List of cases

Kinds of Negligence
 Arising from crime
People of the Philippines vs. Bayotas
Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines vs. People of the Philippines
 Arising from contract
Air France vs. Carascoso
 Arising from Tort
Andamo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Castro vs People of the Philippines
 Culpa Aquillana/Culpa Criminal
Fabre vs. Court of Appeals
Calalas vs. Court of Appeals
Concepts of quasi-delict
 Elements of quasi-delict
Cinco vs. Canonoy
 Quasi-delict vs. Delict
Philippine Rabbit vs. People of the Philippines
 Quasi-delict vs. Breach of Contract
Far east vs. Court of Appeals
Calalas vs. Sunga
Negligence
 Elements of Negligence
Picart vs. Smith
 Negligence as the Proximate Cause
Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
 Proof of Negligence
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company vs. Court of Appeals
 Res Ipsa Loquitor
Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Batiquin vs. Court of Appeals
 Respondent Superior
Castilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vasquez
 Violation of Traffic Rules
Caedo vs. Yu Khe Thai
BLT Bus Co. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
 Defences
 Contributory Negligence
Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company
 Assumption of Risk
Afialda vs. Hisole
 Last Clearance
Picart vs. Smith
Spouses ong vs. Metropolitan water district
 Prescription
Ferrer vs. Ericta
Kramer vs. Court of Appeals
 Force Majeure/Fortuitous evenmt
Gottesco vs. Chatto
National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
 Exercise of Diligence
Ramos vs. Pepsi
 Mistake and Waiver
Gatchalian vs. Court of Appeals
 Damnum Absque injuria
National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova, accused-appellant
FACTS:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardiac
arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 with regard to Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged. The Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the
case of People v. Sendaydiego. Counsel of accused-appellant opposed the view of Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgement of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties. He argued that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil
liability extinguished if accused should die before final judgement is rendered.
ISSUE:
Does the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction?
HELD:
The Supreme Court Ruled in favour of the accused-appellant Stating Article 89.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statue, it reads, in part: Art. 89. How criminal liability is
totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished: By the death of the convict, as to personal penalties; and
as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occur before final
judgement; With reference to Castillo’s criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished. The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability
is extinguished only when the death of the offenders occurs before final judgement. Saddles upon us is the task of
asserting the legal import of the term “final judgement”. For where, as in the case, the right to institute a separate
civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover “both the criminal and civil aspects
of the case.” “The civil action is based on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty,
the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability.” Castillo’s criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought
to be enforced by reasons of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let
the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalies situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof---criminal liability---- does not exist.
Article 30 of the Civil Code Provides: When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising
from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceeding are instituted during the prudency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of. What Article 30 recognizes is
an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil proceedings are instituted during the
pendency of the said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which
is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished in as much
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted there in for recover of civil
liability ex delicto ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.

Philippines Rabbit Bus Line, INC., petitioner. Vs. People of Philippines, respondent
FACTS:
Accused Napoleon Roman y Macadandang was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property. The court further ruled
that (petitioner), in the event of the insolvency if accused, shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused.
Evidently, the judgement against the accused had become final and executory. Admittedly, accused had jumped bail
and remain at-large.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals: The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution
also of the civil action arising from the offense. The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to
dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defence of its accused-employee, may appeal
the judgement of conviction independently of the accused.
RULING:
Pointing out that it had seasonable filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that
the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that its appeal
stayed in the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues that is
appeal takes the place of the accused-employee. Article 102 of Revised Penal Code state the subsidiary civil liabilities
of innkeepers, as follows: in default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be held civilly for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances. The subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the
rulings of this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage Taxicab, Inc., Alvarez v. CA and Yusay v. Adil do not apply to
the present case because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the
criminal case against their employees. The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and
conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also regard to its amount. The
liability of an employer cannot be separated from the employee. Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted,
however, there must be adequate evidence establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees: (2) that the former are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the
employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to
insolvency. The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable. Respondent is correct in
arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Air France, petitioner

Vs.
Rafael Carrascosco and the Honorable Court of Appeals, respondent
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes on
March 30, 1958. The defendant , Air France, through its authorized agency, Philippines Air Lines, Inc., issued to
plaintiff a “first class” round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled
in “first class”, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the “first class” seat
the he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a “white man”, who, the
Manager alleged, has the “better right” to the seat. When asked to vacate his “first class” seat, the plaintiff, as was to
be expected, refused and told the defendant’s Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body.
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witness Luiz Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga although
plaintiff paid for, and was issued a “first class” airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation In Hong Kong.
The court cannot give credit to the testimony of the said witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a breach of contract?
RULING:
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual relation.
And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages is offers. The contract of air carriage,
therefore generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier’s employee,
naturally, could give ground for an action for damages. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They
have a right to be carrier’s employees with kindness, respect courtesy and due consideration. They are entitles to be
protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that
any rule or discourteous conduct on part of the employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for
damages against carrier. And this because, although the relation of passengers and carrier is “contractual both in
origin in nature” nevertheless “the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort”. Petitioner’s contract with
Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress Carrascoso’s action as we have said, is placed upon is
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier ---- a case of quasi-delict. Damages
are proper. At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been any an easy matter for the petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso’s testimony. If it were really true
that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purer could have cleared up the matter. The Civil Code gives the
court ample power to grant exemplary damages --- in contracts and quasi – contracts. The only condition is that
defendant should have “acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner”. The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal percept. And this, in addition to
moral damages.

Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo, petioners,

Vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court (First Civil Cases Division) and Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc,.
FACTS:
Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga Siland, Cavite which is
adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the
land of respondent corporation, water paths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which
allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners’ land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners’ crops and
plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners instituted a criminal action against
officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by mean of inundation under Article 324 of
the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently petitioners filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a
civil case, for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. The
trial court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of a civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which
provides that “criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commented the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgement has been rendered in
the criminal action.”
ISSUES:
Whether or not negligence Quasi delict), is entirely separate and distinct from civil liability arising from the
civil liability arising from the negligence under Penal Code.
RULING:
Complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict.
All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of
the defendant, or some other person whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect
between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. From the petitioners’
complaint, the water paths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have indented the land
petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of casual connection between the act of building there water paths and
damage by the petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for recovery
of damages. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the petitioners, the act or
omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the casual connection between
the act and the damage, with no ptr-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana. Quasi-delict or culpa aquilana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantively all its own, and individually that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime --- a
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under Penal
Code, or create an action of quasi-defict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or
conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal
where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of
the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability. The civil action is entirely independent if
the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this,
for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution ---
whether it be conviction or acquittal--- would render meaningless the independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result latter.

Jerome Castro, petitioner, v. People of the Philippines, respondent, Resolution

FACTS:
Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Tan’s son, Justin Albert (then a Grade 12 student), for
violating the terms of his disciplinary probation. Upon Tan’s request, RIS reconsidered its decision but imposed
“non-appealable” conditions such as excluding Justin Albert from participating in the graduation ceremonies. Tan
filed a complaint in the Department of Education for violation of the Manual of Regulation of Private Schools, and
Article 19 of the Civil Code against RIS> He allegedly that the dismissal of his son was undertaken with malice, bad
faith and evident premeditation. The Dep-Ed found that the RIS’ code violation point system allowed the summary
imposition of unreasonable sanctions (which has no basis in fact and in law). The system therefore violated due
process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified. The Dep-Ed ordered RIS to readmit Justin Albert without any condition. He
was able to graduation from RIS. After the graduation ceremonies, Tan met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at
RIS. Before they hung up, petitioner told Ching: Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking (Tan), that’s
dangerous. Ching then called Tan and informed him that the petitioner said “talking to him dangerous.” Insulted,
Tan filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against
petitioner.
The Metropolitan Trial Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of grave oral defamation.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court affirmed factual findings of the MeTC. However, in view of the animosity
between the parties, it found petitioner guilty on slight oral defamation. But because Tan filed his compliant in the
Office of the City prosecutor of Mandaluyong City on August 2003 (or almost five months from discovery), the
RTC ruled that prescription had already set in; it therefore acquitted the petitioner on that ground.
The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing the decision of the
RTC. The RTC allegedly misappreciated the antecedents which provoked petitioner to utter the allegedly
defamatory statement against Tan. The CA reinstated the MeTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in taking cognizance of the Solicitor General’s position because
it constitute double jeopardy.
Ruling:
No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. This constitutional mandate I
echoed in Section 7 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court which provide: Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy.
When an accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form of substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the
charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for
the offense charged or for any attempt to commit the same frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily
includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or when there was a mistrial.
In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgement in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was
deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. In this case, the OSG merely assailed the RTC’s
finding on the nature of petitioner’s statement that is, whether it constituted grave or slight defamation. The OSG
premised its allegation of grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s “erroneous” evaluation and assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties. Because the OSG did not raise errors of jurisdiction, the CA erred in taking
cognizance of its petition and, worse, in reviewing the factual findings of the RTC’s. We therefore reinstate RTC
decision so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
 Fabre vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Private respondent Word of the World Christian Fellowship Inc. (WWCF) arranged with petitioners for the
transportation of 33 members of its Young Adult Ministry from Manila to La Union and back in consideration of
which private respondent paid petitioners the amount of P3,000.00. The group was scheduled to leave on
November 1984, at 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon. However, as several members of the party were late, the bus did
not leave the Tropical Hut at the corner of Ortigas Avenue and EDSA until 8:00 o’ clock in the evening Petitioner
Porifirio Cabil drove the minibus. The usual route to Caba, La Union was through Carmen, Pangasinan. However
,the bridge at Carmen was under repair, so that petitioner Cabil, who was unfamiliar with the area (it being his first
trip to La Union), was forced to take the detour through the town of Ba-ay in Lingayen, Pangasinan. At 11:30 that
night, petitioner Cabil came to a sharp curve on the highway, running on a south to east direction, which he
described as siete. The road was slippery because it was raining, causing the bus, which was running at the speed of
50 kilometers per hour, to skid to the left road shoulder. The bus hit the left traffic steel brace and sign along the
road and rammed the fence of one Jesus Escano, then turned over and landed on its left side, coming to a full stop
only after a series of impact. The bus came to rest off the road. A coconut tree which it had hit fell on it and
smashed its front portion. Several Passengers were injured.
The driver, petitioner Cabil, claimed he did not see the curve until it was too late. He said he was not
familiar with the ara and he could not have seen the curve despite the care he took in driving the bus, because it was
dark and there was no sign on the road. He said he saw the curve when he was already within 15 to 30 meters of it.
He allegedly slowed down to 30 kilometers per hour, but it was too late. Petitioners Fabre paid Jesus Escano
P1,500.00 for the damage to the latter’s fence. On the basis of Escanos affidavit of desistance the case against the
Fabre was dismissed. Amyline Antonio, who was seriously injured, brought this case to the Regional trial Court of
Makati, Metro Manila. She I now suffering from paraplegia and is permanently paralysed from waist down. During
the trial she described the operations she underwent and adduced evidence regarding the cost of her treatment and
therapy.
The trial court found that, no convincing evidence was shown that he minibus was properly checked for
travel to a long distance trip and that the driver was was properly screened and tested before being admitted for
employement. Indeed, all the evidence presented have shown the negligent act of the defendant which ultimately
resulted to the accident subject of this case.
Issue:
1) Whether or not petitioners were negligent
2) Whether or not petitioners were liable for the injuries suffered by private respondent.
Ruling:
The finding that Cabil drove his bus negligently, while his employer, the Fabres, who owned the bus failed
to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee is fully
supported by the evidence on record. These factual findings of the two courts we regard as final and executory and
conclusive, supported as they are by the evidence. Indeed, it was admitted by Cabil that on the night in question, it
was raining, and, as a consequence, the road was slippery, and it was dark. He averred these facts to justify his
failure to see that there lay a sharp curve ahead. Given the conditions of the road and considering that the trip was
Cabil’s first one outside Manila, Cabil should have driven the vehicle at a moderate speed. There was a testimony
that the vehicles passing on that portion of the road should only be running 20 kilometers per hour, so that at 50
kilometers per hour, Cabil was running at a very high speed.
Pursuant to Article 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code his negligence gave rise to the presumption that his
employers, the Fabre’s were themselves negligent in the selection and supervision of his their employee. In the case
at bar, the Fabres, in allowing Cabil to drive the bus to La Union, apparently did not consider the fact that Cabil has
been driving for school children only, fromtheir homes to St. Scholasticas College in Metro Manila. They had hired
him only after a two-week apprenticeship. They had tested him for certain matters, such as whether he could
remember the names of the children he would be taking to school, which were irrelevant to his qualification to drive
on a long distance travel, especially considering that the trip to La union was his first. The existing of the procedures
and supervisory policies cannot be casually invoked to overturn the presumption of negligence on the part of an
employer.
A person who hires a public automobile and gives the driver directions as to the place to which he wishes to
be conveyed, but exercises no other control over the conduct of the driver, is not responsible for acts of negligence
of the latter or prevented from recovering for injuries suffered from a collision between the automobile and a train,
caused by the negligence either of the locomotive engineer or the automobile driver. As this case involves a contract
of carriage. Petitioners, the Fabres, did not have to be engage in the business transportation for the provision of the
Civil Code on common carriers to apply to them. As this court held: Article 1732. Common carriers are persons,
corporations, firms or occasions engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by
land, water, or air for compensation, offering their services to the public.
As common carriers, the Fabres were bound to exercise extraordinary diligence for the safe transportation
of the passengers to their dissemination. This duty of care is not excused by proof that they exercised the diligence
of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of their employee. Common carriers are liable for the
death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or wilful acts of the formers employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father
of family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

Vivente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, Eliza Sunga and Francisco Salva
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Sunga, the a college student freshman majoring in Physical Education at the
Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was
filed to the capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an “extension seat”, a wooden stool
at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. The jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated
at the rear end of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerion Vercena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped into the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fractured of the “distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe necrosis of
the underlying skin.” Dr. Oligario, an orthopaedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of
three months and would have tyo ambulate in crutches during the said period.
Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage. Calalas, on
the other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu Truck. Korte. The
lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it
was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case, filed by
Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in the same court held his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas
for the damage to his jeepney. The ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause od
action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the
diligence required under the Civil Code. The Appellate Court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for breach of contract of carriage
Ruling:
Breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the performance of contractual
obligation. In quasi delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action.
Whereas in breach f contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the
fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination.
Thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in a Civil case, finding Salva and his driver Verena liable for the
damage of the petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the Isuzu truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in quasi-delict actions, not in actions involving breach of contract. The doctrine is a device
for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and another party. The obligation is created
by law itself. But where there is a re-existing contractual relation between the parties, it I the parties themselves who
create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. In so far as contract
of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death
or injury to passenger.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an “extension seat” placed her in a peril greater than that to which the
other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent
in transporting passengers. Sunga taking an “extension seat” amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is a kin
to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely
because those passengers assumed greater risk of drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of
petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A Caso
fortuito is an event which could not be foreseen, or which though foreseen, was inevitable.

Cinco vs. Hon. Canonoy

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City court for recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident
involving his car and a jeepney driven by respondent Romeo Hilot operated by respondent Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At the pre-trial of the civil case counsel for
the respondents moved for the suspension of the civil action, pending the determination of the criminal case
involving Section 3 Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The City Court granted the motion and ordered the motion and
ordered the suspension of the first instance, alleging that the city judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The court of the First Instance dismissed
the petition, hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Isuue:
Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to property during the pendency of the
criminal action.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code
is quasi-delictual in character, which can be prosecuted independently of criminal action. Where the plaintiff made
essential averments in the complaint that it was the driver’s fault or negligence in the operation of the jeepney which
caused the collision between his automobile and said jeepney; the plaintiff sustained damages of the collision; that a
direct casual connection exist between the damage that he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant
driver and where the defendant operator in their answer , contended, among others, that they observed due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees, a defence peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict,
such action is principally predicated on Article32176 and 2180 in the New Civil Code, which is quasi delictual in
nature and character. Liability being predicated on quasi delict, the civil case may proceed as separate and
independent court actions specifically provided for in Article 2177 Section 3 Rule 111 of the Rules of Court refers
to “ other civil action arising from cases not included in Section 2 of the same rule in which “once the criminal
action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may found, until a final judgement in a criminal proceeding has been rendered.” The
Civil action referred to in Section 2 (a) and (3)b, Rule 11 of the Rules of Court which should be suspended after the
criminal action has been instituted is that arising form criminal offense and not the civil action based on quasi-delict.
The concept of quasi delict enunciated in article 2176 of the New Civil Code is so broad that it includes not
only injuries to persons but also damage to property. It makes no distinction between “damage to persons” and the
one hand and “damage to property” on the other. The word “damage is used in two concepts: the “harm done” and
“reparation” for the harm done. And with respect to “harm” it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since “harm” is not limited to personal but also property injuries. An example of quasi-delict in the law
itself which include damage to property in Article 2191 (2) of the Civil Code which hold proprietors responsible for
damage by excessive smoke which may be harmful “to persons and property.” Respondent judge gravely abuse his
discretion in upholding the decisions of the City Court suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until the
criminal action is finally terminated.

Philippine Bus Lines Inc. vs. People of the Philippines

Facts:
Accused Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to
triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4 years
9 months and 11 days to six years and to pay damages. The Court of Appeals ruled that the institution of a criminal
case implied also civil action arising from the offense. The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to
dispute independently the civil liability fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employees would be to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgement.
Issue:
Whether or not the employer is liable to the criminal action instituted by the petitioner.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that civil actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution. Section 1 of Rule
111 of the Rules of Court provides that: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted by the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institute the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Only the Civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a
criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately,
or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgement of conviction meted out to the
employee. It is clear that the 200 rules deleted the requirement of reversing independent civil action and allowed
these to proceed separately from criminal action. Thus, the civil action referred to in Articles 32,33,34 and2176 of
the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any criminal prosecution based on the Same act .
Here are some direct consequences of such reversion and omission: 1) the right to bring the foregoing actions
based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included
therein. 2) The institution or waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged does
not extinguish the right to bring such action. 3)The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more
than once for the same act or omission what is deemed instituted in every criminal action is the civil liability arising
from the same offense or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact even civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains,
and the offended party may—subject to the control of the prosecutor—still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein. The discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal
Code, which states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Petitioner argues that, as an
employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is not conclusively bound by the outcome thereof.
Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical conclusion—including the
appeal.
 The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was
filed solely against Napoleon Roman, its employee. In its memorandum cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing
with the subsidiary liability of employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because in all those
cases, the accused employer did not interpose an appeal. Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the
employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible. The cases dealing with the
subsidiary liability of the employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they are not parties to the criminal
action instituted against their employees. Although in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact
should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of
supplying the latter’s lawyer, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf, but
can only defend the accused.

Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Honorable Court of Appeals, Luisa Luna and Clarita Luna
Facts:
Private respondent Luis Luna applied for , and was accorded, a FAREAST CARD issued by the petitioner
Far East Bank and Trust Company at its Pasig Branch. Upon his request, the bank also issued a supplemental card
to private respondent Clarita Luna. In August 1988, Clarita lost her credit card. FEBTC was forthwith informed. In
order to replce the lost card, Clarita submitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the bank’s internal
security proceedures and policy would appear to be to meanwhile so the record the lost card, along with the
principal card, as a “Hot Card” or “Cancelled card” in its master file. Luis tendered a despedida lunch for a close
friend, a Filipino-American, and another guest at the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant of the Hotel Intercontinental
Manila. To pay for the lunch, Luis presented his Card Department. Since the card was not honoured, Luis was
forced to pay in cash the bill amounting to P588.13. Naturally, Luis felt embarrassed by this incident.
Private respondent Luis Luna, through counsel, demanded from FEBT the payment of damages. Adrian
Festejo, a vice president of the bank, expressed the bank’s apologies to Luis. Still feeling evidently aggrieved, private
respondent, on December 1988, filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig against
FEBTC. The RTC of Pasig given the factual settings, rendered a decision ordering the FEBTC to pay respondent
(a) 300,000.00 moral damages (b) 50,000.00 exemplary damages and (c) P20,000.00 attorney’s fees. On appeal the
Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a breach of contract and if moral damages can be awarded to such breach
Held:
In culpa-contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad
faith or with malice in the breach of contract. The Civil code provide: Willful injury to property may be a legal
ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly
due. The same rule applies to breach of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad faith, in
this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are
also allowed in the case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier.
The bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to inform Luis of his own card’s cancellation. Nothing in the
findings of the trial court and the appellate court, however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part
of FEBTC to cause harm to private respondent. Neither could the FEBTC’s negligence in failing to give personal
notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or Bad faith implies a conscious
and intentional design to do awrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the
negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or will.
The court has not in the process overlooked another rule that a quasi-delict can be the cause of breaching a
contract that might therby permit the application of the appellate principles on tort even when there is a pre existing
contract between the plaintiff and defendant. This doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondent’s
case for it can aptly govern only where the act or omission complained would constitute an actionable tort
independently on the contract. The test (whether a quasi-delict can be deemed to underlie the breach of contract)
can be stated thusly: Where, without a pre-existing contract between the two parties, an act or omission can
nonetheless amount to an actionable tort by itself, the fact that the parties are contractually bound is no bar to the
application of quasi-delict provisions to the case. Here, private respondents damage claim I predicated solely on
their contractual relationship; without such agreement, the cat or omission complained of cannot by itself be held to
stand as a separate cause of action or as an independent actionable tort
 Vicente Calalas vs. Court of Appeals, Eliza Sunga and Francisco Sunga
Facts:
Private respondent Eliza Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in physical education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to
capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an “extension seat” a wooden stool at the back
portion of the door at the rear end of the vehicle. On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney
stopped to let the passenger off. As she was seated at the rear end of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left
portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the “distal third of the left tibia-
fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin.” Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required from him as a
common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the
truck.
Issue:
Whether Salva and his driver were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner jeepney.
Ruling:
Culpa Aquiliana or culpa contractual, has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor. In quasi-delict, the
negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract,
the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor, in this
case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his destination. Thus no basis for the contention
that the ruling in Civil case, fining that Salva and his driver Verena liable for damage to petitioner jeepney, should be
binding to Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was
the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not
in actions involving breach of contract.
AS found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle., It is undisputed that petitioner driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney.
The Supreme Court ruled that petitioner’s contention that Sunga’s taking an extension seat amounted to an
implied assumption of risk. It is a kin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas
should not be compensated merely because those passenger assumed greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being bumped while it was improperly
parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could bot be foreseen, or which, though
foreseen, was inevitable.
Because of the injury, she was not able to enrol in the second semester of that school year. She testified that
she had no more intention of continuing with her schooling because she could not walk and decided not to pursue
her degree, major in physical education her leg was already in defect. Plaintiff appleant likewise testified that even
when she was under confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured foot. As a result of her injury, the
Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has “residual bowing of the fractured side” She likewise decided not to
pursue Physical Education as her major subject. Those are her physical pain and moral sufferings, the inevitable
bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair just and reasonable.

Amado Picart vs. Frank Smith

Facts:
Amado Picart, seeks to recover of the defendant, Frank Smith,jr., the sum of P31,000.00 as damages alleged
to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant. From a judgement of the Court of the First
Instance of the Province of La Union absolving the defendant from the liability the plaintiff has appealed. The
occurrence which gave rise to the institution of the action took place on December 1912, on the Carlatan Bridge, at
San Feernando La Union. The plaintiff was riding on his pony over the said bridge. Before he had gotten way
across, the defendant approached from the opposite direction in an automobile, going at the rate of about ten or
twelve miles per hour. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give
warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive
blasts, as it appeared to him that the men on horseback before him was not observing the rule of the road. The
plaintiff, it appears, saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. He pulled the pony closely up against
the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he
thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other side. The bridge is shown to have a length of about
75 meters and width of 4.80 meters. As the automobile approached, the defendant guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. The defendant assumed that the horseman would move to the
other side. The pony not as yet exhibited fright, and the rider had made no sign for the automobile to stop. In so
doing, it as struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell
and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received
contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant in manoeuvring his car in the manner described was guilty of negligence
which gives rise to civil obligation to repair the damage done.
Ruling:
In the present casethe Supreme court ruled that negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, place in
the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the cause which he was pursuing was
fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable consequence of
that course. Under the circumstances the law imposed on the defendant the duty to guard against the threaten harm.
The plaintif himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negleigencein planting himself on the
wrong side of the road. But the defendant was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover
which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts of the two parties were
not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an
appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the
impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior negligence of
the other party.
From what has been said it results that the judgement of the lower court must e reversed, and the udgement
is her rendered that the plaintiff recover of the defendant the sum of P200.00, with costs of other instances.The
sum here awarded is estimated to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or
damage occasioned to articles of his apparel, and lawful interest on the whole to the date of this recovery.

Benguet Cooperative, Inc., vs. Court of Appeals, Caridad Bernardo, et.,al

Facts;
For five years upto the time of his death, Jose Bernardo managed a stall at the Baguio City meat market. In
the morning of January 1985, Jose together with other meat vendors went out of their stalls to a jeepney loade with
slaughtered pigs in order to select the meat they would sell for the day. Jose was the very first to reach the parked
jeepney. Grasping handlebars at the rear entrance of the vehicle, and as he was about to raise hi right foot to get
inside, Jose suddenly stiffened and trembled as though suffering from an epileptic seizure. Romeo Pimenta who saw
Jose he was merely joking but noticed in almost disbelief that he was already turning black, other vendors rushed to
Jose and they discovered that the antenna of the jeepney bearing the pigs had gotten entangled with an open electric
wire at the top of the roof of a meat tall. Pimenta quickly got hold of a broom and pried the antenna loose from the
open wire. But shortly after, Jose released his hold on the handlebars of the jeep only to slump on the ground. He
died shortly in the hospital. Cause of death was “Cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to massive brain congestion
with petheccial hemorrhage brain bilateral pulmonary edema and congestion and endocardial petechial hemorrhage
and dilation (history of electrocution)
 Caridad Bernardo, widow of Jose and their minor children, filed a complaint against BENECO before the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City for a sum of money and damages arising from the electrocution of Jose
Bernardo. In the same civil action, BENECO filed a third-party complaint against Canave, jr., the jeepney owner.
The trial court ruled in favour of the Bernardo’s and ordered the BENECo to pay them damages. Both the
petitioner and private respondent herein appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court promulgated its
decision which BENECO now assails contending inter alia that the appellate court gravely erred in ordering
BENECO to pay damages in light of the clear evidence that it was third party defendant Canave’s fault or
negligence which was the proximate and the sole cause or at least the principal cause of the electrocution of Jose.
Issue:
Whether BENECO or Canave is at fault or negligent ehich was the proximate cause and the sole cause of
the death of Jose.
Ruling:
Beneco was solely responsible for the untimely death of Jose thorough accidental electrocution. According
to the trial court, which the Supreme Court find it substantiated by the records. BENECO demonstrated its utter
disregard for the safety of the public. Indeed, Jose Bernardo’s death was an accident that was bound to happen in
view of the negligence of BENECO. Canave’s act of parking in an area not customarily used for that purpose was
by no means the independent negligent act adverted to by BENECO. Canave as well within his right to park the
vehicle in the said area where there was no showing that the Municipal Law or ordinance we violated nor that there
was any foreseeable danger posed by his act. One thing however is sure, no accident would have happened if
BENECO installed the connections with the prescribed vertical clearance of fifteen feet.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company Inc., vs. Court of Appeals and SPS Antonio and Gloria Esteban
Facts:
An action for damages instituted in the former Court of the First Instance of Negros Occidental by private
respondent spouses against petitioner Philippine Lon Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) for the injuries they
sustained in the evening of July 30, 1968 when the jeep ran over a mound of earth and fell into the open trench, an
excavation allegedly undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. The complaint
alleged that the respondent Esteban failed to notice the open trench which was left uncovered because of the
creeping darkness and the lack of any warning light or signs. As a result of the accident, respondent Esteban
allegedly sustained injuries on her arms, legs and face. Leaving a permanent scar on her cheek, while the respondent
husband suffered cut lips. In addition, the windshield of the jeep was shattered. The trial court rendered a decision
in favour of private respondents, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, contending the motion for
reconsideration of private respondent spouses was filed out of time and that the decision of September 1979 by
Justice Agrava was already final. It further submitted therein that the relationship of Bart and petitioner PLDT
should have viewed in the light of the contract between them and, under the independent contractor rule, PLDT is
not liable for the acts of an independent contractor.
Issue:
Whether or not there is negligence on the part of the respondent Antonio Esteban.
Ruling:
The above findings clearly show that the negligence of the respondent Antonio Esteban was not only
contributory to his injuries and those of his wife but goes to the very cause of the occurrence of the accident, as one
of its determining factors, and thereby precludes their right to recover damages. The perils of the road were known
to, hence, appreciated and assumed by, private respondents. By exercising reasonable care and prudence,
respondent Esteban could have avoided the injurious consequences of his act, even assuming arguendo that there
was some alleged negligence on the part of the petitioner.
The presence of warning signs could not have completely prevented the accident; the only purpose of said
signs was to uniform and warn the public of the presence of excavations on the site. The private respondent already
knew of the presence of the aid excavations. It was not lack of knowledge of these excavations which caused the
jeep of respondents to fall into deep excavation but the unexplained sudden swerving of the jeep from the inside
lane towards the accident mound. It is basic that private respondents cannot charge PLDT for their injuries where
their own failure to exercise due and responsible care was the cause therof. It is both a societal norm and necessity
that one should exercise a reasonable degree of caution for his own protection. Respondent Esteban had the last
clear chance or opportunity to avoid accident, notwithstanding the negligence he imputes to petitioner PLDT. As a
resident of Lacson Street, he passed on the street almost everyday and had knowledge of the presence and location
of the excavations thereof. It was his negligence that exposed him and of his wife to danger, hence he is soley
responsible for the consequence of his imprudence.

Pedro Layugan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Godofredo Isidro and Travellers Multi-Indemnity Corporation
Facts:
Pedro Layugan filed an action for damagesagainst Godofredo Isidro, alleging that on May 15 19797 while at
Berebet, bagabag, Nueva Viscaya, the Plaintiff and a companion were repairing the tire of their cargo truck wirh
which was parked along the right side of the National Highway; the defendant’s truck driven recklessly by Daniel
Serrano bumped the plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff, that as a result, plaintiff was injured and hospitalized at Dr.
Paulino J. Garcia Reasearch and Medical Center and Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital; that he spent TEN
THOUSDAND PEOS (10,000.00) and will incur more expenses as he recuperates from said injuries; Defendant
admitted his ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident driven by Daniel Serrano. Defendant countered that
the plaintiff was merely a bystander, not a truck helper being a brother-in-law of the driver of said truck; that the
truck allegedly being repaired was parked, occupying almost half of the right lane towards Solano, Nueva Viscaya,
right after the curved; that the proximate cause of the incident was the failure of the driver of the parked truck in
installing the early warning device, hence the driver of the parked should be liable for damages sustained by the
truck of the herein defendant in the amount of more than P20,000.00;

Issue:
Whether the intermediate appellate court acted correctly in applying the doctrine if “res ipsa liquitor” with
proper juris-prudential.
Ruling:
The burden of proving that care and diligence was observed is shifted evidently to the plaintiff, for, as
adverted to, the motorist have the right to be on the road, while the immobile truck has no business, so to speak, to
be there. It thus for the plaintiff to show to the satisfaction of a reasonable mind that the driver and he himself did
imply early warning device such as that required by law or by some other adequate means or device that would
properly forewarn vehicles of the impending danger that the parked vehicle posed considering the time, place and
other peculiar circumstances of the occasion. Absent such proof of care as in the case at bar, will evoke the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of ress ipsa liquitor, on the part of the driver of the parked cargo
truck as well as plaintiff who was fixing that flat tire of said truck. “Where the thing which causes the injury is
shown to be under themanagement of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things
does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care puts it: Res ipsa liquitor. The thing
speaks for itself Rebuttable presumption or interference that the defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof
that instrumentally cauing injury was in defendant’s exclusive conttol, and that accident was one which ordinarily
does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa liquitor is rule of evidence whereby negligence of alleged
wrongdoer may be interfered from mere fact that the accident happened provided character of accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and
the things which caused is shown to have been under management and control of alleged wrongdoer.
 The doctrine of Res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognises
that the prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof
of negligence. The doctrine is not arule of substantive law., but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a particular case, is not intended to and
does not dispense with the requirement of proof and culpable negligence on the part of the party charged. The
doctrine can be invoked when and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not
readily available. It has generally been held that the presumption of inerence arising from the doctrine cannot be
aviled of, or is overcome, where plaintiff has knowledge and testifies or presents evidence as to the specific act of
negligence which is the cause of the injury complained of or where there is direct evidence as to the precise cause of
the accident and al the facts and circumstances attendant on the occurrence clearly appear.

Dr. Victoria Batiquin and Allan Batiquin vs. Court of appeals, sps. Quedo Acogido and Flotide Villegas
Facts:
Dr. Batiquin was a resident physician at Negros Oriental Provincial Hospital,she was acting Head of the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the said hospital. Mrs Villegas is a married woman who submitted to
Dr. Batiquin for prenatal care as the latter’s private patient sometime before September 1988. Dr. Batiquin, with
the assistance of Dr. Doris Sy who was also a resident physician at the same hospital, C.I and O.R Nurse Diones
and some stuent nurses performed a simple caesarean section on Mrs Villegas and after 45 minutes Mrs Villegas
delivered her first child. Thereafter, Plaintiff remained confined at the hospital until September 27, 1988 during
which perid of confinement she was regularly visited by Dr. Batiquin. On September 28, 1988 Mrs Villegas checked
out of the hospital. Soon after leaving the hospital Mrs. Villegas began to suffer abdominal pains and complained of
being feverish. She also gradually lost her appetite, so she consulted Dr. Batiquin at the latter’s polyclinic who
prescribed for her certain medicines. The abdominal pains and fever kept on recurring and bothered Mrs Villegas
no end despite the medications administered by Dr. Batiquin . When the pains become unbearable and she was
rapidly losing weight she consulted Dr. Ma. Salud Kho at the Holy Child’s Hospital in Dumaguete City. When Dr.
Kho examined Mrs Villegas at the Holy Child’s Hospital she found out that Mrs Villegas to be feverish, pale and
was breathing fast. Upon examination she felt an abdominal mass one finger below the umbilicus which she
suspected to be either a tumor of the uterus or an ovarian cyst, either of which could be cancerous. She had an x-ray
taken of Mrs Villegas’ chest, abdomen and kidney. The result of all those examinations impelled Dr. Kho to suggest
that Mrs. Villegas submit to another surgery to which the latter agreed. When Dr. Kho opened the abdomen of Mrs
Villegas she found whitish yellow discharge inside, an ovarian cyst on each of the left and right ovaries which gave
out pus, dirt and pus behind the uterus, and a piece of rubber materials on the right side of the uterus embedded on
the ovarian cyst. This piece of rubber material which Dr. Kho decribed as a “foreign body” looked like a piece of
“rubber glove “and which is also “rubber drain like. It could have been a torn section of the surgeon’s glove or
could have come from other sources.
Issue:
Whether or not Res ipsa Loquitor is applied in this case
Ruling:
The rule of Res ipsa Loquitor comes to force. “Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under
the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of the things does not happen
if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanayio
by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of care.”
In the instant case, all the requisites for recourse to the doctrine are present. First the entire proceedings of
the caesarean section were under the exclusive control of Dr. BAtiquin. In this light, the private respondents were
bereft of direct evidence as to the actual culprit or the exact cause of the foreign object finding its way into private
respaondent Villegas’ body, which, needless to say, does not occur unless through the intervention of negligence.
Second, since aside from the caesarean section, private respondent Villegas underwent no other operation which
could have caused the offending pieca of rubber to appear in her uterus, it stands to reason that such could only
have been a by-product of the caesarean section performed by Dr. batiquin. The petitioners, in this regard, failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence arising from resort to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, DR. Batiquin
therefore is liable for negligently leaving behind a piece of rubber in private respondent Villegas abdomen and for
all the adverse effects thereof.
Indeed, a physician is bound to serve the interest of his patients “with the greatest of solicitude, giving them
alsways his best talent and skill.” Through the tortious conduct, the petitioner endangered the life of Villegas, in
violation of her profession’s rigid ethical code and in contravention of the legal standards sset fort for professionals,
in the general, and members of the medical profession.
 Catilex Industrial Corporation vs. Vicente Vasquez, Jr., and Luisa Vasquez, and Cebu Doctors Hospital
Facts:
Remeo Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around the Fuente Osmena Rotonda. He was travelling
counter clockwise, but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was only carrying a Student Permit to drive at
the time. Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad manager of appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation registered
owner of Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up. On the same date and time Abad drove the said company car out of a parking lot
but instead going around the Osmena rotunda he made a short cut against the flow of the traffic in proceeding to
his route to General Mavilom St. or to Belvic St. The motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with
each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern
Islands Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital. Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. Abad signed
an acknowledgement of Responsible party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills, professional fees and
other incidental charges Vasquez may incur. A criminal case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently
dismissed for failure to prosecute. So the present action for damages were commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and
Luisa Vasquez, against Jose Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. The trial court ruled in favor of private
respondent Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin and Abad and petitioner Castlex Industrial
Corporation to pay jointly and solidarily.
Issue:
Whether an employer may be held liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by a
managerial employee of a company issued vehicle.
Ruling:
The negligence of Abad is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner Castilex presumes said negligence but
claims that it is not vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by Abad. Petitioner contends that
the fifth paragraph of the 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged
in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is not covered by
said provision.
It is undisputed that Abad was a production Manager of Petitioner Castilex at the time of the tort
occurrence. As whether he was acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which the court a
quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative. Since Abad was driving the petitioners vehicle he was
acting within the scope of his duties as a manager.
Before we pass upon the issue whether Abad was performing with the scope of his employment, we shall
first take up the other reason invoked by the reason invoked by the court of appeals in holding the petitioner
Castilex vicariously liable for Abad’s negligence, that the petitioner did not present evidence that Abad was not
acting within the scope of his assigned task at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the
Court of appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for the petitioner
Castilex to deny that Abad was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove
this negative averment. He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove. The court has consistently applied the
ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rest the burden of proving his cause of action , fails to show in a
satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.
Abad who was presented as a hostile, testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving the company
vehicle, registered under the name of the petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had some snacks
and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the petitioner. No absolutely hard and fast rule
can be stated which will furnish the complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an employee is
engaged in his employers business in the operation of a motor vehicle , so as to fix liability upon the employer
because of the employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each state of facts.
The mere fact that Abad using the service at the time of the mishap is not of itself sufficient to charge the
petitioner for the negligent act of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course
or scope of his employment.

Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and Armando Pon vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Heirs of Paz VDA.
De Pamfilo, Heirs of Norma Neri Baylon Sales and nena VDA Roales
Facts:
 The Collision between Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLBT) driven by Armando Pon and
Superlines Transportation (Superlines) driven by Ruben Dasco took place at the highway traversing Barangay
Isobong,Tayabas, Quezon in the afternoon of Agugust 11, 1978, which collision resulted in the death of Rosales,
Pamfilo and Neri and several injuries to Nena Rosales and Baylon Sales, all passengers of the BLBT . the evidence
show that as BLBT was negotiating behind the highway, it tried to overtake ford fiera car just as Superline Bu was
coming from the opposite direction. Seeing thus, Pon made a belated attempt to slacken the speed of his bus and
tried to return his proper lane. It was an unsuccessful try as the two buses collided with each other. Nena Rosales
and Baylon Sales and the surviving heir of the deceased passengers instituted separate cases in the Court of the First
Instance of Marinduque against BLBT and Superlines together with their respective drivers praying for damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses plus costs. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses were filed in the
Court of the First instance of Quezon.
The lower court exonerated defendant and its driver Dasco from liability and attributed the responsibility to
defendants BLBT and its driver Pon,
Issue:
Whether Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company or Superlines Transportation is liable for the mishap
causing the death and injuries of several passengers.
Ruling:
The proximate cause of the collision resulting in rthe death of the three passengers and injuries of the two
passengers of BLBT was the negligence of the BLBT, who recklessly operated and drove said bus by overtaking a
Ford Fiera car as he was negotiating the ascending bend of the highway, which was divided into two lanes by a
continuous yellow strip. BLBT admitted in hi cross-examination that the continuous yello line on the ascending
bend of the highway signifies a non-overtaking zone. It is no surprise then that the driver of the Superlines bus was
exonerated by the lower court. He had a valid reason to presuppose that no one would overtake in suck a dangerous
situation. These facts shows that patient imprudence of the BLBT driver. Before attempting to pas the vehicle
ahead, the rear driver must see that the road is clear and if there is no sufficient room for safe passage, or the driver
ahead does not urn out so to afford opportunity to pas, or if, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking
vehicle that he cannot make the passage safely, the latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger and
collision, even bringing his car to a stop if necessary. The rule becomes more particularly applicable in this case
when the overtaking took place on ascending curved highway divided into two lanes by a continuous yellow line.
Appellant Pon should have remembered that When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve there is a
special necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver has not the right to drive on the left hand
and side relying upon having time to turn to the right if a car is approaching from the opposite direction comes into
view. For his own negligence Pon is primarily liable in recklessly driving the Bus owned by his employer.

Caedo vs Yu Khe Thai, et. Al

Facts:
On March 24, 1958 on Highway 54 (now E. de los Santos Avenue) in the vicinity of San Lorenzo Village,
Marcial Caedo was driving his Mercury car. With them in the car were Mrs. Caedo and three daughters. Coming
from the opposite direction was the Cadillac of Yu Khe Thai, with his driver Rafael Bernardo at the wheel, taking
the owner from his Parañaque home to Wack Wack for his regular round of golf. The two cars were traveling at
fairly moderate speeds, their headlights were mutually noticeable from a distance. Ahead of the Cadillac, going
in the same direction, was a caretella owned by Pedro Bautista. The carretela was towing another horse by means of
a short rope coiled around the rig's vertical post on the right side and held at the other end by Pedro's son, Julian
Bautista.Bernardo tried to overtake the carretela, instead of slowing down or stopping behind the carretela until the
lane was clear. Its rear bumper caught the wheel of the carretela and wrenched it loose, and the car skidded to the
other lane. Caedo tried to avoid the collision at the last moment by going farther to the right, but was
unsuccessful.Caedo and his family members were injured. They filed a suit for recovery of damages from the
defendants. The CFI Rizal rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, Yu Khe Thai
and Rafael Bernardo.
Issue:
 Is Yu Khe Thai, as owner of the Cadillac, solidarily liable with the driver?
Ruling:
N o . T h e a p p l i c a b l e l a w i s A r t i c l e 2 1 8 4 o f t h e C i v i l C o d e : ART. 2184. In motor vehicle
mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use
of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a driver was negligent, if he had been
found guilty of reckless driving or violating traffic regulations at least twice within the next preceding two
months.Under the foregoing provision, if the causative factor was the driver's negligence, the owner of the vehicle
who was present is likewise held liable if he could have prevented the mishap by the exercise of due diligence.The
basis of the master's liability in civil law is not respondent superior butrather the relationship of paterfamilias. The
theory is that ultimately the negligence of the servant, if known to the master and susceptible of timely correction by
him, reflects his own negligence if he fails to correct it in order to prevent injury or damage.In the present case the
defendants' evidence is that Rafael Bernardo had been Yu Khe Thai's driver since 1937, and before that had been
employed by Yutivo SonsHardware Co. in the same capacity for over ten years. During that time he had no record
of violation of traffic laws and regulations. No negligence for having employed him at all may be imputed to his
master.The time element was such that there was no reasonable opportunity for Yu Khe Thai to assess the risks
involved and warn the driver accordingly.The law does not require that a person must possess a certain measure of
skill or proficiency either in the mechanics of driving or in the observance of traffic rules before he may own a
motor vehicle. The test of his intelligence, within the meaning of Article 2184, is his omission to do that which the
evidence of his own senses tells him he should do in order to avoid the accident. And as far as perception is
concerned, absent a minimum level imposed by law, a maneuver that appears to be fraught with danger to one
passenger may appear to be entirely safe and commonplace to another. Were the law to require a uniform standard
of perceptiveness, employment of professional drivers by car owners who, by their very inadequacies, have real
need of drivers' services, would be effectively proscribed.

Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Company

Facts:
Rakes was a black man working as a labourer for Atlantic Gulf in the early 1900s. One day, they were
working in the company is yard and they were transporting heavy rails using two cars "karitons” each car carrying
the opposite ends of the rails. The cars were pulled by rope from the front and other workers are pushing the cars
from behind. There were no side guards installed on the sides of the cars but the rails were secured by ropes. The
track where the cars mode were also weakened by a pervious typhoon. it was alleged that Atlantic’s foreman was
notified of said damage in the tracks but the same were left unrepaired. (while the cars were being moved and when
it reached the depressed portion of the track, and while Rakes was beside one of the cars, the ropes gave in and the
rails slipped thereby crushing his leg and causing it to be amputated. Rakes sued Atlantic Gulf and he won he
was awarded) for damages ". Atlantic assailed the decision of the lower court alleging that they specifically ordered
their workers to be walking only before or after the cars and not on the side of the cars because the cars have
no side guards to protect them in case the rails would slip. Atlantic also alleged that Rakes should be suing the
foreman as it was him who neglected to have the tracks repaired that Rakes himself was negligent for having known
of the depression on the track yet he continued to work.
Issue:
Whether or not Atlantic is civilly liable
Ruling:

Yes. Rakes as per the evidence could not have known of the damage in the track as it was another employee
who swore he notified the foreman about said damage. Further, his lack of caution in continuing to work is not of a
gross nature as to constitute negligence on his part. On the other hand though, Rakes contributory negligence can
be inferred from the fact that he was on the side of the cars when in fact there were orders from the company
barring workers from standing near the side of the cars. It is disobedient to this order does not bar his recovery of
damages though the Supreme Court instead reduced the award of damages the also elucidated the two kinds of
culpa which are 1.) culpa as substantive and independent, which on account of its origin arises in an obligation
between two persons not formerly bound by any other obligation may be also considered as a real source of an
independent obligation contractual or culpa aquiliana and Culpa as an incident in the performance of an obligation
which cannot be presumed to exist without the other, and which increases the liability arising from the already
existing obligation "contractual or culpa contractual

Afiada vs. Hisole

Facts:
Loreto Afialda was a caretaker of the carabaos owned by Basilio Hisole. In March 1947, without any fault
from Afrialda or ant force majeure, one of the carabaos gored him therefore causing his death. Afialda’s sister
Margarita Afialda, sued Hisole arguing under the Civil Code. That The possessor of an animal, or one who uses the
same, is liable for any damages it may cause, even if such animal should escape from him or stray away. This liability
shall cease only in case, the damage should arise from force majeure or from the fault of the person who may have
suffered it.
Issue:
Whether or not Hisole is liable in the case at bar as owner of the carabao which killed Afialda.
Ruling:
No. The law uses the term “possessor and the user of the animal”. Afialda was the caretaker of the animal
and he was tasked and paid to tend to the carabaos. He, at the time of the goring, is the possessor and the user of
the carabao and therefore, he is the one who had custody and control of the animal and was in a position to prevent
the animal from causing damage. It would have been different had Afialda been a stranger. Obviously, it was the
caretaker’s business to try to prevent the animal from causing injury or damage to anyone, including himself. And
being injured by the animal under those circumstances was one of the risks of the occupation which he had
voluntarily assumed and for which he must take the consequences.
This action could have been more appropriately raised in court under the provisions of the Worksmen
Compensation Act as the risk involve was the one with occupational hazards.
 Picart vs Smith
Facts:
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before he had gotten
half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an automobile. As the defendant neared the
bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and
after he had taken the bridge he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback
before him was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed by the novelty
of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side
of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have
sufficient time to get over to the other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that
being the proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the horseman would
move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the defendant, instead of veering to the right
while yet some distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution
of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other
side, the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but in so doing the
automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became frightened and turned its body across the
bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violenceAs
a result of its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness
and required medical attention for several days.

From a judgment of the CFI of La Union absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

Issue:

WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done.

Held:

The judgment of the lower court must be reversed, and judgment is here rendered that the Picart recover of
Smith damages
YES

The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the
defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is
guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal
judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or
negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The question as to what
would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light
of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case.

Could a prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of the course actually pursued? If so,
it was the duty of the actor to take precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed
by ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.
Stated in these terms, the proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case is this:
Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an
effect harmful to another was sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing conduct or guarding against its
consequences.

Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that negligence is clearly established.
A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant, would in our opinion, have recognized that the course
which he was pursuing was fraught with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as
reasonable consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the duty to guard
against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of antecedent negligence in
planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such
case the problem always is to discover which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the
negligent acts of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant succeeded the
negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these circumstances the law is that the person who has
the last fair chance to avoid the impending harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party.

Spouses Ong vs. Metropolitan Water Distric

Facts:
Plaintiff spouses seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral expenses and attorney’s fees
for the death of their son, Dominador Ong. After trial, the lower court found
that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the complaint
w i t h o u t pronouncement as to costs. Plaintiffs took the case on appeal directly to this Court because the amount
involved exceeds the sum of P50,000.Dominador Ong, 14-year old son of plaintiffs, in company with
two of his brothers went to swim at the defendant’s swimming pool. After paying the admission fee they went
to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. Later Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the
locker room in an adjoining building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, his two brothers went to
the bigger pool. Later another boy in the swimming pool informed lifeguard employed by the defendant that
somebody was swimming underwater for quite along time. The lifeguard immediately jumped into the big
swimming pool and retrieved apparently lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom.
Artificial respiration and resuscitator were applied by employees of the defendant upon Dominador for the
purpose of reviving him. A doctor was summoned by employees of the defendant to revive the boy but all to no
avail. This action was instituted by the parents of the boy to recover damages from the defendant for the death of
their son.

Issue:
(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence
of thedefendants so as to make it liable for the damages sought?
(2) Whether or not the Doctrineof Last Clear Chance applies in the case at bench.

Ruling:
The record shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom of the pool, the
employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life. Thus, after he was placed at the edge of the
pool, lifeguard Abaño immediately gave him manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter, Nurse Armando
Rule arrived, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an oxygen resuscitator.
When they found t h a t t h e p u l s e o f t h e b o y w a s a b n o r m a l , t h e
i n s p e c t o r i m m e d i a t e l y i n j e c t e d h i m w i t h camphorated oil.
When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its
contents were exhausted. And while all these efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the
University of the Philippines who however came late because upon examining the body he found him to be
already dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under the circumstances
to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it liable for his death. With regard to the
application of doctrine of last clear chance, since it is not known how m i n o r O n g c a m e i n t o t h e
b i g s w i m m i n g p o o l a n d i t b e i n g a p p a r e n t t h a t h e w e n t t h e r e without any companion in violation
of one of the regulations of appellee as regards the use of the pools, and it appearing that lifeguard Abaño
responded to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it and immediately after retrieving the
body all efforts at the disposal of appellee had been put into play in order to bring him back to life, it is clear
that there is no room for the application of the doctrine now invoked by appellants to impute liability
to appellee.

Ferrer vs. Ericta

Facts:
Judge Ericta and Teddy C. Galo filed suit for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction assailing the validity of enactment of the Reflector as well as Admin Order No. 2 implementing it, as an
invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause. Galo followed with a
manifestation that in the event that Judge would uphold said statute constitutional, A.O. No. 2 of the Land
Transportation Commissioner, implementing such legislation be nullified as an undue exercise of legislative power.

ISSUE:
Whether Reflector Law and Administrative Order is constitutional and valid.

RULING:
Yes. Reflector Law is enacted under the police power in order to promote public safety and order.

Justice Laurel identified police power with state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty
or property in order to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." The police power
is thus a dynamic agency, suitably vague and far from precisely defined, rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend
thereby to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures calculated to insure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare.

The same lack of success marks the effort of respondent Galo to impugn the validity of Administrative Order No. 2
issued by petitioner in his official capacity, duly approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
for being contrary to the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. Such administrative order, which took
effect on April 17, 1970, has a provision on reflectors in effect reproducing what was set forth in the Act.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may not delegate its
legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that local governments may
over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to
make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its term and provisions
when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative
power the inquiry must be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not
abdicate its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of his
authority.

It bears repeating that the Reflector Law construed together with the Land Transportation Code. Republic Act No.
4136, of which it is an amendment, leaves no doubt as to the stress and emphasis on public safety which is the
prime consideration in statutes of this character. There is likewise a categorical affirmation Of the power of
petitioner as Land Transportation Commissioner to promulgate rules and regulations to give life to and translate
into actuality such fundamental purpose. His power is clear. There has been no abuse. His Administrative Order
No. 2 can easily survive the attack, far-from-formidable, launched against it by respondent Galo.

Kramer, et al. vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

On April 8, 1976, the F/B Marjolea, a fishing boat owned by petitioners Ernesto Kramer, Jr.
and Marta Kramer collided with anointer-island vessel, the M/V Asia Philippines owned by the private respondent
Trans-Asia Shipping Lines, Inc. As a consequence of the collision, the F/B Marjolea sank, taking with it its fish
catch. Both parties filed their protest with the Board of Marine Inquiry for the determination of the proximate
cause of the collision. The Board decided that the collision occurred due to the negligence of the employees of
the private respondent who were on board the M/V Asia Philippines. The findings made by the Board
served as the basis of subsequent Decision of the Commandant of the Philippine Coastguard dated April 29,
1982 wherein the second mate of the M/V Asia Philippines was suspended from pursuing his profession as a
marine officer. On May 30, 1985, the petitioners instituted a Complaint for damages against the
private respondent before the RTC. The private respondent filed a Motion seeking the dismissal of
the Complaint on the ground of prescription. Respondents argue that the prescription period for actions based on
quasi-delict is 4 years from when the cause of action accrued as stated in Art. 1146 of the Civil Code. Therefore, the
period should be counted from April 8, 1976 when the collision occurred. Petitioners argue that the period should
be counted from 1982, or when the date when the Decision ascertaining the negligence of the crew of the
M/V Asia Philippines had become final. They claimed that maritime collisions have peculiarities and
characteristics which only persons with special skill, training and experience like the members of the Board of
Marine Inquiry can properly analyze and resolve. RTC denied the MTD based on the arguments of the petitioners.
It stated that prescriptive period under the law should begin to run only from April 29, 1982, the date when the
negligence of the crew of M/V Asia Philippines had been finally ascertained. The CA reversed the RTC
decision. The CA stated that the decisions of an admin are not binding on the courts. If an accrual of a cause
of action has to be dependent on an action of an adminbody, then it might get delayed

Issue: Whether or not the action has prescribed

Ruling:
 YES. Under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, an action based upon aquasi-delict must be instituted within
four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed.

A. The right of action accrues when there exists a cause of action, which consists of 3 elements, namely:

a.i. A right in favour of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created

a.ii. An obligation on the part of defendant to respect such right

a.iii. An act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff

B. The occurrence of the last element is the time when the cause of action arises.

C. It is therefore clear that in this action for damages arising from the collision of two (2) vessels the four (4) year
prescriptive period must be counted from the day of the collision. The aggrieved party need not
wait for a determination by an administrative body like a Board of Marine Inquiry that the
collision was caused by the fault or negligence of the other party before he can file an action for damages.

D. The period should be counted from April 8, 1976

Gotesco vs Chatto

Facts

Respondents went to see the movie “Mother Dear” at Superama Theater owned by petitioner. Hardly ten
minutes after entering the theater, the ceiling of the balcony collapsed. The theater was plunged into the darkness.
Shocked and hurt, respondents managed to crawl under the fallen ceiling. As soon as they were able to get out, they
walked to the nearby FEU hospital for treatment. The next day they transferred to UST hospital. Due to the
continuing pain, respondent Gloria went to the US for further treatment. Respondents filed a case for damages.
Trial court ruled in favor of respondents. The ceiling collapsed because of some structural construction or
architectural defect. Petitioner is grossly negligent in failing to cause proper and adequate inspection and upkeep of
the building. CA affirmed the decision. Petitioner’s defense is that The ceiling of the balcony collapsed due to force
majeure.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner is liable?

HELD: YES
Petitioner presented Mr. Ong as its witness. Mr. Ong admitted that he could not give any reason why the
ceiling collapsed. The real reason why Mr. Ong could not explain the cause or reason is that he did not actually
conduct the investigation. It was not shown that any causes denominated as force majeure obtained
immediately before or at the time of the collapse of the ceiling. Such defects could have easily been discovered
if only petitioner exercised due diligence and care in keeping and maintaining the premises. But as disclosed by Mr.
Ong, there was no adequate inspection nor the nature and extent of the same. It is settled that: The owner or
proprietor of a place of public amusement impliedly warrants that the premises, appliances and amusement devices
are safe for the purpose for which they are designed, the doctrine being subject to no other exception or
qualification than that he does not contract against unknown defects not discoverable by ordinary or reasonable
means.
This implied warranty has given rise to the rule that: Where a patron of a theater or other place of public
amusement is injured, and the thing that caused the injury is wholly and exclusively under the control and
management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of events would not
have happened if proper care had been exercised, its occurrence raises a presumption or permits of an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant. That presumption or inference was not overcome by the petitioner.
Besides, even assuming for the sake of argument that, as petitioner vigorously insists, the cause of the collapse
was due to force majeure petitioner would still be liable because it was guilty of negligence, which the trial
court denominated as
Gross.
 National Power Corporation. Et al vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
The Court of Appeals Decision dated June 6, 2002, as well as its Resolution dated August 30, 2002,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, Branch 25 which granted the complaint for
expropriation filed by herein petitioner National Power Corporation (NPC) against herein respondents "Petrona
Dilao et al." are being assailed in the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. To implement its Leyte-Cebu
Interconnection Project, the NPC filed on March 19, 1996 before the Regional Trial Court of Danao City a
complaint for expropriation of parcels of land situated at Baring and Cantumog, Carmen, Cebu against Dilao and
siblings, and Enriquez. The complaint covers 7,281 square meters of land co-owned Petrona O. Dilao (Dilao) and
siblings, and 7,879 square meters of land owned by Estefania Enriquez (Enriquez). A day after the complaint was
filed or on March 20, 1996, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of writ of possession of the lands.
Dilao filed her Answer with Counterclaim on April 19, 1996. Enriquez did not. On May 9, 1996, Branch 25 of the
RTC Danao, issued an Order granting NPC’s motion for the issuance of writ of possession. It then appointed a
Board of Commissioners to determine just compensation.

Issue:
Whether or not NPC is liable due to a fortuitous event

Ruling:
There are two stages in every act of expropriation. The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination
by the court of “the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.” The order fixing the just compensation
on the basis of the evidence before the commissioners would be final. In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-
way is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature and effect of the installation
of the transmission lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use. It cannot be opposed that NPC’s complaint merely involves a
simple case of mere passage of transmission lines over Dilao et. Al’s sproperty. Aside from the actual damage done
to the property transversed by the transmission lines, the agricultural and economic activity normally undertaken on
the entire property is unquestionably restricted and perpetually hampered as the environment is made dangerous to
the occupant’s life and limb.

The appeal sought by NPC does not stand on both procedural and substantive grounds. The just
compensation recommended, which was approved by the trial court, to be just and reasonable compensation for
the expropriated property of Dilao and her siblings.
 Ramos vs. Pepsi
Facts:
On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.
and Andres Bonifacio in the Court of First Instance of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958,
involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPESI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the
collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven
by itsdriver and co-defendant Andres Bonifacio.

After trial the Court of First Instance rendered judgment on April 15, 1961, finding Bonifacio negligent and
declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffsP2,638.50
actual damages; P2,000.00 moral damages; P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00attorney's fees, with
costs.
Issue:
WON Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.
Held:
Pepsi Cola had exercised due diligence in the selection of its drivers.

The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to the
effect that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when
he was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances,
previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination, consisting of: First, theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which
he had undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council.
In view hereof, we are of the sense that Defendant Company had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the choice or selection of defendant driver.
In the case of Campo vs. Camarote (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's brief, our Supreme Court had
occasion to put it down as a rule that "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised all the
diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experiences and record of service. “Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides inter alia: The owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions. The responsibility treated of in this
Article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage; hence, Pepsi Cola shall be relieved from liability.

Gatchalian vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
July 11,1973: Reynalda Gatchalian boarded Thames" mini bus at Aringay, La Union bound for Bauang, of the
same province. The bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and
fell into a ditch. Gatchalian got injured with physical injuries on the leg, arm and forehead. Mrs. Adela Delim visited
the passenger and later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave transportation expense of
P12 in going home from the hospital and they were made to sign a Joint Affidavit stating that they are no longer
interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames.

Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages stating that
the mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on the forehead, generating
mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part as a result, she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from
her friends scar diminished her facial beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment. Delim averred that
it was a fortuitous event CFI: dismissed because of the Joint Affidavit. CA: affirmed

ISSUE: W/N Gatchalian is entitled to damages

HELD:

YES. CA, CFI REVERSED and SET ASIDE 1) P15,000 actual or compensatory damages to cover the cost of
plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's forehead; 2) P30,000 moral damages; and 3) P1,000
attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the
promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof

A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. While
reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers who had also suffered injuries sign
the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these
circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit.
To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to claim damages by an injured passenger, under circumstances like those
exhibited in this case, would be to dilute and weaken the standard of extraordinary diligence exacted by the law
from common carriers and hence to render that standard unenforceable. To exempt a common carrier from liability
for death or physical injuries to passengers upon the ground of force majeure, the carrier must clearly show not only
that the efficient cause of the casualty was entirely independent of the human will, but also that it was impossible to
avoid.

The driver did not stop to check if anything had gone wrong with the bus after the snapping sound. Court of
Appeals, however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school since,
being a casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her employment as a substitute
teacher was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. A person
is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is
suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the
woman, resulting from the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate
claim for restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim,
the cost of surgery may be expected to be correspondingly modest.
In view of the testimony, and the fact that a considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973
which may be expected to increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty of removing the scar, we
consider that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable. Moral
damages may be awarded where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier

National Power Corporation vs. CA

Facts:
In the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, at the height of typhoon "Kading", a massive flood
covered the towns near Angat Dam, particularly the town of Norzagaray, causing several deaths and the loss and
destruction of houses, farms, plants, working animals and other properties of the people residing near the Angat
River. Private respondents blamed the sudden rush of water to the reckless and imprudent opening of all the three
(3) floodgates of the Angat Dam spillway, without prior warning to the people living near or within the vicinity of
the dam. In view of these, an action for damages was filed by respondents. The trial court ruled in favor of the
latter. Likewise the Court of Appeals affirmed with said decision. Hence, a petition for review on
certiorari was instituted by the National Power Corporation(NPC) and Benjamin Chavez, Plant Superintendent of
NPC. Petitioners denied private respondents' allegations and, by way of defense, contended that they have
maintained the water in the Angat Dam at a safe level and that the opening of the spillways was done gradually and
after all precautionary measures had been taken. Petitioner NPC further contended that it had always exercised the
diligence of a good father in the selection of its officials and employees and in their supervision. It also claimed that
written warnings were earlier sent to the towns concerned, and that there was no direct causal relationship between
the alleged damages suffered by the respondents and the acts and omissions attributed to the former. That it was
the respondents who assumed the risk of residing near the Angat River, and even assuming that respondents
suffered damages, the cause was due to a fortuitous event and such damages are of the nature and character
of damnum absque injuria,
hence,respondents have no cause of action against them.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners can escape civil liability by invoking force majeure as the proximate cause of the loss
and damage.
HELD: No. Petitioners cannot escape liability because their negligence is the proximate cause of the loss
and damage. Act of God or force majeure, by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or avoidable,
events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, are inevitable. It is therefore not enough that the
event should not have been foreseen or anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to
foresee or to avoid.
As a general rule, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen or which
though foreseen, were inevitable. However, the principle embodied in the act of God doctrine strictly requires that
the act must be occasioned solely by the violence of nature. Human intervention is to be excluded from creating
or entering into the cause of the mischief. When the effect is found to be in part the result of the participation of
man, whether due to his active intervention or neglect or failure to act, the whole occurrence is then humanized and
removed from the rules applicable to the acts of God.
Generally it cannot be said that damage, injury or loss is due to an act of God where it was caused merely
by excessive or heavy rainfall, storms and to weather conditions which are not unusual in character, those which
could have been reasonably anticipated or where the injury complained of is due rather to the negligence or
mismanagement of man than to the disturbance of the elements or where such damage, injury or loss might have
been mitigated or prevented by diligence exercised after the occurrence. In the case at bar, although the typhoon
"Kading" was an act of God, petitioners cannot escape liability because their negligence was the proximate cause of
the loss and damage. The Court of Appeals found that the defendants failed to take the necessary safeguards to
prevent the danger that the Angat Dam posed in a situation of such nature as that of typhoon "Kading".

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