administer the oath to Gloria at 12 noon.
The president is too stunned for words.
Final meal
12 noon Gloria takes her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.
12:20 p.m. The PSG distributes firearms to some people inside the compound.
The President is having his final meal at the Presidential Residence with the few friends and Cabinet members who have gathered.
By this time, demonstrators have already broken down the first line of defense at Mendiola. Only the PSG is there to protect the Palace, since
the police and military have already withdrawn their support for the President.
1 p.m. The Presidents personal staff is rushing to pack as many of the Estrada familys personal possessions as they can.
During lunch, Ronie Puno mentions that the President needs to release a final statement before leaving Malacaang.
The statement reads: At twelve oclock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality
of her proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacaang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin
the healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I
will not shrik from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.
MABUHAY!
It was curtain time for the petitioner.
In sum, we hold that the resignation of the petitioner cannot be doubted. It was confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release
containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation
about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to re-assume the
presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from
any future challengethat may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying
the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national
spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up
the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign but only took a temporary leave of absence due to his inability to govern. In support
of this thesis, the letter dated January 20, 2001 of the petitioner sent to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella is cited. Again, we
refer to the said letter, viz:
Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the
powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada
To say the least, the above letter is wrapped in mystery.[91] The pleadings filed by the petitioner in the cases at bar did not discuss, nay even
intimate, the circumstances that led to its preparation. Neither did the counsel of the petitioner reveal to the Court these circumstances during
the oral argument. It strikes the Court as strange that the letter, despite its legal value, was never referred to by the petitioner during the
week-long crisis. To be sure, there was not the slightest hint of its existence when he issued his final press release. It was all too easy for him
to tell the Filipino people in his press release that he was temporarily unable to govern and that he was leaving the reins of government to
respondent Arroyo for the time being. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the
petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the presidency, then the
resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal
significance. Petitioners resignation from the presidency cannot be the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will especially if the
resignation is the result of his repudiation by the people. There is another reason why this Court cannot give any legal significance to
petitioners letter and this shall be discussed in issue number III of this Decision.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on
section 12 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits his resignation, viz:
Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution
against him, for any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
A reading of the legislative history of RA No. 3019 will hardly provide any comfort to the petitioner. RA No. 3019 originated from Senate Bill
No. 293. The original draft of the bill, when it was submitted to the Senate, did not contain a provision similar to section 12 of the law as it now
stands. However, in his sponsorship speech, Senator Arturo Tolentino, the author of the bill, reserved to propose during the period of
amendments the inclusion of a provision to the effect that no public official who is under prosecution for any act of graft or corruption, or is
under administrative investigation, shall be allowed to voluntarily resign or retire. [92]During the period of amendments, the following provision
was inserted as section 15:
Sec. 15. Termination of office No public official shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation, criminal or administrative, or
pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under the Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an offense committed during
his incumbency.[93]
The bill was vetoed by then President Carlos P. Garcia who questioned the legality of the second paragraph of the provision and insisted that
the Presidents immunity should extend even after his tenure.
Senate Bill No. 571, which was substantially similar to Senate Bill No. 293, was thereafter passed. Section 15 above became section 13 under
the new bill, but the deliberations on this particular provision mainly focused on the immunity of the President which was one of the reasons
for the veto of the original bill. There was hardly any debate on the prohibition against the resignation or retirement of a public official with
pending criminal and administrative cases against him. Be that as it may, the intent of the law ought to be obvious. It is to prevent the act of
resignation or retirement from being used by a public official as a protective shield to stop the investigation of a pending criminal or
administrative case against him and to prevent his prosecution under the Anti-Graft Law or prosecution for bribery under the Revised Penal
Code. To be sure, no person can be compelled to render service for that would be a violation of his constitutional right.[94] A public official has
the right not to serve if he really wants to retire or resign. Nevertheless, if at the time he resigns or retires, a public official is facing
administrative or criminal investigation or prosecution, such resignation or retirement will not cause the dismissal of the criminal or
administrative proceedings against him. He cannot use his resignation or retirement to avoid prosecution.
There is another reason why petitioners contention should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on
January 20, 2001, the cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-1757 and 0-
00-1758. While these cases have been filed, the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered
as pending for the Ombudsman lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for
it contemplates of cases whose investigation or prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from suit of a
sitting President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from
resigning. We hold otherwise. The exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an
administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a
majority of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and private prosecutors walked out, the public
prosecutors filed their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
III
Whether or not the petitioner is only temporarily unable to act as President.
We shall now tackle the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the powers and duties of the presidency,
and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated, the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the same
day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.
Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers
and duties of the presidency. His significant submittal is that Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether
the President is incapable of performing his functions in the manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII. [95] This contention is
the centerpiece of petitioners stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:
SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office.Meanwhile, should a majority of all the Members of
the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall decide the issue. For that purpose,
the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in session within twelve days after it is required to
assemble, determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."
That is the law. Now the operative facts:
(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the Senate President and Speaker of the House;
(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;
(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. 175;[96]
On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 176[97]which states:
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS
SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
WHEREAS, as a consequence of the peoples loss of confidence on the ability of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada to effectively govern,
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine National Police and majority of his cabinet had withdrawn support from him;
WHEREAS, upon authority of an en banc resolution of the Supreme Court, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as President
of the Philippines on 20 January 2001 before Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.;
WHEREAS, immediately thereafter, members of the international community had extended their recognition to Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has espoused a policy of national healing and reconciliation with justice for the
purpose of national unity and development;
WHEREAS, it is axiomatic that the obligations of the government cannot be achieved if it is divided, thus by reason of the constitutional duty of
the House of Representatives as an institution and that of the individual members thereof of fealty to the supreme will of the people, the
House of Representatives must ensure to the people a stable, continuing government and therefore must remove all obstacles to the
attainment thereof;
WHEREAS, it is a concomitant duty of the House of Representatives to exert all efforts to unify the nation, to eliminate fractious tension, to
heal social and political wounds, and to be an instrument of national reconciliation and solidarity as it is a direct representative of the various
segments of the whole nation;
WHEREAS, without surrendering its independence, it is vital for the attainment of all the foregoing, for the House of Representatives to extend
its support and collaboration to the administration of Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and to be a constructive partner in
nation-building, the national interest demanding no less: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its support to the assumption into office by Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as
President of the Republic of the Philippines, to extend its congratulations and to express its support for her administration as a partner in the
attainment of the Nations goals under the Constitution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
On February 7, 2001, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No. 178[98] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SENATOR TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is a vacancy in the Office of the Vice President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President
from among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., to the position
of Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona Jr., is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence and courage; who has served the Filipino
people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government in various
capacities, among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary
of Justice, Senator of the Philippines - qualities which merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore,
be it
Resolved as it is hereby resolved by the House of Representatives, That the House of Representatives confirms the nomination of Senator
Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as the Vice President of the Republic of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary General
(4) Also, despite receipt of petitioners letter claiming inability, some twelve (12) members of the Senate signed the following:
RESOLUTION
WHEREAS, the recent transition in government offers the nation an opportunity for meaningful change and challenge;
WHEREAS, to attain desired changes and overcome awesome challenges the nation needs unity of purpose and resolute cohesive resolute (sic)
will;
WHEREAS, the Senate of the Philippines has been the forum for vital legislative measures in unity despite diversities in perspectives;
WHEREFORE, we recognize and express support to the new government of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and resolve to discharge our
duties to attain desired changes and overcome the nations challenges. [99]
On February 7, the Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82[100] which states:
RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, there is it vacancy in the Office of the Vice-President due to the assumption to the Presidency of Vice President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo;
WHEREAS, pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of the Constitution, the President in the event of such vacancy shall nominate a Vice President from
among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a majority vote of all
members of both Houses voting separately;
WHEREAS, Her Excellency, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo has nominated Senate Minority Leader Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. to the position
of Vice President of the Republic of the Phillippines;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. is a public servant endowed with integrity, competence, and courage; who has served the Filipino
people with dedicated responsibility and patriotism;
WHEREAS, Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. possesses sterling qualities of true statesmanship, having served the government in various capacities,
among others, as Delegate to the Constitutional Convention, Chairman of the Commission on Audit, Executive Secretary, Secretary of
Justice. Senator of the land - which qualities merit his nomination to the position of Vice President of the Republic: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, That the Senate confirm the nomination of Sen. Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. as Vice President of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
On the same date, February 7, the Senate likewise passed Senate Resolution No. 83[101] which states:
RESOLUTION RECOGNIZING THAT THE IMPEACHMENT COURT IS FUNCTUS OFFICIO
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved. That the Senate recognize that the Impeachment Court is functus officio and has been terminated.
Resolved, further, That the Journals of the Impeachment Court of Monday, January 15, Tuesday, January 16 and Wednesday, January 17, 2001
be considered approved.
Resolved, further, That the records of the Impeachment Court including the second envelope be transferred to the Archives of the Senate for
proper safekeeping and preservation in accordance with the Rules of the Senate. Disposition and retrieval thereof shall be made only upon
written approval of the Senate President.
Resolved, finally. That all parties concerned be furnished copies of this Resolution.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR.
President of the Senate
This Resolution was adopted by the Senate on February 7, 2001.
(Sgd.) LUTGARDO B. BARBO
Secretary of the Senate
(5) On February 8, the Senate also passed Resolution No. 84 certifying to the existence of a vacancy in the Senate and calling on the COMELEC
to fill up such vacancy through election to be held simultaneously with the regular election on May 14, 2001 and the senatorial candidate
garnering the thirteenth (13th) highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(6) Both houses of Congress started sending bills to be signed into law by respondent Arroyo as President.
(7) Despite the lapse of time and still without any functioning Cabinet, without any recognition from any sector of government, and without
any support from the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police, the petitioner continues to claim that his inability to
govern is only momentary.
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the
President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability.
The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the
decision of both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following Taada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold
that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for this is an issue in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative x x x branch of the government. Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,[103] there is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.
Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioners claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political
in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court without
transgressing the principle of separation of powers.
In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground
that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de
jure President made by a co-equal branch of government cannot be reviewed by this Court.
IV
Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit. Assuming he enjoys immunity, the extent of the immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the cases filed against him before the respondent Ombudsman should be prohibited because
he has not been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against him; andsecond, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of suit, whether
criminal or civil.
Before resolving petitioners contentions, a revisit of our legal history on executive immunity will be most enlightening. The doctrine of
executive immunity in this jurisdiction emerged as a case law. In the 1910 case ofForbes, etc. vs. Chuoco tiaco and Crossfield,[104] the
respondent Tiaco, a Chinese citizen, sued petitioner W. Cameron Forbes, Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, J.E. Harding and C.R.
Trowbridge, Chief of Police and Chief of the Secret Service of the City of Manila, respectively, for damages for allegedly conspiring to deport
him to China. In granting a writ of prohibition, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Johnson, held:
The principle of nonliability, as herein enunciated, does not mean that the judiciary has no authority to touch the acts of the Governor-
General; that he may, under cover of his office, do what he will, unimpeded and unrestrained. Such a construction would mean that tyranny,
under the guise of the execution of the law, could walk defiantly abroad, destroying rights of person and of property, wholly free from
interference of courts or legislatures. This does not mean, either, that a person injured by the executive authority by an act unjustifiable under
the law has no remedy, but must submit in silence. On the contrary, it means, simply, that the Governor-General, like the judges of the courts
and the members of the Legislature, may not be personally mulcted in civil damages for the consequences of an act executed in the
performance of his official duties. The judiciary has full power to, and will, when the matter is properly presented to it and the occasion justly
warrants it, declare an act of the Governor-General illegal and void and place as nearly as possible in status quo any person who has been
deprived his liberty or his property by such act. This remedy is assured to every person, however humble or of whatever country, when his
personal or property rights have been invaded, even by the highest authority of the state. The thing which the judiciary can not do is mulct the
Governor-General personally in damages which result from the performance of his official duty, any more that it can a member of the
Philippine Commission or the Philippine Assembly. Public policy forbids it.
Neither does this principle of nonliability mean that the chief executive may not be personally sued at all in relation to acts which he claims to
perform as such official. On the contrary, it clearly appears from the discussion heretofore had, particularly that portion which touched the
liability of judges and drew an analogy between such liability and that of the Governor-General, that the latter is liable when he acts in a case
so plainly outside of his power and authority that he can not be said to have exercise discretion in determining whether or not he had the right
to act. What is held here is that he will be protected from personal liability for damages not only when he acts within his authority, but also
when he is without authority, provided he actually used discretion and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining whether he had
authority to act or not. In other words, he is entitled to protection in determining the question of his authority. If he decide wrongly, he is still
protected provided the question of his authority was one over which two men, reasonably qualified for that position, might honestly differ;
but he is not protected if the lack of authority to act is so plain that two such men could not honestly differ over its determination. In such
case, he acts, not as Governor-General but as a private individual, and, as such, must answer for the consequences of his act.
Mr. Justice Johnson underscored the consequences if the Chief Executive was not granted immunity from suit, viz: x x x. Action upon important
matters of state delayed; the time and substance of the chief executive spent in wrangling litigation; disrespect engendered for the person of
one of the highest officials of the State and for the office he occupies; a tendency to unrest and disorder; resulting in a way, in a distrust as to
the integrity of government itself.[105]
Our 1935 Constitution took effect but it did not contain any specific provision on executive immunity. Then came the tumult of the martial
law years under the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos and the 1973 Constitution was born. In 1981, it was amended and one of the
amendments involved executive immunity. Section 17, Article VII stated:
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others
pursuant to his specific orders during his tenure.
The immunities herein provided shall apply to the incumbent President referred to in Article XVII of this Constitution.
In his second Vicente G. Sinco Professional Chair Lecture entitled, Presidential Immunity And All The Kings Men: The Law Of Privilege As A
Defense To Actions For Damages,[106] petitioners learned counsel, former Dean of the UP college of Law, Atty. Pacifico Agabin, brightlined the
modifications effected by this constitutional amendment on the existing law on executive privilege. To quote his disquisition:
In the Philippines, though, we sought to do the Americans one better by enlarging and fortifying the absolute immunity concept. First, we
extended it to shield the President not only from civil claims but also from criminal cases and other claims. Second, we enlarged its scope so
that it would cover even acts of the President outside the scope of official duties. And third, we broadened its coverage so as to include not
only the President but also other persons, be they government officials or private individuals, who acted upon orders of the President. It can
be said that at that point most of us were suffering from AIDS (or absolute immunity defense syndrome).
The Opposition in the then Batasan Pambansa sought the repeal of this Marcosian concept of executive immunity in the 1973
Constitution. The move was led by then Member of Parliament, now Secretary of Finance, Alberto Romulo, who argued that the after
incumbency immunity granted to President Marcos violated the principle that a public office is a public trust. He denounced the immunity as a
return to the anachronism the king can do no wrong.[107] The effort failed.
The 1973 Constitution ceased to exist when President Marcos was ousted from office by the People Power revolution in 1986. When the 1987
Constitution was crafted, its framers did not reenact the executive immunity provision of the 1973 Constitution. The
following explanation was given by delegate J. Bernas, viz:[108]
Mr. Suarez. Thank you.
The last question is with reference to the committees omitting in the draft proposal the immunity provision for the President. I agree with
Commissioner Nolledo that the Committee did very well in striking out this second sentence, at the very least, of the original provision on
immunity from suit under the 1973 Constitution. But would the Committee members not agree to a restoration of at least the first sentence
that the President shall be immune from suit during his tenure, considering that if we do not provide him that kind of an immunity, he might
be spending all his time facing litigations, as the President-in-exile in Hawaii is now facing litigations almost daily?
Fr. Bernas. The reason for the omission is that we consider it understood in present jurisprudence that during his tenure he is immune from
suit.
Mr. Suarez. So there is no need to express it here.
Fr. Bernas. There is no need. It was that way before. The only innovation made by the 1973 Constitution was to make that explicit and to add
other things.
Mr. Suarez. On that understanding, I will not press for any more query, Madam President.
I thank the Commissioner for the clarification.
We shall now rule on the contentions of petitioner in the light of this history. We reject his argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the
reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the
walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. Indeed, on February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate
Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio.[109] Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea if granted,
would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a submission has nothing to commend itself for it will place him in a better situation
than a non-sitting President who has not been subjected to impeachment proceedings and yet can be the object of a criminal prosecution. To
be sure, the debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the
resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him, viz:[110]
xxx
Mr. Aquino. On another point, if an impeachment proceeding has been filed against the President, for example, and the President resigns
before judgment of conviction has been rendered by the impeachment court or by the body, how does it affect the impeachment proceeding?
Will it be necessarily dropped?
Mr. Romulo. If we decide the purpose of impeachment to remove one from office, then his resignation would render the case moot and
academic. However, as the provision says, the criminal and civil aspects of it may continue in the ordinary courts.
This is in accord with our ruling in In re: Saturnino Bermudez[111]that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to
court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond.Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process
against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua
non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. His reliance in the case
of Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan[112] and related cases[113]are inapropos for they have a different factual milieu.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President. The cases filed against petitioner Estrada
are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot
cite any decision of this Court licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. It will
be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.[114] Indeed, a critical reading of current literature on executive immunity will reveal a judicial disinclination to expand the
privilege especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. In the 1974 case of US v. Nixon,[115] US
President Richard Nixon, a sitting President, was subpoenaed to produce certain recordings and documents relating to his conversations with
aids and advisers. Seven advisers of President Nixons associates were facing charges of conspiracy to obstruct justice and other offenses which
were committed in a burglary of the Democratic National Headquarters in Washingtons Watergate Hotel during the 1972 presidential
campaign. President Nixon himself was named an unindicted co-conspirator. President Nixon moved to quash the subpoena on the ground,
among others, that the President was not subject to judicial process and that he should first be impeached and removed from office before he
could be made amenable to judicial proceedings. The claim was rejected by the US Supreme Court. It concluded that when the ground for
asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it
cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice. In the 1982 case of Nixon v.
Fitzgerald,[116] the US Supreme Court further held that the immunity of the President from civil damages covers only official acts. Recently,
the US Supreme Court had the occasion to reiterate this doctrine in the case of Clinton v. Jones[117] where it held that the US Presidents
immunity from suits for money damages arising out of their official acts is inapplicable to unofficial conduct.
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in our jurisdiction. One of the great
themes of the 1987 Constitution is that a public office is a public trust.[118] It declared as a state policy that (t)he State shall maintain honesty
and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption." [119] It ordained that (p)ublic officers
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. [120] It set the rule that (t)he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel. [121] It
maintained the Sandiganbayan as an anti-graft court.[122] It created the office of the Ombudsman and endowed it with enormous powers,
among which is to "(i)nvestigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. [123] The Office of the Ombudsman was also given fiscal
autonomy.[124] These constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain petitioners claim that a non-sitting president enjoys immunity
from suit for criminal acts committed during his incumbency.
V
Whether or not the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined due to prejudicial publicity
Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him
due to the barrage of prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has developed bias and is all set to file the
criminal cases in violation of his right to due process.
There are two (2) principal legal and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with the rain of unrestrained publicity during the
investigation and trial of high profile cases. [125] The British approach the problem with the presumption that publicity will prejudice a
jury. Thus, English courts readily stay and stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair trial suffers a threat.[126] The American
approach is different. US courts assume a skeptical approach about the potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an accused to a
fair trial. They have developed different strains of tests to resolve this issue, i.e., substantial probability of irreparable harm, strong likelihood,
clear and present danger, etc.
This is not the first time the issue of trial by publicity has been raised in this Court to stop the trials or annul convictions in high profile criminal
cases.[127] In People vs. Teehankee, Jr.,[128] later reiterated in the case of Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals, et al.,[129] we laid down the doctrine
that:
We cannot sustain appellants claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and
broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we now rule that
the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to a fair
trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in
the criminal field x x x. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting
the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-
day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his
impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our
bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not
that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity
lest they lose their impartiality. x x x x x x x x x.Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized the
investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et al. v. Alejandro, et al., we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial
judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity
which is incapable if change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden.
We expounded further on this doctrine in the subsequent case of Webb vs. Hon. Raul de Leon, etc.[130] and its companion cases. viz.:
Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary investigation. We find no
procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.
xxx
The democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its excessiveness has been
aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few cases can match the high volume and high velocity of
publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated
even today. Commentators still bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors
in the case the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers have participated in this media blitz.The possibility of media abuses
and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely closed to the press and public. Inn the seminal case
of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, it was wisely held:
xxx
(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates conclusively that the time this Nations
organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the
proceedings were conducted fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on secret bias
or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a
community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic
purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that societys criminal process
satisfy the appearance of justice, Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11, 75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people
to observe such process. From this unbroken, uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be
concluded that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nations system of justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v.
United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.
(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share a common core purpose of assuring
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press,
the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as give meaning to those explicit guarantees; the First
Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the guarantees of speech and press, standing alone,
prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was
adopted. Moreover, the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as a catalyst to
augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately linked by the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a
public place where the people generally and representatives of the media have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has
been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes place.
(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the right to attend criminal trials, various
fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to
attend criminal trial is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment: without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.
Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive an accused of his due process
right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al., we held that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must
be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at
bar, we find nothing in the records that will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on the sense of
fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief
State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether
they can easily be blinded by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The length of time the investigation
was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well
of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias
resulting from their bombardment of prejudicial publicity. (emphasis supplied)
Applying the above ruling, we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.[131] He
needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well
to note, the cases against the petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of prosecutors in the office of the
respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have
already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him. Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its
findings and the Court cannot second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.
The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself with bias. To quote petitioners submission, the
respondent Ombudsman has been influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats and pressures directed
at him by the mobs.[132] News reports have also been quoted to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of
the petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will be influenced by this bias of their superior.
Again, we hold that the evidence proffered by the petitioner is insubstantial. The accuracy of the news reports referred to by the petitioner
cannot be the subject of judicial notice by this Court especially in light of the denials of the respondent Ombudsman as to his alleged prejudice
and the presumption of good faith and regularity in the performance of official duty to which he is entitled. Nor can we adopt the theory of
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice of respondent Ombudsman flows to his subordinates. In truth, our Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, give investigating prosecutors the independence to make their own findings and recommendations albeit they are
reviewable by their superiors.[134] They can be reversed but they can not be compelled to change their recommendations nor can they be
compelled to prosecute cases which they believe deserve dismissal. In other words, investigating prosecutors should not be treated like
unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases against the petitioner and the latter believes that
the finding of probable cause against him is the result of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the proper court.
VI.
Epilogue
A word of caution to the hooting throng. The cases against the petitioner will now acquire a different dimension and then move to a new stage
- - - the Office of the Ombudsman. Predictably, the call from the majority for instant justice will hit a higher decibel while the gnashing of teeth
of the minority will be more threatening. It is the sacred duty of the respondent Ombudsman to balance the right of the State to prosecute the
guilty and the right of an accused to a fair investigation and trial which has been categorized as the most fundamental of all freedoms.[135] To
be sure, the duty of a prosecutor is more to do justice and less to prosecute. His is the obligation to insure that the preliminary investigation of
the petitioner shall have a circus-free atmosphere. He has to provide the restraint against what Lord Bryce calls the impatient vehemence of
the majority. Rights in a democracy are not decided by the mob whose judgment is dictated by rage and not by reason. Nor are rights
necessarily resolved by the power of number for in a democracy, the dogmatism of the majority is not and should never be the definition of
the rule of law. If democracy has proved to be the best form of government, it is because it has respected the right of the minority to convince
the majority that it is wrong. Tolerance of multiformity of thoughts, however offensive they may be, is the key to mans progress from the cave
to civilization. Let us not throw away that key just to pander to some peoples prejudice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President
of the Republic are DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Quisumbing, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., no part in view of expression given in the open court and in the extended explanation.
Vitug, J., see concurring opinion.
Kapunan, J., concur in the result and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.
Mendoza, J., see concurring opinion.
Panganiban, J., no part per letter of Inhibition dated Feb. 15, 2000 mention in footnote 51 of ponencia.
Pardo, J., in the result; believes that petitioner was constrained to resign and reserve his vote in immunity from suit
Buena, J., in the result.
Ynares-Santiago, J., concur in the result and reserve the filing of a separate opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concur in the result and reserve the right to write a separate opinion.
[1] Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), October 5, 2000, pp. A1 and A17.
[2] PDI, October 6, 2000, pp. A1 and A18.
[3] Ibid., October 12, 2000, pp. A1 and A17.
[4] Ibid., October 14, 2000, p. A1.
[5] Ibid., October 18, 2000, p. A1.
[6] Ibid., October 13, 2000, pp. A1 and A21.
[7] Ibid., October 26, 2000, p. A1.
[8] Ibid., November 2, 2000, p. A1.
[9] Ibid., November 3, 2000, p. A1.
[10] Ibid., November 4, 2000, p. A1.
[11] The complaint for impeachement was based on the following grounds: bribery, graft and corruption, betrayal of public trust, and culpable
violation of the Cnstitution.

[12] Ibid., November 14, 2000, p. A1.
[13] Ibid., November 21, 2000, p. A1.
[14] Ibid., December 8, 2000, p. A1.
[15] Ibid., December 23, 2000, pp. A1 and A19.
[16] Ibid., January 12, 2001, p. A1.
[17] Those who voted yes to open the envelop were: Senators Pimentel, Guingona, Drilon, Cayetano, Roco, Legarda, Magsaysay, Flavier, Biazon,
Osmea III. Those who vote no were Senators Ople, Defensor-Santiago, John Osmea, Aquino-Oreta, Coseteng, Enrile, Honasan, Jaworski, Revilla,
Sotto III and Tatad.
[18] Philippine Star, January 17, 2001, p. 1.
[19] Ibid., January 18, 2001, p. 4.
[20] Ibid., p. 1.
[21] Ibid., January 19, 2001, pp. 1 and 8.
[22] Eraps Final Hours Told by Edgardo Angara, (hereinafter referred to as Angara Diary), PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A16.
[24] PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A16.
[25] Philippine Star, January 20, 2001, pp. 1 and 11.
[26] Ibid., January 20, 2001, p. 3.
[27] PDI, February 5, 2001, pp. A1 and A6.
[29] PDI, February 6, 2001, p. A12.
[30] Annex A, DOJ-OSG, Joint Comment; Rollo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, p. 288.
[31] Annex A-1, Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15; Rollo, p. 34.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Annex A, Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15; Rollo, p. 33.
[34] Philippine Star, January 21, 2001, p. 1; January 23, 2001, pp. 1 and 4; January 24, 2001, p. 3; PDI, January 25, 2001, pp. A1 and A15.
[36] PDI, January 25, 2001, p. 1.
[37] Ibid., p. 2.
[38] Annex C, DOJ-OSG Joint Comment; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15 p. 290.
[39] Annex D, id; ibid., p. 292.
[40] PDI, January 27, 2001, p. 1.
[41] PDI, February 13, 2001, p. A2.
[42] Philippine Star, February 13, 2001, p. A2.
[43] Annex E, id.; ibid., p. 295.
[44] PDI, February 8, 2001, pp. A1 & A19.
[45] Annex F, id.; ibid., p. 297.
[46] PDI, February 10, 2001, p. A2.
[47] Annex G., id.; ibid., p. 299.
[48] PDI, February 8, 2001, p. A19.
[49] Philippine Star, February 3, 2001, p. 4.
[50] Acceptance of Gloria is Nationwide, Mahar Mangahas, Manila Standard, February 16, 2001, p. 14.
[51] See The Chief Justices Extended Explanation for His Voluntary Inhibition; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, pp. 525-527.
[52] See Letter of Inhibition of Associate Justice Panganiban; Rollo, GR No. 146738, pp. 120-125.
[53] Rollo, G.R. No. 146738, p. 134.
[54] Leonard de Vera and Dennis Funa; see their Memorandum, pp. 16-27; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, pp. 809-820.
[55] Gunther and Sullivan, Constitutional Law, 13th ed., pp. 45-46.
[56] 369 US 186, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L ed 2d 663, 686 (1962).
[57] See e.g., Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, et al., GR No. 141284, 15 August 2000; Miranda v. Aguirre, 314 SCRA 603 (1999);
Santiago v. Guingona, 298 SCRA 756 (1998); Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997); Marcos v. Manglapus, 177
SCRA 668 (1989); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 129 Phil 7 (1967); Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1 (1947); Avelino v. Cuenco 83 Phil. 17 (1949);
Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192 (1946); Alejandrino v. Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1942).
[58] 103 Phil 1051, 1068 (1957).
[59] Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.
[60] Note that the early treatises on Constitutional Law are discourses on limitations of power typical of which is, Cooleys Constitutional
Limitations.
[61] Joint Resolution, Lawyers League for a Better Philippines and/or Oliver A. Lozano v. Pres. Corazon C. Aquino, et al., GR No. 73748; Peoples
Crusade for Supremacy of the Constitution, etc. v. Mrs. Cory Aquino, et al., GR No. 73972; and Councilor Clifton U. Ganay v. Corazon C. Aquino,
et al., GR No. 73990, May 22, 1986.
[62] Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, 210 SCRA 597 [1992].
[63] Proclamation No. 3. (1986)
[64] It states:
I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Vice President of the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully and conscientiously fulfill my duties as
President of the Philippines, preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the
service of the nation.
So help me God.
(Annex I, Comment of the Ombudsman; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15 Vol. II, p. 332)
[65] See Filipinas Despues de Cien Aos (The Philippines a Century Hence), p. 62.
[66] The guaranty was taken from Amendment I of the US Constitution which provides: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof of abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievance.
[67] See section 8, Article IV.
[68] See section 9, Article IV.
[69] Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression, 1970 ed., p. 6, et seq.
[70] Ibid., See also concurring opinion of Justice Branders in Whitney v. California (74 US 357, 375-76) where he said ... the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people...

[71] 307 US 496 (1939).
[72] Chafee, Jr., Free Speech in the United States, 1946 ed., pp. 413-415, 421.
[73] 260 SCRA 798 (1996).
[74] Section 1, Article II of the 1987 Constitution reads:
The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
[75] Infra at 26.
[76] Infra at 41.
[77] 1 Cranch (5 US) 137, 2 L ed 60 (1803).
[78] Gonzales v. Hernandez, 2 SCRA 228 (1961).
[79] See its February 4, 5, and 6, 2001 issues.
[80] PDI, February 4, 2001, p. A1.
[81] Ibid. [82] Ibid. [83] Ibid. [84] Ibid. [85] Ibid.
[86] PDI, February 5, 2001, p. A1.
[87] Ibid., p. A-1. [88] Ibid.
[89] PDI, February 5, 2001, p. A6.
[90] PDI, February 6, 2001, p. A1.
[91] In the Angara Diary which appeared in the PDI issue of February 5, 2001, Secretary Angara stated that the letter came from Asst. Secretary
Boying Remulla; that he and Political Adviser Banayo opposed it; and that PMS head Macel Fernandez believed that the petitioner would not
sign the letter.
[92] Congressional Record, 4th Congress, 2nd Session, March 4, 1959, pp. 603-604.
[93] Id., May 9, 1959, p. 1988.
[94] Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides: No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted.

[95] Reply Memorandum, p. 3; Rollo, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, Vol. IV.
[96] House Resolution No. 175, 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001), reads:
RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE FULL SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF HER EXCELLENCY, GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, on January 20, 2001, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was sworn in as the 14th President of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, her ascension to the highest office of the land under the dictum, the voice of the people is the voice of God establishes the basis of
her mandate on integrity and morality in government;
WHEREAS, the House of Representatives joins the church, youth, labor and business sectors in fully supporting the Presidents strong
determination to succeed;
WHEREAS, the House of representative is likewise one with the people in supporting President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos call to start the
healing and cleansing process for a divided nation in order to build an edifice of peace, progress and economic stability for the country: Now,
therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives, To express its full support to the administration of Her Excellency, Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, 14th President of the Philippines.
Adopted,
(Sgd.) FELICIANO BELMONTE JR.
Speaker
This Resolution was adopted by House of Representatives on January 24, 2001.
(Sgd.) Roberto P. Nazareno
Secretary General
[97] 11th Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
[99] Annex 2, Comment of Private Respondents De Vera, et al.; Rollo, GR No. 146710-15, Vol. II, p. 231.
[102] 103 Phil 1051, 1067 (1957).
[103] Baker vs. Carr, supra at 686 headnote 29.
[104] 16 Phil 534 (1910).
[105] The logical basis for executive immunity from suit was originally founded upon the idea that the King can do no wrong. [R.J. Gray, Private
Wrongs of Public Servants, 47 CAL. L. REV.. 303 (1959)]. The concept thrived at the time of absolute monarchies in medieval England when it
was generally accepted that the seat of sovereignty and governmental power resides in the throne. During that historical juncture, it was
believed that allowing the King to be sued in his court was a contradiction to the sovereignty of the King.
With the development of democratic thoughts and institutions, this kind of rationalization eventually lost its moral force. In the United States,
for example, the common law maxim regarding the Kings infallibility had limited reception among the framers of the Constitution. [J.
Long, How to Sue the President: A Proposal for Legislation Establishing the Extent of Presidential Immunity, 30 VAL. U.L. REV. 283 (1995)]. Still,
the doctrine of presidential immunity found its way of surviving in modern political times, retaining both its relevance and vitality. The
privilege, however, is now justified for different reasons. First, the doctrine is rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of powers and
supported by history. [Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 451 U.S. 731 (1982)]. The separation of powers principle is viewed as demanding the executives
independence from the judiciary, so that the President should not be subject to the judiciarys whim. Second, by reason of public convenience,
the grant is to assure the exercise of presidential duties and functions free from any hindrance or distraction, considering that the Chief
Executive is a job that, aside from requiring all of the office-holders time, also demands undivided attention. [Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA
393 (1988)]. Otherwise, the time and substance of the chief executive will be spent on wrangling litigation, disrespect upon his person will be
generated, and distrust in the government will soon follow. [Forbes v. Chouco Tiaco, 16 Phil. 534 (1910)]. Third, on grounds of public policy, it
was recognized that the gains from discouraging official excesses might be more than offset by the losses from diminished zeal [Agabin, op.
cit., at 121.]. Without immunity, the president would de disinclined to exercise decision-making functions in a manner that might detrimentally
affect an individual or group of individuals. [See H. Schnechter, Immunity of Presidential Aides from Criminal Prosecution, 57 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
779 (1989)].1
[106] 62 Phil. L.J. 113 (1987).
[107] See Bulletin Today, August 16, 1984, p. 1; December 18, 1984, p. 7.
[108] Records of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Vol. II, Records, p. 423, July 29, 1986.
[109] Supra at 47.
[110] Records of Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, July 28, 1986, p. 355.
[111] 145 SCRA 160 (1986).
[112] 128 SCRA 324 (1984).
[113] In Re: Raul Gonzales, 160 SCRA 771 (1988); Cuenco v. Fernan, 158 29 (1988); and Jarque v. Desierto, A.C. No. 4509, 250 SCRA xi-xiv (1995).
[114] Wallace v. Board of Education, 280 Ala. 635, 197 So 2d 428 (1967).
[115] 418 US 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L ed 1039 (1974).
[116] 457 US 731, 73 L ed. 349, 102 S Ct. 2690 (1982).
[117] 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
[118] See section 1, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[119] See section 27, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution.
[123] See section 13 (1), Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
[125] See Brandwood, Notes: You Say Fair Trial and I say Free Press: British and American Approaches to Protecting Defendants Rights in High
Profile Trials, NYU Law Rev., Vol. 75, No. 5, pp. 1412-1451 (November 2000).
[126] Id., p. 1417.
[127] See e.g., Martelino, et al. V. Alejandro, et al., 32 SCRA 106 (1970); People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54 (1995).
[128] 249 SCRA 54 (1995).
[129] 287 SCRA 581 at pp. 596-597 (1988).
[130] 247 SCRA 652 (1995).
[131] Extensive publicity did not result in the conviction of well known personalities. E.g., OJ Simpson, John Mitchell, William Kennedy Smith and
Imelda Marcos.
[132] Memorandum, p. 25; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, p. 647.
[133] Memorandum, pp. 29-30; Rollo, GR Nos. 146710-15, Vol. III, pp. 572-573.
[134] See section 4, Rule 112.
[135] Estes v. Texas, 381 US 532, 540 (1965).
SECOND DIVISION
MANILA MINING CORPORATION, G.R. No. 171702

Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
MIGUEL TAN, doing business under the name and style of
MANILA MANDARIN MARKETING, Promulgated:
Respondent.
February 12, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the Decision[1] dated December 20, 2005 and the Resolution[2] dated February 24, 2006 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84385. The Court of Appeals had affirmed the Decision[3] dated October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 55, Manila, in Civil Case No. 01-101786.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Miguel Tan, doing business under the name and style of Manila Mandarin Marketing, was engaged in the business of selling electrical
materials.
From August 19 to November 26, 1997, Manila Mining Corporation (MMC) ordered and received various electrical materials from Tan valued
at P2,347,880. MMC agreed to pay the purchase price within 30 days from delivery, or be charged interest of 18% per annum, and in case of
suit to collect the same, to pay attorneys fees equal to 25% of the claim.[4]
MMC made partial payments in the amount of P464,636. But despite repeated demands, it failed to give the remaining balance of P1,883,244,
which was covered by nine invoices.[5]
On September 3, 2001, Tan filed a collection suit against MMC at the Manila RTC.[6]
After Tan completed presenting evidence, MMC filed a Demurrer to Evidence. [7] On December 18, 2003, the RTC issued an Order, denying the
demurrer and directing MMC to present evidence.[8]
MMC offered as sole witness Rainier Ibarrola, its accountant from year 2000 to 2002. Ibarrola confirmed that it was standard office procedure for a
supplier to present the original sales invoice and purchase order when claiming to be paid. He testified that the absence of stamp marks on the
invoices and purchase orders negated receipt of said documents by MMCsrepresentatives.[9]
On rebuttal, Tan presented Wally de los Santos, his sales representative in charge of MMCs account. De los Santos testified that he delivered
the originals of the invoices and purchase orders to MMCs accounting department. As proof, he showed three customers acknowledgment
receipts bearing the notation:
I/We signed below to signify my/our receipt of your statement of account with you for the period and the amount stated below, together with
the corresponding original copies of the invoices, purchase order and requisition slip attached for purpose of verification, bearing
acknowledgment of my/our receipt of goods.[10]
On October 27, 2004, the RTC ruled for Tan. Its ruling stated as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and against the defendant, ordering the defendant to pay
the principal amount of ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY-THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FORTY-FOUR PESOS (P1,883,244.00), with
interest thereon at the rate of eighteen [percent] (18%) per annum starting after thirty (30) days from each date of delivery of the merchandise
sold until finality hereof, and thereafter, at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, and the further sum equal to [twenty five percent] (25%)
of the principal amount as liquidated damages.
SO ORDERED.[11]
On November 30, 2004, MMC moved for reconsideration, but its motion was denied by the RTC in an Order dated January 5, 2005.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTCs decision. The decretal portion of the Court of Appeals Decision dated December 20,
2005 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the RTC dated October 27, 2004 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Hence, this petition, which raises as sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS OBLIGATION TO PAY HAD ALREADY LEGALLY ACCRUED CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT HAS NOT FULLY
COMPLIED WITH ALL THE PREREQUISITES FOR PAYMENT IMPOSED UNDER PETITIONERS PURCHASE ORDERS, THERE BEING NO PROOF THAT
RESPONDENT HAD ACTUALLY DONE SO.[13]
Simply stated, we are now called upon to address the question of whether MMC should pay for the electrical materials despite its allegation
that Tan failed to comply with certain requisites for payment.
Petitioner contends that respondents claim for payment was premature inasmuch as the original invoices and purchase orders were not sent
to its accounting department.Consequently, Tans claims were not verified and processed. MMC believes that mere delivery of the goods did
not automatically give rise to its obligation to pay. It relies on Article 1545 of the Civil Code to justify its refusal to pay:
ART. 1545. Where the obligation of either party to a contract of sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may refuse
to proceed with the contract or he may waive performance of the condition.
Petitioner also assails the probative value of the documentary evidence presented during trial. MMC claims that the unauthenticated photocopies
of invoices and purchase orders did not satisfy the Best Evidence Rule,[14] which requires the production of the original writing in court. It adds that
by Tans failure to yield the original documents, he was presumed to have suppressed evidence under Section 3(e),[15] Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court.
In its Memorandum dated February 20, 2007,[16] petitioner refutes any liability altogether, denying that it consented to the sale. MMC
maintains that the unmarked documents indicated a mere offer to sell, which it did not act upon. MMC also charges Tan with laches for filing
his claim nearly four years after the transaction.
In his Memorandum dated January 30, 2007,[17] respondent Tan counters that the petition presents a factual issue which has already been
settled by the Court of Appeals. He stresses that findings of fact by the appellate court are conclusive on the Supreme Court and only
questions of law may be entertained by it.
After serious consideration, we are in agreement that the petition lacks merit.
Petitioner poses a question of fact which is beyond this Courts power to review. This Courts jurisdiction is generally limited to reviewing errors of
law that may have been committed by the Court of Appeals. We reiterate the oft-repeated and fully established rule that findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals, especially when they are in agreement with those of the trial court, are accorded not only respect but even finality, and are
binding on this Court. Barring a showing that the findings complained of were devoid of support, they must stand.For this Court is not expected or
required to examine or refute anew the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. The trial court, having heard the witnesses and
observed their demeanor and manner of testifying, is admittedly in a better position to assess their credibility.[18] We cannot weigh again the
merits of their testimonies.
Having thoroughly reviewed the records of this case, we find no persuasive much less compelling reason to overturn the findings and
conclusions of the trial court and appellate court. We hereby sustain their findings and conclusions.
Worth stressing, Article 1475 of the Civil Code provides the manner by which a contract of sale is perfected:
ART. 1475. The contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price.
From that moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law governing the form of contracts.
In this case, the purchase orders constituted accepted offers when Tan supplied the electrical materials to MMC. [19] Hence, petitioner cannot
evade its obligation to pay by claiming lack of consent to the perfected contracts of sale. The invoices furnished the details of the transactions.
As regards respondents failure to present the original documents, suffice it to say that the best evidence rule applies only if the contents of the
writing are directly in issue.Where the existence of the writing or its general purport is all that is in issue, secondary evidence may be introduced in
proof.[20] MMC did not deny the contents of the invoices and purchase orders. Its lone contention was that Tan did not submit the original copies
to facilitate payment. But we are in agreement that photocopies of the documents were admissible in evidence to prove the contract of sale
between the parties.
Neither is there merit to petitioners contention that respondent was guilty of delay in filing the collection case. A careful examination of the
records shows that Tan brought suit against MMC less than a year after the latter stopped making partial payments. Tan is, therefore, not guilty
of laches.
Laches is the neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse
party, operates as bar in a court of equity.[21] Here, Tan had no reason to go to court while MMC was paying its obligation, even if partially,
under the contracts of sale.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated December 20, 2005 and Resolution dated February 24, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84385 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-14. Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Vicente Q. Roxas
concurring.
[2] Id. at 15-16.
[3] Id. at 124-127. Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Manuel M. Barrios.
[4] Id. at 10-11.
[5] Id. at 57-65.
[6] Id. at 53-56.
[7] Id. at 102-107.
[8] Id. at 11.
[9] Id.
[10] Id. at 12.
[11] Id. at 127.
[12] Id. at 14.
[13] Id. at 27-28.
[14] RULES OF COURT, Rule 130,
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. − When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, .
xxxx
[15] SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. − The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome
by other evidence:
xxxx
(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;
xxxx
[16] Rollo, pp. 259-276.
[17] Id. at 279-291.
[18] Amante v. Serwelas, G.R. No. 143572, September 30, 2005, 471 SCRA 348, 351-352.
[19] H. BLACK, BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1235 (6th ed., 1990).
[20] S. APOSTOL, ESSENTIALS OF EVIDENCE 66 (1991 ed.).
[21] H. BLACK, BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 875 (6th ed., 1990).
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132214. August 1, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ZALDY CASINGAL, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Must a man be brought behind bars when no one saw him pull the trigger of the carbine that felled his fellowman?
In Criminal Case No. SCC-2411, the accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which states:
"That on or about May 8, 1995, in Barangay Sawat, municipality of Urbiztondo, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot one Diosdado Palisoc with a U.S. Carbine cal. 30 inflicting upon him the following injuries:
-Gunshot wound on the left chest
POE: 0.5 cm., anterior shoulder
POX: 0.5 cm. 5th ICS-L paravertebral line
- Hypovolemic shock
which caused the death of said Diosdado Palisoc as a consequence, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code:"[1]
In Criminal Case No. 2412, he was likewise charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition. The Information states:
"That on or about May 8, 1995, in Barangay Sawat, municipality of Urbiztondo, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and
control one (1) U.S. Carbine caliber 30 with ammunition, without first securing the necessary permit and license to possess the same, which he
used in the commission of the crime of Murder.
Contrary to P.D. 1866.[2]
The accused pled not guilty to both crimes. Trial proceeded in due course.
The facts of the shooting incident are based mainly on the narration of prosecution witness Edgardo Mula Cruz. It appears that on the May 8,
1995 local elections, at about 8:15 p.m., Cruz was near the gate of Sawat Elementary School in Barangay Sawat, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan,
waiting for Palisoc, the victim.[3] Palisoc went home to get food or "baon" for Cruz and himself. [4]Cruz was talking with his friends and facing
the road when he saw Palisoc coming.[5] He heard a gunshot, and when he turned his head towards its direction, he saw Palisoc facing the
accused and falling to the ground. Carrying a U.S. carbine caliber .30, the accused ran towards the house of one Francisca Galpao. [6] The area
where the shooting incident took place was lighted by an electric bulb near the school gate. Cruz stood seven meters from both the victim and
the accused whom he (Cruz) knew personally as they were neighbors.[7] After the accused left the crime scene, Cruz sought assistance from the
policemen assigned at the Sawat Elementary School for the elections.[8] One of the policemen brought Palisoc to the Virgen Milagrosa Medical
Hospital.[9] Palisoc expired in the operating room, the gunshot wound on his chest causing his death. [10] Cruz returned to the Sawat school to
act as pollwatcher.[11] The following day, he executed an affidavit narrating the shooting incident.[12]
An investigation team was dispatched to the crime scene where some bloodstains, a fired bullet caliber .30 and fired caliber .30 cartridge were
found.[13] On May 9, 1995, the accused was arrested in the house of one Mimi Payaoan in Barangay Salavante, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan. On the
same day, pursuant to a search warrant, one (1) carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988 with one long magazine and 30 rounds of live
ammunition were found in the house of Francisca Galpao.[14] The firearm with the magazine and ammunitions, as well as the fired bullet and
cartridge were submitted for ballistic examination conducted by Police Inspector Pascual G. Mangal-ip.[15]
Police Inspector Mangal-ip testified that the fired cartridge and slug found at the crime scene were the same with the cartridge and slug found
in the house of Francisca Galpao and test-fired from the carbine submitted for ballistic examination. He concluded that the cartridge and slug
found at the crime scene came from carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988. [16] Chief Inspector Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid also
testified that the paraffin test on the presence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of the accused and on said carbine caliber .30 yielded
positive results.[17]
The version of the defense was presented through the sole testimony of the accused. He did not dispute that the victim was shot on the night
of May 8, 1995 with the use of carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988. [18] Nor did he deny his presence at the crime scene.[19] He,
however, pointed to another person as the triggerman.
The accused testified that on May 3, 1995, while in Baguio City, he received a letter from a certain Ernesto Payaoan, requesting him to go to
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan to help in the local elections. [20] The accused obliged and arrived in Urbiztondo on May 7, 1995. He spent the night in
the house of Francisca Galpao.[21] The next morning, Payaoan came and instructed the accused to clean carbine caliber .30 with serial number
5611988 and to fire it to test its condition. The accused did as instructed and then gave the firearm back to Payaoan.[22] He asked Payaoan why
the gun was being tested and Payaoan revealed that he would kill Diosdado Palisoc. The accused tried to stop Payaoan as Palisoc was his
second cousin, but to no avail.[23]
On May 8, 1995, at about 7:30 in the evening, the accused and Payaoan went to Sawat Elementary School. Payaoan brought the carbine with
him.[24] When they saw Palisoc, Payaoan shot the victim and passed the firearm to the accused. He ordered the accused to run and bring the
gun to the house of Francisca Galpao.[25] His story was reduced to an affidavit which he executed about seven (7) months after the shooting
incident or on December 20, 1995.[26] On January 25, 1996, he executed another affidavit[27] retracting his December 20, 1995 affidavit. On
February 13, 1996, he made another affidavit[28] recanting his second affidavit. The accused likewise claimed that while in detention in the
Municipal Jail of Urbiztondo, Pangasinan, he confided to SPO1 Teofilo Garcia that it was Payaoan who killed Palisoc.[29]
Payaoan testified as a rebuttal witness. He declared that on May 7 and 8, 1995, he was at the Regional PNP Command on standby detail
because they were on red alert for election duties.[30] At that time, he was a member of the General Services Group, PNP Recom 1, San
Fernando, La Union. He buttressed his claim with a certification that on May 6-9, 1995, he was in the camp vicinity in San Fernando, La Union
for election duties.[31]
The prosecution likewise presented SPO1 Teofilo Garcia. He confirmed that the accused was a detention prisoner in the Municipal Jail of
Urbiztondo, Pangasinan from May up to June 1995, but denied that the accused confided to him that it was Payaoan who shot Palisoc.[32]
The trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunitions.[33] Hence, this appeal with the lone assignment of error,viz:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER AND VIOLATION OF P.D. 1866 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE
PROSECUTION FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
Prefatorily, we shall discuss the applicable law. On June 6, 1997, Republic Act 8294 amended P.D. 1866 which codified the laws on illegal
possession of firearms. Among its amendments was that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
shall be considered as a special aggravating circumstance.[34] The amendment meant:first, the use of an unlicensed firearm in the commission
of homicide or murder shall not be treated as a separate offense, but as a special aggravating circumstance; second, as a single crime is
committed (i.e., homicide or murder with the aggravating circumstance of illegal possession of firearm), only one penalty shall be imposed on
the accused.[35]
In its Joint Decision, the trial court convicted the accused of murder and illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions. It stressed that R.A.
8294 cannot be given retroactive effect for it was enacted in 1997 while the crimes charged against the accused were committed in 1995. It
held that to give R.A. 8294 retroactive effect would be prejudicial to the accused and violative of Art. III, Sec. 22 of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that, "(n)o ex-post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted."[36]
We disagree. This Court has previously ruled that R.A. 8294 is favorable to the accused, and should thus be retroactively applied in the present
case.[37] It was thus error for the trial court to convict the accused of two separate offenses, i.e., Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunitions. The crime for which the accused may be charged is murder, aggravated by illegal possession of firearm.
We now examine the evidence to determine the guilt of the accused. The accused makes much of the fact that no one saw him in the act of
shooting. It is true that there was no eyewitness to the shooting of the victim, but the testimony of prosecution witness Cruz is sufficient to
convict the accused as responsible for the death of Palisoc. He stated in his affidavit executed the day after the shooting incident, viz:
"Q. Do you know who shot Diosdado Palisoc?
A. Yes sir, Zaldy Casingal also resident of Barangay Salavante, Urbiztondo, Pangasinan.[38]
He likewise testified as follows:
PROS. SORIANO:
Q. When he fell down, what did you do?
A. I called up a police, sir.
Q. Before you called up a police, could you tell this Honorable Court the direction where the shot came from?
A. Yes, sir. When I turned my head where the shot came from, I saw Zaldy Casingal holding a carbine going to the house of Ating Galpaw (sic).
xxx
Q. How were you able to recognize Zaldy Casingal whom you said was holding a carbine and proceeded (sic) to the house of Ating Galpaw (sic)
after Diosdado Palisoc was shot?
A. There was an electric bulb near the gate, sir.
Q. How far were you to (sic) Zaldy Casingal when you saw him holding a firearm proceeding to the house of Ating Galpaw?
A. About seven (7) meters, sir.
Q. And how far were you to (sic) Diosdado Palisoc when he was shot?
A. The same, sir.[39]
xxx
Q. You mentioned Zaldy Casingal as a person whom you saw carrying a firearm/carbine after Diosdado Palisoc was shot, do you know this
Zaldy Casingal personally?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why do you know him?
A. He is our neighbor, sir.
Q. If he is now in (sic) courtroom, will you please point to him?
A. (Witness pointing to a man with a mustache, and when he asked his name he answered Zaldy Casingal).[40]
xxx
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q. You said that you did not actually see who shot Diosdado Palisoc, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.[41]
xxx
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q. After you saw Diosdado Palisoc shot, did you look to the direction where the shot came from?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you saw a person running, is that correct?
xxx
A. There is sir, it was Zaldy Casingal bringing a gun.[42]
ATTY. VALDEZ:
Q. When you said that you saw Zaldy Casingal bringing a gun, how far was he from the place where you were standing?
A. At about seven (7) meters, sir.
Q. You said that there was an electric bulb in the Sawat Elementary School, is that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And this electric bulb was installed inside the school room?
A. It is in (sic) the gate, sir.
Q. How far is this electric bulb, Mr. witness (sic)?
A. It is about four (4) meters, sir.
Q. And in the place where you saw Zaldy Casingal running with the gun, there was (sic) various obstruction on (sic) the illumination of that
light, is that correct?
A. None, sir, because it is a road."[43]
For the accused to be convicted of murder, he must be positively identified as the assailant of the victim. Positive identification requires
essentially proof of identity and not per se an eyewitness account of the very act of committing the crime. A witness may identify an accused
as the perpetrator of the crime by direct evidence, i.e., an eyewitness account of the commission of the crime. There are instances, however,
when a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, but he may still be able to identify the accused as the
perpetrator as when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission
of the crime. In this case, the positive identification forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces of
evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion
of all others. Otherwise, if circumstantial evidence could not be resorted to in proving the identity of the accused when direct evidence is not
available, then felons would go scot-free and the community would be denied proper protection. [44] The rules on evidence and jurisprudence
sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial evidence when the following requisites concur: (1) there must be more than one
circumstance; (2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances produces a conviction beyond
doubt of the guilt of the accused.[45]
In fine, it is not decisive that Cruz did not actually see the accused shoot the victim. But immediately after the victim was shot, Cruz saw the
accused holding the carbine which felled the victim, and then accused ran towards the house of Francisca Galpao. The trial court noted in its
decision that the testimony of Cruz was ". . . direct, frank, unfaltering and straightforward . . . His testimony bore the marks of truth and
sincerity, having been delivered spontaneously, naturally and in straightforward manner.[46] It also found that there is . . . nothing in the
records which would show any base motive or vile reason on the part of the witness to falsely implicate the herein accused."[47] It is well-
settled that where there is no evidence that the witness against the accused was actuated by any improper motive, and absent any compelling
reason to conclude otherwise, his testimony will be given full faith and credit.[48]
Cruzs positive identification of the accused as the victim's assailant is corroborated by several pieces of circumstantial evidence. Immediately
after Cruz heard a gunshot, he saw the accused carrying a U.S. carbine caliber .30 and running towards the house of one Francisca Galpaw. The
day after the shooting incident, carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988 with one long magazine and 30 rounds of live ammunition of
the same caliber were seized in the house of Francisca Galpao. The paraffin test conducted upon the seized carbine and upon the accused
yielded positive results. The ballistic examination also showed that the fired cartridge and slug found at the crime scene were the same with
the cartridge and slug that were found in the house of Francisca Galpao and test-fired from the seized carbine submitted for ballistic
examination. These pieces of circumstantial evidence point to the accused as Palisocs assailant.
The defense's attempt to cast doubt upon the prosecution's theory by passing the buck to Ernesto Payaoan is futile for lack of supporting
evidence. The accuseds lone testimony that the supposed triggerman, Ernesto Payaoan, only handed to him the carbine used in killing the
victim and that he accepted and ran away with it is not credible. As held in People v. Maliput,[49] "far from bordering merely on the imaginary,
captious or plainly being a possible doubt, any reasonable doubt must be nothing less than a fair doubt based on reason and common
sense(emphasis supplied)."[50] Certainly, it is beyond reason and common sense for the accused to have taken hold of the carbine in full view
of the people near the crime scene mindless of the danger that it would incriminate him.
However, we hold that the evidence to prove treachery or alevosia which will qualify the killing to murder is insufficient. To prove treachery,
the following must be shown: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution. [51] It is also the running case law that where treachery is
alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Without any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act
which resulted in the victim's death unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated. [52] In the case at bar, prosecution witness Cruz testified on
what transpired immediately after the killing of the victim. He had no knowledge of the circumstances before the shooting and the shooting
itself. There is therefore no proof that the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate. Nor is there any evidence to show that
the victim was unarmed. Even assuming arguendo that the attack is sudden, there is no evidence that the means of execution was deliberately
adopted.[53] The finding of the trial court that the accused shot the victim several times does not find support from the evidence on record.
Evident premeditation cannot likewise be appreciated. There is evident premeditation when the following facts are proven: (1) the time when
the accused decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the accused clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (3)
the lapse of sufficient period of time between the decision and the execution of the crime, to allow the accused to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.[54] The trial court appreciated this aggravating circumstance based on the accused's testimony. A close scrutiny of the
accused's testimony, however, will show that he testified that it was not him but Payaoan who planned to kill the victim and clung to his
determination to kill, and that there was sufficient interval of time between the premeditation and the execution of the crime to allow
Payaoan to reflect upon the consequences of his act. There is no proof whatsoever with respect to the accuseds plan to kill the victim and
when he conceived of such plan.
There being no circumstance to qualify the killing to murder, the accused should be convicted of homicide. The penalty imposed upon the
accused should correspondingly be lowered toreclusion temporal. As there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term is anywhere within the range
of prision mayor, or from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, and the maximum within the range of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, or from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. [55]
We come now to the charge of illegal possession of firearm. As aforediscussed, the accused cannot be charged separately with this offense. It
can only be treated as a special qualifying circumstance. Even then, the prosecution was not able to prove that the accused lacked the license
or permit to own or possess the firearm. While the prosecution presented a photocopy of a certification issued by the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit stating that the accused was not a licensed holder of a firearm of any kind and caliber, [56] it failed to submit the original of the
same.Rule 130, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases. . .
The subject certification does not fall under the exceptions. Hence, we cannot give any evidentiary value to the photocopy of the
certification.[57] Neither did the prosecution present the testimony of a representative of the PNP Firearms and Explosive Unit to establish that
the accused is not licensed to possess carbine caliber .30 with serial number 5611988. This omission is fatal to the prosecution.[58] In fine, the
crime of the accused cannot be qualified as having been committed with an unlicensed, illegally possessed firearm.
Prescinding from these premises, we have to modify the pecuniary liabilities imposed by the trial court. As the accused is liable only for
homicide, he cannot be ordered to pay a fine ofP30,000.00. The award of exemplary damages cannot also be given. Under Art. 2230 of the
Civil Code, "(i)n criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one
or more aggravating circumstances. The evidence on record does not show any aggravating circumstance. We sustain the award of moral
damages as the prosecution was able to prove that the victims death caused the latter's family extreme grief, sleepless nights and loss of
appetite.[59] Funeral and other related expenses are likewise adequately supported by the evidence on record.[60]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned Joint Decision is MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is found guilty of the crime of Homicide and sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. The trial court's award ofP50,000.00 for civil indemnity, P20,000.00 for
moral damages, and P25,000.00 for funeral and other related expenses is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[2] Rollo, p. 10.
[3] Original Records, p. 4; TSN, April 16, 1997, p. 3.
[4] TSN, supra, pp. 3, 9.
[5] Supra, pp. 9-11.
[6] Original Records, p. 4; TSN, supra, pp. 4-5.
[7] Ibid.; TSN, supra, p. 5.
[8] Original Records, p. 4; TSN, supra, p. 14.
[9] TSN, November 21, 1996, p. 31; Original Record, p. 5; Exhibit "L".
[10] TSN, January 15, 1997, pp. 43-44.
[11] TSN, April 16, 1997, p. 14.
[13] TSN, September 26, 1996, pp. 4-6.
[14] Id., pp. 9, 14.
[15] TSN, October 5, 1995, p. 5.
[16] Id., pp. 15-16.
[17] TSN, September 5, 1996, pp. 7-10.
[18] TSN, June 18, 1997, pp. 11-13.
[19] Id., pp. 14-15.
[20] TSN, July 4, 1997, pp. 2-3; June 18, 1997, p. 10.
[21] TSN, June 18, 1997, pp. 10-11.
[22] Id., pp. 11-14.
[23] Id., p. 16.
[24] TSN, July 4, 1997, p. 10.
[25] Id., pp. 10-11.
[26] Original Records, p. 487; Exhibit 2.
[27] Original Records, p. 488; Exhibit 3.
[28] Original Records, p. 489; Exhibit 4; TSN, June 18, 1997, p. 21.
[29] TSN, July 4, 1997, p. 12.
[30] TSN, August 19, 1997, pp. 3-4; August 8, 1997, pp. 9-10.
[31] Original Records, p. 512; Exhibit R; TSN, August 19, 1997, pp. 3-4.
[32] TSN, August 8, 1997, p. 3.
[33] Joint Decision, Regional Trial Court, Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada, presiding; Rollo, pp. 29-37.
[34] People v. Castillo, G.R. Nos. 131592-93, February 15, 2000, p. 5, citing R.A. 8294, sec. 1, par. 3.
[35] Id., p. 6, citing People v. Molina, 292 SCRA 742, 779-783 (1998).
[36] Rollo, p. 37; Joint Decision, p. 9.
[37] People v. Castillo, supra note 34, p. 6, citing Revised Penal Code, art. 22.
[38] Original Records, p. 4; Exhibit P.
[39] TSN, April 16, 1997, pp. 4-5.
[40] Id., pp. 6-7.
[41] Id., pp. 13-14.
[42] Id., pp. 19-20.
[43] Id., p. 21.
[44] People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, February 17, 2000.
[45] Id., p. 8, citing Sec. 4, rule 133, Rules of Court; People v. Abrera, 283 SCRA 1 (1997).
[46] Rollo, p. 33; Joint Decision, p. 5.
[47] Ibid.
[48] People v. Dacibar, et al., G.R. No. 111286, February 17, 2000, citing People v. Solis, 291 SCRA 529, 539 (1998).
[49] 252 SCRA 519 (1996).
[50] Id., p. 528.
[51] People v. Aquino, G.R. No. 128887, January 20, 2000, citing People v. Hubilla, 252 SCRA 471, 481 (1996); People v. Realin, G.R. No. 126051,
21 January 1999.
[52] People v. Rios, G.R. No. 132632, June 19, 2000, citing People v. Nalangan, 336 Phil. 970, 975 (1997).
[53] People v. Geguira, et al., G.R. No. 130769, March 13, 2000.
[54] People v. Virtucio, Jr., G.R. No. 130667, February 22, 2000, citing People v. Armando Sarabia, G.R. No. 106102, October 29, 1999.
[55] People v. Geguira, supra note 53, pp. 25-26.
[56] Original Records, p. 456; Exhibit K.
[57] See People v. Dismuke, 234 SCRA 51 (1994), p. 60 and Bacaltos Coal Mines, et al. v. Court of Appeals, 245 SCRA 460 (1995), pp. 474-475.
[58] People v. Cortez, et al., G.R. Nos. 131619-20, February 1, 2000, citing Mallari v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA 456 (1996), citing
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255, 261-265 (1996) and People v. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 (1991).
[59] TSN, February 19, 1997, p. 8.
[60] Id., pp. 4-5; Exhibit M-2.
THIRD DIVISION
ALBINO JOSEF, G.R. No. 146424

Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, J., Chairman
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES and GARCIA, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES**

and AGUSTIN ALARILLA,
Respondents. Promulgated:
November 18, 2005
x--------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] of a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR no. 23234,[2] which affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos Bulacan convicting Albino Josef of 26 counts of violation of BP 22, also known as the Anti-Bouncing Checks
Law.[3]
By way of a preliminary clarification, this is a petition for review of the CAs decision affirming Albino Josefs conviction for 26 counts of violation
of BP 22. It is therefore a criminal case and the People of the Philippines should be impleaded as a respondent in line with Section 2, Rule 125
of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.[4] Nonetheless, petitioner, in filing this petition, incorrectly entitled it Albino Josef v. Agustin Alarilla.
In accord with Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court,[5] we have allowed petitioner Josef to subsequently implead the People of the Philippines
as respondent in this case.
Now, the facts.

From June to August, 1991, petitioner, a Marikina-based manufacturer and seller of shoes, purchased materials from respondent Agustin
Alarilla, a seller of leather products from Meycauayan, Bulacan, for which the former issued a total of 26 postdated checks against his account
with the Associated Bank and Far East Bank & Trust Company (Marikina Branches). When private respondent presented these checks for
encashment, they were dishonored because the accounts against which they were drawn were closed. Private respondent informed petitioner
of the dishonor and demanded payment of their value. After some negotiations, petitioner drew and delivered a new set of postdated checks
in replacement of the dishonored ones. Private respondent, in turn, returned to petitioner the originals of the dishonored postdated checks
but retained photocopies thereof. When private respondent deposited the replacement checks in his account with the Westmont Bank, these
were also dishonored by the drawee bank. As a result, the private respondent filed criminal complaints against petitioner for violation of BP 22
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan. After preliminary investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor filed 26 Informations against
petitioner with the RTC of Bulacan for violation of BP 22, entitled People v. Josef, Criminal Case Nos. 2113-M-93 to 2138-M-93, for the original
26 postdated checks.[6]
The trial court convicted petitioner on all counts and imposed the penalty of six months for each conviction. The Court of Appeals, in the
assailed decision, affirmed the trial court.
Petitioner admits having issued the 26 dishonored checks. However, he claims the following defenses: 1) he has already paid private
respondent the amount of the checks in cash; 2) the trial court was incorrect to accept as evidence photocopies of the original checks and 3)
he acted in good faith. He likewise adopts the dissenting opinion of CA Justice Martin Villarama, Jr.,[7] which states that the penalty of
imprisonment was incorrectly imposed on petitioner in the light of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000.[8]
The petition is without merit.
The elements of violation of BP 22 are:
1) making, drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value;
2) knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3) subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the
same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.[9]
All three elements are present here.

Petitioner categorically admits the fact of issuance of the checks and their dishonor, [10] the first and third elements. He has likewise failed to
rebut the statutory presumption[11] of knowledge of insufficient funds, the second element, which attaches if the check is presented and
dishonored within 90 days from its issuance.[12] While petitioner alleges to have paid private respondent the amount of the checks, he failed to
specify if he had done so within five banking days from receiving notice of the checks dishonor and to present any evidence of such payment.
In addition, his unsubstantiated claim of cash payment contradicts his earlier defense that he had replaced the checks.
Moving onto the procedural aspects of the case, petitioner claims that, under the Best Evidence Rule, the trial court should not have admitted
in evidence the photocopies of the checks until after he had been given reasonable notice to produce the originals. The Court of Appeals, in
disposing of this contention, said:[13]
However, in the light of the factual milieu in the present recourse, (we) find and so declare that the Court a quo did not commit any reversible
error in admitting in evidence the photostatic copies of the subject checks in lieu of the originals thereof in the possession of the [Petitioner]. It
bears stressing that the raison detre of the proscription against the admission of secondary evidence in lieu or in substitution of the original
thereof is to prevent the commission of fraud on the part of the offeror who is in possession of the best evidence but, in lieu thereof, adduced
secondary evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
When he testified in the Court a quo, the [Petitioner] brought out the originals of the checks and even marked the same in evidence
as Exhibits 1 to 21, except five (5) of the subject checks, which he claimed as missing and the Prosecution even adopted the original checks as
its evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
The [Petitioner] admitted, before the Court a quo, that the originals of the subject checks were in his possession. The [Petitioner] never
alleged that the photostatic copies of the checks marked and offered in evidence by the Prosecution were not faithful copies of the originals
of the checks. In point of fact, when he testified in the Court a quo, he was shown, by his counsel, the photostatic copies of the subject checks
and admitted that the originals of said checks were in his possession on his claim that he had paid the Private Complainant the amount
of P600,000.00 in cash and the balance in the form of checks which he drew and issued to the Private Complainant by way of replacement of
the aforesaid other checks:
xxx xxx xxx
By his testimony, the [Petitioner] thereby admitted that the photostatic copies of the checks marked and offered in evidence by the
Prosecution were the faithful reproductions of the originals of the checks in his possession. Hence, the Prosecution may mark and offer in
evidence the photostatic copies of the checks.
xxx xxx xxx
Having admitted, albeit impliedly, that the photostatic copies of the checks admitted in evidence by the Court a quo were the faithful
reproduction of the original copies in his possession, the Petitioner was thus estopped from invoking Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules
of Evidence.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. By admitting that the originals were in his possession and even producing them in open court, petitioner
cured whatever flaw might have existed in the prosecutions evidence. The fact that these originals were all stamped account closed merely
confirmed the allegations of the respondent that the checks were dishonored by reason of the account being closed. Because they were
entirely consistent with its main theory, the prosecution correctly adopted these originals as its own evidence. In addition, by petitioners own
admission, five of the original checks were lost, thus rendering the photocopies thereof admissible as exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule.[14]
Regarding petitioners allegation of good faith, suffice it to say that such a claim is immaterial, the offense in question being malum
prohibitum.[15] The gravamen of the offense is the issuance of a bad check and therefore, whether or not malice and intent attended such
issuance is unimportant.[16]
In invoking of A.C. No. 12-2000, petitioner adopts the interpretation of Justice Villarama to the effect that the circular mandates judges to
impose fines rather than imprisonment on violators of BP 22. In affirming the sentence imposed by the trial court, the majority pointed out
that it is only under certain conditions that trial court judges may impose fines rather than imprisonment. The Circular provides, in part:
In its decision in Eduardo Vaca, v. Court of Appeals the Supreme Court (Second Division) per Mr. Justice V. Mendoza, modified the sentence
imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount double the
amount of the check. In justification thereof, the Court said:
Petitioners are first-time offenders. They are Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they
brought this appeal, believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise they
could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for probation to evade a prison term. It would best serve the ends of
criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by 1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case we believe that a fine in an amount equal to double the
amount of the check involved is an appropriate penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.
In the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines, the Supreme Court en banc, applying Vaca also deleted the penalty of imprisonment
and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of the fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, i.e., P200,000, and concluded that such
would best serve the ends of criminal justice.
All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing policy of the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of
penalties for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
Considerable confusion arose as a result of this circular. Like Justice Villarama, many came to believe that the policy enunciated in this circular
was to altogether remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violation of BP 22. The circular created so much confusion, in fact, that
less than three months later, we had to issue yet another circular, Administrative Circular No. 13-2001,[17] for the specific purpose of clarifying
exactly what the implications of A.C. No. 12-2000 were. In order to put all doubts to rest, the second circular provides:
The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Order No. 12-2000 is not to remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a
rule of preference in the application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the
legislative intent behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that
where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence,
the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the
circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is the more
appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought not to be deemed a hindrance (emphasis ours).
Clearly, the imposition of either a fine or imprisonment remains entirely within the sound discretion of the judge trying the case, based on his
assessment of the offender and the facts. Justice Villarama premised his dissent on the absence of a distinction in A.C. No. 12-2000 between
which offenders deserve the relatively lenient penalty of a fine and which deserve imprisonment. As A.C. No. 13-2001 states, the application of
the circular is selective and it is entirely up to the trial court judge to make that distinction, given the circumstances obtaining. This brings us to
the factual issue of petitioners worthiness of the lighter penalty. On this, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23234 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
* on leave.
** This case is originally entitled Josef v. Alarilla. Upon the filing of this petition, petitioner Josef neglected to implead the proper indispensable
party, the People of the Philippines, an omission which has since been corrected.
[1] This petition for review was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[2] Dated December 18, 2000, penned by Associate Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and concurred in
by Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Eliezer R. De los Santos, and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., and concurred and dissented in by Associate
Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr., all of the Special Seventeenth Division of the Court of Appeals; Rollo, pp. 49-70.
[3] Dated November 19, 1998, penned by Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 11; Rollo, pp. 131-
134.
[4] Review of decisions of the Court of Appeals. The procedure for the review by the Supreme Court of decisions in criminal cases rendered by
the Court of Appeals shall be the same as in civil cases.

[5] Construction. These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding.

[6] Rollo, pp. 49-51.
[7] Rollo, p. 70.
[8] Issued on November 21, 2000.
[9] Rigor v. People, G.R. No. 144887, 17 November 2004; Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 187 (1998); Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234 SCRA 639.

[10] Rollo, p. 42.
[11] People v. Laggui, G.R. Nos. 76262-63, 16 March 1989, 171 SCRA 305 (1989).
[12] Section 2, BP 22.
[13] Rollo, pp. 55-57.
[14] Section 3(a), Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[15] People v. Laggui, supra.
[16] Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108738, 17 June 1994, 233 SCRA 301.
[17] Issued on February 14, 2001.
EN BANC
G. R. Nos. 150613-14 June 29, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
MANUEL MANTIS, appellant.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In its judgment1 dated October 24, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 52, found appellant, Manuel Mantis, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of rape and sentenced him for each count to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify the victim,
Mary Jane L. Balbin, the sum of P75,000 as civil indemnity and P75,000 as moral damages.
He was charged in two separate informations, both dated August 25, 1999, by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga as follows:
(1) Criminal Case No. G-4788 That on or about the 3rd day of April, 1999 in the municipality of Floridablanca, province of Pampanga,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, MANUEL MANTIS, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously entered (sic) the room of Mary Jane L. Balbin, 12 years old, the daughter of his common-law spouse, and by means
of force, threat and intimidation, accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge with Mary Jane L. Balbin, against the latter’s will.
Contrary to law.2
(2) Criminal Case No. G-4797 That on or about the 16th day of July 1998 in the municipality of Floridablanca, province of Pampanga, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, MANUEL MANTIS, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously entered (sic) the room of Mary Jane L. Balbin, 11 years old, the daughter of his common-law spouse, and by means of force, threat,
and intimidation, accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge with Mary Jane L. Balbin, against the latter’s will.
Contrary to law.3
With the assistance of counsel, he pleaded not guilty to the foregoing charges. The cases were then jointly heard since they involved the same
parties and the same evidence .
The evidence for the prosecution established that:
Private complainant Mary Jane L. Balbin was born on September 28, 1986, as shown by her testimony and a photocopy of her birth
certificate.4 She had known the appellant since she was six (6) years of age since he was the common-law husband ("live-in" partner ) of her
mother, Merly S. Leona. She had come to consider him as her own father, calling him "Papa". 5 Mary Jane lived with her mother, her siblings,
and appellant in a three-bedroom house at Valdez, Floridablanca, Pampanga. At the time of the incident in Criminal Case No. G-4788, she was
a first year high school student at Guillermo D. Mendoza High School in Guagua, Pampanga. 6
Mary Jane testified that in the afternoon of July 16, 1998, she and her godfather, one Antonio Bartolo, brought her mother to the hospital
because she was sick.7 That evening, appellant fetched Mary Jane from the hospital and took her home to Valdez, Floridablanca. 8 A certain
George Nanquil remained at the hospital to watch over Mary Jane’s mother.
Once home, Mary Jane entered her room and was preparing for bed, when suddenly the appellant entered her room. To her surprise,
appellant was wearing nothing but a t-shirt.9 Without further ado, appellant grabbed her and removed her shirt, shorts, and panty. She tried to
free herself from his tight embrace, but to no avail. Appellant then inserted his phallus inside her private part, causing her much pain.10 When
she continued to struggle, appellant threatened to kill her and her mother should she report what he was doing to her. 11 Appellant’s threat
cowed her into submission. Fearful of what she or her mother might suffer in the hands of appellant, Mary Jane endured her ordeal in silence.
In the months that followed, Mary Jane did not breathe a single word to anyone about the harrowing experience she suffered. Not to the
authorities or her mother, not to her friends, not to her classmates or teachers. 12 Her fearful silence, however, merely emboldened the
appellant into repeating his dastardly act.
During the wee hours of April 3, 1999, while Mary Jane was asleep in her room with her two (2) sisters, appellant again entered her
room.13 Mary Jane was awakened when she felt him lie beside her. She saw that he was wearing nothing but a shirt.14 Appellant swiftly
stripped her of her clothes and proceeded to forcibly insert his organ into her vagina. 15 She struggled against the unwanted penile invasion,
but her resistance was fruitless as appellant held her very tightly. She did not shout, despite the fact that her mother was in the
garage,16 because she was scared of his threat to kill her and her mother.
Living in fear and shame, Mary Jane would have kept her silence had she not become pregnant. She then divulged to appellant’s employer,
one Ruben Cabrera, what appellant had done to her.
On July 26, 1999, the victim was examined by Dr. Grace Salinas, medical officer of the Romana Pangan District Hospital in San Jose,
Floridablanca, Pampanga. Mary Jane disclosed to Dr. Salinas that appellant had been sexually abusing her since she was seven (7) years old. Dr.
Salinas confirmed that she was indeed enceinte. Dr. Salinas’ findings, as reduced to writing, are as follows:
...
3. Last menstrual period = February 3rd week 1999
4. Breast = conical
5. Internal examination = vagina admits one finger with ease, healed hymenal laceration 12, 3, 6, 9 o’clock
6. Obstetric ultrasound (7-22-99)
Result - a single live fetus in breech presentation at about 20 weeks and 1 day AOG17
...
Dr. Salinas testified that she could not make a determination as to how many times the victim had been forced to engage in unwanted sexual
intercourse, but Mary Jane most likely had a sexual encounter in February 1999, which resulted in her pregnancy. 18
After her medical examination, Mary Jane filed a sworn complaint with the police authorities alleging that appellant raped her on July 16, 1998
and on April 3, 1999 as well.19 She likewise attested that prior to April 3, 1999, the appellant had engaged in forcible sex with her several times,
but she could no longer recall the dates of these incidents.
On November 29, 1999, Mary Jane gave birth to a baby girl, whom she named Mary Grace. She identified appellant as the father. 20
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi to both charges. He testified that he was separated from his legal spouse, a certain Purisima
Gamboa, and started living in with the victim’s mother, Merly Leona in September 27, 1992. 21 Mary Jane came to live with him and Merly
sometime in August 1995.
Appellant contended that he could not have raped the victim on the night of July 16, 1998 because he was at the hospital looking after Merly
Leona who was then confined. He claimed that he stayed in the hospital from 8:30 p.m. of July 16, 1998 to 3:00 p.m. of the following
day.22 Hence, he could not have raped Mary Jane in their house at Valdez, Floridablanca, Pampanga, as claimed by her.
As to the second rape charge, appellant insisted that it could not have happened, since on April 3, 1999, he was at Maligaya Subdivision,
Pulungmasle, Guagua, Pampanga up to 5:00 p.m.23 He stayed the night at his employer’s office as was his wont and only went home at 6:30
a.m. the following day to have breakfast.24 The appellant explained that he and Merly did not spend their nights at the house where Mary Jane
was staying, since they regularly slept at the office of his employer, Ruben Cabrera, located some 600 meters away from said house.25 He
insisted that he never slept one single night in the same house where Mary Jane was staying.26Instead he allowed Jorge Mercado, Joel
Casupanan, and Roderick Manalansan to sleep in the house where Mary Jane stayed, as she and her siblings had no adult companion at
nights.27 He claimed that Casupanan was Mary Jane’s boyfriend. 28 He also made much of the fact that their neighbor, one Rico Pinili, was a
frequent visitor of Mary Jane’s at night. Appellant tried to portray the victim as a loose and unchaste female who could have been made
pregnant by any of the men previously mentioned, as any or all of them could have enjoyed her favors.
In open court, he claimed that he had an ax to grind against Casupanan, whom he suspected of having an affair with Merly Leona. He testified
that a few days after he was incarcerated, Merly Leona started living with Casupanan and that he had previously caught them kissing and
embracing in the kitchen of his house.29
Further, appellant testified that the rape charges against him were concocted by Mary Jane at her mother’s behest following a violent scolding
he gave them, which prompted them to leave the house. He insisted that the fact that Mary Jane only complained of the alleged rapes after
she became pregnant casts doubt upon the veracity of her testimony.
The trial court found the prosecution’s evidence weighty and convincing. It declared appellant guilty as charged. Accordingly, it decreed as
follows:
WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) finds accused Manuel Mantis GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged in Criminal
Case No. 4797 and Criminal Case No. 4788; and (b) sentences the accused as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 4797, to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify Mary Jane L. Balbin the amount of P75,000.00 and to pay her the
additional sum of P75,000.00 for moral damages; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 4788, to suffer the penalty of death and to indemnify Mary Jane L. Balbin the amount of P75,000.00 and to pay her the
additional sum of P75,000.00 for moral damages.
The records of these cases, including the transcript of stenographic notes, are hereby ordered forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for
automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.
With costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.30
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Art. VIII, Sec. 5 (2d)31 of the Constitution and Rule 122, Sec. 3 (c) and Sec. 10 of the Rules of
Court.32 Before us, appellant assigns the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WHEN HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH WHEN THE INFORMATION DID NOT STATE WITH
SPECIFICITY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES OF AGE AND RELATIONSHIP. 33
Simply stated, the issues for our resolution concern: (1) the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to establish the appellant’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and (2) assuming that appellant is guilty as charged, the propriety of the penalties imposed upon him.
On the first issue, appellant contends that it was error for the trial court to find him guilty of rape committed "by means of force, threat, or
intimidation" in Criminal Case No. G-4788 since a perusal of the prosecution’s evidence, including the victim’s own testimony, would clearly
show that there was no use of force on his part, and that the victim did not offer the good faith resistance required by law and jurisprudence
against sexual assault. He avers that a closer examination of the private complainant’s statements in open court as to what transpired that
evening of April 3, 1999, would clearly show that she never shouted for help when she noticed appellant’s presence beside her,
notwithstanding that her two sisters were sleeping beside her and her mother was in the garage. Nor did she create any commotion of any
sort which could have at least caused her sleeping sisters who were in the same room to wake up or cause her mother to rush to her room and
find out what was wrong. Appellant insists that this was unusual, considering that he was unarmed at the time and there is no showing that he
covered the victim’s mouth to prevent her from shouting. Appellant submits that the foregoing circumstances taken together, far from
showing that the sexual act was committed by means of force, instead show that the complaining witness had voluntarily consented to the
sexual act.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the appellant’s theory of consensual sex is so preposterous as to strain
credulity. The OSG points out that in Criminal Case No. G-4797, the Information charged appellant with ravishing Mary Jane on July 16, 1998,
when she was but eleven (11) years old. In other words, appellant was indicted for statutory rape. The Solicitor General stresses that under
prevailing law, sexual intercourse with a woman below the age of twelve (12) years is statutory rape and her consent to the intercourse, is
conclusively presumed by law to be involuntary, as she is considered to have no will of her own.
Anent Criminal Case No. G-4788, the OSG points out that the evidence on record shows that the victim tried to free herself from the
appellant’s unwanted clutches, but was unsuccessful as he held her tightly. Nor should she be faulted for her failure to shout, says the OSG.
The reason she did not shout is that appellant threatened to kill her and her mother if she shouted.
The Solicitor General submits that in this case, the jurisprudential rule – that the degree of force required in rape cases is relative and need not
be overpowering or irresistible – should be applied. All that is necessary to show is that the force employed was sufficient to consummate the
purpose which the accused had in mind. Furthermore, the law does not impose upon the victim the burden of proving resistance.
We find that the appellant’s last-ditch arguments to persuade us of his innocence are far from convincing. His defense is without merit.
Appellant’s change of theory on appeal cannot exculpate him. In the proceedings below, appellant raised the defense of alibi and denied
having any sexual relations with the private complainant. Before us, appellant now admits having carnal knowledge of her but maintains that it
was consensual all along. His shift of theory does not, however, aid his cause.
Consensual sexual congress as an affirmative defense needs convincing proof such as love notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting
to the consensual romantic relationship between the offender and his supposed victim. 34 Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the
complainant, the burden shifts to the appellant to prove his defense by substantial evidence. 35 In the instant cases, however, we find that
other than appellant’s preposterous tale, there is no scintilla of evidence whatsoever to support his changed theory based on the victim’s
alleged consent. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo, that there was some form of amorous relationship, such averment will not necessarily
rule out the use of force or intimidation by appellant to have sex against her will.36
Appellant’s claim that Mary Jane consented to the sex act, without his use of force or intimidation, is not supported by the evidence on record.
Mary Jane categorically and forthrightly testified that she resisted appellant’s advances, but was unsuccessful because the appellant was
holding her tightly. The amount of force required in rape cases is relative. It need not be overpowering or irresistible. All that is necessary is
that the force employed as an element of the offense be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind.37
The intimidation employed by the malefactor in rape must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the
offense and not by any hard-and-fast rule or standard. All that is required is that the intimidation be sufficient to produce fear in the victim, a
fear that if she does not yield to the brute demands of the appellant, something injurious would happen to her. This Court has previously
observed that victims of tender age are easily intimidated and cowed into silence even by the mildest threat against their lives. 38 Appellant
himself admits that he had played a father role to Mary Jane since her childhood. Appellant exercised moral ascendancy and influence over
her. Well established is the rule, that in instances of rape committed by a father, or a father’s surrogate, his moral ascendancy and influence
over the victim sufficiently substitutes for the elements of violence and intimidation.39
Appellant casts doubt on Mary Jane’s credibility as a witness when she testified that she was raped on July 16, 1998 and on April 3, 1999,
basing on the expert opinion of Dr. Salinas that the sexual intercourse which caused Mary Jane’s pregnancy must have occurred in February
1999. But for the appellee, the OSG counters that the medical examination of the rape victim, as well as the medical certificate which ensues,
is merely corroborative in character and is not an indispensable element for conviction of the rapist. The resulting pregnancy is not an element
of rape. In this case, appellant’s contention is debunked by Mary Jane’s testimony in open court. She testified that appellant raped her not
only on the dates stated in the charge sheets, but also on several other occasions. She could not be faulted if she could not recall the precise
dates of these incidents, considering her age and the trauma she suffered. Victims certainly do not cherish keeping in their memory an
accurate account of the dates, number of times, and the manner in which they were sexually violated.40
Appellant contends that the private complainant’s delay in reporting the rape in Criminal Case No. G-4797 for a period of one (1) year and six
(6) days, and her admission that she only divulged the rapes because she discovered she was pregnant and was ashamed to be pregnant at
such a young age, destroyed her credibility. However, the OSG stresses that delay in reporting rape does not undermine the charge if such
delay is satisfactorily explained. Here, the delay is explained by the death threats made by the appellant against the victim and her mother. It is
not uncommon for a young girl to be intimidated and cowed into silence and conceal for some time the violation of her honor, even by the
mildest threat against her life.41 Mary Jane’s testimony is not discredited simply because she failed to immediately report to her mother or the
authorities the abuses she suffered in the hands of the appellant. A rape victim cannot, after all, be expected to summon the courage to report
a sexual assault committed against her person, where the act was accompanied by a death threat.42
It bears stressing that the trial court gave full credence and probative value to the private complainant’s testimony, finding that she testified in
a straightforward and positive manner when she disclosed the details of her ravishment. Appellant has not come up with any justifiable reason
for us to overturn the trial court’s findings. Thus, we sustain the trial court ruling that appellant’s guilt has been proved in each case by the
prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
We agree, however, that the death sentence imposed upon him by the trial court in each case is erroneous and ought to be reduced
to reclusion perpetua.
In these cases, private complainant testified that she was born on September 28, 1986. Her testimony was supported by a photocopy of her
"Certificate of Live Birth" showing that she was born in September 1986. But an examination of the prosecution’s exhibits shows that the
prosecution has failed to present in evidence the original copy of Mary Jane’s birth certificate. Further, there is no showing that the original
certificate of birth was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of the prosecution. Decisions of this Court relating to the rape of
minors invariably state that in order to justify the imposition of the death penalty, there must be independent evidence proving the age of the
victim, other than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and the absence of denial by the accused. A certified true copy of the certificate of
live birth showing the complainant’s age or some other authentic document such as a baptismal certificate or a school record has been
recognized as competent evidence.43 A mere photocopy of said certificate, however, does not prove the victim’s minority, for said photocopy
does not qualify as competent evidence for that purpose. As repeatedly held by this Court, in a capital case, we are bound by the standards of
strict scrutiny, given the gravity of the death sentence and the irreversibility of its execution. Hence, appellant herein could be held liable only
for two counts of simple rape and the sentence of death imposed upon him for each count of rape must be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
Further, pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award of civil indemnity ought to be reduced, in each count, fromP75,000 to P50,000 only.
Similarly, the award of moral damages in each count should also be reduced fromP75,000 to P50,000 only. But, in each count, by way of public
example in order to protect young children from molestation and abuse by perverse elders, the award to the victim of P25,000 as exemplary
damages is in order.
WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 24, 2001, of the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 52, in Criminal Cases Nos. G-4788
and G-4797, finding appellant MANUEL MANTIS GUILTY of two counts of rape is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The death sentence
imposed upon the appellant for each count of rape is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua. Appellant is DIRECTED to pay the private
complainant, Mary Jane Balbin, the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, another P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of rape. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug*, Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago**, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez*, Corona, Carpio Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
* On Official Leave.
** On Leave.
1 Records, Crim. Case No. G-4788, pp. 99-130.
2 Id. at 3.
3 Records, Crim. Case No. G-4797, p. 3.
4 TSN, 15 December 1999, p. 3; Exh. "C," Folder of Exhibits, p. 3.
5 Id. at 12.
6 TSN, 19 January 2000, p. 2.
7 TSN, 12 January 2000, p. 9.
8 Id. at 10.
9 Supra, note 4, at 6.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 TSN, 19 January 2000, pp. 2-3.
13 TSN, 15 December 1999, p. 7.
14 Id. at 8.
15 Ibid.
16 Id. at 7-9.
17 Exh. "A" and sub-markings, Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
18 TSN, 9 February 2000, pp. 5-6.
19 Exh. "B," Folder of Exhibits, p. 2.
20 See Exh. "D," Folder of Exhibits, p. 4.
21 TSN, 21 June 2000, pp. 2-4; TSN, 19 July 2000, p. 2.
22 TSN, 21 June 2000, p. 3.
23 Id. at 9.
24 Id. at 11.
25 Id. at 5.
26 TSN, 19 July 2000, pp. 8-9.
27 TSN, 21 June 2000, pp. 7-8.
28 Id. at 12-14.
29 TSN, 19 July 2000, pp. 6-7.
30 Records, Crim. Case No. G-4788, pp. 129-130.
31 Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
...
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders
of lower courts in:
...
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
32 SEC. 3. How appeal taken –
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
or where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave
rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice
of appeal in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.
SEC. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. – In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall
be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15) day following the
promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be forwarded within ten
(10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic report.
33 Rollo, p. 67.
34 People v. Bayron, G.R. No. 122732, 7 September 1999, 313 SCRA 727, 734.
35 People v. Cepeda, G.R. No. 124832, 1 February 2000, 324 SCRA 290, 297.
36 People v. De Lara, G.R. No. 124703, 27 June 2000, 334 SCRA 414, 424.
37 People v. Lo-ar, G.R. No. 118935, 6 October 1997, 280 SCRA 207, 219-220.
38 People v. Clado, G.R. Nos. 135699-700 & 139103, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 729, 740.
39 People v. Dulay, G.R. Nos. 144082-83, 18 April 2002, 381 SCRA 346, 352.
40 People v. Historillo, G.R. No. 130408, 16 June 2000, 333 SCRA 615, 623.
41 People v. Bea, Jr., G.R. No. 109618, 5 May 1999, 306 SCRA 653, 659.
42 People v. Satioquia, G.R. No. 125689, 23 October 2003, p. 7.
43 People v. Rata, G.R. Nos. 145523-24, 11 December 2003, p. 19.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167147 August 3, 2005
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
GENARO CAYABYAB y FERNANDEZ, Appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez was sentenced to death by the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 01-
1311, for rape committed against six-year-old Alpha Jane Bertiz.1
Alpha Jane was born on November 26, 1994,2 and the eldest among the six children of Conrado and Metchie Bertiz.3 She was six years and
nine months old when the rape was committed on August 7, 2001.
On that day, at around 6:00 p.m., Alpha Jane was at home in Manlunas St., Lagoon Area, Villamor Airbase, PasayCity, taking care of her
younger siblings. Her mother went to buy kerosene, while her father was out. On the guise of teaching arithmetic, appellant went to the
victim's house and asked her to lie down on her father's bed. When she refused, appellant removed her clothes and his own clothes, then
forced her to lie down on the bed and laid on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Alpha Jane shouted in pain which startled the
appellant who sprayed her with tear gas and left.4
Her mother, Metchie arrived shortly thereafter and Alpha Jane told her what had happened. She immediately reported the incident to the
barangay officials and brought Alpha Jane to the Philippine Air Force General Hospital for medical examination. She also sought assistance
from the police at the 521st Air Police Squadron who, after gathering information from the victim, arrested the appellant at his house.5 Alpha
Jane was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at CampCrame the following day,6 and on August 10, 2001, to the Child Protection Unit (CPU) at
UP-PGH7 for further medical examinations, which both found hymenal abrasions and lacerations, respectively, on the victim's genitalia.8
On August 10, 2001, appellant was charged with rape before the RegionalTrialCourtofPasayCity in an Information that reads:
That on or about the 07th day of August 2001, in Pasay City, Metro , Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, GENARO CAYABYAB Y FERNANDEZ, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously by means of force and intimidation
have carnal knowledge of ALPHA JEAN BERTIS Y JONGCO, a minor six (6) years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.
Appellant raised the defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that on August 7, 2001, he was plying his normal route inside the Villamor
Airbase as a tricycle driver from 6:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m.10 After returning the tricycle to its owner Roberto Gabo at the corner of 14th and
15th Sts., Villamor Airbase, he reached home at around 7:30 p.m and went to sleep after eating dinner. 11 At around 9:30 p.m., he woke up to
urinate at the back of their house when three (3) policemen arrested and mauled him. 12 At the headquarters, he was forced to admit the
rape13while the victim's father asked for money in exchange for his release, which he refused.14
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It found the victim's testimony consistent with the medical
findings of the doctors from the PNP Crime Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH. Moreover, it applied the rule that an unsubstantiated defense of
denial and alibi cannot prevail over a positive and categorical testimony of a minor victim. Finally, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of
minority and imposed the penalty of death. The dispositive portion reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court opines that the prosecution has proven the guilt of the accused Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez beyond
reasonable doubt for rape as defined and penalized under Article 335, paragraph 3 and 4 as the victim herein is only six (6) years old and
hereby sentence accused Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez to DEATH and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Php 75,000.00 and moral and
exemplary damages in the amount of Php 50,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
SO ORDERED.15
The case was directly elevated to this Court for automatic review. However, pursuant to our decision in People v. Mateo16 modifying the
pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as direct appeals from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court in
cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals, 17 which
affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, thus:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED intoto, and accordingly certifies the case and elevate the entire
records to the Supreme Court for review pursuant to Rule124, Section 13[a] of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 00-5-03-SC.
SO ORDERED.18
We have painstakingly reviewed the evidence on record and found no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate
court. There is no doubt that appellant raped Alpha Jane on August 7, 2001 inside their house at Villamor Airbase, PasayCity. This credibility
given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect of evidence19 which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct, and attitude, during the direct and cross-examination by counsel.
On direct examination, Alpha Jane narrated the incident and positively identified appellant as her assailant, thus:
Fiscal Barrera:
Now at around 6:00 p.m. of August 7, 2001 where were you?
A. I was inside our house.
Q. You mean your house at lagoon area, Villamor Air Base, Pasay City?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What about you mother and father where were they on that date and time?
A. My mother bought gas while my father was 'naglalakad ng spray gun for painting.
Q. Who were left in your house on August 7, 2001 at 6:00 p.m. while your mother bought gas and your father was walking with his spray gun
used for painting?
A. My brothers and sisters.
Q. While in your house on said date and time do you know of any unusual incident that happened to you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was that unusual incident that happened to you?
A. Kuya Jimmy entered our house.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy entered your house, what happened next?
A. Kuya Jimmy called for me inside our house.
Q. What did you do when Kuya Jimmy called for you?
A. He asked me one plus one and I answered two.
Q. After that what else happened?
A. He asked me to lie down on my father's bed.
Q. Did you follow him?
A. No, sir, I did not follow.
Q. And so what else happened?
A. He removed my clothes 'hinubaran niya ako; he removed my shorts and panty.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy removed your shorts and panty, what happened?
A. 'Pinatungan po niya ako', he laid on top of me.
Q. What happened when he laid on top of you?
A. He inserted his penis inside my private part.
Fiscal Barrera:
What did you do when this Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis to your private part?
A. I shouted, sir.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy inserted his penis inside your vagina and you shouted, what happened?
A. 'Pinakawalan niya ako', he released me.
Q. Then what happened?
A. 'Tinergas niya ako.
Q. After Kuya Jimmy teargas you, what happened?
A. I run away.
Q. Regarding what Kuya Jimmy did to you, did you report it to your mother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. This Kuya Jimmy whom you said went inside your house and removed your shorts and panty and thereafter inserted his penis inside your
vagina on August 7, 2001 can you point at him if you see him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. If this Kuya Jimmy Cayabyab is inside the courtroom will you be able to identify him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is he inside the courtroom?
Interpreter:
Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Genaro Cayabyab.20
Despite grueling cross-examination by the defense suggesting extortion by the victim's father, Alpha Jane remained steadfast and consistent
that it was appellant who raped her. The victim's testimony was supported by the medico-legal report of the medico-legal experts from the
PNP Crime Laboratory and CPU, UP-PGH, to wit:
ANO-GENITAL
EXAMINATION
Hymen: Tanner Stage 2, hymenal transection at 5 oclock, Type of Hymen: Anullar
...
IMPRESSIONS
Evidence of blunt force or penetrating trauma.
(Exh. 'L', p. 8, Records)
Dr. Baluyut explained that in her findings, the terms hymenal transection at 5 oclock and laceration at 5 oclock are synonymous (TSN,
November 20, 2001, p. 6). Dr. Baluyut further explained that there was prior injury to the victim's hymen which might have been caused by the
insertion of a blunt object such as an erected penis which was compatible with the victim's claim that she had been raped (TSN, November 20,
2001, pp. 6-7).21
The trial court correctly imposed the death penalty.
Rape, such as committed against a 'child below seven (7) years old', is a dastardly and repulsive crime which merit no less than the penalty of
death pursuant to Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. This special qualifying circumstance of age must be specifically pleaded or alleged
with certainty in the information and proven during the trial; otherwise the penalty of death cannot be imposed.
In the case of People v. Pruna,22 this Court took note of conflicting pronouncements concerning the appreciation of minority, either as an
element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance. There were a number of cases where no birth certificate was presented where the Court
ruled that the age of the victim was not duly proved.23On the other hand, there were also several cases where we ruled that the age of the
rape victim was sufficiently established despite the failure of the prosecution to present the birth certificate of the offended party to prove her
age.24 Thus, in order to remove any confusion, we set in Pruna the following guidelines in appreciating age, either as an element of the crime
or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and school records which show the
date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
and credible, of the victim's mother or a member of the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters
4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim's mother or relatives concerning the victim's
age, the complainant's testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.78
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused to object to the testimonial
evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.25
To paraphrase Pruna, the best evidence to prove the age of a person is the original birth certificate or certified true copy thereof; in their
absence, similar authentic documents may be presented such as baptismal certificates and school records. If the original or certified true copy
of the birth certificate is not available, credible testimonies of the victim's mother or a member of the family may be sufficient under certain
circumstances. In the event that both the birth certificate or other authentic documents and the testimonies of the victim's mother or other
qualified relative are unavailable, the testimony of the victim may be admitted in evidence provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by
the accused.
In Pruna, no birth certificate or any similar authentic document, such as the baptismal certificate of the victim was presented to prove her
age. The trial court based its finding that Lizette was 3 years old when she was raped on the Medico-Legal Report, and the fact that the
defense did not contest her age and questioned her qualification to testify because of her tender age. It was however noted that the Medico-
Legal Report never mentioned her age and only the testimony of her mother was presented to establish Lizette's age. The Court found that
there was uncertainty as to the victim's exact age, hence, it required that corroborative evidence, such as her birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of 'below seven (7)
years old is appreciated.
Unlike in Pruna, the trial court in this case made a categorical finding that Alpha Jane was only 6 years old at the time she was raped, based not
only on the testimonies of the complainant and her mother, but also on the strength of the photocopy of Alpha Jane's birth certificate. It is
well to note that the defense did not object to the presentation of the birth certificate; on the contrary it admitted the same 'as to fact of
birth.
We are not unaware of our ruling in People v. Mantis26 that a mere photocopy of the birth certificate, in the absence of any showing that the
original copy was lost or destroyed, or was unavailable, without the fault of the prosecution, does not prove the victim's minority, for said
photocopy does not qualify as competent evidence for that purpose.
However, there are other exceptions to the 'best evidence rule as expressly provided under Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
reads:
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. ' When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office. [Emphasis supplied]
Without doubt, a certificate of live birth is a public record in the custody of the local civil registrar who is a public officer. Clearly, therefore, the
presentation of the photocopy of the birth certificate of Alpha Jane is admissible as secondary evidence to prove its contents. Production of
the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's discretion, whenever in the case at hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the
contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.27
In the case at bar, the defense did not dispute the contents of the photocopied birth certificate; in fact it admitted the same. Having failed to
raise a valid and timely objection against the presentation of this secondary evidence the same became a primary evidence, and deemed
admitted and the other party is bound thereby. 28
In fine, we find that the prosecution sufficiently proved that Alpha Jane was only six-years-old, being born on November 26, 1994, when the
rape incident happened on August 7, 2001.
Anent the award of damages, we sustain the award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity consistent with the prevailing jurisprudence that if the
crime is qualified by circumstances which warrant the imposition of the death penalty by applicable amendatory laws, the accused should be
ordered to pay the complainant the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity.
The Court notes that the trial court awarded P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages is distinct from exemplary
damages, hence must be awarded separately. The award of moral damages is automatically granted in rape cases without need of further
proof other than the commission of the crime because it is assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling her to such
award.29 However, the award of P50,000.00 must be increased to P75,000.00 in accord with prevailing jurisprudence. 30 As regards exemplary
damages, we held in People v. Catubig31 that the presence of an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, entitles the
offended party to an award of exemplary damages. Conformably, we award the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages in accord with
the prevailing jurisprudence.32
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Criminal Case No. 01-1311, as affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00258, finding appellant Genaro Cayabyab y Fernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
and imposing the penalty of DEATH33 isAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is further ordered to pay the victim P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
REYNATO S. PUNO ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Associate Justice ' 'Associate Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice ' Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
CONCHITA CARPIO-MORALES ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice ' Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO CANCIO C. GARCIA
Footnotes
Endnotes:
1 Also spelled as Alpha 'Jean Bertiz in some parts of the records.cralaw
2 Records, p. 9.cralaw
3 TSN, 23 January 2002, p. 9. cralaw
4 TSN, 16 January 2002, pp. 3-4.cralaw
6Id. at 13.cralaw
7Id. at 7.cralaw
8 Records, pp. 8 & 10.cralaw
9Id. at 2.cralaw
10 TSN, 27 February 2002, pp. 8-9.cralaw
11Id. at 9-10.cralaw
13Id. at 12.cralaw
15 Rollo, p. 33. Penned by Judge Lilia C. Lopez.cralaw
16 G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.cralaw
17 Docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00258. cralaw
18 Rollo, p. 163. Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and
Fernanda Lampas Peralta.cralaw

19 People v. Paranzo, 375 Phil. 796, 814 (1999).cralaw
21 Rollo, p. 95.cralaw
22 439 Phil. 440 [2002].cralaw
23 Id. at 465-468.cralaw
24 Id. at 468-470.
cralaw
25Id.at 470-471.cralaw
26 G.R. Nos. 150613-14, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 236, 249.cralaw
27 Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15 & 146738, 3 April 2001, 356 SCRA 108, 138.cralaw
28 People v. Boras, G.R. No. 127495, 22 December 2000, 348 SCRA 638, 645.cralaw
29 People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 157269, 3 June 2004, 430 SCRA 619, 627.cralaw
30 People v. Soriano, G.R. Nos. 142779-95, 29 August 2002, 388 SCRA 140, 172.cralaw
31 416 Phil. 102, 120. cralaw
32 People v. Galigao, G.R. Nos. 140961-63, 14 January 2003, 395 SCRA 195, 209.cralaw
33 Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that Republic Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty, nevertheless they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional, hence the death penalty may be lawfully imposed
in this case.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170604 September 2, 2013
HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS,
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE, REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ, JR.,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title
based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best
Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from presenting evidence other than the original document.
The Case
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on August 18, 2005, 1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
judgment rendered on November 5, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, in Manila in Civil Case No. 96-78481 entitled Heirs of
Maximo S Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v.
Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila dismissing the respondents’ action for quieting of title. 2
Antecedents
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita Prodon, 3 the respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the
late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the registered owners of that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds of Manila; that their parents had been in possession of the property during their lifetime; that
upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that they
could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of
Manila was intact; that the original copy contained an entry stating that the property had been sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right
of repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the
property did not exist. Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
The entry sought to be cancelled reads:
ENTRY NO. 3816/T-84797 – SALE W/ RIGHT TO REPURCHASE IN FAVOR OF: MARGARITA PRODON, SINGLE, FOR THE SUM OF P120,000.00, THE
HEREIN REGISTERED OWNER RESERVING FOR HIMSELF THE RIGHTS TO REPURCHASE SAID PROPERTY FOR THE SAME AMOUNT WITHIN THE
PERIOD OF SIX MONTH (sic) FROM EXECUTION THEREOF. OTHER CONDITION SET FORTH IN (DOC. NO. 321, PAGE 66, BOOK NO. VIII OF LISEO A.
RAZON, NOT.PUB. OF MANILA)
DATE OF INSTRUMENT – SEPT. 9, 1975
DATE OF INSCRIPTION – SEPT. 10, 1975,
AT 3:42 P.M.4
In her answer,5 Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had executed on September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to
repurchase; that the deed had been registered with the Register of Deeds and duly annotated on the title; that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr.
had been granted six months from September 9, 1975 within which to repurchase the property; and that she had then become the absolute
owner of the property due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found
in the files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment,6 finding untenable the plaintiffs’ contention that the deed of sale with right to repurchase
did not exist. It opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by
secondary evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of
its unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the defendant had established the execution and existence of the deed, to wit:
In the case under consideration, the execution and existence of the disputed deed of sale with right to repurchase accomplished by the late
Maximo Alvarez in favor of defendant Margarita Prodon has been adequately established by reliable and trustworthy evidences (sic).
Defendant Prodon swore that on September 9, 1975 she purchased the land covered by TCT No. 84747 (Exhibit 1) from its registered owners
Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave (TSN, Aug. 1, 1997, pp.5-7); that the deed of sale with right to repurchase was drawn and prepared
by Notary Public Eliseo Razon (Ibid., p. 9); and that on September 10, 1975, she registered the document in the Register of Deeds of Manila
(Ibid., pp.18-19).
The testimony of Margarita Prodon has been confirmed by the Notarial Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon dated September 10, 1975
(Exhibit 2), and by the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila (Exhibit 4).
Page 66 of Exhibit 2 discloses, among others, the following entries, to wit: "No. 321; Nature of Instrument: Deed of Sale with Right to
Repurchase; Name of Persons: Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Alvarez (ack.); Date and Month: 9 Sept." (Exhibit 2-a).
Exhibit 4, on the other hand, also reveals the following data, to wit: ‘Number of Entry: 3816; Month, Day and Year: Sept. 10, 1975; Hour and
Minute: 3:42 p.m.; Nature of Contract: Sale with Right to Repurchase; Executed by: Maximo S. Alvarez; In favor: Margarita Prodon; Date of
Document: 9-9-75; Contract value: 120,000.’ (Exhibit 4-a). Under these premises the Court entertains no doubt about the execution and
existence of the controverted deed of sale with right to repurchase.7
The RTC rejected the plaintiffs’ submission that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. could not have executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase
because of illness and poor eyesight from cataract. It held that there was no proof that the illness had rendered him bedridden and immobile;
and that his poor eyesight could be corrected by wearing lenses.
The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted
to produce it before the court. It believed Jose Camilon’s testimony that he had handed the original to one Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that
he could not anymore retrieve such original from Atty. Lacanilao because the latter had meanwhile suffered from a heart ailment and had
been recuperating.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the respondents assigned the following errors, namely:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DUE EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO
REPURCHASE HAS BEEN DULY PROVED BY THE DEFENDANT.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PIECES OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS AS PROOFS OF THE DUE
EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS BEEN LOST OR
OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE PRODUCED IN COURT WITHOUT THE FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM THAT THEIR FATHER COULD NOT HAVE EXECUTED THE QUESTIONED
DOCUMENT AT THE TIME OF ITS ALLEGED EXECUTION.8
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, reversing the RTC, and ruling as follows:
The case of the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) v. Del Rosario in GR No. 146586 (January 26, 2005) is instructive in
resolving this issue. The said case held:
"Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence other than the original document itself. A party may introduce
secondary evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when the original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be
produced in court, provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the
best or primary evidence before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other satisfactory
explanation for non-production of the original instrument. The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, contents,
although the court in its discretion may change this order if necessary."
It is clear, therefore, that before secondary evidence as to the contents of a document may be admitted in evidence, the existence of [the]
document must first be proved, likewise, its execution and its subsequent loss.
In the present case, the trial court found all three (3) prerequisites ha[ve] been established by Margarita Prodon. This Court, however, after
going through the records of the case, believes otherwise. The Court finds that the following circumstances put doubt on the very existence of
the alleged deed of sale. Evidence on record showed that Maximo Alvarez was hospitalized between August 23, 1975 to September 3, 1975
(Exhibit "K"). It was also established by said Exhibit "L" that Maximo Alvarez suffered from paralysis of half of his body and blindness due to
cataract. It should further be noted that barely 6 days later, on September 15, 1975, Maximo Alvarez was again hospitalized for the last time
because he died on October of 1975 without having left the hospital. This lends credence to plaintiffs-appellants’ assertion that their father,
Maximo Alvarez, was not physically able to personally execute the deed of sale and puts to serious doubt [on] Jose Camilion’s testimony that
Maximo Alvarez, with his wife, went to his residence on September 5, 1975 to sell the property and that again they met on September 9, 1975
to sign the alleged deed of sale (Exhibits "A" and "1"). The Court also notes that from the sale in 1975 to 1996 when the case was finally filed,
defendant-appellee never tried to recover possession of the property nor had she shown that she ever paid Real Property Tax thereon.
Additionally, the Transfer Certificate of Title had not been transferred in the name of the alleged present owner. These actions put to doubt
the validity of the claim of ownership because their actions are contrary to that expected of legitimate owners of property.
Moreover, granting, in arguendo, that the deed of sale did exist, the fact of its loss had not been duly established. In De Vera, et al. v Sps.
Aguilar (218 SCRA 602 1993), the Supreme Court held that after proof of the execution of the Deed it must also be established that the said
document had been lost or destroyed, thus:
"After the due execution of the document has been established, it must next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The
destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its
loss, or by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the document or papers
of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made
any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument is indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the
writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts
are unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third person or the like).
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or
five original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before secondary evidence can be given of any one. This[,] petitioners failed to
do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four or five original copies." (218 SCRA at 607-608)
In the case at bar, Jose Camilion’s testimony showed that a copy was given to Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao but he could not recover said copy. A
perusal of the testimony does not convince this Court that Jose Camilion had exerted sufficient effort to recover said copy. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing testimony does not convince this Court that Jose Camilion had exerted sufficient effort to obtain the copy which he said was
with Atty. Lacanilao. It should be noted that he never claimed that Atty. Lacanilao was already too sick to even try looking for the copy he had.
But even assuming this is to be so, Jose Camilion did not testify that Atty. Lacanilao had no one in his office to help him find said copy. In fine,
this Court believes that the trial court erred in admitting the secondary evidence because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the loss or
destruction of the deed.
In fine, the Court finds that the secondary evidence should not have been admitted because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the existence of
the original deed of sale and to establish its loss.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 96-78481 is hereby
REVERSED and a new one entered ordering the cancellation of Entry No. 3816/T-84797 inscribed at the back of TCT No. 84797 in order to
remove the cloud over plaintiff-appellants’ title.
SO ORDERED.9
The heirs of Margarita Prodon (who meanwhile died on March 3, 2002) filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Defendant and for
Reconsideration of the Decision,10 wherein they alleged that the CA erred: (a) in finding that the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary
evidence had not been complied with; (b) in concluding that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been physically incapable of personally executing
the deed of sale with right to repurchase; and (c) in blaming them for not recovering the property, for not paying the realty taxes thereon, and
for not transferring the title in their names.
On November 22, 2005, the CA issued itsresolution,11 allowing the substitution of the heirs of Margarita Prodon, and denying their motion for
reconsideration for its lack of merit.
Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to the Court through petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioners submit the following as issues, namely: (a) whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence
had been complied with; (b) whether the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale with
right to repurchase;and (c) whether Prodon’s claim of ownership was already barred by laches. 12
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
1.
Best Evidence Rulewas not applicable herein
We focus first on an unseemly error on the part of the CA that, albeit a harmless one, requires us to re-examine and rectify in order to carry
out our essential responsibility of educating the Bench and the Bar on the admissibility of evidence. An analysis leads us to conclude that the
CA and the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive issue in
this action for quieting of title. We shall endeavor to correct the error in order to turn the case to the right track.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies the Best Evidence
Rule, to wit:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written document the original of the document must be produced in court.
The rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or
due execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of
bad faith on the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. 13
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact contents of a writing are brought before the court,14 considering that
(a) the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of more than average importance, particularly as respects
operative or dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a slight variation in words may mean a great difference in
rights; (b) there is a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects
oral testimony purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at
describing other situations generally.15 The rule further acts as an insurance against fraud.16 Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best
evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is
withheld for fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat. 17 Lastly, the rule protects against misleading inferences
resulting from the intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger set of writings. 18
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing.
Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns
external facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be
invoked.19 In such a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for the original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real
property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title. In such an action, the competent court is tasked to
determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants to place things in their proper place and to make the one who has no
rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other. The action is for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every
cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired improvements, as well as use, and even
abuse the property. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (b) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding
claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal
efficacy.20
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing
may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for
quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code
specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be received without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is
then no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.
It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by
the respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on, was whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly
executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. They alleged in the complaint that:
xxxx
9. Such entry which could have been maliciously and deliberately done by the defendant Margarita Prodon created cloud and [is] prejudicial to
the title of the property subject matter of this case, since while it is apparently valid or effective, but in truth and in fact it is invalid, ineffective
or unenforceable inasmuch that the instrument purporting to be a Deed of Sale with right of repurchase mentioned in the said entry does not
exist.21
xxxx
On her part, Prodon specifically denied the allegation, averring in her answer that "sometime [o]n September 9, 1975, deceased Maximo S.
Alvarez lawfully entered into a Contract of Sale with Right to Repurchase, object of which is the titled lot located at Endaya Street, Tondo,
Manila, in favor of defendant."22 In the pre-trial order, the RTC defined the issue to be tried as "[w]hether or not the alleged document
mentioned in the said entry is existing, valid or unenforceable," 23 and did not include the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
among the issues.
Apparently, the parties were fully cognizant of the issues as defined, for none of them thereafter ventured to present evidence to establish the
terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. In the course of the trial, however, a question was propounded to Prodon as to who had
signed or executed the deed, and the question was objected to based on the Best Evidence Rule. The RTC then sustained the objection.24 At
that point began the diversion of the focus in the case. The RTC should have outrightly overruled the objection because the fact sought to be
established by the requested testimony was the execution of the deed, not its terms. 25 Despite the fact that the terms of the writing were not
in issue, the RTC inexplicably applied the Best Evidence Rule to the case and proceeded to determine whether the requisites for the admission
of secondary evidence had been complied with, without being clear as to what secondary evidence was sought to be excluded. In the end, the
RTC found in its judgment that Prodon had complied with the requisites for the introduction of secondary evidence, and gave full credence to
the testimony of Jose Camilon explaining the non-production of the original. On appeal, the CA seconded the RTC’s mistake by likewise
applying the Best Evidence Rule, except that the CA concluded differently, in that it held that Prodon had not established the existence,
execution, and loss of the original document as the pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary evidence. Its application of the Best
Evidence Rule naturally led the CA to rule that secondary evidence should not have been admitted, but like the RTC the CA did not state what
excluded secondary evidence it was referring to.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue,
the CA did not have to address and determine whether the existence, execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary
evidence, had been established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have simply addressed and determined whether or not the "existence" and
"execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by preponderance of evidence.
Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the
presentation of evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of Prodon and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary
Eliseo Razon, and the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even without first proving the loss or unavailability of
the original of the deed.
2.
Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with
right to repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of the deed.26This was because the deed, although a collateral document,
was the foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title.27 Her inability to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for
her to prove its existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary under the rules on evidence. Towards that end,
however, it was not required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict standard to which it would be subjected had the
loss or unavailability been a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a writing.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient to show the lossor explain the unavailability of the original as to
justify the presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses, testified that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty.
Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his
heart ailment. Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the original from among Atty. Lacanilao’s belongings by himself or by any
of his assistants or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but no
effort was shown to have been exerted in that direction.
In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the existence of the deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo
Alvarez, Sr. had twice gone to his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale of the property in
question, and the second on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase, viz:
Q
Do you also know the deceased plaintiff in this case, Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife Valentina Clave, Mr. Witness?
A
Yes, sir.
Q
A
Q
Under what circumstance were you able to know the deceased plaintiff Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife?
When they went to our house, sir.
When was this specifically?
A
Sometime the first week of September or about September 5, 1975, sir.
Q
What was the purpose of the spouses Maximo and Valentina in meeting you on that date?
A
They were selling a piece of land, sir.
xxxx
Q
At the time when the spouses Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave approached you to sell their piece of land located at Endaya, Tondo,
Manila, what document, if any, did they show you?
A
The title of the land, sir.
xxxx
Q
You said that on the first week of September or September 5, 1975 spouses Maximo and Valentina approached you at the time, what did you
tell the spouses, if any?
A
I asked them to come back telling them that I was going to look for a buyer, sir.
xxxx
Q
You said that you told the spouse[s] Alvarez to just come back later and that you will look for a buyer, what happened next, if any?
A
I went to see my aunt Margarita Prodon, sir.
Q
A
What did you tell your aunt Margarita Prodon?
I convinced her to buy the lot.
ATTY. REAL
Q
What was the reply of Margarita Prodon, if any?
A
She agreed, provided that she should meet the spouses, sir.
Q
After Margarita Prodon told you that[,] what happened next, if any?
A
I waited for the spouses Alvarez to bring them to my aunt, sir.
Q
Were you able to finally bring the spouses before Margarita Prodon?
A
Valentina Clave returned to our house and asked me if they can now sell the piece of land, sir.
Q
What did you tell Valentina Clave?
A
Q
We went to the house of my aunt so she can meet her personally, sir.
And did the meeting occur?
WITNESS
A
Yes, sir.
ATTY. REAL
Q
What happened at the meeting?
A
I told Valentina Clave in front of the aunt of my wife that they, the spouses, wanted to sell the land, sir.
Q
What was the reply of your aunt Margarita Prodon at the time?
A
That Valentina Clave should come back with her husband because she was going to buy the lot, sir. 28
The foregoing testimony could not be credible for the purpose of proving the due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase for
three reasons.1âwphi1
The first is that the respondents preponderantly established that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out of the hospital around the
time that the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been supposedly executed on September 9, 1975. The records manifested that he had
been admitted to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City on several occasions, and had then been diagnosed with the serious ailments
or conditions, as follows:
Period of confinement Diagnosis
March 31 – May 19, 1975 • Prostatitis, chronic

• Arteriosclerotic heart disease
• Atrial fibrillation
• Congestive heart failure
• CFC III29
June 2- June 6, 1975 • Chest pains (Atrial Flutter)

• Painful urination (Chronic prostatitis)30
August 23-September 3, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart disease

• Congestive heart failure, mild
• Cardiac functional capacity III-B31
September 15-October 2, 1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart disease

• Congestive heart failure
• Pneumonia
• Urinary tract infection
• Cerebrovascular accident, old
• Upper GI bleeding probably secondary to
stress ulcers32
The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly
improbable for him to travel from Manila all the way to Meycauayan, Bulacan, where Prodon and Camilon were then residing in order only to
negotiate and consummate the sale of the property. This high improbability was fully confirmed by his son, Maximo, Jr., who attested that his
father had been seriously ill, and had been in and out of the hospital in 1975.33 The medical records revealed, too, that on September 12, 1975,
or three days prior to his final admission to the hospital, the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had suffered from "[h]igh grade fever, accompanied by
chills, vomiting and cough productive of whitish sticky sputum;"had been observed to be "conscious" but "weak" and "bedridden" with his
heart having "faint" sounds, irregular rhythm, but no murmurs; and his left upper extremity and left lower extremity had suffered 90% motor
loss.34 Truly, Prodon’s allegation that the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been executed on September 9, 1975 could not command
belief.
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of sale with right to repurchase and the entry in the primary entry book of the
Register of Deeds did not themselves establish the existence of the deed. They proved at best that a document purporting to be a deed of sale
with right to repurchase had been registered with the Register of Deeds. Verily, the registration alone of the deed was not conclusive proof of
its authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner of the property, which was precisely the issue in this case. The explanation for this
is that registration, being a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which an instrument is inscribed in the records of the Register of
Deeds and annotated on the dorsal side of the certificate of title covering the land subject of the instrument. 35 It is relevant to mention that
the law on land registration does not require that only valid instruments be registered, because the purpose of registration is only to give
notice.36
By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public Razon could only be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase
had been notarized by him, but did not establish the due execution of the deed.
The third is that the respondents’ remaining in the peaceful possession of the property was further convincing evidence demonstrating that
the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with right to repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon would have herself asserted and
exercised her right to take over the property, legally and physically speaking, upon the expiration in 1976 of the repurchase period stipulated
under the deed, including transferring the TCT in her name and paying the real property taxes due on the properly. Her inaction was an index
of the falsity of her claim against the respondents.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 18, 2005 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs
of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City
Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 20-33; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis (retired) and Associate Justice
Arturo D. Brion (now a Member of this Court) concurring.

2 Id. at 67-72. 3 Id. at 51-56. 4 Id. at 66. 5 Id. at 57-60. 6 Id. at 67-72. 7 Id. at 68-69. 8 CA Rollo, pp. 23-24.
9 Rollo, pp. 25-32.
10 CA rollo, pp. 101-108.
11 Id. at 117. 12 Rollo, p. 11.
13 Citibank, N.A. Mastercard v. Teodoro, G.R. No. 150905, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 577, 584-585, citing De Vera v. Aguilar, G.R. No.
83377, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 602, 606.

14 Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence, (American Casebook Series), Second Edition, 1982, p. 1007.
15 McCormick on Evidence (Hornbook Series), Third Edition 1984, § 233, p. 707.
16 Lempert and Saltzburg, supra.
17 Francisco, Evidence: Rules of Court in the Philippines (Rules 128-134), Third Edition 1996, p. 56.
18 Lempert and Saltzburg, supra.
19 McCormick on Evidence, supra; R. Francisco, supra.
20 Phil-Ville Development and Housing Corporation v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. 167391, June 8, 2011, 651 SCRA 327, 341.
21 Records, p. 5.
22 Id. at 26. 23 Id. at 148. 24 TSN, August 1, 1997, p. 10. 25 Id.
26 Lempert and Saltzburg, supra, at 1007, to wit:
The best evidence rule does not require that a writing be produced when its existence rather than its contents is at issue. If, for example, the
question arises whether a particular report was written and filed, a witness could testify that the report was made without accounting for the
original. Of course, if it were important to one party to show that the report existed, good trial tactics usually would require the party to
produce the report or account for its absence.
27 See Lee v. People, G.R. No. 159288, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 662 ("xxx It has been held that where the missing document is the
foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where the document is only collaterally involved. xxx If the document is one
in which other persons are also interested, and which has been placed in the hands of a custodian for safekeeping, the custodian must be
required to make a search and the fruitlessness of such search must be shown, before secondary evidence can be admitted. The certificate of
the custody of the document is incompetent to prove the loss or destruction thereof. Such fact must be proved by some person who has
knowledge of such loss.")
28 TSN, August 14, 1997, pp. 54-59.
29 Records, p. 182.
30 Id. at 184. 31 Id. at 186. 32 Id. at 188. 33 TSN, June 6, 1997, p. 11.
34 Records, p. 188.
35 Autocorp Group v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157553, September 8, 2004, 437 SCRA 678, 688.
36 Id.
FIRST DIVISION
SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA G.R. No. 168387

CRUZ,
Petitioners,
Present:
- versus -
CORONA, C. J., Chairperson,
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA VELASCO, JR.,
ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO DEL CASTILLO, and
ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI PEREZ, J.
FERNANDEZ,
Promulgated:
Respondents. August 25, 2010
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.
When the parties admit the contents of written documents but put in issue whether these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of
the parties, the deciding body is authorized to look beyond these instruments and into the contemporaneous and subsequent actions of the parties in order to
determine such intent.
Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a contract, not its wording
which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere typographical errors and defeat
the very purpose of agreements.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] assails the October 7, 2003 Decision,[2] as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. SP
No. 69981. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible error committed by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, the instant petition for review is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision, dated 17 January 2001, rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board of Bayombong[,] Nueva Vizcaya, dated 17 March 1998, is REINSTATED. Costs against
respondents.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The reinstated Decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, in turn, contained the following
dispositive portion:
Accordingly, judgment is rendered:
1. Finding [respondents] to be the owner by re-purchase from RBBI [of] the Murong property covered by TCT No. [T-]62096 (formerly TCT No. 43258);
2. Ordering the cancellation of TCT with CLOA Nos. 395 and 396 in the name[s] of Salun-at Marquez and Nestor de la Cruz respectively, as they are
disqualified to become tenants of the Lantap property;
3. Directing RBBI to sell through VOS the Lantap property to its rightful beneficiary, herein tenant-farmer Nemi Fernandez under reasonable terms and
conditions;
4. Ordering RBBI to return the amount paid to it by Nestor and Salun-at; and ordering the latter to pay 20 cavans of palay per hectare at 46 kilos per
cavan unto [respondents] plus such accrued and unpaid rentals for the past years as may be duly accounted for with the assistance of the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Officer of Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya who is also hereby instructed to assist the parties execute their leasehold contracts and;
5. The order to supervise harvest dated March 11, 1998 shall be observed until otherwise modified or dissolved by the appellate body.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Factual Antecedents
Respondents Espejos were the original registered owners of two parcels of agricultural land, with an area of two hectares each. One is located
at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the other is located in Barangay Murong, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong
property). There is no dispute among the parties that the Lantap property is tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez (Nemi)[6] (who is the husband[7] of
respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), while the Murong property is tenanted by petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).[8]
The respondents mortgaged both parcels of land to Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) to secure certain loans. Upon their failure to pay the loans, the
mortgaged properties were foreclosed and sold to RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated title to the properties and transfer certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in
the name of RBBI. TCT No. T-62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued for the Murong property. It contained the following description:
Beginning at a point marked I on plan H-176292, S. 44034 W. 1656.31 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No 1, Bagabag Townsite, K-27,
thence N. 28 deg. 20 E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence S. 61 deg. 40 E., 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 28 deg. 20 W., 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence N. 61 deg. 40 W., 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning;
Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on the southeast, and southwest by public land; and on the northwest by Public
Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete.Bearings true. Declination 0131 E. Points referred to are marked on plan H-176292. Surveyed
under authority of sections 12-22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in]
December 1912-March 1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons. 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot No. 159 of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.[9]
Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap property and contained the following description:
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan H-105520, N. 80 deg. 32 W., 1150.21 m. from BLLM No. 122, Irrigation project,
thence N. 61 deg. 40E., 200.00 m. to point 2;
thence N. 28 deg. 20E, 100.00 m. to point 3;
thence S. 61 deg. 40E, 200.00 m. to point 4;
thence S. 28 deg. 20W, 100.00 m. to point 1; point of beginning; containing an area of 2.0000 hectares. Bounded on the northeast, southeast, and southwest by
Public land; and on the northwest by Road and public land.Bearings true. Declination 0 deg. 31E., points referred to are marked on plan H-105520. Surveyed
under authority of Section 12-22, Act No. 2874 and in accordance with existing regulations of the Bureau of Lands, by H.O. Bauman Public Land Surveyor, [in]
Dec. 1912-Mar. 1913 and approved on January 6, 1932. Note: This is Lot No. 119-A Lot No. 225 of Bagabag Townsite K-27. All corners are B.I. Conc. Mons. 15x60
cm.[10]
Both TCTs describe their respective subjects as located in Bagabag Townsite, K-27, without any reference to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay Murong.
On February 26, 1985, respondents Espejos bought back one of their lots from RBBI. The Deed of Sale[11] described the property sold as follows:
x x x do hereby SELL, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, absolutely and unconditionally x x x that certain parcel of land, situated in the Municipality of Bagabag, Province
of Nueva Vizcaya, and more particularly bounded and described as follows, to wit:
Beginning at a point marked 1 on plan x x x x Containing an area of 2.000 hectares. Bounded on the NE., by Road; on the SE., and SW by Public Land; and on the
NW., by Public Land, properties claimed by Hilario Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearing true. Declination 013 B. Points referred to are marked on plan H-
176292.
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong (NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee simple in accordance with the Land Registration Act, its title thereto
being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62096 issued by the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya.
As may be seen from the foregoing, the Deed of Sale did not mention the barangay where the property was located but mentioned the title of the property
(TCT No. T-62096), which title corresponds to the Murong property. There is no evidence, however, that respondents took possession of the Murong property,
or demanded lease rentals from the petitioners (who continued to be the tenants of the Murong property), or otherwise exercised acts of ownership over the
Murong property. On the other hand, respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita and brother-in-law of the other respondents), continued working on
the other property -- the Lantap property -- without any evidence that he ever paid rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT
No. T-62096 almost a decade later, on July 1, 1994.[12]
Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, pursuant to Sections 20[13] and 21[14] of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,[15] executed separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLTs) in favor of petitioners Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of the Murong property. Both VLTs described the subject thereof as an agricultural land
located in Barangay Murong and covered by TCT No. T-62836 (which, however, is the title corresponding to the Lantap property).[16]
After the petitioners completed the payment of the purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the corresponding Certificates of Land Ownership
Award (CLOAs) to petitioners Marquez[17] and Dela Cruz[18] on September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated that their subjects were parcels of agricultural land
situated in Barangay Murong.[19] The CLOAs were registered in the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya on September 5, 1991.
On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 years after the Deed of Sale in favor of the respondents and almost seven years after the execution of VLTs in favor of the
petitioners), respondents filed a Complaint[20] before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of
petitioners CLOAs, the deposit of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor of respondents, and the execution of a deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI in favor
of respondent Nemi. The complaint was based on respondents theory that the Murong property, occupied by the petitioners, was owned by the respondents
by virtue of the 1985 buy-back, as documented in the Deed of Sale. They based their claim on the fact that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No. 62096, which
pertains to the Murong property.
Petitioners filed their Answer[21] and insisted that they bought the Murong property as farmer-beneficiaries thereof. They maintained that they have always
displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to RBBI when it became the owner of the Murong property, bought the same from RBBI upon the honest belief that
they were buying the Murong property, and occupied and exercised acts of ownership over the Murong property. Petitioners also argued that what
respondents Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 was actually the Lantap property, as evidenced by their continued occupation and possession of the Lantap
property through respondent Nemi.
RBBI answered[22] that it was the Lantap property which was the subject of the buy-back transaction with respondents Espejos. It denied committing a grave
mistake in the transaction and maintained its good faith in the disposition of its acquired assets in conformity with the rural banking rules and regulations.
OIC-RARAD Decision[23]
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T-62096 appeared on respondents Deed of
Sale and the said title refers to the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD concluded that the subject of sale was indeed the Murong property. On the other hand,
since the petitioners VLTs referred to TCT No. T-62836, which corresponds to the Lantap property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners CLOAs necessarily refer
to the Lantap property. As for the particular description contained in the VLTs that the subject thereof is the Murong property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it was
a mere typographical error.
Further, since the VLTs covered the Lantap property and petitioners are not the actual tillers thereof, the OIC-RARAD declared that they were disqualified to
become tenants of the Lantap property and ordered the cancellation of their CLOAs. It then ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold contract with the real tenant of
the Lantap property, Nemi.
The OIC-RARAD recognized that petitioners only right as the actual tillers of the Murong property is to remain as the tenants thereof after the execution of
leasehold contracts with and payment of rentals in arrears to respondents.
DARAB Decision[24]
Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled that in assailing the validity of the CLOAs issued to petitioners as bona
fide tenant-farmers, the burden of proof rests on the respondents. There being no evidence that the DAR field personnel were remiss in the performance of
their official duties when they issued the corresponding CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the presumption of regular performance of duty prevails. This conclusion
is made more imperative by the respondents admission that petitioners are the actual tillers of the Murong property, hence qualified beneficiaries thereof.
As for respondents allegation that they bought back the Murong property from RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they failed to support their allegation with
substantial evidence. It gave more credence to RBBIs claim that respondents repurchased the Lantap property, not the Murong property. Respondents, as
owners of the Lantap property, were ordered to enter into an agricultural leasehold contract with their brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual tenant of the
Lantap property.
The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001 Decision in this wise:
We find no basis or justification to question the authenticity and validity of the CLOAs issued to appellants as they are by operation of law qualified beneficiaries
over the landholdings; there is nothing to quiet as these titles were awarded in conformity with the CARP program implementation; and finally, the Board
declares that all controverted claims to or against the subject landholding must be completely and finally laid to rest.
WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding reversible errors[,] the assailed decision is ANNULLED and a new judgment is hereby rendered, declaring:
1. Appellants Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz as the bona fide tenant-tillers over the Murong property and therefore they are the qualified
beneficiaries thereof;
2. Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 395 and 396 issued in the name of [farmer-beneficiaries] Salun-at Marquez and Nestor Dela Cruz
respectively, covered formerly by TCT No. 62096 (TCT No. 43258) of the Murong property as valid and legal;
3. Ordering the co-[respondents] to firm-up an agricultural leasehold contract with bona fide tenant-tiller Nemi Fernandez over the Lantap property, [the
latter] being the subject matter of the buy back arrangement entered into between [respondents] and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Incorporated, and other
incidental matters are deemed resolved.
SO ORDERED.[25]
In appealing to the CA, the respondents insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling that they repurchased the Lantap property, while the petitioners were awarded
the Murong property. They were adamant that the title numbers indicated in their respective deeds of conveyance should control in determining the subjects
thereof. Since respondents Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the property with TCT No. T-62096, then what was sold to them was the Murong
property. On the other hand, petitioners VLTs and CLOAs say that they cover the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be understood that they were
awarded the Lantap property. Respondents added that since petitioners are not the actual tillers of the Lantap property, their CLOAs should be cancelled due to
their lack of qualification.
The CA agreed with the respondents. Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as to
its contents, particularly the description of the land which was the object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale expressed that its subject is the land covered by TCT
No. T-62096 the Murong property then that is the property that the respondents repurchased.
The CA further ruled that as for petitioners VLTs, the same refer to the property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap
property. The additional description in the VLTs that the subject thereof is located in Barangay Murong was considered to be a mere typographical error. The
CA ruled that the technical description contained in the TCT is more accurate in identifying the subject property since the same particularly describes the
properties metes and bounds.
Both the RBBI[26] and petitioners[27] filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which were separately denied.[28]
On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this Court.[29] RBBI raised the issue that the CA failed
to appreciate that respondents did not come to court with clean hands because they misled RBBI to believe at the time of the sale that the two lots were not
tenanted. RBBI also asked that they be declared free from any liability to the parties as it did not enrich itself at anyones expense. RBBIs petition was dismissed
on July 26, 2004 for lack of merit. The said Resolution reads:
Considering the allegations, issues[,] and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari, the Court Resolves to DENY the petition for lack of sufficient
showing that the Court of Appeals had committed any reversible error in the questioned judgment to warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary
appellate jurisdiction in this case.[30]
Their Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied with finality.[31] Entry of judgment was made in that case on December 15, 2004.[32]
On July 27, 2005,[33] petitioners filed the instant petition.
Issues
Rephrased and consolidated, the parties present the following issues for the Courts determination:
I
What is the effect of the final judgment dismissing RBBIs Petition for Review on Certiorari, which assailed the same CA Decision
II
Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts
III
What are the subject properties of the parties respective contracts with RBBI
Our Ruling
Propriety of the Petition

Respondents maintain that the instant petition for review raises factual issues which are beyond the province of Rule 45.[34]
The issues involved herein are not entirely factual. Petitioners assail the appellate courts rejection of their evidence (as to the contractual intent) as inadmissible
under the Best Evidence Rule. The question involving the admissibility of evidence is a legal question that is within the Courts authority to review.[35]
Besides, even if it were a factual question, the Court is not precluded to review the same. The rule that a petition for review should raise only questions of law
admits of exceptions, among which are (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misappreciation of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on
the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.[36]
In the instant case, we find sufficient basis to apply the exceptions to the general rule because the appellate court misappreciated the facts of the case through
its erroneous application of the Best Evidence Rule, as will be discussed below. Moreover, the disparate rulings of the three reviewing bodies below are
sufficient for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction under Rule 45.
First Issue
Dismissal of RBBIs appeal
Respondents maintain that the Courts earlier dismissal of RBBIs petition

for review of the same CA Decision is eloquent proof that there is no reversible error in the appellate courts decision in favor of the respondents.[37]
We are not persuaded. This Court dismissed RBBIs earlier petition in G.R. No. 163320 because it failed to convincingly demonstrate the alleged errors in the CA
Decision. The bank did not point out the inadequacies and errors in the appellate courts decision but simply placed the responsibility for the confusion on the
respondents for allegedly misleading the bank as to the identity of the properties and for misrepresenting that the two lots were not tenanted. Thus, RBBI
argued that respondents did not come to court with clean hands.
These arguments were ineffectual in convincing the Court to review the appellate courts Decision. It is the appellants responsibility to point out the perceived
errors in the appealed decision.When a party merely raises equitable considerations such as the clean hands doctrine without a clear-cut legal basis and cogent
arguments to support his claim, there should be no surprise if the Court is not swayed to exercise its appellate jurisdiction and the appeal is dismissed outright.
The dismissal of an appeal does not always and necessarily mean that the appealed decision is correct, for it could simply be the result of the appellants
inadequate discussion, ineffectual arguments, or even procedural lapses.
RBBIs failure to convince the Court of the merits of its appeal should not prejudice petitioners who were not parties to RBBIs appeal, especially because
petitioners duly filed a separate appeal and were able to articulately and effectively present their arguments. A party cannot be deprived of his right to appeal an
adverse decision just because another party had already appealed ahead of him,[38] or just because the other partys separate appeal had already been
dismissed.[39]
There is another reason not to bind the petitioners to the final judgment against RBBI. RBBI executed the transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners prior to the
commencement of the action. Thus, when the action for cancellation of CLOA was filed, RBBI had already divested itself of its title to the two properties
involved. Under the rule on res judicata, a judgment (in personam) is conclusive only between the parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action.[40] Thus, when the vendor (in this case RBBI) has already transferred his title to third persons (petitioners), the said transferees
are not bound by any judgment which may be rendered against the vendor.[41]
Second Issue
Is it correct to apply the Best Evidence Rule?
Citing the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that the Deed of Sale between respondents and RBBI is the best evidence as to the property
that was sold by RBBI to the respondents. Since the Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the land covered by TCT No. T-62096 the title for the Murong property
then the property repurchased by the respondents was the Murong property. Likewise, the CA held that since the VLTs between petitioners and RBBI refer to
TCT No. T-62836 the title for the Lantap property then the property transferred to petitioners was the Lantap property.
Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in using the best evidence rule to determine the subject of the Deed of Sale and the Deeds of Voluntary Land
Transfer. They maintain that the issue in the case is not the contents of the contracts but the intention of the parties that was not adequately expressed in their
contracts. Petitioners then argue that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that should be applied in order to adequately resolve the dispute.
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its application of the Best Evidence Rule. The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a
document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as a
general rule. The original is preferred because it reduces the chance of undetected tampering with the document.[42]
In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. It is
admitted by the parties that the respondents Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T-62096 as its subject; while the petitioners Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
referred to TCT No. T-62836 as its subject, which is further described as located in Barangay Murong.
The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents adequately and correctly express the true intention of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale,
petitioners (and RBBI) maintain thatwhile it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties actually intended the sale of the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T-
62836).
As to the VLTs, respondents contend that the reference to TCT No. T-62836 (corresponding to the Lantap property) reflects the true intention of RBBI and the
petitioners, and the reference toBarangay Murong was a typographical error. On the other hand, petitioners claim that the reference to Barangay Murong
reflects their true intention, while the reference to TCT No. T-62836 was a mere error. This dispute reflects an intrinsic ambiguity in the contracts, arising from an
apparent failure of the instruments to adequately express the true intention of the parties. To resolve the ambiguity, resort must be had to evidence outside of
the instruments.
The CA, however, refused to look beyond the literal wording of the documents and rejected any other evidence that could shed light on the actual intention of
the contracting parties. Though the CA cited the Best Evidence Rule, it appears that what it actually applied was the Parol Evidence Rule instead, which provides:
When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties
and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[43]
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or
instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol
Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence
that would contradict such terms.
However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed
between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as
between the parties and their successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a
privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.[44]
Moreover, the instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9:
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the petitioners VLTs suffer from intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described the subject property as covered by TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they
also describe the subject property as being located in Barangay Murong. Even the respondents Deed of Sale falls under the exception to the Parol Evidence
Rule. It refers to TCT No. T-62096 (Murong property), but RBBI contended that the true intent was to sell the Lantap property. In short, it was squarely put in
issue that the written agreement failed to express the true intent of the parties.
Based on the foregoing, the resolution of the instant case necessitates an examination of the parties respective parol evidence, in order to determine the true
intent of the parties. Well-settled is the rule that in case of doubt, it is the intention of the contracting parties that prevails, for the intention is the soul of a
contract,[45] not its wording which is prone to mistakes, inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold otherwise would give life, validity, and precedence to mere
typographical errors and defeat the very purpose of agreements.
In this regard, guidance is provided by the following articles of the Civil Code involving the interpretation of contracts:
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall
control.
If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise enlightening:
Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the
situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to
interpret.
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were
intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners. This may be seen from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties.
Third issue
Determining the intention of the parties
regarding the subjects of their contracts
We are convinced that the subject of the Deed of Sale between RBBI and the respondents was the Lantap property, and not the Murong property. After the
execution in 1985 of the Deed of Sale, the respondents did not exercise acts of ownership that could show that they indeed knew and believed that they
repurchased the Murong property. They did not take possession of the Murong property. As admitted by the parties, the Murong property was in the
possession of the petitioners, who occupied and tilled the same without any objection from the respondents.Moreover, petitioners paid leasehold rentals for
using the Murong property to RBBI, not to the respondents.
Aside from respondents neglect of their alleged ownership rights over the Murong property, there is one other circumstance that convinces us that what
respondents really repurchased was the Lantap property. Respondent Nemi (husband of respondent Elenita) is the farmer actually tilling the Lantap property,
without turning over the supposed landowners share to RBBI. This strongly indicates that the respondents considered themselves (and not RBBI) as the owners
of the Lantap property. For if respondents (particularly spouses Elenita and Nemi) truly believed that RBBI retained ownership of the Lantap property, how
come they never complied with their obligations as supposed tenants of RBBIs land? The factual circumstances of the case simply do not support the theory
propounded by the respondents.
We are likewise convinced that the subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners was the Murong property, and not the Lantap
property. When the VLTs were executed in 1990, petitioners were already the tenant-farmers of the Murong property, and had been paying rentals to RBBI
accordingly. It is therefore natural that the Murong property and no other was the one that they had intended to acquire from RBBI with the execution of the
VLTs. Moreover, after the execution of the VLTs, petitioners remained in possession of the Murong property, enjoying and tilling it without any opposition from
anybody. Subsequently, after the petitioners completed their payment of the total purchase price of P90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) officials conducted their investigation of the Murong property which, with the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, did not reveal
any anomaly. Petitioners were found to be in actual possession of the Murong property and were the qualified beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR officials
issued CLOAs in petitioners favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer to the land in Barangay Murong. All this time, petitioners were in possession of the Murong
property, undisturbed by anyone for several long years, until respondents started the controversy in 1997.
All of these contemporaneous and subsequent actions of RBBI and petitioners support their position that the subject of their contract (VLTs) is the Murong
property, not the Lantap property.Conversely, there has been no contrary evidence of the parties actuations to indicate that they intended the sale of the
Lantap property. Thus, it appears that the reference in their VLT to TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was due to their honest but mistaken belief that the said
title covers the Murong property. Such a mistake is not farfetched considering that TCT No. T-62836 only refers to the Municipality of Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya, and does not indicate the particular barangay where the property is located. Moreover, both properties are bounded by a road and public land. Hence,
were it not for the detailed technical description, the titles for the two properties are very similar.
The respondents attempt to discredit petitioners argument that their VLTs were intrinsically ambiguous and failed to express their true intention by asking why
petitioners never filed an action for the reformation of their contract.[46] A cause of action for the reformation of a contract only arises when one of the
contracting parties manifests an intention, by overt acts, not to abide by the true agreement of the parties.[47] It seems fairly obvious that petitioners had no
cause to reform their VLTs because the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners) never had any dispute as to the interpretation and application thereof. They both
understood the VLTs to cover the Murong property (and not the Lantap property). It was only much later, when strangers to the contracts argued for a different
interpretation, that the issue became relevant for the first time.
All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the
Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. In consequence,
the CAs ruling against RBBI should not be executed as such execution would be inconsistent with our ruling herein. Although the CAs decision had already
become final and executory as against RBBI with the dismissal of RBBIs petition in G.R. No. 163320, our ruling herein in favor of petitioners is a supervening
cause which renders the execution of the CA decision against RBBI unjust and inequitable.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed October 7, 2003 Decision, as well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 69981 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The January 17, 2001 Decision of the DARAB Central Office is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale
dated February 26, 1985 between respondents and Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap property under TCT No. T-62836, while the Deeds of
Voluntary Land Transfer and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-396 of the petitioners cover the Murong property under TCT No. T-62096. The Register of Deeds of
Nueva Vizcaya is directed to make the necessary corrections to the titles of the said properties in accordance with this Decision. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
[1] Rollo of G.R. No. 168387, pp. 10-26.

[2] Id. at 27-35; penned by Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia Alino-Hormachuelos and
Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
[3] Id. at 36-37. [4] Id. at 34.
[5] Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicators (RARADs) Decision dated March 17, 1998, pp. 4-5; DARAB records, pp. 101-102.
[6] CA Decision, pp. 5-6; rollo of G.R. No. 168387, pp. 32-33. Respondents Memorandum, p. 7; id. at 125.
[7] DARAB records, p. 57.
[8] CA Decision, pp. 5-6; rollo of G.R. No. 168387, pp. 32-33. Respondents Memorandum, p. 7; id. at 125.
[9] DARAB records, p. 74.
[10] Id. at 69. [11] Id. at 71-72.
[12] Entry No. 229242 - DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE executed by the Rural Bank of Bayombong, NV, Inc., represented by Manager, Romeo F.
Ramos, Jr., in favor of ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRO ESPEJO, OTHANIEL ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO, ORLANDO
ESPEJO, OSMONDO ESPEJO, for the sum of P9,562 notarized by Miguel M. Guevara, Notary Public; under Doc. No. 51; Page No. 11; Book XIV;
Series of 1985 dated February 26, 1985 and inscribed July 1, 1994 at 10:45 A.M. (Id. at 74).
[13] Section 20. Voluntary Land Transfer. Landowners of agricultural lands subject to acquisition under this Act may enter into a voluntary
arrangement for direct transfer of their lands to qualified beneficiaries x x x:

[14] Section 21. Payment of Compensation by Beneficiaries under Voluntary Land Transfer. Direct payment in cash or in kind may be made by
the farmer-beneficiary to the landowner under terms to be mutually agreed upon by both parties, which shall be binding upon them, upon
registration with and approval by the DAR. Said approval shall be considered given, unless notice of disapproval is received by the farmer-
beneficiary within 30 days from the date of registration. x x x
[15] COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988.
[16] That the LANDOWNER voluntarily transfer his ownership over a parcel of agricultural land and covered by R.A. 6657 and opted to be paid directly by the
FARMER-BENEFICIARY. The said agricultural land is situated at Murong, Reservation Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya and particularly described as follows:
OCT/TCT No. T-62836
x x x x (CA rollo, pp. 93 and 96)
[17] TCT No. CLOA - 395 (DARAB records, p. 84). Registered with the Land Registration Authority on September 5, 1991.
[18] TCT No. CLOA - 396 (Id. at 85). Registered with the Land Registration Authority on September 5, 1991.
[19] TO ALL WHOM THESE PRESENTS SHALL COME, GREETINGS:
WHEREAS, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657, dated June 10, 1988, INSTITUTING A COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM PROGRAM TO
PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE AND INDUSTRIALIZATION AND PROVIDING THE MECHANISM FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION, there is hereby awarded unto SALUN-AT
MARQUEZ [and NESTOR DELA CRUZ], a parcel of agricultural land situated in Barangay Murong, Municipality of Bagabag, Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Island of
Luzon, Philippines, containing an area of TEN THOUSAND (10,000 sq. m.) square meters, more or less, which is now more particularly bounded and described at
the back hereof.
xxxx
Reference: This certificate is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-62836.
(Id. at 84-85).
[20] Id. at 1-8. Docketed as DARAB Case No. II-162-NV-97.
[21] Id. at 21-25. [22] Id. at 11-13. [23] Id. at 79-83.
[24] Id. at 145-132. Docketed as DARAB Case No. 7554.
[25] DARAB Decision, pp. 13-14; id. at 133-132.
[26] CA rollo, pp. 142-147.
[27] Id. at 247-254.
[28] Resolution dated March 19, 2004 (Id. at 153) denying RBBIs Motion for Reconsideration; Resolution dated May 11, 2005 (Id. at 257-258)
denying herein petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

[29] Id. at 178-190. Entitled Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. represented by its President/General Manager Romeo F. Ramos, Jr., vs. Eloisa Espejo,
et al.
[30] Rollo of G.R. No. 163320, p. 91.
[31] Id. at 107. [32] Id. at 108.
[33] Upon petitioners motion, the Court issued a Resolution on July 20, 2005 granting petitioners a thirty- (30) day extension to file the Petition
for Review on Certiorari. (Rollo of G.R. No. 168387, p. 8)

[34] Respondents Memorandum, p. 9; id. at 127.
[35] See People v. Exala, G.R. No. 76005, April 23, 1993, 221 SCRA 494, 499; People v. Judge Seeris, 187 Phil. 558, 560 (1980); People v.
Alarcon, 78 Phil. 732, 737 (1947).

[36] Reyes v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 166516, September 3, 2009, 598 SCRA 61, 74. Emphasis supplied.
[37] Respondents Memorandum, p. 10; rollo of G.R. No. 168387, p. 128.
[38] See Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, 162 Phil. 430, 438 (1976).
[39] See Citibank, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) v. Sabeniano, G.R. No. 156132, October 16, 2006, 504 SCRA 378, 403-405.
[40] RULES OF COURT, Rule 39, Section 47 (b).
[41] See De Leon v. De Leon, 98 Phil. 589, 591-592 (1956).
[42] The Best Evidence Rule comes into play when a reproduction of the original or oral evidence is offered to prove the contents of a
document. The purpose of the rule requiring the production of the best evidence is the prevention of fraud, because if a party is in possession
of [the best] evidence and withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the presumption naturally arises that the better
evidence is withheld for fraudulent purposes which its production would expose and defeat. Asuncion v. National Labor Relations Commission,
414 Phil. 329, 339 (2001).
[43] RULES OF COURT, RULE 130, Section 9, first paragraph.
[44] Lechugas v. Court of Appeals, 227 Phil. 310, 319 (1986).
[45] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr., G.R. No. 113375, May 5, 1994, 232 SCRA 110, 143.
[46] Respondents Memorandum, p. 16; rollo of G.R. No. 168387, p. 134.
[47] Multi-Realty Development Corporation v. Makati Tuscany Condominium Corporation, G.R. No. 146726, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 9, 30-31,
citing Tormon v. Cutanda, 119 Phil. 84, 87-88 (1963).

SECOND DIVISION
NISSAN NORTH EDSA operating under the name G.R. No. 179470
MOTOR CARRIAGE, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
-versus- CORONA*,
BRION,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
UNITED PHILIPPINE SCOUT VETERANS DETECTIVE
AND PROTECTIVE AGENCY,
Respondent. Promulgated:
April 20, 2010
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
80580. The challenged decision affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 200, Las Pias City, in Civil Case No.
LP-02-0265 which, in turn, affirmed the Decision[3] of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 79, Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. 4542.
The Facts
Respondent United Philippine Scout Veterans Detective and Protective Agency (United) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of
providing security services.[4] In 1993, it entered into a contract for security services with petitioner[5] Nissan North Edsa (Nissan), and
beginning 23 April 1993, it was able to post 18 security guards within Nissans compound located in EDSA Balintawak, Quezon City.[6]
In the morning of 31 January 1996, Nissan informed United, through the latters General Manager, Mr. Ricarte Galope (Galope), that its services
were being terminated beginning 5:00 p.m. of that day.[7] Galope personally pleaded with the personnel manager of Nissan to reconsider its
decision.[8] When Nissan failed to act on this verbal request, Galope wrote a Letter[9] dated 5 February 1996, addressed to Nissans general
manager, formally seeking a reconsideration of its action. As this was likewise ignored, Uniteds President and Chairman of the Board wrote a
Letter[10] dated 27 February 1996, addressed to Nissans President and General Manager, demanding payment of the amount equivalent to
thirty (30) days of service in view of Nissans act of terminating Uniteds services without observing the required 30-day prior written notice as
stipulated under paragraph 17 of their service contract.
As a result of Nissans continued failure to comply with Uniteds demands, the latter filed a case for Sum of Money with damages before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City.
In its Answer, Nissan maintained that the above-mentioned paragraph 17 of the service contract expressly confers upon either party the
power to terminate the contract, without the necessity of a prior written notice, in cases of violations of the provisions thereof. [11] Nissan
alleged that United violated the terms of their contract, thereby allowing Nissan to unilaterally terminate the services of United without prior
notice.[12]
It appears that on 3 November 1995, Uniteds night supervisor and night security guard did not report for duty. [13] This incident was the subject
of a Memorandum issued by Nissans security officer to Uniteds officer-in-charge stationed at its security detachment. [14] Then, on 16 January
1996, at noontime, the security supervisor assigned at Nissans premises abandoned his post. [15] Although the general manager of United
directed the immediate replacement of its security supervisor,[16] Nissan nevertheless claimed that its premises had been exposed to threats in
security, which allegedly constitutes a clear violation of the provisions of the service contract.[17]
On 6 April 2001, Nissans counsel withdrew his appearance in the case with Nissans conformity. Despite the directive of the trial court for
Nissan to hire another lawyer, no new counsel was engaged by it. Accordingly, the case was submitted for decision on the basis of the
evidence adduced by respondent United.[18]
The Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court
In its Decision dated 31 July 2002, the Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of herein respondent United. The trial court pronounced that
Nissan has not adduced any evidence to substantiate its claim that the terms of their contract were violated by United; and that absent any
showing that violations were committed, the 30-day prior written notice should have been observed.[19]
It thus rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff as follows:
1. The sum of P108,651.00 plus legal interest from February 1, 1996 until fully paid as actual damages;
2. The sum of P20,000.000 as exemplary damages;
3. The sum of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees and other litigation expenses; and
4. Costs of suit.[20]
Nissan appealed to the Regional Trial Court, questioning the award of actual and exemplary damages, as well as the directive to pay attorneys
fees and litigation expenses. It alleged that there was no evidence to support the award of actual damages, as the service contract, upon which
the amount of the award was based, was never presented nor offered as evidence in the trial.[21] Furthermore, no evidence was adduced to
show bad faith on the part of Nissan in unilaterally terminating the contract, making the award of exemplary damages improper.[22]
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision dated 10 June 2003, the Regional Trial Court declared the appeal without merit as there appears no cogent reason to reverse
the findings and rulings of the lower court.[23] It denied the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Nissan filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Regional Trial Court but the same was denied in an Order [24] dated 15 October
2003.
Nissan further went on an appeal to the Court of Appeals, citing the same assignment of errors it presented before the Regional Trial Court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The 14 February 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision dated 10 June 2003 and the 15 October 2003 Order of the
Regional Trial Court, with the modification that the award for exemplary damages was deleted. The Court of Appeals held that the breach of
contract was not done by Nissan in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.[25]
Nissan sought reconsideration of the decision affirming the judgment of the lower court but the Court of Appeals denied the same in a
Resolution[26] promulgated on 24 August 2007.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
Petitioner Nissan insists that no judgment can properly be rendered against it, as respondent United failed, during the trial of the case, to offer
in evidence the service contract upon which it based its claim for sum of money and damages. As a result, the decisions of the lower courts
were mere postulations.[27] Nissan asserts that the resolution of this case calls for the application of the best evidence rule.[28]
The Ruling of the Court
The petition is without merit. We thus sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Nissans reliance on the best evidence rule is misplaced. The best evidence rule is the rule which requires the highest grade of evidence to
prove a disputed fact.[29] However, the same applies only when the contents of a document are the subject of the inquiry. [30] In this case, the
contents of the service contract between Nissan and United have not been put in issue. Neither United nor Nissan disputes the contents of the
service contract; as in fact, both parties quoted and relied on the same provision of the contract (paragraph 17) to support their respective
claims and defenses. Thus, the best evidence rule finds no application here.
The real issue in this case is whether or not Nissan committed a breach of contract, thereby entitling United to damages in the amount
equivalent to 30 days service.
We rule in the affirmative.
At the heart of the controversy is paragraph 17 of the service contract, which reads:
However, violations committed by either party on the provisions of this Contract shall be sufficient ground for the termination of this contract,
without the necessity of prior notice, otherwise a thirty (30) days prior written notice shall be observed. [31]
Nissan argues that the failure of Uniteds security guards to report for duty on two occasions, without justifiable cause, constitutes a violation
of the provisions of the service contract, sufficient to entitle Nissan to terminate the same without the necessity of a 30-day prior notice.
We hold otherwise.
As the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City stated in its decision, Nissan did not adduce any evidence to substantiate its claim that the
terms of the contract were violated by United.
What Nissan failed to do is to point out or indicate the specific provisions of the service contract which were violated by United as a result of
the latters lapses in security.In so failing, Nissans act of unilaterally terminating the contract constitutes a breach thereof, entitling United to
collect actual damages.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 14 February 2007 and the Resolution dated 24 August 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 80580
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo per raffle dated April 14, 2010.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Lucenito N. Tagle with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Mariano C. Del Castillo (now an Associate
Justice of this Court) concurring. Rollo, p. 39.

[2] Penned by Judge Leopoldo E. Baraquia. Id. at 89.
[3] Penned by Judge Pio M. Pasia. Id. at 56.
[4] Id. at 1. [5] Id. at 16. [6] Id. at 1. [7] Id. at 2. [8] Id. [9] Id. at 108. [10] Id. at 109.
[11] Id. at 22. [12] Id. [13] Id. at 23. [14] Id. [15] Id. at 22. [16] Id. at 57.
[17] Id. at 22. [18] Id. at 42. [19] Id. at 59. [20] Id. [21] Id. at 64. [22] Id. at 71. [23] Id. at 91.
[24] Id. at 102. [25] Id. at 51. [26] Id. at 53. [27] Id. at 20.
[28] Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce
it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and
the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of the public officer or is recorded in a public office.
[29] Gaw v. Chua, G.R. No. 160855, 16 April 2008, 551 SCRA 505, 521-522.
[30] Rollo, p. 42.
[31] Id. at 42.
SECOND DIVISION
PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR., G.R. No. 142641

Petitioner, v e r s u s - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
July 17, 2006
x------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the April 28, 1999 decision[1] and March 27, 2000 resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 19601 affirming the trial courts judgment finding petitioner Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr. liable for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 22,
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The facts of the case as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals follow.
On March 14, 1991, [petitioner], obtained a loan from private complainant Josefino Cenizal [] in the amount of P100,000.00. Several weeks
thereafter, [petitioner] obtained an additional loan of P50,000.00 from [Cenizal]. [Petitioner] then issued in favor of Cenizal, Bank of the
Philippine Islands [(BPI)] Check No. 163255, postdated August 4, 1991, forP150,000.00, at Cenizals house located at
70 Panay Avenue, Quezon City. When August 4, 1991 came, [Cenizal] did not deposit the check immediately because [petitioner] promised []
that he would replace the check with cash. Such promise was made verbally seven (7) times. When his patience ran out, [Cenizal] brought the
check to the bank for encashment. The head office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands through a letter dated December 5, 1991, informed
[Cenizal] that the check bounced because of insufficient funds.
Thereafter, [Cenizal] went to the house of [petitioner] to inform him of the dishonor of the check but [Cenizal] found out that [petitioner] had
left the place. So, [Cenizal] referred the matter to a lawyer who wrote a letter giving [petitioner] three days from receipt thereof to pay the
amount of the check. [Petitioner] still failed to make good the amount of the check. As a consequence, [Cenizal] executed on January 20, 1992
before the office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City his affidavit and submitted documents in support of his complaint for [e]stafa and
[v]iolation of [BP 22] against [petitioner]. After due investigation, this case for [v]iolation of [BP 22] was filed against [petitioner] on March 27,
1992. The check in question and the return slip were however lost by [Cenizal] as a result of a fire that occurred near his residence on
September 16, 1992. [Cenizal] executed an Affidavit of Loss regarding the loss of the check in question and the return slip. [3]
After trial, petitioner was found guilty as charged. Aggrieved, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, on April 28, 1999, the appellate
court affirmed the trial courts decision in toto. Petitioner sought reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him despite the failure of the prosecution to present the dishonored
check during the trial. He also contends that he should not be held liable for the dishonor of the check because it was presented beyond the
90-day period provided under the law. Petitioner further questions his conviction since the notice requirement was not complied with and he
was given only three days to pay, not five banking days as required by law. Finally, petitioner asserts that he had already paid his obligation
to Cenizal.
Petitioners contentions have no merit.
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 90-DAY PERIOD

FOR PRESENTMENT OF THE CHECK
Petitioner asserts that there was no violation of BP 22 because the check was presented to the drawee bank only on December 5, 1991 or 120
days from the date thereof (August 4, 1991). He argues that this was beyond the 90-day period provided under the law in connection with the
presentment of the check. We disagree.
Section 1 of BP 22 provides:
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. ― Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its
presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored
for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of
not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which
fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who, having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws
and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period
of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.
Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer
shall be liable under this Act.
In Wong v. Court of Appeals,[4] the Court ruled that the 90-day period provided in the law is not an element of the offense. Neither does it
discharge petitioner from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable time from the date indicated in the
check. According to current banking practice, the reasonable period within which to present a check to the drawee bank is six months.
Thereafter, the check becomes stale and the drawer is discharged from liability thereon to the extent of the loss caused by the delay.
Thus, Cenizals presentment of the check to the drawee bank 120 days (four months) after its issue was still within the allowable period.
Petitioner was freed neither from the obligation to keep sufficient funds in his account nor from liability resulting from the dishonor of the
check.
APPLICABILITY OF THE
BEST EVIDENCE RULE
Petitioners insistence on the presentation of the check in evidence as a condition sine qua non for conviction under BP 22 is wrong. Petitioner
anchors his argument on Rule 130, Section 3, of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the best evidence rule. However, the rule applies only
where the content of the document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the issue is the execution or existence of the document or the
circumstances surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. [5]
The gravamen of the offense is the act of drawing and issuing a worthless check. [6] Hence, the subject of the inquiry is the fact of issuance or
execution of the check, not its content.
Here, the due execution and existence of the check were sufficiently established. Cenizal testified that he presented the originals of the check,
the return slip and other pertinent documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City when he executed his complaint-
affidavit during the preliminary investigation. The City Prosecutor found a prima facie case against petitioner for violation of BP 22 and filed
the corresponding information based on the documents. Although the check and the return slip were among the documents lost by Cenizal in
a fire that occurred near his residence on September 16, 1992, he was nevertheless able to adequately establish the due execution, existence
and loss of the check and the return slip in an affidavit of loss as well as in his testimony during the trial of the case.
Moreover, petitioner himself admited that he issued the check. He never denied that the check was presented for payment to
the drawee bank and was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
PRESENCE OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE
Based on the allegations in the information,[7] petitioner was charged for violating the first paragraph of BP 22. The elements of the offense
are:
1. the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply to account or for value;
2. knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank
for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment; and
3. subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit, or dishonor of the check for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment. [8]
All these elements are present in this case.

Both the trial and appellate courts found that petitioner issued BPI check no. 163255 postdated August 4, 1991 in the amount of P150,000 in
consideration of a loan which he obtained from Cenizal. When the check was deposited, it was dishonored by the drawee bank for having been
drawn against insufficient funds. There was sufficient evidence on record that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of his funds in
the drawee bank at the time of the issuance of the check. In fact, this was why, on maturity date, he requested the payee not to encash it with
the promise that he would replace it with cash. He made this request and assurance seven times but repeatedly failed to make good on his
promises despite the repeated accommodation granted him by the payee, Cenizal.
NOTICE OF DISHONOR TO PETITIONER

AND PAYMENT OF THE OBLIGATION
The trial court found that, contrary to petitioners claim, Cenizals counsel had informed petitioner in writing of the checks dishonor and
demanded payment of the value of the check. Despite receipt of the notice of dishonor and demand for payment, petitioner still failed to pay
the amount of the check.
Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the period of five banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor within which to pay the
amount of the check.[9] While petitioner may have been given only three days to pay the value of the check, the trial court found that the
amount due thereon remained unpaid even after five banking days from his receipt of the notice of dishonor. This negated his claim that he
had already paid Cenizal and should therefore be relieved of any liability.
Moreover, petitioners claim of payment was nothing more than a mere allegation. He presented no proof to support it. If indeed there was
payment, petitioner should have redeemed or taken the check back in the ordinary course of business. [10] Instead, the check remained in the
possession of the payee who demanded the satisfaction of petitioners obligation when the check became due as well as when the check was
dishonored by the drawee bank.
These findings (due notice to petitioner and nonpayment of the obligation) were confirmed by the appellate court. This Court has no reason to
rule otherwise. Well-settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are not to be
disturbed.[11]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The April 28, 1999 decision and March 27, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 19601 areAFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member of the
Supreme Court) and Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) of the Third Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 17-24.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita Carpio Morales (now a member
of the Supreme Court) and Marina L. Buzon of the Former Third Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, p. 26.
[3] CA decision, rollo, pp. 17-24.
[4] G.R. No. 117857, 02 February 2001, 351 SCRA 100.
[5] Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Volume II, Seventh Revised Edition, 1995, p. 555.
[6] Tan v. Mendez, Jr., 432 Phil. 760 (2002).
[7] The information read:
The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses PACIFICO B. ARCEO, JR. of violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of April 1991, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make, draw and issue in favor of JOSEFINO CENIZAL a check no. 163255 drawn against
the Bank of the Philippine Island[,] a duly established domestic banking institution[,] in the amount in the amount of P150,000.00 Philippine
Currency, postdated August 4, 1991, in payment of an obligation, knowing fully well at the time of issue that [he] did not have the payment of
such check; that upon presentation of said check to said bank for payment, the same was dishonored for the reason that the drawer thereof,
accused Pacifico B. Arceo, Jr., did not have sufficient funds therein, and despite notice of dishonor thereof, accused failed and refused and still
fails and refuses to redeem or make good said check, to the damage and prejudice of the said Josefino Cenizal in the amount aforementioned
and in such other amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, pp. 17-18.)
[8] Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 187 (1998).
[9] Section 2 of BP 22 provides:
Section 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. ― The making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is refused by
the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall
be prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that
such check has not been paid by the drawee.
[10] Tan v. Mendez, Jr., supra; Lim v. People, 420 Phil. 506 (2001).
[11] Miranda v. Besa, G.R. No. 146513, 30 July 2004, 435 SCRA 532

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SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, Petitioners, - versus - ROSALIE PALAA CHUA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 177809

October 16, 2009

The contract of lease reads:

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

This Contract of Lease is entered into by and between:

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

Republic of the Philippines)

Doc. No. _____ ATTY. CALIXTRO B. RAMOS

The MeTC ruled in favor of Rosalie, viz.:

[Spouses Latips] counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

The RTC disposed of the appeal, viz.:

(1) the sum of PhP1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

(2) the sum of PhP500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(4) costs of suit.

Not surprisingly, Spouses Latip filed the present appeal.

On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro[10] is instructive:

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

G.R. No. 145169 May 13, 2004

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioner’s argument is well-taken.

Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence reads:

Vitug, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Corona, JJ., concur.

5 Sec. 1, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

THE COURTS RULING

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

[1] Rollo, pp. 3-24.

The facts, fairly summarized by the appellate court, follow.

Hence, this recourse positing the following issues:

II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE:

We find no reason to depart from the ruling of the CA.

1. Best Evidence Rule

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

[3] Id. at 95-99.

Promulgated: March 17, 2010

RESOLUTION NACHURA, J.:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6899

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 6900

Physical exam: HEENT with in normal limits.

Labs; Vaginal Smear; Negative for Spermatozoa.[5]

Hence, this appeal, assigning the following errors:

Q : When was that?

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

The facts are as follows:

Section 1. Realignment of Administrative Units:

xxx xxx xxx.

B. THE STATE DID NOT GIVE ITS CONSENT TO BE SUED.

It is apropos to reiterate the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency, thus:

Further, in Larin v. Executive Secretary,[20] this Court had occasion to rule:

Article XIX, Section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 provides:

Vitug, (Acting Chairman), Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Peltan Development, Inc. Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-17992

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioners assign the following errors committed by public respondent:[13]

The Courts Ruling

We grant the petition and reverse the public respondent.

Are Private Respondents the Real Parties-in-Interest?

Nonpayment of Docket Fees

Narvasa, C.J., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.