Mind Association

Review
Reviewed Work(s): The Subject in Question -- Sartre's Critique of Husserl in the
Transcendence of the Ego by Stephen Priest
Review by: Barry Dainton
Source: Mind, Vol. 111, No. 442 (Apr., 2002), pp. 473-478
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3093742
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 Book Reviews 473

According
According to Pinkard,
to Pinkard,
it was in it
thewas
late 179os
in theduring latehis179os
stay in during
Frankfurthis sta
that
that Hegel
Hegelcamecame
to be convinced
to be convinced
by Holderlin'sby criticisms
Holderlin's
of the presupposed
criticisms of
ultimacy
ultimacy of the
ofpolarity
the polarity
between subject
betweenand object
subject
in Fichte's
and development
object in of Fichte's
Kant's
Kant's philosophy;
philosophy; the splitthebetween
splitthebetween
conscious subject
the conscious
and its 'object',
subject
Holderlin
Holderlin thought,
thought,
presupposed
presupposed
a more primordial
a more connection
primordial
given theconnection
pre-
reflective
reflective subject's
subject's
embedding embedding
and orientationand within
orientation
existence aswithin
a whole. existen
After
After Hegel's
Hegel's
move move
to the intellectual
to the intellectual
hot-house of the hot-house
University of ofJena
the Unive
where
where he he
joinedjoined
Schelling,
Schelling,
this Holderlinian
this Holderlinian
idea of a pre-reflective
idea orientation
of a pre-reflec
of
ofthethecognitive
cognitivesubject subject
within a more
within
basic aarena
more('Being')
basicwas arena
transformed
('Being')
in was
various
various waysways
courtesy
courtesy
of ideas taken
of ideas
from Kant,
taken Fichte
from and Schelling.
Kant, Fichte
In a nut-and Sch
shell,
shell, Holderlin's
Holderlin's'Being' 'Being'
came to became
thought toofbeas an
thought
intersubjective
of astotality
an intersub
constituted
constituted and maintained
and maintained
by collectivebyacts
collective
of acknowledgment
acts of oracknowledgme
recogni-
tion
tion (Anerkennung),
(Anerkennung), acts in which
acts the
in entitlements
which the andentitlements
commitments of and par- comm
ticular
ticular others
otherswere acknowledged
were acknowledged
along with thealongsociallywith
borne the
normative
socially bor
conventions
conventions themselves.
themselves.
Pinkard traces
Pinkard
Hegel's traces
various experiments
Hegel's various
in systemexperim
building
building around
around
this notion,
this culminating
notion, culminating
in the Phenomenology in the of Spirit,
Phenomenology
com-
pleted
pleted in the
in midst
the midst
of an event
of pivotal
an event
for the
pivotal
emerging
for
configuration
the emerging
of states configu
that
that would
would
comecome
to define
tomodern
defineEurope,
modernNapoleon's
Europe,
crushing
Napoleon's
of the Prus-crushi
sian
sian army
army
at the
atbattle
the ofbattle
Jena. of Jena.
In
InPinkard's
Pinkard'saccount,
account,
in the Phenomenology
in the Phenomenology
Hegel had achievedHegel
the com-
had achie
prehensive
prehensive philosophical
philosophical
conceptionconception
that he was essentially
that he to was
adhere
essentially
to for to
the
therest
rest
of his
oflife.
hisPinkard
life. Pinkard
gives a concise
gives
overview
a concise
of the Phenomenology,
overview ofandthe Pheno
punctuates
punctuates the story
the of
story
Hegel'sof
threatened
Hegel'scareer
threatened
after Jena career
and his subsequent
after Jena an
slow
slow climb
climb
to future
to future
celebritycelebrity
at the University
at theof Berlin
University
with accounts
of Berlin
of his with
other
other major
major
works,
works,
all of which
all of
can which
be understood
can against
be understood
the backdropagainst
of the the
solutions
solutions hit upon
hit upon
in Jena.in
Other
Jena.
HegelOther
interpreters
Hegel have
interpreters
stressed the rolehave
of stre
'Anerkennung'
'Anerkennung'but have
butlargely
have limited
largely
it either
limited
to particular
it either
phases to
or areas
particular
of p
Hegel's
Hegel's philosophy.
philosophy.
Pinkard,Pinkard,
by marrying
bythemarrying
idea to contemporary
the ideapost-Sell-
to contemp
arsian
arsianapproaches
approaches
to the place
to theof the
place
mindofin the
theworld,
mind has in
managed
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to use it has m
in
ina away
way
which
which
beautifully
beautifully
illuminates illuminates
Hegel's thought Hegel's
as a whole.thought as a wh

Department of Philosophy PAUL REDDING

The University of Sydney
NSW2006, Australia

The Subject in Question-Sartre's Critique of Hus

Transcendence of the Ego, by Stephen Priest, Routledge:
Pp. 192. H/b ?50.00.

Few would deny that a conscious being is aware (in some sense
its experiences whenever it is conscious. It is also natural to sup
there is awareness there is a subject whose awareness it is. The
which the objects and contents of consciousness are presented;
of its experiences, the thing which thinks, acts, perceives, the th

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474 Book Reviews

While it may be natural to think that consciousness harbours a subject-object

distinction, whether it actually does so is another matter entirely.
Needless to say, this issue, bearing as it does on the most basic structural
features of consciousness, is of deep interest to those whose sole concern is the
elucidation of precisely these features: philosophers working in the classical
phenomenological tradition. Husserl, the founder of this tradition, notori-
ously found it difficult to make up his mind. In the Logical Investigations
(19oo-1) he elaborated a quasi-Humean position. Unable to discern anything
resembling a 'subject' in his experience, he found no reason to posit such a
thing, and held that the unity of consciousness was a product of relationships
among the constituent parts of consciousness. By the time of Ideas (1913) this
had all changed; scrutinizing the 'region of pure consciousness' made available
by the epoche, Husserl made a momentous discovery: in addition to the varied
objects of consciousness, he also found an 'I' or 'Ego', a pure contentless sub-
ject-pole, related to but distinct from the stream of lived experience. Although
our Ego is not something present before our consciousness, Husserl main-
tained that we nonetheless have indubitable evidence-of a phenomenologi-
cal sort-for its existence. He went still further. The Ego is not merely an idle
spectator, it is responsible for the unity of consciousness, and our sense of per-
sisting as a single thing through time. More generally, the Ego is a necessary
condition for the possibility of consciousness; in the absence of the Ego, con-
sciousness simply cannot exist.
Sartre begged to differ. Although in the early-to-mid 1930S Sartre was still
operating within a broadly Husserlian framework, on the key issue of the sub-
ject he believed Husserl to have made a disastrous mistake, and The Transcend-
ence of the Ego (1936-37) contains (amongst other things) a vehement attack on
the latter's 'egological' phenomenology. Stephen Priest's The Subject in Ques-
tion is a sustained analytical commentary on The Transcendence of the Ego. In
his preface, Priest tells us that his is the first such commentary to appear in
English. Although this remark invites the thought 'Why bother now?', in the
pages which follow Priest develops a compelling case for his particular subject:
although flawed, Transcendence emerges as an intriguing and sophisticated
work, and in some ways a remarkable one. But it is by no means an easy book,
and the same applies to The Subject in Question.
In Transcendence Sartre covers a lot of territory in few words; many of his
formulations are striking but their meaning is often unclear, and while many
intriguing claims are made, he rarely takes the trouble to spell out the reason-
ing behind them. But then, as his subtitle makes clear (Esquisse d'une descrip-
tion phenomenologique), Sartre viewed the work as no more than sketch. Priest
sets himself the task of clarifying the obscure, and supplying the missing argu-
ments, honing in on the best (most charitable) interpretation by a sometimes
lengthy process of elimination of competing hypotheses. This approach adds
depth, but it also means that anyone looking for no more than a straightfor-
ward exposition of Sartre's views will not find it here. This said, Priest often

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 Book Reviews 475

succeeds in revealing Sartre's position (or at least a position which may have
been Sartre's) to be both intelligible and defensible, and in some cases-for
instance the fallibilist account of self-knowledge-almost indiscernible from
positions defended by familiar figures working in the analytic tradition. There
is another reason why the exposition is less than straightforward. Priest him-
self characterizes the thread of Sartre's argument as 'sometimes convoluted
and repetitive', and any close commentary on this argument will to some
extent mirror these characteristics; the helpful summaries which open chap-
ters two and three alleviate the problem only partially. Of course, for anyone
wrestling with Sartre's actual text, Priest's approach will have its advantages.
Priest's opening chapter provides a useful introduction to the relevant Hus-
serlian doctrines and terminology. In the long second chapter Sartre's criti-
cisms of Husserl are given a thorough airing (some 30,000 words of
commentary to about 4000 words of Sartre). The shorter third chapter is given
over to the positive account of the self Sartre offers in place of the Ego: rather
than something standing behind experience, the 'I' emerges as something
which appears within experience. A succinct fourth and final chapter deals
with Sartre's main conclusions. Although there is no shortage of interesting
material in these later chapters, I will confine my remarks here to chapter 2.
Sartre's case against the Ego is wide-ranging. Some of his arguments rest on
distinctively Sartrean presuppositions-for instance his claim that conscious-
ness could not possess the absolute 'spontaneity' that it does possess in the
presence of an Ego-but others are based on more general considerations.
One of his complaints, repeatedly explored by Priest from different angles, is
that in positing the transcendental Ego Husserl broke with his own methodo-
logical strictures. Husserlian phenomenology is supposed to be the description
of what we find within consciousness; but Husserl also insists that the tran-
scendental Ego is not to be found within consciousness, rather it stands behind
consciousness, as its necessary condition or ground, an unseen seer. But if this
is so, how can the positing of the Ego be justified phenomenologically? Sartre
reinforces this point with phenomenological observations of his own. There is
clearly one sort of experience in which we do encounter an 'I, namely in self-
conscious thought, when we explicitly ascribe to ourselves states and proper-
ties. But Sartre maintains that in addition to this reflective/reflexive mode of
consciousness there is a pre-reflective consciousness, in which no 'I' of any sort
appears: the sort of consciousness we have when we are absorbed in whatever
it is that we are doing, and so not thinking about ourselves at all. Sartre's
observation is unlikely to sway the committed Husserlian, who will presuma-
bly reply that the contents of pre-reflective consciousness must be appre-
hended by the Ego or else they would be experienced (and so would be
conscious) at all. Nonetheless, qua phenomenology it has considerable merit,
and the Sartrean thesis that consciousness can be entirely 'impersonal' or 'pre-
personal' is interestingly related to certain Buddhist (not to mention Parfit-
tian) doctrines.

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476 Book Reviews

Other arguments are intended to demonstrate the redundancy of the Ego

from an explanatory perspective. Of particular importance here is the unity of
consciousness, which Husserl believed to depend on the Ego. Sartre makes two
relevant claims: first, the unity of consciousness is accomplished by conscious-
ness itself, and so the invocation of the Ego is unnecessary; second, the exist-
ence of the Ego would be incompatible with the unity of consciousness. I found
Priest's treatment of these claims puzzling, albeit for different reasons.
Rather misleadingly, Priest says on p. 34 (section six of chapter two) that he
will be pursuing the 'incompatibility' issue 'in the section below', but so far as I
can see only returns to it some fourteen sections later, on p. 89, and it is then
dealt with in a cursory manner. This is surprising, and a pity. Sartre expended
one of his more memorable formulations on this point-'this superfluous I
would be a hindrance. If it existed it would tear consciousness from itself; it
would divide consciousness; it would slide into every consciousness like a
blade. The transcendental I is the death of consciousness' (TE, p. 40). But in
addition the point Sartre had in mind seems to be a strong one. Let us suppose
that Sartre is right in his contention that consciousness is unified independ-
ently of the Ego. Let us further suppose that he is right in thinking that the
objects of consciousness do not need an Ego in order to exist at all. Two things
seem to follow. First, if the Ego were non-existent or absent none of us would
be any the wiser: phenomenologically speaking, our streams of consciousness
would be just as they are. Second, even if there were an Ego apprehending our
various states of consciousness as they occur, then on the assumption that this
Ego is a component of our mind (or consciousness) as a whole, we would have
a split, or perhaps better a double, consciousness: there would be the inherently
unified ensemble of conscious contents, and there would be this same ensem-
ble as apprehended by the awareness of the Ego. This may not be formally con-
tradictory, but it is a conclusion few would want to embrace.
But this result depends on the first claim: that consciousness unifies itself.
Priest puts Sartre's explanation of how this comes about thus:
he thinks it is the objects of consciousness which make its unity possible. It is the syn-
thesizing activity of several mental acts in constituting one and the same intentional
object which enables us to say that it is one and the same consciousness which is di-
rected towards that object. It is not that which is conscious which bestows unity on
consciousness but that which consciousness is of. (p. 35)

This doctrine faces obvious difficulties. Consider first synchronic unity. If we

operate the epoche and 'bracket' the physical world, then at any given moment
there is a sense in which much of my consciousness can be regarded as being
composed of various 'intentional objects': for instance the sound of a car-
horn, a twinge of back-ache (perhaps my body as a whole), the table I see in
front of me, the cup on the table, the scene from last year's holiday I am imag-
ining, and so forth. Since many of these objects are phenomenal complexes,
possessing unified experiential parts (particularly in the case of sizeable visuo-
phenomenal items), there is clearly some truth in the notion that objects of

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 Book Reviews 477

this sort provide consciousness with one form of unity-call it 'object-unity'

Since these same objects often endure through time, object-unity can go some
way to accounting for the diachronic unity of consciousness as well. But is it
plausible to suppose that the (synchronic) unity of consciousness in general
can be accounted for in terms of object-unity? No. The different objects to be
found in my consciousness are themselves experienced as occurring together
-they are co-conscious-and this inter-object unity clearly cannot be
accounted for in terms of object-unity alone.
There is a second strand to Sartre's account of the unity of consciousness.
The notion that propositional attitude states are 'systematic' is one that many
contemporary philosophers would endorse: it makes no sense to think that a
subject could believe 'Dogs are happy creatures' unless that same subject had
many other beliefs (for instance, dogs are animals, dogs usually have four legs,
legs are for walking, happiness is pleasant, etc.). Sartre also endorsed a doc-
trine of the 'holism of the mental' but took it to apply to phenomenal states as
well, and was thus led to proclaim: 'Whoever says "a consciousness" says "the
whole of consciousness."' It makes no sense to think my current perceptual
experience is a perception of a table unless I am able to have various other
table-related experiences: at the very least I must be able to imagine what the
table would look like from different angles. Priest suggests this holistic doc-
trine, if true, rescues Sartre's general argument on the unity issue: 'This is an
interesting line of argument which, if sound, does succeed in grounding the
unity of consciousness in the intentional object and therefore makes the tran-
scendental ego redundant' (p. 38). I cannot see that this is so. Even if it is true
that one cannot be conscious of one intentional object without possessing var-
ious other experiential capacities related to that object-which is what Sartre's
holism amounts to-the problem of accounting for the fact that different
intentional objects are simultaneously and occurrently co-conscious remains
completely untouched, and so unsolved.
I have been focusing so far on de facto unity of consciousness: the simple
fact that different phenomenal items are experienced together. Priest claims (p.
34) Sartre accepted, and was trying to account for, the 'necessary unity of con-
sciousness', the doctrine that one's consciousness 'is in principle indivisible'. It
is not entirely clear what this means, but I take it that (at the very least) it
entails the following: for any two phenomenal items 0, and 02, if 0, and 02
are co-conscious, then it is impossible for 0, to exist in the absence of 02, and
vice-versa. There is a variety of holism which yields this result, but it is quite
different from the holism Sartre had in mind. Suppose it were the case that the
phenomenal character of an experience were affected by the other experiences
with which it is co-conscious, in such a way that the experience in question
would not (and could not) have the phenomenal character it actually does
have if any of the other experiences were absent. The desired result follows
directly, assuming we take an experience's exact phenomenal character to be
one of its essential properties. Needless to say, it is far from clear that the 'inter-

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478 Book Reviews

experiential
experiential holism'
holism'
required
required
actually
actually
obtains.obtains.
As
As for
forthe
thedefacto
defacto
unity
unity
problem,
problem,
it is faritfrom
is far
insoluble
from within
insoluble
the Sartrean
within the Sartrean
framework.
framework. Given
Given
the the
fact fact
that numerically
that numerically
distinct phenomenal
distinct phenomenal
objects are objects are
experienced
experienced as as
occurring
occurring
together,
together,
all Sartre
all needs
Sartreis an
needs
account
is an
of account
how this of how this
can
canbe bewhich
which does
does
not not
invokeinvoke
the Ego.
theOne
Ego.
option
Oneisoption
to positisa primitive
to posit arela-
primitive rela-
tionship
tionshipofof co-consciousness,
co-consciousness,a relationship
a relationship
which wewhich
experience
we experience
as holding as holding
between
between(and (andwithin)
within)
different
different
phenomenal
phenomenal
objects. Alternatively,
objects. Alternatively,
we might we might
start
startwith
withthethe
observation
observationthat we
that
areweusually
are usually
conscious conscious
not of objects
notinof
isola-
objects in isola-
tion,
tion,butbutofofobjects
objects
spatially
spatially
relatedrelated
to one another:
to one another:
it is a spatially
it is unified
a spatially unified
world
worldthatthatwewe(typically)
(typically)
encounter
encounter
in consciousness.
in consciousness.
On several Onoccasions
several occasions
Priest
Priesthimself
himselfrecognizes
recognizes
as much.
as much.
At the At
very
the
endvery
of the
end
book
ofhethe
suggests
book that
he suggests that
there
thereisisa common
a common
ingredient
ingredient
underlying
underlying
Husserl'sHusserl's
'field of transcendental
'field of transcendental
subjectivity',
subjectivity', that
that
which
which
SartreSartre
calls 'an
calls
inside
'anwithout
inside an
without
outside',an
andoutside', and
Heidegger
Heidegger thethe
Lichtung
Lichtung
or clearing
or clearing
where being
where is being
disclosed
is to
disclosed
being: to being:
We
Wecould
couldcall
call
it 'subjective
it 'subjective
space'space'
or 'inner
or space'.
'innerItspace'.
is the space
It is of
the
one's
space
ownof
psycho-
one's own psycho-
logical
logicalinteriority,
interiority,
the the
zone zone
of awareness
of awareness
where my
where
experiences
my experiences
happen ... It happen
is the ... It is the
zone
zonewhere
wherebeing
being
and and
phenomenological
phenomenological
content content
coincide ...coincide
I conjecture
... Ithat
conjecture
sub- that sub-
jective
jectivespace
space
is the
is the
soul.soul.
(pp. 152-53)
(pp. 152-53)

Whether
Whetherthis
this
'zone'-our
'zone'-our
consciousness-really
consciousness-really
is space-like
is space-like
is an interest-
is an interest-
ing
ingquestion,
question,butbut
one one
which
which
PriestPriest
(here at(here
least) at
does
least)
not explore
does not
further.
explore
Onefurther. One
point
pointseems
seemsclear.
clear.
If 'subjective
If 'subjective
space' does
space'
exist,
doesit exist,
is a relational
it is a rather
relational
than arather than a
substantival
substantival space.
space.
Lacking
Lacking
discernible
discernible
intrinsicintrinsic
phenomenalphenomenal
features, there
features,
is there is
no
no warrant
warrant forfor
supposing
supposing
that empty
that empty
space (asspace
it features
(as it in
features
our experience)
in our experience)
exists
existsasasanan
entity
entityin its
inown
its right:
own right:
it is void,
it is
nothing
void, more.
nothing
In this
more.
light,InSar-
this light, Sar-
tre's
tre'ssubsequent
subsequent characterization
characterization
of consciousness
of consciousness
(in L'Etre (in
et leL'Etre
Neant) et as le
a Neant) as a
nothingness
nothingness no no
longer
longer
seemsseems
quite so
quite
strange.
so strange.

Department of Philosophy BARRY DAINTON

The University of Liverpool
Liverpool L69 3BX
UK

Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Leibniz and the Monadology,

by Anthony Savile. London: Routledge, 2000. Pp. v + 247. H/b ?40.00, P/b
?8.99.

Smarter than Descartes by a country mile, and half as mothering as the Medi-
tations, Leibniz and the Monadology could stand the services of a good guide
more than most. Students and practitioners of contemporary philosophy wise
enough to learn from its history can only applaud the ambition of the
Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks series-of 'painlessly' introducing classic
texts by 'situating the philosopher and the work in a historical context, consid-
ering the text in question and assessing the philosopher's contribution to con-
temporary thought' (from the back cover). Little advertising is free of hype. If

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