[G.R. No. 75028. November 8, 1991.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PIOQUINTO DE JOYA y

CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

FACTS:
Spouses Arnedo Valencia and Herminia Salac-Valencia, together with their ten (10) year old son Alvin
Valencia and Herminia Valencia's 88-year old mother, Eulalia Diamse, are residents of Balagtas St.,
Baliuag, Bulacan. In the afternoon of January 31, 1978, Herminia Salac-Valencia left for school to teach. Her
mother Eulalia Diamse was then [sitting] at their sofa watching the television set. Her Son Alvin likewise left
for school at 1:00 o'clock. And at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, his classes were dismissed and he
proceeded home. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, the spouses Valencia's neighbor
by the name of Gloria Capulong, together with a friend, went out of the former's house to visit a friend. When
Alvin reached home, he saw his grandmother Eulalia Diamse lying down prostrate and drenched with her
own blood. He immediately threw his bag and ran towards her and asked her: "Apo, Apo, what happened?" .
. . [Eulalia Diamse held his hand and after which said: "Si Paqui". After saying these words, she let go of
Alvin's hand and passed away. Upon seeing her mother, Alvin told her: "Mommy, Mommy, apo is drenched
in her own blood." When she reached their house, she found her mother lying prostrate in her own blood.
Cinsequently, Herminia found out that the two (2) gold rings worn by her mother were missing. The right
earring of her mother was likewise missing. That same afternoon, Herminia saw the room of the groundfloor
ransacked. Herminia found a beach walk step-in, more or less one meter from where the victim was lying
prostrate. Herminia was able to recognize the said step-in because of its color and size, as the other half of
the pair she bought for her husband Arnedo but which she gave to Socorro de Joya, the wife of herein
appellant.

The trial court convicted appellant.

ISSUE:
WON the dying declaration is admissible

HELD:
No. SC acquitted the accused.

It must be noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. It
has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not
mean that the declarant must recite everything that constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that
his statement of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his meaning in
respect of such fact. 3 The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof.
Wigmore's classic work: "The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The statement as offered
must not be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it
is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the statement includes all that the
declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a
statement which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the fragmentary
statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect
from that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is no objection that he
has told only a portion of what he might have been able to tell." 4 (Emphasis supplied).

The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no weight, is
that since the declarant was prevented (by death or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what
he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That incomplete
declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying
declarations are received. 5

It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial
court simply assumed that by uttering the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name the person who had
thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say
so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We
are unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
 [G.R. No. 94545. April 4, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO SANTOS y BAINGAN @

PRAN and VILLAMOR ASUNCION, accused, FRANCISCO SANTOS y BAINGAN @
PRAN, accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Corazon Dayao, was visiting at the Ambre residence to see her husband Pedro, who was the driver of Mr. & Mrs.
David Ambre. That evening, she was in the terrace of the victim's house sorting dirty clothing. The night was dark and
it was raining, but a Coleman lamp was placed atop the cement railing (pasamano) of the terrace. Just then, she
heard five (5) successive gunshots, and she saw David fall prostrate to the ground. Seeing that David wanted to say
something, she called Lolita's attention and said, "Manang, adda kayat nga ibaga ni Manong kenka. (Ate, it looks like
Kuya has something to tell you.)" 4 She pulled Lolita towards the victim. Lolita asked her husband who had shot him
and the latter answered, "It was Pare Pran." 5 She heard David's words because, like Lolita, she had also placed her
head near David who was still alive at the time. Lolita Ambre, the widow, testified that her husband was referring to
Francisco Santos, the godfather of their youngest child.

Dr. Teodomiro Hufana Jr., conducted an autopsy and declared that the cause of death is “severe internal hemorrhage
secondary to gunshot wound." He further clarified that, although the Certificate of Death he issued indicated that the
"Interval Between Onset and Death" was "instant," he was sure the victim still had "a few seconds or minute" before
he actually died. 12 He opined that during those few seconds or minute, it was possible for a victim to utter "about two
or three words," which could be "audible" and "intelligible."
Testifying in his own behalf, appellant interposed an alibi.

The trial court considered the words of the victim as a dying declaration and a positive identification of appellant and
thus convicted the latter.

ISSUE:
WON the last words of the deceased qualify as a dying declaration sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction.

HELD:
Yes, SC convicted the accused.

We affirm the ruling of the trial court's decision to consider the victim's revelation to Lolita and Corazon as a dying
declaration and as a part of res gestae. A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person
who knows of his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. 27 As an exception to the hearsay
rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration is made by the deceased under the
consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration
concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; and (4) the declaration is offered in a
criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of injury. 28

It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent that his demise or at least,
its imminence — not so much the rapid eventuation of death — is at hand. 29 This may be proven by the statement
of the deceased himself or it may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedent's wounds, or other relevant
circumstances. 30
In the case at bar, the victim's declaration consisted of the words "Pare Pran." Under the circumstances, however, he
could not have been expected to articulate his awareness of something so obvious — the inevitability of his demise
— or to have the energy to do so. The nature and extent of said injuries underscored the seriousness of his condition
and they later proved by themselves that the utterances of the deceased were made under a consciousness of an
impending death. 31 That his demise thereafter came swiftly, although not instantaneously, further emphasized the
victim's realization of the hopelessness of his recovery. 32

We stress that when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced
by the most powerful consideration to speak the truth. It was the height of jocularity for appellant to have suggested
that it was highly possible that the deceased mentioned his name to Lolita so that she would tell him to come to
decedent's succor, or for another reason. Such conjecture finds no basis on record. On the other hand, this
speculation is belied by the clear, straightforward testimonies of Lolita and Corazon. Despite several attempts,
counsel for the defense failed to make Lolita admit that the victim mentioned appellant's name for a vague and
undefined purpose, other than to identify his assailant. 33 Lolita adamantly stuck to her testimony that her husband
told her that he was shot by "Pare Pran." 34 The unrebutted testimony of Corazon further clarified that the victim said
those words in answer to his wife's question as to who shot him. 35

The deceased's condemnatory antemortem statement naming appellant as his assailant deserves full faith and credit
and is admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.