Vous êtes sur la page 1sur 10

G.R. No.

79538

Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc

October 18, 1990

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest
Development which cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of
TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by the Bureau to private respondents in 1984 by sending
letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner’s prayers were to no avail. Hence the petition in the
Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondents.

RULING:

The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within there scope
without need of interference by the courts of law. These administrative bodies are deemed to
be in better positions to determine issues within their specialty and resolve the same. The
Court cited the doctrine of res judicata which avers that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by
competent authority acting within their exclusive jurisdiction

The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the latter’s
duty to develop and conserve the country’s natural resources in view of the constitutional
mandate of the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to regulate the issuance of licenses (TLA) as they
see fit, which the court cannot interfere with. The Court further held that sans grave abuse of
discretion which may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled that petitioner cannot
seek affirmative relief.
REPUBLIC v. CA and BERNABE

G.R. No. L-40402 March 16, 1987; Paras, J.:

FACTS:

Lot No. 622 of the Mariveles Cadastre was declared public land in a decision rendered before
the last war in Cadastral Case No. 19, LRC Cadastral Record No. 1097. On July 6, 1965 such lot
was segregated from the forest zone and released and certified by the Bureau of Forestry as an
Agricultural Land for disposition under the Public Land Act. On April 26, 1967, Respondents filed
in the CFI of Bataan a petition to reopen Cadastral Case No. 19 to perfect their rights and
register their titles to said lots. They alleged that they acquired ownership and possession of
said parcels of land by purchase from the original owners thereof, whose possession of the
same including that of the herein respondents, has always been continuous, open, active,
exclusive, public, adverse and in the concept of owners for more than 30 years. The Director of
Forestry filed an opposition to the above petition but later withdrew the same upon
verification of findings that this portion of the timberland had already been released from the
mass of the public forests. Subsequently, the Acting Prov. Fiscal of Bataan, for and in behalf of
the Director of Lands filed his opposition alleging that the land is STILL Public Land and as such
cannot be the subject of a land registration proceeding under Act 496. The lower court
adjudicated in favor or respondent Bernabes, finding that the latter have complied with all the
terms and conditions entitling them to a grant. This decision having become final, the
Commissioner of Land Registration issued the corresponding decrees of registration. On the
other hand, petitioner DL through the Solicitor Gen. filed a petition for review of the decrees.
Afterwards, he filed an Amended Petition for Review, adding: that respondents executed
simulated deeds of sale conveying portions of the subject parcels to third parties for fictitious
considerations in order to remove the same from the coverage of Sec. 38 of Act 496, but in
truth, buyers are mere dummies of petitioners; hence, not purchasers for value. The CFI denied
this petition and on appeal, the CA affirmed the questioned decision. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration having been denied for lack of merit; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON THE LOTS CLAIMED BY RESPONDENTS COULD LEGALLY BE THE SUBJECT OF A JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF TITLE UNDER SEC. 48 (b) OF COMMONWEALTH ACT 141 AS AMENDED BY
R.A. 1942.

HELD:

NEGATIVE. The Supreme Court ruled that Sec. 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies exclusively
to public lands. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded. Thus, possession of
forest lands, however long cannot ripen into private ownership. A parcel of forest land is within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of
the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System. Thus, even if the reopening of the
cadastral proceedings was at all possible, private respondents have not qualified for a grant
under Section 48 (b) of CA 141. They can only be credited with 1 year, 9 mos. and 20 days of
possession and occupation of the lots involved, counted from July 6, 1965 when the lots
involved had been segregated from the forest zone and released by the BOF as an agricultural
land for disposition under the Public Land Act. As such, respondents and their predecessors in
interest could not have possessed the lots for the required period of 30 years as disposable
agricultural land.
Lagua vs Cusi

april 15 1988

DOCTRINE:

It is beyond the power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the
unlawful closure of a passage way, much lessaward or deny the payment of damages based on
such closure. Not every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Forest Development

FACTS:

In a vigorous complaint, the petitioners, alleged, among others: In Paragraph 5(a):a) On


1 January 1976, Atty. Ernesto Nombrado, legal counsel for defendants, issued a memorandum
to the Chief Security Guard of Defendant East coast directing the latter to prevent the passage
of Plaintiff Laguas' hauling trucks loaded with logs for the Japanese vessel (there were no other
trucks hauling logs at that time) on the national highway loading towards where the vessel was
berthed. In compliance with this directive, the security force of Defendant Eastcoast closed the
road to the use by plaintiffs trucks and other equipments and effectively prevented their
passage thereof while the vehicles and trucks. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
on two grounds, namely: (1) lack of jurisdiction, and (2) lack of cause of action. The private
respondents extended that as the acts complained of by the petitioners arose out of the
legitimate exercise of respondent Eastcoast Development Enterprises, Inc., rights as a timber
licensee, more particularly in the use of its logging roads, therefore, the resolution of this
question is properly and legally within the Bureau of Forest Development, citing as authority
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705. The private respondents also argued that petitioner
Daylinda Laguas has no capacity to sue as her name was not registered as an "agent" or
"dealer" of logs in the Bureau of Forestry.

ISSUE: w/n the petition for mandamus may be entertained by the trial court.

Yes. The petition for mandamus will be treated as a petition for certiorari in the interest
of justice. The petitioners maintain that since their action is for damages, the regular courts
have jurisdiction over the same. According to them, the respondent court had no basis for
holding that the Bureau of Forestry Development must first determine that the closure of a
logging road is illegal before an action for damages can be instituted. P.D. No. 705 upon which
the respondent court based its order does not vest any power in the Bureau of Forest
Development to determine whether or not the closure of a logging road is legal or illegal and to
make such determination a pre-requisite before an action for damages may be maintained.
Moreover, the complaint instituted by the petitioners is clearly for damages based on the
alleged illegal closure of the logging road. Whether or not such closure was illegal is a matter to
be established on the part of the petitioners and a matter to be disproved by the private
respondents. This should appropriately be threshed out in a judicial proceeding. It is beyond the
power and authority of the Bureau of Forest Development to determine the unlawful closure of
a passage way, much less award or deny the payment of damages based on such closure. Not
every activity inside a forest area is subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest
Development. Anent the legal capacity to sue of the petitioners, spouses Laguas, we affirm the
trial court's ruling that since they were mere agents of petitioners Achanzar and Donga and
were suing in their own behalf, they did not have the capacity to sue for damages. They are not
the real parties in interest. However, the complaint can still be maintained. It cannot be
dismissed because the real parties in interest, Achanzar and Donga were also plaintiffs. Thus,
the trial court should have ordered only the dropping of the names of the spouses Laguas
pursuant to Section 11, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court but not the dismissal of the
complaint.
Republic vs Naguiat

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws

G.R. No. 134209; January 24, 2006

FACTS:

Celestina Naguiat filed an application for registration of title to four parcels of land
located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales. The applicant alleges that she is the owner of the said
parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from its previous owners and their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years;
and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of
whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession
thereof.

Petitioner Republic opposed on the ground that neither the applicant nor her
predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto, considering the
fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest
or timber zone to alienable and disposable property.

ISSUE:

Did the areas in question cease to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of
the public domain?

HELD:

No, the said areas are still classified as forest land.The issue of whether or not
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, exclusive and continuous
possession of the parcels of land in question is of little moment. For, unclassified land cannot be
acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner,
however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be registered as title.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of
land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way
places. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to
be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.
CASE DIGEST: Tan v Director of Forestry

FACTS:

Sometime in April 1961, the Bureau of Forestry issued notice advertising for public
bidding a certain tract of public forest land situated in Olongapo, Zambales consisting of 6,420
hectares, within the former U.S. Naval Reservation comprising 7,252 hectares of timberland,
which was turned over by the US Government to the Philippine Government. Wenceslao Tan
with nine others submitted their application in due form.

The area was granted to the petitioner. On May 30, 1963, Secretary Gozon of
Agriculture and Natural Resources issued a general memorandum order authorizing Dir. Of
Forestry to grant new Ordinary Timber Licenses (OTL) subject to some conditions stated therein
(not exceeding 3000 hectares for new OTL and not exceeding 5000 hectares for extension)

Thereafter, Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Feliciano (replacing


Gozon) promulgated on December 19, 1963 a memorandum revoking the authority delegated
to the Director of Forestry to grant ordinary timber licenses. On the same date, OTL in the name
of Tan, was signed by then Acting Director of Forestry, without the approval of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. On January 6, 1964, the license was released by the Director
of Forestry .

Ravago Commercial Company wrote a letter to the Secretary of ANR praying that the
OTL of Tan be revoked. On March 9, 1964, The Secretary of ANR declared Tan’s OTL null and
void (but the same was not granted to Ravago). Petitioner-appellant moved for a
reconsideration of the order, but the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources denied the
motion.

ISSUES:

I. Whether or not petitioner’s timber license is valid (No)

II. Whether or not petitioner had exhausted administrative remedies available (No)

RULING:

I.

Petitioner’s timber license was signed and released without authority and is therefore
void ab initio. In the first place, in the general memorandum dated May 30, 1963, the Director
of Forestry was authorized to grant a new ordinary timber license only where the area covered
thereby was not more than 3,000 hectares; the tract of public forest awarded to the petitioner
contained 6,420 hectares In the second place, at the time it was released to the petitioner, the
Acting Director of Forestry had no more authority to grant any license. (The license was
released to the petitioner on January 6, 1964 while on the other hand, the authority of the
Director of Forestry to issue license was revoked on December 19, 1963). In view thereof, the
Director of Forestry had no longer any authority to release the license on January 6, 1964, and
said license is therefore void ab initio. What is of greatest importance is the date of the release
or issuance. Before its release, no right is acquired by the licensee.

Granting arguendo, that petitioner-appellant's timber license is valid, still respondents-


appellees can validly revoke his timber license. "A license is merely a permit or privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state,
or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a
property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation

The welfare of the people is the supreme law. Thus, no franchise or right can be availed
of to defeat the proper exercise of police power.

II.

Petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedy in this case. He did not appeal the
order of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the
Philippines. Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or
acts of the respondents, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on
his part to exhaust his administrative remedies.