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A. Obligation to love each other, FC Art. 68; cf. NCC Arts. 113-114 Ilusorio v. Bildner
Art 68 – added “mutual love” Husband and wife was separated from 1972. Court cannot compel the other party
Art 68-71 – FC
Art 220, 221, 225 – Obligations of Husband and Wife 2. Designation of domicile
*court cannot compel other spouse to live with another, if ayaw
Under the Old Civil Code, the Husband is the administrator and he fixes the domicile, and the one who’s
Art. 69. Fix the Family Home: suppose to give support.
The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The
court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are General Rule: Domicile to be fixed JOINTLY by Husband and Wife
other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the Exception: Disagreement between the Husband and Wife, Court can decide
same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family.
Art. 70. Support of Family:  Under Art. 110 of the Civil Code [OLD BASIS]: The husband (as the head of the family) as the right
The spouses are jointly responsible for the support of the family. The expenses for such support and (not exactly duty) to fix the family residence. The court may exempt the wife from living with the
other conjugal obligations shall be paid from the community property and, in the absence thereof, from husband if he should live abroad, unless he does so in the service of the Republic, in which case the wife
the income or fruits of their separate properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or should also join him abroad.
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from the separate properties.  Under the Family Code [NEW BASIS]: It must be a JOINT DECISION of the spouses, and in case
they disagree, the court shall decide.
Art. 71. Management of the Household: o Once the spouses or the court has fixed the matter: The duty of the spouses is TO LIVE
The management of the household shall be the right and the duty of both spouses. The expenses for TOGETHER. The court may, however, exempt one from living with the other:
such management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of Article 70. (a) If one of the spouses live abroad; or
(b) If there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption.

B. Obligation to live with the other spouse The exemption shall not apply if the same will not be compatible with the solidarity of the family.
 It is no longer required for a spouse to live abroad with the other spouse for purposes of “service
Republic vs Molina to the Republic”. There may be reasons why the wife would justifiably remain in the Philippines like he
The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the children studying here or the weather is too cold abroad for her health.
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in  The court may like wife exempt the wife from living with the husband even if the latter is just in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the the Philippines, but assigned to a place far from the family home.
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.  This article uses the term “family domicile” instead of family residence as he spouses may have
multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the
GOITIA v. CAMPOS-RUEDA duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits.
A judgment for separate maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a penalty nor is it
a debt in the strict legal sense of the term but rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty (a) General rule: jointly FC Art. 69, par. 1, compare with NCC Art. 110
made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve
the public peace and the purity of the wife as where the husband makes so base demands upon his wife Abella v. COMELEC
and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. Husband and Wife are presumed to live together in the same residence once married

Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo (b) Exception, FC Art. 69 par. 2

If the wife abandons the conjugal home without justifiable cause: The husband, under pain of contempt
of court, cannot compel her to return because cohabitation is purely a personal obligation. To compel De la Viña v. Villareal
her would be to violate her personal liberty, which is guaranteed by the Constitution General Rule: Domicile of Wife follows the Husbands’
Exception: Wife may acquire another separate domicile when there’s divorce (legal sep)
Cuaderno v. Cuaderno, 12 SCRA 505
Battered wife – entitled to be provided with support from husband C. Joint management of family life

FC Arts. 71, 94 (last par.), 121 (last par.), 122, 146 -cannot be change AFTER the marriage, unless you go to court and ask for a judicial
separation of property.
D. Joint Obligation to Support
FC Arts. 70,194, 94 (1), 94 (last par.), 121, 122 (1), 146 FC Arts. 66, 67, 128, 135, 136
FC 66 and 67 – reconciliation (leg sep)
Calderon v. Roxas FC 135 and 136 – Joint petition for dissolution
Support was reduced – depending on the capacity of the person giving support and being given the
support, if the Wife is capable to live on her own, no need to give support Note: if walang agreement, automatic the property relation:
Under the Old Civil Code – CPG
E. The right to exercise a profession or calling Under Family Code – ACP
FC Art. 73, as amended by R.A. No. 10572 (July 2013) Compare with NCC Art. 117 *although they have tailored made property relation before marriage

If Wife accepts the 20, 000 BEFORE the objection, community property will be obligated to pay. Pana v. Heirs of Juanite Sr.
If Wife accepts the 20, 000 AFTER the objection, Wife will pay NOT the community property. Remains under CPG
Spouses were married during the Civil Code and their property relation is Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
With the passage of the Family Code, their property relations remains the same, cannot be changed to
cf. NCC Art. 113 compare with ROC, Rule 3, Sec. 4 Absolute Community.
cf. R.A. No. 7192, “An Act Promoting the Integration of Women as Full & Equal Partners of Men in
Development and Nation Building” 2. Form & registration requirement, FC Art. 77; NCC Arts. 1357, 1358, 709
cf. R.A. No. 8187, “An Act Granting Paternity Leave” FC 77 - Local Civil Registry, Registry of Deeds, in WRITING, marriage must take place
-7 days
R.A. No. 9710, “Magna Carta of Women” 3. Celebration of the marriage, FC Art. 81 cf. Art. 86 (1)
-there will be additional leave, if there was ANY procedure done to the woman. -everything stipulated is void, if marriage did not take place

F. Enforcement of Rights of Women and Children FC 74 – what governs property relations

R.A. No. 9262 – Anti-Violence Against Women and Children FC 75 – requisites for validity of marriage settlements
-can be for economic, abuse, etc
B. Parties to a marriage settlement
Sharica Mari Go Tan v. Sps. Tan FC 1
VAWC against Husband and parents-in-law
-conspiracy to abuses 1. Who may enter into settlements

San Diego v. RTC (a) minors, FC Art. 78

Even if the marriage or the relationship is already over, if mapanakit pa din si ex, still applicable to file a -below 21; their parents also signed, consenting in the marriage
case, as long as nagkaron kayo ng relationship (b) persons under civil interdiction, NCC Art. 38, 39, FC Art. 79, RPC Art. 34, FC Art. 135 (1)
FC 79 - guardian appointed by the court
BBB v. AAA (c) incapacitated persons, FC Art. 79, in rel. to NCC Arts. 38-39
Cannot enter into compromise agreement under VAWC Cases
2. Participation of parents/guardians – Art. 78
People v. Jumawan
Marital Rape C. Which law governs property relations
NO MEANS NO 1. Stipulation in marriage settlements, FC Art. 80
FC 80 – when it will NOT apply
A. Requisites for validity of marriage settlements FC Arts. 75; 130 (3); 103 (3) 3. Mixed marriage between Filipino and alien
1. Prior to marriage: modifications FC Art. 1; 76 (modifications after marriage) 4. If both aliens

5. For property located outside Philippines - if encroaching sa legitime
-donations propter nuptias are without onerous consideration, the marriage being merely the occasion
FC Art. 80 (2) and (3) in rel. to NCC Art. 16 or motive for the donation, not its cause. Being liberalities, they remain subject to reduction for
FC Art. 80 (3) in rel. to NCC Art. 17 (1) inofficiousness upon the donor’s death, if they should infringe the legitime of the forced heir.

D. Donations propter nuptias (c) Encumbered Property, FC Art. 85

-to take effect: marriage (d) Donations in the marriage settlements, FC Art. 81
1. Definition, FC Art. 82
-Donation by reason of marriage, in favor of either or both of the spouses Note:
-Usually parents give it to their own child -Donee not liable for the deficiency
-If sold more than the value, excess will go to done
Solis v. Barroso -Donate prior to the marriage
Consideration is the celebration of the marriage
5. Void donations by the spouses, FC Art. 87
2. Form of Donations, FC Art. 83, NCC Arts. 748-749
(a) Donations during the marriage
Velasquez v. CA
- di na pwede bawiin, not valid, since my other nephews pa Ching v. Goyanko
-deed of donation propter nuptias can be revoked by the non-performance of the marriage and the donations between spouses during marriage are prohibited. And this is so because that would destroy
other causes mentioned in Art. 86 of the FC. The alleged reason for the repudiation (that the spouses the system of conjugal partnership, a basic policy in civil law. It was also designed to prevent the
did not intend to give away all their properties since they have several nephews & nieces) is not one of exercise of undue influence by one spouse over the other, as well as to protect the institution of
the grounds for revocation marriage, which is the cornerstone of family law.

Abobon v. Abobon (b) Donations in common law marriages

-suit between cousins, land donated is different from the one pointed
-respondents, who were the registered owners, sued Numeriano their first cousin, to recover possession Matabuena v. Cervantes
of the land. Numeriano asserted that the land belonged to him as owner by right of succession from his donation made to common law wife is also prohibited. “For it is not to be doubted that assent to such
parents, the lot was allegedly donated to his parents. Case was dismissed because the lot Numeriano is irregular connection for 30 years bespeaks greater influence of one party over the other, so that the
claiming is different from the land that was donated to his parents. danger that the law seeks to avoid is correspondingly increase.
Doronio v. Heirs
-must be in a public document Arcaba v. Tabancura vda. Batocael
donor and donee lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable
3. Who may be donors – FC Art. 83 conclusion is that the donation made by donor to donee is void under Art. 87.
FC 83 – would be spouses to each other
-parents to one or both of the spouses
-third persons to either or both of the spouses 6. Revocation of donations propter nuptias, FC Arts. 81, 86(1)
-if not celebrated nor declared void ab initio
4. What may be donated by a spouse as donor -donations can be revoked if marriage didn’t subsist

(a) Present Property, FC Art. 84 (a) Revocation by donor, FC Art. 86; NCC Art. 765; FC Arts. 50; 43 (3)
(b) Future Property, FC Art. 84; NCC Art. 761
Mateo v. Lagua
Note: even if the property is under mortgage, can still be donated In order that a donation may be reduced for being inofficious, there must be proof that the value of the
donated property exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus the donee's share as legitime in the
Mateo v. Lagua properties of the donor.
- may be redeem, if it is inofficious

(b) By operation of law, FC Art. 44; 61; 43 (3) The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to owning Philippine land and not to
improvements built thereon such as the two houses built on the two lands of the spouses. The purpose
E. Absolute Community of Property (ACP) of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony.

1. When applicable, FC Arts. 75, 103 (3); 130 (3); 92 (3) 8. Charges upon ACP, FC Art. 94

2. Commencement, FC Art. 88 Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. De Garcia

the only obligations incurred by the husband that are chargeable against the conjugal property are
3. Waiver during marriage, FC Art. 89 (1) cf. NCC Art. 168 those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that
he is doing right for the benefit of the family. In acting as guarantor or surety for another in an
4. Waiver after marriage, FC Art. 89 par. 2 indemnity agreement, the husband did not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. No proof that
he even received compensation which may have redounded for the benefit the conjugal partnership.
5. Suppletory rules:
Co-ownership, FC Art. 90; of NCC Arts. 484-501 Gelano v. CA
6. What constitutes ACP, FC Art. 91 The obligation contracted by petitioner-husband Carlos Gelano redounded to the benefit of the family,
(a) All property at time of marriage the conjugal property is liable for his debt pursuant to paragraph 1, Article 1408, Civil Code of 1889
(b) Property acquired subsequently which provision incidentally can still be found in paragraph 1, Article 161 of the New Civil Code.
(c) Winnings from gambling, FC Art. 95 cf. NCC Art. 164
(d) Presumption of ACP, FC Art. 93 cf. NCC Art. 160 G-Tractors, Inc. v. CA
the husband is administrator of the CP and as long as he believes he is doing right to his family, he
BEFORE the marriage: should not be made to suffer and answer alone. Since he incurred debts for renting the tractors and
Property of wife: heavy equipments of G-Tractor for use in his mahogany business, the CP must equally bear the
-House & Lot Inherited from parents indebtedness and losses unless he deliberately acted to the prejudice of his family.
- Paintings
- Bank deposits (a) Family expenses cf. FC Arts. 100 (3), 121(5) and 94 (1), (4), (5)

Property of husband: Francisco v. Gonzales

-condo unit During the declaration of nullity of marriage proceedings, the couple executed a compromise
-2014 car agreement stating among others that their children, Cleodia and Ceamantha shall own the house and
-bank deposits lot in Ayala Alabang.
-shares of stock The husband and wife already waived their title to and ownership of the house and lot, the property
should not have been levied and sold at execution sale, for lack of legal basis.
AFTER the marriage:
-LAHAT NG MERON BOTH SPOUSES (b) Debts of spouses, Art. 94 (2) and (3)
-if one of the spouses incurs liability, the ACP can pay for it
7. What is excluded from ACP, FC Arts. 92; 142
(c) Subsidiary liabilities, Art. 94 (9)
Muller v. Muller
Foreigner husband was not allowed to seek reimbursement on the ground of equity for the purchase of Buado v. CA
the house and lot. He willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional contested property is conjugal in nature. Art. 122 of the Family Code provides that payment of personal
prohibition. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property debts contracted by a spouse before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the CPG except
which he is not allowed to own. insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in ACP where liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the ACP, in the absence or insufficiency of
Beumer v. Amores the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the CPG. The CPG
has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

(d) Gambling losses, FC Art. 95
(e) Other charges, Art. 94 Noveras v. Noveras, G.R. No. 188289, August 20, 2014

9. Ownership, FC Arts. 90, 96 in rel. to NCC Art. 206 12. Effect of abandonment, FC Arts. 101, 72, 239 – damages, rescission/nullity of a contract

10. Administration and enjoyment of ACP Noveras v. Noveras

Only the amount of P120K incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged to ACP.
(a) Joint Administration, FC Art. 96, 90 Election expenses when H ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 7166 duly
Yu Bun Guan v. Ong received COMELEC. Expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of his personal driver is not deductible
A simulated deed of sale has no legal effect, and the transfer certificate of title issued in consequence as the same had not benefited the family.
thereof should be cancelled. Pari delicto does not apply to simulated sales.
13. Causes for dissolution of ACP, FC Art. 99
Dar v. Legasto FC 99:
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals should have taken into consideration the fact that the • (1) Upon the death of either spouse;
petitioners were sued jointly, or as "Mr. and Mrs." over a property in which they have a common • (2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
interest. Such being the case, the signing of one of them in the certification substantially complies with • (3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
the rule on certification of non-forum shopping.” • (4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Article 134 to 138.

(b) Sole administration

(a) Death, FC Art. 103 cf. Rule 73, Sec. 12 ROC
(1) incapacity, FC Art. 96 (2) – no court order
Heirs of Go v. Servacio
Uy v. CA The disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal property by the surviving spouse without the prior
In this case, the trial court found that the subject spouse "is an incompetent" who was in comatose or liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family Code is not necessarily void if said portion has not yet
semi-comatose condition, a victim of stroke, cerebrovascular accident, without motor and mental been allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to another heir of the deceased spouse. At any
faculties, and with a diagnosis of brain stem infarct. In such case, the proper remedy is a judicial rate, the requirement of prior liquidation does not prejudice vested rights.
guardianship proceedings under Rule 93 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court.
A spouse who desires to sell real property as such administrator of the conjugal property must observe (b) Legal separation, FC Arts. 63(2); 66
the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial guardians under Rule 95, 1964 (c) Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC Arts. 50 in rel. to FC Arts. 43 (2), 147, 148
Revised Rules of Court, not the summary judicial proceedings under the Family Code. (d) Judicial separation of property, FC Art. 134-138

(2) separation in fact FC Art. 100 (3), Ugalde v. Ysasi, G.R. No. 130623, February 29, 2008
FC 142 – with court order, of separate property
(3) abandonment, FC Art. 101 – with court order 14. Effects of dissolution
(4) pendency of legal separation proceeding, FC 61 – with court order
(a) Liquidation procedure, FC 102
(c) Disposition and encumbrance, FC Arts. 96-98
QUIAO v. QUIAO (2012) –
Matthews v. Taylor to compute for net profits earned under ACP, follow these steps:
In an Agreement of Lease of a parcel of land entered into by a Filipino wife without the consent of her (1) determine the market value of the properties at the time of dissolution;
British husband, aliens are absolutely not allowed to acquire public or private lands in the Philippines. (2) subtract the debts and obligations of the ACP, you will get the net assets or net remainder of the
The wife is the sole owner, even if funds for the purchase came from the alien husband. properties of the ACP
(3) from the net assets deduct the market value of the properties at the time of marriage to get the net
11. Effect of separation de facto, FC Art. 100; 101; cf. FC Art. 239 profits
- summary proceedings for court authority to dispose

if the property relations of the spouses is Absolute Community, net profits is divided by: Lot C is exclusive property of Santiago Garcia, having inherited the same from his mother. The lot is part
of a larger tract of land divided between him and his sisters. The presumption under Art. 160 of the Civil
Market value of properties at time of dissolution Code applies when there is proof that property was acquired during the marriage. The only proof was
- less debts and obligations of the ACP that when the title was issued, Santiago was already married to Consuelo. Acquisition of title and
_____________________________________ registration are two different acts.
= net remainder or net asset
- less market value at the time of marriage Orpiano v. Tomas
_____________________________________ In a collection case filed by deceased husband, the wife Estrella was not allowed to be dropped from the
= net profits divided into 2 but the share of guilty spouse forfeited in favor of children suit or to amend the suit to a complaint for annulment of sale. She has a right as heir of her husband
and as owner of half of the property to maintain a case for annulment of sale as a measure of protecting
 Quiao spouses had no separate properties her share. Instead of exhausting her remedies, she was forum shopping when she filed a case for
annulment of sale while the collection case is pending.
• If the property relation is Conjugal Partnership of Gains
1. When CPG commences and applies
CPG property
- less debts and obligations (a) Marriages under FC, FC 107 cf. FC 88, FC 89
= net profits/ 2 but share of guilty spouse shall be forfeited in favor of children (b) Marriages before FC, FC 105(2) of FC 256

Castro v. Miat
(b) For cause other than death, FC 43 (2); FC 63(2); 147; 148 “Since Moises and Concordia were married before the effectivity of the Family Code, the provisions of
(c) Termination due to death, FC 104 the New Civil Code apply.
The records show that the Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage out of the
15. For marriages before FC, FC 104 cf Art. 103 (3) common fund. It is clearly conjugal property.

Delizo v. Delizo (c) When applicable, FC 105 of FC 74-76, 107, 88, 89

Considering these circumstances and since the capital of either marriage or the contribution of each FC 105: -when future spouses agree upon it in their marriage settlement
spouse cannot be determined with mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties should be -marriages celebrated before the Family Code
divided between the two conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each partnership.
• 1st CPG – 18/64 = 9/64 each to Rosa and Nicolas (d) Suppletory rules, FC 108 cf. NCC 1767-1768
• 2nd CPG – 46/64 = 23/64 each to Dorotea and Nicolas
• Total share of Nicolas is 32/64 (divided into 13 equal parts) 2. What is included in the CPG, FC Art. 106, 117, 115, 118, 119, 120
FC 106: Art. 106. common fund:
• the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties
16. Support during ACP liquidation • those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance,
-Parties and children are entitled to support from the ACP during the proceedings for the liquidation of • net gains or benefits obtained ÷ 2 (unless otherwise agreed in the marriage settlements.)
the ACP.
Titan v. David
F. Conjugal Partnership of Gains SC was not persuaded by Titan’s arguments that the property was Martha’s exclusive property because
Manuel failed to present before the RTC any proof of his income in 1970, hence he could not have had
Belcodero v. CA the financial capacity to contribute to the purchase of the property in 1970; and that Manuel admitted
Property acquired by a husband living with his common law wife remains to be property of the conjugal that it was Martha who concluded the original purchase of the property. Manuel was not required to
partnership. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the CP unless it be proved that it prove that the property was acquired with funds of the partnership. Rather, the presumption applies
pertains exclusively to the husband or wife. even when the manner in which the property was acquired does not appear. Titan failed to overturn the
presumption that the property, purchased during the spouses’ marriage, was part of the conjugal
Sps. Estonina v. CA partnership.

In the absence of Manuel’s consent, the Deed of Sale is void. registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but
merely confirms one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding "Teresita Francisco" is merely
Imani v. Metrobank descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio Francisco. In the light of the foregoing circumstances, the
The fact that the land was registered in the name of Evangelina Dazo-Imani married to Sina Imani is no appellate court cannot be said to have been without valid basis in affirming the lower court's ruling that
proof that the property was acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration the properties in controversy belong exclusively to Eusebio.
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely
confirms one already existing. Indubitably, petitioner utterly failed to substantiate her claim that the Tan v. Andrade
property belongs to the conjugal partnership. Rosario, the wife, is the sole owner of the land, there being no proof that the property was acquired
during marriage or using conjugal funds. She acquired property in 1979 while husband died in 1978.
Dewara v. Lamela
The property was acquired during the marriage and their marriage is governed by CPG having been (b) Acquired by gratuitous title during marriage, FC 109 (2) of FC 113, FC 115
married before the FC. The legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property applies to the lot in
question. The conjugal property is liable for the judgment against the husband for the physical injuries Veloso v. Martinez
he caused Lamela after compliance with Art. 161. record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her
mother, and in the absence of further proof, it must be presumed that they constituted a part of her
BEFORE the marriage: paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same.
Properties of bride
-House & Lot Inherited from parents Berciles v. GSIS
-Paintings GSIS premiums are presumed conjugal without proof of payment through exclusive funds.
-Bank deposits
(c) Acquired by redemption/exchange, FC 109(3), NCC, 1619
Properties of groom
- condo unit Plata v. Yatco
- 2014 car The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaña, and the reconveyance of her several months
- bank deposits afterward of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being
- shares of stock no proof that the money paid to Saldaña came from common or conjugal funds (Civ. Code, Art 153). The
deed of mortgage in favor of respondents Villanueva actually recites that the petitioner was the owner
AFTER the marriage: of the tenement in question and so does the conveyance of it by Saldaña to her.
Included in CPG are the proceeds, products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those
acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by chance. (d) Purchased with exclusive money, FC 109(4); of FC 118-119

3. What is excluded from CPG, FC 109 (e) Properties of parents

(a) Brought as exclusive property, FC 109(1)

Laurena v. CA
Laperal v. Katigbak Parents of the husband executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of two parcels of land in Tanauan, Batangas as
The title to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. At the time of its purchase, the property was an accommodation so that the wife, who was then working at the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP),
already of such substantial value as admittedly, the husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy, could acquire a loan at a lower rate using the properties as collateral. The loan proceeds were used as
considering that singular source of income then was his P200.00/month salary from a Manila Bank. The additional capital for the Jeddah Caltex Station. The loan was still being paid from the income from the
purchase price was furnished by the wife’s mother so she could buy the property for herself. Jeddah Caltex Station. The Lease Contract on the Jeddah Caltex Station was signed by respondent as
Furthermore, it was established during the trial that it was a practice of defendant's parents to so attorney-in-fact of his mother Juanita Laurena, leaving no doubt that it was the business of respondent’s
provide their children with money to purchase realties for themselves.” parents. Jeddah Trucking was established from the proceeds and income of the Jeddah Caltex Station.

Francisco v. CA 4. Administration of exclusive property

The fact that the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco",
is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and (a) By the spouse-owner, FC 110

(b) By the other spouse, FC 110(2); FC 142, 75, 227 (a) Definition, FC 106
(b) Presumption of CPG, FC 116
Veloso v. Martinez ( c) What are included in CPG, FC 117, 115, 118, 119, 120
The wife had the exclusive control and management of her jewels which were her paraphernal (d) If property bought by installments, FC Art. 118
property. Until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent
that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record Jovellanos v. CA
that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being The deed of absolute sale was executed in 1975 by Philamlife, or after full payment of the rentals. Upon
true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since as
without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited. early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his
conjugal partnership with his said second wife.
Manotok Realty v. CA
The petitioner contends that since there is no dispute that the property in question was the paraphernal (e) Credits due, FC 119
property of Clara Tambunting, who died on April 2, 1950, Vicente Legarda had no authority whatsoever
to sell the said property to the private respondent on May 12, 1950 since the former was appointed as (f) Improvements on CPG property, FC 120
administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting only on August 28, 1950, Therefore, the questioned sale
could not have bound Clara Tambunting's estate because the vendor Vicente Legarda neither acted as Munoz, Jr. v. Ramirez
the owner nor the administrator of the subject property when the alleged sale took place. Eliseo paid a portion only of the GSIS loan through monthly salary deductions or a total of about
P60,755 not the entire amount of the GSIS housing loan. Considering the P136,500.00 amount of the
Ong v. CA GSIS housing loan, it is fairly reasonable to assume that the value of the residential lot is considerably
The mere use of the surname of the husband in the tax declaration of the subject property is not more than the P60,755.76 amount paid by Eliseo through monthly salary deductions.
sufficient proof that said property was acquired during the marriage and is therefore conjugal. It is Thus, the subject property remained the exclusive paraphernal property of Erlinda at the time she
undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wife's name, but the house built thereon contracted with the petitioner; the written consent of Eliseo to the transaction was not necessary.
was declared in the name of the spouses. Under such circumstances, coupled with a careful scrutiny of
the records of the present case, the lot in question is paraphernal, and is therefore, liable for the 7. Charges upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121, 122
personal debts of the wife.
Mariano v. CA
FC 111-112, of FC 236, amended by RA 6809 Profits from the business of Esther Sanchez had been used to meet the expenses for the support of the
See R.A. No. 10572, amending FC 111 family. The CPG of Esther and Daniel is therefore liable for the debts and obligations contracted by
-Either spouse may mortgage, encumber, alienate or otherwise dispose of his or her exclusive Esther.
Ayala v. CA
Wong et al. v. IAC If the money was given to another person and the husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, that
the conjugal property of the spouses cannot answer for the personal debts of the wife that did not contract by itself alone be categorized as falling within the context of “obligations for the benefit of the
redound to the benefit of the family and who is not the administrator of the property. Her rights over conjugal partnership”. The contract of loan is clearly for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for
the property are merely inchoate prior to the liquidation of the CPG. Her husband also did not consent the surety or his family. The benefits to the CPG must be one directly resulting from the loan and it
to the indebtedness. cannot be merely a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself.

Note: Ching v. CA
Alienation: the husband’s shares of stock belong to the CPG having been acquired during the marriage and are
When property is sold to a third person therefore presumed to be conjugal. The bank failed to prove that the CPG was benefited by the
husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship agreement for and in behalf of Phil.
Improvement > Lot = CPG Blooming Mills.
-subject to reimbursement The benefit must be those directly resulting from the loan. They cannot merely be a byproduct or a spin-
-no reimbursement = no transfer would still belong to the owner spouse off of the loan itself.

6. What constitutes CPG Homeowners v. Dailo

For the CPG to be held liable, the obligation contracted by the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. must have The father-in-law advanced the money to pay for the couples’ house and lot by issuing a check payable
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. There must be the requisite showing then of to the vendor. The husband refused to sign the acknowledgment, only the wife signed the same.
some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. The burden of proof that the debt Despite his lack of consent, the SC said that under Art. 21 of the FC, he shall be solidarily liable for such
was contracted for the benefit of the CPG lies with the creditor-party litigant claiming as such. He who loan together with thewife.
asserts, not he who denies, must prove. Other than petitioner’s bare allegation, there is nothing from
the records of the case to compel a finding that, indeed, the loan obtained by the late Marcelino Dailo, Villanueva v. Chiong
Jr. redounded to the benefit of the family. Consequently, the CPG cannot be held liable for the payment Prior to the effectivity of the the Family Code, the sale by the husband of the conjugal property without
of the principal obligation. the wife’s consent is not void but merely voidable.

Ando v. Campo Ravina v. Villa-Abrille

The husband as president of PACSI and PACSI itself were sued for illegal dismissal of pilers or haulers of TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house
sugar bags. The sheriff sought to levy property in the name of Ando and his wife. built thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses,
The levy was not allowed because though Ando is president of the corporation, the property was in the who had even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house. Significantly, a sale or encumbrance of
name of Ando and his wife who also stands to lose the property subject of the execution without ever conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by
being party to the case. This will be tantamount to deprivation of property without due process. Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the
consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the
(a) With consent court.

G-Tractors v. CA Fuentes v. Roca

debt of husband was used in their logging business Consequently, when Tarciano sold the conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, the law
that governed the disposal of that lot was already the Family Code. In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil
Ayala Investment v. CA Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a period within which the wife who gave no
If the money or services are given to another person or entity, and the husband acted only as a surety or consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It simply provides that without the other
guarantor, that contract cannot, by itself, alone be categorized as falling within the context of spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the same would be void.
“obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” The contract of loan or services is clearly for
the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the surety or his family. No presumption can be inferred (c) Personal debts, FC 122, RPC 108
that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or accommodation agreement, it is “for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.” Proof must be presented to establish benefit redounding to the People v. Lagrimas
conjugal partnership. Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife "may be enforced against the partnership
assets after the responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is
Security Bank v. Mar Tiera Corp. bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient.”
the credit line agreement was solely for the benefit of the corporation. The accessory contract (the
indemnity agreement) under which Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for Mar Tiera Corp was Pana v. Heirs of Juanite
similarly for the latter’s benefit. Security Bank had the burden of proving that the conjugal partnership The wife was convicted for murder. The SC ruled that the RTC shall first ascertain that, in enforcing the
of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden. writ of execution on the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia Pana for the satisfaction of
the indemnities imposed by final judgment, the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the Family
(b) Without consent Code have been covered.

Costuna v. Domondon (d) winnings from gambling, FC 123

The husband sold his ½ share in the conjugal lot to defray his hospital expenses. He later on died and
the wife continued to refuse to sign the deed of sale of the lot. The court said that her only motivation Note:
was greed. It relaxed the rule that sale without consent of the spouse renders the transaction void in -If a spouse entered into surety, the CPG may not be affected as long as it was proven that it didn’t
view of the circumstances of the case. redounded to the benefit of the family
ACP – can pay for it immediately
Carlos v. Abelardo CPG – not allowed, need to go to 121 and fulfill it all FIRST

8. Ownership, administration and enjoyment Uy v. CA
(a) Joint administration, FC 124 cf. FC 96, 142 In the case at bar, the trial court did not comply with the procedure under the Revised Rules of Court.
-signing by only one of the spouses in a non-forum shopping is allowed because they are JOINT Indeed, the trial court did not even observe the requirements of the summary judicial proceedings
administrators under the Family Code. Thus, the trial court did not serve notice of the petition to the incapacitated
spouse; it did not require him to show cause why the petition should not be granted. Hence, we agree
Guiang v. CA with the Court of Appeals that absent an opportunity to be heard, the decision rendered by the trial
Sale by the husband of the house and lot without the consent of the wife is void even if they later on court is void for lack of due process.
enter into an amicable settlement agreement, which cannot be considered a continuing offer that was
accepted and perfected by the parties. The tenor of the amicable settlement is to the effect that (2) Separation in fact, FC 100 (3), 127(3)
respondent wife would vacate the premises. (3) Abandonment, FC 101, 128
`(4) Pendency of legal separation proceedings, FC 61
Roxas v. CA
The husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership cannot enter into a contract of lease involving Sabalones v. CA
conjugal real property without the knowledge and consent of the wife. It is considered a conveyance in a legal separation case, pending the appointment of an administrator over the whole mass of
and encumbrance conjugal assets, the respondent court was justified in allowing the wife to continue with her
Docena v. Lapesura
When the husband alone signed the Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, he did so as joint
administrator of the CPG. Joint administration does not require that H & W always act together. The (c) Disposition and encumbrance, FC 124-125; FC 97, 121 (8), NCC 1145 (1)
husband signed in behalf of the wife who was then in Samar. He is presumed to have personal
knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar to the petition involving 9. Effect of separation de facto, FC 127, FC 100 cf. FC 239
their real property. If anybody can repudiate the certification, it is the wife who may do so.
Note: Under the Civil Code, sale of CPG property without the consent of the other spouse renders the
Alinas v. Alinas contract VOIDABLE. But when the Family Code took effect, sale of CPG property without consent of
Pursuant to Article 124 of the Family Code and jurisprudence, the sale of petitioners’ conjugal property other spouse is VOID
made by petitioner Onesiforo alone is void in its entirety. In the present case, the Court does not see
how applying Article 124 of the Family Code would lead to injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that 10. Effect of abandonment, FC 128 cf. FC 101
respondent spouses were well aware that Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also
knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of his wife, as they knew that 11. Dissolution of CPG, FC 126
petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The
fact that Onesiforo had to execute two documents, namely: the Absolute Deed of Sale dated March 10, (a) Death, FC 126 (1), 130
1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated March 10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of
the severe infirmities of the sale. Heirs of Go v. Servacio, G.R. No. 157537, Sept. 7, 2011

Aggabao v. Parulan (b) Legal separation, FC 63 (2), FC 66

the void sale was a continuing offer from the petitioners and Ma. Elena that Dionisio had the option of (c) Annulment and declaration of nullity, FC 50 in relation to FC 43 (2)
accepting or rejecting before the offer was withdrawn by either or both Ma. Elena and the petitioners. (d) Judicial separation of property, FC 134-138
The last sentence of the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code makes this clear, stating
that in the absence of the other spouse’s consent, the transaction should be construed as a continuing 12. Effects of dissolution, FC 129
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding (a) Liquidation procedure, FC 129
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or upon authorization by the court before the offer is Quiao v Quiao, G. R. No. 183622, July 4, 2012
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
G. Regime of separation of property
(b) Sole administration
(1) Incapacity, FC 124, 127, 253 1. When applicable

(a) In the marriage settlements, FC 143-146 (d) binding effect on third parties, FC 139-140; of FC 66(2)
(b) When mandatory, FC 103 & FC 130
(c) Reconciliation in legal separation, FC 66(2) Laperal v. Katigbak,
(d) Judicial separation of property The title to the disputed land is in the name of the wife. It was purchased by her mother for her. It was
of substantial value that the husband, by himself could not have afforded to buy, considering that his
2. Property covered, FC 144 only source of income then was his P200.00 a month salary from Manila Bank. Laperals cannot execute
on said paraphernal property in satisfaction of husband’s debt.
3. Administration
5. Revival of property regime after JSP, FC 141 cf. FC 67, 135, 142
(a) By the owner-spouse, FC 145
(b) By the other spouse, FC 142, 101 6. Transfer of administration of exclusive property, FC 142 cf. NCC 196; FC 96; FC 124
(c) FC 100 (3); 101
I. Property regime of unions without marriage
4. Family expenses, FC 146
1. Unions under FC 147, 6, 35, 36, 53, cf. NCC 144
5. Conveyances between the spouses, FC 87, NCC 149
Valdes v. QC RTC
H. Judicial separation of property marriage declared null and void under Art. 36, Art. 147 applies
1. When possible, FC 134
-Voluntary – both of the spouses filing Carino v. Carino
-can still be together while terminating the property relationship the 1st marriage, no ML, Art. 147 applies; 2nd marriage is bigamous, Art. 148 applies

Maquilan v. Maquilan San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. 133743, Feb. 2, 2007
Under Art. 143 of the FC, separation may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause subject to
judicial approval. The Compromise Agreement which was judicially approved is exactly such a Gonzales v. Gonzales
separation of property allowed under the law. marriage declared null and void under Art. 36, Art. 147 applies; since wife helped in the business, RTC
correct in dividing properties equally between H & W
2. For sufficient cause, FC 135 cf. FC 55 (10); 229(4), 231, 232
Diño v. Diño
Ugalde v. Ysasi marriage declared null and void under Art. 36, no need to comply with Art. 50 before decree of nullity
The Compromise Agreement between the parties had become final and resulted in the dissolution of will be issued
the conjugal partnership of gains between the petitioner and respondent.
Salas, Jr., v. Aguila
Sales v. Sales property acquired during marriage of Juan and Eden but under the name of “Juan Salas married to
Nullity of marriage already granted but case was remanded to RTC for reception of evidence re: Rubina Salas (the mistress)” is presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the spouses
property issues between the parties (collection of rentals without proper accounting, sale of common and governed by co-ownership.
properties without husband’s consent and misappropriation of proceeds). RTC should not have ordered
the dissolution of the property relations of the parties without hearing. 2. Unions under FC 148 of FC 50 in rel. to FC 49(2) and FC 50

3. Voluntary separation of property, FC 136, FC 74-75, FC 134 Bienvenido v. CA

sale of lot to mistress is valid considering that marriage of husband and wife is bigamous and because
4. Effects of judicial separation of property husband represented himself to mistress as single.

(a) liquidation of CPG or ACP, FC 137 par. 1 Agapay v. Agapay

(b) support pendente lite, FC 137 par. 2 Erlinda, 2nd wife, tried to establish that she is engaged in the business of buy and sell and had a sari-sari
(c) regime after JSP, FC 138 of FC 66 (2) store but failed to persuade court that she actually contributed money to buy the subject riceland. She

was only 20 years old at time of purchase. The riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership A married man and his mistress put up a manpower business and acquired properties. They separated
property of the deceased Miguel and Carlina Palang. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly and divided the properties. Because of disagreement, they filed a case for judicial partition of the
bought the same for P20,000.00 on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. Money came properties. SC ruled that the properties belong to the married man subject to the claim of legal wife.
from Miguel. Void donation because guilty of concubinage.
Lacbayan Separate Opinion: Brion, separate opinion: Co-ownership only arises when there is clear proof
Tumlos v. Sps. Fernandez showing the acquisition of the property during the cohabitation of the parties, and the actual joint
it is clear that Mario Fernandez was incapacitated to marry petitioner because he was legally married to contribution of the parties to acquire the same. These two (2) conditions must concur.
Lourdes Fernandez. It is also clear that, she cohabited with Mario in a state of concubinage. No proof of The mistress did not present any evidence showing that the funds or a portion of the funds used to
her actual contribution to the purchase of the property, it belongs to the CPG of the spouses. purchase the subject properties came from her own earnings. Properties were under name of several
owners, court should have resolved this.
Adriano v. CA
Considering that the property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio’s marriage with Gliceria subsisted, Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan
such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband Marriage of Sally and Benjamin is bigamous because of Benjamin’s subsisting first marriage. Sally cannot
or to the wife. The second wife cannot claim that it belongs to their CPG. Also, the money used to claim a share in the 37 parcels of land which were inherited by Benjamin from his parents. As to other
purchase the property belonged to the CPG of the first marriage. properties, Art. 148 applies but Sally must prove actual contribution but she failed because she refused
to present evidence during trial.
Malilin v. Castillo
both parties were married to other people when they cohabited; they acquired properties, all under the X. FAMILY RELATIONS
name of the respondent; they separated and petitioner sought his share in the properties alleging there
is co-ownership which respondent denied; SC remanded case for reception of evidence of petitioner’s A. What governs family relations, FC Art. 149
actual contribution B. Effects of family relationship on legal disputes FC Arts. 150 – 151 NCC Art. 2035
FC 150 – who are your family relations under the law
Villanueva v. CA FC 151 – No suit between members of same family (exert effort to compromise before filing)
The cohabitation of a spouse with another person, even for a long period, does not sever the tie of a ROC Rule 16 Sec. 1(j)
subsisting previous marriage. The marriage of Nicolas and Eusebia continued to exist regardless of the RPC Arts. 20, 247, 332
fact that Nicolas was already living with Pacita. Hence, all property acquired from 7 October 1926, the
date of Nicolas and Eusebia’s marriage, until 23 November 1996, the date of Eusebia’s death, are still Note: if not covered by 150, no need to follow procedure in 151
presumed conjugal.
Gayon v. Gayon
Atienza v. De Castro In as much as a sister-in-law, nephew or niece is not included in the enumeration contained in Art. 271
Art. 148 applies to cohabitation before the Family Code because it was intended to fill up the hiatus in of the Civil Code, which should be construed strictly, it being an exception to the general rule, it follows
the Civil Code; claim of co-ownership is without basis, failed to prove contribution to the purchase. that the same does not come within the purview of Art. 222, and plaintiff’s failure to seek a compromise
before filing the complaint does not bar the same.
Borromeo v. Descallar
Jambrich, an Austrian, lived with Antonietta (a waitress) who is married with 2 sons; they purchased Wainwright v. Versoza
properties in the name of Antonietta. Since Jambrich sold the property to a Filipino, the SC allowed the future support cannot be compromised; no earnest effort at compromise is needed.
Magbaleta v. Gonong
Heirs of Maramag v. De Guzman when a stranger to the family is a party to the case, it is neither practical nor fair that the determination
mistress and illegitimate children were designated as beneficiaries in the insurance policy of husband; of the rights of a stranger should be made to depend on the way the family would settle their
designation of mistress was declared void and her share was awarded to the illegitimate children; differences among themselves.
legitimate family has no right to claim insurance
Tribiana v. Tribiana
Lacbayan v. Samoy habeas corpus case was filed by wife against the husband who took their child with him; petition failed
to state that there was earnest efforts at a compromise; wife has barangay certification to prove efforts
were made; what is at stake is the welfare of a child of tender age, case should be allowed to proceed.

The claim that a FH is exempt from execution or forced sale under Art. 153 of the FC must be set up and
Hiyas Savings v. Acuña proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. In this case, Honrado and his wife
once a stranger becomes party to a suit involving family members, the law no longer makes it a failed to assert their claim of exemption within a reasonable time.
condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise before action can prosper.
Cabang v. Basay
Heirs of Favis, Sr. v. Gonzales, et al. The improvements introduced by petitioners were residential houses and are not family homes. Also,
No motion to dismiss the complaint based on the failure to comply with a condition precedent was filed one cannot constitute a family home on property that one does not own.
in the trial court; neither was such failure assigned as error in the appeal that respondent brought
before the Court of Appeals. Therefore, they are deemed to have waived the non-jurisdictional defense Fortaleza v. Lapitan
or objection of no earnest effort at a compromise. Art. 155(3) of the FC allows the forced sale of a family home “for debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution.” The Fortaleza spouses voluntarily executed a deed of Real
C. The Family Home Estate Mortgage over the subject property.

1. What constitutes the family home, FC Arts. 152, 156, 161 8. Rights of creditors, FC Arts. 160-162
FC 161 – only ONE family home
2. Who may constitute the family home, FC Arts.152, FC 161 Ramos v. Pangilinan
3. When deemed constituted, FC Art. 153 Since petitioners claim that the family home was constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as
FC 153 – moment occupied AS A FAMILY RESIDENCE 1944, they must comply with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no
4. When terminated, FC Art. 153 compare with FC Art. 159 proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as the Ramos’ family
-DESPITE death of one or both spouses or head of family for 10yrs AS LONG AS THEY’RE MINOR home, the law’s protective mantle cannot be availed of by petitioners. The records show that the sheriff
exhausted all means to execute the judgment but failed because Ramos’ bank accounts were already
Arriola v. Arriola closed while other properties in his or the company’s name had already been transferred, and the only
the house is the family home and cannot be immediately partitioned by the heirs. The purpose of Art. property left was the Pandacan property.
159 is to avert the immediate disintegration of the family unit following the death of its head. The law
preserves the family home as the physical symbol of family love, security and unity by imposing Equitable v. OJ Mark
restrictions. There is no compelling reason to partition the family home. The claim of exemption under Art. 153 of the Family Code, thereby raising issue on the mortgaged
condominium unit being a family home and not corporate property, is entirely inconsistent with the
5. Beneficiaries, FC Arts. 154, 158, 194-196, 199 clear contractual agreement of the Real Estate Mortgage. Even if it is a family home, it will not be
FC 154 – Husband, Wife, head of the family, parent, ascendant, descendant exempt from foreclosure as Article 155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced sale of a
To be a beneficiary, beneficiary MUST be living in the same roof with them^; dependent to the head; family home "for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after such constitution.”
among the relations in 154

Patricio v. Dario De Mesa v. Acero

To be a beneficiary of the FH, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the relationships the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987. There was no showing,
enumerated in Art. 154 of the FC; (2) they live in the FH; and (3) they are dependent for legal support however, that the same was judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with
upon the head of the family. The grandson who lives in the FH is not the beneficiary contemplated by the provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988, the subject
Art. 154 because he is dependent for legal support from his father and not from the deceased or his property became a family home by operation of law and was thus prospectively exempt from execution.
wife. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that the subject property was a family home.

6. Exemptions, FC Arts. 155, 157, 160 XI. PATERNITY AND FILIATION

FC 155 – cannot benefit if you don’t pay those who built it (family home)
7. When may be sold, FC Art. 158 A. Concept of paternity, filiation and legitimacy, FC Art. 163
FC 163 - The filiation of children may be by nature or by adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or
Honrado v. CA illegitimate.

B. Legitimate children, FC Art. 164 cf. FC Art. 165 in rel to NCC Arts. 256-257, 166, 167, 169, 168 in
relation to Republic Act No. 10655, “An Act Repealing the Crime of Premature Marriage under Article Continental Steel v. Montano
351 Of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as The Revised Penal Code,” March 2015 In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their
child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her conception.
Note: sperm from Husband or there’s a donor, it will be implanted to the Wife. ONLY allowed by the
code. Surogacy NOT ALLOWED in PH 2. terminated marriage under FC Art. 42 in rel. to FC Art. 43(1)
3. void marriages under FC Arts. 53, 36
RA 9225 – illegitimate can use the surname of the Father, AS LONG AS he SIGNED the 4. voidable marriages, FC Art. 45
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: void- not automatic because civil reg. will ask the MOTHER an affidavit giving
consent to use the surname of the father Suntay v. Suntay
the children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born
Angeles v. Maglaya prior to the decree of annulment setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered
The presumption of legitimacy under Art. 164 of the Family Code may be availed only upon convincing legitimate.
proof of the factual basis therefor, i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. (b) Born during marriage
(c) Conceived by artificial insemination cf. NCC Art. 40, FC Art. 164
SSS v. Aguas (d) Adopted children
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality (e) Legitimated children
and more convincing reason that the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. This
presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of 2. Rights of legitimate children, FC Arts. 173-174
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the NCC Arts. 364, 374, 376
birth of the child due to (a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife NCC Arts. 888, 979
(b) the fact that the husband and wife are living separately in such way that sexual intercourse is not
possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual intercourse. Moore v. Republic
Our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father.
Suntay v. Suntay
Supreme Court ordered joint administration of the estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo- Naldoza v. Republic
Suntay by the legitimate granddaughter and illegitimate grandson considering that the illegitimate To allow them, at their mother’s behest, to bear only their mother’s surname (which they are entitled to
grandson was reared by the grandparents and was legally adopted by them. use together with their father’s surname) and to discard altogether their father’s surname, thus
removing the prima facie evidence of their paternal provenance or ancestry, is a serious matter in
1. Who are considered legitimate children which, ordinarily, the minors and their father should be consulted.

(a) Conceived during marriage cf. ROC Rule 131 Sec. 3(dd), FC Art. 168 in relation to Republic Republic v. CA
Act No. 10655, “An Act Repealing the Crime of Premature Marriage under Article 351 Of Act No. 3815, But even, more confusion with grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent
otherwise known as The Revised Penal Code”, March 13, 2015 (a legitimate child of her parents) to bear her step-father’s surname, even if she is not legally adopted
by him
1. valid marriage
C. Illegitimate children
Arbolario v. CA
Once a valid marriage is established, it is deemed to continue until proof that it has been legally ended 1. Who are considered illegitimate
is presented. Thus, the mere cohabitation of the husband with another woman will not give rise to a (a) under NCC
presumption of legitimacy in favor of the children born of the second union, until and unless there be (b) under FC Art. 165
convincing proof that the first marriage had been lawfully terminated; and the second, lawfully entered
into. Uy v. Chua, G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009

2. Rights of illegitimate children, FC Arts. 173, 172, 175-176

FC 173 - action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime
FC 176 - use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled Manungas v. Loreto
to support the subject of the intestate proceedings is the estate of Engracia Manungas. It must be remembered
that the estate of Florentino Manungas was already the subject of intestate proceedings that have long
Osmeña de Valencia v. Rodriguez been terminated. Diosdado, as an illegitimate heir of Florentino Manungas, is still not an heir of Engracia
A legitimate child wants her illegitimate siblings to drop their father’s surname. Court said yes it is a Manungas and is not entitled to receive any part of the Estate of Manungas. There is no reason to
right of legitimate children but it is not a prohibition against the use by others of what may happen to appoint him as its special administrator.
be the surname of their father. From all appearances, their father acquiesces in the use of his surname.
Even if he objects, they can still use the surname “Valencia”, no law grants exclusive ownership over a Gotardo v. Buling
surname Mother of the child testified that she was only involved with one man at the time of conception and this
was corroborated by the manager of the boarding house where she stayed and who is also the uncle of
Briones v. Miguel the respondent (alleged father of child). The respondent did not deny the sexual encounters and he
Loreta, being the mother of and having sole parental authority over the 10-year-old minor who is an failed to prove his allegations that the mother of the child had other relationships during that time.
illeg child, is entitled to his custody. She has the right to keep him in her company. She cannot be
deprived of that right and she may not even renounce it or transfer it “except in cases authorized by Grande v. Antonio
law”. The mother has sole parental authority over her illegitimate children. The case filed the father
recognizing his paternity over the children cannot defeat FC 176. Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the IRR
Maramag v. De Guzman Implementing RA 9255 declared NULL and VOID because it compels the use of surname of the father by
The revocation of Eva as a beneficiary in one policy and her disqualification as such in another are of no the illegitimate children. Case was remanded to RTC for evidence as to the choice of surname that the
moment considering that the designation of the illegitimate children as beneficiaries in Loreto’s illegitimate children would like to use.
insurance policies remains valid. Because no legal proscription exists in naming as beneficiaries the
children of illicit relationships by the insured, the shares of Eva in the insurance proceeds, whether D. Action to impugn legitimacy
forfeited by the court in view of the prohibition on donations under Article 739 of the Civil Code or by
the insurers themselves for reasons based on the insurance contracts, must be awarded to the said Reyes v. Mauricio
illegitimate children, the designated beneficiaries, to the exclusion of petitioners. It is only in cases In a case involving tenancy filed by the wife of the deceased tenant, who subsequently died and was
where the insured has not designated any beneficiary, or when the designated beneficiary is disqualified substituted by her daughter, the Supreme Court stated that the filiation of the daughter cannot be
by law to receive the proceeds, that the insurance policy proceeds shall redound to the benefit of the collaterally attacked in the tenancy case.
estate of the insured.
1. Grounds, FC Art. 166
De la Cruz v. Gracia FC 166 - physically impossible
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the
surname of his/her father if the latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the (a) Physical impossibility of access
record of birth appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public or private
handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in itself, a consummated Andal v. Macaraig
act of acknowledgment of the child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is Although the husband was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious
necessary. that he could hardly move and get up from his bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse, yet that
is no evidence of impotency, nor does it prevent carnal intercourse.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt the following rules respecting
the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten Macadangdang v. CA
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: Whether or not respondent were separated would be immaterial to the resolution of the status of the
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, child Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty days of
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the the three hundred, which preceded the birth of the aforementioned child, no concrete or even
acknowledging parent; and substantial proof was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent her spouse.
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. Concepcion v. CA

The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union in marriage, particularly during the condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere
period of conception. To overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1) (b) of the Family harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there was no access that could have enabled the prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity. Notwithstanding these, it should
husband to father the child. Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal access is not be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court
disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by evidence to the contrary. may, for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already
preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and the DNA test result would only be corroborative,
(b) Biological or other scientific grounds the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing.
-one year from the knowledge
-two years if they should reside in the Philippines; and three years if abroad from the discovery or (c.) FC Art. 166(3)
knowledge of the birth
2. Effect of a mother’s declaration, FC Art. 167
A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC (RULE ON DNA Evidence) FC 167 - child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
FC Arts. 170, 171 legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

Agustin v. CA NOTE:
For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny their 6 MONTHS BEFORE FIRST MARRIAGE OR AFTER SECOND MARRIAGE
existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a much needed
equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the merits of DNA Chua Keng Giap v. IAC
testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than any one
testing has finally evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We else, it was Sy Kao who could say – as indeed she said these many years – that Chua KengGiap was not
therefore take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of begotten of her womb.
determining paternity.
3. In subsequent marriages, FC Arts. 168, 169
Herrera v. Alba
The policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of People v. Quitoriano
children, especially of illegitimate children, is without prejudice to the right of the putative parent to The fact that private complainant gave birth more than ten months after the alleged rape does not
claim his or her own defenses. Where the evidence to aid this investigation is obtainable through the discredit her testimony. Dr. Honesto Marquez, a physician from the Marinduque Provincial Hospital,
facilities of modern science and technology, such evidence should be considered subject to the limits explained that the normal gestation period is 40 weeks or 280 days, but it can also extend beyond 40
established by the law, rules, and jurisprudence. weeks if the woman is having her first pregnancy. It is undisputed that the child delivered by private
complainant on October 31, 1993 was her first. Hence, it is not impossible that the child was conceived
Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz in December, 1992, the date of the alleged rape.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. As 4. Presumptions, FC Arts. 170, 171
defined above, the term “biological sample” means any organic material originating from a person’s FC 170 - action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from the
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of his
and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological heirs, should reside in the city or municipality where the birth took place or was recorded.
samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner
has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for
the conduct of DNA testing. 5. Prescription of action to impugn legitimacy

Lucas v. Lucas Gaspay v. CA

as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving In light of the above, the death of Flaviano Gaspay, Sr., does not constitute a time bar to private
party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in respondent's claim as his acknowledged illegitimate daughter. Settled is the rule that "actions based on
which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a voluntary acknowledgment may be brought even after the father's death."
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is sufficient evidence
to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing. The same 6. Who may impugn

B. Other means
Benitez-Badua v. CA - DNA
birth certificate was negated by totality of evidence presented that Marissa was not a child of deceased - pedigree
spouses. Such as the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate prepared by the deceased husband - declaration against interest
which did not include Marissa as an heir. - family bible

Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao Diaz v. Court of Appeals

It is settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother The presumption in decedent's favor of legitimacy has not been successfully contradicted nor overcome
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. XXXX The child by oppositor's testimonial and documentary evidence.
himself cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the
legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child Tison v. Court of Appeals
of his mother’s alleged paramour. The primary proof to prove relationship between the parties is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tizon
that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero is her niece. This is considered a statement about pedigree.
Republic v. Magpayo
The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to Trinidad v. Court of Appeals
his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to To prove child was born during marriage of parents, they presented witnesses to the wedding, his
grant respondent’s supplication. baptismal certificate where names of parents indicated, certification from civil registrar that documents
were destroyed during war, family pictures with aunt and uncle and witness present when he was born
E. Proof of Filiation and when he was baptized.

1. Of legitimate children, FC Arts. 172-173 Heirs of Conti v. CA

To prove they are collateral relatives of a co-owner of a parcel of land which is the subject of the
Voluntary Recognition: partition case, they presented their baptismal certificates. Taken together, the four baptismal
(1) record of birth certificates indicate that they have the same set of parents.
(2) will
(3) statement before a court of record De Jesus v. Estate of Juan Gamboa Dizon
(4) authentic writing Juan Dizon died and his illegitimate daughters presented a notarized document acknowledging them.
However, the court took note that they were all born during the marriage of Corazon and Danilo De
Compulsory Recognition: Jesus. The acknowledgment cannot be used to impugn their legitimacy.
(1) rape, abduction or seduction when period coincides with conception
(2) continuous possession of status Aguilar v. Siasat
(3) child conceived during time of cohabitation of putative parents Petitioner – who was born on March 5, 1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria
(4) any other proof that the man is the child’s father Siasat-Aguilar – has sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue. He presented Alfredo’s SSS Form
E-1 which satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar spouses under
Primary Evidence (Voluntary) Art. 172; by itself, said document constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
A. public instrument or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.”
- record of birth His Certificate of Live Birth was not presented since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the
- will LCR of Bacolod City were destroyed.

B. Private handwritten instrument signed by the father 2. Of illegitimate children, FC Art. 175

Secondary Evidence Jison v. CA

A. Open and continuous possession of status The testimony of Monina Jison concerning how throughout the years her father Francisco treated her,
- baptismal certificate spent for her schooling, show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an
- GSIS/SSS illegitimate child.

Heirs of Gabatan v. CA - Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception of the
Two birth certificates were presented by both parties, one typewritten and the other hand written. The former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only
court took note that the handwritten one is the authentic birth certificate which indicated a different because either or both of them were below 18 years of age, may be legitimated.
name for her mother. Also, respondent failed to present her mother’s birth certificate to prove that
indeed she is the daughter of the deceased. Abadilla v. Tabiliran
Judge liable for deceitful conduct. An examination of the birth certificates of his 3 illegitimate children
with Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. He caused the entry
Dela Cruz, et. al. v. Gracia therein. It is important to note that these children, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975,
The filiation of an illegitimate child whose father died before the birth of the child was proven through a respectively, and prior to his marriage to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, he ought
handwritten autobiography of the father and the Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by the paternal to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these 3 children cannot be legitimated nor in
grandfather as well as the testimony of the brother of the deceased. any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage
between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran.
Lucas v. Lucas
For the court to issue order for compulsory blood testing in paternity cases, a show cause hearing must 2. How legitimation takes place, FC Arts. 178, 180
be held for the court to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish prima facie case FC 178 - Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment
which warrants issuance of order for blood testing. of a viodable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.

Gotardo v. Buling 3. Retroactivity and effects, FC Arts. 180-181

Mother was able to prove filiation by testifying she only had sexual relations with the alleged father at FC 181 - The legitimation of children who died before the celebration of the marriage shall benefit their
the time when she conceived her child. She also presented the testimony of the owner of the boarding descendants.
house where she stayed to corroborate fact that they had intimate relations.
DOJ Opinion No. 106, s. 1991
Perla v. Baring
Birth certificate and baptismal certificate no bearing if the alleged father did not sign the same. 4. Action to impugn legitimation, FC Art.182
FC 182 - Legitimation may be impugned only by those who are prejudiced in their rights, within five
1. Rights of illegitimate children, FC Art. 176 (as amended by R.A. No. 9255; PSA AA No. 1, s. 2016) years from the time their cause of action accrues.
FC 176:
- use surname of mother 5. Rights of legitimated children, FC Art. 179
- under parental authority of mother FC 179 - Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as legitimate children.
- support from parents
- ½ of the legitime of legitimate child XII. ADOPTION
R.A. No. 8552 (Domestic Adoption Law)
2. Compulsory recognition, cf. RPC Arts. 345, 46, 59 R.A. No. 8043, “The Law on Inter-Country Adoption”
RPC 345: acknowledge the offspring A.M. No. 02-6-02-S.C. Rule on Adoption (Aug. 22, 2002)

Note: RA 8043:
-Filipino child adopted from PH to Abroad.
People v. Abella -LAST RESORT, if no more can adopt in PH
We also accord high respect to the ruling of the trial court, as well as to the appellate court’s deference -ONLY countries who ALSO SIGNED the Hague Convention
thereto, that the accused-appellant was the biological father of the two-year old daughter of AAA as a -adoption should be in the best interest of the child
result of the rape incident and in view of their "striking facial similarities and features." The order to -States should establish safeguards to prevent abduction, sale and trafficking
acknowledge and support accused-appellant’s offspring is in accordance with Article 345 of the Revised -states work together to ensure protection of children
Penal Code.

F. Legitimated Children
1. who may be legitimated, FC Art. 177, R.A. No. 9858 Lazatin v. Campos

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which creates between two persons a relationship In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim
similar to that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the Petitioner, having remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since
court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down under the Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the
this jurisdiction. trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground. Neither does petitioner fall
under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
Cervantes v. Fajardo legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario. Second, the children are not the illegitimate
The minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of biological children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.
parents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in natural
parents over the adopted child. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the
adopted child and exercise parental authority and responsibility over him. 3. Need for consent (WRITTEN) – Sec. 9
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
Bartolome v. SSS (b) parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality
The Decision of the ECC not granting death benefits to the biological mother was reversed by the SC. which has legal custody of the child;
That decedent was adopted, does not deprive biological mother of the right to receive the benefits from (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and
her son’s death. Since the parent by adoption already died when decedent was a minor, the death adoptee, if any;
benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to his mother, his sole (d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter if living with said
remaining beneficiary. adopter and the latter's spouse, if any; and
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
A. Requisites to be an adopter
Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt: Landingin v. Republic
(a) Filipinos The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural
(b) aliens parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
(c) guardians adopting ward safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption. Clearly, the written
consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the
1. Age and capacity required – Sec. 7 natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental
- of legal age rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner
- in possession of full civil capacity and legal rights failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
- of good moral character
- has not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude 4. Aliens as adopters – Sec. 7 (b)
- emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for children (b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
- at least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee - That his/her country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the Philippines
- in a position to support and care for his/her children in keeping with the means of the family. - that he/she has been living in the Philippines for at least three (3) continuous years prior to the filing of
the application for adoption and maintains such residence until the adoption decree is entered
The requirement of sixteen (16) year difference between the age of the adopter and adoptee may be - that he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate government
waived when the adopter is the biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of the adoptee's agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that his/her government
parent; allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter.

2. Husband and wife jointly – Sec. 7 Republic v. Toledano

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases: The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or Code), provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt. Executive Order No. 91 issued on December
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, However, that the 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly
other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or adopt if one of them is an alien. It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt,
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the other, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is
joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses. mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is

the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but institute intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses Maximino and
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses. Eligia.

B. Who may not adopt, Sec. 7 2. On parental authority - adoptive parents

C. Who may be adopted, Sec. 8 Tamargo v. CA

(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years of age who has been administratively or judicially declared We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having been retroactively transferred
available for adoption; to and vested in the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened.
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other spouse; We do not consider that retroactive effect may be given to the decree of adoption so as to impose a
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to improve his/her status to that of legitimacy; liability upon the adopting parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically
(d) A person of legal age if, prior to the adoption, said person has been consistently considered and custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the granting of the petition
treated by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority; for adoption where such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the
(e) A child whose adoption has been previously rescinded; or adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been retroactively
(f) A child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has died: Provided, That no proceedings shall be lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they could not
initiated within six (6) months from the time of death of said parent(s). have foreseen and which they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United
States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable. Such
D. Who may not be adopted a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part
E. Effect of death, Sec. 13 of the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject
Decree of Adoption. – If, after the publication of the order of hearing has been complied with, and no to their control at the time the tort was committed.
opposition has been interposed to the petition, and after consideration of the case studies, the
qualifications of the adopter(s), trial custody report and the evidence submitted, the court is convinced
that the petitioners are qualified to adopt, and that the adoption would redound to the best interest of
the adoptee, a decree of adoption shall be entered which shall be effective as of the date the original Cervantes v. Fajardo
petition was filed. This provision shall also apply in case the petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of the Besides, the minor has been legally adopted by petitioners with the full knowledge and consent of
decree of adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee. The decree shall state the name by which the respondents. A decree of adoption has the effect, among others, of dissolving the authority vested in
child is to be known. natural parents over the adopted child, except where the adopting parent is the spouse of the natural
parent of the adopted, in which case, parental authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly by
F. Procedure in adoption both spouses. The adopting parents have the right to the care and custody of the adopted child and
exercise parental authority and responsibility over him.
Republic Act No. 9253, March 12, 2009 – “An Act Requiring Certification of The Department of Social
Welfare And Development (DSWD) To Declare A "Child Legally Available For Adoption" as a Prerequisite 3. On hereditary rights, Sec. 18; FC Arts. 189-190;
for Adoption Proceedings” P.D. No. 603, Art. 39
See: Balane, Ruben, Jottings in Succession,
G. Effects of a decree of adoption [2006 ed.]

1. On status – legitimate child In legal and intestate succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the adoptee and his/her biological
Bagayas v. Bagayas parent(s) had left a will, the law on testamentary succession shall govern.
Consequently, the declaration that petitioner is the legally adopted child of Maximino and Eligia did not
amount to a declaration of heirship and co-ownership upon which petitioner may institute an action for Note: adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his parents and other blood relatives
the amendment of the certificates of Title covering the subject land. More importantly, the Court has
consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in an ordinary civil action, Bartolome vs. SSS
for matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in a special proceeding From Art. 190 FC and Art. 984 NCC, the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the estate
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. The remedy then of petitioner is to of their child who was the subject of adoption. The death of the adopting parent at the time the child’s
minority resulted in the restoration of the biological mother’s parental authority over the adopted child.

Cornelio’s adoption of John, without more, does not deprive the biological mother of the right to
receive the benefits stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely XIII. SUPPORT
demise during John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under
the Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to the biological mother, John's sole A. What comprises support, FC Art. 194
remaining beneficiary. FC 194 - Support comprises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
4. On name The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall
include his schooling or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
In the Matter of Adoption of Stephanie Garcia majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of
since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to work.
use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
B. Who are obliged to provide support, FC Arts. 195, 196
5. Others, Sec. 13 FC 195 – order of support
(1) The spouses;
H. Rescission of adoption, Sec. 19 (2) Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. – Upon petition of the adoptee, with the assistance of the (3) Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the (4) Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
adoption may be rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (5) Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of full or half-blood (291a)
(a) repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having undergone counseling;
(b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; Pelayo v. Lauron
(c) sexual assault or violence; or Professional fees for medical assistance (wife gave birth) should be paid by husband and not by the
Lahom v. Sibulo
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an adopter a consequential right to rescind the Sanchez v. Zulueta
adoption decree even in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be undesirable, it remains, The Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the defendant to present his evidence for the purpose of
nevertheless, the bounden duty of the Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed determining whether it is sufficient prima facie to overcome the application for support pendente lite.
truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still noteworthy, however, that an adopter, Adultery on the part of the wife is a valid defense against an action for support.
while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture
of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child. For instance, upon the grounds De Asis v. CA
recognized by law, an adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will and testament, Res judicata is inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that renunciation of waiver of future
may freely exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate. support is prohibited by law.

1. by the adopted Rondina v. People

2. by the adopter/s Accused in rape must provide support for the child who was conceived as a consequence of the rape.

I. Effects of rescission, Sec. 20 Gotardo v. Buling

- the parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the The amount of support is variable.
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minor or incapacitated. Perla v. Baring
- The reciprocal rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be They failed to establish their filiation, therefore they are not entitled to support.
- The court shall order the Civil Registrar to cancel the amended certificate of birth of the adoptee and C. Source of support, FC Arts. 197-198, cf. FC Arts. 49, 70, 94, 121, 122
restore his/her original birth certificate. FC 197 - from separate property of obligor
- Succession rights shall revert to its status prior to adoption, but only as of the date of judgment of - If no separate property, from the ACP or CP shall advance the support
judicial rescission. Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall be respected.
All the foregoing effects of rescission of adoption shall be without prejudice to the penalties imposable FC 198 - During legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration of nullity of marriage,
under the Penal Code if the criminal acts are properly proven. the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the

conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the obligation of mutual support Art. 201. The amount of support, in the cases referred to in Articles 195 and 196, shall be in proportion
between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the court may order that the guilty to the Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of such order. paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a
right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
Lerma v. CA obstacle thereto. (299a)
A petition in bad faith, such as one filed by one who is guilty of an act which constitute a ground for
legal separation at the instance of the other spouse, cannot be considered as within the intendment of Art. 202. Support in the cases referred to in the preceding article shall be reduced or increased
the law granting separate support. proportionately, according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the recipient and the
resources or means of the person obliged to furnish the same.
Reyes v. Ines-Luciano
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support. However, the alleged Art. 203. The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the person who has a right
adultery of the wife must be established by competent evidence. The mere allegation will not bar her to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not be paid except from the date of judicial or
from the right to receive support pendente lite. She was not asking for support to be taken from her extrajudicial demand. Support pendente lite may be claimed in accordance with the Rules of Court.
husband’s personal funds but from the conjugal property. Payment shall be made within the first five days of each corresponding month or when the recipient
dies, his heirs shall not be obliged to return what he has received in advance. (298a)
D. Order of support, FC Arts. 199, 200, 204
FC 199 - Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon Art. 205. The right to receive support under this Title as well as any money or property obtained as such
the following persons in the order herein provided: support shall not be levied upon on attachment or execution. (302a)
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree; Art. 206. When, without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger,
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it appears that he gave it without
(4) The brothers and sisters. intention of being reimbursed. (2164a)

Mangonon v. CA Art. 207. When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support when
If father cannot give support, it should be borne by the grandfather. Since said grandfather has the urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right
financial means to support the education of his granddaughters, he is liable for support pendente lite. of reimbursement from the person obliged to give support. This Article shall particularly apply when the
father or mother of a child under the age of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support
Spouses Lim v. Lim to the child when urgently needed. (2166a)
This inability of Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their
obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, Art. 208. In case of contractual support or that given by will, the excess in amount beyond that required
following the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to petitioners’ theory, is to for legal support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution. Furthermore, contractual support
sanction the anomalous scenario of tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of shall be subject to adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to changes of circumstances
parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one degree removed are more than able manifestly beyond the contemplation of the parties.
to fill the void.
G. Renunciation and Termination, NCC Art. 2035; FC Art. 194; NCC Art. 152
E. Manner and time of payment, FC Arts. 200-204 NCC 2035 – future support cannot be the subject of a compromise
FC 200 - When the obligation to give support falls upon two or more persons, the payment of the same
shall be divided between them in proportion to the resources of each. However, in case of urgent need H. Support pendente lite, FC Art. 198; ROC, Rule 61
and by special circumstances, the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support provisionally, FC 198 - During the proceedings for legal separation or for annulment of marriage, and for declaration
without prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share due from them. When two or of nullity of marriage, the spouses and their children shall be supported from the properties of the
more recipients at the same time claim support from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, absolute community or the conjugal partnership. After the final judgment granting the petition, the
should the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the order established in the preceding obligation of mutual support between the spouses ceases. However, in case of legal separation, the
article shall be followed, unless the concurrent obligees should be the spouse and a child subject to court may order that the guilty spouse shall give support to the innocent one, specifying the terms of
parental authority, in which case the child shall be preferred. such order.
F. Amount of support, FC Arts. 200-208
I. Procedure in applications for support, Rule 61

XIV. PARENTAL AUTHORITY & CUSTODY OF CHILDREN B. Transfer of Parental Authority, FC Art. 210 cf. FC Arts. 223-224, 234, 217
FC 210 - Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases
A. Concept of parental authority, Art. II, Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution FC Art. 209, 211, NCC Arts. 356- authorized by law.
Art. II, Sec. 12 (1987 Constitution): The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and FC 223 - The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted
support of the Government. wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds
the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant,
Art. 209, Family Code the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other
Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated measures as it may deem just and proper.
children, parental authority and responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing them for civic
consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental and physical character and FC 224 - The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for
well-being. not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly
accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not
Arts. 356-363 NCC – Care & Education of Children interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper
petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and
Medina v. Makabali proper.
While our law recognizes the right of a parent to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose sight of
the basic principle that "in all questions on the care, custody, education and property of children, the Eslao v. Court of Appeals
latter's welfare shall be paramount" (Civil Code of the Philippines, Art. 363), and that for compelling In the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the
reasons, even a child under seven may be ordered separated from the mother petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority.
Unson v. Navarro
“It is axiomatic in Our jurisprudence that in controversies regarding the custody of minors the sole and C. Who exercises Parental Authority, FC Arts. 211-213 cf. FC Art. 49, 102(6), 43(2), 63(2), 176. 49, 102
foremost consideration is the physical, education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, (6), 129 (9)
taking into account the respective resources and social and moral situations of the contending parents. FC 211 - The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their
Never has this Court diverted from that criterion.” common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary. Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and
In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus Of Minor Shang Ko Vingson v. Cabcaban are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a)
The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the
right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and FC 212 - In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
abusively, impairing their growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over
throughout their lives unless they are liberated from such parents and properly counseled. the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of
the children. (n)
Caram v. Segui
Christina's directly accusing the DSWD officials of forcibly separating her from her child and placing the FC 213 - In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
latter up for adoption, supposedly without complying with the necessary legal requisites to qualify the designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
child for adoption, clearly indicates that she is not searching for a lost child but asserting her parental choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. (n)
authority over the child and contesting custody over him. Since it is extant from the pleadings filed that No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling
what is involved is the issue of child custody and the exercise of parental rights over a child, who, for all reasons to order otherwise.
intents and purposes, has been legally considered a ward of the State, the Amparo rule cannot be
properly applied. Unson v. Navarro

It is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say Gualberto v. Gualberto
immoral influence, that the situation in which her mother has placed herself (living with her brother-in- As between spouses who are separated, custody pendente lite over a child below seven (7) years of age
law), might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most shall be with the mother. This can be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mother’s unfitness.
impressionable stage in her life. Mother was granted visitation rights only. Sexual preference of the mother alone, being a lesbian, does not prove parental neglect or
incompetence. Not even when she is a sex worker or had been unfaithful to the husband would render
Espiritu & Layug v. CA her unfit to have custody of her minor children.
The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the parent with whom they prefer to
stay is clear from the record. From all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two Grande v. Antonio
requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code. Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer
has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor
Santos Sr. v. C.A children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
The father has not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Despite the demonstrated love and
affection for the boy, by the grandparents, the legitimate father is still preferred over the grandparents. D. Substitute Parental Authority FC Arts. 214-216, 233; R.A. No. 10165
The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor, particularly because there is no proof that the father is in (Foster Care Act of 2012), Secs. 6 & 7
no position to support the boy. The fact that he was unable to provide financial support for his minor FC 214 - In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental authority shall be
son from birth up to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without permission, exercised by the surviving grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the court, taking
should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his permanent right to the child's custody. While into account the same consideration mentioned in the preceding article, shall exercise the authority.
petitioner's previous inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it cannot be (355a)
construed as abandonment. His appeal of the unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep
his only child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his past misdeeds. To award FC 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and
him custody would help enhance the bond between parent and son. It would also give the father a grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one
chance to prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth and support which a parent against the other. (315a)
father can give.
FC 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise
substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
David v. Court of Appeals (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
Christopher J. is an illegitimate child since at the time of his conception, his father, Ramon R. Villar, was (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified.
married to another woman other than the child's mother. As such, pursuant to Art. 176 of the Family Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the
Code, Christopher J. is under the parental authority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as a same order of preference shall be observed.
consequence of such authority, is entitled to have custody of him. The fact that Villar has recognized the
minor child may be a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving him FC 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the
custody of the child. Under Art. 213 of the Family Code, "no child under seven years of age shall be person of the child as the parents.
separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the child.
Tonog v. CA
Temporary custody over an illegitimate child was granted to the father pending resolution of the Vancil v. Belmes
guardianship case he filed. Child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings and thrust into Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death,
a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an absence or unsuitability of mother. Considering that mother is very much alive and has exercised
attachment. continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has to prove, in asserting her right to be the
minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner, however, has not proffered convincing
Briones v. Miguel evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists
An illegitimate child is under the sole parental authority of the mother. In the exercise of that authority, that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in
she is entitled to keep the child in her company. The Court will not deprive her of her custody, absent partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this
any imperative cause showing her unfitness to exercise such authority and care. guardianship proceeding.Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still
petitioner cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a

resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit. The teacher could have requested the mother to sign
required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the duties of a the permit form before she left the school or at least called her up to obtain her conformity.
guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those duties to someone else
who may not also qualify as a guardian. Teacher should have coordinated with the school to ensure that proper safeguards, such as adequate
first aid and sufficient adult personnel, were present during their activity. She should have been mindful
E. Special PA FC Arts. 218-219, FC Art. 233 cf. FC Art. 221 in rel. to NCC Art. 2180; FC 236 of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it would be impossible for her by herself alone to
Cybercrime Prevention Act, R.A. No. 10175, September 12, 2012 keep an eye on each one of them.
FC 218 The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in
child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils, respondent should have made sure that the
supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities children were protected from all harm while in her company. Respondent should have known that
whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. (349a) leaving the pupils in the swimming pool area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple
reminder "not to go to the deepest part of the pool" was insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers
FC 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and that the situation presented to the children, especially when respondent knew that Chiara Mae cannot
solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, swim. Dismally, respondent created an unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils
judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be concerned to real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and confidence reposed on her by
subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not the parents of the pupils but of the school itself.
apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular
circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the Aquinas School v. Inton
provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. Aquinas had an agreement with a congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the
congregation would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas
St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos insists that it was not the school but Yamyamin’s religious congregation that chose her for the task of
Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of catechizing the school’s grade three students, much like the way bishops designate the catechists who
the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had would teach religion in public schools. Under the circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did
no control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the not have control over Yamyamin’s teaching methods. The Intons had not refuted the school directress’
death resulting from such accident. testimony in this regard. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with
Child Learning Centre v. Tagario
The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could not be opened Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only qualified outside
from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was wrong with the door, if not the catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it cannot be said that Aquinas took no
door knob, under the principle of res ipsa loquitor. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies where (1) the steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct towards the students by their religion teacher. First,
accident was of such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for Yamyamin’s transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was qualified to teach
the defendant’s negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality religion. Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a legitimate
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the school had reason to assume
and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the that she would behave properly towards the students. Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the
person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for failure to see to it that the doors of their school school’s Administrative Faculty Staff Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also
toilets are at all times in working condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, required her to attend a teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of
instead of the door, shows that something was wrong with the door. 1998. Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach6 to ensure that she
was really catechizing the students. And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a student, classroom evaluation. Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year,
locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use the window to call for help or even to Aquinas did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted promptly to
get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident. It cannot be said that
liability on petitioners’ part. Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.

School of the Holy Spirit v. Taguiam F. Filial privilege FC Art. 215; ROC, Rule 130 Sec. 25 cf. Secs. 22 & 23
Teacher had been grossly negligent. First, student’s permit form was unsigned but she was allowed to
join the activity because she assumed that the mother has allowed her to join by personally bringing her

FC 215 No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents and expect her to be, under the care and supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the
grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the descendant or by one injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at play and which no
parent against the other. parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it
Rule 130, Section 25. Parental and filial privilege. — No person may be compelled to testify against his reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect
parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
Rule 130, Section 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. — During their marriage, neither the
husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse, Rosaldes vs. People
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her
the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a) infliction of the physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted
from the violence suffered at her hands. She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake
Lee v. CA of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family
But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator,
The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis).
descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry. A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by
her stepmother. Art. 965 thus provides: The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former H. Effects of PA over the child’s property,
unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those FC Arts. 225-227, R.A. No. 9231, Secs. 12-B and 12-C
from whom he descends. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee.
FC 225 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the
G. Effects of PA over the child’s person, FC Arts. 220-222; 223-224 unemancipated common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement,
FC220 The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. Where the market
unemancipated children on wards the following rights and duties: value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per
example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means; centum (10%) of the value of the property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding; obligations prescribed for general guardians.
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self- A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child
discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them resides, or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property
compliance with the duties of citizenship; or any part thereof is situated.
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues
recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from regarding the performance of the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be
acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals; heard and resolved. The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests; child is under substitute parental authority, or the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience; which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. FC 226. The property of the unemancipated child earned or acquired with his work or industry or by
onerous or gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted exclusively to the
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries latter's support and education, unless the title or transfer provides otherwise. The right of the parents
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company over the fruits and income of the child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support and
and under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law. secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family. (321a, 323a)
Art. 222. The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's property or a guardian ad litem when the best
interests of the child so requires. Hebron v. Loyola
The minor children of Conrado inherited by representation in the properties of their grandparents
Cuadra v. Monfort Remigia and Januario. These children, not their mother Victorina, were the co-owners of the inherited
In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have properties. Victorina had no authority or had acted beyond her powers in conveying, if she did indeed
prevented the damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise convey, to the petitioner’s mother the undivided share of her minor children in the property involved in
of his parental authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, this case. "The powers given to her by the laws as the natural guardian covers only matters of
his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to administration and cannot include the power of disposition. She should have first secured the

permission of the court before she alienated that portion of the property in question belonging to her The absence of any kinship between the child and the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the lower
minor children."11 In a number of cases, where the guardians, mothers or grandmothers, did not seek court from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the law provides that in certain cases the custody of a
court approval of the sale of properties of their wards, minor children, the Court declared the sales void. child may be awarded even to strangers, as against either the father or the mother or against both.
Thus, in proceedings involving a child whose parents are separated — either legally or de facto — and
I. Suspension or termination of PA where it appears that both parents are improper persons to whom to entrust the care, custody and
1. permanent termination, FC Arts. 228, 232, cf. R.A. No. 6809 control of the child, "the court may either designate the paternal or maternal grandparent of the child,
FC 228. Parental authority terminates permanently: or his oldest brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet person to take charge of such child, or
(1) Upon the death of the parents; commit it to and suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent society.”
(2) Upon the death of the child; or
(3) Upon emancipation of the child. (327a) De Guzman v. Perez
An Information for violation of PD 603 (neglect of child) was filed against the neglectful father.
FC 232. If the person exercising parental authority has subjected the child or allowed him to be The law intends to punish the neglect of any parent, which neglect corresponds to the failure to give the
subjected to sexual abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court of such authority. (n) child the education which the family’s station in life and financial condition permit. The irresponsible
parent cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his neglect by invoking the other parent’s
2. non-permanent termination, FC Arts. 229 cf. FC Art.193 faithful compliance with his or her own parental duties.

FC 229. Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment, parental authority also terminates: XV. EMANCIPATION
(1) Upon adoption of the child; R.A. No. 6809
(2) Upon appointment of a general guardian; A. Cause of emancipation, FC Art. 234 as amended
(3) Upon judicial declaration of abandonment of the child in a case filed for the purpose; FC 234 Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
(4) Upon final judgment of a competent court divesting the party concerned of parental authority; or commences at the age of eighteen years.“
(5) Upon judicial declaration of absence or incapacity of the person exercising parental authority. (327a)
B. Effect of emancipation, FC Art. 236 as amended
Secs. 16 and 19, R.A. No. 8552 re: parental authority and revocation of adoption cf. FC 15, NCC 2180
FC 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property of the child who
3. suspension of PA, FC Arts. 231-230, 233 shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by existing
FC 230. Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of the parent or the person exercising the same laws in special cases.
of a crime which carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is automatically reinstated
upon service of the penalty or upon pardon or amnesty of the offender. (330a) "Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and
FC 231. The court in an action filed for the purpose in a related case may also suspend parental guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second and third
authority if the parent or the person exercising the same: paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
(1) Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;
(2) Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or example; XVI. SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS UNDER FC
(3) Compels the child to beg; or
(4) Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to acts of lasciviousness. Arts. 238-253, 100(2), 127(2), 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124, 217, 225

The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases which have resulted from culpable Art. 100 (2) & Art. 127 (2) – to secure consent of spouse to a transaction when separated in fact
negligence of the parent or the person exercising parental authority. Art. 41 – declaration of presumptive death
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the child so demands, the court shall deprive Art. 69 – disagreement in fixing family domicile
the guilty party of parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be proper under the Art. 73 – objection over exercise of profession
circumstances. The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental authority revived in a Art. 96 - disagreement in administration of ACP
case filed for the purpose or in the same proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased Art. 124 – disagreement in administration of CPG
and will not be repeated. (33a) Art. 217 – parental authority over foundlings and abandoned children filed by heads of children’s homes
Art. 225 – bond of guardian over minor’s property
Chua v. Cabangbang

NCC 356-363, FC 213 The late Serafin Ferrer's widowed mother, Victoria, and his two remaining brothers, Nehemias and
Ruben, have come forward in earnest support of the petition. Adequate publication of the proceeding
XVIII. SURNAMES has not elicited the slightest opposition from the relatives and friends of the late Serafin Ferrer.
NCC Arts. 364-380; R.A. No. 6085 – Regulating the use of aliases, August 4, 1969 Clearances from various Government agencies show that Teresita has a spotless record. And the State
R.A. No. 9255 “An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children to Use Surname of their Father”; FC Art. 176 (represented by the Solicitor General's Office), which has an interest in the name borne by every citizen
within its realm for purposes of identification, interposed no opposition at the trial after a searching
Article 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. cross-examination, of Teresita and her witnesses. Whether the late Serafin Ferrer, who died some five
Article 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. years before Teresita was born, would have consented or objected to her use of his surname is open to
Article 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall principally use the surname of the speculation. One thing, however, is beyond cavil: those living who possess the right of action to prevent
father. If recognized by only one of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of the the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud to share it with her.
recognizing parent.
Article 367. Natural children by legal fiction shall principally employ the surname of the father. Telmo v. Republic
Article 368. Illegitimate children referred to in article 287 shall bear the surname of the mother. The issue is whether there is ample justification to allow Mrs, Telmo to change the spelling of her
Article 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable marriage shall principally use the husband's surname.
surname of the father. A married woman may use her husband's surname (Art. 370, Civil Code). It is axiomatic that if she
Article 370. A married woman may use: desires judicial authorization to change the spelling of his surname, her husband should initiate the
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's surname, or proceeding. In the instant case, the anomaly is that the husband did not ask for judicial authority to
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or change the spelling of his surname. It was his wife who filed the petition. The irregularity in the petition
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." is obvious. The lower Court sanctioned the wifes change of the spelling of her husband's surname but
no similar authority was granted to the husband because he did not file a petition for that purpose.
Article 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the guilty party, she shall resume her It is true that the wife submitted to the court her husband's affidavit of conformity to the change in the
maiden name and surname. If she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and spelling of his surname But, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, that woull not prevent him and their
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her former husband's surname, unless: children from using the old spelling. And in that event, confusion and error might arise.
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or Moreover after a careful evaluation of the reasons advanced by Mrs. Telmo for changing the spelling of
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person. her husband's surname, the Court has arrived at the conclusion that those reasons are not substantial
Article 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and and cogent enough to sustain her petition.
surname employed before the legal separation.
Article 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as though he were still living, in Tolentino v. CA
accordance with article 370. Issue is whether or not a woman who has been legally divorced from her husband may be enjoined by
Article 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger person shall be obliged to use such the latter's present wife from using the surname of her former husband.
additional name or surname as will avoid confusion. Art. 371 is not applicable to the case at bar because Art. 371 speaks of annulment while the case before
Article 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between ascendants and descendants, the word us refers to absolute divorce where there is a severance of valid marriage ties. The effect of divorce is
"Junior" can be used only by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either: more akin to the death of the spouse where the deceased woman continues to be referred to as the
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname, or Mrs. of her husband even if the latter has remarried rather than to annulment since in the latter case, it
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on. is as if there had been no marriage at all.
Article 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority. The private respondent has established that to grant the injunction to the petitioner would be an act of
Article 377. Usurpation of a name and surname may be the subject of an action for damages and other serious dislocation to her. She has given proof that she entered into contracts with third persons,
relief. acquired properties and entered into other legal relations using the surname Tolentino. The petitioner,
Article 378. The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the on the other hand, has failed to show that she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of legal rights
latter. inasmuch as she can use her husband's surname and be fully protected in case the respondent uses the
Article 379. The employment of pen names or stage names is permitted, provided it is done in good surname Tolentino for illegal purposes.
faith and there is no injury to third persons. Pen names and stage names cannot be usurped.
Article 380. Except as provided in the preceding article, no person shall use different names and There is no usurpation of the petitioner's name and surname in this case so that the mere use of the
surnames. surname Tolentino by the Private respondent cannot be said to have injured the petitioner's rights.

Legamia v. IAC misspelled family name in one instance. The records disclose that the erroneous middle or second
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and use the name names, or the misspelling of the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and
of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to another woman. The practice, to unrectified over time.
be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be Identified What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names within the purview of the
who are living with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds Anti-Alias Law; and that such names were not different from each other. Considering that he was not
herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her also shown to have used the names for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the
husband. And yet none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not dismissal of the charge against him was justified in fact and in law.
a bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment that the
NCC Arts. 381-383, 384-389; FC Arts. 96, 101, 124
In Re: Petition for Change of Name, Julian Lin Carulasan Wang NCC Arts. 390-396, FC Art. 41
That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. Article 381. When a person disappears from his domicile, his whereabouts being unknown, and without
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for leaving an agent to administer his property, the judge, at the instance of an interested party, a relative,
change of name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and or a friend, may appoint a person to represent him in all that may be necessary.
discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and This same rule shall be observed when under similar circumstances the power conferred by the
appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice absentee has expired. (181a)
him in his rights under our laws.
Article 382. The appointment referred to in the preceding article having been made, the judge shall take
Remo v. DFA the necessary measures to safeguard the rights and interests of the absentee and shall specify the
However, petitioner consciously chose to use her husband’s surname before, in her previous passport powers, obligations and remuneration of his representative, regulating them, according to the
application, and now desires to resume her maiden name. If allowed, definitely nothing prevents her in circumstances, by the rules concerning guardians. (182)
the future from requesting to revert to the use of her husband’s surname. Such unjustified changes in
one's name and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other official documents, Article 383. In the appointment of a representative, the spouse present shall be preferred when there is
cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport no legal separation.
holders will arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as petitioner, whose If the absentee left no spouse, or if the spouse present is a minor, any competent person may be
marriage subsists, may not change her family name at will. appointed by the court. (183a)

Gonzaludo v. People Article 384. Two years having elapsed without any news about the absentee or since the receipt of the
Petitioner conspired with Rosemarie to falsify, that is, by making untruthful statement in the narration last news, and five years in case the absentee has left a person in charge of the administration of his
of facts in the deed of sale, by declaring Rosemarie to be the owner of the house subject of such sale property, his absence may be declared. (184)
and signing as "Rosemarie Villaflor" instead of her real name, Rosemarie Gelogo, in order to sell the
same to the Canlas spouses. Article 385. The following may ask for the declaration of absence:
(1) The spouse present;
Dapar v. Biascan (2) The heirs instituted in a will, who may present an authentic copy of the same;
The mere use of a surname cannot be enjoined; it is the use thereof coupled with the representation (3) The relatives who may succeed by the law of intestacy;
that one is the lawful wife, or the usurpation of the wife’s status, which gives rise to an action for (4) Those who may have over the property of the absentee some right subordinated to the condition of
damages. his death. (185)
In this case, it was in fact the husband of Gloria Biascan who authorized Zenaida Dapar to use his
surname. No damages was awarded to the wife. Article 386. The judicial declaration of absence shall not take effect until six months after its publication
in a newspaper of general circulation. (186a)
Limson v Gonzalez
On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez”, Article 387. An administrator of the absentee's property shall be appointed in accordance with article
“Eugenio Gonzales”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez”, “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado”, “Eugenio C.R. 383. (187a)
Gonzalez”, “Eugenio J. Gonzalez”, and – per Limson – “Eugenio Juan Robles Gonzalez.” But these names
contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an erroneous middle or second name, or a

Article 388. The wife who is appointed as an administratrix of the husband's property cannot alienate or Eastern Shipping v. Lucero
encumber the husband's property, or that of the conjugal partnership, without judicial authority. (188a) There is thus enough evidence to show the circumstances attending the loss and disappearance of the
M/V Eastern Minicon and its crew. The foregoing facts, quite logically. are sufficient to lead Us to a
Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, moral certainty that the vessel had sunk and that the persons aboard had perished with it. upon this
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession. premise, the rule on presumption of death under Article 391 (1) of the Civil Code must yield to the rule
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of preponderance of evidence.
of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened. (n) Manuel v. People
It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant
Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that 1st wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her
among the heirs: for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in
been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane; relation to Article 41 of the Family Code.
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been Republic v. Granada
known for four years. (n) A petition for presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of remarriage is a summary
proceeding under the Family Code, the judgment shall be final and executory.
Article 392. If the absentee appears, or without appearing his existence is proved, he shall recover his
property in the condition in which it may be found, and the price of any property that may have been Republic v. Narceda
alienated or the property acquired therewith; but he cannot claim either fruits or rents. (194) By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be immediately
final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's
Article 393. Whoever claims a right pertaining to a person whose existence is not recognized must prove judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under
that he was living at the time his existence was necessary in order to acquire said right. (195) Article 41 of the Family Code.

Article 394. Without prejudice to the provision of the preceding article, upon the opening of a XX. FUNERALS
succession to which an absentee is called, his share shall accrue to his coheirs, unless he has heirs, NCC Art. 305-310; FC Arts. 194-195
assigns, or a representative. They shall all, as the case may be, make an inventory of the property.
(196a) Article 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in
accordance with the order established for support, under article 294. In case of descendants of the
Article 395. The provisions of the preceding article are understood to be without prejudice to the action same degree, or of brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the
of petition for inheritance or other rights which are vested in the absentee, his representatives or paternal shall have a better right.
successors in interest. These rights shall not be extinguished save by lapse of time fixed for prescription.
In the record that is made in the Registry of the real estate which accrues to the coheirs, the Article 306. Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased.
circumstance of its being subject to the provisions of this article shall be stated. (197) Article 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the
absence of such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine the funeral rites. In case of
Article 396. Those who may have entered upon the inheritance shall appropriate the fruits received in doubt, the form of the funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements for
good faith so long as the absentee does not appear, or while his representatives or successors in the same, after consulting the other members of the family.
interest do not bring the proper actions. (198)
Article 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred, disposed of or exhumed without the consent
Reyes v. Alejandro of the persons mentioned in articles 294 and 305.
The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is when he has properties which have to be
taken cared of or administered by a representative appointed by the Court (Article 384, Civil Code); the Article 309. Any person who shows disrespect to the dead, or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall
spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property (Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking be liable to the family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.
the Court that the administration of an classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article
196, Civil Code).

Article 310. The construction of a tombstone or mausoleum shall be deemed a part of the funeral Article 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
expenses, and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership property, if the deceased is one of the considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained. (n)
Article 411. Every civil registrar shall be civilly responsible for any unauthorized alteration made in any
Eugenio v. Velez civil register, to any person suffering damage thereby. However, the civil registrar may exempt himself
As to the claim of Tomas Eugenio, Sr. that he should be considered a "spouse" having the right and duty from such liability if he proves that he has taken every reasonable precaution to prevent the unlawful
to make funeral arrangements for his common-law wife, the Court ruled: alteration. (n)
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally
married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as Article 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without a judicial order. (n)
husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may Article 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special
be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines. laws. (n)

Valino v. Adriano Rule 108, Rules of Court – Cancellation or Correction of Entry in the Civil Register
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty. Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from
her husband and was in the United States when he died has no controlling significance. To say that Barretto v. Local Civil Registrar
Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced, expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make “We hold that the petition for correction is not warranted because under the facts of this case the
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased husband is baseless. The right and duty to make funeral alleged error is not clerical in nature. If the name in that record of birth were Domingo Barretto and his
arrangements, like any other right, will not be considered as having been waived or renounced, except sex was indicated therein as female, it might be argued that the error would be clerical. But that is not
upon clear and satisfactory proof of conduct indicative of a free and voluntary intent to that end.9 While the fact in this case. The situation is more complicated. A person named Domingo Barretto claims that
there was disaffection between Atty. Adriano and Rosario and their children when he was still alive, the he is Rosario Barretto and that the word "female" in the latter's birth record is a mistake.”
Court also recognizes that human compassion, more often than not, opens the door to mercy and
forgiveness once a family member joins his Creator. Republic v. Valencia
In a Petition for Correction of Entry in birth certificate (citizenship) - “If all these procedural
requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the record
of birth even if filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be
described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either
by the Civil Registrar or any person having or claiming any interest in the entries sought to be cancelled
XXI. ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTER and/or corrected and the opposition is actively prosecuted, the proceedings thereon become adversary
NCC Arts. 407-413; ROC, Rule 108
R.A. No. 9048, as amended by R.A. No. 10172 Republic v. Marcos
Petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the minor May Sia alias Manman Huang, also known as
Article 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: Mary Pang [to] be changed to Mary Pang De la Cruz”. The general rule is that a change of name should
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments not be permitted if it will give a false impression of family relationship to another where none actually
declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of exists. The law does not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person not their
natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) father, for to allow them to adopt the surname of their mother's husband, who is not their father, can
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. result in confusion of their paternity.

Article 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders mentioned in Labayo-Rowe v. Republic
the preceding article, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain Since only the OSG was notified representing the State, the proceedings taken, which is summary in
whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to nature, is short of what is required in cases where substantial alterations are sought. All other
the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning. (n) indispensable parties should have been made respondents. They include not only the declared father of
the child but the child as well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their hereditary rights
would be adversely affected thereby.

Since Reynaldo was born on 30 October 1948, the late registration of his birth is outside of the coverage
Zapanta v. Registrar of P.D. No. 651, as amended. It falls under the Civil Registry Law,( 27 February 1931). Considering that
SC reversed dismissal of petition for correction of death certificate from Falviano Zapanta to Florencio the late registration of Reynaldo’s birth took place in 1985, NCSO A.O. No. 1, s. 1983 governs the
Zapanta. Rule 108 is an adversarial proceeding. Case was allowed to proceed. implementation of Act No. 3753 in this case.
Under NCSO A.O. No. 1-83, the birth of a child shall be registered within 30 days from the time of birth.
Leonor v. Court of Appeals Any report of birth made beyond the reglementary period is considered delayed. The LCR, upon
A Petition under Rule 108 seeking cancellation of the marriage contract, cannot be used by Mauricio to receiving an application for delayed registration of birth, is required to publicly post for at least 10 days
change his and Virginia's civil status from married to single and of their three children from legitimate to a notice of the pending application for delayed registration. If after ten days no one opposes the
illegitimate. Neither does the trial court, under said Rule, have any jurisdiction to declare their marriage registration and the local civil registrar is convinced beyond doubt that the birth should be registered,
null and void and as a result thereof, to order the local civil registrar to cancel the marriage entry in the he should register the same.
civil registry.
Reynaldo’s certificate of live birth, as a duly registered public document, is presumed to have gone
Silverio v. Republic through the process prescribed by law for late registration of birth. It was only after the lapse of 10 long
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the years from the approval of the application for delayed registration, that Nieves registered her
time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the opposition. She should have done so within the ten-day period prescribed by law. Records show that no
physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally less than Nieves herself informed the local civil registrar of the birth of Reynaldo.
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if Applications for delayed registration of birth go through a rigorous process. The books making up the
not attended by error, is immutable. civil register are considered public documents and are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts
stated there. As a public document, a registered certificate of live birth enjoys the presumption of
Republic v. Cagandahan validity. It is not for Reynaldo to prove the facts stated in his certificate of live birth, but for petitioners
Petitioner has Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH).“The trial court’s grant of respondent’s change of who are assailing the certificate to prove its alleged falsity.
name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondent’s change of name merely recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit Republic v. Magpayo
in respondent’s change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to
certificate from female to male.” his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to
grant respondent’s supplication.
Dela Cruz v. Gracia When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
Rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation,
there should be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the Republic v. Uy
acknowledging parent; and Respondent’s birth certificate shows that her full name is Anita Sy, that she is a Chinese citizen and a
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent legitimate child of Sy Ton and Sotera Lugsanay. In filing the petition, however, she seeks the correction
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by of her first name and surname, her status from "legitimate" to "illegitimate" and her citizenship from
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such other evidence. "Chinese" to "Filipino." Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil
Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have interest and are affected by the
Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.
Their cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by Iwasawa v. Gangan
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code. There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner are all public documents.
It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due execution
questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the
such as the petition filed before the court a quo. petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their
authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not anymore
Baldos v. CA necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary
weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant case,

the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private respondent nor the public
prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.

Republic v. Olaybar
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into
and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While
we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify
the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest
the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had
already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth
as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.

Onde v. Office of LCR

Entry From To
(1) Date and place of Dec. 23, 1983 not married
marriage of his parents

2) First name of
his mother Tely Matilde
3) His first name Franc Ler Francler

• A petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and
controversial alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy
of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. Thus, in his
new petition, petitioner should at least implead his father and mother as parties since the substantial
correction he is seeking will also affect them.
• Correction of his first name and that of his mother may be done thru the Local Civil Registrar.