THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO (G.R. No.

105371, November 11, 1993)

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this
hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself
affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time.
Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other
office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers
of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the
above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own
activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject
and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory
and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes.
The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it
is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the
Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:

a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to
addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered flow or
exchange of postal matters between nations;

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs,
including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;
 d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall cost of
providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and
continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under
Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation
may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single
detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement. 2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been
correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject
as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be
included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution.
If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that
they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is
properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the
new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more
germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected
therewith." 4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it
is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case, 6 if the
title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters
by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of
the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our
ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of
the said law.

II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No.
720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before
 its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill
when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both
chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second
paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.

These argument are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited
in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be
inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results,
results beyond its mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference
committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed
by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from
the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez 7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas andnays on the final
reading of the
bill). 8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S.
vs. Pons, 9 where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.

Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it
retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. 10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance
with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the
Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the
Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars. 13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the
President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as
acourtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of
its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the
selection?

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon, by
the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or
attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political
departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the
government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the
extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private
individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for
the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for
a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people.

Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has
been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the
privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify
the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while
extending it to others less deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January
1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the
Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe
Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of
P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the
franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to
those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly
(especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really
necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by
retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those
favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by
violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of
the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the
Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National
Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized
in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not
send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the
franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it
should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege
in the discharge of their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied
by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the
exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the
franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the
respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating
with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget
compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than
1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a
purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by
the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that
denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary
and the grantees of the franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this
Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of
the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate
power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political
system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases
before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register
of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2,
1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., vs. DRILON (G.R. No. 81958, June 30, 1988)

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to
be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United
States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor
General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is whether or not
it is valid under the Constitution.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits." 6

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the
taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has
been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." 8

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby
to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of
the greater number.

Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it
may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of
the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 12

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.

 13
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, the presumption logically stands.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import
a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications
rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force
abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and
personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of
torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely
the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the
Court sustains the Government's efforts.

The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for
isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no
argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing
some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of
evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or
arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration
and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is
simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this
Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.

As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it
is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or
the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its
wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns,
especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively
enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that
Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the
fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a
deployment ban.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is
the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this
Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those
conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the
Philippines and in the host countries . . ." 18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with
a greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary
malleability, depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in
countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino
workers. 19
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does
not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of
persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously
clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that
"takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and
needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a
real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize
its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be
an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the
basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of
equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not
the contrary.)

It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered
provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote:

5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills

defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the
suspension.

5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government;

5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and

5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international
organizations.

5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor
agreements or understanding.

xxx xxx xxx

7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic

helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite
only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served employment
contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the
suspension and the provision of these guidelines.

xxx xxx xxx

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon

recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in
countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of Filipino workers. 24

xxx xxx xxx

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject,
among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a
valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26pursuant to the
respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner assumes that it is
unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The
disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It
is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking
powers in the enforcement whereof. 28

The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the
demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation.

The Constitution declares that:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. 30

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to
send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally
and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite
ban on deployment.

The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that
it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by
the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in
this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.

This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of
the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is
profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be
tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
PANFILO M. LACSON vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. No. 128096, January 20, 1999)

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings
with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where
slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group
(ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of
May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any
criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said
incident was a legitimate police operation. 1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's
finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein
petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the
charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information
for murder 2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were
among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action. 4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations 5before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia,
Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from the case.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975. 7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG)
27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking
principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at
least SG 27.

Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with
Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan
admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent
or higher.

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain
with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with
the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 1094 11(sponsored by
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
844 12 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the Philippines on
February 5, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."

On the same day 15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de
Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and
the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of
the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring
and dissenting opinion.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely,
Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these
cases — in fact, no order of arrest has been issued — this court has competence to take cognizance of
these cases.

To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the
Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides
that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof."
Petitioner argues that:

a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was
made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months
the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot,
and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)

b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar
circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as
provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post
facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057
to procedural due process.

c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4
and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating
the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution. 17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears
to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute
impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the
accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried
before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-
tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of
the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be
dismissed.

This Court then issued a Resolution 19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10)
days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a
Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within
the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required
supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of
proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly
discharged in the present case.

The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall
have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:

Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise
its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the
following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 123, 23 P.D. No. 1860, 24 P.D. No. 1861, 25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249. 27 Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;
 (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.

(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to
the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in
cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
 shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has
not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
 b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a
of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27"
or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment,
resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade
"27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.

xxx xxx xxx

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the
above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal"
that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying
on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases
since none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the
other hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before
the Supreme Court except in certain cases, 29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in
1986 (sequestration cases), 31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title
VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4
of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their
office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed
in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not
make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which
does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
law 33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a
contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges
the law must present proof of arbitrariness. 34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of
the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose
trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on
substantial distinction that makes real differences. 36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented,
whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional
limitations, 37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases,
which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot
now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely,
paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory
provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the
law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of
the new law (R.A. 8249).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the
part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong
Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further
contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other
Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249. 39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators
and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and,
finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the
same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the
legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of
which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative
powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation. 40

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases constitutes an ex post facto law 41 for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no
longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull, 42 an ex post facto law is
one —
 (a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed.

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the
defendant. 43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of
a person to his disadvantage. 44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of a amnesty. 45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; 47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their
punishment. 48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being
a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has
been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court
several times 50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by
law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post
facto laws. 51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake
the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. 52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of
law. 55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if
he presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis
is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does
is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does
not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.
The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule
is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that
general subject. 59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section
2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts. 60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive
procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the
allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple
murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial. 62

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A.
8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for
the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it. 63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases
committed by the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in
relation to their office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its
jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the
office of the accussed PNP officers.

In People vs. Montejo, 64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. 65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations." 66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be
stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)

As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." 67The real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. 68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69

The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the accused with such a descretion of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of
the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of
law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact andcircumstance necessary to constitute the
crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)

It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no
indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against
herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between
the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.

In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:
 AMENDED INFORMATIONS

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F.
CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III,
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2
NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of
Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows

That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP.
ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN,
SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and
SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and
members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public
office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL
AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO,
CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN
DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS,
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office
as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-
fact for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there
where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision,
Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

CONTRARY LAW.

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in
relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in
their custody.

Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories
after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the
crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid
conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May
18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader.
There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the
"raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as
alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal
accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two
places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said
accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see
the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is
an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the
mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his
office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the
close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.

In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue,
we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information
and not by the result of evidence after trial.

In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged

Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol
and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen
appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then established
a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control where
his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain
person without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that
in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon
his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in
consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was
perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions
and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal
motive in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office
of the accused.

Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not
indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of
the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin
the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these
allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does
not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to
qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with
the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5,
1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the said cases.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE) vs. QUISUMBING (G.R. No. 128845, June 1, 2000)

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos,
cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course,
beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long
honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold
today.1âwphi1.nêt

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents.1 To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction,
Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected
by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable
laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees.

Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be
classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:

a. What is one's domicile?

b. Where is one's home economy?

c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?

d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing
that individual to the Philippines?2

Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire;
otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires
have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:

A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and
take the risk of deviating from a promising career path — all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an
educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for
oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children,
adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement
compensation.

Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that
he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of
obtaining suitable employment after along period in a foreign land.

The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international
level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education. 3

When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School
Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" 4 of the
School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the
parties.

On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to
bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the
parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.

Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the
grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities
other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires. 5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that
these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.

The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell,
there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires. 6

The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:

The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The international
character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different
cultures, among the student population.

We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel
which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in
order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the
international market.

Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires
who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in
other terms and conditions of employment which include the employment which include the employment contract.

A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional
compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:

All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof
provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers
from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.

Appendix C of said CBA further provides:

The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule.
The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the
OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).

To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of
employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.

The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle
of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private
covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial
distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign
hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines
and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the
School.7

We cannot agree.

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy
against these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.

International law, which springs from general principles of law,9 likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of
law include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is
reasonable. 11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 12 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, 13 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 the Convention
against Discrimination in Education, 15 the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment
and Occupation 16 — all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice.
The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.

The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment. 20

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal
value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:

a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with
equal pay for equal work;

xxx xxx xxx

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22 This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.

The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-
hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If
the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for
the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary
rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the
Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of
services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission, 24 we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's
business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it
carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the
prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same
salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve
as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full
protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. 27 These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to
public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties
of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests
Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. 30 The basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees
the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. 31

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of
collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar
functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to
local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are
reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective
bargaining rights.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.

SO ORDERED.
ISHMAEL HIMAGAN vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994)

Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at
Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe
Machitar. After the informations for murder 1 and attempted murder 2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case
on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,
which provides:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused
from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours).

On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, 3 relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the
Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v.
Sandiganbayan, 4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan. 5 In his order dated December 14, 1993 6 respondent judge denied the
motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is
terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied. 7 Hence, the petition
for certiorari andmandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive
suspension.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under the Revised
Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute
however, is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first sentence of
Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one
(1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same section mandates
that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the
accused.

Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads:

Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of
the Department.

he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the
maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:

Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the
administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by
the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension
herein provided.

He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the requirements in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and
the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not
terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.

We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other
meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is
six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the
termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other.
The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The
answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90)
days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is
not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable
reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal 8 or
civil liability. 9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a
speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the
case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition ormandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas
corpus. 10

Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the
lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more,
Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that
"The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine
National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days
cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the
penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.

Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A.
3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:

Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an information
was filed against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended
for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive
suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and shortened his term of office. Thus:

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not
expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan
according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26,
1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of
suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or
malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is
entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its
continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if
thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there
would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted
likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve
as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive
suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is
thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should
be lifted.
 3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal
protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local
Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is
allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In
all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." It
may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government
officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the
opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President,
facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a
situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after
due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law." Further: "In
the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be
removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.
Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite
duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of
the equal protection guarantee. 11

The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who

was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court, faced with similar
factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due process and
equal protection."

It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused
in Laynoand Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the
suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so
in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls
squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated.
The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it
say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the
ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the law.
When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12

Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that
became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all
the more clear. We quote:

So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?"
What is this all about?

REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now, if it
is charged with a crime, regular courts.

SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.

REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal

Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six
years and one day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from the
office until the case is terminated."

REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more.

SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . .?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 — Preventive Suspension.

REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case
at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot
iyong mga witnesses.

SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.

REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case." Okay ito but I
think we should also mandate the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi
ba "the suspension of the accused from office until the case is terminated?" Alam naman
natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa e.

REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case can be, as
Rene pointed out, can run to six years bago
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should mandate. . .

REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period.

REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?

REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,

SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall
also be terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon.

REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as
directory even if you put it in the law?

SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a
particular situation.

SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety
days.

REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these, well, looks
exactly the same thing.
SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really
keen on having it quick, swift.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.

REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.

REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan,
the preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days
which can also be applicable here because this is a preventive suspension.

SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.

SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed against a
policeman may be anti-graft in nature. . .

SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?

REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for criminal
cases. I know anti-graft is a criminal case but here we are talking, let's say, of murder,
rape, treason, robbery. That's why it is in that context that there is a difference between a
purely anti-graft case and a criminal case which could be a serious case since it is six
years and one day or more, so it must be already a grave felony.

xxx xxx xxx

REP. ALBANO. . . .

What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the

Veloso case.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The
feeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case.

What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is
terminated, but he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us study
what kind of language could be done along that line. So just on the National Police
Commission . . .

SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.

SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not
later than . . ." whatever we agree.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.

So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police Commission.
. . . . . 13
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged
with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues
until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the
mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under
Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and
oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause
does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not
absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and
substantial differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as violating the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper
legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
ARTURO GALLARDO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (G.R. No. 142030. April 21, 2005)

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan1(Second Division) in Criminal Case No. 25092 denying petitioners’ Motion To Quash.

The records show that the above-numbered case originated from a sworn letter-complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao by Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan,
Davao del Sur, charging herein petitioners Mayor Arturo A. Gallardo, Vice-Mayor Peter Melchor J. Arches, Sangguniang
Bayan members Allan B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N. Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina delos
Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin, Quirina T. Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P. Espina, Noel Guinita and Budget
Officer Ofelia Nacional, all public officers of the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of
the mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan accruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature of
unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits.2

On 08 January 1999, herein public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the Resolution dated 26
November 1998 of Graft Investigation Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding
probable cause to indict petitioners of the crime alleged.3

On 13 January 1999, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan which reads:

That sometime in or about January, 1998, or shortly prior or subsequent thereto, in Davao del Sur, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Mayor Arturo A. Gallardo with salary grade 27, Vice-mayor Peter
Melchor J. Arches with salary grade 25, Sangguniang Bayan Members with salary grade 24 Allan B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N.
Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina delos Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin, Quirina T.
Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P. Espina, Noel Guinita and Budget Officer Ofelia Nacional all public officers of the
Local Government Unit of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, committing the offense while in the performance of their official duties
and taking advantage of their public position, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, did there and
then, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, cause undue injury to the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of the Municipality of
Bansalan, to wit: by illegally and unjustifiably refusing to perform their duties to include an appropriation in the municipal
budget for the payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan due to the complaining
PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in the aggregate amount of P3,833,798.10
Philippine currency, thus causing undue damage and injury to the complaining PHWs thru evident bad faith in the
performance of their official duties.4

On 24 February 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.5 The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in a
resolution dated 27 April 1999 and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. 6 In a resolution dated 26 July
1999, Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., recommended the dismissal of the case, which recommendation was
approved by Prosecution Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and
concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo.7 This recommendation, however, was disapproved by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto who stated in his own handwriting "[l]et the court determine if indeed the evidence cannot
stand the judicial scrutiny."8

On 15 November 1999, petitioners filed a motion to quash the information anchored on the following grounds: 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; 2) the accused are denied due process; and 3) the accused are not accorded the
equal protection of laws.9

On 06 January 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ motion. It ruled that the averments in the Information
sufficiently charged the offense, and that the mere fact that cases similar to this case were dismissed by the Ombudsman
does not mean due process or equal protection of the law clause was denied the petitioners.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that the reinvestigation conducted by Ombudsman Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., showed
that insufficient funds were the reason for petitioners’ failure to appropriate the money to meet the magna carta benefits of
PHWs and that petitioners acted in good faith when they failed to enact the required appropriation ordinance. The
Sandiganbayan should have duly considered such findings and the evidence adduced supporting the same, irrespective
of the opinion of Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. They conclude that the Sandiganbayan erred when it totally failed to
consider the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
Petitioners likewise argue that the one-sentence disapproval by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the recommendations
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious for he failed to explain how such action
was arrived at, thereby depriving petitioners of their rights to be informed of the facts and the law on which the denial was
based.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that petitioners’ choice of remedy is clearly erroneous.

It is basic that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from judgment or final orders. 10 A final order is one which
disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined.11 The resolution of the Sandiganbayan sought to be reviewed or set
aside is not in any sense judgment or a final order, but an interlocutory order.12 An order is interlocutory if it does not
dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits. 13The order of the Sandiganbayan
denying the motion to quash filed by petitioners is interlocutory in nature because it leaves something more to be done by
the Sandiganbayan, by way of resolving the case on the merits. The denial of petitioners’ motion to quash allows the
same petitioners to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on their part to present the special defenses they invoked in
their motion and if, after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom via appeal by certiorari.14

Even if we consider the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we find that the Sandiganbayan
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash.

Petitioners fault the Sandiganbayan for not taking into account the findings and recommendations of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor which found no probable cause to charge them. Allied to this assignment of error is petitioners’
allegation that the Ombudsman failed to accord them due process of law and equal protection of the law. They claimed
they were denied due process because Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation of Special
Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., by simply writing a one-line note. The disapproval allegedly deprived them of their right
to be informed of the facts and law on which the said disapproval was based. It is further asseverated that they were
deprived the equal protection of law since the Ombudsman, in sixteen (16) previous cases which were similar to the case
at bar, dismissed the same.

These arguments are specious. Petitioners’ submission that they were deprived of due process hinges on the erroneous
assumption that respondent Ombudsman failed to assess and consider the evidence presented by petitioners when he
disapproved the recommendation by the investigating prosecutor to dismiss the case, and that his ruling was not
supported by evidence on record.

The truth of the matter is that petitioners were not denied due process of law. The order of the Ombudsman for the filing of
the necessary information is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the
evidence presented. It may appear that the Ombudsman’s one-line note lacks any factual or evidentiary grounds as it did
not set forth the same. The state of affairs, however, is that the Ombudsman’s note stems from his review of the findings
of fact reached by the investigating prosecutor.15 The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor’s conclusion,
was of the conviction that petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct
an investigation anew.16 He is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation by the
investigating prosecutor, i.e., whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of the
latter. He may agree, fully or partly, or disagree completely with the investigating prosecutor. Whatever course of action
that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor,
is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate.17 Generally, courts should not interfere
in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting
or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman which is absent in the case at hand.18Such
initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people
and preserver of the integrity of the public service.19

The fact that the Ombudsman merely wrote his recommendation for the filing of the information against petitioners in a
one-line note is not a sufficient basis for this Court to attribute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of respondent. As held
in Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan:20

The mere fact that the order to file the information against petitioner was contained in a marginal note is not sufficient to
impute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of the respondent special prosecutors, absent a clear showing that they gravely
abused their discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors to dismiss or withdraw the
case against petitioner. Neither are these notes tainted with or indicative of vindictiveness or arbitrariness as imputed by
petitioner. Public respondents disapproved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors because they sincerely
believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict the accused.

The contention that petitioners’ right to equal protection of the law has been transgressed is equally untenable. The equal
protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons
are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed.21 It allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one
class may be treated differently from another.22 Simply because the respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases
allegedly similar to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his part, absent a clear showing
that he gravely abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he
believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended
the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was
only exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional mandate of his office. Stated otherwise,
the circumstances obtaining in the numerous cases previously dismissed by the Ombudsman are entirely divergent from
those here existing.

In the same vein, respondent Sandiganbayan could not be blamed for not considering the findings of the special
prosecutor because the rule is that in case of conflict in the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the special prosecutor, it
is the former’s decision that shall prevail since the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision and control of
the Ombudsman.23 Moreover, once a case has been filed with the court, it is that court, no longer the prosecution, which
has full control of the case, so much so that the information may grant or deny it, in the faithful exercise of judicial
discretion.24 The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.25 In the instant case, respondent
court is convinced that there is adequate evidence against the petitioners. Absence of proof that it gravely abused its
discretion, the conclusion arrived at by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed resolution, will not be disturbed.

Besides, petitioners’ argument that they could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 as they
acted in good faith when they failed to appropriate funds for the unpaid salary differential and magna cartabenefits due the
private complainants, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, which could be raised in a full-blown trial on the
merits.26 As aptly held in Deloso v. Desierto:27

Public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged.
They merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that prosecutors
believe that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charges.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
BELTRAN vs. SECRETARY OF HEALTH (G.R. No. 133640 November 25, 2005)

Before this Court are petitions assailing primarily the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719, otherwise
known as the "National Blood Services Act of 1994," and the validity of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995
or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719.

G.R. No. 133640,1 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank,
et al., vs. The Secretary of Health" and G.R. No. 133661,2 entitled "Doctors Blood Bank Center vs. Department of Health"
are petitions for certiorari and mandamus, respectively, seeking the annulment of the following: (1) Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 7719; and, (2) Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1995. Both petitions likewise pray for the issuance of a
writ of prohibitory injunction enjoining the Secretary of Health from implementing and enforcing the aforementioned law
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations; and, for a mandatory injunction ordering and commanding the Secretary of
Health to grant, issue or renew petitioners’ license to operate free standing blood banks (FSBB).

The above cases were consolidated in a resolution of the Court En Banc dated June 2, 1998.3

G.R. No. 139147,4 entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank,
et al., vs. The Secretary of Health," on the other hand, is a petition to show cause why respondent Secretary of Health
should not be held in contempt of court.

This case was originally assigned to the Third Division of this Court and later consolidated with G.R. Nos. 133640 and
133661 in a resolution dated August 4, 1999.5

Petitioners comprise the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Association of Blood Banks, a duly registered
non-stock and non-profit association composed of free standing blood banks.

Public respondent Secretary of Health is being sued in his capacity as the public official directly involved and charged with
the enforcement and implementation of the law in question.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to
provide

an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. It
was approved by then President Fidel V. Ramos on May 15, 1994 and was subsequently published in the Official Gazette
on August 18, 1994. The law took effect on August 23, 1994.

On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). 6

Section 7 of R.A. 7719 7 provides:

"Section 7. Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks - All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of
two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary."

Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides:

"Section 23. Process of Phasing Out. -- The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over
a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision
to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety." 8

Blood banking and blood transfusion services in the country have been arranged in four (4) categories: blood centers run
by the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC), government-run blood services, private hospital blood banks, and
commercial blood services.

Years prior to the passage of the National Blood Services Act of 1994, petitioners have already been operating
commercial blood banks under Republic Act No. 1517, entitled "An Act Regulating the Collection, Processing and Sale of
Human Blood, and the Establishment and Operation of Blood Banks and Blood Processing Laboratories." The law, which
was enacted on June 16, 1956, allowed the establishment and operation by licensed physicians of blood banks and blood
processing laboratories. The Bureau of Research and Laboratories (BRL) was created in 1958 and was given the power
to regulate clinical laboratories in 1966 under Republic Act No. 4688. In 1971, the Licensure Section was created within
the BRL. It was given the duty to enforce the licensure requirements for blood banks as well as clinical laboratories. Due
to this development, Administrative Order No. 156, Series of 1971, was issued. The new rules and regulations triggered a
stricter enforcement of the Blood Banking Law, which was characterized by frequent spot checks, immediate suspension
and communication of such suspensions to hospitals, a more systematic record-keeping and frequent communication with
blood banks through monthly information bulletins. Unfortunately, by the 1980’s, financial difficulties constrained the BRL
to reduce the frequency of its supervisory visits to the blood banks. 9

Meanwhile, in the international scene, concern for the safety of blood and blood products intensified when the dreaded
disease Acute Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) was first described in 1979. In 1980, the International Society of
Blood Transfusion (ISBT) formulated the Code of Ethics for Blood Donation and Transfusion. In 1982, the first case of
transfusion-associated AIDS was described in an infant. Hence, the ISBT drafted in 1984, a model for a national blood
policy outlining certain principles that should be taken into consideration. By 1985, the ISBT had disseminated guidelines
requiring AIDS testing of blood and blood products for transfusion. 10

In 1989, another revision of the Blood Banking Guidelines was made. The DOH issued Administrative Order No. 57,
Series of 1989, which classified banks into primary, secondary and tertiary depending on the services they provided. The
standards were adjusted according to this classification. For instance, floor area requirements varied according to
classification level. The new guidelines likewise required Hepatitis B and HIV testing, and that the blood bank be headed
by a pathologist or a hematologist.11

In 1992, the DOH issued Administrative Order No. 118-A institutionalizing the National Blood Services Program (NBSP).
The BRL was designated as the central office primarily responsible for the NBSP. The program paved the way for the
creation of a committee that will implement the policies of the program and the formation of the Regional Blood Councils.

In August 1992, Senate Bill No. 1011, entitled "An Act Promoting Voluntary Blood Donation, Providing for an Adequate
Supply of Safe Blood, Regulating Blood Banks and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof, and for other Purposes"
was introduced in the Senate.12

Meanwhile, in the House of Representatives, House Bills No. 384, 546, 780 and 1978 were being deliberated to address
the issue of safety of the Philippine blood bank system. Subsequently, the Senate and House Bills were referred to the
appropriate committees and subsequently consolidated.13

In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the assistance of the U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID) released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system entitled "Project to
Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking System." It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992,
64.4 % were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by government hospital-based blood
banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based blood banks. During the time the study was made, there were only twenty-four
(24) registered or licensed free-standing or commercial blood banks in the country. Hence, with these numbers in mind,
the study deduced that each commercial blood bank produces five times more blood than the Red Cross and fifteen times
more than the government-run blood banks. The study, therefore, showed that the Philippines heavily relied on
commercial sources of blood. The study likewise revealed that 99.6% of the donors of commercial blood banks and 77.0%
of the donors of private-hospital based blood banks are paid donors. Paid donors are those who receive remuneration for
donating their blood. Blood donors of the PNRC and government-run hospitals, on the other hand, are mostly voluntary.14

It was further found, among other things, that blood sold by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more
likely to have any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis,
Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.15

Commercial blood banks give paid donors varying rates around P50 to P150, and because of this arrangement, many of
these donors are poor, and often they are students, who need cash immediately. Since they need the money, these
donors are not usually honest about their medical or social history. Thus, blood from healthy, voluntary donors who give
their true medical and social history are about three times much safer than blood from paid donors.16

What the study also found alarming is that many Filipino doctors are not yet fully trained on the specific indications for
blood component transfusion. They are not aware of the lack of blood supply and do not feel the need to adjust their
practices and use of blood and blood products. It also does not matter to them where the blood comes from. 17
On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took effect.
On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
said law was promulgated by DOH.

The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and
Section 23 of its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Pursuant to said Act, all commercial blood banks should have
been phased out by May 28, 1998. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and
operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998.

On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
The case was entitled "Rodolfo S. Beltran, doing business under the name and style, Our Lady of Fatima Blood Bank,"
docketed as G.R. No. 133640.

On June 1, 1998, petitioners filed an Amended Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order, writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and/or status quo ante order.18

In the aforementioned petition, petitioners assail the constitutionality of the questioned legal provisions, namely, Section 7
of Republic Act No. 7719 and Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, on the following grounds: 19

1. The questioned legal provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules violate the equal
protection clause for irrationally discriminating against free standing blood banks in a manner which is not germane to the
purpose of the law;

2. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules represent undue delegation if
not outright abdication of the police power of the state; and,

3. The questioned provisions of the National Blood Services Act and its Implementing Rules are unwarranted deprivation
of personal liberty.

On May 22, 1998, the Doctors Blood Center filed a similar petition for mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction before this Court entitled "Doctors Blood
Center vs. Department of Health," docketed as G.R. No. 133661. 20 This was consolidated with G.R. No. 133640.21

Similarly, the petition attacked the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations,
thus, praying for the issuance of a license to operate commercial blood banks beyond May 27, 1998. Specifically, with
regard to Republic Act No. 7719, the petition submitted the following questions22 for resolution:

1. Was it passed in the exercise of police power, and was it a valid exercise of such power?

2. Does it not amount to deprivation of property without due process?

3. Does it not unlawfully impair the obligation of contracts?

4. With the commercial blood banks being abolished and with no ready machinery to deliver the same supply and
services, does R.A. 7719 truly serve the public welfare?

On June 2, 1998, this Court issued a Resolution directing respondent DOH to file a consolidated comment. In the same
Resolution, the Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) for respondent to cease and desist from implementing
and enforcing Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 and its implementing rules and regulations until further orders from the
Court.23

On August 26, 1998, respondent Secretary of Health filed a Consolidated Comment on the petitions for certiorari and
mandamus in G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, with opposition to the issuance of a temporary restraining order. 24

In the Consolidated Comment, respondent Secretary of Health submitted that blood from commercial blood banks is
unsafe and therefore the State, in the exercise of its police power, can close down commercial blood banks to protect the
public. He cited the record of deliberations on Senate Bill No. 1101 which later became Republic Act No. 7719, and the
sponsorship speech of Senator Orlando Mercado.

The rationale for the closure of these commercial blood banks can be found in the deliberations of Senate Bill No. 1011,
excerpts of which are quoted below:

Senator Mercado: I am providing over a period of two years to phase out all commercial blood banks. So that in the end,
the new section would have a provision that states:

"ALL COMMERCIAL BLOOD BANKS SHALL BE PHASED OUT OVER A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS AFTER THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THIS ACT. BLOOD SHALL BE COLLECTED FROM VOLUNTARY DONORS ONLY AND THE
SERVICE FEE TO BE CHARGED FOR EVERY BLOOD PRODUCT ISSUED SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE NECESSARY
EXPENSES ENTAILED IN COLLECTING AND PROCESSING OF BLOOD. THE SERVICE FEE SHALL BE MADE
UNIFORM THROUGH GUIDELINES TO BE SET BY THE DEPARTMENTOF HEALTH."

I am supporting Mr. President, the finding of a study called "Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking
System." This has been taken note of. This is a study done with the assistance of the USAID by doctors under the New
Tropical Medicine Foundation in Alabang.

Part of the long-term measures proposed by this particular study is to improve laws, outlaw buying and selling of blood
and legally define good manufacturing processes for blood. This goes to the very heart of my amendment which seeks to
put into law the principle that blood should not be subject of commerce of man.

The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: What does the sponsor say?

Senator Webb: Mr. President, just for clarity, I would like to find out how the Gentleman defines a commercial blood
bank. I am at a loss at times what a commercial blood bank really is.

Senator Mercado: We have a definition, I believe, in the measure, Mr. President.

The Presiding Officer [Senator Aquino]: It is a business where profit is considered.

Senator Mercado: If the Chairman of the Committee would accept it, we can put a provision on Section 3, a definition of
a commercial blood bank, which, as defined in this law, exists for profit and engages in the buying and selling of blood or
its components.

Senator Webb: That is a good description, Mr. President.

Senator Mercado: I refer, Mr. President, to a letter written by Dr. Jaime Galvez-Tan, the Chief of Staff, Undersecretary of
Health, to the good Chairperson of the Committee on Health.

In recommendation No. 4, he says:

"The need to phase out all commercial blood banks within a two-year period will give the Department of Health enough
time to build up government’s capability to provide an adequate supply of blood for the needs of the nation...the use of
blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of commodity."

Taking into consideration the experience of the National Kidney Institute, which has succeeded in making the hospital 100
percent dependent on voluntary blood donation, here is a success story of a hospital that does not buy blood. All those
who are operated on and need blood have to convince their relatives or have to get volunteers who would donate blood…

If we give the responsibility of the testing of blood to those commercial blood banks, they will cut corners because it will
protect their profit.
In the first place, the people who sell their blood are the people who are normally in the high-risk category. So we should
stop the system of selling and buying blood so that we can go into a national voluntary blood program.

It has been said here in this report, and I quote:

"Why is buying and selling of blood not safe? This is not safe because a donor who expects payment for his blood will not
tell the truth about his illnesses and will deny any risky social behavior such as sexual promiscuity which increases the
risk of having syphilis or AIDS or abuse of intravenous addictive drugs. Laboratory tests are of limited value and will not
detect early infections. Laboratory tests are required only for four diseases in the Philippines. There are other blood
transmissible diseases we do not yet screen for and there could be others where there are no tests available yet.

A blood bank owner expecting to gain profit from selling blood will also try his best to limit his expenses. Usually he tries to
increase his profit by buying cheaper reagents or test kits, hiring cheaper manpower or skipping some tests altogether. He
may also try to sell blood even though these have infections in them. Because there is no existing system of
counterchecking these, the blood bank owner can usually get away with many unethical practices.

The experience of Germany, Mr. President is illustrative of this issue. The reason why contaminated blood was sold was
that there were corners cut by commercial blood banks in the testing process. They were protecting their profits.25

The sponsorship speech of Senator Mercado further elucidated his stand on the issue:

Senator Mercado: Today, across the country, hundreds of poverty-stricken, sickly and weak Filipinos, who, unemployed,
without hope and without money to buy the next meal, will walk into a commercial blood bank, extend their arms and
plead that their blood be bought. They will lie about their age, their medical history. They will lie about when they last sold
their blood. For doing this, they will receive close to a hundred pesos. This may tide them over for the next few days. Of
course, until the next bloodletting.

This same blood will travel to the posh city hospitals and urbane medical centers. This same blood will now be bought by
the rich at a price over 500% of the value for which it was sold. Between this buying and selling, obviously, someone has
made a very fast buck.

Every doctor has handled at least one transfusion-related disease in an otherwise normal patient. Patients come in for
minor surgery of the hand or whatever and they leave with hepatitis B. A patient comes in for an appendectomy and he
leaves with malaria. The worst nightmare: A patient comes in for a Caesarian section and leaves with AIDS.

We do not expect good blood from donors who sell their blood because of poverty. The humane dimension of blood
transfusion is not in the act of receiving blood, but in the act of giving it…

For years, our people have been at the mercy of commercial blood banks that lobby their interests among medical
technologists, hospital administrators and sometimes even physicians so that a proactive system for collection of blood
from healthy donors becomes difficult, tedious and unrewarding.

The Department of Health has never institutionalized a comprehensive national program for safe blood and for voluntary
blood donation even if this is a serious public health concern and has fallen for the linen of commercial blood bankers,
hook, line and sinker because it is more convenient to tell the patient to buy blood.

Commercial blood banks hold us hostage to their threat that if we are to close them down, there will be no blood supply.
This is true if the Government does not step in to ensure that safe supply of blood. We cannot allow commercial interest
groups to dictate policy on what is and what should be a humanitarian effort. This cannot and will never work because
their interest in blood donation is merely monetary. We cannot expect commercial blood banks to take the lead in
voluntary blood donation. Only the Government can do it, and the Government must do it." 26

On May 5, 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Issuance of Expanded Temporary Restraining Order for the Court to order
respondent Secretary of Health to cease and desist from announcing the closure of commercial blood banks, compelling
the public to source the needed blood from voluntary donors only, and committing similar acts "that will ultimately cause
the shutdown of petitioners’ blood banks."27
On July 8, 1999, respondent Secretary filed his Comment and/or Opposition to the above motion stating that he has not
ordered the closure of commercial blood banks on account of the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued on June 2,
1998 by the Court. In compliance with the TRO, DOH had likewise ceased to distribute the health advisory leaflets,
posters and flyers to the public which state that "blood banks are closed or will be closed." According to respondent
Secretary, the same were printed and circulated in anticipation of the closure of the commercial blood banks in
accordance with R.A. No. 7719, and were printed and circulated prior to the issuance of the TRO. 28

On July 15, 1999, petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 filed a Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not be
Held in Contempt of Court, docketed as G.R. No. 139147, citing public respondent’s willful disobedience of or resistance
to the restraining order issued by the Court in the said case. Petitioners alleged that respondent’s act constitutes
circumvention of the temporary restraining order and a mockery of the authority of the Court and the orderly administration
of justice.29 Petitioners added that despite the issuance of the temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 133640,
respondent, in his effort to strike down the existence of commercial blood banks, disseminated misleading information
under the guise of health advisories, press releases, leaflets, brochures and flyers stating, among others, that "this year
[1998] all commercial blood banks will be closed by 27 May. Those who need blood will have to rely on government blood
banks."30 Petitioners further claimed that respondent Secretary of Health announced in a press conference during the
Blood Donor’s Week that commercial blood banks are "illegal and dangerous" and that they "are at the moment protected
by a restraining order on the basis that their commercial interest is more important than the lives of the people." These
were all posted in bulletin boards and other conspicuous places in all government hospitals as well as other medical and
health centers.31

In respondent Secretary’s Comment to the Petition to Show Cause Why Public Respondent Should Not Be Held in
Contempt of Court, dated January 3, 2000, it was explained that nothing was issued by the department ordering the
closure of commercial blood banks. The subject health advisory leaflets pertaining to said closure pursuant to Republic
Act No. 7719 were printed and circulated prior to the Court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order on June 21,
1998.32

Public respondent further claimed that the primary purpose of the information campaign was "to promote the importance
and safety of voluntary blood donation and to educate the public about the hazards of patronizing blood supplies from
commercial blood banks."33 In doing so, he was merely performing his regular functions and duties as the Secretary of
Health to protect the health and welfare of the public. Moreover, the DOH is the main proponent of the voluntary blood
donation program espoused by Republic Act No. 7719, particularly Section 4 thereof which provides that, in order to
ensure the adequate supply of human blood, voluntary blood donation shall be promoted through public education,
promotion in schools, professional education, establishment of blood services network, and walking blood donors.

Hence, by authority of the law, respondent Secretary contends that he has the duty to promote the program of voluntary
blood donation. Certainly, his act of encouraging the public to donate blood voluntarily and educating the people on the
risks associated with blood coming from a paid donor promotes general health and welfare and which should be given
more importance than the commercial businesses of petitioners.34

On July 29, 1999, interposing personal and substantial interest in the case as taxpayers and citizens, a Petition-in-
Intervention was filed interjecting the same arguments and issues as laid down by petitioners in G.R. No. 133640 and
133661, namely, the unconstitutionality of the Acts, and, the issuance of a writ of prohibitory injunction. The intervenors
are the immediate relatives of individuals who had died allegedly because of shortage of blood supply at a critical time. 35

The intervenors contended that Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes undue delegation of legislative powers and
unwarranted deprivation of personal liberty.36

In a resolution, dated September 7, 1999, and without giving due course to the aforementioned petition, the Court granted
the Motion for Intervention that was filed by the above intervenors on August 9, 1999.

In his Comment to the petition-in-intervention, respondent Secretary of Health stated that the sale of blood is contrary to
the spirit and letter of the Act that "blood donation is a humanitarian act" and "blood transfusion is a professional medical
service and not a sale of commodity (Section 2[a] and [b] of Republic Act No. 7719). The act of selling blood or charging
fees other than those allowed by law is even penalized under Section 12." 37

Thus, in view of these, the Court is now tasked to pass upon the constitutionality of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719 or
the National Blood Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
In resolving the controversy, this Court deems it necessary to address the issues and/or questions raised by petitioners
concerning the constitutionality of the aforesaid Act in G.R. No. 133640 and 133661 as summarized hereunder:

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER;

II

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE;

III

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS VIOLATE THE
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE;

IV

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS CONSTITUTE
DEPRIVATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY;

WHETHER OR NOT R.A. 7719 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER; and,

VI

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS TRULY SERVE
PUBLIC WELFARE.

As to the first ground upon which the constitutionality of the Act is being challenged, it is the contention of petitioners that
the phase out of commercial or free standing blood banks is unconstitutional because it is an improper and unwarranted
delegation of legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it was passed by the Legislature,
and the latter failed to fix a standard to which the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions.
Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing
out of commercial blood banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate, thus constituting
undue delegation of legislative power.

In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the Legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of the administrative body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. 38 Except as to matters of detail
that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or promulgated by executive officers and
administrative boards, an act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers
delegated to it.39

Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the
Act that the Legislature intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated several measures to
attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently
provided a definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its provisions, that is, the promotion
of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions, it
has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its execution, to be exercised under and in
pursuance of the law.

Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement
a given legislation and effectuate its policies.40 The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719,
broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Section 11 of the Act states:
"SEC. 11. Rules and Regulations. – The implementation of the provisions of the Act shall be in accordance with the rules
and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary, within sixty (60) days from the approval hereof…"

This is what respondent Secretary exactly did when DOH, by virtue of the administrative body’s authority and expertise in
the matter, came out with Administrative Order No.9, series of 1995 or the Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic
Act No. 7719. Administrative Order. No. 9 effectively filled in the details of the law for its proper implementation.

Specifically, Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial blood banks shall
be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998 "based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood
supply and demand and public safety." This power to ascertain the existence of facts and conditions upon which the
Secretary may effect a period of extension for said phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between
the power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the fact that the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can
be made.41

In this regard, the Secretary did not go beyond the powers granted to him by the Act when said phase-out period was
extended in accordance with the Act as laid out in Section 2 thereof:

"SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy – In order to promote public health, it is hereby declared the policy of the state:

a) to promote and encourage voluntary blood donation by the citizenry and to instill public consciousness of the principle
that blood donation is a humanitarian act;

b) to lay down the legal principle that the provision of blood for transfusion is a medical service and not a sale of
commodity;

c) to provide for adequate, safe, affordable and equitable distribution of blood supply and blood products;

d) to inform the public of the need for voluntary blood donation to curb the hazards caused by the commercial sale of
blood;

e) to teach the benefits and rationale of voluntary blood donation in the existing health subjects of the formal education
system in all public and private schools as well as the non-formal system;

f) to mobilize all sectors of the community to participate in mechanisms for voluntary and non-profit collection of blood;

g) to mandate the Department of Health to establish and organize a National Blood Transfusion Service Network in order
to rationalize and improve the provision of adequate and safe supply of blood;

h) to provide for adequate assistance to institutions promoting voluntary blood donation and providing non-profit blood
services, either through a system of reimbursement for costs from patients who can afford to pay, or donations from
governmental and non-governmental entities;

i) to require all blood collection units and blood banks/centers to operate on a non-profit basis;

j) to establish scientific and professional standards for the operation of blood collection units and blood banks/centers in
the Philippines;

k) to regulate and ensure the safety of all activities related to the collection, storage and banking of blood; and,

l) to require upgrading of blood banks/centers to include preventive services and education to control spread of blood
transfusion transmissible diseases."

Petitioners also assert that the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause
enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing blood banks in a
manner that is not germane to the purpose of the law.42
What may be regarded as a denial of the equal protection of the laws is a question not always easily determined. No rule
that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation, discriminating against some and favoring others is
prohibited but classification on a reasonable basis and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted. The classification,
however, to be reasonable: (a) must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and, (d) must apply equally to each
member of the class.43

Republic Act No. 7719 or The National Blood Services Act of 1994, was enacted for the promotion of public health and
welfare. In the aforementioned study conducted by the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, it was revealed that the
Philippine blood banking system is disturbingly primitive and unsafe, and with its current condition, the spread of infectious
diseases such as malaria, AIDS, Hepatitis B and syphilis chiefly from blood transfusion is unavoidable. The situation
becomes more distressing as the study showed that almost 70% of the blood supply in the country is sourced from paid
blood donors who are three times riskier than voluntary blood donors because they are unlikely to disclose their medical
or social history during the blood screening.44

The above study led to the passage of Republic Act No. 7719, to instill public consciousness of the importance and
benefits of voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply and proper blood collection from healthy donors. To do this, the
Legislature decided to order the phase out of commercial blood banks to improve the Philippine blood banking system, to
regulate the supply and proper collection of safe blood, and so as not to derail the implementation of the voluntary blood
donation program of the government. In lieu of commercial blood banks, non-profit blood banks or blood centers, in strict
adherence to professional and scientific standards to be established by the DOH, shall be set in place. 45

Based on the foregoing, the Legislature never intended for the law to create a situation in which unjustifiable
discrimination and inequality shall be allowed. To effectuate its policy, a classification was made between nonprofit blood
banks/centers and commercial blood banks.

We deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:

One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical
service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter
treats blood as a sale of commodity.

Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,
that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating
blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out
of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood
supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-
sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.

Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar
circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.

Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

Having said that, this Court comes to the inquiry as to whether or not Republic Act No. 7719 constitutes a valid exercise of
police power.

The promotion of public health is a fundamental obligation of the State. The health of the people is a primordial
governmental concern. Basically, the National Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the State’s police power
in order to promote and preserve public health and safety.

Police power of the state is validly exercised if (a) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, requires the interference of the State; and, (b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the
attainment of the objective sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.46

In the earlier discussion, the Court has mentioned of the avowed policy of the law for the protection of public health by
ensuring an adequate supply of safe blood in the country through voluntary blood donation. Attaining this objective
requires the interference of the State given the disturbing condition of the Philippine blood banking system.
In serving the interest of the public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the Legislature deemed it necessary to
phase out commercial blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners and operators, as well as the employees,
of commercial blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a higher end for the interest of the public.

The Court finds that the National Blood Services Act is a valid exercise of the State’s police power. Therefore, the
Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the common
good. Police power is the State authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare.47

It is in this regard that the Court finds the related grounds and/or issues raised by petitioners, namely, deprivation of
personal liberty and property, and violation of the non-impairment clause, to be unmeritorious.

Petitioners are of the opinion that the Act is unconstitutional and void because it infringes on the freedom of choice of an
individual in connection to what he wants to do with his blood which should be outside the domain of State intervention.
Additionally, and in relation to the issue of classification, petitioners asseverate that, indeed, under the Civil Code, the
human body and its organs like the heart, the kidney and the liver are outside the commerce of man but this cannot be
made to apply to human blood because the latter can be replenished by the body. To treat human blood equally as the
human organs would constitute invalid classification. 48

Petitioners likewise claim that the phase out of the commercial blood banks will be disadvantageous to them as it will
affect their businesses and existing contracts with hospitals and other health institutions, hence Section 7 of the Act
should be struck down because it violates the non-impairment clause provided by the Constitution.

As stated above, the State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and
with business and occupations. Thus, persons may be subjected to certain kinds of restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general welfare of the State and to this fundamental aim of government, the rights of the individual may be
subordinated.49

Moreover, in the case of Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 50 settled is the rule that the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the government. The right granted by
this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the State’s power of regulation. While the Court understands
the grave implications of Section 7 of the law in question, the concern of the Government in this case, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of
government regulation.

Furthermore, the freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the
State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject
to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may
change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. 51 This doctrine was reiterated in the case of Vda. de Genuino v.
Court of Agrarian Relations52 where the Court held that individual rights to contract and to property have to give way to
police power exercised for public welfare.

As for determining whether or not the shutdown of commercial blood banks will truly serve the general public considering
the shortage of blood supply in the country as proffered by petitioners, we maintain that the wisdom of the Legislature in
the lawful exercise of its power to enact laws cannot be inquired into by the Court. Doing so would be in derogation of the
principle of separation of powers.53

That, under the circumstances, proper regulation of all blood banks without distinction in order to achieve the objective of
the law as contended by petitioners is, of course, possible; but, this would be arguing on what the lawmay be or should
be and not what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of legislation is not for this
Court to pass upon.54

Finally, with regard to the petition for contempt in G.R. No. 139147, on the other hand, the Court finds respondent
Secretary of Health’s explanation satisfactory. The statements in the flyers and posters were not aimed at influencing or
threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of the law.

Contempt of court presupposes a contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence in defiance of the
court.55 There is nothing contemptuous about the statements and information contained in the health advisory that were
distributed by DOH before the TRO was issued by this Court ordering the former to cease and desist from distributing the
same.
In sum, the Court has been unable to find any constitutional infirmity in the questioned provisions of the National Blood
Services Act of 1994 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt.56 Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis
therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.

Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of the National Blood Services Act of 1994
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the law. As to whether the Act constitutes a wise legislation, considering the issues being raised by
petitioners, is for Congress to determine.57

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders judgment as follows:

1. In G.R. Nos. 133640 and 133661, the Court UPHOLDS THE VALIDITY of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 7719,
otherwise known as the National Blood Services Act of 1994, and Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995 or the Rules
and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 7719. The petitions are DISMISSED. Consequently, the Temporary
Restraining Order issued by this Court on June 2, 1998, is LIFTED.

2. In G.R. No. 139147, the petition seeking to cite the Secretary of Health in contempt of court is DENIED for lack of merit.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010)

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test
of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices –
choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger
us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree and
debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is
built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In
many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable
goal. Yet herein lies the paradox – philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same
time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological
stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow persons of
diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 2009 3 (the Second Assailed
Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC’s
refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act.4

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no substantial membership
base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual
orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-
OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7

On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition
on moral grounds, stating that:

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
(LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation
and gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual
relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs.
In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which is
against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward another;
men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was
meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81)
"And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in sin and
crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F: ‘Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition
which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000
(Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for
accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregardsdecency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order
or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‘Immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as follows:

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or
a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such
literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include those
which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for
violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of
prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs,established policies,
lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are offensive to
morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not being
truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulations relating to the elections."

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does not
conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article
that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the State’s
avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation. 8

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to
deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the
First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly proven
its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se would
benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies, then
all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention of the
framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or
groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the
nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the party-list
system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians,
gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been held that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a
comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the case of race or
religion or belief.

xxxx

Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that
Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same Bill of
Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any
attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters
and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines
cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts espoused by
said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code
imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad"
apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual partnerships or
relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article
694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks, defies or
disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful.10

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the
final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not
later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for Extension,
requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. 12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in
support of petitioner’s application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we
required it to file its own comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment on February 2,
2010.15

In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from
implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad’spetition on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR’s motion to
intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was granted on February 2,
2010.19

The Parties’ Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s application for
registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own
special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification.
However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were
concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field
personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated
in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered
under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.

Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had nationwide
existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its field
personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces
in the country."21

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a new
one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the
elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed
Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence were already
available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular procedure; at
worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioner’s right to procedural
due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows
that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the
Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.22 Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national
LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"

§ Abra Gay Association

§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan

§ Albay Gay Association

§ Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija

§ Boys Legion – Metro Manila

§ Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)

§ Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila

§ Cebu Pride – Cebu City

§ Circle of Friends

§ Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte

§ Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)

§ Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) – Metro Manila

§ Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila

§ Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte

§ Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City

 § Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur

§ Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)

§ LUMINA – Baguio City

§ Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila

§ Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila

§ Naga City Gay Association – Naga City

§ ONE BACARDI

§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila

§ PUP LAKAN

§ RADAR PRIDEWEAR

§ Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro Manila

§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan

§ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal

§ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) – Metro Manila

§ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal

§ The Link – Davao City

§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon

§ Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila

§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City23

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they
found that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitioner
does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements
for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in
the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization
under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims,
lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of
neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible
and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the
COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise
stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:26

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio
holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral disputes
may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might
regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if
government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly
disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are
second-class citizens.1avvphi1

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage,
must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous) to
those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have a
compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions
and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and spiritual
institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or
Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible secular purpose and
justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating
influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at
the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus,
although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality
based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 27

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-
based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it
poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is
nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the
standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its
own existence.28

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have
borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs,
convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize
homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.29

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG
agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are
committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one gender,
but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of disqualification cases against
both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 31
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is
wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless, we cannot
countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or
another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion of morality is
robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at
worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. 32 A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets
homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting
that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be denied equal
protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification. "Equality,"
said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause guarantees that no
person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances.34

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will
uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end. 35 In Central Bank
Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas,36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of analysis
of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative
classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution."37

The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or
parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes
it, the asserted state interest here – that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate state interest
that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s differentiation, and its
unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit the nation,
furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this
case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list
system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under
different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.38 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a
separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is
simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded that it be recognized under the
same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the validity
of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing
opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 40

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens are
free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where
people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or
espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy,
the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.
Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in
this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will
largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very
act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only
for a minority, however small – not only for a majority, however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon
itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting
minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies not
only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that
both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.

Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that homosexual
conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and
equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts.42 To the extent that there is much to learn from other
jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These foreign
authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court’s
analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines
protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,
public institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid the
discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 43

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights
tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a
change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it
proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that challenge the
existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities
or the majority of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate
controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. 45 Only if a political party
incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with democracy does it fall outside the protection of the
freedom of association guarantee.46

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even
defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood,
believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual
relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our
democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration the
values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this
Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more
complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of
homosexuality through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad,
and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their
freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its
authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-list
system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the
conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-
guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition has
the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally
participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x
x x47

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and –
as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To
the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly expressing its
views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list
candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law, in
particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and
groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly
significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather
than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In particular,
we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in
the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this
respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against
discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be applied
equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically enumerated as a
status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation." 48Additionally, a variety of United
Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various international
agreements.49

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by the
Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs,
the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary
to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons entitled
to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum age, must be
justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason of
political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's candidacy.
States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from
elective office.50

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines’
international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now
to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation
to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current state
of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these
alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It
is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that identifies many
social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This
has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights" language,
then they are no longer controversial.1avvphi1

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines.
Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e., international law
is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount
to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.53

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged, societal
attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s role is not to
impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced
by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11,
2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed
to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.

SO ORDERED.
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010(G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No.
193036, December 7, 2010)

When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

--- Justice Jose P. Laurel1

The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It is through the Constitution that the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several
departments.2 The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons, including the highest officials of the land, must defer. 3 Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and much more
tailor itself to the whims and caprices of government and the people who run it. 4

For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases 5 both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."

The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his
capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of
Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create
a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.7

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then
Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan, "Kung
walang corrupt, walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.

To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate reported
cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.

Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1 establishing
the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of said executive order read:

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1

CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines the principle that a public
office is a public trust and mandates that public officers and employees, who are servants of the people, must at all times
be accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives;

WHEREAS, corruption is among the most despicable acts of defiance of this principle and notorious violation of this
mandate;

WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which seriously affects the political, economic, and social life of a nation; in
a very special way it inflicts untold misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized and underprivileged sector of
society;

WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has reached very alarming levels, and undermined the people’s trust and
confidence in the Government and its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the evil, restore the people’s faith and confidence in the Government and
in their public servants;

WHEREAS, the President’s battlecry during his campaign for the Presidency in the last elections "kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap" expresses a solemn pledge that if elected, he would end corruption and the evil it breeds;

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;

WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Revised Administrative
Code of the Philippines, gives the President the continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by law, do hereby order:

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate
reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be
taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman and four (4) members who will act as an independent collegial body.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration
and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.

In particular, it shall:

a) Identify and determine the reported cases of such graft and corruption which it will investigate;

b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate evidence related to or regarding the cases of large scale
corruption which it has chosen to investigate, and to this end require any agency, official or employee of
the Executive Branch, including government-owned or controlled corporations, to produce documents,
books, records and other papers;

c) Upon proper request or representation, obtain information and documents from the Senate and the
House of Representatives records of investigations conducted by committees thereof relating to matters
or subjects being investigated by the Commission;

d) Upon proper request and representation, obtain information from the courts, including the
Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court Administrator, information or documents in respect to
corruption cases filed with the Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the case may be;

e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their testimonies and for that purpose, administer oaths or
affirmations as the case may be;

f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need to utilize any person as a state witness to ensure that the
ends of justice be fully served, that such person who qualifies as a state witness under the Revised Rules
of Court of the Philippines be admitted for that purpose;

g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial authorities, by
means of a special or interim report and recommendation, all evidence on corruption of public officers and
 employees and their private sector co-principals, accomplices or accessories, if any, when in the course
of its investigation the Commission finds that there is reasonable ground to believe that they are liable for
graft and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;

h) Call upon any government investigative or prosecutorial agency such as the Department of Justice or
any of the agencies under it, and the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for such assistance and
cooperation as it may require in the discharge of its functions and duties;

i) Engage or contract the services of resource persons, professionals and other personnel determined by
it as necessary to carry out its mandate;

j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively and
efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct of its
investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence;

k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are appropriate and necessary in connection with the objectives
and purposes of this Order.

SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. – x x x.

SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. – x x x.

SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. – x x x

SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. – x x x.

SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x x.

SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x x.

SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take Oath or Give Testimony. – Any government official or personnel who,
without lawful excuse, fails to appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or who, appearing before the
Commission refuses to take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce documents for inspection, when required, shall
be subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any private person who does the same may be dealt with in accordance
with law.

SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the Commission. – x x x.

SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. – The Office of the President shall provide the necessary funds for the
Commission to ensure that it can exercise its powers, execute its functions, and perform its duties and responsibilities as
effectively, efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.

SECTION 12. Office. – x x x.

SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. – x x x.

SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. – The Commission shall accomplish its mission on or before December 31,
2012.

SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. – x x x.

SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities of the Commission. – x x x.

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances
of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same shall not affect
the validity and effectivity of the other provisions hereof.

SECTION 19. Effectivity. – This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th day of July 2010.

(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III

By the President:

(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.

Executive Secretary

Nature of the Truth Commission

As can be gleaned from the above-quoted provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body
formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by
third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office
of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one. 8

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists
as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions.

The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory and non-
judicial fact-finding bodies "to establish the facts and context of serious violations of human rights or of international
humanitarian law in a country’s past."9 They are usually established by states emerging from periods of internal unrest,
civil strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for transitional justice.

Truth commissions have been described as bodies that share the following characteristics: (1) they examine only past
events; (2) they investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to a particular event; (3) they
are temporary bodies that finish their work with the submission of a report containing conclusions and recommendations;
and (4) they are officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the State.10"Commission’s members are usually
empowered to conduct research, support victims, and propose policy recommendations to prevent recurrence of crimes.
Through their investigations, the commissions may aim to discover and learn more about past abuses, or formally
acknowledge them. They may aim to prepare the way for prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms." 11

Thus, their main goals range from retribution to reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime tribunals are
examples of a retributory or vindicatory body set up to try and punish those responsible for crimes against humanity. A
form of a reconciliatory tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa, the principal function of which
was to heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for victims.

The PTC is a far cry from South Africa’s model. The latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than on judicial
retribution, while the marching order of the PTC is the identification and punishment of perpetrators. As one writer12 puts
it:

The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his inaugural speech: "To
those who talk about reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to simply forget about the wrongs that they have
committed in the past, we have this to say: There can be no reconciliation without justice. When we allow crimes to go
unpunished, we give consent to their occurring over and over again."

The Thrusts of the Petitions

Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional
and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in both cases shows
that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following manner:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to
achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office
which was hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission."

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the "Truth Commission"
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under
the 1987 Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes
those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.

(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth Commission of 2010" violates the consistent and general international
practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights
violations, which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of international law which the
Philippines is mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.

(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching
pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that
widespread poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major
causes of poverty.

(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because
neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive
issuance or even a statute."13

In their Consolidated Comment,14 the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), essentially
questioned the legal standing of petitioners and defended the assailed executive order with the following arguments:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress to create a public office because the President’s
executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987
(E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 141616 (as amended by P.D. No. 1772), R.A. No. 9970,17 and
settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.

The OSG then points to the continued existence and validity of other executive orders and presidential issuances creating
similar bodies to justify the creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint and Action Commission(PCAC) by
President Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on Administrative Performance Efficiency(PCAPE) by President
Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency on Reform and Government Operations(PARGO) by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos.18
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and memoranda, the following are the principal issues to be resolved:

1. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal standing to file their respective petitions and question Executive
Order No. 1;

2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;

3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause; and

5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to injunctive relief.

Essential requisites for judicial review

Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, the Court needs to ascertain
whether the requisites for a valid exercise of its power of judicial review are present.

Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case.19

Among all these limitations, only the legal standing of the petitioners has been put at issue.

Legal Standing of the Petitioners

The OSG attacks the legal personality of the petitioners-legislators to file their petition for failure to demonstrate their
personal stake in the outcome of the case. It argues that the petitioners have not shown that they have sustained or are in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PTC. Not claiming to be the subject of the
commission’s investigations, petitioners will not sustain injury in its creation or as a result of its proceedings. 20

The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail Executive Order
No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong
as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the
complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. As held in
Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez,21

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.22

With regard to Biraogo, the OSG argues that, as a taxpayer, he has no standing to question the creation of the PTC and
the budget for its operations.23 It emphasizes that the funds to be used for the creation and operation of the commission
are to be taken from those funds already appropriated by Congress. Thus, the allocation and disbursement of funds for
the commission will not entail congressional action but will simply be an exercise of the President’s power over contingent
funds.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, Biraogo has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of Executive Order No. 1. Nowhere in his petition is an assertion of a
clear right that may justify his clamor for the Court to exercise judicial power and to wield the axe over presidential
issuances in defense of the Constitution. The case of David v. Arroyo 24 explained the deep-seated rules on locus standi.
Thus:

Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question." In private suits, standing is
governed by the "real-parties-in interest" rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest."
Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.

The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a "public right" in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected
no differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In
either case, he has to adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a "citizen" or "taxpayer.

Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in public actions. The distinction was first
laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is
but the mere instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court in People ex rel Case v. Collins:
"In matter of mere public right, however…the people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every
citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and punished, and that a public grievance be
remedied." With respect to taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to maintain an
action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds to his injury cannot be denied."

However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act with which he
disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State
Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed inTileston v.
Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an
executive or legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is
not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.

This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of cases, such as,Custodio v. President of the
Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’ Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese
League of the Philippines v. Felix. [Emphases included. Citations omitted]

Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed
for nontraditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as
when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest."25

Thus, in Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,26 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where
serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirements may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to
prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers
Cases,27 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders
although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.

The OSG claims that the determinants of transcendental importance 28 laid down in CREBA v. ERC and Meralco29 are
non-existent in this case. The Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in the petition
which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Where the issues
are of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, they should be
resolved for the guidance of all.30 Undoubtedly, the Filipino people are more than interested to know the status of the
President’s first effort to bring about a promised change to the country. The Court takes cognizance of the petition not due
to overwhelming political undertones that clothe the issue in the eyes of the public, but because the Court stands firm in
its oath to perform its constitutional duty to settle legal controversies with overreaching significance to society.
 Power of the President to Create the Truth Commission

In his memorandum in G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an
adjunct body of the Office of the President.31 Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must be
empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law. According to petitioner, such power
cannot be presumed32 since there is no provision in the Constitution or any specific law that authorizes the President to
create a truth commission.33 He adds that Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987, granting the President the
continuing authority to reorganize his office, cannot serve as basis for the creation of a truth commission considering the
aforesaid provision merely uses verbs such as "reorganize," "transfer," "consolidate," "merge," and "abolish." 34 Insofar as
it vests in the President the plenary power to reorganize the Office of the President to the extent of creating a public office,
Section 31 is inconsistent with the principle of separation of powers enshrined in the Constitution and must be deemed
repealed upon the effectivity thereof.35

Similarly, in G.R. No. 193036, petitioners-legislators argue that the creation of a public office lies within the province of
Congress and not with the executive branch of government. They maintain that the delegated authority of the President to
reorganize under Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code: 1) does not permit the President to create a public
office, much less a truth commission; 2) is limited to the reorganization of the administrative structure of the Office of the
President; 3) is limited to the restructuring of the internal organs of the Office of the President Proper, transfer of functions
and transfer of agencies; and 4) only to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. 36 Such continuing authority of the
President to reorganize his office is limited, and by issuing Executive Order No. 1, the President overstepped the limits of
this delegated authority.

The OSG counters that there is nothing exclusively legislative about the creation by the President of a fact-finding body
such as a truth commission. Pointing to numerous offices created by past presidents, it argues that the authority of the
President to create public offices within the Office of the President Proper has long been recognized. 37 According to the
OSG, the Executive, just like the other two branches of government, possesses the inherent authority to create fact-
finding committees to assist it in the performance of its constitutionally mandated functions and in the exercise of its
administrative functions.38 This power, as the OSG explains it, is but an adjunct of the plenary powers wielded by the
President under Section 1 and his power of control under Section 17, both of Article VII of the Constitution. 39

It contends that the President is necessarily vested with the power to conduct fact-finding investigations, pursuant to his
duty to ensure that all laws are enforced by public officials and employees of his department and in the exercise of his
authority to assume directly the functions of the executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of
his officials.40 The power of the President to investigate is not limited to the exercise of his power of control over his
subordinates in the executive branch, but extends further in the exercise of his other powers, such as his power to
discipline subordinates,41 his power for rule making, adjudication and licensing purposes 42 and in order to be informed on
matters which he is entitled to know.43

The OSG also cites the recent case of Banda v. Ermita,44 where it was held that the President has the power to
reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with his constitutionally granted power of control
and by virtue of a valid delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes.

Thus, the OSG concludes that the power of control necessarily includes the power to create offices. For the OSG, the
President may create the PTC in order to, among others, put a closure to the reported large scale graft and corruption in
the government.45

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa. Clearly, the
provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said
provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure"– an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order
No. 1. As held in Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Executive Secretary, 46

But of course, the list of legal basis authorizing the President to reorganize any department or agency in the executive
branch does not have to end here. We must not lose sight of the very source of the power – that which constitutes an
express grant of power. Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative
Code of 1987), "the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy
and efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President."
For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In
Canonizado v. Aguirre [323 SCRA 312 (2000)], we ruled that reorganization "involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions." It takes place when there
is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and
responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance. It falls under the Office of the
President. Hence, it is subject to the President’s continuing authority to reorganize. [Emphasis Supplied]

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the President’s power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter.47 Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the
power to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid
delegation from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public
office?

According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory basis under
P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.48 The said law granted the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, including the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer
functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, transfer appropriations, and to standardize salaries and
materials. This decree, in relation to Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. 292 has been invoked in several cases such as
Larin v. Executive Secretary.49

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said
decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of
the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. In fact, even the Solicitor General agrees with this view. Thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Because P.D. 1416 was enacted was the last whereas clause of P.D. 1416 says "it was
enacted to prepare the transition from presidential to parliamentary. Now, in a parliamentary form of government, the
legislative and executive powers are fused, correct?

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: That is why, that P.D. 1416 was issued. Now would you agree with me that P.D. 1416
should not be considered effective anymore upon the promulgation, adoption, ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Not the whole of P.D. [No.] 1416, Your Honor.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: The power of the President to reorganize the entire National Government is deemed
repealed, at least, upon the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, correct.

SOLICITOR GENERAL CADIZ: Yes, Your Honor.50

While the power to create a truth commission cannot pass muster on the basis of P.D. No. 1416 as amended by P.D. No.
1772, the creation of the PTC finds justification under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the
President the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. Section 17 reads:

Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that
the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied).

As correctly pointed out by the respondents, the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them. The President’s power to conduct investigations to aid him in ensuring the faithful
execution of laws – in this case, fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency – is inherent in the
President’s powers as the Chief Executive. That the authority of the President to conduct investigations and to create
bodies to execute this power is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution or in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of
such authority.51 As explained in the landmark case of Marcos v. Manglapus:52

x x x. The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of government and restored the separation of
legislative, executive and judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of government with
provision for checks and balances.

It would not be accurate, however, to state that "executive power" is the power to enforce the laws, for the President is
head of state as well as head of government and whatever powers inhere in such positions pertain to the office unless the
Constitution itself withholds it. Furthermore, the Constitution itself provides that the execution of the laws is only one of the
powers of the President. It also grants the President other powers that do not involve the execution of any provision of
law, e.g., his power over the country's foreign relations.

On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise
ofspecific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive
power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the
Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive. x x x.

Indeed, the Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. As stated above, the powers
of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.53 One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows
from the obvious need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. Thus, in Department of
Health v. Camposano,54 the authority of the President to issue Administrative Order No. 298, creating an investigative
committee to look into the administrative charges filed against the employees of the Department of Health for the
anomalous purchase of medicines was upheld. In said case, it was ruled:

The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having been
constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the President has the
obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the
legality of the investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the
PCAGC had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the inquiry.
[Emphasis supplied]

It should be stressed that the purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters
which the President is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. And if history is to be revisited, this was also the
objective of the investigative bodies created in the past like the PCAC, PCAPE, PARGO, the Feliciano Commission, the
Melo Commission and the Zenarosa Commission. There being no changes in the government structure, the Court is not
inclined to declare such executive power as non-existent just because the direction of the political winds have changed.

On the charge that Executive Order No. 1 transgresses the power of Congress to appropriate funds for the operation of a
public office, suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds
already appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. Further, there is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, in the words of the Solicitor General, "whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the President
will be the very source of the funds for the commission."55 Moreover, since the amount that would be allocated to the PTC
shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations, there is no impropriety in the funding.

Power of the Truth Commission to Investigate

The President’s power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed is well recognized. It flows from
the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution under Article VII, Section 17 thereof. 56 As the Chief Executive, the
president represents the government as a whole and sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of
his department. He has the authority to directly assume the functions of the executive department. 57

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it. It has been said that "Quasi-judicial powers involve the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by law itself in enforcing and administering the same law." 58 In simpler terms, judicial discretion is
involved in the exercise of these quasi-judicial power, such that it is exclusively vested in the judiciary and must be clearly
authorized by the legislature in the case of administrative agencies.

The distinction between the power to investigate and the power to adjudicate was delineated by the Court in Cariño v.
Commission on Human Rights.59 Thus:

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The
dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x
x to subject to an official probe x x: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to
find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L
Sec. 257; x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on,
settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits
of issues raised: x x to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon
as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: x x to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous
with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence
or condemn. x x. Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." [Italics included. Citations
Omitted]

Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must
be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or resolved authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to appeals or modes of review as may be provided by
law.60 Even respondents themselves admit that the commission is bereft of any quasi-judicial power.61

Contrary to petitioners’ apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by
the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to
conduct a fact-finding investigation."62 The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the
merits of the charges against them,63 is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course
of its investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.64
At any rate, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies. Thus, in the case of Ombudsman v. Galicia, 65 it was written:

This power of investigation granted to the Ombudsman by the 1987 Constitution and The Ombudsman Act is not
exclusive but is shared with other similarly authorized government agencies such as the PCGG and judges of municipal
trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts. The power to conduct preliminary investigation on charges against public
employees and officials is likewise concurrently shared with the Department of Justice. Despite the passage of the Local
Government Code in 1991, the Ombudsman retains concurrent jurisdiction with the Office of the President and the local
Sanggunians to investigate complaints against local elective officials. [Emphasis supplied].

Also, Executive Order No. 1 cannot contravene the power of the Ombudsman to investigate criminal cases under Section
15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770, which states:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction, it may take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of such cases. [Emphases supplied]

The act of investigation by the Ombudsman as enunciated above contemplates the conduct of a preliminary investigation
or the determination of the existence of probable cause. This is categorically out of the PTC’s sphere of functions. Its
power to investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land. In this regard, the PTC commits no act of
usurpation of the Ombudsman’s primordial duties.

The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter 1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised
Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise tasked to investigate the
commission of crimes.

Finally, nowhere in Executive Order No. 1 can it be inferred that the findings of the PTC are to be accorded
conclusiveness. Much like its predecessors, the Davide Commission, the Feliciano Commission and the Zenarosa
Commission, its findings would, at best, be recommendatory in nature. And being so, the Ombudsman and the DOJ have
a wider degree of latitude to decide whether or not to reject the recommendation. These offices, therefore, are not
deprived of their mandated duties but will instead be aided by the reports of the PTC for possible indictments for violations
of graft laws.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this constitutional safeguard. They contend that it
does not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the "previous administration"
as its sole object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan hostility."66 Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of former
President Arroyo.67

The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts
committed not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the
"same magnitude of controversies and anomalies"68 were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people.
They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because
first, "there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1
and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is
not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption."69 In order to attain constitutional permission, the
petitioners advocate that the commission should deal with "graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the Arroyo
administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force."70
Position of respondents

According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the "previous administration" as the initial subject of the
investigation, following Section 17 thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption solely
during the said administration.71 Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to officials of the
previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is committed against the equal protection clause for "the
segregation of the transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible subjects of investigation is
a valid classification based on substantial distinctions and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to
correct."72 To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the following:

First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and corruption in the previous
administration which have eroded public confidence in public institutions. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the government and to put a
closure to them by the filing of the appropriate cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the people’s faith and confidence in the Government and in their public servants.

Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-finding is warranted by the reality that unlike
with administrations long gone, the current administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the policies
of the previous administration.

Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for investigation lies in the reality that
the evidence of possible criminal activity, the evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the
policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully executed, are more easily established in the
regime that immediately precede the current administration.

Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to investigations to provide closure to issues
that are pivotal to national life or even as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent
administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), created by the late President Corazon C.
Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President
Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by former President Joseph Estrada under
Administrative Order No, 53, to form an ad-hoc and independent citizens’ committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding "Philippine Centennial projects" of his predecessor, former President Fidel V.
Ramos.73 [Emphases supplied]

Concept of the Equal Protection Clause

One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in
Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process,
as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause,
however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause. 74

"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." 75 It "requires public bodies and institutions to
treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner."76 "The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every
person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities." 77 "In other words, the
concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."78

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature.79 Its inhibitions cover all
the departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken. 80

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test ofreasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."82

For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally
belong to the class.83 "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated,
both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the classification be made with absolute
symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree.
Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated
equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is
substantially distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."84

The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the
number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification. As elucidated in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union85 and reiterated in a long line of cases,86

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of
the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every
man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be
treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that
are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory
within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other
departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one
another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification
should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This
Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or
rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. [Citations omitted]

Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration"87 only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order. Specifically, these are:

WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;

SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION, hereinafter
referred to as the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate
reports of graft and corruption of such scale and magnitude that shock and offend the moral and ethical sensibilities of the
people, committed by public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private
sector, if any, during the previous administration; and thereafter recommend the appropriate action or measure to be
taken thereon to ensure that the full measure of justice shall be served without fear or favor.

SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The Commission, which shall have all the powers of an investigative body under
Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third level public officers and
higher, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories from the private sector, if any, during the previous administration
and thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. [Emphases
supplied]

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these
distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the "previous administration" only. The
reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said
administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They
are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, "Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification."88

The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to
the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that "to include other past administrations, at this point, may
unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness."89 The reason given is specious. It is
without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or "end corruption and the evil it
breeds."90

The probability that there would be difficulty in unearthing evidence or that the earlier reports involving the earlier
administrations were already inquired into is beside the point. Obviously, deceased presidents and cases which have
already prescribed can no longer be the subjects of inquiry by the PTC. Neither is the PTC expected to conduct
simultaneous investigations of previous administrations, given the body’s limited time and resources. "The law does not
require the impossible" (Lex non cogit ad impossibilia).91

Given the foregoing physical and legal impossibility, the Court logically recognizes the unfeasibility of investigating almost
a century’s worth of graft cases. However, the fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification.
The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC
must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations. Whilereasonable prioritization is permitted, it
should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional. In the often quoted language of Yick Wo v.
Hopkins,92

Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in
similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the constitution.
[Emphasis supplied]

It could be argued that considering that the PTC is an ad hoc body, its scope is limited. The Court, however, is of the
considered view that although its focus is restricted, the constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws should
not in any way be circumvented. The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered.93 Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional. 94 While
the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive,
must be read together with the provisions of the Constitution. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of
"substantial distinctions" would only confirm the petitioners’ lament that the subject executive order is only an "adventure
in partisan hostility." In the case of US v. Cyprian,95 it was written: "A rather limited number of such classifications have
routinely been held or assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political activity or membership
in a political party, union activity or membership in a labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment
rights."

To reiterate, in order for a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all
persons who naturally belong to the class.96 "Such a classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or
so constituted as to preclude additions to the number included within a class, but must be of such a nature as to embrace
all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. Furthermore, all who are in situations and
circumstances which are relative to the discriminatory legislation and which are indistinguishable from those of the
members of the class must be brought under the influence of the law and treated by it in the same way as are the
members of the class."97

The Court is not unaware that "mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the equal protection
clause."98 "Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not include all the evils
within its reach."99 It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not devoid of a
rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.100 In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not
considered a valid reason to strike down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or
regulations. These cases refer to the "step by step" process.101 "With regard to equal protection claims, a legislature does
not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover
every evil that might conceivably have been attacked." 102

In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence. That the previous administration was picked out was
deliberate and intentional as can be gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed
executive order. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act, event or report to
be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past. "The equal protection clause is violated by
purposeful and intentional discrimination."103

To disprove petitioners’ contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG clarifies that the commission does not
only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption committed during the previous administration. 104 The OSG
points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:

SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the President there is a need to
expand the mandate of the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases and instances
of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a
supplemental Executive Order.

The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to expand the scope of investigations
of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee
that they would be covered in the future. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and
caprice of the President. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless. This will only
fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was "crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and
personalities of the Arroyo administration."105

The Court tried to seek guidance from the pronouncement in the case of Virata v. Sandiganbayan,106 that the "PCGG
Charter (composed of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14) does not violate the equal protection clause." The decision,
however, was devoid of any discussion on how such conclusory statement was arrived at, the principal issue in said case
being only the sufficiency of a cause of action.

A final word

The issue that seems to take center stage at present is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
constitutionally mandated power of Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of the legislature and the executive
department, is exercising undue interference. Is the Highest Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers? Time and again, this
issue has been addressed by the Court, but it seems that the present political situation calls for it to once again explain
the legal basis of its action lest it continually be accused of being a hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.

The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power
that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however,
have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

To answer this accusation, the words of Justice Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to wit: "And when the
judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other departments; it
does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned
to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in
an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them." 107

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government is done in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority
of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional.

It cannot be denied that most government actions are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards the betterment of
the nation and its people. But then again, it is important to remember this ethical principle: "The end does not justify the
means." No matter how noble and worthy of admiration the purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed in
accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be allowed. 108 The Court cannot
just turn a blind eye and simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the Constitution and its enshrined principles.

"The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency must not be allowed to
sap its strength nor greed for power debase its rectitude." 109

Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the present
administration. Perhaps a revision of the executive issuance so as to include the earlier past administrations would allow it
to pass the test of reasonableness and not be an affront to the Constitution. Of all the branches of the government, it is
the judiciary which is the most interested in knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a hindrance or obstacle to
its attainment. It must, however, be emphasized that the search for the truth must be within constitutional bounds for "ours
is still a government of laws and not of men."110

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as
it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the provisions of Executive
Order No. 1.

SO ORDERED.