must-carry rule (mandatory carriage) under the
NTC Memorandum Circular.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION vs.
PHILIPPINE MULTI-MEDIA SYSTEM, INC.
G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January 19, 2009
The Case: Petition for review on certiorari assailing
the CTA Decision which affirmed the Decision of the
Director-General of the Intellectual Property Office
(IPO). Also assailed is the Resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration.
FACTS :
• Petitioner ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation
(ABS-CBN) is licensed under the laws to engage
in television and radio broadcasting.
• Respondent Philippine Multi-Media System, Inc.
(PMSI) is the operator of Dream Broadcasting
System. It delivers digital direct-to-home (DTH)
television via satellite to its subscribers all over the
Philippines.
• Respondent was granted a legislative franchise
under Republic Act No. 8630and was given a
Provisional Authority by the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) to
install, operate and maintain a nationwide DTH
satellite service. When it commenced operations,
it offered as part of its program line-up ABS-CBN
Channels 2 and 23, NBN, Channel 4, ABC
Channel 5, GMA Channel 7, RPN Channel 9, and
IBC Channel 13, together with other paid premium
program channels.
• ABS-CBN demanded for PMSI to cease and
desist from rebroadcasting Channels 2 and 23.
• PMSI replied that the rebroadcasting was in
accordance with the authority granted it by NTC
and its obligation under the NTC Memorandum
which requires all cable television system
operators operating in a community within Grade
A or B contours to carry the television signals of
the authorized television broadcast stations.
• Thereafter, negotiations ensued between the
parties in an effort to reach a settlement
• However, the negotiations were terminated by
ABS-CBN allegedly due to PMSIs inability to
ensure the prevention of illegal retransmission
and further rebroadcast of its signals
• ABS-CBN filed with the IPO a complaint for
Violation of Laws Involving Property Rights, with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. It alleged that PMSIs unauthorized
rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 infringed on
its broadcasting rights and copyright.
• The Bureau of Legal Affairs (BLA) of the IPO
granted ABS-CBNs application for a TRO.
• PMSI suspended its retransmission of Channels
2 and 23 and likewise filed a petition for certiorari
with the Court of Appeals
• Subsequently, PMSI filed with the BLA a
Manifestation reiterating that it is subject to the
• PMSI filed another Manifestation with the BLA
that it received a letter from the NTC enjoining
strict and immediate compliance with the must-
carry rule under Memorandum Circular
• Meanwhile, the NTC issued Implementing Rules
and Regulations Governing Community
Antenna/Cable Television (CATV) and Direct
Broadcast Satellite (DBS) Services to Promote
Competition in the Sector which is still enforcing
the obligation of the PMSI.
• The BLA rendered a decision finding that PMSI
infringed the broadcasting rights and copyright of
ABS-CBN and ordering it to permanently cease
and desist from rebroadcasting Channels 2 and
23.
• PMSI filed an appeal with the Office of the
Director-General of the IPO which rendered a
decision in favor of PMSI
• Thus, ABS-CBN filed a petition for review with
prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction with the
Court of Appeals
• Upon the issuance of TRO of the CA, ABS-CBN
filed a petition for contempt against PMSI for
continuing to rebroadcast Channels 2 and 23
despite the restraining order.
• Court of Appeals ordered the consolidation of the
cases
• The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of the
Director-General of the IPO and dismissed both
petitions filed by ABS-CBN.
• ABS-CBNs motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence, this petition.
Contentions:
Petitioner:
• ABS-CBN contends that PMSIs unauthorized
rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 is an
infringement of its broadcasting rights and
copyright under the Intellectual Property Code (IP
Code)
• That the Court of Appeals interpretation of the
must-carry rule violates Section 9 of Article III of
the Constitution because it allows the taking of
property for public use without payment of just
compensation
Respondent:
• Argue that PMSIs rebroadcasting of Channels 2
and 23 is sanctioned by the Memorandum
Circular
• that the must-carry rule under the Memorandum
Circular is a valid exercise of police power
ISSUE : Whether there is an infringement of the
petitioners broadcasting rights
HELD : NO. The Director-General of the IPO
correctly found that PMSI is not engaged in
rebroadcasting and thus cannot be considered to
have infringed ABS-CBNs broadcasting rights and
copyright. Moreover it was ruled by the SC that It is
only the presence of all elements that the DTH is
broadcasting and consequently, rebroadcasting
Appellees signals in violation of Sections 211 and
177 of the IP Code.
Further, as correctly observed by the Court of
Appeals, the must-carry rule as well as the
legislative franchises granted to both ABS-CBN
and PMSI are in consonance with state policies
enshrined in the Constitution, specifically Sections
9,17, and 24[of Article II on the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies.
In Telecom. & Broadcast Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v.
COMELEC,[36] the Court held that a franchise is a
mere privilege which may be reasonably burdened
with some form of public service.
It was also ruled that there is no merit on the
petitioners’ contention that PMSI carries its signals
for profit and commercial purpose. Moreover, there
is no merit on the contention that the must carry
rule has resulted into competition when in-fact, the
must carry rule helps in increasing the programs’
ratings.
Indeed, television is a business; however, the
welfare of the people must not be sacrificed in the
pursuit of profit. The right of the viewers and
listeners to the most diverse choice of programs
available is paramount.
The Director-General correctly observed, thus:
“The Must-Carry Rule favors both broadcasting
organizations and the public. It prevents cable
television companies from excluding broadcasting
organization especially in those places not reached
by signal. Also, the rule prevents cable television
companies from depriving viewers in far-flung
areas the enjoyment of programs available to city
viewers. In fact, this Office finds the rule more
burdensome on the part of the cable television
companies. The latter carries the television signals
and shoulders the costs without any recourse of
charging. On the other hand, the signals that are
carried by cable television companies are
dispersed and scattered by the television stations
and anybody with a television set is free to pick
them up.”
With regard to the issue of the constitutionality of
the must-carry rule, the Court finds that its
resolution is not necessary in the disposition of the
instant case. One of the essential requisites for a
successful judicial inquiry into constitutional
questions is that the resolution of the constitutional
question must be necessary in deciding the case.
The instant case was instituted for violation of the
IP Code and infringement of ABS-CBNs
broadcasting rights and copyright, which can be
resolved without going into the constitutionality of
the Memorandum Circular. The records show that
petitioner assailed the constitutionality of
Memorandum Circular No. 04-08-88 by way of a
collateral attack before the Court of Appeals.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if
not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be
raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court,
it will not be considered on appeal.
NOTE :
As defined in the IP Code, broadcasting is the
transmission by wireless means for the public
reception of sounds or of images or of
representations thereof; such transmission by
satellite is also broadcasting where the means for
decrypting are provided to the public by the
broadcasting organization or with its consent.
On the other hand, rebroadcasting as defined in
the 1961 Rome Convention, of which the Republic
of the Philippines is a signatory, is the
simultaneous broadcasting by one broadcasting
organization of the broadcast of another
broadcasting organization.
AKBAYAN CITIZEN ACTION PARTY v. AQUINO
GR NO. 170516, July 16, 2008
The Case : Petitioners non-government
organizations, Congresspersons, citizens and
taxpayers seek via the present petition for
mandamus and prohibition to obtain from
respondents the full text of the Japan-Philippines
Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA)
including the Philippine and Japanese offers
submitted during the negotiation process and all
pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
FACTS :
• Petitioners Congressmen Lorenzo R. Taada III
and Mario Joyo Aguja filed a House Resolution
calling for an inquiry into the bilateral trade
agreements then being negotiated by the
Philippine government, particularly the JPEPA.
• In the course of its inquiry, the House Committee
requested herein respondent Undersecretary
Tomas Aquino (Usec. Aquino), Chairman of the
Philippine Coordinating Committee created
under Executive Order No. 213 (Creation of A
Philippine Coordinating Committee to Study the
Feasibility of the Japan-Philippines Economic
Partnership Agreement) to study and negotiate
the proposed JPEPA, and to furnish the
Committee with a copy of the latest draft of the
JPEPA.
• Usec. Aquino did not heed the request, however
and replied that the Congressman shall be
provided with a copy thereof once the
negotiations are completed and as soon as a
thorough legal review of the proposed agreement
has been conducted.
• In a separate move, the House Committee,
requested Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
to furnish it with all documents on the subject
including the latest draft of the proposed
agreement, the requests and offers etc.
• Acting on the request, Secretary Ermita, replied
that the Committees request to be furnished all
documents on the JPEPA may be difficult to
accomplish at this time, since the proposed
Agreement has been a work in progress for
about three years. A copy of the draft JPEPA will
however be forwarded to the Committee as soon
as the text thereof is settled and complete.
• In its third hearing, the House Committee
resolved to issue a subpoena for the most recent
draft of the JPEPA, but the same was not
pursued because then House Speaker Jose de
Venecia had requested Teves to hold in
abeyance the issuance of the subpoena until the
President gives her consent to the disclosure of
the documents.
• The JPEPA, which will be the first bilateral free
trade agreement to be entered into by the
Philippines with another country in the event the
Senate grants its consent to it, covers a broad
range of topics
• While the final text of the JPEPA has now been
made accessible to the public since September
11, 2006, respondents do not dispute that, at the
time the petition was filed up to the filing of
petitioners Reply when the JPEPA was still being
negotiated the initial drafts thereof were kept
from public view.
ISSUE : Whether or not the the respondents has
the duty to produce the documents of JPEPA
requested by the petitioners even JPEPA’s
negotiation is still on going
HELD : The SC decided to resolve in the following
order:
Standing - YES, the petitioners have locus
stand to file the suit
For a petition for mandamus such as the one at bar
to be given due course, it must be instituted by a
party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any
tribunal, corporation, board or person which
unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment
of a legal right.
In a petition anchored upon the right of the people
to information on matters of public concern, which
is a public right by its very nature, petitioners need
not show that they have any legal or special
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that
they are citizens and, therefore, part of the general
public which possesses the right.
Mootness - YES but still qualifies for judicial
review
The text of the JPEPA having then been made
accessible to the public, the petition has become
moot and academic to the extent that it seeks the
disclosure of the full text thereof.
However, Article 164 of the JPEPA itself provides
that the agreement does not take effect
immediately upon the signing thereof. For it must
still go through the procedures required by the laws
of each country for its entry into force.
The petition is not entirely moot, however, because
petitioners seek to obtain, not merely the text of the
JPEPA, but also the Philippine and Japanese offers
in the course of the negotiations.
Grounds relied upon by petitioners
Petitioners assert, first, that the refusal of the
government to disclose the documents bearing on
the JPEPA negotiations violates their right to
information on matters of public concern.Second,
they contend that non-disclosure of the same
documents undermines their right to effective and
reasonable participation in all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making. Lastly,
they proffer that divulging the contents of the
JPEPA only after the agreement has been
concluded will effectively make the Senate into a
mere rubber stamp of the Executive, in violation of
the principle of separation of powers.
The first two grounds relied upon by petitioners
which bear on the merits of respondents claim of
privilege shall be discussed. The last, being purely
speculatory given that the Senate is still
deliberating on the JPEPA, shall not.
The JPEPA is a matter of public concern
To be covered by the right to information, the
information sought must meet the threshold
requirement that it be a matter of public concern.
From the nature of the JPEPA as an international
trade agreement, it is evident that the Philippine
and Japanese offers submitted during the
negotiations towards its execution are matters of
public concern. This, respondents do not dispute.
They only claim that diplomatic negotiations are
covered by the doctrine of executive privilege,
thus constituting an exception to the right to
information and the policy of full public disclosure.
Respondents claim of privilege
It is well-established in jurisprudence that neither
the right to information nor the policy of full public
disclosure is absolute, there being matters which,
albeit of public concern or public interest, are
recognized as privileged in nature.
In this case, the privileged character of the
diplomatic negotiations has been categorically
invoked and clearly explained by respondents
The documents on the proposed JPEPA as well as
the text which is subject to negotiations and legal
review by the parties fall under the exceptions to
the right of access to information on matters of
public concern and policy of public disclosure. They
come within the coverage of executive privilege. At
the time when the Committee was requesting for
copies of such documents, the negotiations were
ongoing as they are still now and the text of the
proposed JPEPA is still uncertain and subject to
change. Considering the status and nature of such
documents then and now, these are evidently
covered by executive privilege consistent with
existing legal provisions and settled jurisprudence.
However, the ground relied upon by respondents is
thus not simply that the information sought involves
a diplomatic matter, but that it pertains to diplomatic
negotiations then in progress.
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
The Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that information
on inter-government exchanges prior to the
conclusion of treaties and executive agreements
may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the
sake of national interest.
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization
of authority and expedition of decision which
are inherent in executive action. Another
essential characteristic of diplomacy is its
confidential nature.
It is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may
not be kept perpetually confidential since there
should be ample opportunity for discussion before
[a treaty] is approved, however, the offers
exchanged by the parties during the negotiations
continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is
published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers
with the understanding that historic confidentiality
would govern the same. Disclosing these offers
could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not
only with Japan but with other foreign governments
in future negotiations.
In order to qualify for protection under Exemption 5,
a document must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must
be either inter-agency or intra-agency in nature,
and (2) it must be both pre-decisional and part of
the agency's deliberative or decision-making
process.
Whether the privilege applies only at certain
stages of the negotiation process
Petitioners admit that diplomatic negotiations on
the JPEPA are entitled to a reasonable amount of
confidentiality so as not to jeopardize the diplomatic
process. They argue, however, that the same is
privileged only at certain stages of the negotiating
process, after which such information must
necessarily be revealed to the public. They add that
the duty to disclose this information was vested in
the government when the negotiations moved from
the formulation and exploratory stage to the firming
up of definite propositions or official
recommendations, citing Chavez v. PCGG[44] and
Chavez v. PEA:
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite
propositions by the government and should not
cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and
similar matters affecting national security and
public order.
Whether there is sufficient public interest to
overcome the claim of privilege
The deliberative process privilege is a qualified
privilege and can be overcome by a sufficient
showing of need. This need determination is to
be made flexibly on a case-by-case, ad hoc
basis.
Petitioners have failed to present the strong and
sufficient showing of need referred to in the
immediately cited cases. The arguments they
proffer to establish their entitlement to the subject
documents fall short of this standard.
ALBAA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 163302. July 23, 2004
The Case : A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
for the nullification of the Resolution of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) annulling
the proclamation of the petitioners as the duly-
elected municipal officials of Panitan, Capiz
FACTS:
• During the May 14, 2001 elections, the
petitioners and private respondents ran for the
positions of Mayor, Vice-Mayor and Members of
the Sangguniang Bayan in the Municipality of
Panitan, Capiz.
• Subsequently, the petitioners were duly elected
and proclaimed winners
• The private respondents filed a complaint against
the petitioners with the COMELEC Law
Department, alleging that the latter committed
acts of terroris and engaged in vote-buying. The
private respondents prayed that the petitioners
be charged of the said crimes and disqualified
from holding office.
• The Law Department of the COMELEC found a
prima facie case and issued a Resolution on
recommending the filing of an Information
against the petitioners. It, likewise,
recommended the disqualification of all the
petitioners from further holding office
• Acting on the said resolution, the COMELEC En
Banc issued a Resolution directing its Law
Department to file the appropriate Information
against the petitioners
• The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration[8] thereon, alleging that the
COMELEC did not make any findings of fact in
its resolution, and that there was even no
disquisition as to the merits of the affidavits of
their witnesses and the evidence presented by
them. The petitioners also alleged that the
COMELEC erred in ordering the docketing of the
electoral aspect of the complaint.
• The COMELEC issued a Resolution denying the
said motion for lack of merit and for having been
filed out of time.
• The COMELEC First Division rendered the
assailed resolution annulling the petitioners
proclamation on the ground that they violated
Section 261(a) and (e) of the Omnibus Election
Code, and directing the election officer of
Panitan to constitute a new municipal board of
canvassers
• The petitioners motion for reconsideration and
supplement to the motion for reconsideration
were denied by the COMELEC En Banc
declaring that the disqualification case was the
result of the findings of the Commission En
Banc. It also held that as an aftermath of
petitioners violation, they are considered
disqualified candidates and, therefore, the votes
they received are deemed stray votes.
• The petitioners filed this Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) or a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking to nullify the two Resolutions.
Since the Court did not issue a temporary
restraining order, the COMELEC declared the
assailed Resolutions as final and executory and
directed the Regional Election Director to
implement the same
• The Municipal Board of Canvassers convene
and subsequently, proclaimed the private
respondents as the winners.
ISSUE :
(a) whether the petition was mooted by the election
and proclamation of the new set of municipal
officials after the May 10, 2004 elections; and,
(b) if in the negative, whether the COMELEC
committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed resolutions.
HELD :
(a) YES. The petition was already mooted.
Where the issues have become moot and
academic, there is no justiciable controversy,
thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no
practical use or value. Nonetheless, courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if
it is capable of repetition, yet evading review. In this
case, we find it necessary to resolve the issues
raised in the petition in order to prevent a repetition
thereof and, thus, enhance free, orderly, and
peaceful elections.
(b) YES. Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No.
2050 is as clear as day: the COMELEC is
mandated to dismiss a complaint for the
disqualification of a candidate who has been
charged with an election offense but who has
already been proclaimed as winner by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers. COMELEC
Resolution No. 2050 specifically mandates a
definite policy and procedure for disqualification
cases; hence, should be applied and given effect.
As laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for
disqualification filed after the election against a
candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as
winner, or (b) who has already been proclaimed as
winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be
dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be
referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC
for preliminary investigation.
In sharp contrast, the complaint for disqualification
against private respondent in the case at bar was
lodged seven (7) days after the 1998 elections.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050,
the complaint shall be dismissed as a
disqualification case and shall be referred for
preliminary investigation to the Law Department of
the COMELEC. Under this scenario, the complaint
for disqualification is filed after the election which
may be either before or after the proclamation of
the respondent candidate.
In this case, the petitioners were proclaimed
winners on May 18, 2001. The private respondents
filed their complaint for violation of Section 216(a)
and (e) of the Omnibus Election Code and for the
disqualification of the petitioners only on June 23,
2001. The COMELEC found probable cause
against the respondents for the offense charged
and directed its Law Department to file the
appropriate Information against the petitioners.
Patently then, the COMELEC committed a grave
abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in issuing its assailed resolutions
disqualifying the petitioners from the positions they
were respectively elected, in defiance of Resolution
No. 2050.
The COMELEC, likewise, committed a grave abuse
of its discretion when it ordered the Municipal
Election Officers to convene a new Board of
Canvassers and proclaim the winners after the
petitioners were declared disqualified.
It is well-settled that the ineligibility of a candidate
receiving majority votes does not entitle the eligible
candidate receiving the next highest number of
votes to be declared elected. A minority or defeated
candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
The votes intended for the disqualified candidate
should not be considered null and void, as it would
amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides.
ALMARIO v. ALBA
GR NO. L-66088, January 25, 1984
Background : As provided for in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate will go to the polls
to either approve or reject amendments to the
Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104, 105,
110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang
Pambansa. The proposed amendments are
embodied in four (4) separate questions to be
answered by simple YES or NO
FACTS :
• In January 1984, a plebiscite was to be held to
allow the voters to either approve or reject
amendments to the Constitution proposed by the
Batasang Pambansa.
• The proposed amendments are embodied in four
(4) separate questions to be answered by simple
YES or NO answers.
• Alex Almario and some other concerned
groups seek to enjoin the submission in the said
plebiscite of Questions No. 3 (“grant” as an
additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to
the public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the
government of a land reform program and a
social reform program) to the people for
ratification or rejection on the ground that there
has been no fair and proper submission
following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v.
COMELEC.
• However, unlike in the case of Tolentino vs
COMELEC, Almario et al do not seek to prohibit
the holding of the plebiscite but only ask for more
time for the people to study the meaning and
implications of the said questions/proposals until
the nature and effect of the proposals are fairly
and properly submitted to the electorate.
ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be
presented to the people on a later date.
HELD: No. This is a political question. The
necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the
proposed amendments are beyond the power of
the courts to adjudicate. Precisely, whether or not
“grant” of public land and “urban land reform” are
unwise or improvident or whether or not the
proposed amendments are unnecessary is a matter
which only the people can decide. The questions
are presented for their determination.
Assuming that a member or some members of the
Supreme Court may find undesirable any additional
mode of disposing of public land or an urban land
reform program, the remedy is to vote “NO” in the
plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion
to the proposed amendments by denying to the
millions of voters an opportunity to express their
own likes or dislikes.
Further, Almario et al have failed to make out a
case that the average voter does not know the
meaning of “grant” of public land or of “urban land
reform.”
ANAK MINDANAO PARTY-LIST GROUP v. THE
EXCEUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 166052, August 29, 2007
The Case : Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List
Group (AMIN) and Mamalo Descendants
Organization, Inc. (MDOI) assail the
constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos. 364
and 379, both issued in 2004, via the present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief.
FACTS:
• PGMA issued E.O. No. 364 (TRANSFORMING
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
INTO THE DEPARTMENT OF LAND REFORM)
which provided that Presidential Commission
[for] the Urban Poor (PCUP), National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is
placed under the supervision and control of
the Department of Land Reform. The
Chairman of the PCUP and NCIP shall be ex-
officio Undersecretary of the Department of Land
Reform for Urban Land Reform.
• Subsequently. E.O. No. 379, was issued which
amended E.O. No. 364 stating that the NCIP
shall be an attached agency of the Department
of Land Reform.
ISSUE :
Whether or not the placing the Presidential
Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP) under the
supervision and control of the DAR, and the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) under the DAR as an attached agency is
constitutional under the separation of powers
HELD :
Locus Standi
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG, concedes
that AMIN has the requisite legal standing to file
this suit as member of Congress. Indeed, a
member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in
his office.
As to the Main Issue
AMIN contends that since the DAR, PCUP and
NCIP were created by statutes, they can only be
transformed, merged or attached by statutes, not
by mere executive orders.
In fine, AMIN contends that any reorganization of
these administrative agencies should be the
subject of a statute.
The Constitutions express grant of the power of
control in the President justifies an executive action
to carry out reorganization measures under a broad
authority of law.
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to
have deliberated with full knowledge of all existing
laws and jurisprudence on the subject.It is thus
reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute
which places an agency under the Office of the
President, it was in accordance with existing laws
and jurisprudence on the Presidents power to
reorganize.
In carrying out the laws into practical operation, the
President is best equipped to assess whether an
executive agency ought to continue operating in
accordance with its charter or the law creating it.
This is not to say that the legislature is incapable of
making a similar assessment and appropriate
action within its plenary power. The Administrative
Code of 1987 merely underscores the need to
provide the President with suitable solutions to
situations on hand to meet the exigencies of the
service that may call for the exercise of the power
of control.
The Office of the President consists of the Office of
the President proper and the agencies under it. It is
not disputed that PCUP and NCIP were formed as
agencies under the Office of the President.
As thus provided by law, the President may transfer
any agency under the Office of the President to any
other department or agency, subject to the policy in
the Executive Office and in order to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. Gauged against
these guidelines,[36] the challenged executive
orders may not be said to have been issued with
grave abuse of discretion or in violation of the rule
of law.
It further argues that the Constitution did not intend
an over-arching concept of agrarian reform to
encompass the two other areas, and that how the
law is ordered in a certain way should not be
undermined by mere executive orders in the guise
of administrative efficiency.
A law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For it to be nullified, it must be
shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be
clear and beyond reasonable doubt.
In the present case, AMIN glaringly failed to show
how the reorganization by executive fiat would
hamper the exercise of citizens rights and
privileges. It rested on the ambiguous conclusion
that the reorganization jeopardizes economic,
social and cultural rights. It intimated, without
expounding, that the agendum behind the
issuances is to weaken the indigenous peoples
rights in favor of the mining industry. And it raised
concerns about the possible retrogression in DARs
performance as the added workload may impede
the implementation of the comprehensive agrarian
reform program.
AMIN has not shown, however, that by placing the
NCIP as an attached agency of the DAR, the
President altered the nature and dynamics of the
jurisdiction and adjudicatory functions of the NCIP
concerning all claims and disputes involving rights
of indigenous cultural communities and
indigenous peoples. Nor has it been shown, nay
alleged, that the reorganization was made in bad
faith.
Finally, a word on the last ground proffered for
declaring the unconstitutionality of the assailed
issuances ─ that they violate Section 16, Article XIII
of the Constitution[57] on the peoples right to
participate in decision-making through adequate
consultation mechanisms.
The framers of the Constitution recognized that the
consultation mechanisms were already operating
without the States action by law, such that the role
of the State would be mere facilitation, not
necessarily creation of these consultation
mechanisms. The State provides the support, but
eventually it is the people, properly organized in
their associations, who can assert the right and
pursue the objective. Penalty for failure on the part
of the government to consult could only be
reflected in the ballot box and would not nullify
government action.
Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold
Mining Corporation, G.R. Nos. 152613 & 1526278,
November 20, 2009