ISIDRO CARIÑO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS G.R. No.

96681, December 2, 1991

ISIDRO CARIÑO vs. COMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 96681, December 2, 1991

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook “mass concerted actions” to protest the alleged failure of public
authorities to act upon their grievances. The “mass actions” consisted in staying away from their classes, converging
at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education served them with an
order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers
at the Ramon Magsaysay High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant
to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the
charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a walkout
signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service
of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In the meantime, a case was filed with
RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking teachers’ to due process of law. The case was
eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they
suddenly learned of their replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely
unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it earlier, upholding
the Sec. Carino’s act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that
the “striking teachers” “were denied due process of law;…they should not have been replaced without a chance to
reply to the administrative charges;” there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the
Commission is empowered to investigate.”

ISSUE:

* Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human
rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint
of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of
violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also
request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings.

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies
do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have
well understood and quite distinct meanings.

“Investigate” vs. “Adjudicate”

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study.
The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or
inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of
course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of
settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts
established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation,"
"investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not
require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection
of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve,
rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case)
on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or
decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not
"try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it
has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or
political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits"
the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect
by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what where the particular
acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary
cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are
void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education
had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be
passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and
in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme
Court.
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Simon vs. Comm. on Human Rights G.R. No. 100150 January 05, 1994
Facts :
Petitioner Mayor Simon asks to prohibit CHR from further hearing and investigating "demolition case" on vendors
of North EDSA.
Constitutional Issue :
Whether the CHR is authorized to hear and decide on the "demolition case" and to impose a fine for contempt.
Ruling :
Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution empowered the CHR to investigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. The demolition of stalls, sari-sari stores and carenderia cannot fall
within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights".
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity and are the same in all parts of the
world.
Human rights include civil rights (right to life, liberty and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of religion,
academic freedom; rights of the accused to due process of law), political rights (right to elect public officials, to be
elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics), social rights (right to education,
employment and social services.
Human rights are entitlements that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity...Because they
are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by it.
Human rights includes all the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right,
innate and inalienable.
CIVIL RIGHTS - are those that belong to every citizen and are not connected with the organization or
administration of the government.
POLITICAL RIGHTS - are rights to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of the
government.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO
OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.
The City Attorney for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:
The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in
this petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to
prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et
al. vs. Quimpo, et al."
The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the
petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council
under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and
members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-
period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. 1 Prior
to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls
should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". 2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque
Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking
the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of
Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North
EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. 3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order,
directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4
On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own
ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, 5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase
light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist
from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and
arrest." 6
A motion to dismiss, 7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among
other things, that:
1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency Memorandum of
Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the demolition of the dwellings of poor
dwellers in Metro-Manila;
xxx xxx xxx
3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to moratorium in the
demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;
4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business entrepreneurs even this
Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the complainants are indeed, vendors;
5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA corner North
Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and
6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether or not a certain
business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a
permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law and ordinance. 8
During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss
set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case
to the courts.
On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's
authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights,
and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage
in business." 9
On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt
charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the
ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved). 10
In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of
them.
On 1 March 1991, 12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to
dismiss, in this wise:
Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the complaint filed
by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and constitutional rights. The
motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13
The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger
limited only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the
power to provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines .
. . ." It added:
The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All these brazenly
and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the same time for the basic rights of
women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their actions have psychologically scarred and
traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to
man.
In an Order, 14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this recourse.
The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution 15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in
our resolution 16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to
"CEASE and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580." 17
The petitioners pose the following:
Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;
b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and
c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.
In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public
respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment, 18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners.
The Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to
comply with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.
The petition has merit.
The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987
Constitution. 19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163, 20 issued
on 5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights. 21
The powers and functions 22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and
political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in
accordance with the Rules of Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as
well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged
whose human rights have been violated or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of
human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to
victims of violations of human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.
In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the
members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body. 23 This view, however, has not
heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, 24 the Court, through then
Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers
and functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be
synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:
. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e.,
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political
rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or
even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a
controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence
and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and
definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This function, to repeat, the
Commission does not have.
After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its
is, to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.
It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a
few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the
Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is
"(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have
given the following varied answers:
Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same in all parts of
the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United States or Japan, Kenya or
Indonesia . . . .
Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of the press, of
religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political rights, such as the right to
elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political associations and engage in politics; and
social rights, such as the right to an education, employment, and social services. 25
Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his humanity. . . .
Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be recognized and protected by
it. 26
(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. 27
Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural birth, right,
innate and inalienable. 28
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the
scope of human rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural,
political and civil relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes
of an individual, along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing
almost all aspects of life.
Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in
adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these
rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in
fact, impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among
those voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
a respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines," 29 observes:
But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the human rights
expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the proclamation of Martial Law on
21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule. Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest
upon suspicion, and were detained and held for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until
ordered released by the Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of
grievances became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media were
subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of the writ of habeas
corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of the Supreme Court. They were
required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the acceptance thereof. Torture to extort
confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies like Amnesty International and the International
Commission of Jurists.
Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions
during its 26 August 1986 deliberations:
MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of human rights and
also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international covenants and human rights
legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation.
Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task,
hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.
So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.
MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The Article on the
Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual involves his civil right or his
political right. So, where do we draw the line?
MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human rights
advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number of articles on the
right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on. These are very specific rights
that are considered enshrined in many international documents and legal instruments as constituting civil and
political rights, and these are precisely what we want to defend here.
MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights distinguished
this right against torture.
MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?
MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are other
violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing that the
commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at this moment are under
the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the government. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific parameters which
cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing the behavior of governments
regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially of political detainees or prisoners. This
particular aspect we have experienced during martial law which we would now like to safeguard.
MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say is, perhaps,
at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and defined
as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?
MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are integral parts
of that.
MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by human
rights?
MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in the past
regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with the defense that, as a
matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent housing and a life consistent with
human dignity.
So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the committee,
so as not to confuse the issue?
MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.
MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous speaker.
There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection of rights of
political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and public trials; 4) cases of
disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed against the religious.
xxx xxx xxx
The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.
I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make the proposed
Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future expansion. The coverage of the
concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was actually disturbed this morning when the reference
was made without qualification to the rights embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later
on, this was qualified to refer to civil and political rights contained therein.
If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other human rights specified in other
convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?
MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?
MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights of
which we are signatory.
MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that there are rights specified
in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering whether it would be wise to link our
concept of human rights to general terms like "convention," rather than specify the rights contained in the
convention.
As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period of
amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the concept of civil and
political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed constitutional article, but to give the sense of
the Commission as to what human rights would be included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need
arises. For example, there was no definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to
marry would be considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?
MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt must be
envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political detention and arrest prevention of torture, right to
fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings, hamlettings and collective
violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the civil and political rights of a specific
group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all of the definite areas.
MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his concept or the
concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights as contained in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.
MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to an
international instrument.
MR. GUINGONA. I know.
MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but only to those
that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission on Human Rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social rights.
MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and Political Rights and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second covenant contains all the different
rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education, housing, shelter, et cetera.
MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the Gentlemen has
specified.
MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.
MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.
xxx xxx xxx
SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more on how much
we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .
. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept clients who do not
pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the cases involved are very delicate —
torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest, massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty
are people in power like politicians, men in the military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission
must be independent.
I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little Filipino, the little
individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should concentrate only on civil and
political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we will have no place to go again and we
will not receive any response. . . . 30 (emphasis supplied)
The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the
Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).
The term "civil rights," 31 has been defined as referring —
(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are
not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They include the rights of property,
marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as otherwise defined civil rights are rights
appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state or community. Such term may also refer, in its general
sense, to rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.
Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt. 32
Political rights, 33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government. 34
Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees,
(2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not
likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making
a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve,
instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the
authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." 35
In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-saristores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court
can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be
likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that
cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards
hereinabove discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that
the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the
compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.
On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the
CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or
indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided
for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to
violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial
powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate
with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in
pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance
before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not
possess. In Export Processing Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights, 36 the Court, speaking through
Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino, explained:
The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid services to the
underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not be construed to confer
jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of injunction for, it that were the intention, the
Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never
derived by implication.
Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to extrajudicial and
judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may seek from proper courts on behalf
of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the
writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is
pending [within his district], or by a Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of
preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation
or protection of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to
any appropriate agency of government. 37
The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors
affected by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standion
the part of the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate
administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.
The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and
academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is
merely awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act
about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said
Commission admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been
intended, among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that. 39
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby
prohibited from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for
contempt. The temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno,
JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 1)
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to
die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the
stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move
forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats & following supervening events:
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders
channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This is to prove that
they can stir trouble from afar
Honasan’s failed coup
Communist insurgency movements
secessionist movements in Mindanao
devastated economy because of
accumulated foreign debt
plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of the
President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner also
claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and
equal protection of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section
6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.” However, it
does not define what is meant by “executive power” although in the same article it touches on exercise of certain
powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, the power to
execute the laws, the appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23).
Although the constitution outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined & exclusive. She has residual &
discretionary powers not stated in the Constitution which include the power to protect the general welfare of the
people. She is obliged to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of
the Constitution). Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt, dictate that the President can do anything
which is not forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153), inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the
President (Hyman, American President) and that the president has to maintain peace during times of emergency but
also on the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute. They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The request of
the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the constitutional
provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which
clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to
the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or
demand should submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it
must be granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for the
President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the Philippines. It is
proven that there are factual bases in her decision. The supervening events that happened before her decision are
factual. The President must take preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the country & protection of the
people. She has to uphold the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would depend on the imperatives of events and not on abstract theories of
law. We are undergoing a critical time and the current problem can only be answerable by the President.
Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s responsibility
& obligation to prevent a grave & serious threat to its safety from arising.
We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety & our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish to die in
the country. Compassion must give way to the other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to return, live & die in his own country. It is a right guaranteed by the
Consti to all individuals, whether patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
Military representatives failed to show that Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national security. Fears were mere
conjectures.
Residual powers – but the executive’s powers were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
AFP has failed to prove danger which would allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to the Philippines. .
Family can be put under house arrest & in the event that one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10 days.
Untenable that without a legislation, right to travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. It’s w/in police
power of the state to restrict this right if national security, public safety/health demands that such be restricted. It
can’t be absolute & unlimited all the time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.
No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger national security or public safety. Fears are speculative & military
admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would know how to handle Marcos’ return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
President’s determination that Marcos’ return would threaten national security should be agreed upon by the court.
Such threat must be clear & present.
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after finding
that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former
President Marcos and his family pose a threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the
Philippines. On September 28, 1989, Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that in the interest of the safety of those who will take the death
of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and society, she
did not allow the remains of Marcos to be brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners raising the following arguments:
Barring their return would deny them their inherent right as citizens to return to their country of birth and all other
rights guaranteed by the Constitution to all Filipinos.
The President has no power to bar a Filipino from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it arbitrarily.
There is no basis for barring the return of the family of former President Marcos.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be granted.
Decision:
No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.
Ratio:
Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason to warrant reconsideration.
Factual scenario during the time Court rendered its decision has not changed. The threats to the government, to
which the return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been shown to have ceased.
Imelda Marcos also called President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand Marcos who is the legal
president.
President has unstated residual powers implied from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely for
specifying principal articles implied in the definition; leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can exercise
power from sources not enumerates so long as not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This does not
amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6 expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas 1987 Constitution
granted Aquino with implied powers.
It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply w/ that duty
and there is no proof that she acted arbitrarily
Wednesday, February 29, 2012
Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 , G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989
Posted by Alchemy Business Center and Marketing Consultancy at 12:38 AM Labels: 177 SCRA 668, 1989, G.R.
No. 88211, Marcos vs. Manglapus,Political Law, September 15

Marcos vs. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668 , G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989

G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

FERDINAND E. MARCOS, IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., IRENE M.
ARANETA, IMEE MANOTOC, TOMAS MANOTOC, GREGORIO ARANETA, PACIFICO E. MARCOS,
NICANOR YÑIGUEZ and PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION (PHILCONSA), represented by
its President, CONRADO F. ESTRELLA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL MANGLAPUS, CATALINO MACARAIG, SEDFREY ORDOÑEZ, MIRIAM
DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, FIDEL RAMOS, RENATO DE VILLA, in their capacity as Secretary of Foreign
Affairs, Executive Secretary, Secretary of Justice, Immigration Commissioner, Secretary of National Defense
and Chief of Staff, respectively, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
Before the Court is a contreversy of grave national importance. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the
Court's decision in this case would undeniably have a profound effect on the political, economic and other aspects of
national life.
We recall that in February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people
power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic
under a revolutionary government. Her ascension to and consilidation of power have not been unchallenged. The
failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7
by rebel troops led by Col. Canlas with the support of "Marcos loyalists" and the unseccessful plot of the Marcos
spouses to surreptitiously return from Hawii with mercenaries aboard an aircraft chartered by a Lebanese arms
dealer [Manila Bulletin, January 30, 1987] awakened the nation to the capacity of the Marcoses to stir trouble even
from afar and to the fanaticism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country. The ratification of the 1987
Constitution enshrined the victory of "people power" and also clearly reinforced the constitutional moorings of Mrs.
Aquino's presidency. This did not, however, stop bloody challenges to the government. On August 28, 1987, Col.
Gregorio Honasan, one of the major players in the February Revolution, led a failed coup that left scores of people,
both combatants and civilians, dead. There were several other armed sorties of lesser significance, but the message
they conveyed was the same — a split in the ranks of the military establishment that thraetened civilian supremacy
over military and brought to the fore the realization that civilian government could be at the mercy of a fractious
military.
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided elements and among rabid followers of
Mr. Marcos. There are also the communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which gained
ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the communists have set up a parallel government of their
own on the areas they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about in armed bands. There
has been no let up on this groups' determination to wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to
arms but also to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating chaos and destabilizing the
country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign debt and the plunder of the nation
attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years
after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in alleviating the poverty of the masses, while
the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened
from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after
causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three
years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to issue travel documents to
Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to
bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
Th issue is basically one of power: whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the
President may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
a. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President Marcos and his family from returning to the
Philippines, in the interest of "national security, public safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety or public health?
b. Assuming that she has made that finding
(1) Have the requirements of due process been complied with in making such finding?
(2) Has there been prior notice to petitioners?
(3) Has there been a hearing?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the President's decision, including the grounds
upon which it was based, been made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?
c. Is the President's determination that the return of former President Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a
clear and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health a political question?
d. Assuming that the Court may inquire as to whether the return of former President Marcos and his family is a clear
and present danger to national security, public safety, or public health, have respondents established such fact?
3. Have the respondents, therefore, in implementing the President's decision to bar the return of former President
Marcos and his family, acted and would be acting without jurisdiction, or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion, in performing any act which would effectively bar the return of former President Marcos and his
family to the Philippines? [Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 234-236.1
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because
only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel
because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by
any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed.
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines,
provides:
Article 12
1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement
and freedom to choose his residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.
3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms
of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a political question
which is non-justiciable. According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the question involved is simply whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
family have the right to travel and liberty of abode. Petitioners invoke these constitutional rights in vacuo without
reference to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its proper formulation, the issue is whether or not petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family have the right to return to the Philippines and reside here at this time in the face of the determination by the
President that such return and residence will endanger national security and public safety.
It may be conceded that as formulated by petitioners, the question is not a political question as it involves merely a
determination of what the law provides on the matter and application thereof to petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and
family. But when the question is whether the two rights claimed by petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
impinge on or collide with the more primordial and transcendental right of the State to security and safety of its
nationals, the question becomes political and this Honorable Court can not consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have the right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here? This is clearly a justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family have their right to return to the Philippines and reestablish their
residence here even if their return and residence here will endanger national security and public safety? this is still a
justiciable question which this Honorable Court can decide.
Is there danger to national security and public safety if petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos and family shall return to the
Philippines and establish their residence here? This is now a political question which this Honorable Court can not
decide for it falls within the exclusive authority and competence of the President of the Philippines. [Memorandum
for Respondents, pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national security over individual rights. In support
thereof, they cite Article II of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people. The Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and, in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by
law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Section 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the
general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family from returning to the Philippines for
reasons of national security and public safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala, Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of
Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were among the
deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign
Affairs Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope of presidential power and its limits. We,
however, view this issue in a different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the issues,
we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the confines of the right to travel and the
import of the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78 SCt 1113,
2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766, 69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel
and recognized exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right
involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from
although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a
state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration
speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately
from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand,
the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the
right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as
"are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which
one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to
the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to
travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats
only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of
the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a
different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily
deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of passports for the purpose of effectively
exercising the right to travel are not determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they
relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected right. The issue before the Court is novel
and without precedent in Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether or not there can be limitations on the
right to travel in the absence of legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for its
resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to explain the methodology for its resolution.
Our resolution of the issue will involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the President has
the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine,
pursuant to the express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1, whether or not the
President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she
determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare
and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of government. To
recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution has
blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial
departments of the government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[the legislative
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines" Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in
the President of the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a
separation of powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission,supra] but also confer plenary legislative,
executive and judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court
in Ocampo v. Cabangis[15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all
legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised
under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the legislative power which is exercised by two
chambers with a combined membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power which is
vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the executive power which is vested in one official the
President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the
commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to enter into treaties
or international agreements, the power to submit the budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art.
VII, Sec. 14-23].
The inevitable question then arises: by enumerating certain powers of the President did the framers of the
Constitution intend that the President shall exercise those specific powers and no other? Are these se enumerated
powers the breadth and scope of "executive power"? Petitioners advance the view that the President's powers are
limited to those specifically enumerated in the 1987 Constitution. Thus, they assert: "The President has enumerated
powers, and what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her. Inclusion unius est exclusio alterius[Memorandum
for Petitioners, p. 4- Rollo p. 233.1 This argument brings to mind the institution of the U.S. Presidency after which
ours is legally patterned.**
Corwin, in his monumental volume on the President of the United States grappled with the same problem. He said:
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the Constitution. To those who think that a constitution ought to settle
everything beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the same token, to those who think that constitution makers
ought to leave considerable leeway for the future play of political forces, it should be a vision realized.
We encounter this characteristic of Article 11 in its opening words: "The executive power shall be vested in a
President of the United States of America." . . .. [The President: Office and Powers, 17871957, pp. 3-4.]
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the different persons who held the office from
Washington to the early 1900's, and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship, he
concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment depends in important measure on who is President."
[At 30.]
This view is shared by Schlesinger who wrote in The Imperial Presidency:
For the American Presidency was a peculiarly personal institution. it remained of course, an agency of government
subject to unvarying demands and duties no remained, of cas President. But, more than most agencies of
government, it changed shape, intensity and ethos according to the man in charge. Each President's distinctive
temperament and character, his values, standards, style, his habits, expectations, Idiosyncrasies, compulsions,
phobias recast the WhiteHouse and pervaded the entire government. The executive branch, said Clark Clifford, was
a chameleon, taking its color from the character and personality of the President. The thrust of the office, its impact
on the constitutional order, therefore altered from President to President. Above all, the way each President
understood it as his personal obligation to inform and involve the Congress, to earn and hold the confidence of the
electorate and to render an accounting to the nation and posterity determined whether he strengthened or weakened
the constitutional order. [At 212- 213.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what she does but, rather, that the consideration
of tradition and the development of presidential power under the different constitutions are essential for a complete
understanding of the extent of and limitations to the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935
Constitution created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S. President. The 1973
Constitution attempted to modify the system of government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere
figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became even more powerful, to the point that he was
also the de facto Legislature. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government
and restored the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three
distinct branches of government with provision for checks and balances.
It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President
is head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office
unless the Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws
is only one of the powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution
of any provision of law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. Thus, in the landmark decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928),
on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of
stock held by the Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the Philippine National Bank, the
U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power of the Governor-General to do so, said:
...Here the members of the legislature who constitute a majority of the "board" and "committee" respectively, are not
charged with the performance of any legislative functions or with the doing of anything which is in aid of
performance of any such functions by the legislature. Putting aside for the moment the question whether the duties
devolved upon these members are vested by the Organic Act in the Governor-General, it is clear that they are not
legislative in character, and still more clear that they are not judicial. The fact that they do not fall within the
authority of either of these two constitutes logical ground for concluding that they do fall within that of the
remaining one among which the powers of government are divided ....[At 202-203; Emphasis supplied.]
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring words of dissent we find reinforcement
for the view that it would indeed be a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only what
are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more
specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....
xxx xxx xxx
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot
carry out the distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from believing that it is, or
that the Constitution requires. [At 210- 211.]
The Power Involved
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of theGovernment is to serve and
protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of
democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Admittedly, service and protection of the people, the maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty
and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essentially ideals to guide governmental action. But such
does not mean that they are empty words. Thus, in the exercise of presidential functions, in drawing a plan of
government, and in directing implementing action for these plans, or from another point of view, in making any
decision as President of the Republic, the President has to consider these principles, among other things, and adhere
to them.
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More
than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the
Constitution to protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind
that the Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government
exercising the powers delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution
reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art.
II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who seek to return to the country are the deposed
dictator and his family at whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are
sought to be recovered. The constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible. For the exercise of even the preferred
freedoms of speech and ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and must be adjusted to the requirements of
equally important public interests [Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]
1. To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain
individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the
duty of the President, as steward of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power of the President but also
his duty to do anything not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin, supra, at
153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in
the President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see Hyman, The American President, where the author
advances the view that an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and is best lodged in the President].

2. More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American
Presidency].The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times
of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with
extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of
law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in
the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot
be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

3. That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of
the Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of Representatives and signed by 103 of its members
urging the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish gesture for true national reconciliation
and as irrevocable proof of our collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the Constitution and our
laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1 The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his
country.

4. What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be
considered in the light solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the right to travel, subject to certain
exceptions, or of case law which clearly never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It must be treated
as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and correlative to
the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to determine whether it must be granted or denied.

5. The Extent of Review

6. Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given
this wording, we cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Court to decide.

7. The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which
the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments to decide. But nonetheless there
remain issues beyond the Court's jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for Congress or for the
people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum. We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it
may appear to us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we amend the Constitution under the guise of
resolving a dispute brought before us because the power is reserved to the people.

8. There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political question doctrine. The deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they
did not intend courts of justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the Constitution
limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment
for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide. In this light, it
would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which
specifically empowers the courts to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964,
December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]

9. Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying
our system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of
powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of
checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the suspension of the privilege, but
only if and when he acts within the sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine
whether or not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect, is, in turn,
constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function of the Court is merely to check —
not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits
of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-
480.]

10. Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it
was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she
has acted, or acts, arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

11. We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in
chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and
respondents were represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..

12. The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized
communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with
impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the
Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of
the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

13. As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military establishment has given assurances that
it could handle the threats posed by particular groups. But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be
the proverbial final straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national
interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return.

14. It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that
would be the time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief powers granted her by the Constitution to
 suppress or stamp out such violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action
against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the
people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an
obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the
laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

15. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the
plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the
Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts
to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually
increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and
stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of
our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

16. The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved
during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common knowledge of the
state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

17. WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a
serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED.

18. SO ORDERED.

19.

20. Separate Opinions

21.

22. FERNAN, C.J., concurring:

23. "The threats to national security and public order are real the mounting Communist insurgency, a simmering separatist movement, a
restive studentry, widespread labor disputes, militant farmer groups. . . . Each of these threats is an explosive ingredient in a
steaming cauldron which could blow up if not handled properly." 1

These are not my words. They belong to my distinguished colleague in the Court, Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
But they express eloquently the basis of my full concurrence to the exhaustive and well-written ponencia of Mme.
Justice Irene R. Cortes.
Presidential powers and prerogatives are not fixed but fluctuate. They are not derived solely from a particular
constitutional clause or article or from an express statutory grant. Their limits are likely to depend on the imperatives
of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law. History and time-honored
principles of constitutional law have conceded to the Executive Branch certain powers in times of crisis or grave and
imperative national emergency. Many terms are applied to these powers: "residual," "inherent," 44 moral,"
"implied," "aggregate," "emergency." whatever they may be called, the fact is that these powers exist, as they must if
the governance function of the Executive Branch is to be carried out effectively and efficiently. It is in this context
that the power of the President to allow or disallow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines should be viewed. By
reason of its impact on national peace and order in these admittedly critical times, said question cannot be
withdrawn from the competence of the Executive Branch to decide.
And indeed, the return of the deposed President, his wife and children cannot but pose a clear and present danger to
public order and safety. One needs only to recall the series of destabilizing actions attempted by the so-called
Marcos loyalists as well as the ultra-rightist groups during the EDSA Revolution's aftermath to realize this. The most
publicized of these offensives is the Manila Hotel incident which occurred barely five (5) months after the People's
Power Revolution. Around 10,000 Marcos supporters, backed by 300 loyalist soldiers led by Brigadier General Jose
Zumel and Lt. Col. Reynaldo Cabauatan converged at the Manila Hotel to witness the oath-taking of Arturo
Tolentino as acting president of the Philippines. The public disorder and peril to life and limb of the citizens
engendered by this event subsided only upon the eventual surrender of the loyalist soldiers to the authorities.
Then followed the Channel 7, Sangley, Villamor, Horseshoe Drive and Camp Aguinaldo incidents. Military rebels
waged simultaneous offensives in different parts of Metro Manila and Sangley Point in Cavite. A hundred rebel
soldiers took over Channel 7 and its radio station DZBB. About 74 soldier rebels attacked Villamor Air Base, while
another group struck at Sangley Point in Cavite and held the 15th Air Force Strike wing commander and his deputy
hostage. Troops on board several vehicles attempted to enter Gate I of Camp Aguinaldo even as another batch of 200
soldiers encamped at Horseshoe Village.
Another destabilization plot was carried out in April, 1987 by enlisted personnel who forced their way through Gate
1 of Fort Bonifacio. They stormed into the army stockade but having failed to convince their incarcerated members
to unite in their cause, had to give up nine (9) hours later.
And who can forget the August 28, 1987 coup attempt which almost toppled the Aquino Government? Launched not
by Marcos loyalists, but by another ultra-rightist group in the military led by Col. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan who
remains at large to date, this most serious attempt to wrest control of the government resulted in the death of many
civilians.
Members of the so-called Black Forest Commando were able to cart away high-powered firearms and ammunition
from the Camp Crame Armory during a raid conducted in June 1988. Most of the group members were, however,
captured in Antipolo, Rizal. The same group was involved in an unsuccessful plot known as Oplan Balik Saya which
sought the return of Marcos to the country.
A more recent threat to public order, peace and safety was the attempt of a group named CEDECOR to mobilize
civilians from nearby provinces to act as blockading forces at different Metro Manila areas for the projected link-up
of Marcos military loyalist troops with the group of Honasan. The pseudo "people power" movement was
neutralized thru checkpoints set up by the authorities along major road arteries where the members were arrested or
forced to turn back.
While not all of these disruptive incidents may be traced directly to the Marcoses, their occurrence militates heavily
against the wisdom of allowing the Marcoses' return. Not only will the Marcoses' presence embolden their followers
toward similar actions, but any such action would be seized upon as an opportunity by other enemies of the State,
such as the Communist Party of the Philippines and the NPA'S, the Muslim secessionists and extreme rightists of the
RAM, to wage an offensive against the government. Certainly, the state through its executive branch has the power,
nay, the responsibility and obligation, to prevent a grave and serious threat to its safety from arising.
Apparently lost amidst the debate on whether or not to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is one factor,
which albeit, at first blush appears to be extra legal, constitutes a valid justification for disallowing the requested
return. I refer to the public pulse. It must be remembered that the ouster of the Marcoses from the Philippines came
about as an unexpected, but certainly welcomed, result of the unprecedented peoples power" revolution. Millions of
our people braved military tanks and firepower, kept vigil, prayed, and in countless manner and ways contributed
time, effort and money to put an end to an evidently untenable claim to power of a dictator. The removal of the
Marcoses from the Philippines was a moral victory for the Filipino people; and the installation of the present
administration, a realization of and obedience to the people's Will.
Failing in legal arguments for the allowance of the Marcoses' return, appeal is being made to sympathy, compassion
and even Filipino tradition. The political and economic gains we have achieved during the past three years are
however too valuable and precious to gamble away on purely compassionate considerations. Neither could public
peace, order and safety be sacrificed for an individual's wish to die in his own country. Verily in the balancing of
interests, the scales tilt in favor of presidential prerogative, which we do not find to have been gravely abused or
arbitrarily exercised, to ban the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting
"The Constitution ... is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its
protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine involving more pernicious
consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the
great exigencies of government." (Ex Parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2; 18 L. Ed. 281 [1866])
Since our days as law students, we have proclaimed the stirring words of Ex Parte Milliganas self-evident truth. But
faced with a hard and delicate case, we now hesitate to qive substance to their meaning. The Court has permitted a
basic freedom enshrined in the Bill of Rights to be taken away by Government.
There is only one Bill of Rights with the same interpretation of liberty and the same guarantee of freedom for both
unloved and despised persons on one hand and the rest who are not so stigmatized on the other.
I am, therefore, disturbed by the majority ruling which declares that it should not be a precedent. We are interpreting
the Constitution for only one person and constituting him into a class by himself. The Constitution is a law for all
classes of men at all times. To have a person as one class by himself smacks of unequal protection of the laws.
With all due respect for the majority in the Court, I believe that the issue before us is one of rights and not of power.
Mr. Marcos is insensate and would not live if separated from the machines which have taken over the functions of
his kidneys and other organs. To treat him at this point as one with full panoply of power against whom the forces of
Government should be marshalled is totally unrealistic. The Government has the power to arrest and punish him.
But does it have the power to deny him his right to come home and die among familiar surroundings?
Hence, this dissent.
The Bill of Rights provides:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired
except uponlawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. (Emphasis supplied, Section 6, Art. 111,
Constitution)
To have the petition dismissed, the Solicitor General repeats a ritual invocation of national security and public safety
which is hauntingly familiar because it was pleaded so often by petitioner Ferdinand E. Marcos to justify his acts
under martial law. There is, however, no showing of the existence of a law prescribing the limits of the power to
impair and the occasions for its exercise. And except for citing breaches of law and order, the more serious of which
were totally unrelated to Mr. Marcos and which the military was able to readily quell, the respondents have not
pointed to any grave exigency which permits the use of untrammeled Governmental power in this case and the
indefinite suspension of the constitutional right to travel.
The respondents' basic argument is that the issue before us is a political question beyond our jurisdiction to consider.
They contend that the decision to ban former President Marcos, and his family on grounds of national security and
public safety is vested by the Constitution in the President alone. The determination should not be questioned before
this Court. The President's finding of danger to the nation should be conclusive on the Court.
What is a political question?
In Vera v. Avelino (77 Phil. 192, 223 [1946], the Court stated:
xxx xxx xxx
It is a well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent
that power to deal with such questions has been conferred on the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions. It is not so easy, however, to define the phrase political question, nor to determine what matters fall
within its scope. It is frequently used to designate all questions that he outside the scope of the judicial power. More
properly, however, it means those questions which, under the constitution, are to be decided by the people in their
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government.
We defined a political question in Taniada v. Cuenco (103 Phil. 1051, 1066 [1957]), as follows:
In short, the term 'Political question' connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to 'those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
The most often quoted definition of political question was made by Justice William J. Brennan Jr., who penned the
decision of the United States Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr(369 US 186,82, S. Ct. 691, L. Ed. 2d. 663 [1962]).
The ingredients of a political question as formulated in Baker v. Carr are:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise may
describe a political question, which identifies it as essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on
the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
For a political question to exist, there must be in the Constitution a power vested exclusively in the President or
Congress, the exercise of which the court should not examine or prohibit. A claim of plenary or inherent power
against a civil right which claim is not found in a specific provision is dangerous. Neither should we validate a
roving commission allowing public officials to strike where they please and to override everything which to them
represents evil. The entire Government is bound by the rule of law.
The respondents have not pointed to any provision of the Constitution which commits or vests the determination of
the question raised to us solely in the President.
The authority implied in Section 6 of the Bill of Rights itself does not exist because no law has been enacted
specifying the circumstances when the right may be impaired in the interest of national security or public safety. The
power is in Congress, not the Executive.
The closest resort to a textile demonstrable constitutional commitment of power may be found in the commander-in-
chief clause which allows the President to call out the armed forces in case of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion
and to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law in the event of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it.
There is, however, no showing, not even a claim that the followers of former President Marcos are engaging in
rebellion or that he is in a position to lead them. Neither is it claimed that there is a need to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus or proclaim martial law because of the arrival of Mr. Marcos and his family. To be sure,
there may be disturbances but not of a magnitude as would compel this Court to resort to a doctrine of non-
justiceability and to ignore a plea for the enforcement of an express Bill of Rights guarantee.
The respondents themselves are hard-pressed to state who or what constitutes a Marcos "loyalist." The constant
insinuations that the "loyalist" group is heavily funded by Mr. Marcos and his cronies and that the "loyalists"
engaging in rallies and demonstrations have to be paid individual allowances to do so constitute the strongest
indication that the hard core "loyalists" who would follow Marcos right or wrong are so few in number that they
could not possibly destabilize the government, much less mount a serious attempt to overthrow it.
Not every person who would allow Mr. Marcos to come home can be tagged a "loyalist." It is in the best of Filipino
customs and traditions to allow a dying person to return to his home and breath his last in his native surroundings.
Out of the 103 Congressmen who passed the House resolution urging permission for his return, there are those who
dislike Mr. Marcos intensely or who suffered under his regime. There are also many Filipinos who believe that in the
spirit of national unity and reconciliation Mr. Marcos and his family should be permitted to return to the Philippines
and that such a return would deprive his fanatic followers of any further reason to engage in rallies and
demonstrations.
The Court, however, should view the return of Mr. Marcos and his family solely in the light of the constitutional
guarantee of liberty of abode and the citizen's right to travel as against the respondents' contention that national
security and public safety would be endangered by a grant of the petition.
Apart from the absence of any text in the Constitution committing the issue exclusively to the President, there is
likewise no dearth of decisional data, no unmanageable standards which stand in the way of a judicial determination.
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights states categorically that the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law may be impaired only upon a lawful order of a court. Not by an executive officer. Not even
by the President. Section 6 further provides that the right to travel, and this obviously includes the right to travel out
of or back intothe Philippines, cannot be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
There is no law setting the limits on a citizen's right to move from one part of the country to another or from the
Philippines to a foreign country or from a foreign country to the Philippines. The laws cited by the Solicitor General
immigration, health, quarantine, passports, motor vehicle, destierro probation, and parole are all inapplicable insofar
as the return of Mr. Marcos and family is concerned. There is absolutely no showing how any of these statutes and
regulations could serve as a basis to bar their coming home.
There is also no disrespect for a Presidential determination if we grant the petition. We would simply be applying the
Constitution, in the preservation and defense of which all of us in Government, the President and Congress included,
are sworn to participate. Significantly, the President herself has stated that the Court has the last word when it comes
to constitutional liberties and that she would abide by our decision.
As early as 1983, it was noted that this Court has not been very receptive to the invocation of the political question
doctrine by government lawyers. (See Morales, Jr. .v Ponce Enrile, 121 SCRA 538 [1983]).
Many of those now occupying the highest positions in the executive departments, Congress, and the judiciary
criticized this Court for using what they felt was a doctrine of convenience, expediency, utility or subservience.
Every major challenge to the acts of petitioner Ferdinand E. Marcos under his authoritarian regime the proclamation
of martial law, the ratification of a new constitution, the arrest and detention of "enemies of the State" without
charges being filed against them, the dissolution of Congress and the exercise by the President of legislative powers,
the trial of civilians for civil offenses by military tribunals, the seizure of some of the country's biggest corporations,
the taking over or closure of newspaper offices, radio and television stations and other forms of media, the proposals
to amend the Constitution, etc. was invariably met by an invocation that the petition involved a political question. It
is indeed poetic justice that the political question doctrine so often invoked by then President Marcos to justify his
acts is now being used against him and his family. Unfortunately, the Court should not and is not allowed to indulge
in such a persiflage. We are bound by the Constitution.
The dim view of the doctrine's use was such that when the present Constitution was drafted, a broad definition of
judicial power was added to the vesting in the Supreme Court and statutory courts of said power.
The second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
This new provision was enacted to preclude this Court from using the political question doctrine as a means to avoid
having to make decisions simply because they are too controversial, displeasing to the President or Congress,
inordinately unpopular, or which may be ignored and not enforced.
The framers of the Constitution believed that the free use of the political question doctrine allowed the Court during
the Marcos years to fall back on prudence, institutional difficulties, complexity of issues, momentousness of
consequences or a fear that it was extravagantly extending judicial power in the cases where it refused to examine
and strike down an exercise of authoritarian power. Parenthetically, at least two of the respondents and their counsel
were among the most vigorous critics of Mr. Marcos (the main petitioner) and his use of the political question
doctrine. The Constitution was accordingly amended. We are now precluded by its mandate from refusing to
invalidate a political use of power through a convenient resort to the question doctrine. We are compelled to decide
what would have been non-justiceable under our decisions interpreting earlier fundamental charters.
This is not to state that there can be no more political questions which we may refuse to resolve. There are still some
political questions which only the President, Congress, or a plebiscite may decide. Definitely, the issue before us is
not one of them.
The Constitution requires the Court "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction."
How do we determine a grave abuse of discretion?
The tested procedure is to require the parties to present evidence. Unfortunately, considerations of national security
do not readily lend themselves to the presentation of proof before a court of justice. The vital information essential
to an objective determination is usually highly classified and it cannot be rebutted by those who seek to overthrow
the government. As early as Barcelon v. Baker (5 Phil. 87, 93 [19051), the Court was faced with a similar situation.
It posed a rhetorical question. If after investigating conditions in the Archipelago or any part thereof, the President
finds that public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, can the judicial
department investigate the same facts and declare that no such conditions exist?
In the effort to follow the "grave abuse of discretion" formula in the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, the court granted the Solicitor General's offer that the military give us a closed door factual briefing
with a lawyer for the petitioners and a lawyer for the respondents present.
The results of the briefing call to mind the concurrence of Justice Vicente Abad Santos inMorales, Jr. v. Enrile, (121
SCRA 538, 592 [19831):
How can this Court determine the factual basis in order that it can ascertain whether or not the president acted
arbitrarily in suspending the writ when, in the truth words of Montenegro, with its very limited machinery fit] cannot
be in better position [than the Executive Branch] to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the
Archipelago? (At p. 887). The answer is obvious. It must rely on the Executive Branch which has the appropriate
civil and military machinery for the facts. This was the method which had to be used in Lansang. This Court relied
heavily on classified information supplied by the military. Accordingly, an incongruous situation obtained. For this
Court, relied on the very branch of the government whose act was in question to obtain the facts. And as should be
expected the Executive Branch supplied information to support its position and this Court was in no situation to
disprove them. It was a case of the defendant judging the suit. After all is said and done, the attempt by its Court to
determine whether or not the President acted arbitrarily in suspending the writ was a useless and futile exercise.
There is still another reason why this Court should maintain a detached attitude and refrain from giving the seal of
approval to the act of the Executive Branch. For it is possible that the suspension of the writ lacks popular support
because of one reason or another. But when this Court declares that the suspension is not arbitrary (because it cannot
do otherwise upon the facts given to it by the Executive Branch) it in effect participates in the decision-making
process. It assumes a task which it is not equipped to handle; it lends its prestige and credibility to an unpopular act.
The other method is to avail of judicial notice. In this particular case, judicial notice would be the only basis for
determining the clear and present danger to national security and public safety. The majority of the Court has taken
judicial notice of the Communist rebellion, the separatist movement, the rightist conspiracies, and urban terrorism.
But is it fair to blame the present day Marcos for these incidents? All these problems are totally unrelated to the
Marcos of today and, in fact, are led by people who have always opposed him. If we use the problems of
Government as excuses for denying a person's right to come home, we will never run out of justifying reasons.
These problems or others like them will always be with us.
Significantly, we do not have to look into the factual bases of the ban Marcos policy in order to ascertain whether or
not the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion. Nor are we forced to fall back upon judicial notice of the
implications of a Marcos return to his home to buttress a conclusion.
In the first place, there has never been a pronouncement by the President that a clear and present danger to national
security and public safety will arise if Mr. Marcos and his family are allowed to return to the Philippines. It was only
after the present petition was filed that the alleged danger to national security and public safety conveniently
surfaced in the respondents' pleadings. Secondly, President Aquino herself limits the reason for the ban Marcos
policy to — (1) national welfare and interest and (2) the continuing need to preserve the gains achieved in terms of
recovery and stability. (See page 7, respondents' Comment at page 73 of Rollo). Neither ground satisfies the criteria
of national security and public safety. The President has been quoted as stating that the vast majority of Filipinos
support her position. (The Journal, front page, January 24,1989) We cannot validate their stance simply because it is
a popular one. Supreme Court decisions do not have to be popular as long as they follow the Constitution and the
law. The President's original position "that it is not in the interest of the nation that Marcos be allowed to return at
this time" has not changed. (Manila Times, front page, February 7, 1989). On February 11, 1989, the President is
reported to have stated that "considerations of the highest national good dictate that we preserve the substantial
economic and political gains of the past three years" in justifying her firm refusal to allow the return of Mr. Marcos
despite his failing health. (Daily Globe, front page, February 15, 1989). "Interest of the nation national good," and
"preserving economic and political gains," cannot be equated with national security or public order. They are too
generic and sweeping to serve as grounds for the denial of a constitutional right. The Bill of Rights commands that
the right to travel may not be impaired except on the stated grounds of national security, public safety, or public
health and with the added requirement that such impairment must be "as provided by law." The constitutional
command cannot be negated by mere generalizations.
There is an actual rebellion not by Marcos followers but by the New Peoples' Army. Feeding as it does on injustice,
ignorance, poverty, and other aspects at under-development, the Communist rebellion is the clearest and most
present danger to national security and constitutional freedoms. Nobody has suggested that one way to quell it
would be to catch and exile its leaders, Mr. Marcos himself was forced to flee the country because of "peoples'
power." Yet, there is no move to arrest and exile the leaders of student groups, teachers' organizations, pea ant and
labor federations, transport workers, and government unions whose threatened mass actions would definitely
endanger national security and the stability of government. We fail to see how Mr. Marcos could be a greater danger.
The fear that Communist rebels, Bangsa Moro secessionists, the Honasan ex-soldiers, the hard core loyalists, and
other dissatisfied elements would suddenly unite to overthrow the Republic should a dying Marcos come home is
too speculative and unsubstantial a ground for denying a constitutional right. It is not shown how extremists from
the right and the left who loathe each other could find a rallying point in the coming of Mr. Marcos.
The "confluence theory" of the Solicitor General or what the majority calls "catalytic effect," which alone sustains
the claim of danger to national security is fraught with perilous implications. Any difficult problem or any
troublesome person can be substituted for the Marcos threat as the catalysing factor. The alleged confluence of
NPAs, secessionists, radical elements, renegade soldiers, etc., would still be present. Challenged by any critic or any
serious problem, the Government can state that the situation threatens a confluence of rebel forces and proceed to
ride roughshod over civil liberties in the name of national security. Today, a passport is denied. Tomorrow, a
newspaper may be closed. Public assemblies may be prohibited. Human rights may be violated. Yesterday, the right
to travel of Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Jovito Salonga was curtailed. Today, it is the right of Mr. Marcos and
family. Who will be tomorrow's pariahs I deeply regret that the Court's decision to use the political question doctrine
in a situation where it does not apply raises all kinds of disturbing possibilities.
I must emphasize that General Renato de Villa, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, has personally assured the
Court that a rebellion of the above combined groups will not succeed and that the military is on top of the situation.
Where then is the clear danger to national security? The Court has taken judicial notice of something which even the
military denies. There would be severe strains on military capabilities according to General de Villa. There would be
set-backs in the expected eradication of the Communist threat. There would be other serious problems but all can be
successfully contained by the military. I must stress that no reference was made to a clear and present danger to
national security as would allow an overriding of the Bill of Rights.
The Solicitor General's argument that the failure of Congress to enact a statute defining the parameters of the right to
travel and to freely choose one's abode has constrained the President to fill in the vacuum, is too reminiscent of
Amendment No. 6 of the martial law Constitution to warrant serious consideration. Amendment No. 6 allowed
Marcos to issue decrees whenever the Batasang Pambansa failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter for
any reason that in his judgment required immediate action. When the Bill of Rights provides that a right may not be
impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health and further requires that a law
must provide when such specifically defined interests are prejudiced or require protection, the inaction of Congress
does not give reason for the respondents to assume the grounds for its impairment.
The fact that the Marcoses have been indicted before American federal courts does not obstruct us from ruling
against an unconstitutional assertion of power by Philippine officials. Let the United States apply its laws. We have
to be true to our own.
Mr. Marcos may be too ill to withstand the rigors of a transpacific flight. The agony of traveling while hooked up to
machines which have taken over the functions of his heart, lungs, and kidneys may hasten his death. The physical
condition of Mr. Marcos does not justify our ignoring or refusing to act on his claim to a basic right which is legally
demandable and enforceable. For his own good, it might be preferable to stay where he is. But he invokes a
constitutional right. We have no power to deny it to him.
The issuance of a passport may be discretionary but it should not be withheld if to do so would run counter to a
constitutional guarantee. Besides, the petitioners are not asking for passports and nothing else. Any travel documents
or any formal lifting of the Marcos ban as would allow international airlines to sell them tickets would suffice.
With all due respect for the majority opinion, I disagree with its dictum on the right to travel. I do not think we
should differentiate the right to return home from the right to go abroad or to move around in the Philippines. If at
all, the right to come home must bemore preferred than any other aspect of the right to travel. It was precisely the
banning by Mr. Marcos of the right to travel by Senators Benigno Aquino, Jr., Jovito Salonga, and scores of other
"undesirables" and "threats to national security" during that unfortunate period which led the framers of our present
Constitution not only to re-enact but to strengthen the declaration of this right. Media often asks, "what else is new?"
I submit that we now have a freedom loving and humane regime. I regret that the Court's decision in this case sets
back the gains that our country has achieved in terms of human rights, especially human rights for those whom we
do not like or those who are against us.
The respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Raul S. Manglapus has disclosed a list of former dictators who were
barred by their successors from returning to their respective countries. There is no showing that the countries
involved have constitutions which guarantee the liberty of abode and the freedom to travel and that despite such
constitutional protections, the courts have validated the "ban a return" policy. Neither is it shown that the successors
of the listed dictators are as deeply committed to democratic principles and as observant of constitutional protections
as President Aquino.
It is indeed regrettable that some followers of the former President are conducting a campaign to sow discord and to
divide the nation. Opposition to the government no matter how odious or disgusting is, however, insufficient ground
to ignore a constitutional guarantee.
During the protracted deliberations on this case, the question was asked is the Government helpless to defend itself
against a threat to national security? Does the President have to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
proclaim martial law? Can she not take less drastic measures?
Of course, the Government can act. It can have Mr. Marcos arrested and tried in court. The Government has more
than ample powers under eixisting law to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public safety.
But the denial of travel papers is not one of those powers because the Bill of Rights says so. There is no law
prescribing exile in a foreign land as the penalty for hurting the Nation.
Considering all the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-1573 March 29, 1948
KAISAHAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA KAHOY SA PILIPINAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
GOTAMCO SAW MILL, respondent-appellee.
Severino P. Izon for petitioner.
Romeo Perfecto for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
In its petition for a writ of certiorari, the "Kaisahan ng mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Pilipinas" prays, for the
reasons therein set forth, that we reverse and vacate the orders of the Court of Industrial Relations dated September
23, 1946 (Annex A) and March 28, 1947 (Annex B) and its resolution of July 11, 1947 (Annex C).
In the order of September 23, 1946, it is recited that the laborers in the main case (case No. 31-V of the Court of
Industrial Relations) declared a strike on September 10, 1946, "which suspended all the work in the respondent
company"; that on September 19, 1946 (presumably after the case had been brought to the Court of Industrial
Relations) said court informed the parties that the continuation of the strike would necessarily prejudice both parties,
and that a temporary solution, satisfactory to both parties, must be found to put an end to it, at the same time, urging
both parties to be reasonable in their attitude towards each other; that ample opportunity was given to both parties to
iron out their differences until September 21, 1946, when the court continued the conference at which, among other
things, the leader of the laborers informed the court that, although said laborers were not exactly satisfied with the
arrangement, in order to cooperate with the court and with the parties so that the laborers could return to work and
the company resume its operation, they had no objection to accepting a temporary settlement of P3.50 without meal,
as against the proposal of the company of P2.00 without meal; that after a series of conferences held on September
23, 1946, the date of the order now under consideration, the labor leader decided to accept a temporary arrangement
of the wage problem as proposed by management, that is, P2.00 over-all increase without meal to all striking
laborers; that Francisco Cruz, President of the Union, manifested that he would have a hard time convincing the
laborers, but in view of their desire to preserve that harmony which used to exist between the parties, they were
going to accede to this proposition, provided that the management would permit the laborers to bring with them
home, if available, small pieces of lumber to be utilized as firewood; that the negotiations culminated in an
agreement by which the laborers would return to their work on Tuesday, September 24, 1946, at 7:00 o'clock in the
morning, and the respondent company would resume its operation on said date under the following conditions:
(1) That all the laborers and workingmen will receive an over-all increase of P2.00 daily, without meal, over the
wages received by them before the strike;
(2) That the management will permit the laborers to bring with them home, if available, small pieces of lumber to be
utilized as firewood; and
(3) That the foregoing increase and privilege will take effect upon the return of the workingmen to work until the
final determination of the present controversy.
The same order then proceeds as follows:
Finding the above temporary agreement between the parties to be reasonable and advantageous to both, the court
approves the same and orders the striking laborers of the respondent company to return to their work on Tuesday,
September 24, 1946 at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, and the respondent company to resume its operation and admit
the striking laborers. The respondent company is enjoined not to lay-off, suspend or dismiss any laborer affiliated
with the petitioning union, nor suspend the operation of the temporary agreement, and the labor union is enjoined
not to stage a walk-out or strike during the pendency of the hearing.
From the order of March 27, 1947, it appears that on January 7, 1947, the respondent Gotamco Saw Mill filed with
the Court of Industrial relations an urgent motion asking that the petitioning union be held for contempt of court for
having staged a strike during the pendency of the main case "in violation of the order of this court dated September
23, 1946"; that on January 9, 1947, petitioner filed an answer with a counter-petition alleging, among other things,
that a representative of petitioner conferred with respondent regarding certain discriminations obtaining in the
respondent's saw mill, but instead of entertaining their grievances said respondent in a haughty and arbitrary manner
ordered the stoppage of the work and consequently the workers did then and there stop working; and in the counter-
petition said petitioner asked the respondent be held for contempt for having employed four new Chinese laborers
during the pendency of the hearing of the main case, without express authority of the court and in violation of
section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. It is also recited in the said order of March 28, 1947, that on
that same date, January 9, 1947, respondent filed with the court another urgent motion for contempt against the
petitioning union for picketing on the premises of the respondent's saw mill and for grave threats which prevented
the remaining laborers from working.
Upon request of both parties, the court required the presentation of evidence pertinent to the incidents thus raised.
Thereafter, the said order of March 28, 1947, was entered, and the court stated therein the three questions to be
determined as follows: first, if there was a violation by the petitioning union of the order of said court of September
23, 1946, which would warrant the commencement of contempt proceedings; second, whether the facts and
circumstances attending the picketing constitute contempt of court; third, whether there was a violation by the
respondent of section 19 of the Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, in taking four Chinese laborers pending
the hearing and without express authority of the court; and fourth, whether the dismissal of Maximino Millan was
with or without just cause.
The court, passing upon these questions, found and held:
(1) That there was a violation of the order of the court dated September 23, 1946, by the petitioning union and
thereby ordered Atty. Pastor T. Reyes, special agent of the court, to take such action as may be warranted in the
premises against the person or persons responsible therefor for contempt:
(2) That the question of picketing being closely and intimately related to the strike which had been found illegal, did
not need to be passed upon, it being imbibed by question No. 1;
(3) That there being no strong and clear proof on the question of respondent having violated section 19 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, respondent was thereby exonerated from any liability in connection with
the alleged employment of four Chinamen;
(4) That Maximino Millan being of troublesome nature and unworthy to work among his fellow laborers, his
petition for reinstatement contained in demand No. 5 of the main case was thereby denied.
The above cited resolution of July 11, 1947, was entered by the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting in banc, and
denied reconsideration of its order of March 28, 1947, as requested by the petitioning union's contention is recited
that the provisions of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, upon which order of September 23,
1946, was based, had not been complied with; in other words, that the said order was not issued in conformity with
the requisites of said section, because, it was said, before its issuance there had been no proper hearing and there was
and there was no express finding by the court that public interest required the return of the striking workers. The
further contention is therein recited that, granting that the order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity
with said section 19, said provision is unconstitutional for being in violation of the organic proscription of
involuntary servitude. Passing upon these contentions, the Court of Industrial Relations said:
The order of September 23, 1946, was issued in conformity with the provisions of section 19. Said order was
proposed and issued on the basis of the agreement entered into by the parties after the preliminary hearings and
conferences. While it is true that the order of the Court now in question did not make any express finding as to
whether public interest required the return of the striking workers, it is undeniable, however, that until the numerous
incidents arising therefrom since the certification of the dispute promptly, need not be stated in the said order
because it is a fact which is borne out by the entire record of the case. If the petitioner was aggrieved by the terms of
the order, it could have objected right then and there and could have appealed said order within the period prescribed
by law, and nor to wait after it had become final, definite, and conclusive. The record shows that the petitioner in its
answer answer and counter-petition for contempt based its complaint upon section 19 (incidental Case No. 31-V
[4]). It is, indeed, strange that after taking advantage of this order and enjoyed (enjoying) the benefits thereunder, the
petitioner now comes to impugn and challenge the validity. The second motion for reconsideration is the sad
instance where the petitioner attacks the validity of an order under which it once took shelter.
The court believes that section 19 is constitutional. To start with, this section is presumed to be constitutional.
Several laws promulgated which apparently infringe the human rights of individuals were "subjected to regulation
by the State basically in the exercise of its paramount police power". The provisions of Act No. 103 were inspired by
the constitutional injunction making it the concern of the State to promote social justice to insure the well being and
economic security of all the people. In order to attain this object, section 19 was promulgated which grants to labor
what it grants to capital and denies to labor what it denies to capital. Section 19 complements the power of the Court
to settle industrial disputes and renders effective such powers which are conferred upon it by the different provisions
of the Court's organic law, more particularly, sections 1 and 4, and "other plenary powers conferred upon the Court
to enable it to settle all questions matters, controversies or disputes arising between, and/or affecting employers and
employees", "to prevent non-pacific methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes"
(International HardWood and Venser Co. vs The Pangil Federation of Laborers, G.R. No. 47178, cited in the case of
Mindanao Bus Co. vs. Mindanao Bus Co. Employees' Association, 40 Off. Gaz., 115). Section 4 has been upheld in
the case aforecited. It appearing that the power of this Court to execute its orders under section 19 is also the same
power it possesses under section 4 of the same act, it inferentially follows that section 19 is likewise valid. (Manila
Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union, G.R. No. 47796.)
In Manila Trading and Supply Company vs. Philippine Labor Union, supra, this Court said:
In the first place, the ultimate effect of petitioner's theory is to concede to the Court of Industrial Relations the power
to decide a case under section 19 but deny it, the power to execute its decision thereon. The absurdity of this
proposition, is too evident to require argument. In the second place considering that the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations under section 19 is merely incidental to the same jurisdiction it has previously acquired under
section 4 of the law, if follows that the power to execute its orders under section 19 is also the same power that it
possesses under section 4. (40 Off. Gaz., [14th Supp.], No. 23, p. 178.)
Among the powers thus conferred is that to punish a violation of an order such as those now under consideration as
for contempt of court.
We agree with the Court of Industrial Relations that section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is constitutional. It
does not offend against the constitutional inhibition prescribing involuntary servitude. An employee entering into a
contract of employment said law went into effect, voluntarily accepts, among other conditions, those prescribed in
said section 19, among which is the "implied condition that when any dispute between the employer or landlord and
the employee, tenant or laborer has been submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for settlement or arbitration,
pursuant to the provisions of this Act, and pending award or decision by it, the employee, tenant or laborer shall not
strike or walk out of his employment when so joined by the court after hearing and when public interest so requires,
and if he has already done so, that he shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only
after hearing when public interest so requires or when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be promptly decided or
settled ...". (Emphasis supplied.) The voluntariness of the employee's entering into such a contract of employment
— he has a free choice between entering into it or not — with such an implied condition, negatives the possibility of
involuntary servitude ensuing. The resolution of July 11, 1947, states that the order of September 23, 1946, was
issued after a series of preliminary hearings or conferences, and we are satisfied that these were "hearings" within
the meaning of the above mentioned section 19 of the law. The record certainly reveals that what was done during
and what resulted from said preliminary hearings or conferences were reported to the court at a formal hearing. As
to public interest requiring that the court enjoin the strike or walk out, or the return of striking laborers, aside from
the legal presumption that the Court of Industrial Relations complied with the provisions of the law in this respect,
we think that, considering the universally known fact, of which this Court takes judicial notice, that as a result of the
destructions wrought by the late war, the economic and social rehabilitation of the country urgently demands the
reconstruction work will inevitably tend to paralyze, impede or slow down the country's program of rehabilitation
which, for obvious and natural reasons, the government is striving to accelerate as much as is humanly possible.
Besides, the order of the court was for the striking workers to return to their work. And that order was made after
hearing, and, moreover, section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, in providing for an order of the court fro the
return of striking workers, authorizes such order, among other cases, "when the dispute can not, in its opinion, be
promptly decided or settled". The provision says: "... and if he has already done so (struck or walked out),that he
shall forthwith return to it, upon order of the court, which shall be issued only after hearing when public interest so
requires or when the dispute cannot, in its opinion, be promptly decided or settled, (emphasis supplied). In other
words the order to return, if the dispute can be promptly decided or settled, may be issued "only after hearing when
public interest so requires", but if in the court's opinion the dispute can not be promptly decided or settled, then it is
also authorized after hearing to issue the order: we construe the provision to mean that the very impossibility of
prompt decision or settlement of the dispute confers upon the court the power to issue the order for the reason that
the public has an interest in preventing undue stoppage or paralyzation of the wheels of industry. And, as well stated
by the court's resolution of July 11, 1947, this impossibility of prompt decision or settlement was a fact which was
borne out by the entire record of the case and did not need express statement in the order.
Finally, this Court is not authorized to review the findings of fact made by the Court of Industrial Relations
(Commonwealth Act No. 103, section 15, as amended by Commonwealth Act 559, section 2; Rule 44, Rules of
Court; National Labor Union vs. Phil. Match Co., 40 Off. Gaz. 8th Supp. p. 134, Bardwell Brothers vs. Phil. Labor
Union, 39 Off. Gaz. 1032; Pasumil Workers' Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 40 Off. Gaz. 6th Supp., p. 71).
However, Mr. Justice Briones thinks that we should expressly reserve our opinion on the constitutionality of the
above statutory and reglementary provisions should it, in the future, become necessary to decide it.
For all theses considerations, the orders and resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations assailed by the instant
petition are hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioner-appellant. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., concurring and dissenting:
We concur in the result of the decision in this case, but we cannot agree with the pronouncement depriving the
Supreme Court the power to revise findings of facts made by the Court of Industrial Relations.
We are of opinion that such curtailment of the powers of the Supreme Court is violative of the spirit and purposes of
Commonwealth Act No. 103. The power of revision granted by the Supreme Court should not be limited so as to
deny relief to any party that may foundedly feel aggrieved by any substantial finding of fact made by the Court of
Industrial Relations center on disputed facts, such as reasonable salaries, reasonable working conditions, periods of
rest, reasons for strikes or lockouts, injustice of the relations between employer and employees, etc. The aggrieved
party must not be denied his day in court in the highest tribunal.
Validity of section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 is impugned on constitutional grounds, upon the allegation
that it is tantamount to authorizing involuntary servitude. We cannot agree with the proposition. Under said section,
the question of involuntary work is not involved, but only the workability of the settlement of a labor dispute
contemplated by Commonwealth Act No. 103. When workers on strike appear before the Court of Industrial
Relations to seek remedy under Commonwealth Act No. 103, they do so, on the assumption that the work in their
employment were and are agreeable to their conscience and dignity and, as a matter of fact, they claim the right to
continue performing the same work. Otherwise they would not have resorted to strike, a means resorted to, to
compel the employer and let them continue working, but on conditions more agreeable to the workers. If the strikers
should feel that their work is in the nature of involuntary servitude, they would not resort to a strike nor recur to the
Court of Industrial Relations, but will simply resign and seek some other employment.
When the strikers are seeking remedy under the law from the Court of Industrial Relations, the court may impose
such reasonable conditions, one of them being that provided by section 19 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, but
because it is a reasonable implementation of the powers of the court to effectively settle a labor controversy.
If the laborers should feel that they are compelled against their will to perform something which is repugnant to their
conscience or dignity, they need not resort to any court action to seek judicial settlement of the controversy, as they
can resign from their work and there is no power that can compel them to continue therein.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26182 May 31, 1971
THE PEOPLE OF PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TOMAS BAGASALA, JUANITO BAGASALA, ANICETO RONAN, SALVADOR RONAN and ANICETO
REX, defendants, JUANITO BAGASALA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor
Hector C. Fule for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose Agbulos for defendant-appellant.

FERNANDO, J.:
The plea of appellant Juanito Bagasala for the reversal of his conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide and
serious physical injuries is based on the insufficiency of the proof to demonstrate his beyond reasonable doubt as the
confession attributed to him was allegedly obtained by means of torture and the infliction of body injuries and there
was not enough testimonial evidence to justify the finding that he was liable for the crime committed the
information for the above offense was filed against five accused, but only Tomas Bagasala and Juanito Bagasala
were adjudged guilty. 1 An appeal was duly taken to this Court by both of them, but Tomas Bagasala having escaped
from the provincial jail on March 24, 1966, his appeal was dismissed. 2 Juanito Bagasala is thus the sole appellant.
As will hereafter be shown his contention that an extra-judicial confession was involuntary, having been exorted by
force, must by given credence. He is not, however, entitled to an aquital, as the oral testimony contrary to his
assertion did clearly point him as one of the perpetrators of the offense charged. The conviction cannot be reversed.
The tragic occurrence took place on June 10, 1961. At about 2:00 o'clock that morning, Macario Ongkit and his
wife, Juliana Reginaldo, were asleep in their house in Barrio Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur. They were awakened by
the barking of their dog. Macario stood up and armed himself with his bolo and an iron pipe. Proceeding to the sala,
he saw five men entering his house through the doors leading to the veranda as well as the kitchen. 3 In no time at all,
one of them, recognized by him as appellant Juanito Bagasala, wrested the iron pipe. Another, Tomas Bagasala, in
turn sought to take away from him his bolo. Iron pipe in hand, appellant was heard by Ongkit demanding from his
wife, Juliana Reginaldo, her key, prompting her to exclaim: "Juanita why are you doing this to us?" This was
followed by her plea for help, as she was beaten up with such weapon. 4
Tomas Bagasala in turn succeeded in relieving Ongkit of his bolo and to use it against the latter, wounding him on
the back of his head and thus causing him to fall to the floor. It was not until almost dawn that morning that he
regained consciousness. His son, It was then attending to his wounds. He was asked by his father to report what
happened to the authorities. Ongkit was then taken to the provincial hospital in Naga City so that he could receive
medical care. He likewise testified that of the raiding party of five, he could identify only appellant and Tomas
Bagasala. On the occasion of such robbery, he suffered a loss of one sack of rice valued at ten pesos. 5
With the incident being reported to the Philippine Constabulary at Naga City on the same morning, two
sergeants6 and two corporals 7 were directed to investigate the occurrence. Upon their arrival, what greeted them at
the scene of the crime 10:00 o'clock that morning were the lifeless body of the wife, Juliana Reginaldo, lying flat on
the floor the iron pipe and the bolo stained with blood. 8 They were told by the son, Rafael Ongkit, that his father
was in the provincial hospital in Naga City. Proceeding to said place, Ongkit pointed to appellant and Tomas
Bagasala with three other persons who were responsible for the killing and the robbery. 9 Acting on this information,
they brought the two to the hospital where they were readily identified by Ongkit as the perpetrators. 10 The death of
the wife, according to their doctor who performed the autopsy, was due to the "acute internal and secondary
hemorrhage, because of the multiple wounds on the head and fracture of the skull." 11
The oral testimony of Macario Ongkit, in the opinion of the lower court, was "corroborated and strengthened by the
[extra-judicial statement] under oath" of appellant Juanita Bagasala wherein it was admitted that he was among the
group of five persons who went to the house of the Ongkit spouses precisely for the purpose of taking away the
palay stored therein. 12 There, was thus a rejection of the claim made that such confession was involuntary. The
defense of alibi put up by appellant was rejected in view of the positive identification. Hence his conviction for the
crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries, being sentenced to pay the heirs of Juliana Reginaldo
the amount of P5,000.00 and to pay Macario Ongkit the amount of P10.00 representing the value of the palay.
If the conviction of appellant were predicated solely on the confession, he would be entitled to acquittal, his attack
on its voluntary character having support in the evidence of record. There is, however, sufficient basis for the finding
of guilt as the testimonial evidence is sufficiently wieghty and the defense of alibi utterly unconvincing.
1. The Constitution in its Bill of Rights explicitly guarantees: "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself." 13 There is thus a safeguard against the compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts. It does not bar, as
Justice Tuason pointed out, the conviction of an accused "on a voluntary extrajudicial statement ...." 14 Certainly,
however, where the confession is involuntary being due to maltreatment or induced by fear or intimidation, there is a
violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of coercion whether physical, mental, or emotional thus stamps it
with inadmissibility. What is essential for its validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person confessing.
This is the prevailing principle even prior to the Constitution. Both under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the
Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 as well as a statute enacted in 1903, there is the requirement that a confession to
be received as evidence must be shown to be freely and voluntarily made and not the result of violence intimidation
threat, menace, or promise or offer of reward or leniency. 15 Why it should be thus was explained in an early leading
case: "Involuntary confessions are rejected by all courts — by some on the ground that a concession so obtained is
unreliable and by some on the grounds of humanitarian principles which abhor all forms of torture or unfairness
toward the accused in criminal proceedings. But either theory arrives at the same goal. Such a confession is not legal
evidence and must be rejected. If the accused satisfactorily shows that it was made involuntarily, the confessions
stand discredited the eyes of the law and is a thing which never existed." 16 Such a thought finds expression in an
even earlier decision, United States v. Navarro, 17 promulgated in 1904. Thus: "The provision that no one is bound to
criminate himself is older than the Government of the United States. At an early day it became a part of the common
law of England. It was established on the grounds of public policy and humanity — of policy, because if the party
were required to testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury,
and of humanity, because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress." 18
It is no surprise then that where there was ample basis in a habeas corpus proceeding for petitioner's contention as to
the signature on his confessions in the eight cases where he did plead guilty being due to his desire to avoid any
further torture or maltreatment, this Court, through Justice Perfecto reached this conclusion: "The facts proved by
petitioner convince us that the sentences rendered in the eight cases in question are null and void and should not be
given any effect." 19 As a result, the release from confinement of petitioner was ordered. Then, too, in line with this
controlling doctrine, there is this relevant excerpt from an opinion of Justice Labrador: "We cannot close our ears to
the stories of maltreatment used to extort the confession in question. Courts are not unaware that some officers of
the law resort to illegal and reprehensible tactics to extort confessions, and had occasions to, express condemnation
of such tactics. 20
It is unfortunate that the lower court failed to abide by the authoritative doctrines that ban the use of involuntary
confessions in accordance with the constitutional provision against self-incrimination which, in the language of
Justice Sanchez, should be "mandatory", being "a valuable and substantive right." 21 Appellant testified that on June
10, 1961, while he was being investigated at the constabulary barracks, he was boxed repeatedly in different parts of
the body, at one time made to lie down after being blindfolded and then water poured on his face. 22 He repeated that
before signing the confession on June 13, 1961, he was likewise subjected to physical maltreatment, having been
boxed many times on the breast and stomach. 23 His testimony received confirmation from a competent and neutral
source, Dr. Pedro Villafuerte, the city health officer of Naga, who examined appellant on June 27, 1961 in the
provincial jail of Camarines Sur seventeen days after his being apprehended and taken to the constabulary barracks.
When asked what he found on the person of appellant, this was his answer: "He has five lesions here. Tenderness of
the stomach on the left; elongated scar, lower third of the forearm; healing wound, circular shape on the elbow, left
side; sensation of deafness and easily nervous."24 When questioned as to what could have caused the tenderness, he
replied as follows: "That is trauma. The elongated scar on the lower third might have been produced by a stick; the
healing wound circular in form, he might have fallen on a hard object and the sensation of deafness, if you try to hit
the two ears with the palm, there is compression of the ear drum, so that the hearing is interfered with. But this will
be temporary in nature. Easily nervous, because of fear. I examined him in jail." 25
The above testimony notwithstanding, the lower court could still look upon such confession as free of any infirmity.
Clearly, that was error, as pointed out by appellant. The constant course of decisions of this honorable Tribunal, true
to the meaning of the self-incrimination clause forbids the admission of any confession obtained under such
circumstances. It would be to render nugatory a valuable constitutional right if judges of the courts of first instance
display less than full sensitivity to its command. A conviction resting on such proof, and such proof alone, certainly
cannot be allowed to stand.
It is likewise timely to impress anew on police officials that the imperative requirements of truth and of humanity
condemn the utilization of force and violence to extract confessions from unwilling victims. Crime must be punished
and the guilty must not be allowed to escape. A desirable end cannot, however, be attained by unconstitutional
means. There should be less than full respect for the law if in the process of enforcing it lawless methods are
employed. Once again, then, this Court is called upon to manifest in the strongest language possible its abhorrence
for the employment of force to compel a person to sign a statement acknowledging guilt. A decent regard for the
dignity that attaches to every human being as such will be satisfied with nothing less.
2. Nonetheless, a reversal is not called for. There is sufficient competent and credible evidence of record pointing
unerringly to the guilt of appellant. His brief, in two other errors assigned would impute the perpetration of the deed
"to someone else." 26 By that cryptic statement, reference is made to the testimony of his own thirteen-year-old
daughter, Soledad Bagasala, who did, on the witness stand, declare that on the morning of June 9, 1969 there was a
quarrel between the Ongkit spouses presumably due to the wife having applied to work as a maid in the household
of a certain family in Naga. 27 She even went so far as to state that she saw the deceased hitting, with a piece of pipe,
the head of her husband, Macario Ongkit, who retaliated by using the bolo on her. 28 Certainly, it is understandable
why the lower court could not be expected that such an assertion, coming from the daughter, could disprove what
was testified to by Macario Ongkit as to the fatal beating inflicted on his wife by appellant on the occasion of a
robbery.
Nor could appellant's responsibility for the gory occurrence be wiped away by the simple disclaimer that he was,
during the night of June 9, 1961, asleep in his house, leaving the place only the next morning to harvest Palay. 29His
defense of alibi was sought to be bolstered by still another member of the family, his wife, who affirmed that on the
evening of June 9, 1961 appellant was sleeping in their house, but likewise admitted that the evidence of the Ongkit
spouses was only about fifty meters away. 30 The lower court did not accept such a version. It is understandable why.
His identification coming from a neighbor was easily believable. Such an alibi which did not prelude appellants
having taken the time to go with his other co-accused in a house only fifty meters away during the course of the
evening, as not calculated to impress any court of justice with its truth. As was stressed in Justice Castro's opinion
in People v. Alcantara: 31 "The appellant's main defense in exculpation is alibi. It must he stressed at the outset that
alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, especially if there is direct testimony of an
eyewitness duly corroborated by that of another, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also
because of the case of fabricating evidence of alibi and the difficulty of checking or rebutting." 32 People vs.
Estrada 33 was cited in support of such a view. Thus: "No jurisprudence in criminal case more settled than the rule
that alibi is the weakest of all defense and that the same should be rejected when the identity of the accused has been
sufficiently and positively established by eyewitnesses to the crime. Such should be the rule, for as a defense, alibi is
easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove. And for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that defendant was
somewhere else when the crime was committed, but he must, likewise, demonstrate that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time." 34 Only last January, such a view was reiterated by the
Chief Justice in People v. Provo 35 in these words: "Needless to say, as one of the weakest defenses available in
criminal cases, the alibi set up by appellant herein cannot offset the testimony of Benita Mayuyu, who positively
identified him as one of those who seized Matignas Serrano, at Pisok, in the evening of October 9, 1958 ...." 36 In the
light of the foregoing, the guilt of the accused having been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt, the
inadmissibility of the confession extorted from appellant could not justify a reversal of his conviction. 37
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of December 28, 1965 finding Juanita Bagasala guilty of the crime of robbery
with homicide and serious physical injuries and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuais
affirmed, with the modification that the amount of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased Juliana Reginaldo should
be in the sum of P12,000.00. Costs against appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Villamor and Makasiar,, JJ., concur.
Castro, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Of the three other co-accused, the case against Salvador Ronan was dismissed by the lower court for lack of
evidence. Aniceto Ronan was acquitted. The fifth accused, Arsenio Rex, was never apprehended.
2 The resolution of this Court of August 24, 1966 reads as follows: "It appearing from the report of the Provincial
Warden of Camarines Sur that defendant-appellant Tomas Bagasala escaped from the provincial jail on March 24,
1966, the appeal in case L-26182 (People v. Tomas Bagasala, et al.) as to Tomas Bagasala, is hereby [dismissed]."
3 Testimony of Macario Ongkit, T.s.n., session of April 10, 1962, pp. 41-42.
4 Ibid., pp. 43-45.
5 Ibid., pp. 45-47.
6 Sergeants Quiano and Turiano.
7 Corporals Julian Saldo and Ricardo P. Intia.
8 Testimony of Ricardo P. Intia, T.s.n., session of April 10, 1962, pp. 13-15.
9 Ibid., p. 15.
10 Ibid., pp. 15-18.
11 Ibid., testimony of Dr. T.J. Santy, provincial health officer of Camarines Sur, p. 5.
12 Art. III, See. 1, par. 18.
13 People v. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 576 (1946).
15 Cf. See. 4 Act. 619 (1903) and United States v. Baluyut, 1 Phil. 451 (1902); United States v. Lozada, 4 Phil. 226
(1905); United States v. Mercado, 6 Phil. 332 (1906); People v. Turtal, 74 Phil. 667 (1944).
16 United States v. De los Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 369 (1913). See also People v. Panopio, 75 Phil. 767 (1946).
17 3 Phil. 143.
18 Ibid., p. 152.
19 Camasura v. Provost Marshal, 78 Phil. 131, 137 (1947).
20 People v. Obenia, 91 Phil. 292, 301 (1952).
21 Chavez v. Court of Appeals, L-20169, Aug. 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 679.
22 T.s.n., session of Jan. 23, 1963, p. 10.
23 Ibid., session of March 11, 1963, p. 101.
24 Ibid., p. 78.
25 Ibid.
26 Brief for the Appellant, p. 12.
27 T.s.n., session of March 11, 1963, pp. 105-106.
28 Ibid., p. 107.
29 T.s.n., session of January 23, 1963, p. 8.
30 T.s.n., session of June 4, 1963, p. 114.
31 L-26867, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 812.
32 Ibid., p. 824.
33 L-26103, January 17, 1968, 22 SCRA 111.
34 Ibid., p. 127.
35 L-28347, January 20, 1971, 37 SCRA 19.
36 Ibid., pp. 34-35. Cf. People v. Estacio, 106 Phil. 981 (1960).
37 The fourth error raised was the alleged violation of the double jeopardy clause, another complaint for the same
offense having been dismissed after appellant was arraigned. The filing of the two cases was the result of a mistake
committed by a constabulary sergeant. What was done by the court was precisely to assure that appellant be tried
only under one of them, the other constituting, under the circumstances, a superfluity. This assignment of error is
thus not to be taken seriously.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51770 March 20, 1985
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO GALIT, defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION, JR., J:
1. The prisoner was arrested for killing the victim oil the occasion of a robbery. He had been detained and
interrogated almost continuously for five days, to no avail. He consistently maintained his innocence. There was no
evidence to link him to the crime. Obviously, something drastic had to be done. A confession was absolutely
necessary. So the investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Still the prisoner insisted on
his innocence. His will had to be broken. A confession must be obtained. So they continued to maltreat and beat him.
'They covered his face with a rag and pushed his face into a toilet bowl full of human waste. The prisoner could not
take any more. His body could no longer endure the pain inflicted on him and the indignities he had to suffer. His
will had been broken. He admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit and he signed the confession
they prepared. Later, against his will, he posed for pictures as directed by his investigators, purporting it to be a
reenactment.
2. This incident could have happened in a Russian gulag or in Hitler's Germany. But no it did not. It happened in the
Philippines. In this case before Us.
3. The Revised Penal Code punishes the maltreatment of prisoners as follows:
ART. 235. Maltreatment of prisoners. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused, shall be
imposed upon any public officer or employee who shall over do himself in the correction or handling of a prisoner
or detention prisoner under his charge, by the imposition of punishments in a cruel and humiliating manner.
If the purpose of the maltreatment is to extort a confession, or to obtain some information from the prisoner, the
offender shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum period, temporary special disqualification and a
fine not exceeding 500 pesos, in addition to his liability for the physical injuries or damage caused.
4. This Court in a long line of decisions over the years, the latest being the case of People vs. Cabrera, 1 has
consistently and strongly condemned the practice of maltreating prisoners to extort confessions from them as a grave
and unforgivable violation of human rights. But the practice persists. Fortunately, such instances constitute the
exception rather than the general rule.
5. Before Us for mandatory review is the death sentence imposed upon the accused Francisco Galit by the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, in Crim. Case No. CCC-VII-2589 of said court.
6. The record shows that in the morning of August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando, a widow, was found dead in
the bedroom of her house located at Barrio Geronimo, Montalban, Rizal, as a result of seven (7) wounds inflicted
upon different parts of her body by a blunt instrument. 2 More than two weeks thereafter, police authorities of
Montalban picked up the herein accused, Francisco Galit, an ordinary construction worker (pion) living in Marikina,
Rizal, on suspicion of the murder. On the following day, however, September 8, 1977, the case was referred to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for further investigation in view of the alleged limited facilities of the
Montalban police station. Accordingly, the herein accused was brought to the NBI where he was investigated by a
team headed by NBI Agent Carlos Flores. 3 NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the suspect who
allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. 4 But the following day, September 9, 1977, Francisco Galit
voluntarily executed a Salaysay admitting participation in the commission of the crime. He implicated Juling Dulay
and Pabling Dulay as his companions in the crime.5 As a result, he was charged with the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, in an information filed before the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, committed as follows:
That on or about the 23rd day of August 1977 in the municipality of Montalban, province of Rizal, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
with Juling Doe and Pabling Doe, whose true Identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and three of them
mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain and by means of force, intimidation and violence upon
the person of one Natividad Fernando while in her dwelling, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously
take, steal and carry away from the person of said Natividad Fernando, cash money of an undetermined amount,
belonging to said Natividad Fernando, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the latter in an undetermined
amount; that by reason or on the occasion of said robbery, and for purpose of enabling them (accused) to take, steal
and carry away the said cash money in pursuance of their conspiracy and for the purpose of insuring the success of
their criminal act, with intent to kill, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and stab
with a dagger said Natividad Fernando on the different parts of her body, thereby inflicting multiple injuries on the
head and extremities, which directly caused her death, and the total amount of the loss is P10,000.00 including
valuables and cash.
Trial was held, and on August 11, 1978, immediately after the accused had terminated the presentation of his
evidence, the trial judge dictated his decision on the case in open court, finding the accused guilty as charged and
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P110,000.00, and to
pay the costs. Hence, the present recourse.
7. The incriminatory facts of the case, as found by the trial court, are as follows:
From the evidence adduced in this case, it was gathered that in the early morning of August 23, 1977, a 70-year old
woman named Natividad Fernando, widow, in the twilight of her life, was robbed and then hacked to death by the
accused and two others in her (victim's) own residence at Montalban, Rizal.
Prosecution witness Florentino Valentino testified that he heard accused Francisco Galit and his wife having an
argument in connection with the robbery and killing of the victim, Natividad Fernando. It appears that on August 18,
1977, accused Galit and two others, namely, Juling Dulay and a certain "Pabling" accidentally met each other at
Marikina, Rizal, and in their conversation, the three agreed to rob Natividad Fernando; that it was further agreed
among them to enter the premises of the victim's house at the back yard by climbing over the fence; that once inside
the premises, they will search every room, especially the aparador and filing cabinets, with the sole aim of looking
for cash money and other valuables.
Witness Valentino further testified that on August 22, 1977, at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused
Francisco Galit and his two companions, Juling Dulay and Pabling, as per their previous agreement, met at the place
where they formerly saw each other in Mariquina, Rizal; that the three conspirators took a jeepney for Montalban
and upon passing the Montalban Municipal Building, they stopped and they waited at the side of the road until the
hour of midnight; that at about 12:00 o'clock that night, the three repaired to the premises of the victim, Natividad
Fernando; that they entered the said premises through the back wall of the house; that while entering the premises of
said house, Juling Dulay saw a bolo, lying near the piggery compound, which he picked up and used it to destroy the
back portion of the wall of the house; that it was Juling Dulay who first entered the house through the hole that they
made, followed by the accused Galit and next to him was "Pabling", that it was already early dawn of August 23,
1977 when the three were able to gain entrance into the house of the victim; as the three could not find anything
valuable inside the first room that they entered, Juling Dulay destroyed the screen of the door of the victim,
Natividad Fernando; that upon entering the room of the victim, the three accused decided to kill first the victim,
Natividad Fernando, before searching the room for valuables; that Juling Dulay, who was then holding the bolo,
began hacking the victim, who was then sleeping, and accused Galit heard a moaning sound from the victim; that
after the victim was killed, the three accused began searching the room for valuables; that they helped each other in
opening the iron cabinet inside the room of the victim, where they found some money; that when the three accused
left the room of the victim, they brought with them some papers and pictures which they threw outside; that after
killing and robbing the victim, the three accused went out of the premises of the house, using the same way by
which they gained entrance, which was through the back portion of the wall; that the three accused walked towards
the river bank where they divided the loot that they got from the room of the victim; that their respective shares
amount to P70.00 for each of them; and that after receiving their shares of the loot, the three accused left and went
home.
When witness Florentino Valentino was in his room, which was adjoining that of accused Francisco Galit, he
overheard accused Galit and his wife quarreling about the intention of accused Galit to leave their residence
immediately; that he further stated that he overheard accused Galit saying that he and his other two companions
robbed and killed Natividad Fernando.
As a result of the killing, the victim, Natividad Fernando, suffered no less than seven stab wounds. There was
massive cerebral hemorrhage and the cause of death was due to shock and hemorrhage, as evidenced by the Medico-
Legal Necropsy Report (Exhs. 'C' and 'C-2'), and the pictures taken of the deceased victim (Exhs. 'E', 'E-1' and 'E-2').
8. The accused, upon the other hand, denied participation in the commission of the crime. He claimed that he was in
his house in Marikina, Rizal, when the crime was committed in Montalban, Rizal. He also assailed the admissibility
of the extra-judicial confession extracted from him through torture, force and intimidation as described earlier, and
without the benefit of counsel.
9. After a review of the records, We find that the evidence presented by the prosecution does not support a
conviction. In fact, the findings of the trial court relative to the acts attributed to the accused are not supported by
competent evidence. The principal prosecution witness, Florentino Valentino merely testified that he and the accused
were living together in one house in Marikina, Rizal, on August 23, 1977, because the mother of his wife is the wife
of the accused; that when he returned home at about 4:00 o'clock in the morning from the police station of Marikina,
Rizal, the accused and his wife were quarreling (nagtatalo); that he heard that the accused was leaving the house
because he and his companions had robbed "Aling Nene", the owner of a poultry farm and piggery in Montalban,
Rizal; that the wife of the accused was imploring him not to leave, but the latter was insistent; that he saw the
accused carrying a bag containing about two handfuls (dakot) of coins which he had taken from Aling Nene; that
upon learning of what the accused had done, he went to the Montalban police the next day and reported to the police
chief about what he had heard; and that a week later, Montalban policemen went to their house and arrested the
accused. 6
10. This Court, in the case of Morales vs. Ponce Enrile, 7 laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to
follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which We reiterate:
7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the
arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means — by
telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that
this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged
by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
11. There were no eyewitnesses, no property recovered from the accused, no state witnesses, and not even
fingerprints of the accused at the scene of the crime. The only evidence against the accused is his alleged confession.
It behooves Us therefore to give it a close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:
I. TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa ilalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas
na kung inyong nanaisin ay maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang salaysay, na hindi rin kayo maaaring pilitin
o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat
na ito ay maaaring laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa anumang hukuman o tribunal dito sa
Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at kung sakaling hindi
mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan ka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang
mga ito nakahanda ka bang magbigay ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
12. Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the
accused be informed of his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and
clear questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person under
investigation. Accused is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover, at the time of
his arrest, accused was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and
other relatives did not know that he had been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks
after he had executed the salaysay that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain
any waiver of right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again accused was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of his rights.
13. The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence because they
were obtained in a manner contrary to law.
14. Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession,
especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to its
voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
15. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Minister of Justice for whatever action he may deem proper to take
against the investigating officers.
16. WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE, and another one entered
ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released from custody immediately
unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.
17. SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1 G.R. No. 51858, promulgated January 31, 1985.
2 Exhs. "C", "D", "E", "E-1", "E-2"; t.s.n. of August 3, 1978, p. 7.
3 T.S.N. of August 3, 1978, p. 10.
4 Id., p. 26.
5 Exh. "F".
6 T.S.N. of August 9, 1978, pp. 3-11.
7 G.R. Nos. 61016 and 61107, April 26, 1983, 121 SCRA 538.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,
GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B.
CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA,
EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R.
SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,
HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias
Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.
JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs.
SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to
Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the
ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to
Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the
son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned,
Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus
weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and
death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource
among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry
dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal
adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of
private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific
injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions
for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers,
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution
of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted
by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially
superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial
law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus,
on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as
the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from
the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the
interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10,
1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one
common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however,
and will first be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas
Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano,
Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said
measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a
valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by
a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v.
Dulay 5and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of
Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their
property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the
burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed
on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands
occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure
would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases
ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v.
The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities
conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not
foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature
because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners
are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7
hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on
tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings
below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a
final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was
merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except
Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be
declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare
land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a
compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April
10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental.
Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks
to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise
legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the
transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised,
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial
amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the
Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and
accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this
Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the
contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On
the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in
an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair
market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several
modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or
bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by
the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of
the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the
CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers,
although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been
violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP)
which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987,
another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland
owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event,
the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and
Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the
minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount
has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own
property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for
an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the
landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the
land, in violation of the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas"
clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the
feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its
promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a
different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first
distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this
viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money
without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of
an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated
as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional
amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is
unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of
Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the
requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of
lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation
Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private
respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987,
he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued.
These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the
private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous
and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President
under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise
of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the
retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He
likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring
that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance
payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small
landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is
undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration
filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the
tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after
that date should therefore be considered amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December
14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229,
which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not
exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his
farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of
retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And
even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already
been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners,
with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981
(Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention
and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For
failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from
invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the
pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules,
assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ
of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the
government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not
own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to
cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by
law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional
reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the
government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the
executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the
doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of
separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional.
The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was
done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the
Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring
therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and
voted on the issue during their session en banc. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove
the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not
proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this
exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues
like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be
done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the
light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies
that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall,
and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official,
betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we
shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already
been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power
of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section
6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was
formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-
empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131
and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be
valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or
repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative
simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of
legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she
possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the
challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not
inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion
fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in
the CARP Law.18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a
valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure
even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one
the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation
of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article
VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for
the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation
measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely
vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do
not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A.
No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly,
any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-
sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications:
(1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to
keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long
as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be
expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue
of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred
from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was
called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence,
it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27
because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos,
whose word was law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement
for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those
enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated
November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as
a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that
mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of
such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is
purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public
official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great
detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave
it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a
question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude
the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for
example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its
assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property
involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of
such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a
famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which
might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a
coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder,
with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained
without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid
exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some
right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making
compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a
taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains
in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the
owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases
to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be
removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of
eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The
employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of
expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the
following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different
planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for
improvements that would be available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand,
they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's
reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately
authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need have
afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use, the
distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain
interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme
Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to
match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of
Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose,
Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court
sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had
not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic
landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however,
was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other
landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the
Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would
"undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by
Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to
neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a
landmark — the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to
countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed,
theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the
right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To
the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of
the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out
such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are
challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has
already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the
deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being
questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed
violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under
the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention
limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the
area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform,
an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular
interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)
it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds
that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between
these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment
of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end
does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person
invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the
nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With
regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public
use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions
offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the
State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is
absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this
principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute
public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by
forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands
may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any
event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the
legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is
known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which
now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even
so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may
not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of
private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing
apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority,
which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be
so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between the
American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its
entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that
determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is
no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less
than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken
from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc.
No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary
measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are
landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law
itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's
loss.40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use
of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has
dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them
to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions
concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must
be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites
are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the
condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment,
and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the
CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the
administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which
provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land-
... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by
requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the
land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is
deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be
usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees
promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be
either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was
lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment
on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it
for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the
lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the
due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No.
1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and
authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is
unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a
minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented,
and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered
the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the
landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value
of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the
courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as
may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-five percent (25%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance
to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other
qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds
shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner
choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his successors-in- interest or
his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the Asset Privatization
Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial institutions in the same province or region where the
lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares of stock owned by the
government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested
in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium- scale industry, in the same province or region as the
land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these bonds for these purposes will
be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the
PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government universities,
colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it
requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is
the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned
property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy,
and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such
property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is
also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus
—
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to
accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than
the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes.
When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both
parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and constant
standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at
least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such
payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and
no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do
not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a
specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as
they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for
the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino
nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not
cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to
secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are
as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling
life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it
is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution"
among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least
to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of
land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed,
far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our
present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as
a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation
that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way
but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial
limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to
allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if
the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other
things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed
in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they
presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the
members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive
agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the
demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment
should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as
"progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no
special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the
general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the
landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided
for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting
that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a
cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement.
The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that
invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as
they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is
not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we
find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be
needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any
time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of
value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little
inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these
countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not
begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this
elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any
more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This
repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in
case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city
assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the
basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to
him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator
only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and
in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment
fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition
under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the
property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass
to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to
this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the
condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not
to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the
construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation
although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further
said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as
soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not
pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent
that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of
land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that
he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land
owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to
be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged
membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper
for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary
after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered
as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or
LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is
fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under
E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express
provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree
No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners
with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet
to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised
their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights
provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from
those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these
enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be
sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of
agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected
difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice
Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if
necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means.
Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for
so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are
removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not
only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and
helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be
his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once
it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at
last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and
the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to
their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Art. 11, Sec. 5.
2 1973 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 6.
3 Ibid., Art. XIV, Sec. 12.
4 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 15.
5 149 SCRA 305.
6 150 SCRA 89.
7 55 SCRA 26.
8 91 SCRA 294.
9 113 SCRA 798.
10 136 SCRA 271; 146 SCRA 446.
11 Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2).
12 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392.
13 Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US 633.
14 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.
15 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331; PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479; Sanidad v.
COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333.
16 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.
17 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 75.
18 Ibid., Sec. 63.
19 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 US 410.
20 Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172; Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151
SCRA 208.
21 Supra.
22 Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456.
23 Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359; Espanol v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA
314.
24 106 Phil. 144.
25 260 US 393.
26 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 US 678: Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148; Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, supra.
27 John J. Costonis "The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision," Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 91:40,1977, p. 404.
28 348 US 1954.
29 438 US 104.
30 See note 27.
31 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 US 199.
32 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
33 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
34 US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85; Fable v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486; Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256.
35 Noble v. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1.
36 100 Phil. 1101.
37 1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
38 57 L ed. 1063.
39 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286.
40 Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA
413; Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA
89.
41 City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208.
42 58 SCRA 336.
43 Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, pp. 1166- 1167.
44 149 SCRA 305.
45 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286; Province of Tayabas v. Perez, supra, at note 40.
46 31 SCRA 413.
47 Mandl v. City of Phoenix, 18 p 2d 273.
48 Sacramento Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron 156 Cal. 408,104 pp. 979, 980.
49 City of Waterbury v. Platt Bros. & Co., 56 A 856, 76 Conn, 435 citing Butler v. Ravine Road Sewer Com'rs, 39
N.J.L. 665; Bloodgood v. Mohawk v. H.R.R. Co., N.Y. 18 Wend. 9 35, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Sanborn v. Helden, 51 Cal
266; Burlington & C.R. Co. v. Schweikart, 14 p. 329, 10 Colo, 178; 23 Words and Phrases, pl. 460.
50 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 647, 704; Vol. 3, pp. 16-20, 243-247.
51 Chicago Park Dist. v. Downey Coal Co., 1 Ill. 2d 54.
52 Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 US 599, 26 L ed 550.
53 Ibid.
54 4 Blkf., 508.
55 11 NY 314.
56 40 Phil. 550.
57 Sec. 16(d).

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742 (175 SCRA 343), July
14, 1989
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,

GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B.
CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA,
EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R.
SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.

G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989

ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,
HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias
Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.

G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.
JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs.
SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,

vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

FACTS:

These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter
alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property
shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous with payment
of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and that
the said executive orders violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree.
They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.

RULING:

Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there are traditional distinction between the police
power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for
noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to compensation, unlike the taking
of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation
to the owner of the property expropriated.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of
Manila,respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of
Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment,
fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal
protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law
purports to remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic
impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of
economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national aspirations for economic independence and national
security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures
designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country and the nation
may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the
enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and
against associations, partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in
favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein,
unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until their death or voluntary retirement in case of
natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical
persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a provision for
the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against
the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of
retail business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with
the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the
business, their assets and liabilities and their offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision
allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six
months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely
affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act
is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city
and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without
due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act
violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against
the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino
capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1
and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid
exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national
economic survival; (2) the Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations
are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not
impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power. —
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its
exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal
protection of the laws. But before proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it
would be well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination
of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the
laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and equal protection clauses related to it?
What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These
consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought
forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its
sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or
defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive
and active of all governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a
modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable
proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest
and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as
we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive
world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police
power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due
process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power. —
The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not
limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race,
of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause. —
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the
object to which it is directed or by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to
privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies
only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and
reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
(2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is
there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient
foundation or reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not merely an unjustified interference with
private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is
more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the
essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic
society. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be
absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and
property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided
everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power
legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said
distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be
overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and
exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of
necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of
the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the other hand, courts,
although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with
the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable
arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override
legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed
legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the
legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging
therein. The problem becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society
itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer,
of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than
what they consume and needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence.
As villages develop into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is
enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to
unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite
variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers
perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies are ministered to
members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to the
resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and
daily life. He provides his customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices
needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes
that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a
department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait. —
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there
was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages;
now he predominates in the cities and big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the
beginnings of community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural
produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native
retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent
neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community
takes note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and
dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all
articles of daily life reach the residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired
not only predominance, but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber,
hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And were it not for
some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the Acefa, his control over principal foods
and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear
is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and
pure and unabashed nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable
factors in the retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact
merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature
and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the
constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled
the minds of our leaders with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail
trade act (1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien
of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:
Assets Gross Sales
Year and Retailers No.- Per cent Per cent
Pesos Pesos
Nationality Establishments Distribution Distribution
1941:
Filipino .......... 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 51.74
Chinese ........... 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21
Others ............ 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05
1947:
Filipino .......... 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03
Chinese ........... 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96
Others ........... 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01
1948: (Census)
Filipino .......... 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51
Chinese .......... 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20
Others .......... 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29
1949:
Filipino .......... 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47
Chinese .......... 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36
Others .......... 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17
1951:
Filipino ......... 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07
Chinese .......... 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06
Others .......... 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 9,691

Others ............................................... 24,415 8,281

1947:
 Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

1948: (Census)

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 24,398

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686

1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 24,152

Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737

1951:

Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 33,207

Others ............................................... 24,824 22,033

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948
Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of
Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments
already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has steadily
increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens
more than make up for the numerical gap through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven
times those of the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests
more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to
the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely
engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the
Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target
in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution
also believed in the existence of this alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically
declaring among other things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on
page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since then have not been either pleasant or
comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of
the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation of
Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other
economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the
members of the constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic
provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and
that if such a situation should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength.
Filipino private capital is not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it
is but of recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the
government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership,
in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for
political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation
not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien interests in the
economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen,
manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express
sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth
National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second
National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears, alien
predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only to control but to alien
stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and
felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —
But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone;
there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital,
unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison
and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be
made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or
distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national economy
and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed
completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed by the
aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new competing article
offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,
eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the
prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the
article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave
abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of
justice may not properly overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on
the part of the public that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable
practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have
cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance
profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the
consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation to
save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price control laws,
especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No.
1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret
combinations among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they
have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful
restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled
goods and money into and out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in
derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting public officials
with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the Government. As a matter of
fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic
representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above
practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The present
dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of
danger on occasions of war or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens
retailing goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the
distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or
loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his
life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy
of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product
of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the
people, thru their authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately
been saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of
the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the
State insures its existence and security and the supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny
the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his
birth or his adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit.
His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of
loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard,
sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their
weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his beloved country
and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt
the legislation, radical as it may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national
income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not
invested in industries that would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this
country being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very
important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret
manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the
ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and
disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative classification adopted in
the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the national over the
alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for
a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real,
furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree
with the wisdom of the legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making
power. Since the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are
treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty
bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act
transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not
curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of
discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without
reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs.
Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application of equal
protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify
in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids
what is done only when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having
some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or
because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law
was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing
that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been
affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell &
Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue,
because of a condition therein limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed
by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the
Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in
enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these
Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions are
in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels engaged in
coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law
clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion
of Justice Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses,
retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an
extensive system, the object of which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with
the shipping of other nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation
of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an American character, that the license is granted; that
effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as
contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in surreptitiously
intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade
coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply
because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of
protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly
speaking, the difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the
exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers,
which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the
United States, was held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of
those who are supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court
cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which
prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result
of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien
cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to appreciate the relation of this
particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach,
274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of
Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational
discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some
instances such a relation to a legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and
that it could not state that the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative
appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The
case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle,
210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public
interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to
engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also
in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to have different
interests, knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the
business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights.
In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing
of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the
business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community.
In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a California statute banning the issuance of
commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal
power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the
fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the
outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory
that fishing rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82
Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized
male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the
classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained. —
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction
between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid
were found to be either arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and
hostility, and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed.
1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of
books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the
decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution, and (2)
that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of their right to be advised of
their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public
benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of
something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance
conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was
declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the
discrimination which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was
mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as
hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable and just relation to the act in
respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally
possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the
patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and
allegiance which the national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown
on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the
language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and significance of the distinction
between the alien and the national, thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of
our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of
different psychology from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the
foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and
control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political systems, have not the same
inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship,
are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it
cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for making the
classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest
authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable,
arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to
be attained. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is
free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that
policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it
is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and
judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950,
957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in
a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is
to inquire whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable,
and not whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects,
must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)-
1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests
of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the
operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is whether
the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an
arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals,
comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered. —
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago
recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation
and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and
reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in
by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable and unimpeachable manner, without
harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the
Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the
alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the
occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of
crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and
circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary
capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore
engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is
not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of
reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry
out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually
necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was
enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our
economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free
institutions, and who have no permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny.
All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the
Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not
citizens of the Philippines a power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our
national security it respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less
legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and
domination of others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of
foreign economic control and domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the constitutional limitation of due
process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on
the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the
police power. The fathers of the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact
legislation that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue
now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the
legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain
from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter
because it is convinced that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and
American citizens the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution,
quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in
the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision
limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in
Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail
trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.
Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the
Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the
radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its
people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy
commensurate with the demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of
legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger
and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has
been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation
to continue therein during the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded
associations of aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the
deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege should not have been denied
to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims
and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the
Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative judgment. The
Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption
is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not
annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law
attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions
are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which
are: that the law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment;
that prices will increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that
adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that there would be repercussions from
foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely
within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or
deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens
from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI,
which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of
the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the
public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec.
1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of
duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of
"nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and objectives of the law. But
"regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included
within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of
intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the
tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an
act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters
being properly included within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p.
42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts
usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning
of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power
in connection with a thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton,
162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an
index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was
followed the title of the Act in question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or
"prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be
included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or
"prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which would have made
the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of
statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other
provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters
which have received the notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be
claimed that the legislators have been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the
prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the
persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be claimed,
therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the
United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We
find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their
subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights
contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all
nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can
be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit
foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in
domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also
claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not
discriminating against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the
law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.
S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the
State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and
danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and
country from dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the
State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the
law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and
reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case
such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department
of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers
from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the
subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in
its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of
existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the
law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal
protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the
Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the Act passed by the
Congress and duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule does not preclude courts from inquiring
and determining whether the Act offends against a provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the
Act assailed as violative of the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution
does not infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of which is not
wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have not been engaged in the retail
business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not violate said clauses insofar as the Act applies to
associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to aliens, who are and have heretofore been engaged in said
business. When they did engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it.
They assumed and believed in good faith they were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows aliens to
continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business or forfeiture of their license; and
corporations, associations or partnership, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines
to continue in the business for a period of ten years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until
the expiry of term of the existence of the association or partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The
prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the
retail business for a period of more than ten years from the date of the approval of the Act or beyond the term of
their corporate existence, whichever event comes first, is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence
of such corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by subsequent
legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the capital of which
is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval of the Act, even
before the end of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to
whom the retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or
administrator, amounts to a deprivation of their property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year
period from the date of the approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of the existence of the association
and partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period granted to alien heirs of a deceased alien, his
executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the law, because the effect of the
prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of the
business would be inadequate to reimburse and compensate the associates or partners of the associations or
partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The
stock of merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The goodwill that the
association, partnership and the alien had built up during a long period of effort, patience and perseverance forms
part of such business. The constitutional provisions that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law2 and that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws3 would have no meaning as
applied to associations or partnership and alien heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if they were to be
compelled to sell or dispose of their business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and before the
end of the term of the existence of the associations and partnership as agreed upon by the associations and partners
and within six months after the death of their predecessor-in-interest.
The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the ownership of private
agricultural lands which together with the lands of the public domain constitute the priceless patrimony and
mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not deem it wise and prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands. 4
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations and partnership
referred to therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act even
before the expiry of the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners and section 3 of the
Act, insofar as it compels the aliens engaged in the retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to
liquidate the business, are invalid, for they violate the due process of law and the equal protection of the laws
clauses of the Constitution.

Footnotes
1
Section 76, Act No. 1459..
2
Section 1 (1), Article III, of the Constitution..
3
Ibid.
4
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,
vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF
MANILA,respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery,
Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a
complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas
corpusfiled with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not
yet released or filed against them an information with the proper courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a
quorum in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for
deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as to the action taken by the office of the
city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the action
taken by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question
involved herein for the information and guidance in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the petitioners are
being illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the
meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our Constitution
guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of
the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said
courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having
committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law".
(Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly in
force of these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall
arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial authority within twenty
four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court
of justice empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the
person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article
204, which complements said section 202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its
minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the
period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under
arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds upon which the
same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated in the Revised
Penal Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by
the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement]
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of
the complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his
liberty, except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the
complainant and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public officers must be
surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or
provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without such warrant of
commitment, the detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our
Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the duty of an officer
after arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay,
and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to the proper court orjudge for
such action for they may deem proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by
the defendant and his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him.
He shall also informed of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to
testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses
need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to the
provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a
judgement or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ
shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal
of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule
108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947,
43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation
proper provided for in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by
the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the
purpose of filing the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of
First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a
warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary
investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses
triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of temporary
absence of both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place,
are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3,
Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a
city fiscal may conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila
is not filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not
make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of
Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the
arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of
the investigation so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest should,
as abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed
in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the
offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original
jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having
no original jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the
provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance,
the officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal,
and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding information within
the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment
for the temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation
forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making
the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either
release the person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability
of the defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the
testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that
prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the
proper information against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the
purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by
the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such
as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the
necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to
authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without
any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find
sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had
been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party
or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such
case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in
municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest
even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused
is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense
upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that
the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who
intervened in the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence
of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the
petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the
petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal,
we hold that the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless
they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J.:, concurring:
Petitioners Melencio Sayo and Joaquin Mostero were apprehended at 11:30 in the morning of April 2, 1948, upon
complaint of Bernardino Malinao, for the crime of alleged robbery.
The fact is alleged expressly in respondent's answer supported by the affidavit of Benjamin Dumlao (Exhibit 1), the
patrolman who made the arrest. Therein it is also alleged that petitioners were "finally" placed under arrest at 4:30
p.m. and 5:00 p.m. respectively, on the same day, April 2, l948.
The distinction between the two arrests, the apprehension made at 11:00 a.m. and the "final arrest at 4:30 and 5:00
p.m., is purely academic or imaginary. There was but one arrest, effected at 11:00 a.m., April 2, 1948, and continued
without interruption until the petition had been filed with us April 5, 1948, at the hearing on the next day. Until the
moment we are writing this opinion we have not heard that petitioners have been released at any time.
Respondents allege also that on April 3, 1948, at about 8:30 a.m., a criminal complaint was filed with the fiscal's
office of Manila, and that by said filing their duty to deliver arrested persons, within six hours from their arrest, to a
proper judicial authority has been duly complied with.
There is no dispute that no warrant of arrest has ever been issued for the apprehension of petitioners.
Petitioners pray for their immediate release, alleging that, as the six-hour period provided in article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code had expired, their continued detention is illegal.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the penalty of arresto mayor or in its maximum period
toreclusion temporal, or from 4 months and 11 days to 20 years imprisonment, for the crime of a public officer or
employee who, after detaining a person, "shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the
period of six hours."
Both parties implying from the above provision that after six hours of said failure, petitioners shall be entitled to be
released, discussed the question whether there is such failure or not.
Upon the very facts alleged by respondents and supported by documentary evidence accompanying it, there should
not be any dispute that there is such failure.
(a) Respondents have not delivered the persons of petitioners to any authority, and much less to any judicial
authority.
(b) Their filing of a complaint with the office of the fiscal of Manila is not a delivery of the persons of petitioners.
Said persons are not a complaint. A complaint, whether oral or written, can never be elevated to the category of the
person. No one is crazy enough to confuse or identify a person with a complaint.
(c) Even in the false hypothesis that respondents, by filing the complaint, intended to make a delivery of the persons
of petitioners, if not actually, constructively, the fiscal's office is not a judicial authority.
(d) Under our Constitution and laws, judicial authorities comprehend only courts of justice, such as the Supreme
Court and all other inferior Court, and justices and judges. The authority possessed and exercised by judicial
authorities is judicial, and the Constitution(section 1, Article VIII) vests the judicial power exclusively "in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law."
Respondents' pretension in making the fiscal of Manila a judicial authority is absolutely groundless, upon the clear
letter of the fundamental law. Counsel for respondents himself had to admit that said officer belongs to the
administrative or executive department. Under the tripartite system of the government established by the
Constitution, it is extreme absurdity to make an administrative or executive officer, or any officer of the executive
department or branch, a judicial authority. Such will make of separation of powers a madman's illusion.
That a fiscal is not a judicial authority has been unmistakably declared in the decision in Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159,
43 Off. Gaz., 1214. The statement made therein that there was yet no purpose of deciding whether a fiscal is a
judicial authority or not, is just a rhetorical figure that is a judicial authority or not, is just a rhetorical figure that
should not deceive any one. All those who can read, will that the decision has made the declaration. It is there stated
in plain language that the fiscal is "unlike" a judicial authority.
"Unlike" means, as an elementary school student knows, not like, dissimilar, diverse, different.
No warrant of arrest having been issued by any competent tribunal for the apprehension of petitioners, said
apprehension appears to be illegal.
At any rate, even under the hypothesis that it was legal and continued to be so for six hours, this time having expired
seven days ago, the continued detention and confinement of petitioners is clearly illegal, and not only illegal but
criminal, involving an offense committed by public officers and heavily punished by the Revised Penal Code.
Regarding the question as to legality of the arrest, counsel for respondents has advanced the shocking theory that
police officers may arrest any person just for questioning or investigation, without any warrant of arrest.
The theory is absolutely unconstitutional and could have been entertained only under the "Kempei" system
implanted by the brutal Japanese army occupation. Such theory represents an ideology incompatible with human
dignity. Reason revolts against it.
Respondents are ordered, upon notice of the decision, to immediately release the two petitioners and to report to this
Court the time when the release shall have been effected.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I dissent on the grounds stated in my dissent in Lino vs. Fugoso et al., Off. Gaz., 1214.

R ES OLUTION
August 27, 1948
FERIA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of our decision which holds that the phrase "judicial authority" used in the
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, to whom a person arrested without warrant shall be delivered by the officer
making the arrest within the period of six hours from the arrest, means a competent court or judge, and the City
Fiscal is not such a judicial authority.
We have already held, in the United States vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472,477-479, that the provisions of the Provisional
Law for the application of the provisions of the Spanish Penal Code in the Philippines by Royal Decree of
September 4, 1884, are in force of this Islands insofar as they have not been repealed or amended by implication by
the enactment of the body of laws put in force in these Islands since the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty. According to the ruling of this court in said case, a person may be arrested without warrant in the cases
specified in Rules 27 and 28 of said provisional law and section 37 of Act No. 183 (Charter of Manila). The
provisions of said Rules 27 and 28 are substantially the same of those contained in section 6 Rule 109 of the Rules
of Court which superseded them; and the provisions of section 37 of Act No. 183 above reffered to have been
incorporated in section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code. Both section 6 of Rule 109, and the pertinent
provisions of said section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code are now the laws in force on the subject.
Article 30 of said Provisional Law for the application of the Penal Law in the Philippines also provides:
The executive authorities or the agents detaining a person shall release the same or else turn him over to the judicial
authorities within twenty four hours after the arrest if made in the head town of the district, or within as brief a
period as the distance and transportation facilities permit.
And the next article 31 of the same law reads as follows:
Within twenty four hours after the person arrested has been surrendered to the competent judge of Court of First
Instance, the latter shall order the commitment or release of the prisoner by warrant containing the grounds on which
it is based (auto motivado).
If it is impossible to do so because of the complexity of the facts, the number of defendants or any other serious
cause, which must be made of record, the time of detention may be extended to three days. Upon the expiration of
that period of time the judge shall order the commitment or the release of the defendant. The warrant of commitment
shall be ratified after the defendant has been heard within the period of sixty two hours from the time the defendant
has been committed to prison.
Said Rule 30 has been modified by section 17, Rule 109, which provides that "Any person making arrest for legal
ground shall, without unnecessary delay and within the time prescribed in the Revised Peal Code, take the person
arrested to the proper court or judge for such action as they may deem proper to take," and by article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code already quoted.
But the provisions of Rule 31 above quoted are still in force because they may have not been repealed, either
expressly or by implication, by any law or the present Rules of Court, except the last sentence, thereof which is no
longer in force. The procedure of hearing the accused after he has been committed to prison referred to in said last
sentence, is a sort preliminary investigation by the judge or justice of the peace according to the present procedure.
Persons arrested or accused in the City of Manila are not entitled to such investigation. In provinces the justice of the
peace or judge shall, according to section 2 of Act No. 194, "make the preliminary investigation of the charge as
speedily as may be consistent with the right and justice, but in any event he must make the investigation within three
days of the time the accused was brought before him, unless the accused or complainant shall ask for delay in order
that witnesses may be obtained, or for other good and sufficient reason, in which event a continuance for a
reasonable time may be allowed." This provision of section 2 of Act No. 194 is still in force, because no law has
been enacted amending or repealing it. (Marcos vs. Cruz [May 13, 1939] 1st Supp., 40 Off. Gaz., 174, 182.) The
Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure do not undertake to dispose of all subjects of preliminary investigation, and
repeal all laws on the subject not incorporated therein; especially those that, like the said provisions of section 2, Act
No. 194, confer substantive rights upon defendants which can not be diminished, increased or modified by the Rules
of Court (section 13, Article VIII, of the Constitution).
In view of the provisions of section 17, Rule 109, Rule 31 of the Provisional Law, article 204 of the old Penal Code,
from which article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was taken, and section 1 (3) Article III of the Constitution, there
can be no doubt that the judicial authority within the meaning of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code must be a
judge who has authority to issue a written warrant of commitment or release containing the ground on which it is
based (auto motivado). Because said section 17 of Rule 109 expressly provides that the officer making the arrest
without warrant shall, within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to acourt or
judge for such action as the latter may deem proper to take; Rule 31 expressly states that, within twenty four hours
or at most three days after the person arrested has been delivered to the judge of Court of First Instance (and
also the justice of the peace now), the latter shall order the commitment or release of the prisoner by a warrant
containing the ground upon which the commitment or release is based (auto motivado); article 204 of the Penal
Code (not incorporated in the Revised Penal Code), penalize the judicial authority or judge who fails to comply with
the provisions of said Rule 31; and section 1(3) Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrant shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affidavit of the complainant
and witnesses he may produce," in order to safeguard "the right of the people to be secured in their person ... against
unreasonable seizure" or detention for a longer period than that fixed or considered by law as reasonable (six hours
according to section 125 of the Revised Penal Code).
It is obvious that the city fiscal is not a city judge, and has no power to issue order or commitment or release by a
written warrant containing the ground on which it is based. As a matter of fact the city fiscal has never exercised
such power since that office was created. In justice to the city fiscal, we have to state that the latter did not and does
not contend in his motion for reconsideration that it has the power to issue such a warrant, as contended in the
dissenting opinion.
To consider a city fiscal as a judicial authority within the meaning of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would
be to place a person arrested in provinces without warrant in a better position than those arrested in the City of
Manila. Because, as there is no law requiring the city fiscal to act or file an information against such person within a
limited period of time, after the arresting officer has taken the prisoner to the city fiscal within six hours, the
prisoner may be held under detention without any warrant for days and weeks and possibly months until such time
as the city fiscal may take action, either by releasing the prisoner without filing any information, or filing an
information with the proper city court and obtain a warrant of commitment. While a person arrested outside of the
City of Manila has to be delivered by the arresting person or peace officer to the competent judge within six hours
after his arrest, and the latter shall have to investigate the charge and issue a warrant of release or commitment of the
prisoner within the period of twenty four hours or at most three days prescribed in said article 31 of the Provisional
Law.
It is obvious that the surrender or delivery to the judicial authority of a person arrested without warrant by a peace
officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or charge or filing of an information
against the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge, whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an
order of release or of commitment of the prisoner, because the arresting officer can not transfer to the judge and the
latter does not assume the physical custody of the person arrested. And in the City of Manila it does consist in
delivering physically the body of the prisoner to the city fiscal, for the latter will not assume the responsibility of
being the custodian of the prisoner; nor in making or lodging a complaint against him with the said fiscal, because
the latter has no power to order the commitment or release of the prisoner by a warrant containing the ground on
which it is based (auto motivado). Such delivery is a legal one and consists in making a charge or filing a complaint
against the prisoner with the proper justice of the peace or judge of Court of First Instance in provinces, and in filing
by the city fiscal of an information with the corresponding city courts after an investigation if the evidence against
said person so warrants. Upon the filing of such information will the prisoner be deemed deliver to a judicial
authority in the City of Manila within the meaning of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
The city court or judge need not make an investigation of the facts alleged in the information, which the judge or
justices of the peace in provinces have to make before issuing the proper warrant, because the law vest the power in
the city fiscal, but said city judge shall determine only the legal question whether said facts constitute an offense or
violation of ordinances, and issue a warrant of commitment if they do, or of release if they do not.
As a peace officer can not deliver directly the person arrested to the city courts, he shall deliver him to said court
through the city fiscal, and if the latter does not take the prisoner in time to the latter so that the proper investigation
may be made and information filed within six hours, he has to release the prisoner in order to avoid criminal liabilty
for violation of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The city fiscal is not an agent of the arresting officer, but as
prosecuting officer, he will be recreant to his duty if he does not do his best to make the investigation and file the
corresponding information in time against the person arrested without warrant, in order to effect the delivery of the
prisoner to the city courts within the period of six hours prescribed by law, and thus prevent his being released by
the officer making the arrest. If the city fiscal does not file the information within said period of time and the
arresting officer continues holding the prisoner beyond the six-hour period, the fiscal will not be responsible for
violation of said article 125, because he is not the one who arrested and illegally detained the person arrested, unless
he has ordered or induced the arresting officer to hold and not release the prisoner after the expiration of said period.
Section 2640 of the Revised Administrative Code which specifies the powers and duties of chief of police of the
City of Manila, authorizes the latter "to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city court of any
person arrested for violation of any city ordinance: Provided, however, That he shall not exercise this power in cases
of violation of any penal law except when the fiscal of the city shall so recommend and fix the bail to be required of
the person arrested." These provisions do not authorize, either expressly or by implication, the city fiscal to order the
detention of the prisoner if bond is not given, not only because they refer to the powers of the chief of police of
Manila and not of the city fiscal, but because the only incidental authority granted to the latter is to recommend the
granting of the bail to be required of the person arrested for violation of any penal law in order that the chief of
police may release the latter on bail. If no bail is given by the person arrested, neither the chief of police, who is only
authorized to release on bail, has power to detain the person arrested for more than six hours; nor the city fiscal, who
is only empowered to fix and recommend the bail to the chief of police, has authority to order the detention of
persons arrested for violation of a penal law.
The above-quoted provisions of section 2640 of the Revised Administrative Code refers evidently to persons
arrested without warrant, for accused arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the courts may be released on bail
only by order of the court or judge that issued the warrant and has exclusive jurisdiction or control over the person
arrested. The purpose of the law in empowering the chief of police of Manila to release the prisoner if he sets up a
bail, is to relieve the officer making the arrest from the necessity of taking the prisoner to the city fiscal, and the
latter from filing an information with the proper courts within the period of time prescribed by law.
The dissenting opinion calls a general principle of law an excerpt of the Corpus Juris Secundum quoted therein
which says that "the officer however need not necessarily have personal knowledge of the facts constituting the
offense in the sense of having seen or witnessed the offense himself, but he may if there are no circumstances known
to him by which materially impeach his information, acquire his knowledge from information imparted to him by
reliable and credible third persons or by the information together with other suspicious circumstances" (6 C.J.S.,
599, 600), and after the quotation adds: "This is a common law rule implanted in the Philippines along with its
present form of government, a rule which has been cited and applied by this Court in a number of cases (U. S.vs.
Santos, 36 Phil., 853; U. S. vs. Batallones, 23 Phil., 46; U. S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516).
The above-quoted excerpt is not a general principle of law or a common law rule implanted in the Philippines. It is a
summary of the ruling of several State courts based on statutory exceptions of the general rule. "It is the general rule,
although there are statutory exceptions and variations, that a peace officer has no right to make an arrest without a
warrant, upon a mere information of a third person" (5 C.J., p. 404), because "statutes sometime authorize peace
officer to make arrest upon information" (4 Am. Jur., p. 17). In none of the cases cited in the dissenting opinion has
this Court quoted and applied it. In U.S. vs. Fortaleza, 12 Phil., 472, this Court, after quoting Rules 27 and 28 of the
"Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Law" and section 37, Act No. 183, as the law in force in force in
these Islands providing for cases in which a person may be arrested without a warrant, said:
These provisions quite clearly set out the powers usually conferred by American and English law upon "peace
officers" including "constables," in making arrests without warrants; and since similar powers are clearly included
in the powers conferred upon "agents of authority" in the above cited articles of the "Provisional Law," there can be
no doubt that the Commission, in imposing the duty of maintaining order and preserving and protecting life and
property within their respective barrios upon municipal councilors and their lieutenants of barrios, conferred upon
such officials authority to make arrests without warrant not less extensive than that conferred upon peace officers in
Manila in the above-cited provisions of the Manila Charter. (United States vs. Vallejo, No. 4367, decided by this
court on September 3, 1908; also United States vs. Burgueta, 10 Phil., 188.) (Emphasis ours.)
The case of U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516, one of the cases cited in the last paragraph of the dissenting opinion,
does not contain anything about the implantation in these Islands of the so-called common law rule. In the case of
U.S. vs. Battallones (not Ballesteros) 23 Phil., 46, cited also therein, this Court, following the ruling in U.S. vs.
Fortaleza, said:
In a former case we held that officials in these Islands, who, "by direct provisions of law or by appointment of
competent authority are charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and
property," have authority to make arrests without warrant substantially similar to the authority generally conferred
upon "peace officers" in the United States, and more especially that class of `peace officers' known to American and
English law as constables; and that "the provisions of section 37 of Act No. 183" (the Charter of Manila) "quite
clearly set forth the powers usually conferred by American and English law upon "peace officers" including
"constables" in making arrests without warrants," and provide that they "may pursue and arrest without warrant, any
person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances, reasonably tending to show that such person
has committed or is about to commit any crime or breach of the peace; may arrest, or cause to be arrested without
warrant, any offender, when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within his view". (U.S. vs.
Fortaleza, 12, Phil., 472, 479.)
And in the case of U.S. vs. Santos, 36 Phil., 853, this Supreme Court has reiterated the ruling in the previous cases
and held:
The powers of peace officers in the Philippines, generally stated, are the same as those conferred upon constables
under the Anglo-American Common Law. The extent of their authority to make arrests without warrant and the
limitations thereon, as held by the Supreme Court, are as stated in the language of the Legislature in the Charter of
the City of Manila. (U.S. vs. Fortaleza [1909], 12 Phil., 472). The Administrative Code (section 2204, edition of
1916; section 2258, edition of 1917) enjoins municipal policemen to "exercise vigilance in the prevention of public
offenses".
The provisions above quoted of section 37 of Act No. 183 have been incorporated in section 2463 of the Revised
Administrative Code and those of Rules 27 and 28 were substantially incorporated in section 6, Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court. Section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code reads as follows:
SEC. 2463. Police and other officers — Their powers and duties. — The mayor, the chief and assistant chief of
police, the chief of the secret service, and all officers and members of the city police and detective force shall be
peace officers. Such peace officers are authorized ... to pursue and arrest, without warrant, any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or
is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace; to arrest or cause to be arrested, without warrant, any offender
when the offense is committed in the presence of a peace officer or within his view;
And section 6 of Rule 109 provides:
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant — When lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his
presence;
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
These are the only provisions of law in force these Islands which enumerate the cases in which a peace officer may
arrest a person without warrant, and the so called common law relating to other cases of arrest without warrant cited
in the dissenting opinion has no application in this jurisdiction. Therefore, all the considerations set forth in the said
opinion about the disastrous consequences which this Court's interpretation of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
will bring to a law enforcement, because "the entire six hours might be consumed by the police in their investigation
alone," or that "even if the city fiscal be given the chance to start his assigned task at the beginning of the six hours
period, this time can not insure proper and just investigation in complicated cases and in cases where the persons
arrested are numerous and witnesses are not at hand to testify," since "the police is not authorized to round up the
witnesses and take them along with the prisoner to the city fiscal," are without any foundation. Because they are
premised on the wrong assumption that, under the laws in force in our jurisdiction, a peace officer need not have
personal knowledge but may arrest a person without a warrant upon mere information from other person. "The right
to make arrests without a warrant is usually regulated by express statute, and except as authorized by such statutes,
an arrest without a warrant is illegal." (5 C.J., pp. 395, 396.) And statutory construction extending the right to make
arrest without a warrant beyond the cases provided by law is derogatory of the right of the people to personal liberty
(4 Am. Jur., p. 17).
The investigation which the city fiscal has to make before filing the corresponding information in cases of persons
arrested without a warrant, does not require so much time as that made upon a complaint of the offended parties for
the purpose of securing a warrant of arrest of the accused. In all cases above enumerated in which the law authorizes
a peace officer to arrest without warrant, the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge that the person
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence or within his view,
or of the time, place or circumstances which reasonably tend to show that such person has committed or is about to
commit any crime or breach of the peace. And the testimony of such officer on the commission of the offense in his
presence or within his view by the person arrested, or on the facts and circumstances that tend reasonably to show
that said person has committed or is about to commit an offense, would be sufficient evidence or basis for the city
fiscal to file an information without prejudice to his presenting of their evidence or witness, if any, during the trial to
insure the conviction of the defendant. If the city fiscal does not believe the testimony of the officer making the
arrest or consider it sufficient, or has any doubt as to the probability of the prisoner having committed the offense
charged, and is not ready to file an information against him on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented,
there would be no legal reason or ground for him to wait until further evidence may be secured before dismissing the
case against the prisoner, or detaining the person arrested without warrant without violating the precept of article
125 of the Revised Penal Code.
After the release of the prisoner, the city fiscal may make or continue the investigation and file afterwards the proper
information against him with the corresponding court, if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to secure
a warrant of arrest of the same. Of course, as we have said in our decision for the purpose of determining the
criminal liability of a peace officer detaining a person for a longer period of time than the six hours prescribed by
article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, "the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other
circumstances such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and
file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration." The period originally fixed by our Penal
Code was twenty four (24) hours, and if the city fiscal believes that the period now prescribed by article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code is short, and that the law must be amended so as to extend it, it would be proper for the
interested parties to take the case to Congress, since it can not be done by judicial legislation.
Motion for reconsideration is denied.
Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, and Briones, JJ., concur.

PERFECTO, J.:
We agree with the above resolution except that which may be at variance with our concurring opinion in this case
and with our written opinion in the case of Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214.

BRIONES, M., concurring:

Estoy enteramente conforme con la resolucion. En la opinion concurrente que dicte en el asunto de
Lino contraFuguso y otros (43 off. Gaz., 1235, 1244) donde se discutio por primera vea el importante punto legal
debatido en el presente asunto, dije lo siguiente y lo reafirmo en esta ocasion, saber:
Sin discutir la responsabilidad de la Fiscalia por la demora — si esta se puede o no justificar administrativamente es
cuestion que no nos compete considerar ni resolver — vamos a limitarnos a comentar y discutir la fase juridica
legal. Esta en orden naturalmente el hacer la siguiente pregunta: es correcta, es acertada la asercionde que el
"Promotor Fiscal de Manila es un funcionario judicial (judicial officer)," que, por tanto, la entrega al mismo de la
persona de undetenido dentro del periodo de 6 horas equivale a la entrega a las autoridades judiciales
correspondentes (proper judicial authorities) de que habla el ariticulo 125 del codigo penal revisado? Creemos que
no: no por su letra ni por su espiritu puede aplicarse por extension la fraseologia de ese articulo al Fiscal de la
Ciudad de Manila o a cualquier otro Fiscal; ese articulo no puede referirse mas que a un tribunal, a u juzgado, se
municipal, sea de primera instancia. Asi que story de perfecto acuerdo con la ponencia cuando positivamente sienta
la doctrina de que "si bien un arresto puede hacerse sin orden cuando hay motivos razonalbes apra ello (regla 109,
articulo 6, reglamento de los tribunales), el detenido no puede ser recluido fuera del periodo prescrito por la ley, a
menos que una orden de arresto se obtenga antes de un tribunal competente" (veanse las autoridades que se citan), y
que "en el presente caso el Fiscal de la Ciudad no tenia autoridad para expedir ordenes de arresto y carecia de
facultad para convalidar tal detencion ilegal con solo presentar las querellas, o con una orden de su propia cuenta,
ora tacita, ora expresa" (veanse asimismo las authoridades que se citan).
De lo dicho se sigue que cuando la policia entrega a la Fiscalia de la ciudad despues del periodo de 6 horas prescrito
por la ley los papeles sobre un detenido arestado sin previa orden al efecto, no por ello se cura la ilegalidad del
arresto y detencion, sino que dicha ilegalidad continua y persiste hasta que el Fiscal presenta la querella y obtiene
una orden de arresto del tribunal competente, o que, tratandose de delito, mediante la prestacion de una fianza cuya
cuantia se fijare y recommendare por dicho Fiscal, la policia soltare al detenido, a tenor de lo previsto en el articulo
2460 del codigo administrativo.
Puede ocurrir, sin embargo, que la policia entregue los papeles a la Fiscalia de la ciudad dentro del periodo de 6
horas, pero que la Fiscalia no solo deja pasar dicho periodo, sin que transcurren dias, hasta semanas sin actuar sobre
el caso en uno u otro sentido. La cuestion en orden naturalmente es la siguiente: ¿es legal o ilegal la detencion del
arrestado en tal caso? En otras palabras: ¿queda suspenidod el periodo de 6 horas durante el tiempo que el Fiscal de
la Ciudad tarda en actuar sobre el caso? La contestacion tiene queser necesariamente negativa. La rigidez., la
inflexibilidad del periodo de 6 horas reza no solo para la policia, sinohast para cualquier otra agencia o ramo oficial,
sin excluir a la Fiscalia de la ciudad de Manila. Si por cualquier motivo la Fiscalia dejare de actuar dentro de dicho
periodo, el deber de la policia o del que tenga la custodia del detenido es soltarle, quiera o no quiera el Fiscal, lo
recomiende o no lo recomiende. De otra manera, la restriccion que estatuye la ley a favor de los detenidos sin previa
orden de arresto — restriccion que implementa las garantias de la libertad establecidas en la Constitucion —
resultaria un mito. La filosofia de la ley es, a saber: solamente se verifica un arresto sin previa orden cuando hay
motivos razonalbes para ello, v. gr., cuando un individuo es cogido in fraganti cometiendo un delito. La ley
presupone, por tanto, que el Estado tiene a mano todos los elementos necesarios para decider que accion ha de tomar
dentro del periodo de 6 horas, ya entregando la persona del detenido a las autoridades judicales correspondientes
mediante la querella procedente, a tenor del articulo 125 del Codigo Penal Revisado: ya poniendole en libertad
provisional bajo una fianza razonable, de acuerdo con el citado articulo 2460 del Codigo Administrativo; o ya
poniendole compoletamente en la calle por falta de meritos en el caso. Si ninguna de estas cosas puede hacer el
Estado en 6 horas no puede ser mas que por dos motivos: o poor que se quiere cometer una arbitrariedad, o la
maquinaria oficial se halla en un deplorable estado de confusion, indeptitud of impotencia.
Se arguye con enfasis que bajo esta interpretacion la prosecucion del crimen sufriria un serio quebranto, sobre todo
en la Ciudad de Manila; que materialmente la Fiscalia no puede actuar adecuadamente sobre algunos casos en el
plazo percentorio de 6 horas. Si esto es verdad el remedio no es infringer la ley como cosa inevitable, rutinaria; el
remedio seria — o recabar de la Legislatura que se reforme la ley en la forma que se estime conveniente, o
implementar ya perfeccionar la maquinaria de la prosecucion criminal, colocandola a la altura de las circunstancias.
No hay nada mas anarquico, mas subversivo y fatal para el principio de la autoridad y del buen gobierno que el tener
leyes que no se cumplen, leyes que se infringen hasta por los llamados a ponerlas en vigor. "To be or not to be, that
is the question." O existe la ley y hay que cumplirla; o si la ley es mala o impracticable, hay que reformarla o
derogarla. Lo que no se debe permitir es el disolvente espectaculo de la diaria inobservancia de la ley.
Se me ocurre ahora añadir otras observaciones en refuerzo de la arriba transcritas. Creo que ni siquiera es necesario
enmendar la ley en el sentido de alargar el periodo de 6 horas provisto en el articulo 125 del Codigo Penal Revisado.
Creo que con un poco mas de esfuerzo y buena voluntad la presente ley se podria cumplir en la Ciudad de Manila.
La Fiscalia de la Ciudad podria, por ejemplo, establecer turnos semanales o mensuales, segun como se estime
conveniente, destinando fiscales que se hagan cargo exclusivamente de los casos de individuos detenidos sin previa
orden de arresto, para los efectos de presentar la correspondiente querella contra ellos, o de soltarlos si se viere que
no existen meritos suficientes para la prosecucion, sin perjuicio desde luego de ulteriores procedi mientos. Si para
realizar satisfactoriamente este trabajo fuese necesario aumentar el personal de la Fiscalia, yo no creo que el
gobierno escatimaria el dinero para una atencion tan importante.
Esincreible que dentro de 6 horas — si hay voluntad de trabajar y sobre todo de hacer buena y efectiva la ley — la
Fiscalia no pueda hacr su composicion de lugar en tales casos, bien para proseguir, bien para no proseguir, de
finitivamente o en el entretanto. Hay que tener en cuenta que se trata de casos en que el individuo es detenido, ora
porque ha sido sorprendido in fraganti cometiendo una infraccion o un delito, ora poroque se le ha cogido " en
lugares sospechosos o bajo cirunstancias sospechosas, que tiendan razonablemente a demostrar que el mismo ha
cometido o esta para cometer cualquier crimen o atentado contra el orden y la paz" (E. U. contrafortaleza, 12 Jur.
486). ¿Que es lo que neceista entonces la Fiscalia en tales casos? ¿No esta alli el testimonio del policia,
constabulario o agente del orden aprehensor? De modo que la cuestion, en ultimo resultado, es que la Fiscalia tenga
o no fe en la integridd y verracidad del agente de la ley. Si la tiene ¿que motivo hay para no formular
inmediatamente la querella y obtener asi del juzgado la correspondiente orden de arresto? Y si no la tiene ¿que razon
hay para pisotear la libertad individual reteniendo la causa sin accion mas alla de las 6 horas y causando asi una
inecesaria vejacion al ciudadano?
La cuestion se puede simplificar mas todavia. Todo se reduce, en ultimo termino, a que la Fiscalia pueda contar con
la ayda de una policia eficiente, integra y honrada sobre todo, que persiga el crimen si cuartel, pero que tenga el
maximo respeto a los derechos del ciudadano. Si la Fiscalia puede tener un modus vivendi con una policcia de
semejante tipo y de tales quilates, no hay miedo de que una rigida observancia del requerimiento legal de 6 horas
facilitie la inmunidad de los tulisanes, bandidos, gangsters y criminales del bajo mundo, y se ponga en grave peligro
la eficaz prosecucion del crimen y la seguridad y sosiego del pueblo. Dentro de las 6 horas hay tiempo mas que
suficiente para meter en cintura a toda la canalla ... ¡pero por Dios que no se violen ni pisoteen las garantias
consitucionales por miedo a los gansters!
Desde luego que se debe dar cierto margen de viabilidad a la ley. Por ejemplo, si se verifica una detencion sin previa
orden de arresto a medianoche, creo que la ley estaria cumplida si en las primeras horas de la mañana siguiente se
tomara enseguida accion, aungque ello rebassara un poquito el periodo de 6 horas.
Se deniega la mocion de reconsideracion.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

I vote to grant the motion for reconsideration.
In my dissent from the decision of this Court I contended myself with citing my dissenting opinion in Lino vs.
Fugoso, L-1197, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214, 1246, as grounds for my disagreement. As the present decision has gone farther
than that decision and contains new statements and conclusions, I deem it convenient to enlarge on my dissent.
The term "judicial officers" has been defined to be, in its popular sense, officers of a court (Hitt vs. State, Miss. 181,
So. 331) and in its strict sense, "judges and justices of all courts and all persons exercising judicial powers by virtue
of their office." (Settle vs. Van Evrea, 49 N.Y., 280.) The city fiscal is a judicial officer in both senses. In the popular
or larger sense, he is a judicial officer because he is a part of the legal machinery created for the administration of
justice. A prosecuting attorney, charged with the administration of justice and invested with important discretionary
power in a motion for a nolle prosequi, is a judicial officer. (State ex rel. Freed vs. Circuit Court of Martin Country,
Ind., 14 N.E. 2d 910; State vs. Ellis, 112 N.E., 98, 100; 184 Ind., 307.)
In the strict legal sense, the city fiscal is a judicial officer when making preliminary examination because he
performs the function of a justice of the peace — assuming, as the majority seem to assume, that the conduct of
preliminary examination is a judicial function. By express provision of section 2465 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the city fiscal "shall cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors, and violations of
ordinances, and have the necessary information or complaints prepared or made against the persons accused." In
addition, section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court states that "every justice of the peace, municipal judge or city
fiscal shall have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses alleged to have been committed,
within his municipality or city, cognizable by the Court of First Instance."
The city fiscal is not any the less a judicial officer simply because he can not issue warrant of arrest. The power to
issue warrant of arrest is not essential ingredient of a judicial office. This is especially so when, as in cases like the
present, the accused is already under arrest when the city fiscal intervenes and there is no need of issuing an order of
arrest. As to power to commit a detained person to prison, if that be necessary, the majority are not exactly right
when they affirm that the city fiscal is not clothed with it. I shall come to this later.
However that may be, the city fiscal is a "judicial authority" within the contemplation of article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. This is the inevitable result from the fact that in the City of Manila, the city fiscal under the existing
scheme of the government is the only officer to whom the person arrested without warrant may be presented. The
majority opinion admits that the municipal court and the Court of First Instance of Manila "do not make or conduct a
preliminary investigation proper," and criminal complaints are not filed with them but with the city fiscal. Reasoning
from another angle, we reach the same conclusion. We are to presume that in using the generic term "judicial
authorities" — and in plural — instead of more specific word "justice," "judge," or "court", the lawmaker intended to
include in the operation of the article under consideration all officers who are named to receive the prisoner from the
arresting officer. We have to adopt this construction if we are to give effect to the law and the rule of court I have
cited, and if we are to avoid what I might call, without meaning offense, an absurdity.
Under no canon of statutory construction is there justification for this Court's opinion that the police and the city
fiscal have to share the six hours fixed in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The language, the nature and the
object of this provision unerringly point to the theory that the six hours mentioned in the Revised Penal Code are
meant exclusively for the police officer who made the arrest. I can discern absolutely no indication of any intention
to have the city fiscal squeeze in his action within this brief period, a period which, in many cases, is not even
sufficient for the police. Read separately or in conjunction with the entire criminal procedure, article 125 does not
furnish the slightest indication of legislative intent to place the city fiscal and the police under the same category.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was devised for one purpose; section 2465 of the Revised Administrative
Code and section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court for another. Article 125 is a penal provision designed to prevent
and punish police abuses for which the police are noted. The investigation by the city fiscal is strictly and essentially
procedural. It is an integral part of the procedure for bringing the case to trial.
Little reflection will disclose the disastrous consequences which this Court's interpretation of article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code will bring to law enforcement. It nullifies the role of the fiscal in the administration of criminal
law. For sheer lack of time, the release of the prisoner arrested without warrant will, in a great number of cases, be
inevitable, unless the city fiscal files charges without sufficient and adequate investigation. The alternative will be
for the city fiscal to be on a 24-hour watch lest in his sleep the time for him to act might slip by.
But this is only a poor alternative. Regardless of any vigilance on his part the opportunity for the city fiscal to make
the required investigation cannot always be assured. The law gives the police absolute power to detain a prisoner for
six hours without incurring penal liability. There is no law which obliges the police to take the prisoner to the city
fiscal before the expiration of six hours from the time of arrest. There can be cases where the entire six hours might
be consumed by the police in their investigation alone, or just in the chasing, collection and transportation to the
police station of the law breakers. This can happen in tumultuous and other mob offenses in which many people are
involved and there is necessity of screening the guilty ones.
Supposing then that the police should deliver the prisoner or prisoners to the city fiscal at the last minute of the six
hours through the negligence or by force of circumstances, what time is there for this functionary to comply with his
duty? And even if the city fiscal be given the chance to start his assigned task at the beginning of the six hour period,
can this time insure proper and just investigation in complicated cases and in cases where the persons arrested are
numerous and witnesses are not on hand to testify? It is well to remember that the police are not authorized to round
up witnesses and take them along with the prisoners to the city fiscal.
In the light of these consequences I can not imagine that the meaning which this Court attaches to article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code so much as entered the thought of the legislature. No sound-minded legislature could have
intended to create such situation, which is easy to perceive unless we assume that the legislative purpose was to tie
up the hands of the law and give lawlessness full sway; unless the legislature wanted to coddle and pamper lawless
elements to a calamitous extreme. When the Court says that the prisoner, after being released at the end of six hours
from the time of his arrest may be rearrested should the city fiscal find sufficient evidence and prefer charges against
him, it takes for granted that underworld characters and hardened criminals are honorable men who would keep
themselves ready and handy for a second arrest.
The Court says:
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to
authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without
any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find
sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had
been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.
What is that "proper process" referred to in the above quoted portion of the decision? Whatever is meant by "proper
process," we should note that there is no fundamental difference between the proceeding before a justice of the
peace and the procedure followed by the city fiscal. There is nothing important the justice of the peace may do in the
interest of the accused in the cases triable before the Court of First Instance which the city fiscal may not do. If the
city fiscal can not issue an order of arrest, the justice of the peace himself does not do so to give the detention the
stamp of legality. At least, I am aware of no law which tells him to take this step, and I can see no material
advantage which an accused could derive from this ceremony. All the justice of the peace does which matters to the
accused is admit him to bail, if the crime be bailable, and proceed to an investigation.
But the city fiscal does just that; and if the necessary to order the commitment of the prisoner pending ascertainment
of his guilt, the city fiscal no less than the justice of the peace or judge of first instance has the authority also, as I
propose to show later. In actual practice, a person arrested without warrant in a regular municipality frequently
suffers greater injustice and is subject to, and frequently goes through, greater hardships than his counterpart in the
City of Manila. We are witness to the common spectacle of cases being dismissed on motion of the provincial fiscal
for want of sufficient evidence after the prisoner had been bound by the justice of the peace over to the Court of
First Instance for trial and after he had languished in jail for months or years. Prisoner's detention in that case is not
considered illegal.
This anomaly seldom takes place in cities where the preliminary investigation is entrusted to the city fiscal. Rarely
in the City of Manila is a case dropped for insufficiency of evidence after it has been determined in a preliminary
investigation that the prisoner should be held for trial. On the whole, the method by which the preliminary
investigation is conducted by the prosecuting attorney is more conducive to efficiency, minimizes or eliminates
conflicts of opinion in the existence of probable cause, and better insures prompt dispatch of criminal cases to the
lasting benefit of the prisoner. Only physical impossibility, as I understand it, is in the way for the adoption of this
method throughout the country.
It is a mistake, in my humble judgment, to confuse a prisoner's detention during the six-hour period fixed in article
125 of the Revised Penal Code and his continued detention after he is turned over to the city fiscal. As I have said,
article 125 regulates the time within which a police officer may hold the prisoner under his responsibilty, and it
applies to the police alone. It will hardly be contended that this article, or any other law, or the constitution limits the
period within which a prisoner may be detained after he is delivered to the justice of the peace. If that is so, and
since the city fiscal acts in lieu of a justice of the peace, there is no sound basis, legal or practical, for denying to the
former the same time and the same freedom of action that is enjoyed by the latter.
By the same token, there is no sound reason for denying to the proceeding by the city fiscal the same attributes
which adhere to the proceeding before the justice of the peace. After the arresting officer produced the prisoner
before the city fiscal, the law takes its course in the same manner that it does when the examining officer is the
justice of the peace or judge of first instance. From that time the arresting officer ceases to have any control over the
prisoner save to keep him in custody subject to the orders of the city fiscal. The police step out and the law steps in
and extends to the prisoner the mantle of protection against inquisitory examination by the police. From that time on
he enjoys the rights granted by law to all accused persons — the right to give bail and the right to testify freely
uninfluenced by any fear of violence or other forms of maltreatment. The danger envisioned by article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code is past.
The proceeding before the city fiscal does not lose its character of due process of law by its being conducted by the
city fiscal instead of a judge. For one thing, preliminary investigation is not a trial. It is a constitutional right. It is
purely a matter of statutory regulation. (Potenciana Dequito vs. Hugo O. Arellano et al., G.R. No. L-1336; 32 C.J.S.,
456.) A judicial proceeding which lies within the power of the legislature to provide or withhold without infringing
the fundamental law may be placed in the hands of any officer other than a judge.
The jurisdiction to make a preliminary examination or investigation is not even considered judicial. Judges who
perform this function do not do so as judicial officers. Municipal executives here and in the United States are
conferred this power. "The power to examine and to commit persons charged with crime is not judicial, but is one of
the duties of the conservators of the peace, and it may be, and usually is, vested in persons other than courts, as, for
instance, justices of the peace or police magistrates, or persons exercising jurisdiction analogous to that exercised by
justices of the peace, or who are ex officio justices of the peace, such as mayors, notaries public, or court
commissioners. Power to hold preliminary examinations may be exercised by the United States commissioners, and
United States district judges who, while making the preliminary examination, exercise the powers of commissioners
only." (16 C.J., 319-320.)
There is no basis for the fear that "the city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an
information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for days or
weeks without any process issued by a court or judge." This statement overlooks the consistent and general practice
heretofore followed with clear, express statutory sanction. Section 2640 of the Revised Administrative Code
authorizes the chief of police of the City of Manila "to take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the
city court of any person arrested for violation of any city ordinance," while in cases of violation of any penal law,
according to the same article, the fiscal of the city may, and does, recommend and fix the bail to be required of the
person arrested. Power to fix bail necessarily implies power to recommend or order the detention of the prisoner if
bond is not given. This in its working is no more nor less than the power to commit an accused to prison pending
investigation of this case, power which the majority erroneously say is not possessed by the city fiscal.
The constitutional and statutory provisions and rules cited by the majority are of general application which are good
only in the absence of specific enactments. The controlling provisions in the case at bar are sections 2460 and 2465
of the Revised Administrative Code and section 2, Rule 108, of the Rules of Court.
The decision further says:
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party
or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such
case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in
municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the city fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest of
a person charged with having committed a public offense even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a
probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no
authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons
even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
I do not think the foregoing paragraph is relevant to the instant case. We are not dealing with the authority of a
police officer to make arrest without warrant. There is no question raised against the legality of the petitioners'
arrest. Our problem concerns the time in which the city fiscal may make his investigation and the scope of his
power.
Assuming the above-quoted statement to be pertinent to the issues, the same can not, in my humble view, pass
unchallenged. Under certain, well-defined circumstances, an officer may and constantly does make arrests without a
court order, with or without complaint. An officer in good faith may arrest without warrant when he believes that a
person is guilty of a crime, and his belief rests on such grounds as would induce an ordinarily prudent and cautious
man, under the circumstances, to believe likewise. (6 C.J.S., 596.) This practice is not derived from any express
authority but on the necessity of catching law violators before they disappear and hide. I have not come across any
law naming specific offenses for committing which the offenders shall be arrested without court orders.
It is also a general principle of law that an officer need not necessarily have personal knowledge of the facts
constituting the offense himself, in the sense of having seen or witness the offense himself, but he may, if there are
no circumstances known to him which materially impeach his information, acquire his knowledge from information
imparted to him reliable and credible third persons, or by information together with other suspicious circumstances.
(Id., pp. 599, 600.) This principle ought to serve as a qualification to the ruling laid down by this Court, that "a peace
officer has no power to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person."
Under the rule I have quoted, a police officer certainly may arrest a person pointed to him as having committed a
crime provided that the information or complaint comes from a reliable source and under circumstances as to make
an ordinary reasonable man to believe it to be well-founded. When the victim of a robbery or aggression, for
example, should subsequently spot the criminal and request an officer to arrest him, the officer would not have to
seek or wait for a warrant of arrest before detaining the man, provided again that there was good ground to believe
the truth of the accusation.
This is a common law rule implanted in the Philippines along with its present form of government, a rule which has
been cited and applied by this Court in a number of cases. (U.S. vs. Santos, 35 Phil., 853; U.S. vs. Batallones, 23
Phil., 46; U.S. vs. Samonte, 16 Phil., 516.)
Padilla, J., concurs.

SUPPLEMENTARY
TUASON, J., dissenting:
When I filed my dissent from the decision of the Court on the occasion of the denial of the motion for
reconsideration, it was my understanding that there was going to be only a minute resolution. I make this remark not
as a complaint but as my explanation for writing my dissent in advance of the reasoned resolution. Even then I
would contend myself with resting my dissent on what I have already stated did the resolution contain new
propositions to be answered and disclose misunderstanding of some of many statements to be cleared. As this is in
the nature and reply, topics will be treated without regard to continuity of thought.
The resolution says that article 30 of the Provisional Law for the Application of the Penal Code in the Philippines
has been repealed by section 17 of Rule 109, but that section 31 is still in force except the last sentence. And so,
according to the resolution, is section 2 of Act No. 194.
Without discussing the materiality of those laws, I disagree that they are still in effect. Like article 30, article 31 of
the Provisional Law and section 2 of Act No. 194 deal with procedure in justice of the peace courts in general
covered by the new Rules of Court. The Rules of Court, in the words of their introductory section, concern
"pleading, practice and procedure in all courts of the Philippines, and the admission to practice law therein." These
Rules are complete revision and a complete re-enactment of the entire field of procedure, and there is every reason
to believe that they were intended to replace, with some exceptions, all previous laws on the subject, especially
Spanish laws which had long been out of harmony with the new mode of pleading and practice. If the last sentence
of article 31 is repealed, as the resolution says, I see no valid ground for not holding the other parts of that article
repealed so. "Where a later act covers the whole subject of earlier acts, embraces new provisions, and plainly shows
that it was intended, not only a substitute for the earlier acts, but to cover the whole subject then considered by the
legislature, and to prescribe the only rules in respect thereto, it operates as a repeal of all former statutes relating to
subject matter. The rule applies not only where the former acts are inconsistent or in conflict with the new act, but
also even where the former acts are not necessarily repugnant in express terms, or in all respects, to the new act." (59
C.J., 919-920.) "While, as a general rule, implied repeal of a former statute by a later act is not favored, yet `if the
later act covers the whole subject of the earlier act and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as
a repeal of the earlier'." Posadas vs. National City Bank of New York, 296 U.S., 497; 80 Law ed., 351.)
As the Rules of Court took effect on July 1, 1940, the case of Marcos vs. Cruz, decided on May 30, 1939, and cited
in the resolution, is no authority for the opinion that no law has been enacted amending or repealing section 2 of Act
No. 192.
But this rule of implied repeal holds good only as regards laws of general application. Another well known rule of
the statutory construction tells us that preliminary investigations in Manila and other chartered cities are to be
excluded from the operation of the Rules of Court. Such investigations are provided for the special enactments
which, because of their special nature and limited application, must be excepted from and prevail over the general
provisions. "When the provisions of a general law, applicable to the entire state, are repugnant to the provisions of a
previously enacted special law, applicable in a particular locality only, the passage of such general law does dot
operate to repeal the special law, either in whole or in part, unless such appeal is provided for by express words, or
arises by necessary implication. An intention to repeal local acts generally is not intolerable from the fact that the
general acts specifically excludes one locality from its operation." (59 C. J. . 934.) There is no apparent intention in
the Rules of Court to repeal the laws under which preliminary investigations in Manila have to be conducted by the
city fiscal. The contrary contention is evidenced by section 2 of the rule 108, which provides that "Every justice of
the peace, municipal judge or city fiscal shall have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation of all offenses
alleged to have been committed within his municipality or city, cognizable y the Court of First Instance,"
(Espiritu vs. De La Rosa [July 31, 1947], L-1156, 45 Off. Gaz., 196; Hashim vs. Boncan [Nov. 22, 1941], 40 Off.
Gaz., 13th Supp., p. 13.) In the first of these cases, Mr. Justice Padilla, speaking for the court, categorically held that
the Rules of Court had not repealed and supplanted the provisions of the Revised Administrative Code regarding the
power and authority of the City Fiscal to conduct preliminary investigation." And in Hashim vs. Boncan, the Court,
through Mr. Justice Laurel, said:
The framers of the Rules could not have intended to brush aside these lessons of experience and to tear down an
institution recognized by law and decision and sanctioned by years of settled practice. They could not have failed to
keep intact in effective machinery in the administration of criminal justice, as expeditious and simple as any reform
they have infused into the new Rules.
The term "proper court or judge" in section 17, Rule 109, of the Rules of Court1 should be interpreted to mean, in the
case of Manila, city fiscal, under the last mentioned canon of interpretation. In Manila, the city fiscal performs the
duties devolving on justices of the peace in regular municipalities in the conduct of preliminary investigations, and
all criminal charges by the police and offended parties are filed with him. And it is admitted that prisoners arrested
without warrant in Manila may be taken only to the city fiscal by the arresting officer. Let it be noted also in this
connection that section 17 of Rule 109 regulates the taking of persons arrested to the court or judge, not the filing of
complaint.
In view of this circumstances; in view of the fact that neither the judges of first instance nor the municipal judges of
Manila are authorized to conduct preliminary hearings other than the purpose of determining the amount of bail
(section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code), the result of applying section 17 of Rule 109 to Manila would be
virtually to eliminate preliminary investigation in this city of persons arrested without a warrant. The decision
creates a vacuum, a situation which this Court on another occasion refused to countenance in the forceful language
above quoted in Hashim vs. Boncan et. al. There, the Court continued:
To sustain the theory of repeal is to wipe out these advantages. Not only this. If neither section 11 nor section 13 of
Rule 108 is applicable to the preliminary investigation conducted by the City Fiscal, as we have above shown, and if
existing legislation thereon is to be deemed repealed, then the matter would be left uncovered by rule or law. There
would thus be a void crying for urgent reform. There would be no such void if the old and tried procedure is kept in
being, untouched by the new Rules. Withal, our own knowledge of the history of this portion of the Rules here
involved does not warrant an interpretation not contemplated when we drafted and deliberated upon these Rules.
And while, perhaps, the language could have been clearer and the arrangement made more logical, consideration to
expediency and the avowed purpose of preliminary investigation point to the already trodden path hereinabove
indicated.
The resolution has interpreted article 125 of the Revised Penal Code with meticulous adherence, at best, to its latter,
and open disregarded, at worst, of its spirit and of the pernicious results that follow from such interpretation. The
construction which the majority give to the term "judicial authority" makes it impossible for the city fiscal to
perform his assigned duties with the consequence that for lack of time, malefactors will have to be turned loose
before proper investigation in conducted, or prosecution filed on insufficient evidence, in many cases.
Nevertheless, I am not pleading, in the case, for a departure from the letter of the law. I merely submit that the city
fiscal, as was emphasized in my dissent from the decision, is a judicial officer or judicial authority both in the
popular and the legal sense of the term, and that it is unjust, unwarranted by any rule of interpretation, absolutely
disastrous to the administration of criminal law to identify the city fiscal with the police, forcing him to file an
information or release the prisoner within the six hours intended for the arresting officer alone. I do not contend that
the term "judicial authority" be expanded beyond its literal and legal meaning, although if necessary this might be
done to carry out the obvious purpose of the law, but I take exception to the unjustified restriction and limitation
placed on the meaning of "judicial authority" which not only does violence to the letter and spirit of article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code but leads to an extremely anomalous, not to say impossible, situation. We do not have to
look outside for the meaning of "judicial authority," as a simple reading of article 125 of the Revised Pena Code and
section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code yields the clear intent of the legislature. This intent, as manifested
in laws that have been amended by section 2465 and section 2474 of the Revised Administrative Code, crystalized in
a system of practice that have received "the imprint of judicial approval" in various decisions of this Court. (U. S. vs.
McGoven, 6 Phil. 261; U. S. vs. Ocampo, 18 Phil. 122;U. S. Carlos, 21 Phil. 553; Hashimvs. Boncan, ante;
Espiritu vs. De la Rosa, ante.)
The resolution, as a solution to the quandary in which it places the city fiscal, would have him go to Congress. But,
as I trust I have shown, the laws on the subject need no supplementation and implementation. They have no gaps to
be filled or ambiguities to be cleared. The loopholes exist only as a direct result of this Court's new ruling. Section
2474 of the revised Administrative Code and its predecessors have operated smoothly, without a hitch for nearly half
a century. Not even when the arresting officer had 24 hours to take arrested persons to a judicial authority was it ever
imagined, much less asserted, that the city fiscal had to borrow his time from the police.
The resolution in laying down the rule that the city fiscal has no power to issue warrant of arrest or "an order or
commitment of release by a written warrant containing the ground on which it is based," thinks it is necessary to
advert, "in justice to the city fiscal," that this official does not pretend to possess such authority, since it is only in the
dissenting opinion, it says, where the claim is made.
At the outset I deny that I attributed to the city fiscal power to issue warrant of arrest; and did not say in an
unqualified manner that he has power to issue commitment. On the first point, what I said was an implicit
aknowledgment of the opposite. Let me quote from the second paragraph of page 2 of my dissenting opinion what I
did say:
The city fiscal is not any the less a judicial officer simply because he can not issue warrant of arrest. The power to
issue warrant of arrest is not essential ingredient of a judicial office.
On the power to commit prisoners, the same paragraph of my opinion shows what I said.
As to the power to commit a detained person to prison, if that be necessary, the majority are not exactly right when
they affirm that the city fiscal is not clothed with it. It shall come to this later.
And taking the matter up again on page 11, I said:
Section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes the chief of police of the City of Manila "to take good
and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city court of any person arrested for violation of any city
ordinance," while in cases of violation of any penal law, according to the same article, the fiscal of the city may, and
does, recommended and fix the bail necessarily implies power to recommend or order the detention of the prisoner if
bond is not given. This i its working is no more nor less than the power to commit an accused to prison pending
investigation of his case, power which the majority erroneously say is not possessed by the city fiscal.
There is nothing in this statement any outright affirmation that the city fiscal has power to issue commitment papers.
There is, on the contrary, an implied admission that the power, as it is ordinarily exercised by a judge or court, does
not exist. I merely submitted as my personal opinion and interpretation of section 2460 of the Revised
Administrative Code, regardless of what the city fiscal thinks, that it confers upon the latter official a power which,
performed in conjunction with the power of the chief of police, amounts in its practical operation to a power to
commit a man to prison. And I said this in answer to the sweeping assertion (which apparently was made in the
decision in complete oblivion of section 2460, supra), that to give the city fiscal unlimited time might result in
injustice, since, the decision says,
The city fiscal may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the
person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegal detained for days or weeks without any process
issued by a court or judge.
I intended to emphasize by citing section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, that a prisoner could secure his
released, pending investigation of his case, in the same manner and with the same facilities that he could if the
complaint or information had been filed with a court. In citing and stating my interpretation of section 2460 of the
Revised Administrative Code, I wished to show what I considered an erroneous ruling that
If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not
ready to filed the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he should release and not
detain the person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code.
The majority come back with the assertion that the provisions of section 2460 of the Revised Penal Administrative
Code2
do not authorize, either expressly or by implication, the city fiscal to order the detention of the prisoner if the bond is
not given, not only because they refer to the power of the chief of police of Manila and not of the city fiscal, but
because the only incidental authority granted to the latter is to recommend the granting of the bail by the chief of
police may release the latter on bail.
I disagree again. I do not believe that a provision is rendered nugatory by the mere fact that it is foreign to the
subject of the main provision or to the title or caption of the section, if otherwise the language is clear. The title or
caption is important only in determining the meaning of laws which are ambiguous and uncertain. The provision of
section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code quoted in the resolution does not suffer from such infirmity.
In truth, the proviso in section 2460 is not alien to the enacting clause. The proviso relates to the chief of police,
conferring on him power of the same nature as does the enacting clause, with the only difference that, in cases of
violations of a municipal ordinance the chief of police acts independently, on his own responsibility, while in cases
of violations of a penal law, he acts with the advice of the city fiscal and the latter fixes the amount of bail. The
intervention of the city fiscal was only inserted, in my opinion, in view of the gravity of the latter class of cases.
As to the other reason given in the resolution why, it says, continued detention of a prisoner beyond six hours is not
authorized — namely, that the authority granted to the city fiscal to recommend the granting of bail by the chief of
police and to fix the amount of bail to be required of the person arrested, is only incidental — my comment is that,
whether the power to take bail or release prisoners belongs to the city fiscal or the chief of police, is inconsequential.
To my mind, the important point is that the accused, as the resolution admits, may be released on bond. From this
power, irrespective of who possess it, is implied the power to keep the prisoner under detention if he does not file a
bond.
When the resolution concludes that if no bond is given by the person arrested, "neither the chief of police, who is
only authorized to release on bail, has power to detain the person arrested for more than six hours; not the city fiscal,
who is empowered to fix and recommend the bail to the chief of police has authority to release person arrested in
violation of penal law," I can not follow. In a nutshell, the majority's reasoning, as I understand it, is that the law
authorizes the city fiscal to recommend and fix the bail "in order that the chief of police may release the latter
(prisoner) on bail," but that if the prisoner does not put up a bond to be set at large just the same. The filing of bail is
not a meaningless gesture which may be taken advantage of by an accused at pleasure with the same effect. The
privilege to put a bond extended to an accused must be the price or condition of his temporary release. The law does
not have to say in so many words that if he does not put a bond he would be kept in confinement in order that we
may be warranted in reaching this result.
The resolution says that "the purpose of the law in empowering the chief of police of Manila to release the prisoner
if he puts up a bail, is to relieve the officer making the arrest the necessity of taking the prisoner to the city fiscal,
and the latter from filing an information with the proper courts within the period of time prescribed by law."
I have reflected closely on the meaning of this statement to be sure that I did not misunderstand it. Unless I still fail
to grasp the idea, I think the statement is self-annulling and self contradictory. The filing of bail cannot relive the
arresting officer from the necessity of taking the prisoner to the city fiscal for the simple reason that such bail, in
cases of violations of penal laws, can be filed only on recommendation of, and its amount can be fixed by, the city
fiscal. In other words, the prisoners necessarily has to be taken to the city fiscal before any bond can be executed.
And it would be underestimating the intelligence of an accused to expect him to file a bond within six hours from
the time of his arrest if he is aware that, if at the end of those hours the city fiscal had not preferred any charges
against him and no order of commitment had been issued by the proper judge, he (accused) had to be released. In the
face of the latter theory, no prisoner would, even if he could, perfect a bond within six hours knowing that if he did
not, he would be a free man, at leased temporarily, within what remains of six hours, while if he did, the bond would
enable the city fiscal to take his time to file case against him in court.
The gravamen of the court's argument seems to be that a commitment by a court or judge is essential to validate the
detention beyond the time specified in the Revised Penal Code. I do not share this opinion. Neither such
commitment by a judge nor a formal complaint is required by the constitution in order that a person may lawfully be
kept in jail pending investigation of his case. An opportunity to file a bond in reasonable amount satisfies the
constitutional demands. Nor does the bail have to be fixed or granted by a court. Sheriffs and police officers have
been authorize by statutory enactments in other jurisdiction to take bail. At least one court has gone so far as to
uphold, "independently of statue, a practice of long standing on the part of the sheriff to take bail in criminal cases of
prisoners committed for not filing bail, and release them from confinement." (Dickinson vs. Kingsbury, 2 Day
[Com., 1.] Now then, under section 2460 of the Revised Administrative Code, the chief of police of Manila, as
already shown, is allowed to take bail by himself in cases violation of a municipal ordinance and with the
intervention of the city fiscal in other cases. Under this provision and this practice, a detention prisoner arrested
without warrant is not deprived of any privilege of benefit guaranteed by the constitution. The lack of formal
complaint does not in the least prejudice him or deprive him of any benefit enjoined by his counterparts in the
provinces. On its legal aspect, let it be observed that all the proceedings conducted by the city fiscal is a preliminary
and summary inquiry which is purely a matter of statutory regulation. Preliminary investigation by the prosecuting
attorney when authorized by law is due process no less than one conducted by a judge. It may be suppressed
entirely, and if it may be suppressed, it may be entrusted to any officer, provided only the constitutional right to give
bail is carefully safeguarded. As this Court has said in Hashim vs. Boncan, supra, and U.S. vs. Ocampo, supra:
The prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila is presumed to be as competent to conduct a preliminary investigation
as the average person designated by law to conduct a "preliminary examination" under the provisions of General
Orders No. 58. He is a sworn officer of the court, and the law imposes upon him the duty of making such
investigations. For such purpose the legislature may designate whom it pleases within the judicial department.
The resolution has taken pain to cite and explain in detail what it says are the laws on arrests in the Philippines, and
takes me to task for quoting from 6 Corpus Juris Secundum, 599-600 and citing the decisions of this Court. We are
told the effect that the excerpts from my dissenting opinion, quoted on page 16 of the resolution are without any
foundation because, it is said,
they are premised on the wrong assumption that, under the laws in force in our jurisdiction, a place officer need not
have personal knowledge but may arrest a person without a warrant mere information from other person.
The resolution assumes that those excerpts are predicated on what I call the common law rule, on Corpus Juris
Secundum, and on decisions of the Supreme Court.
I commend a reading to my dissenting opinion. It will be seen that I did not base on those laws, rules or decisions
my statements, "The entire six hours might be consumed by the police in their investigation alone;" "Even if the city
fiscal be given the chance to start his assigned task at the beginning of the six hour period, this time can not insure
proper and just investigation in complicated cases and in cases where the persons arrested are numerous and
witnesses are not on hand to testify," and "The police is not authorized to round up witnesses and take them along
with the prisoner to the city fiscal." It will be seen that far from using as my premise those laws, rules and decisions,
which I said contain in brief outlines the powers of police officers to make arrests, I said clearly on page 12 of my
dissenting opinion:
I do not think the foregoing paragraph is relevant to the instant case. We are not dealing with the authority of the
police officer to make arrest without warrant. There is no question raised against the legality of the prisoner's arrest.
Our problem concerns the time period within which the city fiscal may make his investigation, and the scope of his
power.
It was the majority decision which brought the question of the authority of the police to make arrests into the
discussion. I only met the decision on its own territory though I regarded that territory as outside the legitimate
circle of the present dispute. I cited Corpus Juris Secundum and decisions of this Court, which I said are derived
from common law, to refute the statement,
a fortiori, a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of
the offended party or other person seven though after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty
of the offense charged.
I especially wanted to express my disagreement with the thesis in the decision that
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party
or any other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law.
It was my humble opinion that the rules I cited and the rules on which the decisions of this Court are predicated,
were general provisions of law applicable to varying and changed circumstances, and I wanted to deny the
insinuation that there were, or there might be, arrests without warrant "expressly authorized by law"; so I countered
that "I have not come across any law naming specific offenses for committing which the offenders shall be arrested
without court orders." This is my concept of express provisions authorizing arrests without a warrant.
Section 6 of Rule 109, section 2463 of the Revised Administrative code, and the provisional Law on the subject of
arrest, cited in the resolution in an attempt to show the error of my citations, can not be a source of comfort to the
majority. Rather, I should think, they reinforce my position, for I believe that the rules and decisions I cited the rules
and laws called to our attentions as the real thing, are in substantial agreement. My mistake was in not citing,
myself, Rule 109, section 6, of the Rules of Court, section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, and the
Provisional Law. I might have found and cited them had I thought the matter worthy of more than a passing notice.
Now that the resolution has gone into this subject at length, I shall devote a few more lines to it at the peril of tiring
the reader on what I believe an impertinent topic.
My citation from Corpus Juris and my comment that "this is a common law rule implanted in the Philippines along
with its present form of government, a rule which have been cited or applied by this Court in a number of case," has
met with decision. I am informed that my quotation is "not a general principle of law or common law rule implanted
in the Philippines"; that "it is the summary of the ruling of several states courts based on statutory exceptions of the
general rule."
I do not think I wise wide off the mark when I said that the common law rule has been transplanted to this country
along with the present form of government and that the rules and decisions I have quoted spring from the common
law. And the majority are not closer to the marked when they affirmed that my quotation from Corpus Juris
Secundum, and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code are purely statutory creation.
There was common law before there were statutes. Common law in England and in the U. S. preceded statement
statutes and constitutions. Statutes and constitutions in matters of arrest came afterwards, restating, affirming,
clarifying, restricting or modifying the common law.
The English common law has been adopted as the basis of jurisprudence in all the states of the Union with the
exception of Louisiana "where the civil law prevails in civil matters." (11 Am. Jur., 157.) And
in England, under the common law, sheriffs, justices of the peace, coroners, constables and watchmen were
entrusted with special powers as conservators of the peace, with authority to arrest felons and persons reasonably
suspected of being felons. Whenever a charge a felony was brought to their notice, supported by reasonable
grounds of suspicion, they were required to apprehend the offenders, or at the least to raise hue and cry, under the
penalty of being indicted for neglect of duty.
See the footnote on pp. 2512-2513, Vol. 2, of Jones Blackstone and the numerous cases therein cited. It is a footnote
appended o the statement of a common law principle which of the same tenor as that just noted. Treatises on arrest
not infrequently start with a statement of the common law rule and speak of statute and constitutions in the sense I
have mentioned. Moran's Commentaries on the Rules of Court mention of the common law. (Vol. 2, p. 577) in
connection with the power to make arrest without a warrant.
The doctrine taken from 5 C. J., 395-396-that "the right to make arrest without a warrant is usually regulated by
express statute, and, except as authorize by such statutes, an arrest without a warrant is illegal" — is not at war with
the proposition that the authority of peace officers to make arrest originated at common law and that constitutions
and statutes merely re-stated and defined that the authority with greater precision, naming the officers who may
make arrest, the grades of offenses for, and the circumstances under, which arrest may be effected, etc. Arrests made
by officers not designated or under circumstances not coming within the terms of the statute or constitution are
illegal.
Even then, broad constitutional or statutory inhibition against search and seizure of property or persons without a
warrant has exceptions, as can be inferred from the two sentences preceding the above sentence quoted in the
resolution. This exceptions are cases where the public security has demanded the search and seizure.
Well established exceptions to this rule have been long recognized in cases of felony, and of breaches of the peace
committed in the presence of the party making the arrest. (5 C. J., 395.)
Arrests under such circumstances are authorized in spite of statutes and constitutions. The power to make such arrest
is deeply rooted in the unwritten or common law, which "includes those principles, usage and rules of action
applicable to the government and security of person and property which do not rest for their authority an any express
or positive declaration of the will of the legislature." Although acting at his peril, the powers to arrest on" probable
cause of suspicion" even by a private person are "principles of the common law, essential to the welfare of society,
and not intended to be altered or impaired by the Constitution." (Wakely vs. Hart, 6 Binn. [Pa.,], 316.)
I have remarked that there is no fundamental difference between my citations, on the other hand, and section 6 of
Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, Cited by the majority of the Court, on the other
hand. There is only a difference in phraseology. The very case of U. S. vs. Fortaleza relied upon in the resolution
speaks of barrio lieutenant's power to make arrest as not inferior to that usually conferred on peace officers known to
American and English law as constables.
The resolution quotes this from 5 C. J., 404:
It is a general rule, although there are statutory exceptions and variations that a peace officer has no right to make an
arrest without a warrant upon mere information of a third person.
This is only a part of the sentence. The omitted portion is more important from my point of view and contradicts the
point of view and contradicts the point stressed by the majority. The complete sentence in.
It is a general rule, although there are exceptions and variations, that a peace officer has no right to make an arrest
without a warrant, upon mere information of a third person or mere information of committed, that right being
limited to arrests for offenses of the grade of felony, as elsewhere shown.
It will be noticed that the quoted portion relates to arrest for misdemeanor. For further proof, I invite attention to the
title of the Section on page 401, paragraph (a), which reads: "For Misdemeanor — aa. In General." Let it be noted
that the power to arrest for misdemeanor is different from, and more restricted than, the power to arrest for felony, as
is further demonstrated by the last clause of the full sentence above quoted. This clause refers us back to section 30,
p. 399, which says:
"At common law, (here again common law mentioned), and subject to the provisions of any applicatory statute, and
subject officer may arrest, without a warrant, one whom he has reasonable or probable grounds to suspect of having
committed of felony, even though the person suspected is innocent, and generally, although no felony has in fact
been committed by any one, although, under some statutes a felony must have been actually committed, in which
case an may arrest, without a warrant, any person he has reasonable cause for believing to be the person who
committed it."
As is elsewhere stated, section 6 of Rule 109 and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, like the
authorities I have cited, do not limit the power of a police officer to make arrest tho those cases where he saw with
his own eyes or heard with his own ears the commission of an offense. Section 6 of a Rule 109 and section 2463 of
the Revised Administrative Code empowers police officers.
to pursue and arrest, without warrant, any person found in suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances
reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to commit, any crime or breach of the peace,
and section 6 of Rule 109 authorizes a peace officer or a private person to make arrest when
an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it
Rule 28 of the Provincial Law itself empowers judicial and administrative authorities "to detain, or cause to be
detained person whom there is reasonable ground to believe guilty of some offense" or "when the authority or agent
has reason to believe that unlawful act, amounting to a crime had been committed."
To make arrest on suspicion or on information is not new; it is an everyday practice absolutely necessary in the of
public security and firmly enshrined in the jurisprudence of all civilized societies. The power to arrest on suspicion
or on reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed is authority to arrest on information.
Information coming from reliable sources maybe, and it often is, the basis reasonable ground to believe that a crime
has been committed or of reasonable ground of suspicion that a person is guilty thereof. Suspicion reasonable
ground and information are interviewed within the same concept.
The necessary elements of the ground of suspicion are that the officer acts upon the belief of the person's guilt, based
either upon facts or circumtances within the officers own knowledge, or information imparted by a reliable and
credible third person provided there are no circumstances known to the officer sufficient to materially impeach the
information received, It is not every idle and unreasonable charge which will justify an arrest. An arrest without a
warrant is illegal when it is made upon mere suspicion or belief, unsupported by facts, circumstances, or credible
information calculated to produce such suspicion or belief.
Failure to take these principles into account has led to the belief that:
The investigation which the city fiscal has to make before filing the corresponding information in cases of persons
arrested without a warrant, does not require so much time as that made upon a complaint of the offended parties for
the purpose of securing a warrant of arrest of the accused. In all cases above enumerated in which the law authorizes
a peace officer to arrest without warrant, the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge that the person
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence or within his view,
or of the time, place or circumstances which reasonably tend to show that such person has committed or is about to
commit any crime or breach of the peace. And the testimony of such officer on the commission on the offense in his
presence or within his view by the person arrested, or on the facts and circumstances that tend reasonably to show
that said person has committed or is about to commit an offense, would be sufficient evidence or basis for the city
fiscal to file an information without prejudice to his presenting of other evidence of the defendant. (Pp. 16-17 of the
Resolution.).
Section 6 of Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and section 2463 of the Revised Administrative Code, as well as the
authorities I have quoted, show the fallacy of the idea that the arresting officer knows, or should know, all the facts
about the offense for the perpetration, or supposed perpetration, of which he has made the arrest. The resolution fails
to realize that in the great majority of cases an officer makes arrest on information or suspicion; that "suspicion
implies a belief or opinion as to the guilt based upon facts or circumstances which DO NOT AMOUNT TO
PROOF," and that information and suspicion by their nature require verification and examination of the informers
and other persons and circumstances. While an officer may not act on unsubstantial appearances and unreasonable
stories to justify an arrest without a warrant, obviously in the interest of security, an officer who has to act on the
spot and cannot afford to lose time, has to make arrest without satisfying himself beyond question that a crime has
been committed or that the person suspected is guilty of such crime. A police officer can seldom make arrest with
personal knowledge of the offense and of the identity of the person arrested sufficient in itself to convict. To require
him to make an arrest only when the evidence he himself can furnish proves beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
the accused, would "endanger the safety of society." It would cripple the forces of the law to the point of enabling
criminals, against whom there is only moral conviction or prima facie proof of guilt, to escape. Yet persons arrested
on necessarily innocent so that the prosecuting attorney should release them. Further and closer investigation not
infrequently confirm the suspicion or information.
The majority of arrests are not as simple as a police officer catching a thief slipping his hand into another's pocket or
snatching someone else's bag, or suprising a merchant selling above the ceiling price, or seizing a person carrying
concealed weapons. Cases of frequent occurrence which confront the police and the prosecution in a populous and
crime-redden city are a great deal more complicated. They are cases in which the needed evidence can only be
supplied by witnesses, whom the arresting officer or private persons has not the authority or the time to round up
and take to the city fiscal for examination with in what remains, if any, of six hours.
Let me give two examples.
1. A murder with robbery is reported to the police. An alarm is broadcasted giving a description of the murderer.
Later a police officer is told that the wanted man is in a store. He proceeds to the store and. besides believing in
good faith of his informant, detects in the man's physical appearance some resemblance to the description given in
the alarm. All this occurs at the holy hours of night.
Should the officer refrain from making an arrest because he is not certain beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of
the suspected murderer? Should the city fiscal order the release of the prisoner because of insufficiency of evidence
and because the six hours are expiring, or should he prefer formal charges (if that can be done at midnight) on the
strength of evidence which, as likely as not, may be due to a mistaken identify? Should not the prosecuting attorney
be given, as the law clearly intends, adequate time to summon those who witnessed the crime and who can tell
whether the prisoner was the fugitive?, allowing the prisoner to give bail, if he can.
2. A police officer is attracted by screams from a house where a robbery has been committed. The officer rushed to
the place, finds a man slain, is told that the murderers have filed. The officer runs in the direction indicated and finds
men with arms who, from appearances, seem to be the perpetrators of the crime. The people who saw the criminals
run off are not sure those are the men they saw. The night was dark, for criminals like to ply their trade under cover
of darkness.
The officer does not, under these circumstances, have to seek an arrest warrant or wait for one before detaining the
suspected persons. To prevent their escape he brings them to the police station. On the other hand, would the fiscal
be justified in filing an information against such persons on the sole testimony of the police officer? It is not his duty
to wait for more proofs on their probable connection with the crime? Should the city fiscal file an information on
sufficient evidence, or should he as the only alternative, order the release of the prisoners? Does either course
subserve the interest of justice and the interest of the public? If the arrested persons are innocent, as they may be, is
either interest be served by hasty filing of information against them, or would they rather have a more thorough
investigation of the case?
Cases like these with varying details can be multiplied ad infinitum. They form the bulk of underworld activities
with which the forces of law have to cope and with which the general public is vitally concerned. The public would
not be secure in their homes and in the pursuit of their occupations if his Court, through unreasoning worship of
formalism, throws down a method, practice and procedure that have been used here and elsewhere from time
immemorial to the end of service and in the interest of public security. The public security. The public is not much
interested in such minor offenses as pick-pocketing, fist fights and misdemeanors or violations of municipal
ordinances for which arrests can be made by police officers only when committed in their presence or within their
hearing.
The decision of this Court leaves the city fiscal no alternative between releasing prisoners for insufficiency of
evidence due to lack of time to secure more, and filing information against persons who may be innocent of the
crimed charge. The latter course, defeats directly the very aims of preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent
against hasty, malicious and oppresive prosecution and to protect him from open and public accusation of crime, and
from the trouble, expense, anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the State from useless and expensive
prosecutions. (Hashim vs. Boncan, No. 47777, January 13, 1941; 40 Off. Gaz., 13th Supp. p. 13; U.S.vs. Mendez, 4
Phil.; 124; U.S. vs. Grant and Kennedy, 11 Phil. 122; U. S. vs. Marfori, 35 Phil. 666; People vs. Colon, 47 Phil. 443.)
Even more deplorable would be the acquittal of guilty accused due to lack of proofs which the prosecution, if it had
been afforded sufficient time, could have gathered.
The foregoing goes, too, for the concurring opinion. There is only one more point to which we wish to address
ourselves briefly. The concurring opinion contains this passage:
Dentro de las 6 horas hay tiempo mas que suficiente para meter en cuenta atoda la canalla ... Pero; por Dios que no
se violen ni pisoteen lasgarantias constitucionales por miedo a los gangsters!
No one can disagree with this though — as an abstract proposition. The only trouble is that the opinion does not cite
any concrete constitutional provision or guaranty that is infringed by our dissent. I take the suggestion in the
resolution — that "it would be proper for the interested parties to take the case to Congress, since it can not be done
by judicial legislation" — to be a tacit recognition that the matter is purely one of statute and that no constitutional
impediment is in the way of changing the law and enlarging the power of the city fiscal in the premises. And let it be
said that the objection in the concurring opinion to this suggestion is rested, not on constitutional grounds but on the
supposition that the law is good enough to be left alone. All which tempts us to paraphrase the famous apostrophe of
that equally famous woman in French history, and exclaim, "Oh Constitution! what grievous mistakes are committed
in thy name!"
The concurring opinion is in error when it sees shadows of fear gangster in our dissent. Society no less than a natural
person has the right to protect itself, and the arrest and punishment of transgressors of its laws is one of its legitimate
means of self-protection and self-preservation. As far as the insinuation of fear may reflect on those who are duty
bound to have part in such arrest and punishment, the application of criminal laws without quarters to the end which
they are intended to serve, is not in strict logic a sign of apprehension. Such course, rather than tolerance, leniency
or indifference towards crimes and appeasement of lawless and other elements and groups who wield the power of
physical and verbal relations, calls for exactly the opposite quality of fright.
Padilla, J., concurs.

Footnotes
1
Any person making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay and within the time prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to the proper court or judge for such action as they may deem proper to
take.
2
There shall be a chief of police who ... may take good and sufficient bail for the appearance before the city court of
any person arrested for violation of any city ordinance: Provided, however, That he shall not exercise this power in
cases of violations of any penal law, except when the fiscal of the city shall so recommend and fix the bail to be
required of the person arrested; . . . .
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 109287. April 18, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTOLIN CUIZON y ORTEGA, STEVE PUA y
CLOFAS alias STEPHEN P0 y UY or TOMMY SY and PAUL LEE y WONG alias PAUL LEUNG, accused-
appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; LAWFUL ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANT;
REQUIREMENTS; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. - Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at
bench, this Court cannot agree with and accept the conclusion of the trial court that the appellants were caught
in flagrante delicto which would justify the search without a warrant. The shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives
away the baselessness of its findings and conclusion: x x x the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room
could still be regarded as valid for being incidental to a lawful arrest. x x x The arrest of accused Pua and Lee
without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they could be considered to have committed the crime of transporting
shabu in the presence of the arresting officers from the time they received the bags containing the regulated drug in
the airport up to the time they brought the bags to the hotel. Or their arrest without a warrant was legal as falling
under the situation where an offense had in fact just been committed, and the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the said accused were the ones who committed it. x x x Scrutinizing the
provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests without warrant, we note that par. (c) of said
section is obviously inapplicable, the appellants not being escapees from a penal institution at the time of arrest. Par.
(a) on the other hand requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer(s). These
requirements are not present in the case at bench, for at the time of their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were merely
resting in their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting with his wife and child inside his
home. No offense had just been committed, or was being actually committed or being attempted by any of the
accused in the presence of the lawmen.
2. ID.; ID.; RULE 113, SECTION 5; PARAGRAPH (b) THEREOF; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR.
- Par. (b) of Rule 113, Section 5 is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting requirements have also not been
met. The prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and
the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had committed
it. Appellant Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the other two appellants,
be considered to have committed the offense of carrying and transporting prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances
of the case, there was no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the accused were then and
there committing a crime. The act per se of handing over the baggage, assuming the prosecutions version to be true,
cannot in any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed under suspicious circumstances as
indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of the public.
Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport setting, for travellers and/or their welcomers to be
passing, handing over and delivering pieces of baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive penchant of
our fellow countrymen for sending along (pakikipadala) things and gifts through friends and relatives. Moreover,
one cannot determine from the external appearance of the luggage that they contained shabu hidden beneath some
secret panel or false bottom. The only reason why such act of parting with luggage took on the color and dimensions
of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI agents purportedly
received that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon would be arriving that same day with a shipment of shabu.
To quote from another decision of like import, (A)ll they had was hearsay information (from the telephone caller),
and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBABLE CAUSE; NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. - We therefore hold that under
the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution failed to establish that there was sufficient and reasonable ground for
the NBI agents to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the point when the search and arrest of Pua and
Lee were made; hence, said search and arrest do not come under the exception in par. (b) of Sec. 5 of Rule 113, and
therefore should be deemed illegal.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH AFFECT CRIMINAL LIABILITY; CONSPIRACY;
NOT ESTABLISHED IN CASE AT BAR. - Because of the way the operation actually turned out, there is no
sufficient proof of conspiracy between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and Cuizon on the other, inasmuch as there is
no clear and convincing evidence that the four (4) bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport were the
very same ones found in the possession of the latter in Room 340 of the Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents
when testifying could definitely and positively state that the bags seized from Room 340 were the very same ones
passed by Cuizon at the airport; at best, they could only say that they looked like the ones they saw at the airport.
And even assuming them to be the same bags, there remains doubt and uncertainty as to the actual ownership of the
said bags at the alleged turnover vis-a-vis the time they were seized by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot
sustain the finding of conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua and Lee on the other. Well-settled is
the rule that conspiracy must be proved independently and beyond reasonable doubt.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST UNLAWFUL SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES; DEEMED WAIVED BY FAILURE TO CHALLENGE ITS VALIDITY; CASE AT BAR. - What
has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua. While the search and arrest carried out on him and
Lee may have been illegal for not being incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that
appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search, as well as the admission of the evidence
obtained thereby;he did not raise the issue or assign the same as an error before this Court. Accordingly, any
possible challenge thereto based on constitutional grounds is deemed waived. This Court has upheld and recognized
waivers of constitutional rights, including, particularly, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, in cases
such as People vs. Malasugui (63 Phil. 221 [1936]) and De Garcia vs. Locsin (65 Phil. 689 [1938]).
6. ID.; ID.; THE JUDICIARY WHOSE MAIN FUNCTION IS THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
WOULD HAVE NO RIGHT TO EXPECT ORDINARY PEOPLE TO BE LAW ABIDING IF WE DO NOT
INSIST ON THE FULL PROTECTION OF THEIR RIGHTS. - It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents
gravely mishandled the drug bust operation and in the process violated the constitutional guarantees against
unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures. Because of the large haul of illegal drugs that the government
officers claimed to have recovered, this Court agonized over the case before us and struggled to apply the law with
an even hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people
to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights.
7. ID.; ID.; LAW ENFORCERS MUST ACT WITH DELIBERATE CARE AND WITHIN THE
PARAMETERS SET BY CONSTITUTION AND THE LAW. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still
tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizures as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime
regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of
law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual
denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law
and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and
within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorneys Office and The Law Firm of Ross B. Bautista for Antolin Cuizon.
Marcial P. Pe Benito for Steve Pua and Paul Lee.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In deciding the case at bench, the Court reiterates doctrines on illegal searches and seizures, and the requirements for
a valid warrantless search incident to a valid warrantless arrest. While the Court appreciates and encourages pro-
active law enforcement, it nonetheless upholds the sacredness of constitutional rights and repeats the familiar
maxim, the end never justifies the means.
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated January 5, 1993 Criminal Case No. 92-0230) of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 116,2 Pasay City finding appellants guilty of violating Section 15 of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous rugs Act of 1972.
On March 10, 1992, an Information3 was filed against the appellants charging them as follows:
That on or about February 21, 1992 in Pasay City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously carry and transport into the country, without lawful authority, 16 kilograms, more or less,
of METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE, also popularly known as SHABU, a regulated drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment, appellant Antolin Cuizon, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. During the
arraignment of appellants Paul Lee and Steve Pua, the latter translated the Information into Chinese-Cantonese for
the understanding of appellant Lee, who does not speak nor understand English, Pilipino or any other Philippine
dialect. Both of them, duly assisted by their counsel, also pleaded not guilty. 4 Trial ensued and on January 5, 1993,
the court a quo found appellants guilty as charged and rendered the following disposition:5
WHEREFORE, accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega, Steve Pua y Clofas alias Stephen Po y Uy or Tommy Sy, and Paul
Lee y Wong, alias Paul Leung, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting, without legal authority,
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a regulated drug, as charged in the aforequoted Information; and they
are each sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00.
The methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu involved in this case is declared forfeited in favor of the government
and is ordered turned over to the Dangerous Drug Board for proper disposal.
The Facts
According to the Prosecution
The facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Solicitor General, who added the page references to
the transcript of stenographic notes as indicated in brackets, are as follows:6
In January 1992, the Reaction Group of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) gathered an information
regarding the drug activities of accused Antolin Cuizon y Ortega and his wife, Susan Cuizon. A surveillance was
conducted on them. The residence of the spouses was traced to Caloocan City (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 17-18, 21).
In the morning of February 21, 1992, the Reaction Group received a report from its informant in Hong Kong that
accused Cuizon, together with his wife, was arriving on the same day at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
(NAIA) in Pasay City, Metro Manila, from the British crown colony, carrying with him a big quantity of shabu. A
team was organized to intercept the suspects. Heading the team was Jose Yap, with Ernesto Dio, Marcelino Amurao,
Jose Bataller and Alfredo Jacinto, as members. Some belonged to the Narcotics Division and the others to the
Reaction Group of the NBI (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4, 18).
Arriving at the NAIA shortly before 12:00 noon of February 21, 1992, Dio positioned himself at the Arrival Area,
while Yap and the other members of the team posted themselves at the parking area of the airport. At about 12:45 in
the afternoon of the same date, accused Cuizon and his wife, who had just returned from Hong Kong, after passing
through the Immigration and Customs Areas at the NAIA, proceeded to the Arrival Area of the airport preparatory to
their boarding a car. While there, accused Cuizon, together with his wife, handed four (4) travelling bags to accused
Steve Pua y Clofas and accused Paul Lee y Wong, who were at the vicinity of the Arrival Area. Accused Pua and
Lee loaded the bags in a taxicab which they boarded in leaving the airport. Accused Cuizon and his wife took
another vehicle (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 4-5, 8-9).
At this juncture, Dio, who was observing the activities of the accused, radioed the group of Yap at the parking area,
describing the vehicle boarded by accused Pua and Lee so that Yap and his companions could apprehend the two.
However, the message of Dio was not completely received by his teammates as the radio he was using ran short of
battery power (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 25-26).
Immediately after the vehicle boarded by Pua and Lee had left, Dio proceeded to the place where his companions
were stationed for the purpose of giving assistance to them, believing that they were already in the process of
apprehending accused Pua and Lee. When he realized that the two accused were not apprehended, Dio told the
group of Yap to follow him as he was following the vehicle taken by Pua and Lee which, according to an earlier tip
he learned, was proceeding to the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati, Metro Manila (tsn, May 19, 1992 pp. 25-26;
tsn, May 21, 1992 pp. 6, 15).
Upon arriving at about 2:00 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, in the Manila Peninsula Hotel, in whose
premises the taxicab boarded by accused Pua and Lee entered, Dio and the other members of the team coordinated
with Cot. Regino Arellano, Chief Security Officer of the hotel, for the purpose of apprehending the two accused. A
verification made by the Chief Security Officer showed that accused Pua and Lee occupied Room 340 of the hotel.
The two accused allowed Dio and Yap, together with Col. Arellano, to enter their room. Found inside Room 340
were four (4) travelling bags, which were similar to the ones handed by accused Cuizon to accused Pua and Lee at
the Arrival Area of the NAIA. After having introduced themselves as NBI agents, Dio and Yap were permitted by
accused Pua and Lee to search their bags in the presence of Col. Arellano. The permission was made in writing.
(Exh. I). Three (3) of the four (4) bags each yielded a plastic package containing a considerable quantity of white
crystalline substance suspected to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Each package was sandwiched
between two (2) pieces of board which appear to be lawanit placed at the bottom of each of the three (3) bags. The
suspected shabu contained in one bag weighed 2.571 kilos, that found in the other had a weight of 2.768 kilos, and
the suspected shabu retrieved from the third bag weighed 2.970 kilos. Pua and Lee were then apprehended by Dio
and his companions (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 9-13; tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 9, Exh. F-2, p. 75, Records).
Immediately thereafter, Dio and the other members of the team proceeded to the house of accused Cuizon
in Caloocan City, taking with them accused Pua and Lee and the bags with their contents of suspected dangerous
drugs. They reached the place at about 5:50 in the afternoon of the same date of February 21, 1992. Retrieved from
accused Cuizon in his residence was another bag also containing a white crystalline substance weighing 2.695 kilos,
likewise believed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. In addition, a .38 Cal. firearm was taken from
accused Cuizon (tsn, May 19, 1992, pp. 10-11).
Pua, Lee, Cuizon and his wife were then brought by the arresting officers to the NBI headquarters at Taft
Avenue, Manila, for further investigation. They were subsequently referred to the Prosecution Division of the
Department of Justice for inquest. However, only the present three accused were charged in court (tsn, May 19,
1992, pp. 12-13, 16-17).
In the meantime, at about 5:30 p.m. of the same date of February 21, 1992, Joselito Soriano, roomboy of the Manila
Peninsula Hotel, while cleaning Room 340, observed that a portion of the ceiling was misaligned. While fixing it, he
discovered in the ceiling a laundry bag containing suspected shabu of more than five (5) kilos (Exh. X, p. 110).
Informed of the discovery while they were already in their office in the NBI, Yap and some companions returned to
the hotel. The suspected shabu was turned over to them (tsn, May 20, 1992, pp. 19-22).
When examined in the Forensic Chemistry Section of the NBI, the white crystalline substance taken from the three
(3) travelling bags found in the room of accused Pua and Lee in the Manila Peninsula Hotel, the white crystalline
substance retrieved from the bag confiscated from accused Cuizon in his house in Caloocan City, and the white
crystalline substance hidden in the ceiling of Room 340 of the hotel were confirmed to be methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug. (Board Regulation No. 6, dated December 11, 1972, of the Dangerous
Drugs Board) (tsn, May 7, 1992, p. 12).
The Defenses Version(s)
Appellant Pua, on his part, interposed the defense of alibi. On direct examination, he testified that at the time of the
alleged commission of the offense, he and his co-appellant Lee were in their room at the Manila Peninsula
Hotel.7 His version of what happened on February 21, 1992 can be summarized as follows:
At around 9:30 in the morning, he accompanied appellant Paul Lee to check-in at the Manila Peninsula Hotel for
and in behalf of the latters personal friend named Leong Chong Chong or Paul Leung, who was expected to arrive
that evening because of a delayed flight. Appellant Pua was engaged by appellant Lee to act as interpreter as Lee
does not know how to speak English and the local language.8
While in Room 340, past 1:00 in the afternoon, they received a call from the lobby informing them of the arrival of
Paul Leungs luggage. At Puas instructions, the said luggage were brought to the room by a bellboy. Thereafter, two
persons knocked on their door, accompanied by a tomboy and a thin man with curly hair. The two men identified
themselves as NBI agents and asked appellant Pua to let them in. He declined since he did not know who they were.
However, when Col. Arellano, the Chief Security Officer of the hotel, arrived and identified the two NBI agents, he
and Lee relented and permitted them to enter. Thereafter, he and Lee were told by the agents to sign a piece of paper.
Made to understand that they were merely giving their consent for the agents to enter their room, Pua and Lee signed
the same. Whereupon, the agents told them that they will open Paul Leungs bags. Again appellant Pua refused,
saying that the bags did not belong to them. Just the same, the agents, without appellants Pua and Lees consent,
opened the bags and found the shabu. Pua and Lee were then apprehended and brought to the NBI headquarters.9
Appellant Cuizon, on the other hand, flatly rejected the prosecutions version of the incident. While admitting that
on February 21, 1992, he and his wife Susan did arrive from Hong Kongwith several pieces of luggage, he denied
that he met Pua and Lee at the arrival area of the airport, much less passed to them the four pieces of luggage.
According to him, only his two-year old son, accompanied by his cousin, Ronald Allan Ong, met them outside the
airport. Ong fetched them from the airport and brought them to their home in Caloocan City. They arrived at their
house around 3:00 in the afternoon.10
About two hours later, while he was resting together with his wife and son on his bed, two NBI agents suddenly
barged in and poked a gun at him. They manhandled him in front of his wife and son. His hands were tied with a
necktie and he was forcibly brought out of their house while the NBI agents ransacked the place without any
warrant. He, his wife Susan, and his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, were afterwards brought to the NBI Headquarters
in Manila and there the NBI agents continued mauling him.11
Appellant Cuizons wife Susan, his cousin Ronald Allan Ong, and his nephew Nestor Dalde, testified in his favor
basically reiterating or confirming his testimony.12
Unfortunately, appellant Paul Lee, who does not speak or understand a word of English or Pilipino and only knows
Chinese-Cantonese, was not able to take the witness stand for lack of an interpreter who would translate his
testimony to English. In the hearing set on October 28, 1992, the last trial date allotted to the defense for the
reception of Lees testimony, his counsel, although notified of the proceedings, did not appear. Thus, the trial court
deemed him and Pua to have waived their right to present additional evidence,13 and the case was considered
submitted for decision after the filing of memoranda. The counsel for Pua and Lee did not ask for the
reconsideration of such ruling; neither did he submit any memorandum. Only accused Cuizon, who was assisted by
another counsel, was able to submit his memorandum.
The Issues
In their brief, appellants Pua and Lee made the following assignments of errors: 14
I. The trial court erred in finding conspiracy among the accused.
II. The trial court erred in giving credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Marcelino Amurao, Jose Yap
and Ernesto Dio despite contradictions made on material points.
III. The trial court erred in not giving accused Paul Lee the opportunity to present his evidence in his defense in
violation of his constitutional right to due process.
Appellant Cuizon, in a separate brief, essentially reiterates the first two assignments of errors above-quoted, and in
addition challenges the legality and validity of his warrantless arrest and the search and seizure incidental thereto. 15
As this Court sees it, the resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question of the legality of the arrest and search
of herein appellants effected by the NBI operatives. Put differently, were the warrantless arrests and the warrantless
searches conducted by the NBI legal and constitutional?
The answer to this threshold question determines whether the judgment of the court a quo will stand or fall.
Consequently, there is a need to resolve first this issue before endeavoring to consider the other issues raised by
appellants.
A necessary side issue to be considered is, assuming the searches and arrests to have been illegal, whether failure by
appellants Pua and Lee to explicitly assign the same as errors before this Court amounted to a waiver of their
constitutional rights against such illegal searches and arrests.
The Courts Ruling
General Rule on Warrantless
Arrests, Searches, & Seizures
Well entrenched in this country is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant
issued by a competent judicial authority. So sacred is this right that no less than the fundamental law of the
land16 ordains it:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. 17
However, the right against warrantless arrest and search and seizure is not absolute. Thus, under Section 5 of Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Court, an arrest without a warrant may be lawfully made by a peace officer or a private
person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
On the occasion of any of the aforementioned instances of legitimate arrest without warrant, the person arrested may
be subjected to a search of his body and of his personal effects or belongings, for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, likewise without need of a search warrant. 18
However, where a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances other than those justifying a
warrantless arrest, as discussed above, upon a mere suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or
for the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him, then the search made of such person as
well as his arrest are deemed illegal.19 Consequently, any evidence which may have been obtained during such
search, even if tending to confirm or actually confirming such initial suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible for any
purpose and in any proceeding,20 the same being the fruit of the poisonous tree.21 Emphasis is to be laid on the fact
that the law requires that the search be incident toa lawful arrest, in order that the search itself may likewise be
considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a person and his
belongings. Were a search first undertaken, then an arrest effected based on evidence produced by the search, both
such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being contrary to law.
The Instant Case Does Not Fall Under
The Exceptions for Warrantless Searches, etc.
Re-assessing the factual backdrop of the case at bench, this Court cannot agree with and accept the conclusion of the
trial court that the appellants were caught in flagrante delictowhich would justify the search without a warrant. The
shaky reasoning of the court a quo gives away the baselessness of its findings and conclusion:
x x x the search conducted on their bags in the hotel room could still be regarded as valid for being incidental to a
lawful arrest. x x x The arrest of accused Pua and Lee without a warrant of arrest was lawful, as they could be
considered to have committed the crime of transporting shabu in the presence of the arresting officers from the time
they received the bags containing the regulated drug in the airport up to the time they brought the bags to the hotel.
Or their arrest without a warrant was legal as falling under the situation where an offense had in fact just been
committed, and the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the said accused were the ones
who committed it. x x x22
Scrutinizing the provisions of Sec. 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court on lawful arrests without warrant, we note
that par. (c) of said section is obviously inapplicable, the appellants not being escapees from a penal institution at the
time of arrest. Par. (a) on the other hand requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed or while he is
actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the arresting officer(s).
These requirements are not present in the case at bench, for at the time of their arrest, appellants Pua and Lee were
merely resting in their hotel room, and appellant Cuizon for his part was in bed resting with his wife and child inside
his home. No offense had just been committed, or was being actually committed or being attempted by any of the
accused in the presence of the lawmen.23
Par. (b) of the same provision is likewise inapplicable since its equally exacting requirements have also not been
met. The prosecution failed to establish that at the time of the arrest, anoffense had in fact just been committed and
the arresting officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused-appellants had committed
it. Appellant Cuizon could not, by the mere act of handing over four pieces of luggage to the other two appellants,
be considered to have committed the offense of carrying and transporting prohibited drugs. Under the circumstances
of the case, there was no sufficient probable cause for the arresting officers to believe that the accused were then and
there committing a crime. The act per se of handing over the baggage, assuming the prosecutions version to be true,
cannot in any way be considered a criminal act. It was not even an act performed under suspicious circumstances as
indeed, it took place in broad daylight, practically at high noon, and out in the open, in full view of the
public.24 Furthermore, it can hardly be considered unusual, in an airport setting, for travellers and/or their welcomers
to be passing, handing over and delivering pieces of baggage, especially considering the somewhat obsessive
penchant of our fellow countrymen for sending along (pakikipadala) things and gifts through friends and relatives.
Moreover, one cannot determine from the external appearance of the luggage that they contained shabu hidden
beneath some secret panel or false bottom. The only reason why such act of parting with luggage took on the color
and dimensions of a felonious deed, at least as far as the lawmen were concerned, was the alleged tip that the NBI
agents purportedly received that morning, to the effect that appellant Cuizon would be arriving that same day with a
shipment of shabu. To quote from another decision of like import, (A)ll they had was hearsay information (from the
telephone caller), and about a crime that had yet to be committed.25
In the leading case of People vs. Burgos,26 this Court laid down clear guidelines, as follows:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to
commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence
or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
The same decision is highly instructive as it goes on to state:
The Solicitor General is of the persuasion that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Section 6(b) using the
test of reasonableness. He submits that the information given by Cesar Masamlok was sufficient to induce a
reasonable ground (for belief) that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe
that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first.
That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may
have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok s verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to
suspect that the accused had committed crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained.
The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot
make the arrest lawful. x x x
The foregoing doctrine was affirmed in the case of Alih vs. Castro,27 where this Court ruled that x x x under the
Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must havepersonal knowledge of the ground therefor
as stressed in the recent case of People v. Burgos.
In the case at bench, not only did the NBI agents rely merely on hearsay information (tips), but they were
completely uncertain that anything was really going down that day. That much is undisputed, from a reading of the
testimony of Agent Dio:
Q - Now, but you were informed by the personnel of the airport that the spouses Cuizon were going to bring in or
transport into the country shabu on February 21, 1992?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - Now, you were not sure or your group was not sure that they indeed would bring in shabu, is it not? That was
only the information relayed to your group?
A - Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q - But then you were jumping ahead. You were not sure is it not that they were bringing in shabu?
A - Yes, sir. (TSN, May 19, 1992, pp. 37-38.)
In his testimony, NBI Investigator Jose Justo Yap, who was with Agent Dio during the operation, likewise admitted
in substantially the same tenor their uncertainty regarding the commission of the offense (cf. TSN, May 20, 1992,
pp. 29 & 34).
We therefore hold that under the circumstances obtaining, the prosecution failed to establish that there was sufficient
and reasonable ground for the NBI agents to believe that appellants had committed a crime at the point when the
search and arrest of Pua and Lee were made; hence, said search and arrest do not come under the exception in par.
(b) of Sec. 5of Rule 113, and therefore should be deemed illegal. We might add that the search conducted on Pua and
Lee was not incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, having preceded the same and produced the justification therefor.
On the other hand, the search on Cuizon s residence, without the benefit of a search warrant, was clearly illegal and
the shabu seized thereat cannot but be considered inadmissible in evidence. More on these points later.
Comparison Between The Present Case
and Earlier Decisions of This Court
For claritys sake, it is imperative to compare the foregoing holding with previous decisions by this Court in various
drug cases, in which apparently different conclusions were reached, in order to distinguish them from the instant
case and avoid any potential misunderstanding of the foregoing holding as well as the constitutional and legal
principles on which it is based.
1. In People vs. Claudio,28 the accused, a passenger on a bus bound for Baguio City, was arrested by a policeman on
the same bus because of the distinctive odor of marijuana emanating from the plastic bag she was carrying. The
Court held the warrantless arrest under the circumstances to be lawful, the search justified and the evidence thus
discovered admissible in evidence.
2. In People vs. Tangliben,29 the accused, carrying a travelling bag at a bus terminal, was noticed by lawmen to
be acting suspiciously, and was also positively fingered by an informer as carrying marijuana, and so he was
accosted by policemen who happened to be on a surveillance mission; the lawmen asked him to open the bag, in
which was found a package of marijuana leaves. It was held that there was a valid warrantless arrest and search
incident thereto. The Court in effect considered the evidence on hand sufficient to have enabled the law enforcers to
secure a search warrant had there been time, but as the case presented urgency, and there was actually no time to
obtain a warrant since the accused was about to board a bus, and inasmuch as an informer had given information on
the spot that the accused was carrying marijuana, the search of his person and effects was thus considered valid.
3. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,30 the accused was seen acting suspiciously, and when accosted by two members
of the Davao INP who identified themselves as lawmen, he suddenly fled, but was pursued, subdued and placed in
custody. The buri bag he was carrying yielded an unlicensed revolver, live ammunition and a tear gas grenade. This
Court upheld his conviction for illegal possession of firearms, holding that there was under the circumstances
sufficient probable cause for a warrantless search.
4. In People vs. Moises Maspil, Jr., et al.,31 agents of the Narcotics Command set up a checkpoint on a highway in
Atok, Benguet, to screen vehicular traffic on the way to Baguio Citydue to confidential reports from informers that
Maspil and a certain Bagking would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana. At about 2 a.m. of November 1,
1986, the two suspects, riding a jeepney, pulled up to the checkpoint and were made to stop. The officers noticed
that the vehicle was loaded with some sacks and tin cans, which, when opened, were seen to contain marijuana
leaves. The Court upheld the search thus conducted as being incidental to a valid warrantless arrest.
5. In People vs. Lo Ho Wing, et al.,32 the Court ruled that the search of the appellants moving vehicles and the
seizure of shabu therefrom was legal, in view of the intelligence information, including notably, clandestine reports
by a planted deep penetration agent or spy who was even participating in the drug smuggling activities of the
syndicate, to the effect that appellants were bringing in prohibited drugs into the country. The Court also held that it
is not practicable to secure a search warrant in cases of smuggling with the use of a moving vehicle to transport
contraband, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must
be sought.
6. In People vs. Malmstedt,33 NARCOM agents stationed at Camp Dangwa, Mountain Province, set up a temporary
checkpoint to check vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region, due to persistent reports that vehicles from Sagada
were transporting marijuana and other drugs, and because of particular information to the effect that a Caucasian
would be travelling from Sagada that day with prohibited drugs. The bus in which accused was riding was stopped
at the checkpoint. While conducting an inspection, one of the NARCOM men noticed that accused, the only
foreigner on board, had a bulge at the waist area. Thinking it might be a gun, the officer sought accuseds passport or
other identification papers. When the latter failed to comply, the lawman directed him to bring out whatever it was
that was bulging at his waist. It was a pouch bag which, when opened by the accused, was found to contain packages
of hashish, a derivative of marijuana. Invited for questioning, the accused disembarked from the bus and brought
along with him two pieces of luggage; found inside were two teddy bears stuffed with more hashish. The Court held
that there was sufficient probable cause in the premises for the lawmen to believe that the accused was then and
there committing a crime and/or trying to hide something illegal from the authorities. Said probable cause arose not
only from the persistent reports of the transport of prohibited drugs from Sagada, and the tip received by the
NARCOM that same day that a Caucasian coming from Sagada would be bringing prohibited drugs, but also from
the failure of the accused to present his passport or other identification papers when confronted by the lawmen,
which only triggered suspicion on the part of the law enforcers that accused was trying to hide his identity, it being
the normal thing expected of an innocent man with nothing to hide, that he readily present identification papers
when asked to do so. The warrantless arrest and search were thus justified.
In all the cases discussed hereinabove, there were facts which were found by the Court to provide probable cause
justifying warrantless arrests and searches, i.e., distinct odor of marijuana, reports about drug transporting or
positive identification by informers, suspicious behaviour, attempt to flee, failure to produce identification papers,
and so on. Too, urgency attended the arrests and searches because each of the above-mentioned cases involved the
use of motor vehicles and the great likelihood that the accused would get away long before a warrant can be
procured. And, lest it be overlooked, unlike in the case before us now, the law enforcers in the aforementioned
cases acted immediately on the information received, suspicions raised, and probable causes established, and
effected the arrests and searches without any delay.
Unexplained Matters in the Instant Case
In the case before us, the NBI agents testified that they purportedly decided against arresting the accused-appellants
inside the airport as they allegedly wanted to discover the identities of the airport immigration, security or customs
personnel who might be protecting the accused or otherwise involved in the drug smuggling activities, and also in
order to avoid the possibility of an armed encounter with such protectors, which might result in injuries to innocent
bystanders. These excuses are simply unacceptable. They are obviously after-thoughts concocted to justify their rank
failure to effect the arrest within constitutional limits. Indeed, the NBI men failed to explain how come they did not
apprehend the appellants at the moment Cuizon handed over the baggage to Pua and Lee, or even afterwards, in
relative safety. Such arrest would have been consistent with the settled constitutional, legal and jurisprudential
precedents earlier cited.
The spouses Cuizon had already passed through the airport security checks allegedly with their contraband cargo
undetected in their luggage. Apparently, the NBI agents did not see (as indeed they did not testify that they saw)
anyone from the airport immigration, security or customs who could have escorted the spouses Cuizon, and
therefore, there was no danger ofany live ammo encounter with such group(s). The alleged drug couriers had already
made their way outside the NAIA, had allegedly made contact with the accused Pua and Lee, and were in the very
act of handing over the luggage to the latter. Why the NBI men did not move in and pounce on them at that very
instant has not been satisfactorily explained. Instead, one of the agents, Dio, merely watched as Pua and Lee loaded
the luggage into a cab and took off for Makati. Furthermore, it taxes the imagination too much to think that at the
most critical and climactic moment, when agent Dio radioed his companions for help to close in on the suspects, the
most amazing and stupendous thing actually happened: Murphys Law kicked in - whatever could go wrong, did, and
at the worst possible time - the batteries in Agent Dios hand-held radio supposedly went dead and his message was
not transmitted. Thus the departing Pua and Lee proceeded merrily and unimpeded to the Peninsula Hotel, while the
spouses Cuizon simultaneously sped off to their residence in Caloocan City, leaving the lawmen empty-handed and
scampering madly to catch up. Such absolutely astounding and incredible happenstance might find a place in a
fourth-rate movie script, but expecting the courts to swallow it- hook, line and sinker - is infinite naivete, if not
downright malevolence.
Even granting arguendo that the radio really went dead, nevertheless, the agents were not thereby rendered helpless
or without recourse. The NBI agents, numbering five in all, not counting their so-called informant, claimed to have
piled into three cars (TSN, May 19, 1992) and tailed the suspects Pua and Lee into Makati, keeping a safe two-car
distance behind (TSN, May 20, 1992). The lawmen and the prosecutors failed to explain why the agents did not
intercept the vehicle in which Pua and Lee were riding, along the way, pull them over, arrest them and search the
luggage. And since the agents were in three (3) cars, they also could have easily arranged to have agents in one
vehicle follow, intercept and apprehend the Cuizons while the others went after Pua and Lee. All or any of these
possible moves are mere ordinary, common-sense steps, not requiring a great deal of intelligence. The NBI men who
testified claimed to have conducted or participated in previous drug busts or similar operations and therefore must
have been familiar with contingency planning, or at least should have known what to do in this situation where their
alleged original plan fell through. At any rate, what the lawmen opted to do, i.e., allow Pua and Lee to freely leave
the airport, allegedly bringing the drug cache to the hotel, and Cuizon to leave unimpededly the airport and reach his
residence with one of the luggage, increased significantly the risk of the suspects (and/or the drugs) slipping
through the lawmens fingers, and puts into question the regularity of performance of their official functions. The
agents alleged actions in this case compare poorly with the forthright and decisive steps taken by lawmen in the
cases earlier cited where this Court held the arrests and seizures to be valid.
Had the arrests and searches been made in transitu, i.e., had the agents intercepted and collared the suspects on the
way to Makati and Caloocan, or better yet, at the very moment of the hand-over, then there would not have been any
question at all as to the legality of their arrest and search, as they would presumably have been caught red-handed
with the evidence, and consequently for that reason and by the very nature and manner of commission of the offense
charged, there would have been no doubt also as to the existence of conspiracy among the appellant to transport the
drugs. However, because of the way the operation actually turned out, there is no sufficient proof of conspiracy
between Pua and Lee on the one hand, and Cuizon on the other, inasmuch as there is no clear and convincing
evidence that the four (4) bags handed by Cuizon to Pua and Lee at the airport were the very same ones found in the
possession of the latter in Room 340 of the Peninsula Hotel. Not one of the NBI agents when testifying could
definitely and positively state that the bags seized from Room 340 were the very same ones passed by Cuizon at the
airport; at best, they could only say that they looked like the ones they saw at the airport. And even assuming them
to be the same bags, there remains doubt and uncertainty as to the actual ownership of the said bags as at the alleged
turnover vis-a-vis the time they were seized by the agents. For these reasons, we cannot sustain the finding of
conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and Pua and Lee on the other. Well-settled is the rule that conspiracy
must be proved independently and beyond reasonable doubt.34
Additionally, in light of the foregoing discussion, we find it extremely difficult to subscribe to the trial courts finding
as to the existence and sufficiency of probable cause in this case, one major component of which would have been
the alleged information or tip purportedly received by the agents as to the expected arrival of the spouses Cuizon
that fateful day with a large cache of shabu. The question that defies resolution in our minds is why, if indeed the
information or tip was genuine and from a highly reliable source as claimed by the government agents, did they not
act on it? Throw in the alleged month-long surveillance supposedly conducted by some of the NBI people on the
Cuizon couple, and the mystery only deepens. Even with the so-called tip and the results of surveillance, the
government officers were still seemingly hesitant, reluctant, uncertain, or perhaps afraid, to arrest and search the
accused appellants, so much so that the NBI agents who went after Pua and Lee at the Peninsula Hotel, instead of
outrightly cuffing and searching them, as they were supposed to, opted instead to play it safe and meekly beseeched
the two to sign a written consent for the agents to search their personal effects! Indeed, this is one for the books. If
this is how confident the agents were about their hot tips, reliable informers and undercover surveillance, then we
cannot be blamed for failing to appreciate the existence/sufficiency of probable cause to justify a warrantless arrest
and search in this case. There is a whole lot more that can be said on this score, but we shall leave it at that for now.
We shall now dispose of the appeals of the accused-appellants individually.
Re: Appellant Antolin Cuizon
The search of the house of appellant Cuizon, having been conducted without any warrant, and not on the occasion or
as an incident of a valid warrantless arrest, was indubitably illegal, and the shabu seized thereat could not be
admissible in evidence. That is why even the trial judge did not make an effort to hold him liable under such seizure.
He lamely argued: (A)t any rate, accused Cuizon is not held criminally liable in this case in connection with the bag
containing shabu confiscated from his residence. His responsibility is based on the bags containing shabu which he
handed to Pua and Lee at the NAIA. Consequently, even if the bag and its contents of shabu taken from his house
were not admitted in evidence, the remaining proofs of the prosecution would still be sufficient to establish the
charge against him. However, contrary to the trial judges conclusion, we hold that insofar as Cuizon is
concerned, all the evidence seized are considered fruit of the poisonous tree and are inadmissible as against him, and
thus, he should be acquitted, since, as shown hereinabove, (i) the warrantless search conducted on Pua and Lee was
clearly illegal per se, not being incident to a valid warrantless arrest either; (ii) and even if the search on Pua and Lee
were not illegal, conspiracy as between Cuizon on the one hand and appellants Pua and Lee on the other had not
been established by sufficient proof beyond reasonable doubt; and (iii) appellant Cuizon had timely raised before
this Court the issue of the illegality of his own arrest and the search and seizure conducted at his residence, and
questioned the admission of the seized shabu in evidence.
Re: Appellant Steve Pua @ Tommy Sy
What has been said for Cuizon cannot, alas, be said for appellant Pua. While the search and arrest carried out on him
and Lee may have been illegal for not being incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, the unfortunate fact is that
appellant Pua failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search as well as the admission of the evidence
obtained thereby; he did not raise the issue or assign the same as an error before this Court. Accordingly, any
possible challenge thereto based on constitutional grounds is deemed waived. This Court has upheld and recognized
waivers of constitutional rights, including, particularly, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, in cases
such as People vs. Malasugui35 and De Garcia vs. Locsin.36
Additionally, the prosecution had argued and the trial court agreed that by virtue of the handwritten consent (Exhibit
I) secured by the arresting officers from appellants Pua and Lee, the latter freely gave their consent to the search of
their baggage, and thus, the drugs discovered as a result of the consented search is admissible in evidence. The said
written permission is in English, and states plainly that they (Pua and Lee) freely consent to the search of their
luggage to be conducted by NBI agents to determine if Pua and Lee are carrying shabu. It appears that appellant Pua
understands both English and Tagalog; he is born of a Filipino mother, had resided in Vito Cruz, Manila, and gave
his occupation as that of salesman. He admitted that he was asked to sign the written consent, and that he did in fact
sign it (TSN, May 28, 1992, pp. 33-34). His barefaced claim made during his direct and cross-examinations to the
effect that he did not really read the consent but signed it right away, and that by signing it he only meant to give
permission for the NBI agents to enter the room (and not to search) is hardly worthy of belief, considering that prior
to the search, he seemed to have been extra careful about who to let into the hotel room.
Thus, the full weight of the prosecutions testimonial evidence plus the large amount of prohibited drugs found, must
be given full force vis-a-vis Puas claim of innocent presence in the hotel room, which is weak and not worthy of
credence.
Re: Appellant Paul Lee @ Paul Leung
Appellant Lees situation is different from that of Pua. We agree with the Solicitor General when he noted that the
trial judge did not exert sufficient effort to make available compulsory process and to see to it that accused appellant
Lee was given his day in court. It is clear that appellant Lee was effectively denied his right to counsel, for although
he was provided with one, he could not understand and communicate with him concerning his defense such that,
among other things, no memorandum was filed on his behalf; further, he was denied his right to have compulsory
process to guarantee the availability of witnesses and the production of evidence on his behalf, including the
services of a qualified and competent interpreter to enable him to present his testimony.37 In sum, he was denied due
process. For this reason, we hold that the case as against Lee must be remanded to the court of origin for a re-trial.
Epilogue
It is evident and clear to us that the NBI agents gravely mishandled the drug bust operation and in the process
violated the constitutional guarantees against unlawful arrests and illegal searches and seizures. Because of the large
haul of illegal drugs that the government officers claimed to have recovered, this Court agonized over the case
before us and struggled to apply the law with an even hand. In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice
would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their
rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the
law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This
kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid
breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and
encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we
nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the
law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused-appellant Antolin Cuizon y Ortega is hereby
ACQUITTED on constitutional grounds. His immediate release is ordered unless he is detained for other valid
causes. Accused-appellant Steve Pua y Clofas is hereby found GUILTY of the crime of Illegal Transport of
Regulated Drugs, penalized under Section 15, R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; the Decision appealed from, as herein modified, is hereby affirmed as to appellant
Pua. Finally, the case as to appellant Lee is hereby ordered REMANDED to the trial court in order that said accused
may be given his day in court. The Decision appealed from is also AFFIRMED with respect to the disposition of the
prohibited drugs involved in the case.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J. (Chairman), Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., J., concur in the result.
1
Rollo, pp. 28-34.
2
Presided over by Judge Alfredo J. Gustilo.
3
Rollo, pp. 9-10.
4
Records, pp. 37 & 42.
5
Rollo, pp. 33-34.
6
Rollo, pp. 90-95.
7
TSN, May 28, 1992, p. 6.
8
Ibid., pp. 3-4, 26.
9
Ibid., pp. 8-12, 17 & 26.
10
TSN, June 24, 1992, pp. 3, 7-9.
11
Ibid., pp. 12-17, 19, 21.
12
TSNs, June 11, 1992, pp. 3-4, 10-11, 13-17, 19-21, 24; June 17, 1992, pp. 3-6, 10-14, 16, 20; July 1, 1992, pp. 11-
14, 16.
13
Rollo, p. 28.
14
Appellants brief for Pua and Lee, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 49-50.
15
Appellants brief for Cuizon, p. 11; Rollo, p. 167. See also page 4 of the Appellees Brief, where the Solicitor
General sums up appellant Cuizons position as follows: Appellant Cuizon contends that since he was not caught in
flagrante delicto, the warrantless arrest and the incidental search and seizure conducted at his residence was illegal,
thereby rendering the shabu procured thereat inadmissible as evidence.
16
Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
17
Section 3(2), Art. III, 1987 Constitution.
18
Sec. 12, Rule 126, Rules of Court.
19
Cf. Separate Opinion of Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401,415 (June 19,
1991).
20
People vs. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (September 4, 1986); Nolasco vs. Ernani Cruz-Pao, 147 SCRA 509 (January 30,
1987).
21
Vide People vs. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402 (July 6, 1988).
22
Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 32.
23
Vide, People vs. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174 (June 22, 1992).
24
People vs. Tangliben, 220 SCRA 221 (April 6, 1990); also People vs. Mengote, supra.
25
People vs. Mengote, supra. In the present case, the NBI agents had nothing else to go on. They claimed that they
had put the spouses Cuizon under surveillance for about a month (third week of January 1992 onward, up until the
time of arrest per TSN, May 19, 1992, pp. 17-18). Nonetheless, their efforts yielded no result, and they still relied on
tips.
26
144 SCRA 1, 14-15 (September 4, 1986).
27
151 SCRA 279, 287 (June 23, 1987).
28
160 SCRA 646 (April 15, 1988).
29
184 SCRA 220 (April 6, 1990).
30
188 SCRA 288 (August 2, 1990).
31
188 SCRA 751 (August 20, 1990).
32
193 SCRA 122 (January 21, 1991).
33
198 SCRA 401 (June 19, 1991).
34
People vs. Lug-aw, 229 SCRA 308 (January 18, 1994); People vs. Jorge, 231 SCRA 693 (April 22, 1994).
35
63 Phil. 221 (1936).
36
65 Phil. 689 (1938).
37
Rollo, pp. 110-111.

Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs Secretary of Agrarian Reform

November 6, 2010
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175 SCRA 343 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Equal Protection – Valid Classification
Eminent Domain – Just Compensation
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a call for the
adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted
in 1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for
distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for landowners. In 1987, President
Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and
providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment.
In 1987, P.P. No. 131, instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No.
229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the enactment of
R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier
mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land distribution scheme
provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of ricelands and cornlands whose
landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they
should not be forced to distribute their land to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown
willingness to till their own land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229) on the ground that
these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program and that the specific amount must be
determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in
eminent domain which provides that only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated
due process for under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land in bonds and not
necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt from the agrarian
reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each
other in certain particulars and different from each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to
the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between
these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment
of the Bill of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as part of the
agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts. However, there is no law
which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining just compensation. In fact, just compensation
can be that amount agreed upon by the landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long
as both parties agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner agrees,
then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that, the just compensation
determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the landowner does not agree with the finding of just
compensation by an administrative body, then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final
determination. This is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional exercise of eminent domain.
The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of eminent domain. The program will require billions of
pesos in funds if all compensation have to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not
have sufficient money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just compensation.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,
GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO, JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO RAMIR B.
CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO, FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA, REYNALDO G. ESTRADA,
FELISA C. BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B. MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA,
EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C. ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES, BENJAMIN R.
SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE & NAPOLEON S. FERRER, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON, VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,
HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D. TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE, INC., Victorias
Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989
INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.
JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and Messrs.
SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.
G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989
NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to
Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the
ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to
Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the
son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned,
Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus
weakened and died.
The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and
death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that underscores the acute imbalance in the distribution of this precious resource
among our people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry
dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935 mandated the policy of social justice to "insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973, the new Constitution affirmed this goal
adding specifically that "the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and disposition of
private property and equitably diffuse property ownership and profits." 2 Significantly, there was also the specific
injunction to "formulate and implement an agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating the tenant from the
bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and
separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions
for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an
agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers,
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution
of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just
compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall
further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had already been enacted
by the Congress of the Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the above-stated principles. This was substantially
superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No. 27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972, along with martial
law, to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not change and indeed even energized the thrust for agrarian reform. Thus,
on July 17, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the decree as well as
the manner of their payment. This was followed on July 22, 1987 by Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the mechanics for its
implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the revived Congress of the Philippines took over legislative power from
the President and started its own deliberations, including extensive public hearings, on the improvement of the
interests of farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino signed on June 10,
1988. This law, while considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one
common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however,
and will first be explained hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas
Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano,
Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of
powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped legislative power when she promulgated E.O. No. 228. The said
measure is invalid also for violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other requisites of a
valid appropriation.
In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by
a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines. They invoke the recent cases of EPZA v.
Dulay 5and Manotok v. National Food Authority. 6 Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of
Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment on the land, the executive order also deprives the petitioners of their
property rights as protected by due process. The equal protection clause is also violated because the order places the
burden of solving the agrarian problems on the owners only of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is imposed
on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners of the lands
occupied by them, E.O. No. 228 ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due process. Worse, the measure
would not solve the agrarian problem because even the small farmers are deprived of their lands and the retention
rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the earlier cases
ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v. Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v.
The National Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of just compensation by the executive authorities
conformably to the formula prescribed under the questioned order is at best initial or preliminary only. It does not
foreclose judicial intervention whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the challenge to the order is premature
because no valuation of their property has as yet been made by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The petitioners
are also not proper parties because the lands owned by them do not exceed the maximum retention limit of 7
hectares.
Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for retention limits on
tenanted lands and that in any event their petition is a class suit brought in behalf of landowners with landholdings
below 24 hectares. They maintain that the determination of just compensation by the administrative authorities is a
final ascertainment. As for the cases invoked by the public respondent, the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was
merely assumed in Chavez, while what was decided in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22, 1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 (except
Sections 20 and 21) have been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657. Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be
declared unconstitutional because it suffers from substantially the same infirmities as the earlier measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a 1. 83- hectare
land, who complained that the DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a
compromise agreement he had reached with his tenant on the payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion dated April
10, 1989, he adopted the allegations in the basic amended petition that the above- mentioned enactments have been
impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental.
Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks
to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229.
The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise
legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the
transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised,
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian Reform Fund, an initial
amount of FIFTY BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover the estimated cost of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992 which shall be sourced from the receipts of the sale of the assets of the
Asset Privatization Trust and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received through the Presidential Commission on
Good Government and such other sources as government may deem appropriate. The amounts collected and
accruing to this special fund shall be considered automatically appropriated for the purpose authorized in this
Proclamation the amount appropriated is in futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover the cost of the
contemplated expropriation has yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On
the contrary, Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner in
an amount to be established by the government, which shall be based on the owner's declaration of current fair
market value as provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain controls to be defined and promulgated by the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council." This compensation may not be paid fully in money but in any of several
modes that may consist of part cash and part bond, with interest, maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash or
bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary and the landowner or as may be prescribed or approved by
the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of
the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the
CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers,
although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been
violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August 27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane Planters (NASP)
which claims a membership of at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over the country. On September 10, 1987,
another motion for intervention was filed, this time by Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and riceland
owners. Both motions were granted by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program and that, in any event,
the appropriation is invalid because of uncertainty in the amount appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and
Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and thus specifies the
minimum rather than the maximum authorized amount. This is not allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount
has not been certified to by the National Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear and convincing evidence
the necessity for the exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and the violation of the fundamental right to own
property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for non-registration of the lands, which is the expropriation of the said land for
an amount equal to the government assessor's valuation of the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if the
landowner declares his own valuation he is unjustly required to immediately pay the corresponding taxes on the
land, in violation of the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor General first invokes the presumption of constitutionality in favor of
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for the expropriation as explained in the "whereas"
clauses of the Proclamation and submits that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot project to determine the
feasibility of CARP and a general survey on the people's opinion thereon are not indispensable prerequisites to its
promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection clause, the sugar planters have failed to show that they belong to a
different class and should be differently treated. The Comment also suggests the possibility of Congress first
distributing public agricultural lands and scheduling the expropriation of private agricultural lands later. From this
viewpoint, the petition for prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the constitutional prohibition is against the payment of public money
without the corresponding appropriation. There is no rule that only money already in existence can be the subject of
an appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although denominated
as an initial amount, is actually the maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial" simply means that additional
amounts may be appropriated later when necessary.
On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed a petition on his own behalf, assailing the
constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In addition to the arguments already raised, Serrano contends that the measure is
unconstitutional because:
(1) Only public lands should be included in the CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one subject which is not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund from the National Treasury did not originate from the House of
Representatives.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the
requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer.
Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of
lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding under Operation
Land transfer and asked for the recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land Transfer in the name of the private
respondents. He claims that on December 24, 1986, his petition was denied without hearing. On February 17, 1987,
he filed a motion for reconsideration, which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were issued.
These orders rendered his motion moot and academic because they directly effected the transfer of his land to the
private respondents.
The petitioner now argues that:
(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President of the Philippines.
(2) The said executive orders are violative of the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum retention provided for under the 1987 Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous
and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President
under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise
of the police power.
The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be deprived of his property without due process of law and to the
retention of his small parcels of riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. He
likewise argues that, besides denying him just compensation for his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring
that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall be considered as advance
payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of even small
landowners in the program along with other landowners with lands consisting of seven hectares or more is
undemocratic.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration
filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory Provisions of the
1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on October 21. 1972, the
tenant-farmer of agricultural land was deemed the owner of the land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid after
that date should therefore be considered amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was resolved on December
14, 1987. An appeal to the Office of the President would be useless with the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229,
which in effect sanctioned the validity of the public respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not
exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his
farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been
determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted
decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of
retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And
even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already
been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners,
with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978,
(Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981
(Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention
and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For
failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from
invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the
pendency of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules,
assuming this has not yet been done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ
of mandamus. This is especially true if this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the
government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not
own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to
cover them also, the said measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by
law and the ruling of this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional
reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have repealed the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as the weakest of the three departments of the
government, the judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of either the legislative or the
executive or of both when not conformable to the fundamental law. This is the reason for what some quarters call the
doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so, this power is not lightly assumed or readily exercised. The doctrine of
separation of powers imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other departments, in striking down the acts of the legislative and the executive as unconstitutional.
The policy, indeed, is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain. The theory is that before the act was
done or the law was enacted, earnest studies were made by Congress or the President, or both, to insure that the
Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down stringent conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality, requiring
therefor the concurrence of a majority of the members of the Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations and
voted on the issue during their session en banc. 11 And as established by judge made doctrine, the Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into
such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal
rights susceptible of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the
proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, we hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an
immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly speaking, they are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive the requirement and so remove
the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were invoking only an
indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection that they were not
proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled
promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." We have since then applied this
exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also been met in the present petitions.
In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional issues
like the ones now before it, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this must be
done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution as God and its conscience give it the
light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies
that cannot influence its decision. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to "make the hammer fall,
and heavily," to use Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of these departments, or of any public official,
betray the people's will as expressed in the Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words of Justice Laurel, that —
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise constitutional questions that this Court must categorically resolve. And so we
shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the preliminary issues before resolving the more serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos in the exercise of his powers under martial law has already
been sustained in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the power
of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same was authorized under Section
6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted above.
The said measures were issued by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress of the Philippines was
formally convened and took over legislative power from her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended to pre-
empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131
and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that these measures ceased to be
valid when she lost her legislative power for, like any statute, they continue to be in force unless modified or
repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does not ipso facto become inoperative
simply because of the dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By the same token, President Aquino's loss of
legislative power did not have the effect of invalidating all the measures enacted by her when and as long as she
possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially affirmed the
challenged measures and has specifically provided that they shall be suppletory to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not
inconsistent with its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion
fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been incorporated by reference in
the CARP Law.18
That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being questioned on the ground that it does not conform to the requirements of a
valid appropriation as specified in the Constitution. Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an appropriation measure
even if it does provide for the creation of said fund, for that is not its principal purpose. An appropriation law is one
the primary and specific purpose of which is to authorize the release of public funds from the treasury. 19 The creation
of the fund is only incidental to the main objective of the proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and Section 25(4) of Article
VI, are not applicable. With particular reference to Section 24, this obviously could not have been complied with for
the simple reason that the House of Representatives, which now has the exclusive power to initiate appropriation
measures, had not yet been convened when the proclamation was issued. The legislative power was then solely
vested in the President of the Philippines, who embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do
not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A.
No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial
provisions. This section declares:
Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly,
any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-
sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential
Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications:
(1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the
farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to
keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory
heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long
as they continue to cultivate said homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the constitutional requirement that a bill shall have only one subject, to be
expressed in its title, deserves only short attention. It is settled that the title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue
of its contents and will suffice if the matters embodied in the text are relevant to each other and may be inferred
from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by whatever name it was
called, had the force and effect of law because it came from President Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence,
it is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No. 79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D. No. 27
because the former was only a letter of instruction. The important thing is that it was issued by President Marcos,
whose word was law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances from the President Marcos still had to comply with the requirement
for publication as this Court held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless published in the Official Gazette in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not have any force and effect if they were among those
enactments successfully challenged in that case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the Official Gazette dated
November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of mandamus cannot issue to
compel the performance of a discretionary act, especially by a specific department of the government. That is true as
a general proposition but is subject to one important qualification. Correctly and categorically stated, the rule is that
mandamus will lie to compel the discharge of the discretionary duty itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue to require action only but not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public official and an unnecessary and unreasonable delay in the exercise of
such duty occurs, if it is a clear duty imposed by law, the courts will intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely ministerial, the courts will require specific action. If the duty is
purely discretionary, the courts by mandamus will require action only. For example, if an inferior court, public
official, or board should, for an unreasonable length of time, fail to decide a particular question to the great
detriment of all parties concerned, or a court should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when the law clearly gave
it jurisdiction mandamus will issue, in the first case to require a decision, and in the second to require that
jurisdiction be taken of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available from the administrative authorities, resort to the courts may still be permitted if the issue raised is a
question of law. 23
III
There are traditional distinctions between the police power and the power of eminent domain that logically preclude
the application of both powers at the same time on the same subject. In the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for
example, where a law required the transfer of all municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in exchange for its
assets of equivalent value, the Court held that the power being exercised was eminent domain because the property
involved was wholesome and intended for a public use. Property condemned under the police power is noxious or
intended for a noxious purpose, such as a building on the verge of collapse, which should be demolished for the
public safety, or obscene materials, which should be destroyed in the interest of public morals. The confiscation of
such property is not compensable, unlike the taking of property under the power of expropriation, which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of the police power in a
famous aphorism: "The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." The regulation that went "too far" was a law prohibiting mining which
might cause the subsidence of structures for human habitation constructed on the land surface. This was resisted by a
coal company which had earlier granted a deed to the land over its mine but reserved all mining rights thereunder,
with the grantee assuming all risks and waiving any damage claim. The Court held the law could not be sustained
without compensating the grantor. Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he argued that there was a valid
exercise of the police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property imposed in the exercise of the police power deprives the owner of some
right theretofore enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by the State of rights in property without making
compensation. But restriction imposed to protect the public health, safety or morals from dangers threatened is not a
taking. The restriction here in question is merely the prohibition of a noxious use. The property so restricted remains
in the possession of its owner. The state does not appropriate it or make any use of it. The state merely prevents the
owner from making a use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases
to be noxious — as it may because of further changes in local or social conditions — the restriction will have to be
removed and the owner will again be free to enjoy his property as heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a polarization but a mingling of the police power and the power of
eminent domain, with the latter being used as an implement of the former like the power of taxation. The
employment of the taxing power to achieve a police purpose has long been accepted. 26 As for the power of
expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law (referring to the earlier case of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under the police power) makes the
following significant remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when judges located the Police and eminent domain powers on different
planets. Generally speaking, they viewed eminent domain as encompassing public acquisition of private property for
improvements that would be available for public use," literally construed. To the police power, on the other hand,
they assigned the less intrusive task of preventing harmful externalities a point reflected in the Euclid opinion's
reliance on an analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of zoning. So long as suppression of a privately
authored harm bore a plausible relation to some legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent measure need have
afforded no compensation whatever. With the progressive growth of government's involvement in land use, the
distance between the two powers has contracted considerably. Today government often employs eminent domain
interchangeably with or as a useful complement to the police power-- a trend expressly approved in the Supreme
Court's 1954 decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to
match that of the police power's standard of "public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment project and the improvement of blighted areas in the District of
Columbia as a proper exercise of the police power. On the role of eminent domain in the attainment of this purpose,
Justice Douglas declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is
clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S Supreme Court
sustained the respondent's Landmarks Preservation Law under which the owners of the Grand Central Terminal had
not been allowed to construct a multi-story office building over the Terminal, which had been designated a historic
landmark. Preservation of the landmark was held to be a valid objective of the police power. The problem, however,
was that the owners of the Terminal would be deprived of the right to use the airspace above it although other
landowners in the area could do so over their respective properties. While insisting that there was here no taking, the
Court nonetheless recognized certain compensatory rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it said would
"undoubtedly mitigate" the loss caused by the regulation. This "fair compensation," as he called it, was explained by
Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its pristine landmark status, Penn Central was authorized to transfer to
neighboring properties the authorized but unused rights accruing to the site prior to the Terminal's designation as a
landmark — the rights which would have been exhausted by the 59-story building that the city refused to
countenance atop the Terminal. Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites were proportionately relaxed,
theoretically enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the Terminal site by constructing or selling to others the
right to construct larger, hence more profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty complication insofar as the question of compensable taking is concerned. To
the extent that the measures under challenge merely prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is an exercise of
the police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out
such regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the
maximum area allowed, there is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just
compensation is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required
is the surrender of the title to and the physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the
owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an exercise not of the police power but of the power of
eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of the power of eminent domain, the several measures before us are
challenged as violative of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has
already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the
deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being
questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed
violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under
the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have been denied equal protection because of the absence of retention
limits has also become academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657. Significantly, they too have not questioned the
area of such limits. There is also the complaint that they should not be made to share the burden of agrarian reform,
an objection also made by the sugar planters on the ground that they belong to a particular class with particular
interests of their own. However, no evidence has been submitted to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and
different from each other in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)
it must be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class. 32 The Court finds
that all these requisites have been met by the measures here challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights
conferred and the liabilities imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that they belong to a different class and
entitled to a different treatment. The argument that not only landowners but also owners of other properties must be
made to share the burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction between
these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see. There is no need to elaborate on
this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment
of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is a
concurrence of the lawful subject and the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of the public generally as
distinguished from those of a particular class require the interference of the State and, no less important, the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. 34 As the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, we may say that the first requirement has been satisfied. What remains to be examined is the
validity of the method employed to achieve the constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the rights of the individual are concerned, the end
does not justify the means. It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts.
There is no question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent public need, subject only to a
few notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a, person
invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one even as against the rest of the
nation who would deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and his property under Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution. With
regard to his property, the owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9, which reaffirms the familiar rule that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the State that enables it to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public
use upon payment of just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of sale may be agreed
upon by the parties. 35 It is only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot accept the price or other conditions
offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent domain will come into play to assert the paramount authority of the
State over the interests of the property owner. Private rights must then yield to the irresistible demands of the public
interest on the time-honored justification, as in the case of the police power, that the welfare of the people is the
supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is
absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this
principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just
compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute
public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by
forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands
may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any
event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the
legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that
discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect the decisions of the political departments when they decide what is
known as the political question. As explained by Chief Justice Concepcion in the case of Tañada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to
"those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question has been constricted with the enlargement of judicial power, which
now includes the authority of the courts "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 37 Even
so, this should not be construed as a license for us to reverse the other departments simply because their views may
not coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP the redistribution of
private landholdings (even as the distribution of public agricultural lands is first provided for, while also continuing
apace under the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The Court sees no justification to interpose its authority,
which we may assert only if we believe that the political decision is not unwise, but illegal. We do not find it to be
so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, 38 it was held:
Congress having determined, as it did by the Act of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river between the
American bank and the international line, as well as all of the upland north of the present ship canal, throughout its
entire length, was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of said waters, and the waters connected therewith," that
determination is conclusive in condemnation proceedings instituted by the United States under that Act, and there is
no room for judicial review of the judgment of Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public use has already been settled for us by the Constitution itself No less
than the 1987 Charter calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why private agricultural lands are to be taken
from their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D. No. 27, Proc.
No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction that the State adopt the necessary
measures "to encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are
landless to own directly or collectively the lands they till." That public use, as pronounced by the fundamental law
itself, must be binding on us.
The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just compensation, needs a longer and more thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's
loss.40 The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged in these petitions contemplate more than a mere regulation of the use
of private lands under the police power. We deal here with an actual taking of private agricultural lands that has
dispossessed the owners of their property and deprived them of all its beneficial use and enjoyment, to entitle them
to the just compensation mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v. Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when the following conditions
concur: (1) the expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the entry must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to public use or
otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must
be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these requisites
are envisioned in the measures before us.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the
condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment,
and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the
CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the
landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper
Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The
DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed is entrusted to the
administrative authorities in violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific reference is made to Section 16(d), which
provides that in case of the rejection or disregard by the owner of the offer of the government to buy his land-
... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to determine the compensation for the land by
requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the
land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is
deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for
decision.
To be sure, the determination of just compensation is a function addressed to the courts of justice and may not be
usurped by any other branch or official of the government. EPZA v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several decrees
promulgated by President Marcos providing that the just compensation for property under expropriation should be
either the assessment of the property by the government or the sworn valuation thereof by the owner, whichever was
lower. In declaring these decrees unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:
The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment
on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile in a matter which under this Constitution is reserved to it
for final determination.
Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to determine the just
compensation for the property, following the applicable decrees, its task would be relegated to simply stating the
lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be
useless for the court to appoint commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the
due process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a judicial
proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade as the court has only to choose between the
valuation of the owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could
substitute for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again confronted with the same question of whether the courts under P.D. No.
1533, which contains the same provision on just compensation as its predecessor decrees, still have the power and
authority to determine just compensation, independent of what is stated by the decree and to this effect, to appoint
commissioners for such purpose.
This time, we answer in the affirmative.
xxx
It is violative of due process to deny the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax documents is
unfair or wrong. And it is repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and fairness to allow the haphazard work of a
minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence and arguments pro and con have been presented,
and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair and just determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered
the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the
landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value
of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final
determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the
courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is
admittedly a judicial function.
The second and more serious objection to the provisions on just compensation is not as easily resolved.
This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. — The LBP shall compensate the landowner in such amount as
may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as the excess hectarage is concerned — Twenty-five percent (25%)
cash, the balance to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares and up to fifty (50) hectares — Thirty percent (30%) cash, the balance
to be paid in government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below — Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at any time.
(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares, physical assets or other
qualified investments in accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;
(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax liability;
(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following features:
(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face value of the bonds
shall mature every year from the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year: Provided, That should the landowner
choose to forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part, he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP bonds may be used by the landowner, his successors-in- interest or
his assigns, up to the amount of their face value, for any of the following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of the government, including assets under the Asset Privatization
Program and other assets foreclosed by government financial institutions in the same province or region where the
lands for which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of government-owned or controlled corporations or shares of stock owned by the
government in private corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the provisional release of accused persons, or for performance bonds;
(iv) Security for loans with any government financial institution, provided the proceeds of the loans shall be invested
in an economic enterprise, preferably in a small and medium- scale industry, in the same province or region as the
land for which the bonds are paid;
(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to government: Provided, That the use of these bonds for these purposes will
be limited to a certain percentage of the outstanding balance of the financial instruments; Provided, further, That the
PARC shall determine the percentages mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government universities,
colleges, trade schools, and other institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of the original bondholder in government hospitals; and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No. 79777 is that the above provision is unconstitutional insofar as it
requires the owners of the expropriated properties to accept just compensation therefor in less than money, which is
the only medium of payment allowed. In support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is that the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just
compensation, which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property. Just compensation has always been understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the
expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, 46 this Court held:
It is well-settled that just compensation means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking.
Anything beyond that is more, and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair and full
equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to the
expropriating entity. The market value of the land taken is the just compensation to which the owner of condemned
property is entitled, the market value being that sum of money which a person desirous, but not compelled to buy,
and an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received for such
property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our jurisprudence on the subject has been derived, the weight of authority is
also to the effect that just compensation for property expropriated is payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus
—
The medium of payment of compensation is ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot compel the owner to
accept anything but money, nor can the owner compel or require the condemnor to pay him on any other basis than
the value of the property in money at the time and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution and the statutes.
When the power of eminent domain is resorted to, there must be a standard medium of payment, binding upon both
parties, and the law has fixed that standard as money in cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a reliable and constant
standard of compensation. 48
"Just compensation" for property taken by condemnation means a fair equivalent in money, which must be paid at
least within a reasonable time after the taking, and it is not within the power of the Legislature to substitute for such
payment future obligations, bonds, or other valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and
no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do
not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a
specific and perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private agricultural lands whenever found and of whatever kind as long as
they are in excess of the maximum retention limits allowed their owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for
the benefit not only of a particular community or of a small segment of the population but of the entire Filipino
nation, from all levels of our society, from the impoverished farmer to the land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not
cover only the whole territory of this country but goes beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it hopes to
secure and edify with the vision and the sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos. Generations yet to come are
as involved in this program as we are today, although hopefully only as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling
life we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be forgotten that it
is no less than the Constitution itself that has ordained this revolution in the farms, calling for "a just distribution"
among the farmers of lands that have heretofore been the prison of their dreams but can now become the key at least
to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering the vast areas of
land subject to expropriation under the laws before us, we estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed,
far more indeed than the amount of P50 billion initially appropriated, which is already staggering as it is by our
present standards. Such amount is in fact not even fully available at this time.
We assume that the framers of the Constitution were aware of this difficulty when they called for agrarian reform as
a top priority project of the government. It is a part of this assumption that when they envisioned the expropriation
that would be needed, they also intended that the just compensation would have to be paid not in the orthodox way
but a less conventional if more practical method. There can be no doubt that they were aware of the financial
limitations of the government and had no illusions that there would be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among the farmers. We may therefore assume that their intention was to
allow such manner of payment as is now provided for by the CARP Law, particularly the payment of the balance (if
the owner cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed of the entire amount of the just compensation, with other
things of value. We may also suppose that what they had in mind was a similar scheme of payment as that prescribed
in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in force at the time they deliberated on the new Charter and with which they
presumably agreed in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the Constitutional Commission any categorical agreement among the
members regarding the meaning to be given the concept of just compensation as applied to the comprehensive
agrarian reform program being contemplated. There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the requirement to suit the
demands of the project even as it was also felt that they should "leave it to Congress" to determine how payment
should be made to the landowner and reimbursement required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such innovations as
"progressive compensation" and "State-subsidized compensation" were also proposed. In the end, however, no
special definition of the just compensation for the lands to be expropriated was reached by the Commission. 50
On the other hand, there is nothing in the records either that militates against the assumptions we are making of the
general sentiments and intention of the members on the content and manner of the payment to be made to the
landowner in the light of the magnitude of the expenditure and the limitations of the expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided
for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting
that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a
cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement.
The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the
frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that
invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as
they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is
not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just compensation is not always required to be made fully in money, we
find further that the proportion of cash payment to the other things of value constituting the total payment, as
determined on the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated, is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the payment in money, primarily because the small landowner will be
needing it more than the big landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments making up the balance of the payment are "negotiable at any
time." The other modes, which are likewise available to the landowner at his option, are also not unreasonable
because payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds, other properties or assets, tax credits, and other things of
value equivalent to the amount of just compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in the law will cause the landowners, big and small, not a little
inconvenience. As already remarked, this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is devoutly hoped that these
countrymen of ours, conscious as we know they are of the need for their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not
begrudge us their indispensable share in the attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform. Otherwise, our pursuit of this
elusive goal will be like the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of non-registration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does not seem to be viable any
more as it appears that Section 4 of the said Order has been superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This
repeats the requisites of registration as embodied in the earlier measure but does not provide, as the latter did, that in
case of failure or refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof shall be that given by the provincial or city
assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the CARP Law says that the just compensation shall be ascertained on the
basis of the factors mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the landowner is divested of his property even before actual payment to
him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the owner to the expropriator
only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled principle is consistent both here and
in other democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of condemnation proceedings does not vest the condemnor until the judgment
fixing just compensation is entered and paid, but the condemnor's title relates back to the date on which the petition
under the Eminent Domain Act, or the commissioner's report under the Local Improvement Act, is filed. 51
... although the right to appropriate and use land taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry, title to the
property taken remains in the owner until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme Court cited several cases holding that title to property does not pass
to the condemnor until just compensation had actually been made. In fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to
this effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v. McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the owner of the
condemned property was a condition precedent to the investment of the title to the property in the State" albeit "not
to the appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v. Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said that the
construction upon the statutes was that the fee did not vest in the State until the payment of the compensation
although the authority to enter upon and appropriate the land was complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further
said that "both on principle and authority the rule is ... that the right to enter on and use the property is complete, as
soon as the property is actually appropriated under the authority of law for a public use, but that the title does not
pass from the owner without his consent, until just compensation has been made to him."
Our own Supreme Court has held in Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus and Paredes, 56 that:
If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in the preceding discussion are attentively examined it will be apparent
that the method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece of
land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner until compensation is paid ... . (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that
he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land
owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly
recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to
be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by
virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged
membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper
for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary
after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered
as advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on
receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or
LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. 57 No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is
fully paid for must also be rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under
E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counter-balance the express
provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree
No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal filed by the petitioners
with the Office of the President has already been resolved. Although we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there are factual issues that have yet
to be examined on the administrative level, especially the claim that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues. In any event, assuming that the petitioners have not yet exercised
their retention rights, if any, under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are entitled to the new retention rights
provided for by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole more liberal than those granted by the decree.
V
The CARP Law and the other enactments also involved in these cases have been the subject of bitter attack from
those who point to the shortcomings of these measures and ask that they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these
enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they should be continuously re-examined and rehoned, that they may be
sharper instruments for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of
agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls and expected
difficulties. This is inevitable. The CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On the contrary, to use Justice
Holmes's words, "it is an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and so we learn as we venture forward, and, if
necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot expect perfection although we should strive for it by all means.
Meantime, we struggle as best we can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles that have unconscionably, and for
so long, fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are
removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not
only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and
helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be
his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once
it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at
last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and
the dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:
1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the
constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions.
2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to
their respective owners.
3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention
rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed.
5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Art. 11, Sec. 5.
2 1973 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 6.
3 Ibid., Art. XIV, Sec. 12.
4 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 15.
5 149 SCRA 305.
6 150 SCRA 89.
7 55 SCRA 26.
8 91 SCRA 294.
9 113 SCRA 798.
10 136 SCRA 271; 146 SCRA 446.
11 Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2).
12 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392.
13 Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US 633.
14 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.
15 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331; PHILCONSA v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479; Sanidad v.
COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333.
16 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.
17 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 75.
18 Ibid., Sec. 63.
19 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 US 410.
20 Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172; Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288. Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151
SCRA 208.
21 Supra.
22 Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456.
23 Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359; Espanol v. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA
314.
24 106 Phil. 144.
25 260 US 393.
26 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 US 678: Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148; Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, supra.
27 John J. Costonis "The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central Terminal Decision," Harvard Law
Review, Vol. 91:40,1977, p. 404.
28 348 US 1954.
29 438 US 104.
30 See note 27.
31 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 US 199.
32 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
33 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
34 US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85; Fable v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486; Case v. Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256.
35 Noble v. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1.
36 100 Phil. 1101.
37 1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.
38 57 L ed. 1063.
39 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286.
40 Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA
413; Municipality of Daet v. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 503; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA
89.
41 City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208.
42 58 SCRA 336.
43 Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, pp. 1166- 1167.
44 149 SCRA 305.
45 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286; Province of Tayabas v. Perez, supra, at note 40.
46 31 SCRA 413.
47 Mandl v. City of Phoenix, 18 p 2d 273.
48 Sacramento Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron 156 Cal. 408,104 pp. 979, 980.
49 City of Waterbury v. Platt Bros. & Co., 56 A 856, 76 Conn, 435 citing Butler v. Ravine Road Sewer Com'rs, 39
N.J.L. 665; Bloodgood v. Mohawk v. H.R.R. Co., N.Y. 18 Wend. 9 35, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Sanborn v. Helden, 51 Cal
266; Burlington & C.R. Co. v. Schweikart, 14 p. 329, 10 Colo, 178; 23 Words and Phrases, pl. 460.
50 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 647, 704; Vol. 3, pp. 16-20, 243-247.
51 Chicago Park Dist. v. Downey Coal Co., 1 Ill. 2d 54.
52 Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 US 599, 26 L ed 550.
53 Ibid.
54 4 Blkf., 508.
55 11 NY 314.
56 40 Phil. 550.
57 Sec. 16(d).