Acrefore 9780190846626 e 249

Jus ad Bellum
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International

Studies
Jus ad Bellum
Caron E. Gentry
Print Publication Date: Dec 2013 Subject: Conflict Studies, International Relations Theory
Online Publication Date: Dec 2017 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.013.249
Summary and Keywords
Alex J. Bellamy's Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (2006), Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars
(1977), and Larry May's Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (2008) are three significant works
on Just War thinking that offer unique perspectives on the different facets of jus ad bellum.
Bellamy's book is a historical examination of the evolution of Just War thinking. Walzer's book is
a classic and a crucial component of the Just War canon; this book brought Just War
considerations back into political conversations. While classical Realism dominated the post-
World War II political landscape for its own moral contemplations towards war and power, it was
not able to speak to the anti-Vietnam agonism. Walzer purposefully set out to speak to these
considerations in a frankly philosophical framework, one rooted in historical thought and
examples. May has a unique voice within the Just War tradition— his starting point is a form of
pacifism. Although this is somewhat controversial, it is not without precedence. One of the key
pieces on nuclear weapons is the 1983 letter from the US Catholic Bishops that placed the Just
War tradition within a pacifist framework. Similarly, May has set out to examine how this ancient
tradition can fit the needs of the current international arena, particularly in light of
humanitarian intervention.
Keywords: just war, justice, jud ad bellum, Alex J. Bellamy, Michael Walzer, Larry May
There are three components to Just War thinking: jus ad bellum, the justice of starting a war; jus
in bello, just conduct within a war; and jus post bellum, the creation of justice, or sustainable
peace, after war (see Orend 2002; Patterson 2007; Williams 2014). This essay recognizes the complex
depth and breadth of all three even as it focuses on jus ad bellum. Jus ad bellum is typically
measured via key criteria, sometimes referred to as principles. These are often recognized as
just cause (typically self-defense or defense of another state), legitimate authority (a state), right
intent (peace), proportionality (does the response fit the cause?), last resort (have all other
measures been exhausted?), and reasonable chance of success (see US Catholic Bishops 1983:98–
100; Walzer 1977; Charles 2005; Bellamy 2006; May 2008;). In examining the historical scholarship on
Just War, jus ad bellum is the first of the components to emerge as it deals with the decision to
engage in war; this deliberation is demonstrated in writings from Augustine (1998 [426]) to James
Turner Johnson (1981).
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Jus ad Bellum
Ethical, if not moral, deliberation is at the center of the Just War tradition. Johnson is not alone
in his intentional and well-reasoned approach to the decision to engage in war. Among modern
theorists, Johnson is joined by Paul Ramsey (2002), Jean Bethke Elshtain (1992, 2004), Terry Nardin
(1992, 1996, 2002), and Brian Orend (2006). In the work of these five scholars among others, we see
an effort to balance moral reasoning with public choices in the face of conflict (Ramsey 2002) –
whether it is the aftermath of a terrorist attack (Elshtain 2004; Orend 2006) or in the decision to
intervene for humanitarian purposes (Nardin 2002). Within the tradition's scholarship, there is an
unapologetic normative code, whether it stems from religious-based morality or a more human
secularist ethic. While the Western-centric scholarship on Just War has been problematized (see
Sjoberg 2006; Sorabji and Rodin 2006), that Just War is a tradition (see Nardin 1992) is important.
Nicholas Rengger (2002:355) is clear that as a tradition, rather than a cohesive and discrete
theory, Just War is able to adapt to new challenges and developments in state relations,
technology, and ethical progress. This flexibility pushes the tradition and allows a tradition
traced back to Antiquity and multiple cultural traditions, from the West, Middle East, and Asia,
to stay relevant (Sorabji and Rodin 2006). The challenges that Just War has faced reflects the
eternal tension between power politics and normative restraints on the making (and fighting in
the case of jus in bello or resolution in jus post bellum) of war. Because of this, historical context
is important to understanding the evolution of the Just War tradition. The earliest articulations of
the Just War tradition focused upon who had the right to go to war and for which reasons. From
Ancient Greece and Rome to the Holy Roman Empire, it was determined that the sovereign
authority, whether monarch or state, was the legitimate authority with the right to go to war.
The reasons concentrated on the provision of justice and for righting wrongs – with the intention
that war could not be fought for selfish reasons and to the utter-limits of moral behavior. As the
West began to move towards the Westphalian order, theologians and philosophers began to
concern themselves more with jus in bello. With the aggression of World Wars I and II, to the
controversy surrounding Vietnam (Walzer 1977), the fear and threat of nuclear annihilation during
the Cold War (US Catholic Bishops 1983; O'Brien 1992; Zaw 1992), to the recent focus upon
terrorism (Bellamy 2005; Heinze and Steele 2009; Held 2011; Gentry, FORTHCOMING), jus ad bellum has
been the center of considerable debate. Thus, each of the authors that are examined here speaks
to this legacy of change and growth within the tradition.
Instead of creating a tedious treatment of each jus ad bellum criteria this essay looks at three
very different, yet important and inter-related treatments of Just War. These three are Alex J.
Bellamy's Just Wars (2006), Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars (1977), and Larry May's
Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (2008). Each author has a unique perspective that grants a
student of Just War to consider different ways of approaching the tradition. While recognizing
the chronology of the maturation of jus ad bellum, this essay looks at how each author chooses
to focus on different facets of it: Bellamy's historical treatment, Walzer's philosophical
examination, and May's comparison of ad bellum principles with international law. And, thus, the
ordering of the books here may not reflect their chronological publication date, but instead a
way of making sense of the importance of the books to the tradition's growth and development.
Even though Bellamy is a ‘newcomer’ to the Just War tradition, he has garnered considerable
attention with his deliberative, engaging, and well-written work. Since Bellamy's book is a
historical examination of the evolution of Just War thinking, the essay begins with it in order to
both present his thoughts and give a thorough historical background from which information
from the other two pieces can be better understood. Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars is, quite
simply, a classic and a crucial component of the Just War canon. It was Walzer's text, initially
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published in 1977, which brought Just War considerations back into political conversations. While
classical Realism had dominated the post-World War II political landscape for its own moral
contemplations towards war and power, it was not able to speak to the anti-Vietnam agonism.
Quite purposefully, Walzer set out to speak to these considerations in a frankly philosophical,
one rooted in historical thought and examples, framework. Finally, May has a unique voice
within the Just War tradition – his starting point is a form of pacifism. This is somewhat
controversial, but it is not without precedence. One of the key pieces on nuclear weapons is the
1983 letter from the US Catholic Bishops that placed the Just War tradition within a pacifist
framework (see US Catholic Bishops 1983). Similarly, May has set out to examine how this ancient
tradition can fit the needs of the current international arena, particularly in light of
humanitarian intervention.
Alex J. Bellamy's Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (2006)
The purpose of Bellamy's book is two-fold: (1) “to map the evolution of the Just War tradition and
the many controversies that shaped it;” and (2) to “investigate the normative dilemmas posed by
contemporary wars with reference to the Just War tradition” (2006:1). This evaluation of
Bellamy's 2006 book will focus on the first claim, especially as it demonstrates how jus ad bellum
criteria developed. First, however, this essay will explicate how Bellamy approaches and treats
the general subject of just wars.
Bellamy is clear that he also believes that the “Just War tradition is a two-thousand-year-old
conversation about the legitimacy of war” (2006:2). By referencing several of the largest
contributors to Just War, such as Jean Bethke Elshtain (1992), James Turner Johnson (2011),
Nicholas Rengger (2002), and Michael Ignatieff (2004), Bellamy argues that Just War is not a
theory and that the tradition/conversation is not just about “‘Just’ wars” (2006:3). First, the
tradition is “fragmented, comprising many different sub-traditions, and indeed sub-sub-
traditions” and is, therefore, “only a ‘theory’ in the very loosest sense” (2006:3). Second, “‘just’
should not be read as implying that its function is to justify war or that it holds war to be a good
in itself” (Bellamy 2006:3). The importance of the conversation stems from its ability to provide a
“common language that actors can use to legitimize recourse to force and the conduct of war
and that others use to evaluate those claims” (Bellamy 2006:5–6).
Throughout Bellamy's book, the reader witnesses the tension between sovereign state authority
and international moral norms. To Bellamy “what is considered ‘just’” is dependent upon “the
interplay between the tradition's legal sub-tradition (positive law), moral sub-tradition (natural
law [both secular and divine]) and political sub-tradition (realism [further identified as
consequentialism, prudence, power, politics])” (Bellamy 2006:7–8). He traces each of these three
sub-traditions throughout the historical development of the Just War tradition. Bellamy
structures the first part of his book according to historical eras and identifies the major sub-
tradition contributions within each era, see Table 1.
Table 1
Historical Era Contributions
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Ancient/Antiquity Greek Customs (lus gentium)
Roman and Greek Philosophy
Early Christian Pacifism
Middle Ages Canon Law
Scholasticism: Aquinas
Crusades
Sixteenth Century Legalism
Scholasticism: Spanish School
Reformism
Realism: Machiavelli
Seventeenth Century Legalism: Grotius
Holy War
Realism: Hobbes
Eighteenth Century Legalism: positive law
Legalism: naturalism
Reformism: Kant
Realpolitik, raison d’état
Modern Positive Law
“Just War theory”: ethics of war, liberal humanitarianism
Realism
(Bellamy 2006:8)
The rest of this section on Bellamy will thus focus on his very thorough and helpful historical
evaluations of how the Just War tradition evolved.
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Bellamy breaks his chapter on Antiquity into four parts: (1) Ancient Greece's “customary
practices and philosophical ideas;” (2) Roman law and ethics; (3) early Christian pacifism; and
(4) St. Augustine's contributions (2006:15). The relevant Greek customs to jus ad bellum criteria
pertained to “war between the city-states and not to the Hellenic wars against Persia,” and
covered formal declaration of war, the respect for truces (especially during the Olympic Games),
and that battles were only to “be fought during campaigning season (summer)” (Bellamy 2006:
16). The classic tension again is witnessed as Bellamy argues that the Peloponnesian War caused
many of these normative customs to break down and were replaced by “‘might is right,’” as
exemplified in Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue (Bellamy 2006:16–17). Refuting the breakdown in
customs, Plato argued that the “path to happiness lay in justice, [which was] a matter of
knowledge. … The aim of the state was to establish peace … According to Plato, war should only
be waged for the sake of peace” (Bellamy 2006:17).
From here, Aristotle “distill[ed]” Plato's ideas further (Bellamy 2006:18). Because “justice
depended on human relations and all humans had their own position within nature,” “Aristotle
formulated the first ideas about the legitimate causes of war” (Bellamy 2006:18). According to
Aristotle, there are five pretexts for waging war legitimately. These include: (1) self-defense; (2)
finding vengeance on those who injured; (3) to help allies; (4) to gain advantages of either glory
or resources for the polis; and (5) to maintain authority over those not fit to rule themselves
(Bellamy 2006:18).
The Roman Empire contributed through customs and philosophy, and, according to Bellamy, its
main contribution to jus ad bellum was just cause and right authority. An early articulation of the
last resort criterion was demonstrated through fetial law. Fetial law was used as a means to
“persuade the gods to support wars” (Bellamy 2006:19). In order to declare war, the Roman
Senate had to first send emissaries with their demands to enemy states and wait 33 days for a
reply. If these demands were rejected or ignored, the war was then pondered by the fetiales
(religious leaders). If they approved, war could be declared. However, the demands were “non-
negotiable and often set at unacceptable levels” (Bellamy 2006:19). The sending of emissaries was
more of a signaling of war than an actual desire to resolve the conflict (Bellamy 2006:19). When
Polybius argued that it was important to “always have a pretext for war, because pretexts
satisfied humanity as well as the gods,” fetial law fell out of favor and was replaced with a need
to demonstrate justice, or just cause (Bellamy 2006:19). Cicero began to articulate right authority:
wars should only be “fought to protect the safety or honor of the state” and “‘the only excuse …
for going to war is that we may live in peace unharmed’” (Cicero, as quoted in Bellamy 2006:19).
Further, the ability of only a legitimate authority to declare war would minimize the risk of civil
war, according to Cicero (Bellamy 2006:20).
Christianity's movement into the political realm demanded a theological response to war.
Ambrose was one of the first to do this but it was St. Augustine who is “credited with fleshing
out the first Christian doctrine of the Just War” (Bellamy 2006:25). For jus ad bellum, Augustine's
“two principle insights on the ethics of war” are right intention and proper (legitimate) authority
(Bellamy 2006:27). Right intentions rest upon a person's (ruler's) inward disposition, which means
war cannot be fought from “hatred, envy, greed,” or desire to dominate. Thus war happens out
of a desire to maintain peace and justice (Bellamy 2006:27). Proper authority is related only to
monarchs and sovereigns (Bellamy 2006:28).
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The main relevance of Bellamy's next chapter on the Middle Ages (tenth to fifteenth centuries)
to jus ad bellum focuses on canon law, or the “system of law that governed the Church and
individuals under its jurisdiction,” and Aquinas’ Scholasticism (Bellamy 2006:30). Bellamy
declares Gratian of Bologna's Decretum (1140) one of the most “significant contribution[s]” to
Just War thinking (Bellamy 2006:32). Gratian articulated “four central questions on war”:
whether war and killing were ever justified;

the nature of the Just War;
the question of right authority; and
conduct in war
(Bellamy 2006:33).
A war is justified when it furthered peace and rested on three “legitimate” causes:
to recover stolen goods;

to avenge injuries;
for self-defense
(Bellamy 2006:33).
From here, drawing upon canon law, scripture, theology, and philosophy, subsequent Canon
lawyers formalized rules of war that made some significant changes. First, they replaced the
internalized nature of right intent with externalized just cause thereby providing “what they
thought of as objective benchmarks by which to judge actions” (Bellamy 2006:36). Second, one of
the core questions over legitimate authority articulated the relationship between the Church and
war. Thus, by the middle of the thirteenth century, the Church was designated as the “primary
authority for waging war” (Bellamy 2006:37).
Aquinas’ most significant (this cannot be emphasized enough) contribution to Just War is the
principle of “double-effect;” double-effect occurs when an action has an intended and
unintended consequence and by examining the consequences of an activity and whether it was a
proportionate response (Bellamy 2006:39). This is the starting point of the historical shift in focus
from jus ad bellum to jus in bello. Still, Aquinas articulated three conditions for jus ad bellum
based around legitimate authority, a just cause, and right intention. Aquinas believed war must
be declared by a competent ruler and only done where there was no possible means of
arbitration (an early last resort). As individuals always have their king to arbitrate for them,
kings, with “no superiors,” do not have that option and war may be a result (Bellamy 2006:39). A
just cause according to Aquinas included avenging a wrong, fighting against those who failed to
make amends for a wrong, and for recovering something unjustly taken (Bellamy 2006:39).
Finally, right intention was determined to be seeking good or avoiding evil (Bellamy 2006:40).
Bellamy declares “Aquinas’ major contribution to the Just War tradition was to offer a
philosophical justification for restraining war,” especially related to double effect and
proportionality (Bellamy 2006:40).
In moving to the Reformation and Renaissance, Bellamy argues that this period “is sometimes
characterized as one in which the Just War tradition was secularized, as the tradition's
foundations shifted from canon law and scholasticism towards natural law grounded in human
reason and positive law based on the voluntary agreements of sovereigns” (Bellamy 2006:49).
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Thus, there is an inherent tension in this time period between holding states to international
norms and granting states the authority to do as they please.
Vitoria, of the Spanish Scholastic tradition, became interested in Just War thinking due to “his
concern about the legitimacy of the Spanish conquest of the Americas” (Bellamy 2006:50). Vitoria
eliminated “three potential just causes: religious differences, claims of universal jurisdiction,
and the personal ambitions of sovereigns” (Bellamy 2006:52). But he followed Augustine by
arguing “that the only just cause for war was to right a prior wrong” but not every wrong
“created sufficient grounds for war” (Bellamy 2006:52). Just cause has objective and subjective
qualities through which he complicated the ease of sovereigns to act under right authority.
Vitoria brought to the fore this ambiguity: how was a sovereign to be sure of the justice of his
particular cause? Indeed, a sovereign could not be certain and thus must seek out council
(Bellamy 2006:53, 55). This uncertainty further contributed to focus upon jus in bello criteria over
jus ad bellum.
The questioning of a sovereign's right authority is also exemplified in the contradicting

developments in Machiavelli's realism and the legalism as argued by both Ayala and Gentili
(Bellamy 2006:56–60). As Just War thinking moved away from the definitive knowledge that a
state was in the right in going to war this created space for early conceptualizations of raison
d’état and realpolitik. Machiavelli's writings “proffered a historicist methodology that rejected
the relevance of scripture and canon law; it rejected universal deontology; it insisted that all
acts conducted in the interests of the state were licit; and it prioritized consequences over
intentions” (Bellamy 2006:58).
In response to this, legalists agreed with realism on the primacy of the states but that those
states “comprised an international society constituted by laws and norms governing their mutual
relations” (Bellamy 2006:59). They, like Machiavelli, rejected theological underpinnings for state
action and rooted their Just War thinking in natural law (Bellamy 2006:61). For Ayala, if war could
be just on both sides, this raised questions about how the war was conducted – moving Just War
thinking into jus in bello. Gentili's contribution at this time was to argue that sovereigns were
beholden to international laws in determining the justice of a war (Bellamy 2006:59). Defensive
and offensive wars, according to Gentili, could be justified. A defensive just war includes
necessary defense, expedient defense, and defense of honor. Gentili's statements on offensive
just war echoes what previous scholars wrote: “to maintain the existence of the political
community by reclaiming property unjustly taken (necessity), to take vengeance on those who
have committed a wrong (expediency), to enforce customary and natural rights [where they are]
denied, and to punish crimes” (Bellamy 2006:60). The importance of this time period is the
movement away from a focus upon jus ad bellum to jus in bello because it “introduced the notion
of simultaneous ostensible justice” (Bellamy 2006:65).
The next time period Bellamy examines centers around the Enlightenment. At this point, the
tension between realism and legal/ethical constraints on state behavior is growing. However,
even with the emergence of Hobbesian realism, one of the strongest Just War theorists wrote his
seminal text: Hugo Grotius’ De Jure Belli et Pacis (Bellamy 2006:69–71). As war itself was neither
right nor wrong, Grotius found that “[i]nternational law … provided a framework for evaluating
when and how war could be legitimately used” (Bellamy 2006:71). International law is rooted in
both natural law (“governing what was just”) and human law (“determining what was legal’)
(Bellamy 2006:71). According to Grotius, there are three “‘images’ of Just War: war as judicial act;
war as litigation; and war as defense of the common good” (Bellamy 2006:72). Bellamy finds
Grotius contributes three key elements to jus ad bellum: that he “recognized the problem of
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‘abuse’” of sovereign power; “that not all just causes justified war;” and that if war was
improperly fought a just war might “become unjust” (Bellamy 2006:73). Grotius also articulated
the need for “right authority” to include last resort and proper declaration (Bellamy 2006:73).
Grotius argued there were four reasons for just cause. The first two are rooted in natural law:
self-defense and retribution; the next two are grounded in human law: enforcement of legal
rights and reparation of injuries (Bellamy 2006:73–4). The importance of Grotius’ work according
to Bellamy was, first, his creation of a system of morality and law built “on both natural and
volitional law” that could “make ethical and legal sense of virtually any type of conflict” (Bellamy
2006:75); second, how Grotius established relationships between the various jus ad bellum
criteria; finally, Grotius insisted that conduct in war relates to its overall justice (Bellamy 2006:
75). As Just War thinking moved beyond theological groundings, scholars had to rely more and
more on international law. This time period transformed Just War thinking in significant ways.
Bellamy sees the first as “the rise of subjectivism” – “how could we know for sure that what we
do is just or unjust?” Second, decreasing weight was being given to jus ad bellum criteria, thus
the legal procedural elements of right authority and proper declaration became more important
than just cause and intent. Finally, more emphasis was being placed on jus in bello criteria over
jus ad bellum due to the rise of subjectivism (Bellamy 2006:86–7).
This all sets the stage for the modern period, from the French Revolution to the present, where
the focus became rooted in “demonstrat[ing] that the laws of war carried normative force” and
the need to “develop a more comprehensive system of jus in bello” (Bellamy 2006:87). Because
realism dominated this time period, further development of jus ad bellum was scarce and jus in
bello became the focus (Bellamy 2006:89). Instead of moral considerations, strategy became the
priority (Bellamy 2006:93). Where jus ad bellum thinking is apparent is in the development of
international treaties and law that limited war, for example the Monroe Doctrine (1823), which
“declared that European powers were not free to wage war in the Americas,” and the “Geneva
arbitration” (1872), which forced Britain to pay the US reparations for Britain's support of the
Confederacy during the US Civil War (Bellamy 2006:99). Under the 1899 and 1907 Hague
Conventions a state's right to wage war was “tacitly accepted” but it was limited via “a system of
arbitration” (Bellamy 2006:98). Further, after World War I and the establishment of the League of
Nations, jus ad bellum became the priority by strengthening the requirement of compulsory
arbitration and the introduction of collective security. Additionally, the Kellogg-Briand Pact
“outlawed the use of force except in self-defense” in the 1920s (Bellamy 2006:98). After World
War II and the failure to constrain Germany and Japan's aggressions, the UN Charter “expressly
prohibit[ed] the threat or use of force (Article 2(4))” unless it was in self-defense or authorized
by the UN's Security Council (Bellamy 2006:107). Just War thinkers however “criticize the UN
Charter system for forbidding aggressive war and downplaying the role of justice in determining
a war's legitimacy” (Bellamy 2006:107). While the tension between realism and normative
constraint on state behavior remains, since the 1970s there has been a resurgence in Just War
thinking, particularly due to the controversy of the Vietnam War (as seen in Walzer's impetus for
writing Just and Unjust Wars). Bellamy emphasizes that this is even more the case since the 9/11
attacks on the US (2006:113).
The rest of Bellamy's book goes on to focus on specific contemporary issues from a Just War
perspective, specifically terrorism, pre-emption, aerial bombing, and humanitarian intervention.
This section has attempted to briefly cover Alex Bellamy's significant contribution to Just War
scholarship, especially his historical examination of the major thinkers and their contributions to
a vast, nuanced, and incredibly detailed tradition.
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Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars (1977)
As a political activist against the Vietnam War in the US in the late 1960s and early 1970s,
Walzer “promised [himself] that one day [he] would try to set out the moral argument about war
in a quiet and reflective way” (1977:xvii). The main purpose of Michael Walzer's classic and widely
regarded book on the Just War tradition is to examine it from a philosophical position regarding
the moral argument about war. While it uses similar language to international law, his treatise
“is not about the positive law of wars … Legal treatises do not … provide a fully plausible or
coherent account of our moral arguments” (Walzer 1977:xviii). He breaks with legalese because of
his desire to “account for the ways in which men and women who are not lawyers but simply
citizens (and sometimes soldiers) argue about war, and to expound upon the terms we commonly
use” (Walzer 1977:xix). (Some terms covered in this “moral vocabulary” include “aggression,
neutrality, surrender, civilian, reprisal, and so on” (Walzer 1977:xx).) This means he focuses upon
moral law: “those general principles that we commonly acknowledge, even when we can't or
won't live up to them” (Walzer 1977:xix).
But this morality to Walzer is a “practical morality,” the “study of judgments and justifications in
the real world” which is “casuistic.” In order to capture this, he relies upon illustrative historical
cases (Walzer 1977:xxi–xxii). As such, the “arguments we make about war are most fully
understood … as efforts to recognize and respect the rights of individual and associated men
and women” – it is “in its philosophical form a doctrine of human rights” (Walzer 1977:xxi–xxii).
Thus, because of his intention “to recapture the just war for political and moral theory” (Walzer
1977:xx), Just and Unjust Wars, like Bellamy, captures the tension between realism (his first
chapter is entitled “Against Realism”) and moral, ethical, and normative constraints on fighting
war. He reaches back into the religious tradition through which “Western politics and morality
were first given shape,” including such thinkers as Maimonides, Aquinas, Suarez, and then
moves to Grotius, “who took over the tradition and began to work it into secular form” (Walzer
1977:xx). He divides his book into five parts, but of particular interest for jus ad bellum are
chapter two and part two, the sections in which he “will examine in detail the nature of the
crime [of war], describe the appropriate forms of resistance, and consider the ends that soldiers
and statesmen may legitimately seek in fighting just wars” or jus ad bellum (Walzer 1977:22).
Chapter three and part three focus upon jus in bello. The last two parts examine the tension
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello with contemporary issues.
Before looking specifically at Walzer's approach to jus ad bellum, it is important to understand

the argument he makes in his first chapter. When he acknowledges the tension between realism
and morality, he is quick to recognize that it is simply, in many ways, a tension borne of
discourse. For instance, “[a] war called unjust is not, to paraphrase Hobbes, a war misliked; it is
a war misliked for particular reasons, and anyone making the charge is required to provide
particular sorts of evidence” (Walzer 1977:12). Thus, there are languages of war: morality and
justice versus strategy (Walzer 1977:13). He uses Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue to illustrate this
point: the Melian representatives argue for justice and the Athenian generals for strategy and
power. And in a realist paradigm such as the one present in international relations, the “moral
theorist … must come to grips with the fact that his rules are often violated and
ignored” (Walzer 1977:13–14), yet while also living in a society where “hypocrisy is rife in wartime
discourse” (Walzer 1977:20). Because in spite of or perhaps embedded within the strategy in war,
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“it is especially important … to appear to be in the right” or “most of us want … to act or to seem
to act morally” (Walzer 1977:20). It is this desire that Walzer “want[s] to explore in this book,”
especially in “its detailed application to the conduct of war” (Walzer 1977:20).
There are two parts to the “moral reality of war;” “war is always judged twice, first with
reference to the reasons states have for fighting [jus ad bellum], secondly with reference to the
means they adopt [jus in bello]” (Walzer 1977:21). Determining jus ad bellum means people have
to “make judgments about aggression and self-defense” (Walzer 1977:21). The reader arrives at
jus ad bellum criteria in chapter two inductively as Walzer elaborates upon his own question and
its answer: “Why is it wrong to begin a war? … War is Hell’ (Walzer 1977:22). And while his
answer sometimes seems to move into jus in bello (how war is fought and who is targeted), it is
the state that is in charge of when and why to fight the war: “‘the power of the state compels’”
when and who fights a war (Walzer 1977:28). This is not, however, without the support of those at
home or on the frontlines. What this means is that the moral language of war is incredibly
important to a state. For instance, Napoleon bragged that “he could afford to lose 30,000 men a
month.” Walzer's response to such a disquieting claim is:
Perhaps he could have lost that many and still have maintained political support at
home. But he could not have done so, I think, had he had to ask the men he was about to
“lose.” Soldiers might agree to such losses in a war forced upon them by the enemy, a
war of national defense, but not in the sorts of wars that Napoleon fought. The need to
seek their consent … would surely limit the occasions of war.
(Walzer 1977: 28)
Thus, as Walzer is challenging Napoleon's language of war, he is also referencing just cause
criteria, proportionality, and how important that discourse is to fomenting and maintaining
support for war (both at home and within the ranks).
War then is like a fire – but not one that randomly breaks out but one started by an arsonist. In
this intentional activity, the agents who start war, “criminals,” are beholden to moral
understandings of war because these determine whether the agent is indeed perceived to be a
criminal. Thus, did these agents have a right (just cause) to start war? But Walzer does not rest
on this point, but instead quickly proceeds to alluding to Aquinas’ presumption against war as
well as, to refer back to Bellamy, the rise of subjectivism as raised by Ayala, Gentili, and Grotius.
War is an act of aggression; the agents who commit the act are tyrannical, but “[i]t is the men
and women on the other side who are most likely to recognize and resent the tyranny of war;
and whenever they do that, the contest takes on new significance” (Walzer 1977:31). In this new
significance Walzer writes “the experience of war as hell generates what might be called a
higher ambition: one doesn't aim to settle with the enemy but to defeat and punish him and, if
not abolish the tyranny of war” – the aim of war is peace (Walzer 1977:31). In this manner, Walzer
covers just cause and right intention in chapter two.
In part two, Walzer continues his study of morality and war by focusing upon the crime of
aggression, the continuum between preventive and preemptive war, the acceptability of
intervention, and the end goal of war. In the first chapter of part two, chapter four, Walzer
examines the concept of sovereignty and how war violates it. Indeed sovereignty is not just
important to this chapter, but to the other chapters to follow in this section and to jus ad bellum
criteria as a whole.
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Violation of sovereignty (the “territorial integrity or political sovereignty of an independent

state”) is classified as aggression (Walzer 1977:52). This transgression “opens the gates of hell”
and it “justif[ies] forceful resistance” due to its placing lives and safety at the greatest peril
(Walzer 1977:52). While states see it is as imperative to fight back against aggression, resistance
would not be possible if the people did not agree (Walzer 1977:53). Thus, Walzer sets out and
relies upon social contract theory in order to draw out the moral language against the crime of
aggression and for its rightful resistance (Walzer 1977:53–4). Further, Walzer articulates the
“domestic analogy,” where states are compared to individuals enabling one to see states in
international society similarly to individuals in civil society. This analogy is “crucial” to
understanding aggression: war is seen then as on a par with murder or robbery (Walzer 1977:58).
However, in the international society of states, aggression is even more dangerous because of
the anarchy of the system. Without a global “police force,” “police” power is distributed to all
member states (Walzer 1977:59). This leads to two presumptions: (1) that aggression must be
resisted through self-defense and defense of other states in international society in order to
maintain rights and deter future acts; and (2) when fighting begins, some state must be
responsible for enforcing law (Walzer 1977:59).
Further in the chapter, Walzer lays out six parts of the theory of aggression, all of which he
implicitly relates to just cause. First, that there is an international society of states. Two, that
this society has a commonly held law that recognizes the territorial and political integrity of all
members. Three, force or imminent force against this sovereignty is a criminal act of aggression.
Four, aggression justifies self-defense or “a war of law enforcement by the victim” and any other
state (Walzer 1977:61–2). Five, “nothing but aggression can justify war” (Walzer 1977:62). Finally,
six, once the aggressor has been stopped, it must also be punished (Walzer 1977:62). It is these
six propositions that “shape the judgments we make when wars break out” – they create and
shape the moral discourse on war (Walzer 1977:63). Walzer argues that these propositions
remained in force even when raison d’état dominated international affairs in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries (1977:63). To illustrate this, he quotes C.A. Pompe, “the foremost historian
of the theory of aggression,” “‘The idea of war and the launching of it … were for the ordinary
man and for public opinion always loaded with moral significance, demanding full approval if
waged with right and condemnation and punishment if without’” (Walzer 1977:63). And Walzer
maintains that a moral constraint on war will always exist until “wars are really fought with
pawns, inanimate objects and not human beings” (Walzer 1977:64).
In the next chapter, Walzer explores the continuum between preventive wars and preemptive
ones. This continuum must weigh what is meant by imminent threat, an action that Walzer refers
to as the “spectrum of anticipation” (Walzer 1977:74). Walzer argues that under international law,
states have the right to defend themselves “against violence that is imminent but not actual” but
that this right is so “severely restricted” it is “no longer clear whether the right has any
substance at all” (Walzer 1977:74). To work through this restriction, Walzer looks at those who see
the imminent threat as so significant that there is “‘no moment for deliberation’” (a quote from
Secretary of State Daniel Webster (1824)) to those who believe there is “often plenty of time for
deliberation, agonizing hours, days, even weeks of deliberation, when one doubts that war can
be avoided and wonders whether or not to strike first” (Walzer 1977:74–5). The chapter then
teases out the differences between preventive war and preemptive war (Secretary Webster
being closer to preemptive war). As one moves along the spectrum away from “Webster's
reflex,” Walzer believes there is a point where “it is still possible to make choices, to begin the
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fighting or to arm oneself and wait” (Walzer 1977:75). In this place of decision making lies the
moral tension.
Walzer identifies preventive wars as ones that maintain the balance of power. To explain he uses
the concert of Europe's balance of power system (Walzer 1977:76). Preventive wars are identified
as necessary to the balance of power via a utilitarian argument in two ways: first that the
balance of power actually preserves liberty and is thus worth defending and second that fighting
early “greatly reduces the cost of the defense, while waiting doesn't mean avoiding war … but
only fighting on a larger scale and at worse odds” (Walzer 1977:77). However, Walzer finds that
balance of power politics cannot actually be the “key to peace among states” because if it were
“it would not need to be defended so often by force of arms” (Walzer 1977:76). Thus, Walzer
believes there is a third proposition to be added: “that the acceptance of propositions (1) and (2)
is dangerous (not useful) and certain to lead to ‘innumerable and fruitless wars’ whenever shifts
in power relations occur” (1977:77). Further, balance of power assumes a malignant intent by
neighbor-states and this is “merely cynical” (Walzer 1977:78). Instead of relying upon what it
means to be threatened, states are simply relying upon what it means to be afraid. As this is not
useful, Walzer argues that there needs to be a more objective standard that measures
“threatening” activity by a state (1977:78) and for this he relies upon the dictionary definition of
“threaten”: “‘to hold out or offer (some injury) by way of a threat to declare one's intention of
inflicting injury’” (1977:78).
Understanding what threatening behavior may be is not that easy: “Now, what acts are to count,
what acts do count as threats sufficiently serious to justify war? It is not possible to put together
a list, because state action, like human action generally, takes on significance from its
context” (Walzer 1977:80). Thus, in his discussion of preemptive strikes, Walzer acknowledges this
is where “we move along the anticipation spectrum in search … of enemies: not possible or
potential enemies, not merely present ill-wishers, but states and nations that are already …
engaged in harming us” (Walzer 1977:81). This brings one beyond preventive wars, but still “short
of Webster's pre-emption” (Walzer 1977:81). In order to justify a first strike, legitimacy is
determined not at “the point of imminent attack but at the point of sufficient threat” (Walzer 1977:
81). For Walzer three things must be covered: “a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active
preparation that makes that intent a positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting …
greatly magnifies the threat” (1977:81). In order to illustrate a justifiable preemptive strike,
Walzer relies upon the Six Day War of 1967. To bring it back to moral discourse, it is state
leaders “that make such judgments” on war and its legitimacy, but it is the citizens that “weigh
and evaluate their actions on the basis of criteria like those I [Walzer] have tried to
describe” (Walzer 1977:85).
In order to understand how interventions, as violations of sovereignty within the international

system, may be justified, Walzer first takes the reader through J.S. Mill's understanding of self-
determination and how interventions into wars of secession, civil wars, and humanitarian abuses
are related to self-determination. Aggression is always wrong, but intervention, which still
“threatens the territorial integrity and political independence of invaded states,” can be justified
(Walzer 1977:86). The burden for justification is high and falls upon the political leaders who
chose this route, “not only because of the coercions and ravages that military intervention
inevitably brings, but also because it is thought that the citizens of a sovereign state have a
right, insofar as they are to be coerced and ravaged at all, to suffer only at one another's hands;”
this argument goes back to sovereignty and the nature of the social contract (Walzer 1977:86).
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“Self-determination … is the right of the people ‘to become free by their own efforts’” (Walzer
1977:88). Nonintervention recognizes this right by not impeding or preventing their success or
failure (Walzer 1977:88). However, Walzer argues that nonintervention (as the “ban on boundary
crossings”) is “not absolute” because state boundary lines are sometimes “arbitrary and
accidental” and there are “ambiguous” relationships between “political … communities within
those boundaries to the government that defends them” (1977:89). Walzer expounds on this: “it
isn't always clear when a community is in fact self-determining, when it qualifies, so to speak,
for nonintervention” (1977:89). Before explaining what instances Walzer sees as legitimizing
intervention, it is important to yet again reiterate the burden those who choose to intervene
face. In intervention, “states must demonstrate that their own case is radically different from
what we take to be the general run of cases [for nonintervention], where the liberty or
prospective liberty of citizens is best served if foreigners offer them only moral support,” or in
other words, the state must demonstrate that the liberty of the intervened upon citizens is best
served by this act of war (Walzer 1977:91).
Walzer sees “three sorts of cases” where “the ban on boundary crossing is subject to unilateral
suspension,” secession, civil war, and humanitarian intervention. The first, secession, is
justifiable “when a particular set of boundaries contains” multiple political communities, one of
which is fighting for independence (Walzer 1977:90). Walzer illustrates this with the Hungarian
Revolution of 1848 (1977:91–5). The second, in the instance of a civil war, happens when
“boundaries have already been crossed by” foreign powers (even if this intervention has been
requested), which now calls for a counter-intervention (Walzer 1977:90). Walzer uses America in
the Vietnam War to illustrate this instance (1977:96–101). The third, humanitarian intervention,
is necessary “when the violation of human rights within a set of boundaries is so terrible that it
makes talk of community or self-determination … seem cynical or irrelevant, this is, in cases of
enslavement or massacre” (Walzer 1977:90). Walzer looks at Cuba in 1898 and Bangladesh in
1971 (1977:101–8). These instances are judged to be morally acceptable “because they uphold
the values of individual life and communal liberty of which sovereignty itself is merely an
expression” (Walzer 1977:108).
In the final chapter of part two, Walzer responds to the common hope/response to soldiers
deaths: “that they did not die in vair” (1977:110). When a soldier dies in a Just War, this life
“does not die in vain” because “[c]ritical values are at stake: political independence, communal
liberty, human life” (Walzer 1977:110). These ideas lead to a perceived urgency toward winning
the war, but Walzer urges the reader to ponder what winning is. It cannot simply be a
Clausewitzian accomplishment of the “‘overthrow of the enemy’” (Walzer 1977:110), but instead
must “seek the legitimate ends of war, the goals that can rightly be aimed at.” These will also be
the limits of a Just War. Once they are won, or once they are within political reach, the fighting
should stop. Soldiers killed beyond that point die “needlessly” and war at this point becomes one
of aggression (Walzer 1977:110). After working through his case studies of unconditional
surrender in World War II and political settlements in the Korean War, Walzer defines “the
theory of ends in war” as recognizing “the right of nations, even of enemy nations, to continued
national existence and, except in extreme circumstances, to the political prerogatives of
nationality” (Walzer 1977:123). Succinctly and in summation of Walzer's jus ad bellum argument,
the aim must be a peace that respects sovereignty based upon social contract and self-
determination – once this has been achieved, the war has been just and continuation of the war
can no longer be justified.
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Larry May's Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (2008)
Aggression and Crimes Against Peace is the third book in a four-book series on Just War by May.
The intent of this third book is to examine Just War thinking and its relationship to international
law, especially by re-imaging/contemporizing jus ad bellum criteria to fit the needs and issues of
today. Specifically, his overarching argument is to present the idea that “crimes of aggression
are deserving of international prosecution when one State undermines the ability of another
State to protect human rights” (May 2008:3). This is especially needed in light of the growing call
for humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War and the complicated and
controversial invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq after 9/11. Instead, this essay will specifically
focus on how May approaches jus ad bellum and only detail his argument for prosecution of
aggression as needed. To May, international law and the Just War tradition have many
commonalities, the most important of which “is the general condemnation of war and yet the
recognition that war may be justified or excused in certain cases” (May 2008:9). It is May's
working through of the relationship between international law and the Just War tradition in part
one and his examination of three normative jus ad bellum principles, principle of priority, just
cause, and proportionality, in part two that are important to this essay.
Before moving specifically into May's treatment of jus ad bellum, one must understand his
doctrine of “contingent pacifism” (May 2008:25). According to May, “[c]ontemporary Just War
theories seem to have lost sight of the fact that Just War theory was initially devised as a
response to, though not a complete rejection of, pacifism” (2008:26). May argues that Grotius
was a “contingent pacifist” because he believed “that if one is unable to wage a war with
justified methods or tactics then one is unjustified in initiating war at all” (2008:30). In most
cases, May finds that jus in bello rests on jus ad bellum, but contingent pacifism reverses this
trend. A war also becomes justified when, as May proposes, “it must be likely that the conduct of
the war will be proper” (2008:35). This blends jus ad bellum and jus in bello by “disrupt[ing] the
separateness of these branches” (May 2008:35). This understanding of contingent pacifism is
important because part of May's rationale behind the book is to substantially restrict the
justifications for going to war.
Even though the principle of priority, or first strike, is not normally included as a jus ad bellum
principle, May finds it is a “preliminary way of understanding the just cause
principle” (2008:73). In going to war, first strike is either illegitimate (aggressive war) or
legitimate (“last resort”) (May 2008:73). Thus the priority principle measures whether there “was
a reasonable alternative” other than going to war – was the war truly a product of last resort
(May 2008:74)? Preemptive strike, or “anticipatory self-defense,” is “one of the most difficult
questions posed” by the priority principle. Thus, by relying upon Grotius, May investigates
anticipatory self-defense and the justifiability of preemptive and preventive war (2008:74).
He concludes that should a state strike first, especially without the threat of imminent attack,
the state should be prosecuted for the crime of aggression. Imminence is proven when “all of the
factors are in place for a first strike and there is some evidence that the State has the intention
to engage in such a strike” (May 2008:90). Last resort, the threshold of which is measured when
all other means to avoid war have been attempted (May 2008:84), is used by May to “place very
severe limitations on self-defense” (2008:85). When this threshold has been met and these
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limitations recognized, then first strike is proven to have been necessary for one's self-defense
and thus, crimes of aggression/against peace have been avoided (May 2008:85).
Recognizing that just cause is seen to be (but doubting it at the same time (May 2008:115)) the
traditional main criterion of jus ad bellum, May nonetheless believes it needs to be
“reconceptualized” (2008:95). May finds that just cause is not as straightforward as typically
assumed and thus he problematizes the concept with the view of creating a legal rationale for
holding individuals over states responsible for war (May 2008:95). Without question self-defense
and defense of others remains the centerpiece of just cause; that has been codified in
international law in the UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security” (May 2008:100). However, he argues that there are few truly
“paradigmatic cases of just causes to initiate a sustained war of one State against another” (May
2008:101). Furthermore, May “rejects” the traditional understanding of just cause:
In my view, states are not justified in going to war against other states merely to protect
territory or property, unless that territory was occupied. The reason for this is that war
involves the killing of many people and it is not at all clear why it would be a just cause
to wage a war that involved such killings merely to preserve territory.
(May 2008:101)
Invoking his doctrine of contingent pacifism, just cause needs to be better connected with “what
the principle is ultimately to justify … the killing of many people in war” (May 2008:103). Instead
of viewing just cause as a means and measure for retaliation for a wrong done, May wants to see
“just causes for war concern preventing or stopping wrongs from occurring” (2008:104). This
would “involve a threshold proportionality consideration” within just cause (May 2008:105).
Territorial integrity is not enough of a rationale (on its own) to meet this threshold (May 2008:
105). By holding individuals accountable instead of or in addition to states for crimes of
aggression (war in this newly realized instance is “too broad” to act as a deterrent if a
traditional grievance occurs (May 2008:106)), just cause performs a new function and deterrence
comes back into play (May 2008:111). Further, when a new weight is placed on just cause making
it harder to wage war, “then it matters less what moral considerations there might otherwise be
concerning tactics and how the war is waged” (May 2008:114). This reformulation of just cause
breaks down the barrier between jus ad bellum and jus in bello (May 2008:115–16).
The final jus ad bellum criterion that May examines in this book is proportionality. While both ad
bellum and in bello claim a principle of proportionality, the focus here is on the ad bellum one
that “primarily concerns limitations on when initiating or waging wars might be unjustified
because the gains aimed at in the war do not outweigh the likely losses in that war” (May 2008:
117). The goal of this chapter is similar to the goal of the last chapter: to break down the
barriers between ad bellum and in bello. Ad bellum proportionality plays the largest part in “the
idea of aggression” because the “killing that inevitably follows from the initiating of war must be
offset by the greater prevention of killing” (May 2008:118). In this, proportionality is “deeply
concern[ed with] the protection of basic human rights” (May 2008:118). It is Grotius that provides
the most basic idea of proportionality, even if it is sometimes difficult to assess: the good of the
war must outweigh the evil (May 2008:120–1). Traditional understandings of proportionality are
present nonetheless in contemporary international law. Ad bellum proportionality in
international law is “focused on ‘the civilian population as a whole, the level of destruction of the
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enemy forces and damage to enemy territory, infrastructure and the environment
generally’” (May 2008:125). In international law, proportionality is also strongly related to
necessity and just cause and acts as a restraint for wars of self- and collective defense (May 2008:
126–9).
In the last section of this chapter, May brings together proportionality, priority, and just cause in
order to assess “whether they form a coherent set of jus ad bellum principles” (2008:133). That
May ranks proportionality as the most important principle because it bridges ad bellum and in
bello and because it is a “major moral restraint on the justifiability of wars” in a way that just
cause does not operate, and that he subsumes priority to just cause is of lesser importance than
the reason May brought these three together (2008:135–6). May's purpose is “to promote human
rights” and that these “normative principles … are aimed at determining when States … have
engaged in practices that so threaten human rights that other States might be justified in
invading these states” (2008:136). This is May's most important point, drawing upon his earlier
doctrine of contingent pacifism, highlighting his argument that war is horrible, and it sets the
tone for the rest of this book (2008:136).
Summation
This essay briefly highlights three significant works on Just War thinking and their specific
commentary on jus ad bellum. The intent was to introduce the reader to the jus ad bellum
criteria and how, due to the interdisciplinary nature of international relations and Just War
thinking, different fields, history, philosophy, and law, will address and further the tradition.
Such grounding in three very different yet key thinkers helps provide the basics to students
interested in further exploration of contemporary concerns from a Just War stance. Current
events, such as 9/11, torture (Rodin 2007), the debate over targeted assassinations and drone
strikes (Plaw 2008), and humanitarian intervention (ICISS 2001; Coady 2002; Nardin 2002; Brown
2003), have led to a number of publications from a variety of perspectives. For instance, both the
Bush Administration and the preeminent scholar Jean Bethke Elshtain argued that the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan were just (see Elshtain 2004 (2nd edn)), whereas Bellamy (2005, 2006),
Rengger (2004), Held (2011), Heinze and Steele (2009), and Laura Sjoberg (2006) have all been far
more nuanced and opposed to these justifications. Thus, in order to evaluate the scholarship on
these specific issues a student must understand that the tradition has a depth and breadth that
leads to rich and lively debate.
References
Augustine (1998 [426]), The City of God Against the Pagans. Edited and translated by R.W.
Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bellamy, A.J. (2005) Is the War on Terror Just? International Relations (19) (3), 275–96.
Bellamy, A.J. (2006) Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq. London: Polity Press.
Bellamy, A.J., and Williams, P.D. (2006) The UN Security Council and the Question of
Humanitarian Intervention in Darfur. Journal of Military Ethics (5) (2), 144–60.
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Brown, C. (2003) Selective Humanitarianism: In Defense of Inconsistency. In D. Chatterjee and

D. Scheid (eds.) Ethics and Foreign Intervention. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 31–
50.
Charles, J.D. (2005) Between Pacifism and Jihad: Just War and Christian Tradition. Downer's
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press.
Coady, C.A.J. (2002) The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention. Washington, DC: United
States Institute of Peace.
Coates, A. (2006) Culture, the Enemy and the Moral Restraint of War. In R. Sorabji and D. Rodin
(eds.) The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different Traditions. Burlington, VT, Ashgate, pp.
208–21.
Elshtain, J.B. (ed.) (1992) Just War Theory. New York: New York University Press.
Elshtain, J.B. (2004) Just War against Terror: The Burden of American Power in a Violent World.
New York: Basic Books.
Gentry, C.E. (forthcoming) Epistemic Bias. In C.E. Gentry and A.E. Eckert (eds.) The Future of
Just War: New Critical Essays. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Heinze, E.A., and Steele, B.J. (eds.) (2009) Ethics, Authority, and War: Non-State Actors and the
Just War Tradition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Held, V. (2011) How Terrorism Is Wrong: Morality and Political Violence. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hensel, H. (ed.) (2008) The Legitimate Use of Military Force. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Himes, K.R. (2004) Intervention, Just War, and US National Security. Theological Studies (65) (1),
141–57.
Ignatieff, M. (2004) The Lesser Evil: Politics in an Age of Terror. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) The

Responsibility to Protect. At http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf,
accessed July 30, 2013.
Johnson, J.T. (1981) Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and Historical Enquiry.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Johnson, J.T. (1984) Can Modern War be Just? New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Johnson, J.T. (1999) Morality and Contemporary Warfare. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Johnson, J.T. (2011) Ethics and the Use of Force: Just War in Historical Perspective. Burlington,
VT: Ashgate.
May, L. (2004) Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.
May, L. (2007) War Crimes and Just War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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May, L. (2008) Aggression and Crimes Against Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
May, L. (2012) After War Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Nardin, T. (ed.) (1996) The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Nardin, T. (2002) The Moral Basis of Humanitarian Intervention. Ethics & International Affairs
(16) (1), 57–70.
Nardin, T., and Marpel, D.R. (1992) Ethical Traditions in International Affairs. In T. Nardin and
D.R. Marpel (eds.) Traditions of International Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 1–22.
O'Brien, W.V. (1992) Just-War Doctrine in a Nuclear Context. In R.B. Miller (ed.) War in the
Twentieth Century: Sources in Theological Ethics. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press,
pp. 311–46.
Orend, B. (2002) Justice after War. Ethics & International Affairs (16) (1), 43–56.
Orend, B. (2006) The Morality of War. Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press.
Patterson, E. (2007) Jus Post Bellum and International Conflict: Order, Justice, and
Reconciliation. In M. Brough, J. Lango, and H. van der Linden (eds.) Rethinking the Just War
Tradition. Albany, NY: SUNY, pp. 35–52.
Plaw, A. (2008) Targeting Terrorists: A License to Kill?Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Ramsey, P. (2002) The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility. Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield.
Rengger, N.J. (2002) On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century. International Affairs
(78) (2), 353–63.
Rengger, N.J. (2004) Review: Just a War against Terror? Jean Bethke Elshtain's Burden and
American Power. International Affairs (80) (1), 107–16.
Rodin, D. (2007) War, Torture and Terrorism: Ethics and War in the 21st Century. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Sjoberg, L. (2006) Gender, Justice, And the Wars in Iraq: A Feminist Reformulation of Just War
Theory. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Sorabji, R., and Rodin, D. (eds.) (2006) The Ethics of War: Shared Problems in Different
Traditions. Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Teson, F. (2006) Eight Principles for Humanitarian Intervention. Journal of Military Ethics (5) (2),
93–113.
US Catholics Bishops (1983) Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, Nuclearfiles.org. At

www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/ethics/issues/religious/us-catholic-bishops-
pastoral-letter.htm.
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Walzer, M. (1977) Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations. New
York: Basic Books.
Williams, R. (2014) Jus post Bellum: Justice in the Aftermath of War. In C.E. Gentry and A.E.
Eckert, (eds.) The Future of Just War: New Critical Essays. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
Yoder, J.H. (1996) When War is Unjust: Being Honest in Just-War Thinking. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books.
Zaw, S.K. (1992) Morality and Survival in the Nuclear Age. In J.B. Elshtain (ed.) Just War Theory.
New York: New York University Press, pp. 234–59.
Links to Digital Materials

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war (accessed July 30, 2013). This is an entry on “War” in
the Stanford Journal of Philosophy. In addition to the ethics of war it also provides an extensive
overview of the Just War basics before discussing Realism and Pacifism's approach to war.
www.justwartheory.com (accessed June 30, 2013). An extensive, critically annotated website

on the Just War tradition and contemporary applications, it is run by Associate Professor Mark
Rigstand at Oakland University. It is a useful starting point for students to familiarize themselves
with key terminology as well contemporary issues.
www.iep.utm.edu/j/justwar.htm (accessed November 30, 2013). The Internet Encyclopedia of

Philosophy's entry for Just War is another extensive overview of the historical and thought
tradition. It covers the three major components as well as providing references for further
reading.
www.cceia.org/themes/ethics/index.html (accessed 30 July 2013). This is the website for the

Carnegie Council's program on ethics, war, and peace. This study has been the focus of the
council since its founding in 1914. Its purpose is to create conversation around “the moral
choices behind the toughest issues in international affairs, and the implications and
consequences of these choices.” Some of the current research questions under study at
Carnegie that have some bearing on jus ad bellum and Just War include: “the ethics of
humanitarian intervention and non-intervention;” “democracy promotion as a US foreign policy
goal;” “and the challenges of humanitarian relief and peace-keeping operations.”
www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (accessed 30 July 2013). This is the Charter of the United

Nations, which, as discussed in the essay, incorporates jus ad bellum principles into its language
and disavowal of one state's aggression towards another state.
www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/FULL/195?OpenDocument (accessed 30 July 2013). This is the link to

the Hague Convention of 1907, which, as discussed in the essay, addresses several jus ad bellum
criteria, including the curtailment of state aggression and an insistence upon arbitration
between states before war begins. The convention is an open document on the International
Committee for the Red Cross website, which is the main international organization to oversee
and maintain the Geneva Conventions, in which jus in bello criteria are enumerated.
Page 19 of 20
Jus ad Bellum
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (accessed 30 July 2013). The Report

on the Responsibility to Protect by the International Committee on Intervention and State
Sovereignty has provided one of the most in-depth and thoughtful considerations of
humanitarian intervention, or intervention for humanitarian purposes. It is largely dependent
upon the Just War tradition and specifically jus ad bellum to complicate state sovereignty when a
state is harming its own citizens. The UN has adopted the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in
cases of genocide.
Caron E. Gentry
School of International Relations, University of St Andrews
Page 20 of 20

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Jus ad Bellum

Oxford Research Encyclopedia of International

Summary and Keywords

Alex J. Bellamy's Just Wars: From Cicero to Iraq (2006)

Historical Era Contributions

Ancient/Antiquity Greek Customs (lus gentium)

Roman and Greek Philosophy

Early Christian Pacifism

Middle Ages Canon Law

Sixteenth Century Legalism

Scholasticism: Spanish School

Seventeenth Century Legalism: Grotius

Eighteenth Century Legalism: positive law

Realpolitik, raison d’état

Modern Positive Law

“Just War theory”: ethics of war, liberal humanitarianism

whether war and killing were ever justified;

to recover stolen goods;

The questioning of a sovereign's right authority is also exemplified in the contradicting

Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars (1977)

Before looking specifically at Walzer's approach to jus ad bellum, it is important to understand

(Walzer 1977: 28)

Violation of sovereignty (the “territorial integrity or political sovereignty of an independent

In order to understand how interventions, as violations of sovereignty within the international

Larry May's Aggression and Crimes Against Peace (2008)

Brown, C. (2003) Selective Humanitarianism: In Defense of Inconsistency. In D. Chatterjee and

International Committee on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (2001) The

May, L. (2004) Crimes Against Humanity: A Normative Account. Cambridge: Cambridge

May, L. (2012) After War Ends. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Plaw, A. (2008) Targeting Terrorists: A License to Kill?Burlington, VT: Ashgate.

US Catholics Bishops (1983) Pastoral Letter on War and Peace, Nuclearfiles.org. At

Links to Digital Materials

www.justwartheory.com (accessed June 30, 2013). An extensive, critically annotated website

www.iep.utm.edu/j/justwar.htm (accessed November 30, 2013). The Internet Encyclopedia of

www.cceia.org/themes/ethics/index.html (accessed 30 July 2013). This is the website for the

www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ (accessed 30 July 2013). This is the Charter of the United

www.icrc.org/IHL.NSF/FULL/195?OpenDocument (accessed 30 July 2013). This is the link to

http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf (accessed 30 July 2013). The Report

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