SRCM® Methodology

Compliant with SAE JA 1011 Standard

Summary
Various derivatives of the original aviation-oriented RCM
methodology have emerged and are currently being applied in
different industries. In order to ensure these derivatives meet the
intent of the original RCM methodology, a set of standards were
published by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) in
1999 to be used as a benchmark for any RCM process. This
paper describes the RCM methodology (SRCM®) developed by
ERIN Engineering and Research, Inc. (an SKF Group Company)
and discusses how this methodology complies with the standards
set forth by SAE.

MB03017
Michael E Creecy and
Kazem Mohammadi
20 pages
October 2006

SKF Reliability Systems

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San Diego, CA 92123
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 SRCM® Methodology

1 Introduction...............................................................................................................................3

2 Background...............................................................................................................................3

3 SRCM® Methodology And Compliance With SAE JA 1011 ..................................................4

3.1 Select System ...............................................................................................................4
3.2 Data Collection ............................................................................................................6
3.3 Functions and Functional Failures ...............................................................................6
3.4 Criticality Analysis ......................................................................................................9
3.5 Task Selection............................................................................................................11
3.6 Task Comparison .......................................................................................................13
3.7 Implementation ..........................................................................................................13
3.8 Living Program ..........................................................................................................14

4 Conclusions.............................................................................................................................14

5 References & Acknowledgements..........................................................................................14

Appendix A....................................................................................................................................15

© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved 2


1 Introduction
Various derivatives of the original aviation-
oriented RCM methodology [1] have emerged
and are currently being applied in different
industries. In order to ensure these derivatives
meet the intent of the original RCM
methodology, a set of standards [2] were
published by the Society of Automotive
Engineers (SAE) in 1999 to be used as a
benchmark for any RCM process.
This paper describes the RCM methodology
(SRCM®) developed by ERIN Engineering
and Research, Inc. (an SKF Group Company)
and discusses how this methodology complies
with the standards set forth by SAE.
2 Background
With the birth of 747 jumbo jet aircraft in the
late 1960s, the commercial aircraft industry
was faced with the challenge of developing a
maintenance program for the 747 which
would be both FAA-certifiable and cost-
effective.
This challenge was met by the engineers at the
United Airlines. They completely reviewed
how maintenance was done, and how it could
best be accomplished. What resulted from
this effort was an entirely new technique that
employed a decision-tree process for ranking
PM tasks that were necessary to preserve
critical aircraft functions during flight. This
new technique was subsequently approved by
the FAA and in 1975 it was officially named
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM).
RCM can be defined as an approach that
employs reactive, preventive, and proactive
maintenance practices and strategies in an
integrated manner to increase the probability
that a machine or component will function in
the required manner over its design life cycle
with minimum maintenance. The goal of
RCM is to preserve equipment function with
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
the required reliability and availability at the
lowest cost.
Since its inception, RCM has been used
extensively by the aircraft, space, defense, and
nuclear industries, among others. The results
are used to determine applicable and cost-
effective maintenance tasks based on
equipment criticality.
Various streamlined versions of the original
RCM methodology have been developed in
recent years to reduce the effort and resources
required to perform an RCM analysis. In
order to ensure these streamlined versions
meet the intent of the original RCM
methodology, a set of standards [2] were
published by the SAE in 1999 that constitute
the framework for any RCM process. Section
5 of SAE JA 1011 [2] summarizes the key
attributes of an RCM process by posing the
following questions in the sequence shown:
• What are the functions and associated
desired standards of performance of the
asset in its present operating context
(functions)?
• In what ways can it fail to fulfill its
function (functional failure)?
• What causes each functional failure
(failure modes)?
• What happens when each failure occurs
(failure effects)?
• In what way does each failure matter
(failure consequences)?
• What should be done to predict or prevent
each failure (proactive tasks and task
intervals)?
• What should be done if a suitable
proactive task cannot be found (default
actions)?
3

RCM processes that satisfactorily answer the
above questions in the sequence shown are
judged to meet the intent and spirit of the
original RCM methodology, and thus are
deemed to be acceptable.
3 SRCM® Methodology And
Compliance With SAE JA 1011
An optimized methodology, titled SRCM®,
was developed by ERIN in the late 1980s to
effectively address the needs of the process
industries. This methodology is a practical,
cost-effective, RCM approach that maintains
all of the key elements of the more rigorous,
time-consuming, original RCM process,
produces similar results, yet requires
significantly less effort.
The SRCM methodology is primarily geared
towards the process industries. Since its
inception, it has been successfully applied at
facilities in the Power, Manufacturing, Pulp
and Paper, and Petrochemical industries.
Due to economies of scale, the more rigorous,
aviation-oriented, classical RCM approach is
considered practical and cost-effective when
applied to a large number of systems (e.g.,
aircrafts) that are of exactly the same type.
However, in the process industries, due to
significant variations in system design and
lack of adequate operating data, application of
the original RCM approach facility-wide is
judged to be impractical and extremely time /
resource intensive.
The SRCM® methodology is depicted in
Figure 1. The various elements of SRCM®
and compliance with SAE JA 1011 standards
are discussed below. A tabulated comparison
of SAE JA 1011 standards and SRCM is
provided in Appendix A.
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
3.1 Select System
The first step in an SRCM® analysis is to
select the system or systems that are going to
be analyzed.
Theoretically, it is desired that all systems in a
facility be analyzed in order to properly
allocate resources across the board and to
establish an overall cost-effective, optimized,
maintenance program. However, in certain
instances (e.g., lack of adequate budget), it
may not be feasible for all systems to be
analyzed, and therefore, the facility may elect
to analyze only a subset of the systems. In
such instances, the following system
characteristics could be used as a guide in
identifying systems that should be analyzed:
• high number of PM tasks and costs
• high number of corrective maintenance
and cost
• large contribution to full or partial
outages/downtime/loss of throughput
• impact on safety/environment
Once systems have been selected for analysis,
the boundaries of each system must be
precisely defined. System boundaries should
encompass all subsystems and equipment that
support system functions and that are
dedicated to the system being analyzed.
Boundaries should include all required
mechanical, electrical, and instrumentation
and control equipment, as appropriate.
4
 SRCM® Methodology

• Resource Availability
• PM/CM Cost History
• Outage/Downtim e History Select System (s)
• Safety/Environm ental • Design Information
Im pact History • Equipm ent List
Collect Pertinent Data • P&IDs, Electrical Schem atics
• Other
Identify Key Im portant Design Information
Functions and Functional (including Perform ance
Failures (FFA) Standards)

Criticality Analysis
• Operating History
Equipm ent List Failure Modes and • Design Information
Effects Analysis (FMEA) • Expert Judgment

Critical and Non- Consequence Analysis

Critical Criteria

Organization Goals Yes At Least 1

and Objectives Critical Criteria
Met?

No

At Least 1 Yes
Non-Critical Criteria
Met?
No
Task Selection
Run-to-Failure

Com ponent “Critical” Com ponent “Non-Critical”

• Design
Inform ation
• Operating Identify Failure Causes
History
Assign Applicable, Cost-Effective
Tasks Commensurate
with Com ponent Criticality

Existing PMs Task Com parison

Im plem entation

Living Program

Figure 1 SRCM® Methodology

© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved 5


The SRCM® methodology, at the onset of
the analysis, allows exclusion of certain
components within system boundary from
further evaluation. These components
include those that are considered to have
comparatively lower failure rates and that do
not have safety or environmental impact.
Examples include manual valves, local
indications, piping systems, and manual
switches whose failure would not have
safety, environmental, or production
implications. These components have been
analyzed in the past and are typically found
to be non-critical and run-to-failure.
Evaluation of equipment such as pressure
vessels and high pressure piping systems
with respect to pressure boundary integrity
may also be omitted from the analysis if the
facility already has an inspection program in
place for addressing this issue for this
equipment. Exclusion of such evaluation
would imply that the existing inspection
programs are adequate and that no further
action is necessary to verify or question the
adequacy of these programs.
No specific guidance regarding system
selection and establishing system boundary
conditions is provided in SAE JA 1011. The
approach used in SRCM is judged to be
consistent with the original RCM
methodology.
3.2 Data Collection
All pertinent information required to
perform the analysis is collected and
reviewed. This includes Piping and
Instrumentation Diagrams (P & IDs), design
information, operating manuals, schematics,
operating history, equipment list, Code
requirements, pre-established commitments,
insurance requirements, etc. Operations,
Maintenance, and Engineering staff are also
consulted to gain additional information that
would enhance the analysis.
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
No specific guidance regarding data
collection is provided in SAE JA 1011. The
approach used in SRCM is judged to be
consistent with the original RCM
methodology.
3.3 Functions and Functional
Failures
Consistent with the original RCM approach
[1] and Section 5.1 of SAE JA 1011 [2], the
objective of SRCM® is to develop a set of
applicable and cost-effective tasks, that
when applied would preserve the functions
of the asset being analyzed. As such,
functions and their operating context (e.g.,
continuous process, batch process) are
defined in this step of the analysis.
Functions are typically categorized as
primary and secondary functions. Primary
functions of a system are those functions for
which the system was acquired. For
example, the primary function of a feed
water system is to provide feed water from
the dearator to the boiler per design
specifications. The secondary functions are
those that are not primary but that must also
be satisfied. For example, in a feed water
system with two 100% capacity pump trains,
the operating pump discharge check valve
must open (or remain open) to satisfy the
primary function and the standby pump
discharge check valve must be in a closed
(seated) position to satisfy the secondary
function of protecting the redundant pump
against reverse flow. It should be noted that
although protection against reverse flow is
the primary function of the standby pump
discharge check valve itself, this function is
considered a secondary function within the
context of the feed water system analysis.
In the original RCM approach, all primary
and secondary functions are explicitly
defined at the component level. However,
in SRCM only the primary functions are
6

explicitly defined, and furthermore, these
functions are defined at system and/or
subsystem level and not component level.
The secondary functions are not explicitly
defined in SRCM but nevertheless are
analyzed implicitly at component level
under the primary function analysis.
The SRCM methodology also provides
flexibility in the level at which the primary
functions are explicitly defined and
analyzed. Primary functions can be
identified and analyzed either at the system
level or at both the system and subsystem
levels, without affecting the analysis results.
For systems with no stand-alone support
subsystems, it may be more appropriate to
define the primary functions at the system
level whereas for systems with one or more
stand-alone support subsystems, it may be
more appropriate to define the primary
functions at both system and subsystem
levels. The determination of which
approach is most suitable is made by the
system analyst and the asset user/owner. In
either case, the analysis results are not
affected.
Figure 2 can be used as an example to
illustrate the points discussed above. This
figure shows a simplified functional block
diagram for a turbine system. The block
diagram consists of the main turbine itself
and the associated support systems. In this
case, the system-level primary function can
be defined as:
“convert thermodynamic energy of main
and re-heat steam supply into mechanical
energy per design specifications”
Similarly, the subsystem-level primary
functions can be defined as:
“provide lube oil to turbine bearings at
proper temperature and pressure via lube
oil subsystem”
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
“control steam flow through turbine via
EHC subsystem”
“monitor turbine operation via supervisory
control subsystem”
“provide steam at proper temperature,
pressure, and quality from main steam to
turbine via steam supply subsystem”
“provide for proper turbine coast-down and
ramp-up during shutdown and startup via
turning gear subsystem”
In this example, if only the system level
primary function is explicitly defined, then
all support system primary functions are
assumed to be included and analyzed
implicitly as part of the main system
primary function. However, if the primary
functions are explicitly defined at both
system and subsystem levels, then the
primary functions would be analyzed
separately and explicitly. In this example,
the second approach may provide more
clarity, although, both approaches will
produce the same results.
To illustrate the analysis treatment of the
secondary functions, let’s look at the turbine
lube oil subsystem. Let’s assume that this
subsystem consists of a lube oil tank, a main
(AC) lube oil pump, a standby (DC)
emergency lube oil pump, a safety relief
valve, two 100% capacity lube oil coolers,
and a lube oil filter.
As stated above, the primary function of this
subsystem is to “provide lube oil to turbine
bearings at the proper pressure and
temperature.” To accomplish this, the
suction path, pump, pump motor (and
breaker), discharge path, lube oil filter, and
one lube oil cooler must work in concert, as
designed.
7

Figure 2 Main Turbine and Auxiliaries Functional Block Diagram
However, note that the function statement
for the primary function does not include the
secondary functions of equipment that are
part of the lube oil subsystem. These
secondary functions include:
• auto start of emergency (DC) pump on
main lube oil pump failure or low header
pressure (a protective function)
• lifting of safety relief valve on demand
(a protective function)
• opening of main pump motor breaker on
demand (a protective function)
• oil containment (containment function)
The design function of the emergency (DC)
pump is to auto start on main pump failure
or low header pressure in order to prevent
turbine bearing damage by allowing the
system to coast-down and allow for a
controlled shutdown.
Similarly, the design function of the safety
relief valve is to lift and relieve pressure
when system pressure reaches a pre-
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
determined set-point in order to prevent
system over-pressurization and damage.
The main pump motor circuit breaker must
remain in the closed position in order to
satisfy the lube oil subsystem primary
function; however, this circuit breaker has a
secondary function of opening on situations
like over-current in order to protect the
motor and circuitry from being damaged.
Within the context of the analysis, these
functions are considered secondary
functions and are analyzed implicitly under
the umbrella of the primary function (i.e.,
provide lube oil to turbine bearings at proper
temperature and pressure) for the lube oil
subsystem.
Therefore, when analyzing the emergency
(DC) pump or the safety relief valve under
the lube oil subsystem primary function, the
pump and safety relief valve are analyzed
with respect to their intended design
function (i.e., protection) and not with
respect to the primary function of providing
lube oil to turbine bearings.
8

The main pump motor circuit breaker has a
dual function. It must remain closed in
order to satisfy the lube oil subsystem
primary function (i.e., provide lube oil flow)
and it must open when required in order to
satisfy the secondary function (i.e.,
protection).
Therefore, when analyzing this circuit
breaker under the lube oil subsystem
primary function, the function of circuit
breaker to remain closed is analyzed with
respect to the primary function (i.e., provide
lube oil flow) whereas the function of circuit
breaker to open, when required, is analyzed
with respect to the secondary function (i.e.,
protection).
Proper treatment of the secondary functions
in a manner consistent with the way the
primary functions are treated is implied in
SRCM. As such, application of SRCM
requires a knowledgeable, experienced,
practitioner, as does the original RCM
approach for similar reasons.
Consistent with SAE JA 1011, Sections
5.1.3 and 5.1.4, the system or subsystem
primary function statement in SRCM
contains a verb, an object, and a
performance standard. The performance
standards incorporated into function
statements represent performance desired by
asset user/owner. These standards can be
qualifiers such as “proper”, “sufficient”,
“adequate” or can be specific values and
thresholds, depending on the situation, and
what is acceptable to the asset user/owner.
In SRCM, failure to meet the standards
defined in a primary function would
constitute functional failure of the primary
function. For example, for the lube oil
subsystem discussed above, functional
failure of the primary function would be
“failure to provide lube oil to turbine
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
bearings at proper temperature and
pressure.”
Failure of a secondary function in SRCM
would have no impact on the associated
primary function. However, the impact of
this failure is properly captured when
evaluating failure effects and consequences
in Criticality Analysis.
Total and partial failures are identified and
captured in SRCM as part of a Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA). This
is discussed below under Criticality
Analysis.
The above discussion touches on specific
points identified in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of
SAE JA 1011. Based on the above
discussions, it can therefore be concluded
that the function and functional failure
approach used in SRCM meets the intent of
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 of SAE JA 1011 [2].
3.4 Criticality Analysis
Once the primary functions are defined, the
components within function boundary are
subjected to a Criticality Analysis. The
Criticality Analysis performed in SRCM is a
combination of an FMEA and Consequence
Analysis.
The objective of the Criticality Analysis is
to determine component criticality (i.e.,
whether the component is critical or non-
critical with respect to asset user/owner
business objectives). This in turn is used to
determine the level of resources that should
be allocated to each component
commensurate with its criticality. A
component that is determined to be critical
would command more attention and
resources in maintaining it than one that is
determined to be non-critical.
9

The Criticality Analysis begins with an
FMEA. Consistent with Section 5.3 of SAE
JA 1011, all credible failure modes for the
component being analyzed are identified.
This effort may include all or any of the
following, as appropriate, and as determined
to be useful by the analyst:
• review of operating history to identify
failure modes that have happened in the
past (this may also be achieved by
soliciting information from user/owner),
• review of the current maintenance tasks
to identify failure modes that are actively
addressed, and
• consideration of failure modes that have
not yet happened, but that are judged to
be credible.
It should be noted that in certain instances a
failure mode may be characterized as
component deterioration to an unacceptable
level and not total failure of the component.
This specifically addresses Section 5.3.5 of
SAE JA 1011.
Consistent with Section 5.3.1 of SAE JA
1011, all identified failure modes are
reviewed and approved to the satisfaction of
user/owner.
Once the failure modes are identified, the
effects of each failure mode are specifically
assessed in an FMEA. Failure effects
essentially describe what would happen if a
failure mode were to occur. These effects
could include operational effects (e.g.,
functional failure or degradation of the
primary function, downtime, loss of
redundancy), safety effects (e.g., personnel
injury), environmental effects (e.g., releases
to environment), and collateral damage (e.g.,
damage to other equipment). The treatment
of failure effects in SRCM is consistent with
Section 5.4 of SAE JA 1011.
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
The consequence evaluation part of
Criticality Analysis then focuses on the
degree to which the failure effects can or
cannot be tolerated by the asset user/owner.
To facilitate this effort, a set of user-defined
criticality criteria are developed based on the
user’s/owner’s overall goals and objectives.
These criticality criteria are categorized into
Critical and Non-Critical Criteria.
Examples of Critical Criteria include:
• personnel injury
• reduction in load/output > X units
• delay in startup > X hours
• unit trip
• violation of regulatory requirements
• equipment damage > $X
A component failure mode resulting in
meeting one or more of the above criteria
would render that component “Critical.” If
none of the failure modes result in meeting
at least one of the above criteria, then the
component is classified as “Non-Critical.”
For components that have been determined
to be Non-Critical, a different set of criteria
(i.e., Non-Critical Criteria) is further
applied. The intention here is to place more
emphasis on economic considerations rather
than equipment themselves. The Non-
Critical criteria are used to evaluate the
benefit of maintaining the component, rather
than allowing the component to run-to-
failure. Examples of Non-Critical criteria
include:
• high cost of repair if run-to-failure
• a simple cost-effective task can be
applied to ensure expected reliability
• failure leads to costly failure of other
components
10

• allowing run-to-failure may lead to
greater safety hazard
• failure could impact support activities
If at least one of these criteria is met,
component is classified as Non-Critical
requiring some level of maintenance
commensurate with its importance. If none
of the above criteria are met, the
determination has been made to allow the
component to run-to-failure and perform
corrective maintenance when required.
It should be noted that in SRCM, operator
action in response to events is explicitly
credited as part of the FMEA and
Consequence Analysis, when appropriate.
In certain instances, failures can be detected,
diagnosed, and successfully mitigated by the
operator without significant functional,
safety, or environmental impact.
Failure causes in SRCM are only identified
for components that are determined to be
Critical. Consistent with Section 5.3.3 of
SAE JA 1011, failure causes are identified at
a level that makes it possible to assign
appropriate tasks that would preclude the
occurrence of those failure causes.
Section 10.1.1 of SAE JA 1011 provides
provisions for treatment of hidden and
evident failures. Hidden and evident
failures are not explicitly defined in SRCM.
Evident failures are captured in the primary
function analysis and hidden failures are
captured in the secondary function analysis
in SRCM. For example, in the turbine lube
oil subsystem discussed earlier, the auto
start control loop of the standby emergency
(DC) oil pump has a protective, hidden,
function. If the auto start control loop is in a
failed state, this failure would not be evident
and therefore will not be detected until the
pump is demanded. In SRCM, this
assessment is made during FMEA based on
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
the analyst’s understanding of the
component’s intended design function.
The above discussion touches on specific
points identified in Sections 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5
of SAE JA 1011. Based on the above
discussions, it can therefore be concluded
that the Criticality Analysis approach used
in SRCM meets the intent of Sections 5.3,
5.4, and 5.5 of SAE JA 1011 [2].
3.5 Task Selection
Once a component has been determined to
be Critical or Non-Critical, but not allowed
to run-to-failure, the next step is to develop
applicable and cost-effective maintenance
tasks based on component criticality. As
mentioned earlier, components that have
been determined to be Critical would
command more attention and resources in
maintaining them than those determined to
be Non-Critical.
Task selection also takes into account
factors such as component design, operating
environment, frequency of use, component
age, operating mode (normally operating
versus standby), component replacement
cost, task cost, etc. These factors are
qualitatively assessed during the task
selection process in SRCM. Ultimately
tasks that are selected are those that are cost-
effective and applicable. Cost-effective
means that cost of performing a task is less
than cost of the failure over a specific period
of time. Applicable means that task
performed is intended to preclude the
occurrence of the identified failure causes.
In SRCM, the use of non-intrusive tasks is
maximized to the extent possible. The task
type hierarchy used during task selection
process in SRCM (in order of task type
importance) can be listed as follows:
• Condition Monitoring Tasks
11

• Predictive Tasks
• Failure-Finding Tasks
• Time-Directed Tasks
The SRCM methodology places great
emphasis on the interaction between the
operator and the equipment. As such,
condition-monitoring tasks (operator
rounds) are judged to be the most important
task type. Operator rounds are non-intrusive
and are relatively inexpensive to perform.
Furthermore, operators have a great sense of
equipment condition due to their close
proximity to equipment. An example is
visual inspection of a heat exchanger for
external leakage and monitoring heat
exchanger inlet and outlet temperature
gauges for proper performance.
Involving operators in minor equipment
maintenance can also be a mechanism for
empowerment and asset ownership which
overall can have a tremendous value in asset
management.
Predictive tasks are next on the task type
hierarchy. These tasks are non-intrusive and
can be used to identify the onset of failures
so that proper action can be taken to
minimize consequences. Examples include
vibration monitoring, thermography, lube oil
analysis, and on-line motor current signature
analysis. Use of predictive tasks is
maximized in SRCM to the extent possible.
Consistent with Section 5.7.2 of SAE JA
1011, for predictive tasks frequencies are set
such that task interval is always shorter than
the P-F interval (where P is the point at
which degradation is observed and F is the
point at which component is assumed to
have failed). The interval selected is set
such that upon reaching point P, sufficient
time is available to take action to prevent
failure.
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
Failure-finding tasks are applied to
equipment in standby mode to verify
operability. Examples include valve stroke
test, pump operability test, and
instrumentation calibration check. The
effectiveness of this type of task depends on
the task frequency. Failure-finding tasks are
more effective when performed more
frequently. However, the frequency must be
balanced against cost and potential for
human-induced failures.
Failure finding tasks in SRCM are applied
such that all hidden failure modes are
detected. For example, the emergency (DC)
oil pump in the turbine lube oil subsystem
discussed earlier, could be functionally
tested at appropriate intervals to determine
its operability. This functional test, if
possible, would include simulating a low
header pressure condition and then
observing to see if the pump actually starts
and develops the required head. This would
functionally test the auto start
instrumentation, as well as the pump and
motor.
Section 13.3.3 of SAE JA 1011, provides an
equation for calculating task frequencies for
failure-finding tasks based unavailability
and Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF).
It should be noted that in SRCM, task
frequencies for failure-finding tasks, and in
fact all task types, are determined
qualitatively and not quantitatively since
failure mode-specific MTBF data most often
does not exist or at best is generic.
Time-directed tasks are considered to be the
least important task type in SRCM and to
the extent possible their use is minimized.
These are tasks that are performed at
specific intervals regardless of the condition
of equipment. Examples include detailed
inspections and overhauls. Time-directed
tasks should be performed on as as-needed
12

basis based on predictive and condition-
monitoring results.
Although the above discussion is focused on
each individual task type, in most
circumstances a combination of different
task types may be required to preclude the
identified component failure modes and
failure causes.
Again, it should also be emphasized that the
determination of task frequencies and task
intervals in SRCM is done qualitatively
based on operating experience, performance
data, operating condition, equipment age,
and engineering judgment to the satisfaction
of equipment user/owner.
Finally, it should be noted that during the
task selection process it may be determined
that in some cases an applicable task may
not exist. In such cases, it may be necessary
to recommend further actions to be taken by
equipment user/owner such that the
reliability of equipment is maintained and
adverse consequences are minimized. These
actions (or one-time changes) may include
design change, additional training, revising
procedures, among others.
The above discussion touches on specific
points identified in Sections 5.7 and 5.8 of
SAE JA 1011. Based on the above
discussion, it can therefore be concluded
that the task selection approach used in
SRCM meets the intent of Sections 5.7 and
5.8 of SAE JA 1011 [2].
3.6 Task Comparison
Upon assignment of applicable and cost-
effective tasks, the recommended tasks are
compared against the existing tasks. The
purpose of this comparison is to identify the
needed changes in the existing program,
facilitate implementation of the task
recommendations, and to provide additional
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
check of the analysis to assure validity of
assumptions and completeness.
No specific guidance regarding task
comparison is provided in SAE JA 1011.
The approach used in SRCM is judged to be
consistent with the original RCM
methodology.
3.7 Implementation
Implementation of task recommendations
can be time consuming and labor intensive.
It is vital that the facility develops an
implementation plan that is realistic, yet
aggressive enough, so that the necessary
changes are made to the existing program
while the assumptions and basis are current
and still applicable.
Implementation generally requires
developing an action plan that includes the
following:
• formal approval of task
recommendations and one-time changes
• establishing priorities for implementing
changes
• determining the degree of difficulty for
implementing changes
• developing proper work packages
including job plans that describe the
detailed steps of each task
• identifying potential constraints
Implementation may also include the
purchase of new technology, incorporating
design changes, and training.
No specific guidance regarding
implementation is provided in SAE JA
1011. However, implementation is
discussed in Section 18.9 of SAE JA 1012
[3]. The approach used in SRCM is judged
to be consistent SAE JA 1012.
13
 SRCM® Methodology

3.8 Living Program

Consistent with Section 5.9 of SAE JA1011,
a living program is established in SRCM to
allow for periodic review of information
used to support decisions and the decisions
themselves. The living program will ensure
that the PM Program is always optimized
and remains evergreen.

4 Conclusions
Although SRCM is an optimized version of
the original RCM process, the SRCM
methodology does not exclude any of the
main elements of the original RCM
approach.

Based on issues discussed in this paper, it

can be concluded that the SRCM
methodology is a robust and defendable
approach that meets the intent of the
standards set forth in SAE JA 1011.

5 References &
Acknowledgements
[1] Nowlan, F. Stanley, and Howard F.
Heap, “Reliability-Centered
Maintenance,” Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C. 1978. Report Number
AD-A066579.

[2] Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-

Centered Maintenance (RCM)
Processes, SAE JA 1011, Issued August
1999.

[3] A Guide to the Reliability-Centered

Maintenance (RCM) Standard, SAE JA
1012, Issued January 2002.

© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved 14


SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description
Section
5.1 Functions
5.1.1 Operating context of asset shall be
defined
5.1.2 All functions of asset/system
(primary and secondary) shall be
identified
5.1.3 All function statements shall
contain a verb, an object, and a
performance standard
5.1.4 Performance standards shall be
level of performance desired by
asset user in its operating context
5.2 Functional Failures – all failed
states associated with each
function shall be identified
5.3 Failure Modes
5.3.1 All failure modes reasonably likely
to cause each functional failure
shall be identified
5.3.2 Method used to decide what
constitutes a “reasonably likely”
failure mode shall be acceptable to
asset owner/user
5.3.3 Failure modes shall be identified at
a level of causation that makes it
possible to identify an appropriate
failure management policy
5.3.4 Failure modes should include
those that have happened before,
those that are currently being
prevented, and those that have not
happened but are likely
5.3.5 Failure modes should include any
event or process that is likely to
cause a functional failure including
deterioration, design defects, and
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
Appendix A
SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Yes No
9 See 5.1.2.
9 Operating context defined based on review of system
description, operating manual, design documents, etc.
9 Primary functions identified explicitly at system and
subsystem level; secondary functions identified and
analyzed implicitly at component level under primary
functions.
9 Performance standards are defined for primary
functions at system and/or subsystem level to the
satisfaction of asset user/owner; performance
standards are not explicitly defined for secondary
functions.
9 See 5.1.3.
9 Failure to meet required standards as defined for
primary functions would result in functional failure of
primary function; functional failure of secondary
functions defined implicitly and analyzed with respect
to failure effects and consequences.
9 See 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 5.3.3, 5.3.4, and 5.3.5.
9 All credible (reasonably likely) failure modes are
identified and analyzed.
9 Credible failure modes are identified by the analyst to
the satisfaction of asset owner/user.
9 Failure causes identified for all Critical components and
are identified at a level that would allow for
identification of appropriate tasks that would preclude
those failure causes; failure causes not identified for
Non-Critical components. (see Criticality Analysis
below)
9 Historical data is reviewed to identify failure modes that
have happened in the past; discussion with asset
user/owner is used to determine what failure modes
are being prevented; and those failure modes that have
not yet happened but are likely are identified by the
analyst in FMEA.
9 In certain instances failure modes are characterized by
equipment degradation and not total failure; errors of
omission and commission are addressed separately;
this is acceptable per SAE JA 1012, 8.5.
15
 SRCM® Methodology

Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Section
Yes No

human error

5.4 Failure Effects 9 See 5.4.1 and 5.4.2

5.4.1 Failure effects shall describe what 9 Done as part of FMEA in Criticality Analysis.
would happen if no specific task is
done to anticipate, prevent, or
detect failure

5.4.2 Failure effects shall include all 9 Done as part of FMEA in Criticality Analysis.
information needed to support
evaluation of consequences of
failure

5.5 Failure consequence categories 9 See 5.5.1, 5.5.1.1, 5.5.1.2, and 5.5.2.

5.5.1 Consequence of every failure 9 Done as part of establishing criticality criteria.

mode shall be formally categorized

5.5.1.1 Consequence categorization 9 Hidden and evident failure modes are not explicitly
process shall separate hidden defined; all equipment analyzed based on their
from evident failure modes intended design function; as such, hidden and evident
failures are properly captured in the analysis.

5.5.1.2 Consequence categorization 9 Done as part of establishing criticality criteria.

process shall clearly distinguish
events that have safety and/or
environmental consequences from
those that have economic
consequences

5.5.2 Assessment of failure 9 Done as part of Criticality Analysis.

consequences shall be carried out
as if no specific task is currently
being done to anticipate, detect, or
prevent failure

5.6 Failure Management Policy 9 See 5.6.1, 5.6.2, 5.6.3, and 5.6.4.
Selection

5.6.1 Failure management selection 9 Effect of component age is captured through condition
process shall take into account monitoring for equipment that are monitored in this
impact of age on conditional manner; impact of equipment age is also assessed
probability of failure mode when determining task frequency.

5.6.2 All scheduled tasks shall be 9 All scheduled tasks are devised to eliminate failure
technically feasible and worth causes for the associated failure modes; applicable
doing (applicable and effective) and most cost-effective tasks are selected.

5.6.3 If two or more proposed failure 9 Most cost-effective tasks are always selected.
management policies are
technically feasible, the most cost-
effective shall be selected

5.6.4 Selection of failure management 9 Task selection is performed assuming no tasks

policies shall be carried out as if currently applied to anticipate, prevent, or detect

© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved 16


SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description
Section
no specific task is currently being
done to anticipate, prevent, or
detect failure
5.7 Failure Management Policies –
Scheduled Tasks
5.7.1 All scheduled tasks shall comply
with 5.7.1.1, 5.7.1.2, 5.7.1.3, and
5.7.1.4
5.7.1.1 For evident failure modes with
safety or environmental
consequences, task shall reduce
probability of failure mode to a
level tolerable by asset user/owner
5.7.1.2 For hidden failure modes with
safety or environmental
consequences, task shall reduce
probability of failure mode to a
level tolerable by asset user/owner
5.7.1.3 For evident failure modes w/o
safety or environmental
consequences, direct and indirect
costs of task shall be less than
direct and indirect costs of failure
mode over comparable time
periods
5.7.1.4 For hidden failure modes w/o
safety or environmental
consequences, direct and indirect
costs of tasks shall be less than
direct and indirect costs of failure
plus repair cost over comparable
time periods
5.7.2 On-condition tasks shall satisfy
additional criteria in 5.7.2.1,
5.7.2.2, 5.7.2.3, 5.7.2.4, and
5.7.2.5
5.7.2.1 There shall exist a clearly defined
potential failure
5.7.2.2 There shall exist an identifiable
P-F interval
© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved
SRCM® Methodology
Appendix A
SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Yes No
failure; intent of task selection is to come up with the
most cost-effective and applicable tasks w/o
considering current tasks.
9 See 5.7.1, 5.7.1.1, 5.7.1.2, 5.7.1.3, 5.7.1.4, 5.7.2,
5.7.2.1, 5.7.2.2, 5.7.2.3, 5.7.2.4, 5.7.2.5, 5.7.3, 5.7.3.1,
5.7.3.2, 5.7.4, 5.7.4.1, 5.7.4.2, 5.7.4.3, 5.7.5, 5.7.5.1,
5.7.5.2, 5.7.5.3, and 5.7.5.4.
9 See 5.7.1.1, 5.7.1.2, 5.7.1.3, and 5.7.1.4.
9 Done during task selection; for evident failures with
safety or environmental consequences, tasks are
assigned to eliminate failure causes and thus reduce
probability of failure to an acceptable level.
9 Done during task selection; for hidden failures with
safety or environmental consequences, tasks are
assigned to eliminate failure causes and thus reduce
probability of failure to an acceptable level.
9 Done during task selection; for evident failures w/o
safety or environmental consequences cost-effective
tasks are assigned.
9 Done during task selection; for hidden failures w/o
safety or environmental consequences cost-effective
tasks are assigned.
9 See 5.7.2.1, 5.7.2.2, 5.7.2.3, 5.7.2.4, and 5.7.2.5.
9 Done during task selection; on-condition tasks are
assigned at proper frequency to detect the onset of
equipment failure.
9 Task frequencies for on-condition tasks are determined
qualitatively based on historical data, engineering
judgment, and user/owner experience; frequencies are
set to allows for detection of deterioration and time to
take action before equipment reaches a failed state
(frequency < P-F interval).
17
 SRCM® Methodology

Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Section
Yes No

5.7.2.3 Task interval shall be less than 9 See 5.7.2.2.

shortest likely P-F interval

5.7.2.4 It shall be physically possible to do 9 This assessment is made during task and frequency
task at intervals less than P-F selection.
interval

5.7.2.5 Shortest time between discovery 9 This assessment is made during task and frequency
of a potential failure and selection.
occurrence of functional failure
shall be long enough for pre-
determined action to be taken to
avoid, eliminate, or minimize
consequences of failure mode

5.7.3 Any scheduled discard task shall 9 See 5.7.3.1 and 5.7.3.2.
satisfy additional criteria in 5.7.3.1
and 5.7.3.2

5.7.3.1 There shall be a clearly defined 9 Effects of age on conditional probability of failure
age at which there is an increase modes assessed qualitatively as part of task selection
in conditional probability of failure and frequency assignment.
mode

5.7.3.2 A sufficiently large proportion of 9 See 5.7.3.1.

occurrences of failure mode shall
occur after this age to reduce
probability of premature failure to a
level that is tolerable to asset
user/owner

5.7.4 Any scheduled restoration task 9 See 5.7.4.1, 5.7.4.2, and 5.7.4.3.
selected shall satisfy additional
criteria in 5.7.4.1, 5.7.4.2, and
5.7.4.3

5.7.4.1 There shall be a clearly defined 9 Effects of age on conditional probability of failure
age at which there is an increase modes assessed qualitatively as part of task selection
in conditional probability of failure and frequency assignment.
mode

5.7.4.2 A sufficiently large proportion of 9 See 5.7.4.1.

occurrences of failure mode shall
occur after this age to reduce
probability of premature failure to a
level that is tolerable to asset
user/owner

5.7.4.3 Task shall restore resistance to 9 See 5.7.4.1.

failure of component to a level that
is tolerable to asset user/owner

5.7.5 Any failure-finding task selected 9 See 5.7.5.1, 5.7.5.2, 5.7.5.3, and 5.7.5.4.
shall satisfy additional criteria in
5.7.5.1, 5.7.5.2, 5.7.5.3, and
5.7.5.4

© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved 18

 SRCM® Methodology

Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Section
Yes No

5.7.5.1 Basis upon which task interval is
selected shall take into account
the need to reduce probability of
multiple failure of associated
protected system to a level that is
tolerable to asset user/owner
9 Task intervals for failure-finding tasks are determined
based on historical data, operating experience, and
best engineering judgment; they are devised to reduce
probability of failure to a level tolerable by asset
user/owner.

5.7.5.2 Task shall confirm that all 9 The intent of assigned failure finding tasks is to verify
components covered by failure functionality of component/asset in its entirety.
mode description are functional

5.7.5.3 Failure-finding task and associated 9 Task frequency is balanced against the potential
interval selection process should adverse effects of task during task selection.
take into account any probability
that task itself might leave the
hidden function in a failed state

5.7.5.4 It shall be physically possible to do
task at the specified intervals
9 This determination is made during task selection; if
failure-finding task cannot be performed due to
inadequate access or w/o disturbing process or w/o
damaging equipment, task is considered not
applicable; other more applicable tasks are then
considered.

5.8 Failure Management Policies – 9 See 5.8.1 and 5.8.2.

One-time Changes and Run-to-
Failure

5.8.1 One-Time Changes 9 See 5.8.1.1 and 5.8.1.2.

5.8.1.1 RCM process shall endeavor to 9 Done as part of task selection.

extract desired performance of
system as it is currently configured
and operated by applying
appropriate scheduled tasks

5.8.1.2 In cases where such tasks cannot 9 Done as part of task selection.
be found, one-time changes to
asset or system may be necessary
subject to criteria in 5.8.1.2.1,
5.8.1.2.2, 5.8.1.2.3, and 5.8.1.2.4

5.8.1.2.1 In cases where failure is hidden, 9 Done as part of task selection.

and associated multiple failure has
safety or environmental
consequences, a one-time change
that reduces probability of multiple
failure to a level tolerable by asset
user/owner is compulsory

5.8.1.2.2 In cases where failure is evident 9 Done as part of task selection.

and has safety or environmental
consequences, a one-time change
that reduces probability of failure
to a level tolerable by asset
user/owner is compulsory

© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved 19

 SRCM® Methodology

Appendix A
SAE JA 1011 and 1012 Standards and SRCM Compliance Matrix
SAE JA 1011 Description SRCM Complies? Method of Compliance
Section
Yes No

5.8.1.2.3 In cases where failure is hidden, 9 Done as part of task selection.

and the associated multiple failure
does not have safety or
environmental consequences, any
one-time change must be cost-
effective in opinion of asset
user/owner

5.8.1.2.4 In cases where failure is evident 9 Done as part of task selection.

and does not have safety or
environmental consequences, any
one-time change must be cost-
effective in opinion of asset
user/owner

5.8.2 Run-to-Failure – Any run-to-failure 9 See 5.8.2.1 and 5.8.2.2.

policy selected shall satisfy
appropriate criteria in 5.8.2.1 and
5.8.2.2

5.8.2.1 In cases where failure is hidden 9 Done as part of Criticality Analysis.

and there is no appropriate
scheduled task, associated
multiple failure shall not have
safety or environmental
consequences

5.8.2.2 In cases where failure is evident 9 Done as part of Criticality Analysis.

and there is no appropriate
scheduled task, associated failure
mode shall not have safety or
environmental consequences

5.9 A Living Program 9 See 5.9.1 and 5.9.2.

5.9.1 A periodic review is necessary to 9 Done as part of established living program.

ensure that assets continue to
fulfill the current functional
expectations of users/owners

5.9.2 Any RCM process shall provide for 9 Done as part of established living program.
a review of information used to
support decisions and decisions
themselves

© 2006 SKF Reliability Systems All Rights Reserved 20