EN BANC On June 4, 1991, respondent CSC issued another order,
requiring petitioner Almonte to show cause why he should not be
[G.R. No. 129133. November 25, 1998]
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE AND INVESTIGATION BUREAU, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court to review and set aside the 7 November
1996 Decision[1]and 18 March 1997 Resolution[2] of the Court of
Appeals[3] in CA - G.R. SP No. 37720.
As culled by the Court of Appeals, the antecedent facts that matter are,
as follows:
In a letter dated October 13, 1988, respondent CSC through
Chairman Patricia A. Sto. Tomas required the Secretary of
Finance to submit to the CSC all appointments in the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB).
Instead of complying with the said letter, petitioner Jose T.
Almonte, as Commissioner of EIIB, wrote a letter dated March
29, 1989, to respondent CSC, requesting for confirmation of
EIIBs exemption from CSC rules and regulations with respect to
appointments and other personnel actions invoking as basis for
such exemption PD No. 1458 and LOI No. 71.
On June 21, 1989, respondent CSC issued the subject
Resolution No. 89-400, denying petitioner Almontes request for
exemption of the EIIB from the coverage of the civil service rules
and regulations and reiterating its order that petitioner
EIIB submit to the CSC all appointments to career or non-career
positions in the Bureau.
Not having received any compliance from petitioners, respondent
CSC, in its Order of December 7, 1990, directed petitioner Jose
T. Almonte to immediately implement Resolution No. 89-400,
with a warning that any EIIB official who shall fail or refuse to
comply with the said order shall be held liable for indirect
contempt.
cited for indirect contempt for his continued refusal to implement
or comply with CSC Resolution No. 89-400 and the Order of
December 7, 1990.
In a letter, dated June 13, 1991, petitioner Almonte explained to
the respondent CSC the reasons of the EIIB for its inability to
comply with Resolution No. 89-400. He invoked PD No. 1458
and LOI No. 71 exempting the EIIB from the coverage of
civil service rules and regulations on appointments and other
personnel actions. Petitioner Almonte prayed that Resolution No.
89-400, the Order of June 4, 1991, and the subsequent orders be
set aside.
On August 22, 1991, respondent CSC issued an order, finding
petitioner Almonte guilty of indirect contempt of the Commission,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Commission hereby
resolves to find and adjudge Jose T. Almonte, Commissioner, EIIB, guilty of
indirectcontempt of the Commission pursuant to Section 12 (11), Book V,
Subtitle A of Executive Order No. 292 and Memorandum Circular No. 42,
series of 1990. He is thus meted the penalty of fine P1,000.00 each day from
the date of receipt of this Order dated December 7, 1990. Accordingly, the
Cashier of the EIIB is hereby directedto deduct from the salary of
Commissioner Almonte the amount of P1,000.00 each day of his failure to
comply with the above CSC Order. Let copies of this Order be furnished the
Resident Auditor of the EIIB as well as the COA, the Secretary of the
Department of Finance and the CSFO-DND, for their information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied therewith, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals on a
Petition for Certiorari. However, on November 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the petition; ratiocinating thus:
The 1987 Constitution is so clear and categorical in its mandate that:
Article IX (B), Section 2 (1). - The civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
The civil service contemplated in the constitutional provision is very
comprehensive in its scope, that it includes every category of officer or
employee of the government, its branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities, and even employees of private corporations, if such
corporations are controlled or owned by the government with original
charters.
In the light of this constitutional mandate, petitioner EIIB, being a
government agency, is necessarily embraced by the civil service. The fact
that positions in the EIIB are primarily confidential did not place it outside the
domain of civil servants, since it is conceded that one holding in the
Government a primarily confidential position is in the Civil Service (Ingles v.
Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171). That fact merely exempts confidential positions in the
EIIB from the constitutional rule that appointments in the civil service shall be
made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as
practicable ... by competitive examination [Art. IX (B), Sec. 2 (2) ]. And it is in
this sense that the provisions of PD 1458, particularly Section 5 and LOI 71
relied upon by the petitioners should be interpreted.
Neither does petitioners contention that if EIIBs positions and personnel
actions will be opened, one may know its operations, movements, targets,
strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being deserve merit, as the same
is pure speculation and conjecture. EIIB officials and personnel remain civil
servants and as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, EIIB officials
occupying confidential positions, remain accountable to the people and are
subject to the same state policies on morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness and courtesy in the civil service. Thus, We hold that the
personnel in the EEIB are covered by the civil service.
xxx
WHEREFORE, the Court upholds Resolution No. 89-400 but
declares CSC Orders of December 7, 1990, June 4, 1991, and of
August 22, 1991, as NULL AND VOID, the Civil Service
Commission not having jurisdiction to cite and punish
Commissioner Jose T. Almonte of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau for indirect contempt of the Commission.
With the denial of its motion for reconsideration by Resolution,
dated March 18, 1997, of the Court of Appeals, petitioner found its way to
this Court via the present Petition; contending, that:
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS COVERED BY CIVIL
SERVICE, RESPONDENT COURT VIOLATED P.D. No. 1458
AND LOI No. 71 WHICH EXPRESSLY EXEMPT IT FROM CIVIL
SERVICE COVERAGE.
The pivotal issue here is: whether or not the petitioner, Economic
Intelligence Investigation Bureau (EIIB), is embraced by the Civil Service.
Section 2, subparagraph (1), Article IX, paragraph (B) of the 1987
Constitution provides:
The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charter.
Succinct and clear is the provision of the Constitution in point that
all government agencies, without exception, are covered by the civil
service.
Petitioner EIIB is a government agency under the Department of
Finance as provided by Section 17, Chapter 4, Title II, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code.[4] Therefore, EIIB is within the ambit of the Civil Service
Law.
The civil service within the contemplation of the aforecited
constitutional provision is comprehensive in scope. It embraces all officers
and employees of the government, its branches, subdivisions and
instrumentalities. Even employees of corporations owned or controlled by
the government, with original charters, are covered thereby.
Petitioner contends that EIIB is expressly exempted from civil service
coverage, under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1458, which provides :
Application of WAPCO and Civil Service Rules - Personnel of the
FDIIB shall be exempted from WAPCO and Civil Service Rules
and Regulations relative to appointments and other personnel
actions: Provided, That they shall be entitled to the benefits and
privileges accorded to government employees ...
On the other hand, LOI No. 71, the Implementing Rules of P.D. No.
1458, reads:
10. It is further directed that personnel of the BII shall be exempt
from OCPC and Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative
to appointments and other personnel actions; Provided, That
they shall be entitled to the benefits accorded to government
employees ... "
Petitioners submission is barren of merit.
 The aforecited provisions of law provide for the exemption of petitioner production, no similar excuse can be made for a privilege resting
EIIB only from Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to on other considerations.
appointments and other personnel actions, but not from the Civil
Service Law or Civil Service Rules and Regulations relative to any other Nor has our attention been called to any law or regulation which
matter. considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified information
...
Neither can we uphold petitioners reliance on Section 26 of Executive
Order No. 127.[5] Petitioner, in gist, asserts exemption from Civil Service All things viewed in proper perspective, we are of the opinion, and so
coverage since the Bureau forms part of the intelligence community created hold, that the Court of Appeals erred not in holding that:
under the said Executive Order. ... [R]espondent CSCs act of requiring petitioner EIIB to submit to
There is merit in the disquisition by the Court of Appeals that it all appointments in the Bureau, for appropriate action, is part of
membership of petitioner EIIB in the intelligence community is of no moment, its administrative function as the central personnel agency of the
insofar as application of the Civil Service Law is concerned. The National government.
Bureau of Investigation (NBI), also a member of the intelligence community WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED; and the Decision of the
which performs functions similar to those of EIIB, e.g., intelligence gathering, Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 37720 AFFIRMED, without any
investigation, research, etc., submits to the Civil Service Commission the pronouncement as to costs.
appointments of all NBI personnel, whether belonging to the career or non-
career service. Besides, in Ingles vs. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171, this Court ruled SO ORDERED.
that one holding in the Government a primarily confidential position is in the
Civil Service. Narvasa, C.J., Davide Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez, Quisumbing, and Pardo,
Equally untenable is petitioners contention that because the personnel JJ., concur.
of EIIB are occupying jobs highly confidential in nature, the EIIB should not
be required to submit the names of its personnel to the Civil Service
Commission.
In Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286 [1995], EIIB was ordered by
the Ombudsman to produce documents relating to personnel
services and salary vouchersof EIIB employees. The Bureau pleaded
that such documents are classified, and knowledge of EIIBs documents
relative to its Personnel Services Funds and its plantilla will inevitably lead to
knowledge of its operations, movements, targets and strategies, which could
destroy the Bureau itself. The Court ruled that the required documents can
be examined by the Ombudsman, explaining that:
... [T]here is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the
personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIBs function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding illegal
activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited
to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting. Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets
it may be sufficient to determine from the circumstances of the
case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the
evidence will expose military matters without compelling
 EN BANC
[G.R. No. 93867 : December 18, 1990.]
192 SCRA 358
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B. YORAC,
in her capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
The petitioner is challenging the designation by the President of the
Philippines of Associate Commissioner Haydee B. Yorac as Acting
Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman
Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding
commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d' etat attempt.
The qualifications of the respondent are conceded by the petitioner
and are not in issue in this case. What is the power of the President
of the Philippines to make the challenged designation in view of the
status of the Commission on Elections as an independent
constitutional body and the specific provision of Article IX-C, Section
1(2) of the Constitution that "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the
Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity."
The petitioner invokes the case of Nacionalista Party v. Bautista, 85
Phil. 101, where President Elpidio Quirino designated the Solicitor
General as acting member of the Commission on Elections and the
Court revoked the designation as contrary to the Constitution. It is
also alleged that the respondent is not even the senior member of
the Commission on Elections, being outranked by Associate
Commissioner Alfredo E. Abueg, Jr.:-cralaw
The petitioner contends that the choice of the Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be
resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the
President of the Philippines violates their independence. He cites the
practice in this Court, where the senior Associate Justice serves as
Acting Chief Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No
designation from the President of the Philippines is necessary.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that no such
designation is necessary in the case of the Supreme Court because
the temporary succession cited is provided for in Section 12 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948. A similar rule is found in Section 5 of BP 129
for the Court of Appeals. There is no such arrangement, however, in
the case of the Commission on Elections. The designation made by
the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for
reasons of "administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the
functions of the COMELEC.
Expediency is a dubious justification. It may also be an
overstatement to suggest that the operations of the Commission on
Elections would have been disturbed or stalemated if the President
of the Philippines had not stepped in and designated an Acting
Chairman. There did not seem to be any such problem. In any event,
even assuming that difficulty, we do not agree that "only the
President (could) act to fill the hiatus," as the Solicitor General
maintains.
Article IX-A, Section 1, of the Constitution expressly describes all the
Constitutional Commissions as "independent." Although essentially
executive in nature, they are not under the control of the President of
the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of
these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the
applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own
discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review
on Certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution in Article
IX-A, Section 7.
The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular
chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be
exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the
Philippines.
A designation as Acting Chairman is by its very terms essentially
temporary and therefore revocable at will. No cause need be
established to justify its revocation. Assuming its validity, the
designation of the respondent as Acting Chairman of the
Commission on Elections may be withdrawn by the President of the is hereby ordered to desist from serving as such. This is without
Philippines at any time and for whatever reason she sees fit. It is prejudice to the incumbent Associate Commissioners of the
doubtful if the respondent, having accepted such designation, will not Commission on Elections restoring her to the same position if they
be estopped from challenging its withdrawal.chanrobles virtual law so desire, or choosing another member in her place, pending the
library appointment of a permanent Chairman by the President of the
Philippines with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.: rd
It is true, as the Solicitor General points out, that the respondent
cannot be removed at will from her permanent position as Associate SO ORDERED.
Commissioner. It is no less true, however, that she can be replaced
Fernan C . J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras,
as Acting Chairman, with or without cause, and thus deprived of the
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and
powers and perquisites of that temporary position.
Regalado, JJ., concur.
The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by
extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. This Sarmiento, J., took no part.
is still a government of laws and not of men. The problem allegedly
sought to be corrected, if it existed at all, did not call for presidential
action. The situation could have been handled by the members of
the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of
the President, however well-meaning.
In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the
Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the
seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any
event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the
President to make.
The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the
Philippines was moved only by the best of motives when she issued
the challenged designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we
cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the Constitution.
Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista
case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.
The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence
of the Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the
security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to
the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections
by designation of the President of the Philippines.
WHEREFORE, the designation by the President of the Philippines of
respondent Haydee B. Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission
on Elections is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, and the respondent