AC. No. 10912, January 19, 2016 complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check No.

complainant, Citystate Savings Bank Check No. 0088551, dated August 31,
PAULINA T. YU, Complainant, v. ATTY. BERLIN R. DELA CRUZ, 2011, in the amount of P34,500.00. Upon presentment, however,
Respondent. complainant was shocked to learn that the check was dishonored for the
reason, "Account Closed."4 Complainant immediately notified respondent
PER CURIAM: lawyer of the dishonor of the check.
Subject of this disposition is the September 28, 2014 Resolution1 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) which In a letter,5 dated March 23, 2012, complainant demanded for the refund of
adopted and approved the findings and the recommendation of the the acceptance fees received by respondent lawyer prior to the
Investigating Commissioner for the disbarment of Atty. Berlin Dela Cruz "abandonment" of the cases and the payment of the value of the jewelry, but
(respondent lawyer). to no avail.

It appears from the records that respondent lawyer agreed to represent
Paulina T. Yu (complainant) in several cases after having received various
amounts as acceptance fees, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Case Title
Acceptance Fees
People v. Tortona for attempted homicide (Case No. 06-359) filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Bacoor, Cavite
P 20,000.00
Paulina T. Yu v. Pablo and Rodel Gamboa for qualified theft/estafa (I.S. No.
XV-07-INV-116-05339) filed with the City Prosecutor of Manila
P 8,000.00
Paulino T. Yu v. Roberto Tuazon et al. (Civil Case No. LP-00-0087) filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas2
P 15,000.00
cralawlawlibrary
On November 29, 2011, while the lawyer-client relationship was subsisting,
respondent lawyer borrowed pieces of jewelry from complainant and pledged
the same with the Citystate Savings Bank, Inc. for the amount of P29,945.50,
as shown in the Promissory Note with Deed of Pledge.3 Respondent lawyer
appropriated the proceeds of the pledge to his personal use. In order to
facilitate the redemption of the said jewelry, respondent lawyer issued to
1
In another letter,6 dated April 18, 2012, this time represented by another
lawyer, Atty. Francisco C. Miralles, complainant yet again demanded the
redemption of the check in cash within five days from notice; the refund of
the paid acceptance fees, in exchange for which no service was rendered; the
payment of the value of the pledged jewelry in the amount of PI00,000.00 in
order to avoid the interests due and the possible foreclosure of the pledge;
and moral damages of P 300,000.00.
For his failure to heed the repeated demands, a criminal case for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor, Las
Pinas City, against him.7
On June 7, 2012, a verified complaint was filed with the IBP-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),8 where complainant prayed for the disbarment of
respondent lawyer on account of grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a
lawyer and commission of acts in violation of the lawyer's oath. The IBP-CBD
required respondent lawyer to submit his answer to the complaint.9 Despite
having been duly served with a copy of the complaint and the order to file his
answer, as shown in a certification10 issued by the Post Master of the Las
Piñas Central Post Office, respondent still failed to file an answer.
Respondent lawyer was likewise notified of the scheduled mandatory
conference/hearing on November 23, 2012, but only the complainant and
her counsel appeared on the said day. The IBP-CBD then ordered the
resetting of the mandatory conference for the last time to January 11, 2013
and the personal service of the notice thereof to respondent lawyer's given
address.11 Notwithstanding the receipt of the notice by respondent lawyer's
mother,12 he still failed to appear during the conference, prompting
complainant to move for the termination of the conference and the
submission of the case for report and recommendation.
On June 7, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner recommended the
disbarment of respondent lawyer from the practice of law.13 Based on the
evidence on record, respondent lawyer was found to have violated Rule 16.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which proscribed the
borrowing of money from a client, unless the latter's interests were fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Worse,
respondent lawyer had clearly issued a worthless check in violation of law
which was against Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR stating that, "[a] lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct."
On September 28, 2014, the IBP-BOG affirmed the said recommendation in
Resolution No. XXI-2014-698.14
Neither a motion for reconsideration before the BOG nor a petition for review
before this Court was filed. Nonetheless, the IBP elevated to this Court the
entire records of the case for appropriate action with the IBP Resolution
being merely recommendatory and, therefore, would not attain finality,
pursuant to par. (b), Section 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.15
The Court acknowledges the fact that respondent lawyer failed to refute the
accusations against him despite the numerous opportunities afforded to him
to explain his side. All means were exhausted to give respondent lawyer a
chance to oppose the charges against him but to no avail and for reasons
only for known to him. Whether respondent lawyer had personally read the
orders by the IBP-CBD or his mother failed to forward the same for his
personal consideration may only be an object of surmise in which the Court
2
cannot indulge. "Disbarment of lawyers is a proceeding that aims to purge
the law profession of unworthy members of the bar. It is intended to preserve
the nobility and honor of the legal profession."16 Surely, respondent lawyer's
failure or refusal to participate in the IBP-CBD proceedings does not hinder
the Court from determining the full extent of his liability and imposing an
appropriate sanction, if any.
After a judicious review of the records, the Court finds no reason to deviate
from the findings of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondent lawyer's violation of Canons 1,17 16,18 17,19 and Rules 1.01,20
16.04,21 of the CPR.
In the case at bench, the complaint stemmed from the use by respondent
lawyer of his client's property. He had, indeed, come into possession of
valuable pieces of jewelry which he presented as security in a contract of
pledge. Complainant voluntarily and willingly delivered her jewelry worth
P135,000.00 to respondent lawyer who meant to borrow it and pawn it
thereafter. This act alone shows respondent lawyer's blatant disregard of
Rule 16.04. Complainant's acquiescence to the "pawning" of her jewelry
becomes immaterial considering that the CPR is clear in that lawyers are
proscribed from borrowing money or property from clients, unless the latter's
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent
advice. Here, respondent lawyer's act of borrowing does not constitute an
exception. Respondent lawyer used his client's jewelry in order to obtain, and
then appropriate for himself, the proceeds from the pledge. In so doing, he
had abused the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his client. That he
might have intended to subsequently pay his client the value of the jewelry is
inconsequential. What deserves detestation was the very act of his exercising
influence and persuasion over his client in order to gain undue benefits from
the latter's property. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the
relationship between a lawyer and his client is one imbued with trust and
confidence. And as true as any natural tendency goes, this "trust and
confidence" is prone to abuse.22 The rule against borrowing of money by a
lawyer from his client is intended to prevent the lawyer from taking
advantage of his influence over his client.23 The rule presumes that the
client is disadvantaged by the lawyer's ability to use all the legal
maneuverings to renege on his obligation.24 Suffice it to say, the borrowing
of money or property from a client outside the limits laid down in the CPR is
an unethical act that warrants sanction.
Due to complainant's respect for respondent lawyer, she trusted his
representation that the subject jewelry would be redeemed upon maturity.
She accepted respondent lawyer's check, which was eventually dishonored
upon presentment. Despite notice of the dishonor, respondent lawyer did not
take steps to remedy the situation and, on the whole, reneged on his
obligation, constraining complainant to avail of legal remedies against him.
Given the circumstances, the Court does not harbor any doubt in favor of
respondent lawyer. Obviously, his unfulfilled promise to facilitate the
redemption of the jewelry and his act of issuing a worthless check constitute
grave violations of the CPR and the lawyer's oath. These shortcomings on his
part have seriously breached the highly fiduciary relationship between
lawyers and clients. Specifically, his act of issuing worthless checks patently
violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR which requires that "[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." This
indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed on him,
shows such lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
him unworthy of public confidence, and constitutes a ground for disciplinary
action,25 and thus seriously and irreparably tarnishes the image of the
profession.26 Such conduct, while already off-putting when attributed to an
ordinary person, is much more abhorrent when exhibited by a member of the
Bar.27 In this case, respondent lawyer turned his back from the promise that
he once made upon admission to the Bar. As "vanguards of the law and the
legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in
their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and
integrity in a manner beyond reproach."28
As to the penalty commensurate to respondent lawyer's actions, the Court
3
takes heed of the guidepost provided by jurisprudence, viz.: "Disbarment
should not be decreed where any punishment less severe, such as
reprimand, suspension, or fine, would accomplish the end desired. This is as
it should be considering the consequence of disbarment on the economic life
and honor of the erring person."29 Hence, caution is called for amidst the
Court's plenary power to discipline erring lawyers. In line with prevailing
jurisprudence,30 the Court finds it proper to impose the penalty of three-year
suspension against respondent lawyer, with a stern warning that a repetition
of any of the infractions attributed to him in this case, or any similar act,
shall merit a heavier penalty.
Anent the monetary demands made by complainant, the Court reiterates the
rule that in disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a
member of the Bar.31 Thus, the Court is not concerned with the erring
lawyer's civil liability for money received from his client in a transaction
separate, distinct, and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement. Accordingly, it cannot order respondent lawyer to make the
payment for the subject jewelry he pawned, the value of which is yet to be
determined in the appropriate proceeding.
As to the return of acceptance fees, a clarification is in order. The
Investigating Commissioner erred in referring to them as "attorney's fees"—
As to the charge that respondent abandoned the cases he accepted after
payment of attorney's fees, this commission is not fully satisfied that the
complainant was able to prove it with substantial or clear evidence. It was
not fully explained in the complaint how or in what manner were the cases
"abandoned" by the respondent; and what prejudice was caused to the
complainant. This Commission noted that not a single document or order
coming from the court of prosecutor's office was appended to the Complaint-
Affidavit that would at least apprise this body of what the respondent
actually did with the cases he represented.32cralawlawlibrary
There is a distinction between attorney's fee and acceptance fee. It is well-
settled that attorney's fee is understood both in its ordinary and
extraordinary concept.33 In its ordinary sense, attorney's fee refers to the
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services
rendered. Meanwhile, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's fee is awarded
by the court to the successful litigant to be paid by the losing party as
indemnity for damages.34 On the other hand, acceptance fee refers to the
charge imposed by the lawyer for merely accepting the case. This is because
once the lawyer agrees to represent a client, he is precluded from handling
cases of the opposing party based on the prohibition on conflict of interest.
Thus, this incurs an opportunity cost by merely accepting the case of the
client which is therefore indemnified by the payment of acceptance fee. Since
the acceptance fee only seeks to compensate the lawyer for the lost
opportunity, it is not measured by the nature and extent of the legal services
rendered.35
In the case at bench, the amounts of P20,000.00, P18,000.00, and
P15,000.00, respectively, were in the nature of acceptance fees for cases in
which respondent lawyer agreed to represent complainant. Despite this
oversight of the Investigating Commissioner, the Court affirms the finding
that aside from her bare allegations, complainant failed to present any
evidence showing that respondent lawyer committed abandonment or neglect
of duty in handling of cases. Hence, the Court sees no legal basis for the
return of the subject acceptance fees.
WHEREFORE, finding respondent Atty. Berlin R. Dela Cruz GUILTY of
violating Canons 1, 16, 17, and Rules 1.01 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for THREE YEARS with a STERN WARNING that a repetition
of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this decision be furnished the Bar Confidant to be entered in
the personal record of the respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the
4
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts throughout the
country.
SO ORDERED
A.C. No. 10868 [Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041]
CHERYLE. VASCO-TAMARAY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS, Respondent.
PERCURIAM:
Pretending to be counsel for a party in a case and using a forged signature in
a pleading merit the penalty of disbarment.
Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a ComplaintAffidavit before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that
respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis) filed, on her behalf, a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged
her signature on the Petition.1 She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner,"
referring to Vasco-Tamaray.2
Vasco-Tamaray stated that Atty. Daquis was not her counsel but that of her
husband, Leomarte Regala Tamaray.3 To support her allegation, she
attached the Affidavit4 of Maritess Marquez-Guerrero. The Affidavit states:
1. Sometime in October 2006, I accompanied Cheryl Tamaray in going to
East Cafe at Rustan's Makati to meet with her husband Leomarte Tamaray;
2. We arrived at the said place at around 7:00 pm and Leomarte introduced
to us (Cheryl and I) Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis as his lawyer. He further told us
that Atty. Daquis' husband also worked in Japan and that's how he got to
know the latter and got her services;
3. Among other things, Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting
and the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to
annul his marriage with Cheryl;
4. Cheryl was shocked and just cried. After awhile [sic], Leomarte's brother
arrived and shortly after, the group left;
5. The next instance that I saw Atty. Daquis was when we (Cheryl and I) went
to McDonald's-Greenbelt where Atty. Daquis tried to convince her not to
oppose Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled[.]5 (Emphasis
supplied)
Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her
"that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City."6 In February 2007, Atty. Daquis
asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City.7
On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's
Office and met Atty. Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the
Petition but Atty. Daquis refused.8
Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City. She was surprised to see that the Petition was allegedly
signed and filed by her.9
Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature
was forged by Atty. Daquis, and that her purported community tax certificate
appearing on the jurat was not hers because she never resided in
Muntinlupa City.10 She attached a Certification issued by the Sangguniang
Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa City stating that she was "never . . . a
resident of #9 Daang Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision,
Barangay Putatan."11 She also attached a Certification issued by Barangay
Talipapa stating that she has been a resident of "#484-J Saguittarius St.,
5
Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City... from 2000 till
present."12
Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage was Atty. Daquis' idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray.13
She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The
Petition states that her postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp.,
Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[,]"14 which is the address of
her husband's family. The return slips of the notices sent by the trial court
were received by Encarnacion T. Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives
ofLeomarte Tamaray.15
Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray,
complainant herself, and not complainant's husband. She alleged that
Vasco-Tamaray knew of the Petition as early as October 2006, not December
2006.16
With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that
when she notarized the Petition, the community tax certificate number was
supplied by Vasco-Tamaray.17 Atty. Daquis' allegation was supported by the
Joint Affidavit of her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and Ludy Lorena
(Lorena).18
Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-
Tamaray to be a client of Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis
forge Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated that she typed the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and that the community tax certificate
was provided by Vasco-Tamaray.19
Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand
money from Leomarte Tamaray but she refused to do so.20
Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When
Vasco-Tamaray requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was
unable to grant her client's request because she did not have a copy of the
Petition with her at that time.21
Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate
son with a certain Reuel Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named
Charles Dino Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda signed the Affidavit
Acknowledgment/ Admission of Paternity portion of the birth certificate.22
The Commission on Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their
position papers,23 but based on the record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied.24
The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the
Complaint because Vasco-Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The
Commission on Bar Discipline noted that Vasco-Tamaray should have
questioned the Petition or informed the prosecutor that she never filed any
petition, but she failed to do so.25
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and
approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar
Discipline in the Resolution dated September 27, 2014.26
The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis
should be held administratively liable for making it appear that she is
counsel for complainant Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a
forged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of
Canon 15 is dismissed.
I
By pretending to be counsel for complainant, respondent violated Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and failed to uphold her
duty of doing no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any falsehood in court
as stated in the Lawyer's Oath.27
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land
of and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was
Leomarte Tamaray's counsel28 but was unable to rebut the other allegations
against her.
Respondent admitted that she met complainant in October 2006,29 but did
not refute30 the statement in Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's Affidavit that
Leomarte Tamaray introduced her as his lawyer.31 Likewise, respondent
admitted that she met with complainant subsequently,32 but did not refute
Maritess Marquez-Guerrero's statement that in one of the meetings, she tried
to convince complainant not to oppose Leomarte Tamaray's decision to annul
their marriage.33
Respondent argued in her Answer that she was the counsel for
complainant.34 Yet, there is no explanation how she was referred to
complainant or how they were introduced. It appears, then, that respondent
was contacted by Leomarte Tamaray to file a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. As stated in Maritess Marquez-
Guerrero's Affidavit, "Leomarte told Cheryl that the reason for that meeting
and the presence of Atty. Daquis was because he had decided to file a case to
annul his marriage with Cheryl[. ]"35
Based on this, it seems Leomarte Tamaray intended to file the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. However, respondent made it appear that
6
complainant, not her client Leomarte Tamaray, was the petitioner. There is a
probability that respondent did not want Leomarte Tamaray to be the
petitioner because he would have to admit that he entered into a bigamous
marriage, the admission of which may subject him to criminal liability.
In addition, if it is true that complainant was respondent's client, then there
appears to be no reason for respondent to advise her "not to oppose
Leomarte's decision to have their marriage annulled."36
The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never
received any court process because her purported address in the Petition is
the address of Leomarte Tamaray. The Petition states that complainant is "of
legal age, Filipino citizen, married with postal address at 09 Daang Hari St.,
Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[.]"37
The Certificate of Marriage of complainant and Leomarte Tamaray states that
Leomarte's residence is at "Summitvil[l]e Subv [sic], Muntinlupa," while
complainant's residence is at "Hermosa St. Gagalangin, Tondo, Manila."38
Assuming that complainant lived with her husband after they were married,
complainant most likely did not receive court processes because she left their
home before the filing of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. As
written in the Minutes of the meeting before the Office of the City Prosecutor:
P[etitioner] & R[espondent] met sometime in 1993 through his secretary.
They became sweethearts in 1993 and their relationship as steadies lasted
until 1996;
During the 3 years of their union, petitioner knew respondent's family as she
even sleeps in their house; Theirs was also a long distance relationship as
respondent worked in Japan;
Upon respondents [sic] return to the Philippines they got married in Feb,
1996. They had no children, as respondent immediately left for Japan on
March 11, 1996;
7
Respondent returned to the Philippines but unfortunately he brought
another woman. As a result, petitioner left their house.39 (Emphasis
supplied)
Further, complainant cannot be faulted for her failure to inform the
prosecutor that she did not file any petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage because during the meeting on March 5, 2007, complainant had no
knowledge that the Petition was filed in her name.40 She obtained a copy of
the Petition after the March 5, 2007 meeting.41
In Yupangco-Nakpil v. Uy,42 this court discussed Canon 1, Rule 1.01, as
follows:
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as it is applied to the members of the legal
professions, engraves an overriding prohibition against any form of
misconduct, viz:
CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE
LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL
PROCESSES
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
The gravity of the misconduct- determinative as it is of the errant lawyer's
penalty- depends on the factual circumstances of each case .
. . . Verily, members of the Bar are expected at all times to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from any act or
omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public
in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession. By no
insignificant measure, respondent blemished not only his integrity as a
member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his
conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of
law and justice.43
When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the
truth was otherwise, she committed a falsehood against the trial court and
complainant.
II
Respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 when she
allowed the use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and
notarized.44
Complainant alleged that her signature on the Petition was forged.45
Respondent merely denied complainant's allegation.46
The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain
"CVasco."47 The records of this case show that complainant has used two
signatures. In her identification cards issued by the University of the East,
she used a signature that spelled out "CVasco."48 In her Complaint-Affidavit
against respondent, complainant used a signature that spelled out
"CTamaray."49
A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and on complainant's identification cards show a
difference in the stroke of the letters "c" and "o." Further, complainant's
signatures in the documents50 attached to the records consistently appear
to be of the same height. On the other hand, her alleged signature on the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage has a big letter "c."51 Hence, it
seems that complainant's signature on the Petition for Declaration ofNullity
of Marriage was forged.
While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's
signature, the fact remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be
used on a petition she prepared and notarized.52 In doing so, respondent
8
violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01. These canons state:
CANON 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the
legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar.
RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
....
CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
RULE 10.01 -A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any
artifice.
In Embido v. Pe, Jr.,53 Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Salvador N. Pe, Jr.
was found guilty of violating Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and was meted the penalty
of disbarment for falsifying a court decision "in a non-existent court
proceeding."54 This court discussed that:
Gross immorality, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or
fraudulent transactions can justify a lawyer's disbarment or suspension from
the practice of law. Specifically, the deliberate falsification of the court
decision by the respondent was an act that reflected a high degree of moral
turpitude on his part. Worse, the act made a mockery of the administration
of justice in this country, given the purpose of the falsification, which was to
mislead a foreign tribunal on the personal status of a person. He thereby
became unworthy of continuing as a member of the Bar.55
In a similar manner, respondent's act of allowing the use of a forged
signature on a petition she prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of
moral fiber on her part.
Other acts that this court has found violative of Canon 7, Rule 7.03 are:
engaging in a scuffle inside court chambers;56 openly doubting paternity of
his own son;57 hurling invectives at a Clerk of Court;58 harassing occupants
of a property;59 using intemperate language;60 and engaging in an
extramarital affair.61
Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before
a court is tantamount to consenting to the commission of a falsehood before
courts, in violation of Canon 10.
In Spouses Umaguing v. De Vera,62 this court discussed the importance of
Canon 10, Rule 10.01, as follows:
The Lawyer's Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land
but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as
well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe
and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation
by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of
honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."63 (Emphasis supplied)
III
This court further finds that respondent violated Canon 17, which states:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented
complainant, who is the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in
the same case.
9
The responsibilities of a lawyer under Canon 17 were discussed in Penilla v.
Alcid, Jr.:64
The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a
lawyer to accord the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the
protection of the client's interest. The most thorough groundwork and study
must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the client. The
honor bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon
taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such
honor attaches to him for the entire duration of his practice of law and
carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only satisfying the basic
requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests
of the client and the pursuit of justice[. ]65
Respondent is reminded of the duties and responsibilities of members of the
legal profession, as discussed in Tenoso v. Echanez:66
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued
with public interest and that "a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to
his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the
nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State-
the administration of justice-as an officer of the court." Accordingly,
"[l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing. "67
(Citations omitted)
IV
This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03
when she entered her appearance as counsel for complainant68 even though
she was engaged as counsel by Leomarte Tamaray.69 Canon 15, Rule 15.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
CANON 15 - A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his
dealings and transactions with his client.
....
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The rationale for Canon 15 was discussed in Samson v. Era:70
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations
wherein a lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly
adverse to any of his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer
may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or a
substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client
only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is
grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty. Throughout the course of a
lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the
client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case. Knowledge
and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be treated as
sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their
secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.
The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree .
....
. . . The spirit behind this rule is that the client's confidence once given
should not be stripped by the mere expiration of the professional
employment.1âwphi1 Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer
should not do anything that will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client. Nor should the
lawyer disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous
relation. In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
expressly declares that: "A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and
10
he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."
The lawyer's highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at
all hazards and costs even to himself. The protection given to the client is
perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
affected by the client's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another,
or by any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death
of the client.71
The test to determine whether conflict of interest exists was discussed in
Hornilla v. Salunat:72
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof.73 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel.74 When
the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed
the Petition as counsel for complainant.75 If respondent was indeed engaged
as counsel by complainant, then there is conflict of interest, in violation of
Canon 15, Rule 15.03.

However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as
counsel by complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not
commit conflict of interest.
V
On a final note, Rule 139-B has been amended by Bar Matter No. 1645 dated
October 13, 2015. Section 12 of Rule 139-B now provides that:
Rule 139-B. Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys
....
Section 12. Review and recommendation by the Board of Governors.
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator
with his report.
(b) After its review, the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, shall recommend to the Supreme Court the dismissal of the
complaint or the imposition of disciplinary action against the respondent.
The Board shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings
recommendations, clearly and distinctly stating the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. The resolution shall be issued within a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days from the next meeting of the Board following the
submission of the Investigator's report.
(c) The Board's resolution, together with the entire records and all evidence
presented and submitted, shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action within ten (10) days from issuance of the resolution.
Under the old rule, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines was given the power to "issue a decision"77 if the lawyer
complained of was exonerated or meted a penalty of "less than suspension or
disbarment."78 In addition, the case would be deemed terminated unless an
interested party filed a petition before this court.79
The amendments to Rule 139-B is a reiteration that only this court has the
power to impose disciplinary action on members of the bar. The factual
findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline and the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are
recommendatory, subject to review by this court.80
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis is found GUILTY of
violating Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7, Rule 7.03, Canon 10, Rule 10.01, and
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The charge for violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 against respondent Atty.
Deborah Z. Daquis is DISMISSED.
The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z.
Daquis. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of
and Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant
to be appended to respondent's personal record as attorney, to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts throughout the country for their information and
guidance.
This Resolution takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED

(d) Notice of the resolution shall be given to all parties through their counsel, A.C. No. 5582 January 24, 2017
if any.76 ARTHUR O. MONARES, Complainant,
vs.
11
ATTY. LEVI P. MUÑOZ, Respondent. counsel of the NEA-appointed team which took over the management of
x-----------------------x ALECO. Moreover, Olaybal alleged that Muñoz illegally collected payments in
A.C. No. 5604 the form of notarial and professional fees in excess of what was agreed upon
ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., Complainant, in their retainer agreement. 4
vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUNOZ, Respondent. Constante is the Executive Assistant for Legal Affairs of Sunwest
x-----------------------x Construction and Development Corporation (Sunwest). Constante claimed
A.C. No. 5652 that Muñoz filed ten (10) cases against Sun west on Ludolfo's behalf before
the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) while he was serving as
BENJILIEH M. CONSTANTE, 1 Complainant, Provincial Legal Officer. 5
vs.
ATTY. LEVI P. MUNOZ, Respondent. All three (3) complaints prayed that Muñoz be disbarred for unlawfully
engaging in private practice. In addition, Olaybal sought Muñoz's disbarment
CAGUIOA, J.: for acts of disloyalty, particularly, for violating the rule against conflict of
For resolution is the Joint Petition for Review with Prayer for Absolution interest.6
and/or Clemency2 (Joint Petition) dated May 14, 2009 filed by respondent
Atty. Levi P. Muñoz (Muñoz), in connection with the complaints for To support their position, the complainants raised that Muñoz had been
disbarment filed by Arthur O. Monares (Monares), Atty. Oliver O. Olaybal previously disciplined by the Ombudsman for two (2) counts of unauthorized
(Olaybal) purportedly representing Albay Electric Cooperative, Inc. (ALECO), practice of profession in OMB-ADM-1-01-0462, and was meted the penalty of
and Benjilieh M. Constante (Constante), dated January 17, 2002, February removal and dismissal from service. The complainants further manifested
4, 2002 and March 21, 2002, respectively. that Muñoz had been convicted by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC)
of Legazpi City in Criminal Case Nos. 25568 and 25569 for violation of
Monares is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9923 filed against Ludolfo Muñoz Section 7(b)(2) in relation to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 6713.7 Munoz's
(Ludolfo) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City. In his conviction has since become final pursuant to the Court's Resolution dated
complaint, Monares alleged that Muñoz represented his brother Ludolfo in June 14, 2004 in G.R. No. 160668.8
the said case during regular government hours while employed as Provincial
Legal Officer of Albay City. 3 In his respective comments to the complaints,9 Muñoz claimed that he had
requested Governor Al Francis C. Bichara (Governor Bichara) for authority to
Under the chairmanship of Olaybal, ALECO's old board of directors (BOD) continue his private practice shortly after his appointment. This request was
engaged Muñoz as retained counsel sometime in June 1998. Olaybal averred granted on July 18, 1995.10 Thereafter, Muñoz submitted the same request
that Muñoz did not inform ALECO's old BOD that he was employed as to Rafael C. Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
Provincial Legal Officer at such time. Olaybal raised that after its Local Government (DILG).11 On September 8, 1995, Acting Secretary
administrator, the National Electrification Administration (NEA), deactivated Alexander P. Aguirre granted Muñoz's request, under the following
the old BOD on the ground of mismanagement, Muñoz served as retained conditions:
12

1. That no government time, personnel, funds or supplies shall be utilized in
connection (sic) and that no conflict of interest with your present position as
Provincial Legal Officer shall arise thereby;
2. That the time so devoted outside of office hours, the place(s) and under
what circumstances you can engage in private employment shall be fixed by
the Governor of Albay to the end that it will not impair in any way your
efficiency; and
3. That any violation of the above restrictions will be a ground for the
cancellation and/or revocation of this authority. 12 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuant to the DILG's authorization, Governor Bichara imposed the
following conditions upon Muñoz:
a. [Y]ou cannot handle cases against the Province of Albay;
b. [Y]ou will be on call and you will have no fix (sic) working hours provided
that the efficiency of the Provincial Legal Office shall not be prejudiced;
c. [Y]ou are exempted in (sic) accomplishing your Daily Time Record
considering the limitation already mentioned above; [and]
d. In addition to the above enumeration[,] you are to perform functions
subject to limitations in Sec. 481 of RA 7160. 13
Muñoz emphasized that his authority 'to engage in private practice was
renewed by Governor Bichara on July 3, 1998 for his second term ending in
July 2001, and again on July 5, 2001 for his third term ending in July 2004.
14
The complaints were separately referred by the Court to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. 15 The
13
complaints were then consolidated through the Order dated January 16,
2003 issued by Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan. 16 Subsequently, the
complaints underwent a series of re-assignments, until finally assigned to
Commissioner Doroteo B. Aguila.17
In his Report dated March 11, 200518 (IBP Report), Commissioner Aguila
recommended that Muñoz be found guilty of gross misconduct and violation
of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR). The penalty of suspension from the practice of law for
an aggregate period of four (4) years19 was recommended. On automatic
review, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) approved and adopted
Commissioner Aguila's recommendation in a Resolution dated October 22,
2005.20
On December 22, 2005, Muñoz filed an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency
and Compassion before the IBP-BOG, praying that the recommended penalty
be reduced to one (1) year.21 This appeal was denied on January 28,
2006.22
Muñoz filed before this Court an Ex-Parte Appeal for Mercy, Clemency,
Forgiveness and Compassion23 (Appeal) dated April 8, 2006 praying for the
reduction of the recommended penalty of suspension for four (4) years to one
(1) year or less, and the dismissal of the complaints for disbarment filed
against him. As an alternative prayer, Muñoz requested that he be granted
special limited authority to practice law until all his pending cases are
terminated. 24
In his Appeal, Muñoz insisted that when he served as Provincial Legal Officer
from June 1995 to May 2002, he engaged in private practice pursuant to the
three (3) written authorities issued by Governor Bichara, and the written
authority of the DILG issued during his first term, which he claims had never
been revoked. Muñoz also argued that no conflict of interest existed between
ALECO's old BOD and the NBA management team, since he was engaged as
retained counsel of ALECO as an institution, not its management teams. 25

On August 28, 2006, the Court resolved to remand Muñoz's Appeal to the
IBP for disposition. 26
Acting on Munoz's Appeal, the IBP-BOG issued a Resolution reducing the
recommended period of suspension from four (4) to three (3) years. 27
Unsatisfied, Muñoz filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the IBP-BOG
denied on December 11, 2008.28
Aggrieved, Muñoz elevated his case anew to this Court through this Joint
Petition. In fine, Muñoz reiterates the allegations in his Appeal, with the
additional assertion that the fees he collected from ALECO
contemplated under their retainer agreement. 29
The Court agrees with the IBP-BOG's findings and recommendations.
Muñoz violated the conditions of his
DILG authorization.
Muñoz's DILG authorization prohibited him from utilizing government time
for his private practice. As correctly observed by Commissioner Aguila, Rule
XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292
and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Omnibus Rules), requires
government officers and employees of all departments and agencies, except
those covered by special laws, to render not less than eight (8) hours of work
a day for five (5) days a week, or a total of forty (40) hours a week.30 The
number of required weekly working hours may not be reduced, even in cases
where the department or agency adopts a flexible work schedule. 31
Notably, Muñoz did not deny Monares' allegation that he made at least
eighty-six (86) court appearances in connection with at least thirty (30) cases
from April 11, 1996 to August 1, 2001.32 He merely alleged that his private
practice did not prejudice the functions of his office.
Court appearances are necessarily made within regular government working
hours, from 8:00 in the morning to 12:00 noon, and 1:00 to 5:00 in the
afternoon.33 Additional time is likewise required to study each case, draft
pleadings and prepare for trial. The sheer volume of cases handled by Muñoz
clearly indicates that government time was necessarily utilized in pursuit of
his private practice, in clear violation of the DILG authorization and Rule
6.0234 of the CPR.
Muñoz should have requested for
authority to engage in private practice
from the Secretary of DILG for his
second and third terms.
were
Acting Secretary Aguirre's grant of authority cannot be unreasonably
construed to have been perpetual. Moreover, Muñoz cannot claim that he
believed in good faith that the authority granted by Governor Bichara for his
second and third terms sufficed.
Memorandum No. 17 dated September 4, 1986 (Memorandum 17), which
Muñoz himself cites in his Joint Petition, is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation. The power to grant authority to engage in the practice of one's
profession to officers and employees in the public service lies with the head of
the department, in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules which provides, in part:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission from the
head of Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided,
further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, the time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the
chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency
of the officer or employee x x x. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
14
Memorandum 17 was issued more than nine (9) years prior to Munoz's
appointment as Provincial Legal Officer, hence, he cannot feign ignorance
thereof.1âwphi1 As a local public official, it was incumbent upon Muñoz to
secure the proper authority from the Secretary of the DILG not only for his
first term, but also his second and third. His failure to do so rendered him
liable for unauthorized practice of his profession and violation of Rule 1.0135
of the CPR.
Muñoz represented conflicting interests.
Muñoz cannot elude Olaybal's allegations of disloyalty. In Mabini Colleges,
Inc. v. Pajarillo,36the Court explained the tests to determine the existence of
conflict of interest, thus:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of
two or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one
client, it is the lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to
oppose it for the other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this
argument will be opposed by him when he argues for the other client." This
rule covers not only cases in which confidential communications have been
confided, but also those in which no confidence has been bestowed or will be
used. Also, there is conflict of interest if the acceptance of the new retainer
will require the attorney to perform an act which will injuriously affect his
first client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will
be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client any
knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double
dealing in the performance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
As Muñoz himself detailed in his Joint Petition, he acted as counsel for
ALECO under the management of the old BOD in the following cases:
A. Civil Case No. 10007 -ALECO (Petitioner) vs. Eleuterio Adonay, NEA
Project Supervisor and his team John Catral et. al., a case filed by Oliver O.
Olaybal and his group. For: Injunction, Accounting with Prayer for Writs of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to stop
the election of the new set of member (sic) of the Board of Directors x x x.
B. Civil Case [N]o. 10066 entitled ALBAY ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. as
Petitioner, also filed by Oliver O. Olaybal, a case for Prohibition, Mandamus
and Receivership, with Preliminary Prohibition and Mandatory Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining and Mandatory Orders. Among others, this
Petition was filed to stop the second scheduled election of the ALECO Board
of Directors scheduled for February 23, and 24, 2002.37 (Underscoring
omitted; additional emphasis supplied)
Muñoz thereafter served as retained counsel of ALECO under the direction of
the NEA management team. Muñoz could have easily anticipated that his
advice would be sought with respect to the prosecution of the members of the
old BOD, considering that the latter was deactivated due to alleged
mismanagement. The conflict of interest between Olaybal's board on one
hand, and NEA and its management team on the other, is apparent. By
representing conflicting interests without the permission of all parties
involved, Muñoz violated Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the CPR.38
In Catu v. Rellosa,39the Court imposed the penalty of suspension for six (6)
months upon a punong barangay who acted as counsel for respondents in an
the ejectment case without securing the authority of the Secretary of DILG. In
Aniñon v. Sabitsana, Jr.,40the Court imposed the penalty of one (1) year
suspension upon a lawyer who accepted a new engagement that required
him to oppose the interests of a party whom he previously represented. In
view of Muñoz's multiple infractions, the Court finds the recommended
penalty of suspension for an aggregate period of three (3) years proper.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Levi P. Muñoz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
15
violation of Rules 1.01, 6.02, 15.01 and 15.03 of the Code of Professional Elmer T. Bautista (Atty. Bautista), Chief Legal Counsel and Atty. Winston F.
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a Garcia (Atty. Garcia), General Manager (respondents), both of the
period of three (3) years effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), for violations of Rules 1.01
WARNING that a repetition of any violation hereunder shall be dealt with and 1.02,5 Canons 16 and 57 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
more severely. (CPR) and the Attorney's Oath.
SO ORDERED. Factual Background

A.C. No. 7424 February 8, 2017 The petitioners are public school teachers and members of the GSIS residing
NATIVIDAD R. MUNAR, BENNY O. TAGUBA, REYNALD S. LAMPITOC, in the provinces of Isabela and Ifugao.8 They alleged that sometime in
ADELINA A. FARNACIO, ANITA R. DOMINGO, LUZ T. DOMINGO, November 1998, marketing representatives of the GSIS and the San Lorenzo
EVANGELINE G. VINARAO, MOISES J. BARTOLOME, JR., ROSARIO R. Ruiz Realty and Development Corporation (SLRRDC), namely Ferdinand
RAMONES, MERCEDITA G. PIMENTEL, MYRNA A. . CAMANTE, LEONIDA Patajo, Levy Gonzales and Martina Guerrero (Representatives), visited a
A. RUMBAOA, NORMA U. VILLANUEVA, ANTONIA M. TANGONAN, number of public schools in the provinces of Isabela and Ifugao, and enticed
ASUNCION C. MARQUEZ, JULIETA B. MADRID, ESTRELLA C. the teachers to avail of SLRRDC's low-cost housing units in San Lorenzo Ruiz
ARELLANO, LUDIVINA B. SALES, JEANY M. FLORENTINO, and SHRI B. Subdivision (the Subdivision) located at Marabulig I, Cauayan, Isabela based
VISAYA, Petitioners on the following representations, to wit: (1) the Subdivision is financed by the
vs. GSIS; (2) the housing units are available to the teachers at the least cost, not
ATTY. ELMER T. BAUTISTA and ATTY. WINSTON F. GARCIA, exceeding ₱1,000.00 or ₱2,000.00 monthly, depending on the teacher's
Respondents capacity to pay; (3) the monthly amortizations are payable on any convenient
time of the year for the teachers, or after five or 10 years; (4) there are no
REYES, J.: processing fees or downpayment; (5) no salary deduction but only direct
This is a petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court payments to the nearest GSIS Branch Office; (6) when the housing units are
from the Resolution2 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) passed by ready for occupancy, the teachers will receive a cash gift of ₱3,000.00 for the
its Board of Governors on June 5, 2008 adopting the Report and installation of water and electricity facilities; (7) that the units are payable
Recommendation3 dated March 27, 2008 of the Commission on Bar until the teacher-buyer reaches 70 years old; (8) the units may not be
Discipline (CBD) Investigating Commissioner Atty. Salvador B. Hababag foreclosed until the 10th year for its payment; (9) in case a teacher-buyer is
(Commissioner Hababag) and dismissing the undated administrative unable to continue payment, he/she may sell his right to the unit before it is
Complaint for Disbarment4 filed on February 1, 2007 by Benny O. Taguba, foreclosed; and (10) that the Subdivision is fully developed with first class
Natividad R. Munar, Reynald S. Lampitoc, Adelina A. Farnacio, Anita R. amenities that blends with nature's finest, such as: a) guarded entrance; b)
Domingo, Luz T. Domingo, Evangeline G. Vinarao, Moises J. Bartolome, Jr., concrete paved roads; c) perimeter fence; d) street lights and street names; e)
Rosario R. Ramones, Mercedita G. Pimentel, Myrna A. Camante, Leonida A. shady trees every three meters; f) centralized water system; g) underground
Rumbaoa, Norma U. Villanueva, Antonia M. Tangonan, Asuncion C. drainage; h) clubhouse; i) tennis court; j) basketball court; k) children's
Marquez, Julieta B. Madrid, Estrella C. Arellano, Ludivina B. Sales, Jeany M. playground; and l) one perante orange tree per unit. The Representatives
Florentino, and Shri B. Visaya (collectively, the petitioners) against Atty. boasted that the Subdivision will "set the standard of fine living" where the
16
teachers' "dreams are now a reality."9
The petitioners claimed that they were induced to sign blank forms to
supposedly reserve housing units in the Subdivision and were not given the
opportunity to review its contents due to the Representatives' excuse of being
in a hurry. The Representatives, however, assured them that they will return
with the filled-up forms for the petitioners' inspection and final decision, and
that more GSIS personnel would meet them regarding the housing project
and loan. The petitioners highly relied on the said assurances by signing the
blank forms in contemplation of a good future investment.10
Apparently, none of the Representatives or any person from SLRRDC or GSIS
returned as promised for the supposed further orientation and explanation
on the housing project and loan. Sometime in August 1999, the petitioners
were aghast at their respective salary deductions in the amount of ₱5,000.00
monthly for an alleged housing loan from the GSIS. They complained that the
deduction left them with a measly ₱1,000.00 as "take home" pay. The
petitioners claimed that their signatures in the Authority to Deduct were
forged.11
In October 1999, Elvira Agcaoili of the GSIS Main Office visited GSIS
Cauayan, Isabela to invite the petitioners to a forum and convinced them to
go on with the housing loan on the premise that the GSIS was after their
welfare but to no avail. She agreed to stop the salary deductions against the
monthly pay of the petitioners by cancelling the Deeds of Conditional Sale
(DCS). She, however, told them that it would take six months to do so. It was
only in or about August 2003 that the Notices of Cancellation12 were mostly
sent to them by the GSIS.13
In 2004, the petitioners received notices from the GSIS that they still remain
liable to pay for the accrued interests of the principal amount of the housing
loan. To their dismay, the value of the housing loans reflected in their GSIS
records ranged from ₱800,000.00 to more than ₱1,000,000.00 for a house
and lot they allegedly never bought or even saw, much less occupied. They
were also directed to pay the alleged arrears in order to stop the loans from
further escalating in interest and their retirement pay may not be even
enough to settle them.14
On January 19, 2004, Atty. Bautista issued a Memorandum15 regarding the
17
right of GSIS to retain ownership of the subject housing units and to collect
the purchase price thereof through monthly salary deduction against the
petitioners. In support of the collection enhancement of the GSIS on the
matter, the GSIS Board of Trustees (BOT) passed Board Resolution No. 48.16
Accordingly, Atty. Garcia, as GSIS General Manager, enforced and
implemented the same by effecting salary deductions on the monthly pay of
the petitioners as public school teachers.17
The petitioners claimed that the allowance and implementation of the
collection on arrears on cancelled housing loans are tantamount to double
recovery for the GSIS.18 The respondents ought to know that double
recovery is not only prohibited by law, but it is also against public policy and
morals. The respondents, therefore, committed serious infractions of the
profession's ethical rules and put in question their moral and continued
fitness to remain as members of the legal profession.19
In the Resolution20 dated March 7, 2007, the Court required the
respondents to comment on the complaint.
In compliance, Atty. Bautista commented21 that he rendered a legal opinion
on July 25, 2003, as former Chief Legal Counsel of the GSIS Legal Services
Group, upon the request of Arnaldo Cuasay, the Senior Vice President of the
Housing and Real Property Development Group, regarding the issue on
whether the GSIS can collect arrearages on a housing loan with a DCS that
was cancelled vis-a-vis Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6552 or the Maceda Law.22
The legal opinion of Atty. Bautista, in part, reads:
It is clear then that the law expressly recognizes the vendor's right of
cancellation of sale on installments with full retention of previous payments
only in commercial and industrial properties. The law does not provide
recovery of arrearages from the defaulting buyer in case of cancellation of
conditional sale of residential properties. On the contrary, the refund of the
cash surrender value of the payments on the residential property to the
buyer is mandated.
The application of said law in the case of Valarao vs. Court of Appeals, x x x,
is also clear when the Supreme Court held that "the rescission of the
contract and the forfeiture of the payments already made could not be
effected, because the case falls under [R.A.] No. 6552 x x x."23
He explained that he needed to re-study the matter because the GSIS was
unable to implement the cancellation of the DCS between SLRRDC and the
borrower/member (herein petitioners) to take possession of the subject
property through ejectment proceedings, or to even recover its investment in
the housing unit. Worse, the awardees of the cancelled housing loans
continually occupied the housing units without paying their amortizations or
any reasonable rental fees.24 Hence, Atty. Bautista issued a new legal
opinion which provided for the collection of arrearages by the GSIS because
of its acquisition of all of SLRRDC's rights in the DCS and the Deed of
Absolute Sale and Assignment (DASA) by legal subrogation under Article
130325 of the Civil Code. It was also provided therein that allowing the
borrower/member to go scot-free after the cancellation of the DCS would be
contrary to the principle of unjust enrichment and solutio indebiti and at the
same time repugnant to the mandate of the GSIS to ensure collection or
recovery of all indebtedness payable in its favor.26
On March 10, 2004, the GSIS-BOT passed and approved Board Resolution
No. 48, as recommended by the Housing and Real Property Development
Group based on Atty. Bautista's memorandum pursuant to Section 41(a)27
of R.A. No. 8291,28 which supported the collection of arrearages on the
cancelled housing loans through salary deduction against the petitioners.29
In his Comment,30 Atty. Garcia averred that the disbarment complaint
against him constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of Board Resolution
No. 48. He discussed that a real property developer obtains a loan from the
GSIS then assigns its rights under a DASA in favor of the latter. GSIS would
then collect on the housing loan through monthly amortizations from the
member's salary through monthly deduction. Title to the property would only
transfer upon full payment of the loan.31
To amplify his defense, he explained that the petitioners' non-payment of the
monthly amortizations resulted in the cancellation of the DCS and that such
rampant practice of non-payment prompted the GSIS to devise a policy that
would enhance its collection efforts such as the assailed Board Resolution
No. 48, which sought to collect rental fees and not the purchase price of the
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housing units that were occupied by the petitioners.32
As General Manager, he averred that it was his ministerial duty to implement
an official act of the GSIS-BOT which, under the law, enjoys a presumption
of validity. He further updated the petitioners that Board Resolution ·No. 48
is no longer effective because it has already been superseded by Board
Resolution No. 125 which was adopted by the GSIS-BOT on October 4, 2006
which significantly reduced the amount of the rentals that had to be paid by
the petitioners due to non-accumulation of interests and surcharges in the
rentals due.33 Thus, the complaint for his disbarment is baseless and futile.
In conclusion, the comments of the respondents criticized the petitioners for
resorting to a disbarment complaint as a wrong remedy. Since the issue
circulates on the issuance of Board Resolution No. 48, they opined that the
petitioners should have filed a petition before the GSIS-BOT to question its
validity pursuant to Sections 30 and 31 of R.A. No. 8291 which read:
SEC. 30. Settlement of Disputes. - The GSIS shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction to settle any disputes arising under this Act and any other laws
administered by the GSIS.
xxxx
SEC. 31. Appeals. - Appeals from any decision or award of the Board shall be
governed by Rules 43 and 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure adopted by
the Supreme Court on April 8, 1997 which will take effect on July 1, 1997:
Provided, That pending cases and those filed prior to July 1, 1997 shall be
governed by the applicable rules of procedure: Provided, further, That the
appeal shall take precedence over all other cases except criminal cases when
the penalty of life imprisonment or death or reclusion perpetua is imposable.
The appeal shall not stay the execution of the order or award unless ordered
by the Board, by the Court of Appeals or by the Supreme Court and the
appeal shall be without prejudice to the special civil action of certiorari when
proper.
In the Resolution34 dated July 9, 2007, the Court referred the case to the
IBP for investigation, report and recommendation.
Ruling of the IBP
In the Report and Recommendation35 dated March 27, 2008, the IBP-CBD,
through Commissioner Hababag, found no merit in the complaint because
the disbarment suit constitutes an unwarranted and improper collateral
attack against the validity of Board Resolution No. 48 which the GSIS-BOT
adopted pursuant to its mandate; that such collateral attack against an
official act of the GSIS-BOT infringes public interest and militates against the
legal presumption on the regularity of performance of an official duty; and,
that the petitioners failed to avail of the remedy of a petition in assailing the
resolution's validity before the GSIS-BOT as set forth in Sections 30 and 31
of R.A. No. 8921. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint was recommended.
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report of Commissioner Hababag through Resolution No. XVIII-2008-267,36
as follows:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and
APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution
as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that
the complaint lacks merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED.37
The petitioners' motion for reconsideration38 reiterated the same arguments
raised in their complaint.
On June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration through Board Resolution No. XIX-2011-499,39 as follows:
RESOLVED to unanimously DENY [the petitioners'] Motion
Reconsideration, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the
Board and it being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been
threshed out and taken into consideration. Thus, for lack of substantial
ground or reason to disturb it, the Board of Governors' Resolution No. XVIII-
2008-267 dated June 5, 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED.40
Undaunted by the adverse decision of the IBP, the petitioners filed the
instant petition for review before the Court.1âwphi1
Ruling of the Court
The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken.
The petitioners clarify that the instant administrative case is directed against
the fitness of the respondents as members of the legal profession and not
against the validity of Board Resolution No. 48. They asseverate that the
issuance of the memorandum by Atty. Bautista which paved the way for the
passage of Board Resolution No. 48 and its implementation through the
management of Atty. Garcia were in blatant disregard and flagrant violation
of Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 5 of the CPR and the Attorney's
Oath. They further argue that the collection of arrears on the supposed
housing loans was a disguised payment of the purchase price of the realties
involved and, that the policy authorizing its collection was a scheme to
window-dress the huge financial losses suffered by GSIS due to
mismanagement.
Citing Article 138541 of the New Civil Code, the petitioners put to fore the
restoration of their prior position before the execution of the housing
contracts upon the cancellation of the DCS. This being so, the GSIS cannot
legally collect anything from them anymore as it has retained possession and
ownership of the subject properties.
The contention is untenable.
for A careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint would show that the
issue hinges on the validity of Board Resolution No. 48 which allowed GSIS
to collect arrears for the cancelled housing loans. As aptly found by the IBP
Board of Governors, the controversy should have been resolved in
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accordance with the GSIS Law as set forth in Sections 30 and 31 of R.A. No.
8291 which confers original and exclusive jurisdiction on the GSIS on
matters arising therefrom such as in the instant case. The Court quotes the
IBP-CBD Report and Recommendation, to wit:
The disbarment suit is a[n] unwarranted and improper collateral attack
against the validity of a Board Resolution duly adopted by the GSIS[-BOT] in
accordance with its mandate. The complaint assails the validity of Board
Resolution No. 48.
A collateral attack against the official act of a duly mandated body such as
the GSIS[-BOT], will undermine public interest and will militate against the
legal presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed x x x[.]
[R.A. No.] 8291 or the GSIS Act of 1997 provides a remedy for [the
petitioners]. Herein [petitioners ]/borrowers should have filed a petition
before the GSIS[-BOT] to question the validity of Board Resolution No. 48. x x
x.42
It should also be noted that Board Resolution No. 48 was passed to enhance
the collection efforts of the GSIS in view of its fiduciary duty to its members
regarding the GSIS funds. The assailed memorandum issued by Atty.
Bautista was an enhancement of the collection efforts of the GSIS on
delinquent accounts of members who availed of housing loans. The
cancellation of the DCS and the cession of SLRRDC 's rights in favor of GSIS
warranted such collection upon the monthly salaries of the petitioners. There
being no administrative declaration of the resolution's invalidity, it was
incumbent upon Atty. Garcia to implement the same, as GSIS President and
General Manager, in accordance with his mandate under Section 4543 of
R.A. No. 8291. Any disobedience would hold him liable under R.A. No.
301944 and the GSIS Charter.
As held in Arma v. Atty. Montevilla:45
Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction and, as such, the
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power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution, only for the
most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and
member of the bar.
As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges proffered against him until the contrary is proved, and that as an
officer of the court, he has perfom1ed his duties in accordance with his oath.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and
the Court will exercise its disciplinary power only if the former establishes its
case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. Considering the serious
consequence of disbarment, this Court has consistently held that only a clear
preponderant evidence would warrant the imposition of such a harsh
penalty. It means that the record must disclose as free from doubt a case
that compels the exercise by the court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious
character of the act done, as well as the motivation thereof, must be clearly
demonstrated.46 (Citations omitted)
It is well-settled that protection is afforded to members of the Bar who are at
times maliciously charged, not just by their clients. Regrettably, the failure of
the petitioners to discharge the burden that the acts of the respondents-
lawyers violated Canons 1 and 5, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR and the
Attorney's Oath warrants the dismissal of the instant petition.
It should be noted that the focal point of the complaint for disbarment
against the respondents was the collection of arrears against the monthly
salaries of the petitioners to pay off housing loans. The rampant collection
problems which plagued the GSIS from housing loans that were prevalently
unpaid by its members resulted in the influx of receivables and bad debts to
the detriment of the GSIS fund. The scenario geared the GSIS-BOT and the
Management to enhance its collection efforts as a result of which Atty.
Bautista issued the second memorandum regarding the legal right of the
GSIS to demand payment of the arrearages47 from the cancelled housing
loans due to delinquency, the issuance of Board Resolution No. 48, and the
implementation of the same through the management of Atty. Garcia.
Clearly, nothing from the acts of the respondents is deemed a violation of
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR, its Canon 5, and the Attorney's
Oath.

Lastly, the Court commiserates with the sad plight of the petitioners who are
among minimum-income earners highly depending on their wages for their
daily needs. Nonetheless, they still remain liable to pay the arrears indicated
in their GSIS records not only for failing to discharge the burden of proving
their allegations in the complaint but also for resorting to a wrong remedy.
Despite thereof, the new GSIS Board Resolution No. 125 which replaced the
assailed Board Resolution No. 48 is deemed to have given them sufficient
leeway from payment because interests and surcharges will no longer
accumulate and put to a halt, as explained by Atty. Garcia. Therefore, their
chances of paying the balance of the housing loans would become lighter and
no longer that burdensome.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED

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