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Theory Construction in Qualitative Research: From Grounded Theory to Abductive Analysis

Author(s): Stefan Timmermans and Iddo Tavory


Source: Sociological Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3 (SEPTEMBER 2012), pp. 167-186
Published by: American Sociological Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41725511
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Abtt
AMERICANASSOCIATION
SOCIOLOGICAL

Theory
Sociological
30(3)167-186
Theory Construction in ©American
Sociological 2012
Association
DOI:10.1177/07352751
12457914
Qualitative Research: http://stx.sagepub.com
ilSAGE
From Grounded Theory
to Abductive Analysis

Stefan Timmermans1 and Iddo Tavory2

Abstract
A critical
pathway forconceptualinnovationinthesocialis theconstructionoftheoreticalideasbased
on empirical data.Grounded theoryhasbecomea leading approachpromisingtheconstruction ofnovel
theories.Yet grounded theory-basedtheoreticalinnovationhas been scarce in partbecause of its
commitment to lettheoriesemergeinductivelyratherthanimposing frameworks
analytic a priori.
We
note,alongwitha longphilosophical thatinduction
tradition, doesnotlogically
leadto noveltheoretical
insights.
Drawing fromthetheory ofinference,meaning,andactionofpragmatist philosopherCharles
S. Peirce,
we arguethatabduction, ratherthaninduction,shouldbe theguiding of
principle empirically
basedtheory construction.Abductionrefersto a creative
inferential
processaimedat producing new
hypotheses andtheoriesbasedon surprising researchevidence.We proposethatabductive analysis
arisesfrom actors'socialandintellectual
positionsbutcanbefurtheraidedbycareful data
methodological
We outline
analysis. howformal methodologicalstepsenrichabductiveanalysis
throughtheprocesses of
and
defamiliarization,
revisiting, alternative
casing.

Keywords
theorization,
abduction, ofinquiry
community

A crucial
pathway forconceptual inthesocialsciences
innovation is theconstruction
oftheoreticalideas
onthebasisofempirical data.Tryingtomakesenseofempirical phenomena, often
sociologists findthem-
selves"constructing - engaging
theory" increative
attemptstogeneralize mechanisms, cases,or
particular
linksbetween causalstatements(Abend2008:177-79; Gross2009a)inwaysthatprovide bettertraction
forunderstandingobservationstheyworkwithandpossibly anticipate observations
inothercases.Theory
construction
is thusan ongoing processof"puzzling
pragmatic out"andproblem solvingthatdrawson
waysofunderstanding
existing whatthephenomenon "isa caseof' (Ragin1992;Tavory andTimmermans
2009;Winship 2006).Thecommon groundinsuchgeneralizations is thedialectic
betweendataandgen-
eralization
as a waytoaccount forempirical
findings.1

ofCalifornia,
'University LosAngeles,
CA,USA
2The
NewSchoolforSocial NewYork,
Research, NY,USA
Author:
Corresponding
Stefan
Timmermans, ofCalifornia,
University ofSociology,
Department 266Haines LosAngeles,
Hall,
CA90095-1551,
USA
Email:
stefan@soc.ucla.edu

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168 Sociological
Theory
30(3)

Asserting thatunexpected theoretical formulations andcategories emerge inrelation todatalocatesa


socialpractitioner within a meta-theoretical debateabouttherelation between dataandtheory. Grounded
theory haspopularized theemergence oftheory from datasincethelate1960s.2 Indeed, owingtoitsprom-
ise to provide heuristic guidelines fordata-driven theory construction, grounded theory has becomea
dominant data-analytical approach. Barney GlaserandAnselm Strauss' s (1967)TheDiscovery ofGrounded
Theory hasspread acrosssociology, anthropology, socialwork, education, law,management, nursing and
medical research, andcomputer andinformation sciences. Itscodingschemes andheuristic principleshave
beenincorporated intothemostwidelyusedqualitative dataanalysis software programs (MacMilan and
Koenig2004).Consequently, criticshave used grounded theory as the main foil from which to advance
alternative approaches. Burawoy initially
developed hisversion oftheextended casemethod incontrast to
grounded theory's inductive focus (Burawoy 1991:8-28, 272-79;1998). DeVault adapted Dorothy Smith's
institutionalethnography inreaction togrounded theory's principle tolettraditional sociological variables,
suchas raceandgender, emerge from thedata(Devault1995;butseeClarke2008).
In spiteofgrounded theory's popularity andwidecirculation, evendevoted practitioners haveques-
tioned whether grounded theory hasfulfilled itspromise to create new empirically based theories (Bryant
2002;Charmaz 2006;Clarke2005).Although grounded theory precepts seemtoguidemanyresearchers
ina solid"normal science"(Kuhn1962)sense,scanttheoretical innovation seemstohaveemerged from
thesestudies. Someresearchers explain the lack of theoretical with the
breakthroughs lackadaisical, incom-
plete,orinaccurate application ofgrounded theory principles.Grounded theory, theyargue, hasbeenused
tolabelanyresearch that
endeavor involves coding, any form of qualitative analysis, anykindof
data and
theory construction. Research thatclaimstobe grounded often hasverylittle todowiththeoriginal meth-
odological precepts, usingthelabel"grounded theory" as a shorthand forqualitative researchand lack
the
ofa well-articulated analytical strategy(Hood2007;Titscher etal. 2000).Manyothers seegrounded the-
ory'sfocuson induction as a criticalweakness stymieing theory development. In theoriginal bookand
especially thecontinued workofGlaser,thehallmark ofgrounded theory hasbeenletting newtheory
emerge from datawithout theoretical preconceptions. Thus,Wacquant dismissed grounded theory as "an
epistemological fairytale" (2002:1481), andmorecharitable criticssimply pointoutthatduetoitsinduc-
tivefocus,grounded theory hasnotdelivered on itspromise todeveloptheories (Emerson 1987;Snow,
Morrill,andAnderson 2003).
Recently, someresearchers havearguedthatbecauseofthepurported emphasis on generating new
theory,grounded theory isepistemologically muchcloser towhatpragmatist scientist-philosopher Charles S.
Peircecalledabduction: a central concept inhistheory oflogicandinference thatdenotes thecreative
production ofhypotheses basedon surprising evidence (Coffey andAtkinson 1996;Haig 1995;Kelle
2007;Locke2007;Reichertz 2007;Strubing 2007).Theseauthors, however, aremostly concerned with
elaborating theplacethatabduction playswithin thegrounded theory project (seeespecially Locke2007;
Reichertz 2007;Strubing 2007).Indeed,someoftheleadingfigures inthegrounded theory movement
havealsomovedinthisdirection. Thus,Charmaz (2000,2006,2009)hasadvocated fora "constructivist"
grounded theory andhascalledattention tothereflexive character ofdataanalysis as an interactive and
iterativeprocess.3 Inhermostrecent writings, Charmaz hasalsomentioned abduction intheframework of
sucha constructivist grounded theory (2009).Similar toother grounded theorists, however, Charmaz posi-
tioned abduction as secondary toinduction: "Grounded theory beginswithinductive analyses ofdatabut
movesbeyond induction tocreateanimaginative interpretation ofstudied life.We adoptabductive logic
whenweengageinimaginative thinking aboutintriguing findings andthenreturn tothefieldtocheckour
conjectures" (Charmaz 2009:137-38).According to thisperspective, abduction reflects theprocessof
creatively inferencing anddouble-checking theseinferences withmoredata.As such,abduction fitsinwith
thetraditional grounded theory recommendation tomovebackandforth between dataandtheory iteratively.
Whilewe sharemuchwithCharmaz' s goalofinfusing grounded theory witha pragmatist theory on
inference, wearguefora muchmoreradicalrethinking oftherelation between dataandtheory construc-
tion.As wedevelop below,rather thanthinking aboutabduction as a pointofconjecture within a broader

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Timmermans
andJavory 169

inductive framework, we proposean analytical approach thatprivileges abduction.We arguethatinthe


process oftheory construction,abduction comesfirst- temporally andanalytically.Whilegrounded theory
stilloffers usefultoolsfortheorganization ofqualitativeresearch,itis onlyinrelation toabduction that
theory construction becomes meaningful.
Instead ofusingPeirce'stheory ofinference as a waytolegitimize grounded theory,wethusconstruct
abductive analysis from a grounded theory foundation tofostertheoreticalinnovation.Abductive analysis
constitutes a qualitativedataanalysis approach aimedattheory construction. Thisapproach restsonthe
cultivation of anomalous andsurprising empirical findings againsta background of multiple existing
sociological theories andthrough systematic methodological analysis.As such,itrequires a fundamental
rethinking of coreideasassociated withgrounded theory, specificallytheroleof existing theories in
qualitative dataanalysis and the relationshipbetween methodology and theory generation.
Ourargument proceeds in threestages.First, we developa Peircian-pragmatist approach to theory
construction. After evaluating
critically the role induction in
played grounded theory,we outlinethelogic
ofabduction andexamine howpotentiality,intheform ofdataitems, canbeturned intotheoreticalgener-
alizations. Second,as we show,a contemporary reworking ofPeirce'snotion ofabduction restsonthe
abilitytorecognize a findingas surprisinginlightofexisting theoriesandpresumes in-depth familiarity
witha broadrangeoftheories. As opposedtobothgrounded and
theory approaches thatassumethatwe
address data"withourfavorite theory" (Burawoy 1998:16),weshowthatifwewishtofoster theory con-
structionwemustbe neither theoreticalatheistsnoravowedmonotheists, butinformed theoreticalagnos-
tics.Third, we theorize whythemethodological heuristics
ofgrounded theory,whatwe see as grounded
theory's lasting contribution to qualitative
sociology, provide researchers withopportunities to develop
noveltheoretical We that
insights. argue grounded theory'smeticulous methodological guidelines ofitera-
tiverounds of codingandmemowriting facilitate
theory construction through of
processes revisiting,
defamiliarizing, andalternative casing.Throughout thearticle wemakethepointthatallowing forobser-
vational or
surprises puzzles should be a central for
object qualitative research and
design, although there
canbe no setformula fortheory construction,specificforms of research organizationcan maximize the
for
potential original theoreticalcontributionsto emerge.

THE INDUCTIVE DILEMMA OF GROUNDED THEORY


Inthe1960s,GlaserandStrauss perceived a growing division
oflaborbetweentheoreticians
andempirical
researchers:Theorists
suchas Parsons andBlaucreated broad"logico-deductive"
theories
thatwouldthen
orient
theworkofempirical researchers ina feedbackcycleofrefutation.
Surveyingthetheoretical
land-
scape,GlaserandStrauss argued thatthisapproach generatedtheories
withlittle
connection
tosubstantive
sociallifebecauseresearchers wouldforcedataintothestraightjacket ofpreexistingconcepts.Instead,
theyfavored generatingtheoriesbasedonthe"emergence" oftheoretical
categories
througha process
of
constant comparisonsbetween groupssampledon theoretical In TheDiscovery
grounds. ofGrounded
Theory, theyrepeatedlyadmonished researchers nottobe ledastraybyan earlycommitment toexisting
theory:"Aneffectivestrategyis,atfirst, toignore
literally theliterature
oftheoryandfactoftheareaunder
study,inordertoassurethattheemergence ofcategorieswillnotbecontaminatedbyconceptsmoresuited
todifferentareas"(GlaserandStrauss 1967:37).
GlaserandStrauss positedan"inductive method oftheorydevelopment"thatledtoeither
a substantive
ora formal theorythrougha heuristicprocess ofabstraction:

To maketheoretical
senseofso muchdiversity
inhisdata,theanalystis forced
todevelopideason
a levelofgenerality inconceptual
higher abstraction
thanthequalitative
materialbeinganalyzed....
Iftheanalyststarts
withrawdata,hewillendupinitially
witha substantivetheory.... Ifhestarts
withthefindingsdrawnfrom manystudies toanabstract
pertaining sociological
category, hewill
endupwitha formal theory toa conceptual
pertaining area.(GlaserandStrauss1967:115)

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170 Sociological 30(3)
Theory

GlaserandStrauss proposed a "constant comparative method" thatshouldbe evaluated basedonthe


transparencyofthemethodological process andtheresulting conceptual framework: "Do thecategories fit
andwork? Aretheyclearly indicated bydata,anddo theyexplain, predict,andinterpret anything ofsig-
nificance?"(GlaserandStrauss1967:91).Theoretical sampling suggests sampling comparison groups
basedon"thetheoretical relevance forfurthering thedevelopment ofemerging categories" (Glaserand
Strauss1967:49).In thisway,theyaspiredforgrounded theory methodology to produce whatMerton
calledmiddle-range theories "between highly abstract theory and the multitudeof miniscule substantive
studies"(Glaserand Strauss 1967:97).
Atthesametime, GlaserandStrauss notedthattheoretical insights thecultivation
require ofa personal
they
quality called"theoreticalsensitivity," of the
consisting "ability to havetheoretical insightintoanarea
ofresearch,combined withanability tomakesomething ofinsights." Theoreticalsensitivity consisted of
an"armamentarium ofcategories andhypotheses onsubstantive andformal levels."Yetonceagain,they
qualifiedtheircallforsuchtheoretical sensitivitywiththestrong admonition thatcreativity is lostwhen
commit
sociologists themselves to "preconceived," or
"doctrinaire,""pet" theories (GlaserandStrauss
1967:46).From thebeginning, then, their commitment to an inductive approachcreated anepistemological
andpracticaldilemma: Researchers wereadmonished togenerate newtheory without beingbeholden to
but still
theories, they required
preexisting theoreticalsensitivity based ona broad with
familiarity existing
togenerate
theories newtheories.
Thiscontradictory advicesidestepped a logicalproblem: Induction doesnotgenerate theory. Glaserand
Strauss'
s approach toinduction the of
resembles approaches earlyempiricist who
philosophers argued that
theonlyreliable theoriesarethosegeneralized from observable data. FrancisBacon had indeed argued in
his1620Novum Organum forfreeing one'smindfrom theoretical biasesbefore conducting research, let-
tinggo ofthe"idols"ofpreconceived notions (Bacon[1620]1994).However, evencontemporary philo-
sophical attacked
rationalists Bacon's"naïveempiricism" (Chalmers 1999),andhisphilosophy wasdealt
a devastatingblowbyHume's"problem ofinduction" andKant'scritique ofanyclaimtonaturally per-
ceivecausalrelations.Mostphilosophers ofscience, atleastsincethewaning ofthe1930s'"Vienna circle"
oflogicalpositivism, takeas a starting pointthatobservation is necessarily theoretically informed (e.g.,
Galison1987;Kuhn1962;Lakatos1978).Induction mayhavean important placein research, butits
strengthdoesnotlieingenerating newtheories.

THE LOGIC OF ABDUCTION


A number ofauthors haverecently arguedthattheultimate goalofgrounded theory- theconstruction
of
newtheories - calls forwhatpragmatist CharlesS. Peircelabeledusingthe"peculiar" term(Peirce
1935:525)abduction (Coffey andAtkinson 1996;Haig 1995;Kelle2007;Locke2007;Reichertz 2007;
Strubing 2007).TheLatinetymology ofabduction suggestsa leadingaway.In thecontext ofresearch,
abduction refersto an inferentialcreativeprocessofproducing newhypotheses andtheories basedon
surprisingresearchevidence.A researcher is ledawayfrom oldtonewtheoretical insights.
Whereas logicalempiricistphilosophers of sciencesuchas Popper, Reichenbach,andBraithwraite
assume a sharp oflaborbetween
division discovery andjustification(seeSiegel1980),Peircetreated
scien-
tificworkas an ongoing actwherein "discovery" and"justification" areinseparablemoments. Although
Peircetookthenatural sciences as hismodel, thebasiclogicalmodelofabduction hasa widerapplication.
Peircepositioned inferencewithin theactofmeaning making; logicwasinseparable from His
semiotics.
approach restedonabduction as the"process offorming anexplanatory hypothesis"(Peirce1934:171)and
theonlylogicalmechanism thatintroducesnewideasintoa scientific bodyofknowledge. Although s
Peirce'
understanding ofabductionevolved throughout hiscareer, thereis a coresetofideasthatpresentabduction
inferential
as a synthetic process involvedintheproduction ofhypotheses (Fann1970).
Abduction hasa logicalform from
distinct induction anddeduction. Deductive reasoningbeginswith
a ruleandproceeds through a casetoarrive atan observed result, whicheitherdemonstrates theruleor
it.Thus,thegeneral
falsifies form ofdeduction is as follows:

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Timmermans
andTavory 17 1

AllA areB.

C is A.

Thus,C is B.
incontrast,
Induction, starts
witha collection
ofgivencasesandproceeds their
byexamining implied
todevelopaninference
results thatsomeuniversalruleis operative:

Allobserved
A areC.

Thus,allA areC.

Theinductive
rulegainscertainty
withthemultiplication
ofcases,although,
as wenotedabove,thevery
ofA andC andtheconnection
definitions between
themcannot themselves
be explained
byinduction.
Last,abduction with
starts and
consequences then reasons:
constructs

factC is observed.
Thesurprising

ButifA weretrue,
C wouldbe a matter
ofcourse.

Hence,there
is a reasontosuspect
thatA is true.(Peirce1934:117)

In otherwords,abduction is theformofreasoning through whichwe perceive thephenomenon as


relatedtootherobservations either inthesensethatthere is a causeandeffecthidden fromview,inthe
sensethatthephenomenon is seenas similar toother phenomena alreadyexperiencedandexplained in
other orinthesenseofcreating
situations, newgeneral descriptions. Abductionis themostconjectural of
thethreelogicsbecauseitseeksa situational fitbetweenobserved factsandrules.
Inhislaterwritings,Peirceconsidered abductiontobe thefirst stepina methodologicalprocessofsci-
entific
inquirythatalsorequired inductionanddeduction(Fann1970)."Abduction istheprocessofforming
an explanatoryhypothesis. Itis theonlylogicaloperation whichintroduces anynewideas;forinduction
doesnothing butdetermine a value,anddeduction merely involves thenecessaryconsequences ofa pure
hypothesis"(Peirce1934:171).In Peirce'sview,then,abduction is an integral
processofthescientific
method. Oncea hypothesis hasbeenformed, deductionhelpsworkoutthehypothesis byprovidinga plau-
siblegeneralization
orcausalchain.Induction constitutes
theevaluation ofthehypothesisbecauseitpro-
videsthedatathatshould conform tothedeductivelydelineated premises.Abduction,Peircenoted,
provides
lesscertainty
thaninduction, andbothofthoseprocesses werelesssecure thandeduction,butabductionhad
innovative Induction
potential. was ableto classifyonlybygrouping in a preformed
particulars general
category,whileabduction formulated theexplanation,
thecategory intowhichobservationswouldfall.
Abduction suggestedexplanations, which werethenformalized intodeductions,
whileinductionconfirmed
them throughempirical testing: "Abduction seeksa theory.Induction seeksforfacts"(Peirce1958:217-18).
WithinPeirce'sbroader theory ofinference,
meaning, andaction, peopleconstantlyperformabduction
intheireveryday life,continuously their
recalibrating expectations ofthefuturewhentheyfacesurprising
phenomena.4 Peircedistinguished twokindsofsurprise:novelty - ora newexperience - andanomaly - or
anunexpected experience. Inscience, surprising callforanexplanation.
findings Peirceconceptualized the
processofabduction as botha logicalinference anda flashofinsight whenone'smindwanders
occurring
(seeReichertz2007).As Peirceputit:

Itis anactofinsight, ofextremely


although fallible Itis truethatthedifferent
insight. of
elements
thehypothesiswereinourmindsbefore;
butitis theideaofputting whatwe hadnever
together

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172 Sociological 30(3)
Theory

beforedreamedofputting
together beforeourcontemplation.
thenewsuggestion
whichflashes
(Peirce1934:181)

Theproblem wasnotso muchto comeup witha goodhypothesis butto decidewhichhypothesis was


worthpursuing: Howwouldwechooseoneparticular direction withinanendless universe
ofpossibilities?
EvenPeirce' s mostavidsupporters consideredhis solution fordiscriminating between competing
hypothesesa problematic partofhis writings
philosophical on abduction Anderson
(e.g., 2005; Fann 1970;
Paavola2005;Rescher 1978).As Paavola (2005)argued, Peirce approached this using
question three kinds
ofargumentation. He sometimes revertedtometaphysical andtheistic arguments, butmost prominently,
Peircepositeda naturalistic basisforabduction - as we arealreadywithin we haveacquired
nature,
the
through process ofevolution an to the
"affinity" waythings actuallywork aroundus. LikeWilliam
he
James, argued that thecomplexity ofthe human mind a
implies complexity of instincts
(ratherthana
of
paucity instincts). Peircesaw an "innatetendencytoward a positivetruth"(Peirce1934:591) as suchan
instinct.
After all,ifchickens know the"correct" to
grains peck at sincebirth,"why shouldyou thinkthat
tomanalonethisgiftis denied" (Peirce1934:591)?
Thishighly problematic form ofreasoning,however, wasnotthesoleonePeirceused.Inother places,
Peircestatedthatinstinctsshouldnotbe considered onlytendencies peoplearebornwithbutshouldalso
includethetendencies thatpeopledevelopthroughout theirlives.According tothisformulation, the"ten-
dencytoward a positivetruth"is complemented by a cultivated perceptual -
insight whatHusserl (1960)
wouldcall "apperceptions" and "appresentations," socializedwaysof perceiving. Indeed,as Peirce
(1934:181)wrote, "abductiveinferenceshadesintoperceptual judgments."

ABDUCTIVE ANALYSIS: THE ROLE OF THEORIES


Peirce'
s writingsonabduction provide a refreshingdirectionforthinkingabouttheoreticalinnovation, but
theambiguities ofabductive reasoning resultinawkward andimpractical advice(Levin-Rozalis 2000).To
makeabduction pragmatically generative, thesourceoftheabductive process should be elucidated,brack-
etinganynatural between
affinity person andworld(Locke,Golden-Biddle, andFeldman 2008).
Abduction should beunderstood as a continuous processofconjecturingabouttheworldthatis shaped
bythesolutions a researcher has"ready-to-hand" (Heidegger [1927]1996).Instead of"natural instinct,"
we arguethatsocially cultivated andcultivatable waysofseeingbecomethepreconditions forabductive
reasoning.Thesubstitution ofa "truth instinct"forcultured knowledge provides a wayto conceiveof
abduction as sociallylocated, positional knowledge thatcanbe deepened andmarshaled fortheory con-
Italsoallowsus togaininsights
struction. from theliterature
onpositionality,wherein muchis madeof
thefactthattheresearcher is partoftheworldofthepeoplestudied. Thisbeing-in-the-world, however, is
farfrom beinga guarantor fortruth butis a coreissuetobe grappled with,inevitably leading topartial,
situated
historically insights,andprovoking questionsofscientific
authorityandrepresentation (Atkinson
1990;MarcusandFischer 1986).Therichsociological andanthropologicalliteratureonpositionality has
calledfordiverse forms ofepistemological wherecritically
accountability, interrogatinga researcher's
biography, intentions,andprocedural principles offers oftheposition
a clarification from whichknowl-
edgehadbeenculled(Macbeth 2001).
Theexamination ofthequalitative researcher's rolein theworldresembles earliermethodological
approaches exhorting researchers tobe cognizant ofreactivityandresearch roles(AdlerandAdler1987;
Becker1967;Hammersley andAtkinson 1983).Qualitativeresearchas diverseas autoethnography (Ellis
1995),standpoint feminism (Smith 2005),interpretive (Denzin2001),reflexive
interactionism ethnogra-
phy(Burawoy 2003),andcritical raceethnography (Collins1992)putpositionalityattheheart ofmethod-
ology.Atitscore,thearguments oftheliterature onpositionalityarequitesimple. We alwaysoccupya
certainposition(as parents,as academics, as middle-class etc.),andthisposition
Latinas, colorsourvision,
by(1) allowing usonlya partial accesstothefieldandshaping thewayinwhichourinterlocutors interact

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Timmermans
andTavory 173

withusand(2) arming uswithprototheories oftheworld, waysto"case"thephenomena infront ofusthat


arealready deeplyingrained inthewaysweperceive theworld.
Thisdoesnotmean,however, thatwe shouldassignprimacy to fixed, generic identity a
categories,
form of"academic paint-by-number landscape" (Robertson 2002:790).Thedanger hereis to use these
ready-made categorizations toobliterate thecomplexity ofpersonal andprofessional lives,toself-stereotype,
andtoessentialize theresearcher inwaysthatcomplacently exudeauthority (Brewer 2000;Murphy and
Dingwall2003).Positions arecomplexandsituated - including theobviousrace-class-gender trifecta
andalsospecific lifehistories andintellectual biographies (Gross2009b).Wemayseethrough gendered
andracialized eyes,butwe also see through thetheoretical lensesofthetraining we wentthrough, the
theories weread,thepolitical allegiances wemayhavefostered (see,e.g.,Brubaker 1993).
Abduction thusdepends ontheresearcher's cultivated position. Thedisposition toperceive theworld
anditssurprises - including theveryreflection on one'spositions in thisworld5 - is predicated on the
researcher's biography as well as on an and
affinity familiarity with broader theoretical fields.Abductive
analysis, consequently, restsfora largepartonthescopeandsophistication ofthetheoretical background
a researcher brings to research. and
Unanticipated surprising observations are strategic inthesensethat
theydepend ona theoretically sensitized observer whorecognizes their potential relevance.
Thisviewofabduction necessitates a radicalshift from thetraditionally reluctant engagement oftheo-
reticalliterature ingrounded theory. Discovering new theories depends on the inability to frame findings
inexisting theoretical frameworks as wellas ontheability tomodify andextend existing theoriesinnovel
ways(James [1907]1981).In-depth of
knowledge multiple theorizations is thus necessary both tofindout
whatis missing oranomalous inan areaofstudy andto stimulate insights about innovative ororiginal
theoretical contributions. Rather thanengaging withthescholarly literature attheendoftheresearch pro-
ject,as inductivist approaches haveoften advised, abduction assumesextensive familiarity withexisting
theories attheoutset andthroughout every research step.
Wearenot,however, advocating a return todeduction basedonexisting theories. Knowing thelitera-
tureandbeingprofessionally positioned is farfrom coming the to field toverify, falsify, ormodify a uni-
fied,firmed-up theory, stilllessfinding onlywhatweexpect tofind. Thisisbecausesociology isnot- and
neverwas- a paradigmatic science, inthesenseKuhn(1962)gavetheword.Therehasneverbeenonly
onedisciplinary matrix intowhichall knowledge fits,notevenintheheyday ofstructural functionalism.
"Knowing thetheory" means,inessence, knowing thetheories. Theyaresensitizing notions thatinform
research butdonotdetermine thescopeofperceivable findings (Blumer 1954).Ifouraimis toenrich the
abductive possibilities ofresearch, theoretical breadth is encouraged (HenwoodandPidgeon2003).In
muchthesamewaythatAbbott (2004)explores theoretical debates fortheir heuristic potential,existing
theories readeither as anargument oras a wayofargumentation, a wayofseeingthatmayfoster further
theoretical innovation.
As thisdiscussion clarifies,abduction is farfrom beingtheprivilege ofgrounded theory methodology.
Other qualitative approaches haverecommended thatresearchers enter thefieldprepared andwellread.To
takea prominent example, theManchester school'sextended-case method, as reinterpreted byMichael
Burawoy (2009),is often mistaken fora deductive qualitative research approach. A closerlookatitsepiste-
mologica! grounds intheworkofLakatos (1970,1978)showsthat ittooaimsatreworking theory byseeking
outunexpected findings, focusing onthedoublefitting oftheory andanomalous observations tocreatetheo-
reticalprotection. Burawoy ispartial toa Marxist-Gramscian approach that locates ethnographic observations
ina fieldofglobalizing socialforces. Yethisgeneral thrust supports abduction, albeitinanoverly narrow
way.Asseveral observers havepointed out(Eliasoph andLichterman 1999;Tavory andTimmermans 2009),
theextended casemethod beginsfrom a worldalready theorized; thegeneral contours ofthenarrative are
provided byonewell-defined theory. Weargue, however, that theworld is alwaysconceived (bothprotothe-
oreticallyandtheoretically) inmultiple ways.Indeed, abduction andtheory construction wouldbecome quite
predetermined ifitwerenot(Stark 2009;VedresandStark 2010).Inaddition, as weshowbelow,extended
casemethod lacksthemethodological heuristics todrawsurprises outofempirical material.

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174 Sociological
Theory
30(3)

To understand thisdifference, however, we needtodo morethannotethatsuchinformed theoretical


agnosticism changes ourrelationship tothefieldandthekindofhypotheses anddata-gathering tactics we
canuse.We needto clarify whatwe meanby"theory" - bothinterms ofourgoalandinterms ofthe
theoreticalinspirations inthefield.In terms ofinspiration, we arguethatwhatever provides researchers
witha waytoasknewquestions orseetheworlddifferently is potentially useful - from erudite abstrac-
tionsto localexplanatory frameworks andpersonal experiences (Strauss1987).In thatsense,theonly
criterionforusefulinspiration is thegeneral pragmatist guideline thattheories arewayseither toasknew
questions ortomakenewobservations possible(Dewey1925;James [1907]1981).
In terms ofthetheories thatabductive analysis helpsgenerate, however, ourcriteria needtobe nar-
rower. Thetheories developed in abductive analysisdenotean attempt to generalize causallinksand
descriptionsoftheworld outofparticular empirical instances (seealsoAbend2008:177-79; Gross2009a).
Suchtheories depend on the fit with observations and their in
plausibilitylight of alternative theoretical
accounts. Pragmatically speaking, better theories allow for understanding ofmore and a broader variety of
phenomena. As a form of generalization, theory allows us to move between instances within the same
studyandbetween studies as wellas toexpectcertain things tohappen andexplain howandwhycertain
events havehappened. Abductive analysis specifically aims at generating novel theoretical insights that
reframe empirical findings in contrast to existing theories.
Thereareother forms of"sociological theory," suchas aninvolvement withclassicaltheory ora pro-
duction ofanepochalworldview. Whilethosemaybe usefulinterms ofinspiration, andwhiletheyalso
maycallforabductive reasoning, thisreasoning is notnecessarily related totheempirical research actin
thesameway.Attheother endofthespectrum, although even a listof variables ora simpledescription
includesprototheoretical assumptions regarding relevance (Weick1995),thetheories weareafter aremore
explicitabout their if
pretensesonly because otherwise any form of writing can be read as theory.
Anexample oftheaddedanalytical valueofa broadtheoretical base,anditsuseindeveloping theory,
canbe found inDianeVaughan's historical ethnography ofthespaceshuttle Challenger launchdecision
andaccident. Vaughanwas attracted to grounded theory's emphasis on making constant comparisons
acrossvarious casesbutqualified heruseofgrounded theory with the proviso that "we alwayshavesome
theories,models, orconcepts inmind"(Vaughan 2004:319).Havingalready conducted three earlier case
studies,Vaughan approached theChallenger casewitha Mertonian-inspired organizational theory of mis-
conduct thatsuggested an interplay between threesetsoffactors: forces ofcompetition andscarcity as
pressures toviolatelaws,rulesandorganizational structure andprocesses as opportunities toviolate, and
a regulatory structurethatsystematically failsto deterviolations (Vaughan1983).Vaughan intended to
furtherstrengthen hertheory byselecting a newcasethatallowedhertoelaborate hertheory acrossvarious
organizational forms.Thereport from thepresidential commission ontheChallenger accident seemedto
confirm theinitialimpression ofmisconduct: Its authors pointed to flaweddecisionmaking in which
NASAmanagers knowingly tookrisksbasedoneconomic pressures.
Important forourdiscussion ofabduction, Vaughan thusapproached thecasewitha layering ofpreex-
istingtheoretical tools(suchas interactionism, Bourdieusian fieldtheory, andneoinstitutionalism) andher
originalsyntheses andinnovations culledinprevious studies. Thesetools,however, didnotfittheChal-
lengercase.Vaughan keptfinding disagreements intestimonies byengineers andmanagers thatcontra-
dicted theconclusion ofmisconduct. Vaughan described thecritical breakthrough:

whether
To determine thiscasewasanexampleofmisconduct ornot,I haddecided onthefollowing
Ruleviolations
strategy: wereessential as I wasdefining
tomisconduct, it.... I chosethethree
most
controversial forin-depth
[ruleviolations] I discovered
analysis. thatwhatI thought wereruleviola-
tionswereactions
completely withNASArules!"(Vaughan
inaccordance 2004:320)

Eventually herdataas anorganizationally


sheabducted producedmistake ofmisconduct.
instead
WhenVaughan layattheorigin
thata mistake
realized ofthespaceshuttle shebeganrecon-
disaster,
ofalldecisions
a chronology
structing thesolidrocket
about between
boosters theoretical
1977and1985.Thus,

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Timmermans
andTavory 175

preparationresultednotonlyina largerarmamentarium foranalysisbutalsoina different


methodological
forreturning
strategy intothefieldintheongoingback-and-forth
between anddatagathering.
analysis The
importance of the structuralpositionand specialization
as suggested by new institutionalism and
Bourdieu's notionofhabitusalsoprompted Vaughan tocross-checkeachindividual'stestimony,interview
data,andactions inhistorical
as reflected documents.This,inturn,ledhertotheliterature onprofession-
alization
ofengineering andmanagerial cultures.
Attheendofherresearch, Vaughan theorizedtheNASA
decision-making processas oneoforganizational inwhichgradually
conformity, shifting beliefs
local of
riskacceptability
embedded inprofessional and
engineering managerial cultures
valuing compromises in
an environment of structural secrecy,createdan organizationalprocess that normalized deviance
(Vaughan1996).
Vaughan's project alsodemonstratestheimportanceofdeductively checkingnovelexplanations with
newdatatotesttheoretical robustness.
Aftershedelineatedan organizational that
process explained the
normalizationofpreviously deviantO-rings,Vaughan analyzedtheteleconferencecallinwhich thedeci-
sionto launchChallenger was madein detail.Duringthecall,theparticipants discussed whetherthe
launchshould be postponed duetothecoldtemperature. Vaughan observed that

thesamefactors thatexplainedthenormalizationofdeviancein thehistory ofdecisionmaking


explainedthe decisionmaking on theeve ofthelaunch! The of
productionculture, theculture
of
production,and structural
secrecyworked as
together,before, normalizingyetanother -
anomaly
unprecedented coldtemperature- and systematicallyproducinga decisionto proceedwiththe
... Allparticipants
launch. conformedtothedictatesoftheculture
ofproduction,thusexpanding
the
boundsofacceptable riskonefinaltime.(Vaughan 2004:337)

Thetheoretical
analysis
Vaughanconstructed
thusemerged outofempirical
contradictions
generated
by
herin-depth withexisting
familiarity Within
theories. thistheoretical "another
context, technical
mistake,
a misunderstood anunforeseen
procedure, actionoractor"(Vaughan
contingency, 1996:335)abductively
pushedtheanalysis
along.

ABDUCTIVE ANALYSIS: THE ROLE OF METHOD


Ifthecontexts ofdiscoveryandjustification
areseenas a seamless whole,theactsofgathering dataand
primary analysisbecomesitesforfostering abductivereasoning. Evenwitha firm theoretical
backing,
theoretical
misfitsdo notautomaticallydevelopwhenimmersing oneselfina research site.Whilesuch
anomalies areopportunities
todevelopnewtheoretical insightsandmodify existing researchers
theories,
needtofoster anenvironment thatallowsdoubttodevelop(Lockeetal. 2008).Thisconducive environ-
mentis predicatedona seriesofpreestablishedstepsthroughwhichtheresearcher revisits
thephenome-
non- inother words,onmethod.
Here,wetheorizegrounded theory'smethodologicalstepsofdataanalysis.Through thegroundedtheory
heuristics
offieldnotetaking,theoretical
sampling,codingalongvarious dimensions, memowriting,con-
stantcomparing,andsortinganddiagramming memos (Charmaz 2006;Strauss 1987),qualitativeresearch-
ersareurgedto subjecttheirworktoa seriesoftedious andtime-consuming methodological sequences.
Generally,takingdetailedfieldnotesandprecisetranscriptions
is understood as a wayto checkagainst
faultymemory andagainstthetendency- wellestablishedinthestudy ofmemory andofrumor - tomodify
ourfieldexperience so thatitfitsbetter
retroactively withourtheoreticalproclivitiesorwiththekindof
narrativewe wanttotell(AllportandPostman 1947;Schechter 1997).In thissense,thesestepsdo what
many methodological
guidelinesdo:Theyincrease theresistance
ofthephenomenon toourinterpretations.
codingandmemowriting
Similarly, aredesigned toensurethatwe thoroughly familiarizeourselves
with
ourdata,thatwedonotforget theinteractions
wehavebeenprivy toonceweputthem downonthepage.
Suchmethodological whenperformed
steps, a theoretical
against background, canalsoserveas heuris-
ticsfortheconstruction
oforiginaltheoretical andarethusa crucial
insights partofabductive To
analysis.

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176 Sociological
Theory
30(3)

develophowgrounded methods
theory helpinabductive wedeepen
analysis, thequestion in
ofperception
theresearch
process.
Remainingwithwhatwe seeas themostgenerative ofPeirce'swaysofexplicating
we focuson therelationship
abduction, between theoretically waysof seeingtheworldand
cultivated
abductive Where
reasoning. theories toseethephenomenon
allowus initially insociologically
interesting
ways,methodsaredesigned
tocompel ustorevisit againandagain,defamiliarize
thesameobservation the
known world, casingstoourobservations.
andapplyalternative

Revisiting the Phenomenon


Although perception is usually treated as a one-time experience, theimportance ofqualitative methods in
thecontext oftheory construction stems first from researchers' abilitytorevisitthe phenomenon they study
inlightofexisting theoretical accounts.6 Theinscription ofobservation (whether through fieldnotesor
through interview transcripts)is notsolelyperformed as a waytocheckforfaulty memory andcognitive
biasesbutto sensitize different theoretical approaches. Drawing on the work of phenomenological phi-
losopher Jean-Luc Marion(2002),we arguethatevenwithout methods, experiencing thephenomenon
should notbeconceived ofas a singular occurrence, sealedanddonewithafter thefirst encounter. Rather,
inthelanguage ofMarion, is
perceptionalways "saturated." That the
is, phenomenon alwaysoverflows
ourinitialperception ofit.As we attend tothephenomenon overtime, we revisit ourexperience, andas
werevisit we
it, reexperience it in different ways.
Oneoftheexamples givenbyMarion(2002)forsuch"overflowing ofthephenomenon" is thatofa
manlooking in
ata picture a museum, halfwayand into this visit,finding that he thinks about itagain,
understanding itdifferently andseeingthings he missed when he was physically in frontof it.As he walks
around differentexhibits, thetemporal shift is followed by situationalchanges, and with the
them, procliv-
itytoseethings innewways.Thus,forexample, hereexperiences thepainting differentlywhenhesud-
denlyrealizesthatsomeaspects looka lotlikethoseofother drawings madeatthesameperiod - something
hemight realizeonlyafter walking through theexhibition fora while.
In theoretical terms, thesituational specificity ofthereliving ofexperience allowsus toposition our
perception innewrelations toother phenomena. Thisrevisiting, forcing theresearcher toreevaluate and
rethinkmundane experience tobreakthehabituation ofperception (Kilpinen 2009),is heightened through
detailedfieldnotes,transcriptions, coding, andmemowriting. Datathathavenotbeenvery"luminous"
(Katz2001b)inthefieldoften yieldinsights through repetitive methodological processes. To return tothe
concept of"saturation" offered byMarion (2002),themethodological process canbe seenas a contrivance
forreexperiencing whentaking advantage ofthewaysthesameobservation changes as itis perceived in
differentpoints oftime, from different theoretical vantage points.
Interms offurthering abductive analysis, revisitingthephenomena is a waytoharness temporality in
theservice oftheory construction. Thekeyinsight weuseinMarion's(2002)depiction of"saturation" is
thatwithtimeelapsed, a phenomenon's relevance changes. Thus,recurrent revisits,whendonecarefully,
almost necessarily provide whatWalter Benjamin, writing abouthistory, calledan"imagethatflashes up
atthemoment ofitsrecognizability" (Benjamin [1940]2003:301),a theoretically salientimagethatillu-
minates different aspects ofthedataandforegrounds previously undistinguishable facets.

Defamiliarization
Marion's(2002)notionofsaturation byanother
is complemented ofgrounded
effect methodology:
theory
defamiliarization.
Althoughthequestion wasdealtwithinthepragmatist
ofdefamiliarization on
writings
itseffect
habit, wasbestcapturedintheliterary movement
criticism oftheearlytwentieth known
century
In a classicessay,thefounder
as Russianformalism. ofthemovement,VictorShklovsky
([1917]1965),
arguedthatpoeticlanguagegainsitspotency from ofthelanguage
thedefamiliarization of
andexperience
everydaylife.Either
through minute theuseofmetaphor,
description, orsimply linebreaksin
unnatural

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Timmermans
andJavory 177

wefindourselves
poetry, confrontingoureverydayexperience as unfamiliar,gaining a deeper appreciation
foritorthinking itanew.Objectsthatwererelegated tothebackground ofourexperience, as theywere
tootakenforgranted tobe givena secondthought, suddenly becomepossiblefocalpoints. Thislineof
waslatertaken
reasoning onbyothers, becoming thetechnique of"alienation" employed byBrecht (1974)
andfindingitswayas theobjectofsociology intheworkofPeterBerger (1963),whoargued thatoneof
thewaysinwhichsociology enrichesourunderstanding ofsociallifeis byestranging thefamiliar.
Theactofinscription throughoutthemethodological sequence functions as such a techniqueofdefa-
miliarization.
As anthropologist JackGoody(1977)notedmorebroadly, we actually thinkdifferentlyin
thaninatextual
textual modesofengagement. Theinscribed textbothproblematizes andcrystallizes things
thatwe wouldglossoverin atextual accounts.Certain similarities,
logicalfallacies, lists,anddetailed
comparisonsbecomepossibleas technologies oftheintellect.Rather thanlamenting theinscriptionof
experienceas a loss of immediacy, abductive analysis createsa -
different -
defamiliarized object that
providesus withopportunities andmodesofthought thatwe glossoverin ourimmediate experience.
Defamiliarization
thusaugments theresearcher's
abilitytorevisitthedatainwaysthatincrease thefecun-
dityofabductive reasoning.Whereas revisits
are analytically on
dependent shifting relevancies over time,
theartificiality
ofinscription allowstheresearchertocreatesemantic distance from thetakenforgranted.

AlternativeCasing
Although there canbe no standardized protocol fortheory thecomplementary
construction, processes of
and
revisiting defamiliarizing maximize the possibilitiesof abduction.Defamiliarizationensures thatwe
mulloveraspects wetookforgranted, andrevisiting allowsustoreturn tothesameobservation transsitu-
ationally.When these take
processes place in a contextofexisting theories,we can"case"ourdatain
differenttheoretical waysas we go along(RaginandBecker1992;TavoryandTimmermans 2009).
Practically,researchers should thinkthrough different conceptual andtheoretical frameworks inbothcod-
ingandmemowriting. Theyshouldforcethemselves to takea relativelysmalldataexcerpt andwork
through itindetailinlight oftheir theoreticalexpertise,trying tofindas many possiblewaystounderstand
thedataas can be found.How do thedatalookfromAbbott's(1988) system theoryof professions,
Heimer's (Heimer andStaffen 1998)organizational theory ofresponsibility,
orSuchman's (2007)theory
ofsituated action? Eachcasingabstracts andhighlights differentaspectsofthephenomenon, rendering it
comparable todifferent phenomena andturning itintoa generalizationthatthencanbe linkedto other
fieldsandtheories.
As ourperception ofthephenomenon is colored bytheoreticalformulations, someofthosecasings will
easilyfallwithin therealmofexisting theories. Others, however, maybemoredifficult tofitin.Although
theliteraturesinwhich wearesteeped guidetheanalytical process, andmakerevisiting anddefamiliariza-
tionworthwhile, thereality is thatcarefulcodingusually meansitis notthatobvioustoimposetheory on
data.As Winship (2006)notedinthecontext ofpublicpolicydecisions, decisions oftenemerge inthe
processof fiddling with,andpuzzlingout,aspectsof thesituation. Carefulcodingalmostinevitably
requiresfurther definitionandoperationalization ofconcepts, processes,andtheoreticallinks,adding sur-
prisingpiecesto thepuzzleat hand.7 Fieldnotesandcodingarethusprocesses designedto maximize
abductive analysis, where weforce ourselvestoremain withthephenomenon andtrytoform as many links
andhypotheses as possibleinlightofourtheoretically positioned knowledge, evenafterwe feelwehave
noother possible casings toprovide. Thetrick is tocontinue analyzing thedatawordbyword, linebyline,
paragraph byparagraph, to "turnoverourrecollection of observed facts"(Peirce1934:183,1958:36).
Often,theprocess ofpuzzling through thedatanotonlywillcreate a newpuzzlebutmayactually construct
a newgamewithnewrulesforthinking abouttherelationship between differentpieces.
Theswitch from induction to abduction thusrequires a gestalt switchinwhichthetheoretical back-
ground is foregrounded as a waytosetupempirical puzzles(AdlerandAdler2009).Heuristics forsuch
alternativecasingthatstimulate abductive reasoning arecentral togrounded theorymethodology andto

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178 Sociological
Theory
30(3)

other sociologists interested intheory construction (Abbott 2004;Becker1998;Corbin andStrauss 2008;


Strauss1987;Vaughan1992).Expanding thescopeofthetheory through "constant comparisons," for
example, is a critical
strategy ingrounded theory, as itis intheworkofEverett Hughes ([1945]1971).The
purpose ofthisheuristic is to compare newdataexcerpts withconcepts underdevelopment toexamine
casesthatcouldbe expected toconform totheemergent theory anddetermine whether thetheory explains
their variation. Areproblems withawareness relevant onlyfordying patients inhospitals, ordo similar
interactional problems aboutone'sstatus emerge inother institutional locations suchas schoolsorprisons
(GlaserandStrauss1965)?Snowetal. (2003),similar toVaughan (2004;analogical theorizing), locate
thiskindofheuristic fortheory extension through comparison in a Simmelian project focusing on recurring
theoretical "forms" acrossdiverse contexts (seealsoZerubavel 1980).Thegoalofthisheuristic precisely
is toforce researchers torethink theirdata,totryandseeitinlight ofdifferent cases,tocaseitinas many
waysas possible. Thechoiceforcomparison groups, ofcourse, depends on theresearcher's familiarity
withresearch andtheory. However, such a heuristicforces the researcher consciously tocasetheobserva-
tionsinlightofother instances takenfrom theliterature; thedefamiliarization ofobservations is coupled
witha sustained to
attemptreexperience them as part of different cases.
StefanTimmermans's (1999a,1999b)studyofresuscitati ve efforts in twoemergency departments
offers anexample ofthewaythatgrounded theory-inspired methods allow fortheabductive construction
oftheory.8 Oneempirical puzzleinTimmermans's study wasthetremendous variation intheextent to
whichtheemergency staffwerecommitted tosavinga lifeduring resuscitative efforts. As inVaughan' s
case, there was an officialexplanation for such variation: Emergency medicine that
proposed life-saving
efforts depended on thepresence ofvitalsigns.Thisofficial explanation beliedthereality ofobserved
resuscitative efforts,however. In some situations,the staff did not seem to want to a
regain patient's pulse,
whileforother patientstheywouldcontinue resuscitating evenwhensignsofdeathhadobviously setin.
Codingoftheempirical datainthe"grounded theory tradition" (Timmermans 1999b:211)revealed differ-
encesinintent tobring thepatient of
backtolifealonga variety patient, and
staff, organizational charac-
butnoclearorganizing
teristics, principle stoodout.
Itwasonlywhenrevisiting thedatawhilereading Sudnow's (1967)study ofdying inhospitals, Passing
On,thatthevariation intheemergency department gainedtheoretical traction. Sudnow argued thatdying
inhospitals restsona patient's positioninaninstitution-specific moralevaluation. Certain salient patient
characteristics addeduptoa presumed "socialworth," andthestaff interacted differently basedontheir
assessment ofthepatient's position in thismoralhierarchy. Whilereading Sudnow, Timmermans was
transcribing interviews withemergency department staff andwasstruck bya casualstatement madebya
nurse whocommented thatshewouldalwaysresuscitate a young person, evena person whohada living
will,"becausetomethatis thesameas stating suicideina passiveaggressive kindofway."Takenaback
bytheequation ofa living willwithsuicidalideation fora young person, Timmermans suddenly realized
thatthere wasanorganizational principle inthevariation: A young patient, a patient known tothestaff, or
a patient withwhomthestaff identified was morelikelyto generate an aggressive resuscitative effort,
whilea patient witha history ofsubstance abuseoranoldpatient hadtheopposite effect. Revisiting field
noteswithrenewed rounds ofcareful codinginlightoftheseemerging theoretical insights revealed thata
keyelement inresuscitative fervor wasthepatient's ability totranscend anonymity.
Yetsimply extrapolating Sudnow'sinsights tothecurrent situation wasdissatisfactory becauseevery
aspectofU.S.health carehadchanged drastically during thepast30years.Sudnow's theory neededfurther
theoretical development to makethespecificity ofTimmermans's findings standout,to avoidglossing
overthehistorically situated natureoftheobservations. To capture howforms ofpersonhood mattered in
thisnewhistorical juncture, Timmermans replaced Sudnow'scoreconcept of"socialworth" with"social
viability" tohighlight thatinthecurrent configuration there wasnotonlya systematic constitution ofmoral
worth buta moralcalculusattached toit,so thatactions intheemergency department reflected a form of
"rationing" centered ona collective assessment ofa lifeworth saving (Timmermans 1999a).Theseinsights
inthepersistence ofsocialviability as a predictor ofstaff effort inresuscitation shifted Sudnow's emphasis

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Timmermans
andTavory 179

oninstitutional
factorstoananalysis centered onprofessionalpowerandinformed a broadertheory ofthe
socialrationinginmedical care(Timmermans 1999a).
Timmermans' s studyalso provides insight intotheprocessof methodological defamiliarization by
contrasting observations of resuscitative effortswithofficialaccounts of resuscitating.
The rationale
behind is a last-resort
resuscitation effort tosavelives.On a case-by-casebasisintheemergency depart-
ments, fewlivesweresaved.Atbest,thestaff succeeded instabilizing
somepatients andtransferring them
totheintensivecareunit.Thestaff, however, didnotseembothered by their
lackof official
success. They
congratulatedthemselves whenrunning a smooth resuscitative
effort
orwhenthey wereattentive tofamily
needs.In fieldnotes,Timmermans observed thatin almosteverysituation in whicha patient failedto
survive,thestaffconsidered theiractions and
medically morally sound inspiteofa deceased patient.Tim-
mermans thendecidedtowritedowntheexactconversations during theresuscitativeefforts
and noted
muchcasualjoking,banter aboutTV shows,discussions ofstaffingandsupplies, weekend planning or
catch-up and
talk, teasing of staff.
The tone shifted however,
dramatically, when relativesentered to pay
their
respects tothedeceased. Remaining staffaccompanied relatives
respectfully,
encouraging touchand
farewells.Thesetranscribed conversations notonlydefamiliarizedbutalsoruptured theofficial
purpose of
Timmermans
resuscitating. proposed a reversal:In resuscitative
practice, efforts
are notabout saving lives
butabout"saving" sudden death.Resuscitative efforts thesuddenness
disrupt ofanunexpected deathand
provide familiessome consolation that everything medicallypossible hadbeen done to savea relative.
Defamiliarizationledto a deeperengagement withthedeathanddying, medicaltechnologies, science
and
studies, sociology of work literatures(Timmermans 1999b).

THE ABDUCTIVE RESEARCH CYCLE


Abductive analysis involves a recursiveprocess ofdouble-fitting dataandtheories. Anabductive inference
involves making a preliminary guessbasedon theinterplay between existingtheories anddatawhen
anomalies orunexpected findings occur.Iftheexisting theories account
fully fortheempirical phenomena,
theresearcher hassimply verified anexisting theory. Astheexamples ofVaughan andTimmermans show,
however, pushing thedataagainst existing theorieswilllikelyidentify changed circumstances, additional
dimensions, ormisguided preconceptions. Anomalies, whichareinevitably bothempirical andtheoretical,
thenrequire thedevelopment oftentative newtheories builton inductive conceptualizationofthisdata
through intensive codingandother methodological steps.Thereis thusa recursive cascading ofpossible
abductions inwhichonesurprise suggests other elements thatnolonger fit(Agar2006).
Therecursive aspectofabductive analysis shouldbe understood intwocomplementary ways.First,
sharingresearch amonga community ofinquiry stimulates thearticulation andrefinement oftheoretical
constructs (seealsoStrauss 1987).Withfewexceptions, developingcollaborative relationships,
talking to
otherscholars, presenting atconferences andcolloquia, circulatingworking papers,andthelikearecrucial
sitesfortheproduction oftheory. Creative theory development doesnotoccurrandomly butoften begins
withinhabiting a marginal structuralpositionina broader intellectualmilieuthatstiflesambition (Becker
1982;Collins1987;Farrell 2001).Collinsobserved that"thinking is a conversation withimaginary audi-
ences";rather thanlocating creativitywiththeisolated heemphasized
intellectual, that"highdegrees of
intellectual creativitycomes[sic]from realistically
imagining existingorprospective intellectualaudi-
ences"
(Collins1987:67).Intense face-to-face interactions amonga smallcollaborative circleof like-
minded scholars exchanging ideaswithmixtures ofencouragement andcriticism enhance theveracity of
suchimaginary audiences (Farrell2001).Besidessupport, suchcollaborations mayhelphonea research
ethicfocused ondeliberately seeking andorganizing a noveltheoretical program aimedathigher levelsof
coherence andgenerality (Heilbron 2011).
Consensus is notnecessary inresearch collaboratives.As DavidStark(Stark2009;VedresandStark
2010)hasargued, innovation tends tooccurwhere morethanonestandard is atplay- morethanoneorder
ofworth (Boltanski andThevenot 2006).Indeed, itis ofteninthetensions between judgments, andinthe

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180 Sociological
Theory
30(3)

overlappingstructure ofmembers' professionalandintellectual thatinnovations


allegiances, arise.This,as
wehaveshown, couldbe trueontheleveloftheloneresearcher whocancasethedatainmultiple ways.
Butas Starkrightly pointsout,innovation moreoften arisesinthearguments anddebates between col-
leagueswhoare"multiple insiders"withsimultaneous allegiancestomorethanoneorder ofworth.
Second,abductive analysis furtherjump-startsbothinductive anddeductiveforms ofreasoning, which
maybe repeated as newanomalous findingsemerge. Induction looksforthecorroboration ofgeneraliza-
tions, outliers,
patterns, andsalient themesinthedata,whilededuction suggestsa reanalysisofexistingdata
ornewdata-gathering rounds. Thecorroboration ofthetheory,aswellas a processof"internalfalsification"
inwhichnewdatapoints refinean emerging argument (Timmermans andTavory 2007),occursthrough
narrowingthe class of empirical phenomena to which thenew theory and
applies reshaping thetheoretical
scopeto make itbetter suited forthecluster
of empirical we
phenomena theoretically "lump" together(Katz
2001a).9The resultwill be a new theory,emerging inabductiveanalysisthroughtheiterativedialogue(both
metaphoricalandliteral) between dataandanamalgam ofexisting andnewconceptualizations.
Therecursive anditerative nature ofabductive analysisnotonlygenerates butalsocullsandnarrows
possibletheoreticalleads. Although some abductions are there
productive, are stillmanymoredeadends
andfalsestartsthangoodideasthatculminate intheory Theweeding
construction. outofabductive pro-
is donethrough
totheories theprocessof"theoretical coding," sharingmuch with what Znaniecki (1934)
andothers (Katz2001a)call "analytical induction." Here,theresearcher attempts to testtheemergent
abductivehypothesis to further shape the"fit" between and
explanans explanandum, between thetheo-
retical
framework developed and theobservations explainedby thisaccount.Researchers aim
deliberately
togathernegative cases with related to
phenomenaprogressively the
redefine to be
phenomenon explained
tomakeitfittheexplanatory factors.
theoretical Thereis little
methodologicalvalueingathering confirm-
ingcases;thestrategy is tolookfornegative cases oralternative to
explanations account for thephenom-
ena.Thisalready complex wayofthinking aboutresearch (seealsoLakatos1970)is further problematized
bythefactthatexplanans andexplanandum arenotonlyhonedandrefined butsometimes thrown outto
givewaytoa different casing,andoften morethanonecasingis inmindata giventime.

CONCLUSION
Abductive analysis is a qualitativedataanalysis approach aimedatgenerating creativeandnoveltheoreti-
cal insights through a dialecticof cultivated theoreticalsensitivityand methodological heuristics.
Abductive analysis emphasizes thatratherthansetting allpreconceived theoreticalideasasideduring the
researchproject,researchers shouldenter thefieldwiththedeepest andbroadest basepossible
theoretical
anddevelop theirtheoretical repertoiresthroughout theresearchprocess. Theoretical relevancyis notlim-
itedto analogy butflourishes withtheory-close and-farwritings thatinspire novelinsights.Insteadof
theoriesemerging from data,newconcepts aredeveloped toaccount forpuzzling empiricalmaterials.The
methodological precepts ofgrounded theory canstimulate abductivereasoning through a processofrevis-
iting,defamiliarizing, andalternative casingin lightoftheoretical knowledge. Thesurprise, puzzle,or
anomaly thatmaytrigger a noveltheory thenemerges methodologically through careful dataanalysis
againsta background ofcultivated theoreticalexpertise.
We anticipate diverging reactionsfrom thosewithin andwithout thegrounded theoryresearch com-
munity. Fromoutsiders, we expectthefollowing reaction:"Ofcourse, all qualitativeresearchis theory
driven,andtheory construction cannot occurwithout a strong base.Thatis precisely what'nongrounded'
theorists
havebeenstating alltheseyears."Whileweindeed arguefora strong theoreticalfoundationguid-
ingqualitativeresearch, ourfocusonpreexisting theories from
differs thewaytheories areusedinalterna-
tiveforms of qualitative dataanalysis in twoways.First,suchapproaches - forexample, institutional
ethnography orextended -
casemethodpurposefully eschewmethodological "cookbooks," worried that
theywouldresult ina fetishization ofmethods andcrassempiricism. Instead, theydirect researchersto
privilegedtheoreticaldatapoints ortospecific heuristics andamending
forspecifying theory.Theattraction

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Timmermans
andTavory 18 1

ofabductive analysis is thatitelicitstheoretical innovations precisely through a doubleengagement with


existingtheory andcareful methodological steps.Whileitis undoubtedly truethatthemyth ofnontheo-
reticalworkwasdetrimental totheaimsofgrounded theory, theory construction without explicit method-
ologyin qualitative analysis riskspursuing onlypreconceived ideas.Second,theseapproaches tendto
suggest thatthesociologist approaches an empirical sitewitha "favorite theory" (Burawoy 1998:16)in
mind.As we havearguedextensively in thearticle, we believethisto be unhelpful. It is through the
engagement ofdatawitha multiplicity oftheorizations thatwe canmakethemostofthepossibility of
generative abduction.
On theother sideofthespectrum, somewithin thegrounded theory community mayprotest against
downplaying what for many has been the most cherished aspectofgrounded theory, namely, induction.
Thereality is,however, thatinductive grounded theory as theory-engine isphilosophically untenable. After
halfa century oftrying, grounded has
theory very little
theoretical novelty toshowcase. Without exception,
thebestqualitative research is steeped invarious literaturesandaimstocontribute totheseliteratures. Also
without exception, the most successful qualitative researchers are voracious consumers of substantive
sociological theories, whousetheir reading as a touchstone forresearch (seealsoBecker1998;Wilsonand
Chadda2009).Nottaking current scholarship into consideration risks notonlyignorance butalso the
of a
rediscovery well-developed domain.
Centering abduction anditsrelationship onbothexisting literature andmethods ofanalysis suggests
thattheory construction is a skilldeveloped through repeated exposure and close engagement withboth
dataandrelated examples oftheory construction. Muchas Becker's(1982)ArtWorlds, Merton's patterns
ofserendipity (Merton and Barber 2006:230-98), and Glaser and Strauss's pedagogical focusofteaching
grounded theory tointeractive groups (Morseetal. 2009;Star1997;Strauss 1987),thisskillsetalsocon-
tainsanirreducible socialcomponent ofexchanging theoretical ideasina network ofresearchers. Inthis
sense,ourapproach to theory construction resembles Chambliss's (1989,2009)analysis ofcompetitive
swimmers. As Chambliss showed, becoming a competitive athlete depends onmundane routines, farfrom
theimageoftheathletic Übermensch. To becomea topswimmer, oneneedsphysical equipment, social
support,andmuchdetailed andguided practice. Athletic excellence is,inChambliss's démystification, not
a physical starting pointbuta hard-honed outcome: partly dependent on careful practice andmundane
routines,partly onsocialnetworks, on"cultural capital," andevenonseemingly ephemeral qualities such
as tenacity. Likeanycraft, therearefavorable conditions ofpossibility - conditions thatcanenableor
obstructtheproduction oftheory. Itis inthissocially fostered craftlikesensethatabduction is feasible.
Whileourapproach requires extensive theory andmethodology training forqualitative researchers, we
havebeenflexible regarding thekindsoftheories mostlikelyleadingto innovations (Abend2008),the
components ofsuchtheories (Vaughan 2009),thescopeconditions oftheory construction (Walker and
Cohen1985),andthecriteria ofsuccessful noveltheories (Weick1995).Instead, we havearticulated an
adaptable logicfortheory discovery thatwillrequire further specification inresearch practice. Thechal-
lenge,from ourperspective, doesnotlie withthekindsoftheories we beginwith(as longas theseare
empirically grounded andoffer anaddedinspirational value)butwiththeworkofdesigning andconduct-
inga research project. Thegoalofconstructing theories via qualitative research requires a sophisticated
research design thatconceptually linksa substantive topicwithmultiple bodiesoftheory. Thetheories we
approach thefieldwithwillinfluence thedetailsofsuchresearch design. Atthesametime,theresearch
designrequires anopening forthesurprises andempirical challenges thatstimulate abductive reasoning.
Thechallenge, then,istocreate "a stateofpreparedness forbeingtaken unprepared" (Reichertz 2007:221).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
WethankRichard NeilGross,
Bernstein, RobJansen, Colin
KayJenkins, Nahoko
Jerolmack, Jack
Kameo, Debi
Katz,
SaraShostak,
Osnowitz, andDianeVaughan;
theethnography
working atNorthwestern
groups theNew
University,
andUCLA;andanonymous
School, reviewers
forcomments
onmany,
manyearlier
versions.

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182 Sociological
Theory
30(3)

NOTES

1. Ourapproach tothedefinition oftheory is,much liketherestofthearticle, informed bypragmatism. Ourdefinition


positstheory construction asanattempt tomake senseoftheworld through generalizations ofempiricalphenomena.
Theory as a specific kind ofgeneralization allows ustomove between datainstances aswellastoexpect certain
phenomena tohappen andretrodict why certainphenomena havehappened (seebelow).
2. Aswemake clearerbelow, other positionsstressthattheory iselaborated,ortweaked, inrelation
tonovel andanoma-
lousdata. There is,however, a difference between tweaking a preconceived theory andconstructing newtheoretical
accounts.
3. Inaddition, inaninfluential contemporary reformulationofgrounded theory,Adele Clarke haslinkedStrauss'swork
ongrounded theory with hissymbolic interactionist-infusedwork onsocialworlds/arenas tocreate ananalytical
"theory-methods package" thatexamines a broad arrayofmicro-macro conditions that make situated
actionspossible
(Clarke2003, 2005, 2009).Clarke's "situational offers
analysis" differentkinds ofmapping asa heuristictodraw out
situationsandtheir conditions. Insituational analysis,the traditional
grounded theory stepsof coding and memo
writingtake placeagainst contemporary andpostmodern
poststructuralist theories guidingtheresearcher toa broad
range of relevant themes inthe data.While we share Clarke's commitment to broadening the theoretical
scopeof
qualitativeresearchers, ourapproach isdifferent. ForClarke, and
poststructuralist interactionist
theoriesareonlyone
possibleframework with which toapproach analysis.However, grounded as a
theory "theory-methods package" may
belimiting, precisely because (asweshow below) suchanapproach presumes knowing inadvance howtoorganize
empirical findings theoretically.
4. Itisinthis lightthatPeirce's equation ofhispragmatism with thelogicofabduction shouldbeunderstood. AsPeirce
"If
writes,youcarefully consider the of
questionpragmatism you willsee it isnothing elsethan thequestion ofthe
logicof abduction" (Peirce 1934:195). At the same time,abduction to
relates Peirce's habitual
conception ofaction
inwhich mental reflectionandmore mechanical actionsform habits thatallowpeople tocoordinate actionsand
participatein new-to-them traditions(Kilpinen 2009).
5. Notsurprisingly, eventhenotion that positionalitymatters requires theoreticalcultivation.Eachoftheforms of
reflexivityissituated ina specifictheoretical literature
thatsketches out how and
biographydemography may affect
therelationship between observable andobserved andwhether this relationshipcanbetranscended (see,e.g.,Bour-
dieu1992).Theearlyethnographic tricks-of-the-tradeadviceon reactivity, forexample, wassituated in an
interactionist,phenomenological, andlater ethnomethodological literature(Lynch that
2000) conceptualized the
observer-research participantrelationship asa particularform ofinteraction(Denzin 1970).
6. These operations, obviously,change theexperience (Marcus andCushman 1982). However, insofarasnotes, inter-
viewrecordings, transcripts,andvisual recordings evoke theobservation, thisstillaidsusinreconstructing the
experience. Notealsothat ourunderstanding ofrevisitingcaptures thephenomenology ofseeing newdimensions in
data,while Burawoy's notion of"focused revisits"constitutesa strategytoexamine differenceovertime when a
researcher revisitsa fieldsiteofa previous researcher(Burawoy 2003).
7. Thisisimplied inBlumer's distinctionbetween concepts
sensitizing that
guide researchanddefinitiveconceptsthat
offerclear benchmarks andmeasurements ofthesocial world (Blumer 1954).
8. Duetomassive amounts ofdocumentary data,DianeVaughan didnotengage inthedetailed coding andmemo
writingtypical ofgrounded theory (Vaughan 1996).
9. Thisis,however, without itsoriginalpurpose offindinguniversais (Znaniecki 1934).

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BIOS
Timmermans
Stefan isProfessor
andChairattheDepartment atUCLA.Heistheauthor
ofSociology ofSudden
Death
andtheMyth : TheChallenge
ofCPR(1999),TheGoldStandard ofEvidence-Based andStandardization
Medicine in
Health
Care(with
MarcBerg, 2003),Postmortem:
HowMedical Examiners
Explain Deaths
Suspicious (2005),and
TheConsequences
Babies?
Saving ofGenetic
Newborn MaraBuchbinder,
(with
Screening 2012).
IddoTavoryisanassistant atTheNewSchool
professor forSocialResearch.
Hehaswritten
oncondom-use,
sexwork,
inMalawi,
andrelationship-formation inthelivesofOrthodox
andexperience
morality JewsinLosAngeles,
aswellas
other
pieces
inspired Hisprevious
andpragmatism.
byphenomenology workhasbeenpublished, other
among in
places,
theAmerican Review,
Sociological TheoryandSociety
,andSociological
Theory.

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All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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