Maceda v ERB GR# 95203-05, 12/18/1990; 192 SCRA 363 (General Considerations)

Grego v. COMELEC , 247 SCRA 481 (Quasi- Legislative Power)

Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines v. CA, 266 SCRA 489 (Quasi- Legislative Power)
Garments and Textile Export Board v. CA, 268 SCRA 258 (Judicial Review)
Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 264 (Judicial Review)

Maceda vs. ERB

192 SCRA 363

Facts:

1. Petroleum companies Caltex,Shell and Petron filed separate applications with theEnergy Regulatory Board for permission to
increase the wholesale prices of petroleumproducts, and meanwhile, for provisional authority to increase temporarily such
pricespending further proceedings.

2. The Energy Regulatory Board, in a joint order granted provisional relief and authorizessaid applicants a provisional increase.

3. The petitioners, Senator Ernesto Maceda and Atty. Oliver Lozano submits that the samewas issued without proper notice and
hearing in violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of Executive Order No. 172, and has been issued with grave abuse of
discretion,tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.

4. Hence, this petition praying for injunctive relief, to stop the Energy Regulatory Boardfrom implementing its order mandating
a provisional increase in the prices of petroleumand petroleum products.

Issue:
Whether or not the Order of the Energy Regulatory Board is valid?

Held:

YES.
Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the lack of a hearing, have overlooked theprovisions of Section 8 of Executive
Order No. 172 which authorizes the Board to grantprovisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative,
without prejudice to afinal decision after hearing, should the Board find that the documentary evidences substantiallysupport
the provisional order. Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule and conducta hearing thereon within thirty (30)
days thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affectedparties.: naSection 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate
each other, or otherwise, operateexclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same
time.Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree aprice adjustment, subject to
the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, itmay order, under Section 8, an authority to increase
provisionally, without need of a hearing,subject to the final outcome of the proceeding.

WILMER GREGO, petitioner, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HUMBERTO BASCO, respondents

G.R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997

FACTS:

In 1981, Basco was removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff for serious misconduct. Subsequently, he ran as a candidate for
councilor in the Second District of the City of Manila during the 1988, local elections. He won and assumed office. After his
term, Basco sought re-election. Again, he won. However, he found himself facing lawsuits filed by his opponents who wanted to
dislodge him from his position.

Petitioner argues that Basco should be disqualified from running for any elective position since he had been “removed from
office as a result of an administrative case” pursuant to Section 40 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160.

For a third time, Basco was elected councilor in 1995. Expectedly, his right to office was again contested. In 1995, petitioner
Grego filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification. The COMELEC conducted a hearing and ordered the parties to
submit their respective memoranda.

However, the Manila City BOC proclaimed Basco in May 1995, as a duly elected councilor for the Second District of Manila,
placing sixth among several candidates who vied for the seats. Basco immediately took his oath of office.

COMELEC resolved to dismiss the petition for disqualification. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said resolution was
later denied by the COMELEC,, hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC acted in with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the petition for disqualification.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in dismissing the petition for
disqualification, however, the Court noted that they do not agree with its conclusions and reasons in the assailed resolution.

The Court reiterated that being merely an implementing rule, Sec 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure must not override, but
instead remain consistent with and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement. Administrative rules and
regulations are intended to carry out, neither to supplant nor to modify, the law. The law itself cannot be extended to
amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. An administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails
because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law. Since Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646,
the law which Section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure seeks to implement, employed the word “may,” it is,
therefore, improper and highly irregular for the COMELEC to have used instead the word “shall” in its rules.

Still, the Court DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit

SEC. 5. Effect of petition if unresolved before completion of canvass. - x x x (H)is proclamation shall be suspended
notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning number of votes in such election.

Grego vs. COMELEC GR. No. 125955, June 19, 1997

FACTS:

On Oct. 31. 1981, private respondent Basco was removed from office as Deputy sheriff by the court upon finding of serious
misconduct in an administrative complaint. Ran for councilor in the second district of Manila and had won the race for 3 term.
On his final term, an election protest was filed against him by petitioner Grego, seeking to disqualify him on the ground that he
was removed previously in an office as a result of an administrative case. On May 14, 1995, COMELEC ordered the parties to
submit memoranda, but before the parties able to comply the directive, the Board of Canvassers proclaimed Basco as duly
elected councilor and took his oath of office. Petitioner contends that, respondent COMELEC should have suspended the
proclamation. Such act according to the petitioner violated the provision of sec. 6 of R.A 6646, which prohibits the proclamation
of the elected candidate by the COMELEC pending final judgment on the case filed, uses the word may, therefore giving
discretion to order the suspension of the proclamation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent COMELEC violated the provision of R.A 6646 when it did not suspend the proclamation of the
petitioner as the elected councilor pending final judgment of the case filed against it.

HELD:

It did not. The use of the word “may” in sec.6 of R.A 6646 indicates that the proclamation
is merely directory and permissive in nature and confers no jurisdiction. What is merely mandatory, according to the provision
itself, is the continuation of trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest. The rule or regulations should be within the scope
of the authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule
or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulations cannot go beyond the terms
and provisions of the basic. Since section 6 of R.A 6646, the law which section 5 of Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
seeks to
implement, employed the word “may”, it is, therefore improper and highly irregular for the
COMELEC to have used instead
the word “shall” in its rules.

hilippines Interisland Shipping Association vs CAIt came to pass that a response from a clamor of harbour pilots for an increase
in pilotagerates was given by the then President Marcos through the issuance of an E.O No. 1088
“
PROVIDING FOR UNIFORM AND MODIFIED RATES FOR PILOTAGE SERVICESRENDERED TO FOREIGN AND COASTWISE VESSELS IN
ALL PRIVATE AND PUBLICPORTS. The executive order increased substantially the rates of the existing pilotage
fees previously fixed by the PPA.” Duri
ng that time the President was exercisinglegislative power and was authorized
However, PPA was reluctant to enforce the same arguing that it was issued hastily and it was just an Administrative Order
whereby PPA has the power to revised EO 1088 which it did so by issuing A.O. No. 43-86,
which fixed lower rates of pilotage fees, and evenentirely left the fees to be paid for pilotage to the agreement of the parties to
acontract..
Actually Philippine Interisland Shipping Association of the Philippines is jus an intervenorin the factual milieu that lead us to this
issue. For Purposes of Admin Law we should not care about it.Issue: Is E.O. No. 1088 an Administrative Order and by virtue of
which PPA has the powerto modify the same.Held: EO 1088 is a law.
The fixing of rates is essentially a legislative power.is no basis for petitioners' argument that rate fixing is merely an exercise of
administrative power, that if President Marcos had power to revise the ratespreviously fixed by the PPA through the issuance of
E.O. No. 1088, the PPA could inturn revise those fixed by the President, as the PPA actually did in A.O. No. 43-86,which fixed
lower rates of pilotage fees, and even entirely left the fees to be paid forpilotage to the agreement of the parties to a contract.
The orders previously issuedby the PPA were in the nature of subordinate legislation, promulgated by it in theexercise of
delegated power. As such these could only be amended or revised by law,as the President did by E.O. No. 1088.It is not an
answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statutebecause that would imply the withdrawal of power from
the PPA. What determineswhether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature.Here, as we have
already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for services,including pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative
in character.(Note: Bold letters are copied from the Original Supreme Court decision)