ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 1

TITLE IV: CRIMES AGAINT PUBLIC
INTEREST
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 247
PROHIBITING AND PENALIZING
DEFACEMENT, MUTILATION, TEARING,
BURNING OR DESTRUCTION OF CENTRAL
BANK NOTES AND COINS.
WHEREAS, the Central Bank has the sole right
and authority to issue currency within the
territory of the Philippines under its issue power,
and pursuant to Section 54 of Republic Act No.
265, otherwise known as the “Central Bank Act,”
as amended, by Presidential Decree No. 72
dated November 29, 1972, the notes and coins
issued by the Central Bank shall be fully
guaranteed by the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and shall be legal tender in the
Philippines for all debts, both public and private;
in any manner whatsoever, currency notes and
coins issued by the Central Bank of the
Philippines; and
2. That any person who shall violate this Decree
shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of
not more than twenty thousand pesos and/or by
imprisonment of not more than five years.
All laws, orders and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent herewith are hereby
modified or repealed accordingly.
This Decree is hereby made part of the law of
the land and shall take effect immediately after
the publication thereof in a newspaper of
general circulation.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of July,
in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and
seventy-three.

WHEREAS, Central Bank notes and coins are

issued for circulation as medium of exchange
and to utilize them for other purposes does not
speak well of the due respect and dignity
befitting our currency; and

WHEREAS, defacing, mutilating, tearing, or

partially burning or destroying our currency by
any means renders it unfit for circulation,
thereby unduly shortening its lifetime, and such
acts unfavorably reflect on the discipline of our
people and create a bad image for our country;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E.

MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue
of the powers vested in me by the Constitution
as Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces
of the Philippines and pursuant to Proclamation
No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972,
Proclamation No. 1104 dated January 17, 1973,
and General Order No. 1 dated September 22,
1972, and in order to effect the desired changes
and reforms in the social, economic and political
structure of our society, do hereby order and
decree:

1. That it shall be unlawful for any person to

willfully deface, mutilate, tear, burn or destroy,

FORGING
G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961
SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury
notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and
Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court
of First Instance of Davao of illegal possession
of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to
an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years
and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, and pay a fine of P5,000, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
as well as a proportionate part of the costs. On
appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, except insofar as the maximum of
said indeterminate penalty which was increased
to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision
mayor. The case is before us on appeal by
certiorari taken by Sergio del Rosario.
It appears that, after showing to complainant
Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine one-peso
bills Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-
peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing him to believe
that the same were counterfeit paper money
manufactured by them, although in fact they
were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine
Government one of the digits of each of which
had been altered and changed, the
aforementioned defendants had succeeded in
obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in
the City of Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the
avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of
more counterfeit treasury notes of the
Philippines. The only question raised in this
appeal is whether the possession of said
Exhibits C, E, G and H constitutes a violation of
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code.
Appellant maintains that, being genuine
treasury notes of our government, the
possession thereof cannot be illegal. We find no
merit in this pretense.lawphil.net
It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9
of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had been
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 2
erased and changed so as to read 0 and that
similar erasures and changes had been made in
the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691
of Exhibit E, in the last digit in Serial No. D-
716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of
Serial No.
D-716329 of Exhibit H.
Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code
read:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false
treasury or bank notes and other instruments of
credit. — Unless the act be one of those coming
under the provisions of any of the preceding
articles, any person who shall knowingly use or
have in his possession, with intent to use any of
the false or falsified instruments referred to in
this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower
in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
ART. 169. How forgery is committed. — The
forgery referred to in this section may be
committed by any of the following means;
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or
any instrument payable to bearer or to order
mentioned therein, the appearance of a true and
genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or
altering by any means the figures, letters, words
or signs contained therein.
It is clear from these provisions that the
possession of genuine treasury notes of the
Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or
signs contained" in which had been erased and
or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as
they were used by petitioner herein and his co-
defendants in the manner adverted to above, is
punishable under said Article 168, in relation to
Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised
Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil., 398; U.S.
vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).
Being in accordance with the facts and the law,
the decision appealed from is, accordingly,
affirmed, with costs against petitioner Sergio del
Rosario. It is so ordered.

FALSIFICATION
G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS
MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.
Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and
Julio Llorente for appellant Romualdez.
Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for
appellant Mabunay.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the following decision of
the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of Manila:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are
charged with the crime of falsification of public
and official documents, committed, according to
the information, as follows:
That in or about the month of February, 1927, in
the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the
accused Estela Romualdez, who, by
appointment of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands, was then taking part in the
discharge of public functions as secretary to the
Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the
Justices of the Supreme Court, and by reason
of said duty had under her care the
compositions and other papers and documents
having reference to the examinations for the
admission of candidates to the bar held in the
months of August and September, 1926, which
were then kept in the archives of the said court,
confabulating with her co-accused, Luis
Mabunay, and acting in common accord with
him, who was then one of the candidates who
took the said Bar Examinations, willfully,
illegally, and criminally extracted from the said
archives of the Supreme Court certain public
and official documents, to wit: the compositions,
which were written, prepared and submitted by
the accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination.
Once in possession of the same, the said
accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay,
conspiring together and acting in common
accord, willfully, illegally, and criminally erased
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 3
the grade of fifty-eight (58%) given by the
correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the
composition in Remedial Law, which was written
and prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay,
and in its place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also
erased the grade of sixty-three (63%) given by
correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del
Rosario to the composition in Civil Law written
and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in
its place wrote seventy-three (73%), and by
means of these alterations the said accused
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were able
to change the relative merits of those
compositions, thereby attributing to the said
correctors, statements and declarations
contrary to what they really made, and the
accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay
thus succeeded by means of falsifications made
by them in the aforesaid public and official
documents in making it appear that Luis
Mabunay obtained the general average
required by the rules of the Supreme Court, and
in securing the latter's admission to the practice
of law, as in fact he was admitted, to the great
prejudice of the public.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not
guilty.
Both the prosecution and the defense produced
an abundance of evidence, oral and
documentary, the presentation of which
consumed considerable of the court's time.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
There is no question whatsoever as to the
following facts which are not disputed either by
the prosecution or by the defense:
The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed
upon the recommendation of Justice Norberto
Romualdez of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands as his secretary on November
1, 1921, and continued as such until September
15, 1928.
The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the
candidates duly admitted to the bar
examinations held in 1926.
The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente
Albert, who was appointed to that office on July

11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex
oficio of the examination committee for
admission to the bar.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands
designated Justice Norberto Romualdez as
chairman of the examination committee for
admission to the bar in the year 1926, and upon
recommendation of Clerk Vicente Albert, he
appointed the following as members of the
examination committee, with their respective
subjects: Attorney Francisco Ortigas, Civil Law;
Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law;
Attorney Godofredo Reyes, Criminal Law;
Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C.
A. DeWitt, International Law; Attorney-General
Delfin Jaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney
Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.
Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr.
Vicente Albert, a committee of correctors was
appointed, composed of the following attorneys:
Amado del Rosario, Assistant Director of Civil
Service, and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of
the Supreme Court, as correctors in Civil Law;
Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson,
and Fulgencio Vega, Secretary of Justice
Malcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law;
Cecilio Apostol, Assistant City Fiscal, and
Remo, of the Bureau of Audits, as correctors in
Penal Law; Marciano Guevara, of the Bureau of
Audits and Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal,
as correctors in Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of
the Executive Bureau, and the accused Estela
Romualdez, as correctors in Political Law;
Rufino Luna, of the Executive Bureau, and Zoilo
Castrillo, of the Bureau of Lands, as correctors
in International Law; and Anatalio Mañalac, of
the Bureau of Lands, and Jeronimo Samson as
correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness,
Mr. Remo was substituted by Jeronimo Samson
as corrector in Penal Law. All said correctors
were designated by clerk of court Albert with the
approval of the chairman of the examination
committee.
The work of the members of the examination
committee was limited to the preparation of the
questions in their respective subjects and of a
memorandum or note of the articles, legal
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 4
provisions and jurisprudence showing the
sources from which the questions were taken.
The work of reviewing and grading the
compositions was entrusted to the correctors
designated for each subject. Each corrector was
furnished with this note or memorandum, and a
set of rules, patterned after those of the Civil
Service, was prepared by corrector Amado del
Rosario to guide the correctors in grading the
examination papers.
The correctors worked separately in reviewing
and grading the papers on the subject assigned
to them, noting the grades given to each
answer, not on the composition, but in a
separate note book, which were later checked
with the grades given by the other corrector in
the same subject, for the purpose of determining
the general average to be given to the
composition.
The report of the examination committee on the
final result of the bar examination for the year
1926 was submitted, under date of March 2,
1927, to the Supreme Court and was published
on the fifth of said month. In the list of successful
candidates (Exhibit C-5) there appeared the
name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general
average of 75%. The grades of Mabunay in
each subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2,
which was prepared after the publication of the
result of the examination, are: 73 in Civil Law,
77 in Mercantile Law, 69 in Penal Law, 76 in
Political Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in
Remedial Law, 80 in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises. However, a later revision of the
composition of Luis Mabunay showed that the
grades of seventy-three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit
B-1), and sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law
(Exhibit B-2) had been written on the first page
of said compositions after striking out the grades
of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the
composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-
eight (58) theretofore given to the composition
in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation
of this irregularity by the City Fiscal of Manila led
to the filing of the information in this case.
Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez

Before the prosecuting attorney had finished
presenting his evidence tending to show the
identity of the person who altered the grades
appearing on the first pages of the compositions
Exhibits-B-1 and B-2, the accused Estela
Romualdez spontaneously and with the
conformity of her attorneys made of record an
admission as follows (p. 395, s. n.):
"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the
figures 73% inclosed in parenthesis are in my
regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the
words sixty-four and the figures 64% inclosed in
parenthesis appearing in said composition are
also in my regular handwriting."
Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to
alter or change the grades
In view of the admission made by the accused
Estela Romualdez that she was the person who
wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2
the words and figures alleged to have been
falsified, it now appears that the burden of
establishing the authority under which said
changes and alterations were made is on the
accused. On this point the evidence for the
defense tended to show that the accused Estela
Romualdez, both in her capacity as private
secretary of the chairman of the examination
committee and as corrector and at the same
time supervisor of the correctors, was
authorized by said chairman to revise the
compositions already reviewed by the other
correctors and to change the grades given by
them.
Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for
the defense, said that he considered the
accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk
Samson as supervisors of the correctors; and
explaining the powers of the former he said
(page 721, s. n.):
"As such supervisor I think there was on
occasion when I gave her to understand that in
order to do justice to the compositions, she
could review the compositions already graded
by the other correctors; provided, I want to add,
that the new revision was done in order to do
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 5
justice to the compositions and before the
names of the candidates were known."
Referring to the alterations made by the
accused Estela Romualdez to the grades given
by the corresponding correctors to compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness testified
that said alterations were made within the limits
of the powers he had given to said accused
(pages 723, 726, s. n.).
For her part the accused Estela Romualdez,
testifying as a witness in her own behalf, said
that the chairman of the examining committee,
gave her to understand that she "was authorized
to correct any composition in any subject" in the
bar examinations of the year 1926 and that she
had never corrected any composition after the
name of the corresponding candidate was
identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied
having known Luis Mabunay, and said that the
first time she saw him was on the first day of the
trial of this case (page 783, s. n.).
Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney
The contention of the prosecuting attorney with
respect to the accused Estela Romualdez may
be summarized in two following propositions:
1st — that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of
the examination committee, did not have
authority to delegate to his secretary, the
accused Estela Romualdez, the power to revise
compositions in subjects in which she was not a
corrector and which had already been graded by
the other correctors, and much less the power
to alter or change the grades given to and
written on said compositions; 2nd — that
granting that the chairman of the examination
committee had such authority, the accused
Estela Romualdez did not exercise the same in
the manner prescribed by said chairman,
namely, in order to do justice to the
compositions and on the condition that the
revision and the changes of grades should be
made before the names of the candidates, to
whom the compositions belonged, were known.
In support of the first proposition, the
prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice
Romualdez was appointed by the Supreme
Court as chairman of the bar examination

committee of the year 1926, so that he would
supervise the examinations in accordance with
law and the rules, and that precisely, in
accordance with the rules the chairman can not
by himself exercise the individual powers of the
committee, among which were the powers to
review, and to change or alter the grades given
to the compositions.
As to the second proposition, the prosecuting
attorney maintains that the evidence adduced
by the prosecution, specially the testimony of
the Deputy Clerk Samson, shows that the
accused Estela Romualdez made the changes
in the grades given by the correctors to
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to
favor the accused Luis Mabunay, to whom she
knew said compositions belonged, thus violating
the conditions imposed upon her by the
chairman of the examination committee when
she was given said authority.
As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the
prosecuting attorney also maintains that the
evidence for the prosecution shows that he was
in connivance with the accused Estela
Romualdez in the alteration by the latter of his
grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the
purpose of raising to 75% the general average
of 72.8 which he had obtained.
Theory of the Defense
In reply to the contention of the prosecuting
attorney, the defense argues that the power of
supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his
secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is not
contrary to law, rules or precedents. This
assertion is based on the testimony of said
Justice that the appointment of a committee of
attorneys in accordance with section 2 of the
rules had not been followed by the Supreme
Court for a number of years prior to 1926, and
that when said court designated Justice
Romualdez as chairman of the examination
committee without designating the examiners, it
left that function to said chairman, and conferred
upon him ample powers to do what in his
judgment was most in line with justice and the
law, and that no Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction to determine the propriety or illegality
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 6
of the procedure employed by the chairman of
the examination committee, or of the powers
conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch
as said chairman was responsible only to the
Supreme Court for his acts.
The defense also claims that the accused Estela
Romualdez could not have known to whom
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at
the time of making the alteration of the grades
appearing on the first pages thereof, because,
according to the testimony of said accused,
corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was
one of those who helped in the preparation of
the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes
containing the names and the identification
numbers of the candidates were opened just
one day before the publication of the result of
the examination, and that in order to finish this
work and to place the names of the candidates
on said list, they had to work continuously from
8 o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the
evening on the day prior to the publication of the
result of the examinations.
Considerations on the evidence and
contentions of both parties
Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice
Romualdez, as a witness for the defense, the
court finds that the accused Estela Romualdez,
as secretary of the chairman of the examination
committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy
clerk of the Supreme Court were considered by
said chairman not only as correctors in the
subjects assigned to them but also as
supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. n.),
both of them with equal powers and authority so
that neither could consider himself superior to
the other (page 727, s. n.). It appears, however,
that while the chairman of the committee gave
his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, to
understand that she "was authorized to revise
the compositions already graded by the other
correctors provided the new revisions were
made for the purpose of doing justice to the
compositions and that the same were mad
before the names of the candidates were
known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the
same with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo
Samson, to whom he said nothing about this

matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the
accused Estela Romualdez had never informed
the chairman of the committee about the
corrections or alterations made by her in
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did
the latter examine said compositions to
determine whether or not their merits justified
the changes so made, and he only knew of said
changes upon the filing of the information
against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.). For
her part, she made no report to the chairman of
the examination committee of any error or
injustice committed by any corrector, and she
only told him during the progress of the work of
grading the papers that they were being graded
very strictly and that "she feared that some
injustice might be committed" (page 729, s. n.),
and for that reason Justice Romualdez told his
secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a
case of the kind come to her knowledge, she
should take special notice of the same in order
to do justice," that is to say, if any person should
bring to her attention any such case in which, in
her opinion, some injustice had been
committed, she was authorized to put things in
order (page 781, s. n.), and the revision in such
cases was left to the judgment of his secretary
(page 780, s. n.).
The powers conferred in the manner above
stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman of
the examination committee upon his secretary,
Estela Romualdez, gave her so ample a
discretionary power of supervision that in its
exercise she should act independently, not only
of the correctors and of her cosupervisor
Jeronimo Samson, but also of the examination
committee. Now, granting that Justice
Romualdez, as a chairman of the committee
appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the
bar examinations of 1926, was authorized to
confer such power of supervision upon his
secretary Estela Romualdez, in what manner
did she exercise that power when she made the
changes in the compositions in question?
The accused Estela Romualdez who, according
to her own admission, made the alterations of
the grades originally given by the correctors to
compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is the only
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 7
person who could give an account of and
explain the circumstances under which said
alterations were made. But said accused,
testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was
not able to explain how and under what
circumstances she made those alterations.
When pressed by the fiscal during the cross-
examination to state the circumstances under
which she came across those compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela
Romualdez said: "If I were to make any
statement with reference to the circumstances
under which I came across these compositions,
you would compel me to tell a lie, because I do
not really remember" (page 823, s. n.). Neither
does the accused remember why she did not
put her initials under or at the side of those
alterations she made on compositions Exhibits
B-1 and B-2, limiting herself to say, when she
saw the other compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-
1 and X-2) bearing her initials which were
exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she placed her
initials on said compositions because she
graded them as corrector, and she did not put
her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-
2 because she revised them in her capacity as
supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also
said, that, as corrector, she had instructions to
put her initials when writing the original grade on
any composition, but as supervisor "she was
under no obligation" to put her initials (page 830,
s. n.) and that the chairman of the examination
committee "has not gone into such minor
details" (page 831, s. n.). Upon being
questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the
altered grade on composition Exhibit B-2 on the
same line and immediately before the initials of
the correctors she said: "Because on that
occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836, s.
n.). Neither does the accused remember
whether or not she exercised her supervisory
authority with respect to the other five
compositions forming part of those marked as
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page 840, s. n.); and when
asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why
the increase given by her to the grades originally
given to said compositions had the effect of
raising the general average of the compositions
of the same candidate to 75%, the accused
answered that "the fiscal ought to know that in

this life there are happy coincidences" (page
848, s. n.). With these answers and others
appearing in her testimony, the accused instead
of giving a satisfactory explanation of her
conduct, has demonstrated that with the
encouragement given by Justice Romualdez to
the effect that the new revision of the
compositions was left to her discretion (page
780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers
exercised by her in the bar examinations of
1926 were such that she could revise any
composition in any subject already graded and
increase or decrease the grades given by the
correctors; in other words, that she could, at her
pleasure, do or undo the work done by the
correctors without the necessity of accounting to
anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping a
note or memorandum of the compositions so
revised and the alteration of the grades.
The evidence, however, shows that Justice
Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his capacity
as chairman of the examination committee, the
compositions of the candidates who filed
motions for reconsideration of the grades given
them, after the publication of the result of the
examinations, performed his work with such
diligence and zeal that he noted in a
memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the
grades given to each answer of the candidate,
but also the total grade obtained by the
candidate in the revision, together with such
other data which would explain the increase of
the grades of this or that candidate.
The court is loath to believe that Justice
Romualdez had given his secretary to
understand that she had such unlimited powers,
or that the Supreme Court in designating said
Justice as chairman of the bar examination
committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to
confer such powers upon his secretary,
because it is an undisputed fact that his
designation was made so that he should
conduct the examinations in accordance with
law and the rules.
But, even granting that when the accused Estela
Romualdez altered the grades given by the
correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 8
she acted in the exercise of the powers
conferred upon her by the chairman of the
examination committee, is there any ground in
support of her claim that she made those
alterations only to do justice to the
compositions, and without knowing the name of
the candidate to whom they belonged?
Without giving any weight to the testimony of the
witness for the prosecution, Juan Villaflor,
which, according to the defense is not worthy of
credit because of the contradictions and
inconsistencies therein noted, the record
contains other evidence establishing certain
facts from which such knowledge can be
inferred.
It has been proved that after the revision and
grading of all the compositions numbering over
8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in pencil.
This list was prepared with the intervention of
the said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine
Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons, Juan
Villaflor and the accused Estela Romualdez.
However, before the preparation of this list,
sometime during the first day of February, 1927,
the sealed envelopes containing the
identification numbers attached to each
composition were opened. Said numbers were
written either on the upper part of each envelope
or on the first page of the composition, and that
work lasted several days (pages 162, 163, s. n.).
In the list Exhibit C-1 the numbers of the
candidates contained in the envelopes attached
to the compositions were first written (page 166,
s. n.), and then the grades in each subject,
followed by the general average (pages 71, 184,
s. n.), leaving in the blank the space intended for
the names (page 166, s. n.). Deputy Clerk
Samson wrote on an adding machine the
grades in each composition as they were read
out by one of the helpers, and then the
corresponding general average as computed by
him (page 71, s. n.), and, at the same time,
Josephine Stevens wrote said grades in the
space corresponding to each subject (page 188,
s. n.). The roll of paper used by Deputy Clerk
Samson on the adding machine was presented
as Exhibit C-6.

After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in
each subject and the general average of each
candidate, who was theretofore known by his
identification number only, was prepared, the
envelopes containing the names corresponding
to the identification numbers written on said list
were taken from the safe of the office of the
clerk, and the names of the candidates were
inserted in said list by those who assisted in the
preparation thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.)
among whom was the accused Estela
Romualdez, who admitted, upon cross-
examination, having written many of the names
appearing on several pages of said list (pages
859-861, s. n.). After said list Exhibit C-1 was
prepared the examination committee submitted
to the Supreme Court a report recommending
the admission to the bar and not only for those
candidates with a general average of 75% or
more, but also of those who had obtained a
general average of 70 or more but below 75%,
and said automatic increase was ordered noted
on said list Exhibit C-1. However, this
recommendation was not approved by the
Supreme Court on the ground that said
automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74,
s. n.), and for that reason the clerk of court, Mr.
Albert, instructed his deputy, Mr. Samson, to
prepare another list containing only the names
of the candidates who had originally obtained a
general average of 75% without having obtained
less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance
thereof the typewritten list Exhibit C-5 was
prepared (page 77, s. n.), which was approved
by the Supreme Court and published on March
5, 1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is included with
an average of 75%.
Eight or ten days after the publication of the
result of the examinations the list Exhibit C-2
was prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1
taking the grades directly from the
compositions; while one of the helpers read
them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the
adding machine and computed the general
average of each candidate. The roll of paper
used by Deputy Samson on this occasion was
also presented and marked as Exhibit C-7.
Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the
lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in the office
of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 9
when the investigation of the irregularities in the
examinations of 1926 was commenced (page
81, s. n.). And only in the course of that
investigation it was discovered that the grades
of candidate Luis Mabunay, identified with
number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list
Exhibit C-1, which had been prepared
simultaneously, did not agree, because, while
roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade in Civil Law
of candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1
shows that the grade of the same candidate is
73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the
grade of candidate No. 898 was 58 (in Remedial
Law), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in
the same subject), a difference also being noted
between the general average of candidate No.
898 in Exhibit C-6, which is 72.8%, and his
general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75%
(pages 73, 74, s. n.). This discovery led to the
revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in
the examinations of 1926, which were united to
his personal record (Exhibit B), which showed
that the grades given to, and written by the
respective correctors on the compositions of
said candidate in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and
Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered, and
further, that the grades that appeared on said
compositions before the alterations were
identical with those that appeared on the roll,
Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of page 29 of
said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the
numbers 73, 64, and 75 in the columns
corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and
General Average, respectively, were written
after erasing with rubber what was there
originally written. It may also be noted, upon an
examination of the alterations appearing on the
first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-
2, that the grades originally written by the
correctors, authenticated by their initials, had
been stricken out in such a way that it is difficult
to make out said original grades, leaving,
however, intact, the initials of the correctors.
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the
person who erased and altered the grades
written by the correctors on the first pages of
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to
make it appear that said alterations had been
made by the correctors themselves; second,
that said alterations were made after the grades

written by the correctors had been noted on the
adding machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list
Exhibit C-1 which were prepared
simultaneously; third, that after said alterations
had been made, and in order that the grades so
altered should agree with the grades already
written on the list Exhibit C-1, the grades in Civil
Law and Remedial Law were erased with
rubber, and in place thereof were written the
grades now appearing in said compositions.
The accused Estela Romualdez having
admitted that she was the author of such
alterations, the only logical inference from her
admission and the facts above set out, is that
she was also the person who erased not only
the grades originally written by the correctors on
the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 but also
those appearing in the columns corresponding
to Civil Law and Remedial Law on the list Exhibit
C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades
now appearing in said columns, and which
agree with those written by her on compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2. Now, if the accused Estela
Romualdez erased in the manner stated the
grades originally written, and substituted for
them the grades now appearing in said
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 as well as in
the columns corresponding to Civil Law and
Remedial Law in the list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be
doubted that in making such erasures and
alterations she not only acted with the intent of
concealing her identity, but she also knew the
number and the name of the candidate to whom
said composition belonged, because at that time
the numbers and the names of the candidates
were already written on the list Exhibit C-1, and
that list was kept in the office of Justice
Romualdez (page 83, s. n.), were she had
complete and absolute control as private
secretary and supervisor of the examinations.
Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay
Discarding the testimony of witness Juan
Villaflor in which he says that one Luis Mabunay
called up the accused Estela Romualdez on the
telephone a few days before the publication of
the results of the examinations, there is, indeed,
no direct proof in the record showing the
participation of the accused Luis Mabunay.
However, there is other evidence for the
prosecution establishing certain facts which
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 10
show strong indications that he operated in the
act before or at the time of its execution by his
coaccused. It has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused Luis
Mabunay was one of the candidates who took
the bar examinations in 1926; that the general
average obtained by him, according to the
computation appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of
the adding machine and that originally written in
the list Exhibit C-1 was 72.8%; that after the
Supreme Court denied the recommendation of
the examination committee that all grades from
and between 70% and 75% be automatically
raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless,
appeared in the list of successful candidates
which was published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit
C-5), and that said inclusion was due to the
increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-
1) and Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2), which was
made by his coaccused by erasing and altering
the grades theretofore given by the correctors.
It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in
her desire to show that she had no motive
whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis
Mabunay, testified that she did not know him
and that the first time she saw him was on the
first day of the trial of this case. However, in view
of her inability to explain why precisely the
compositions of said Luis Mabunay had been
benefited by the revision, and in view of the
admission of Justice Romualdez that the power
to revise conferred upon Estela Romualdez
could be exercised by her in the compositions
already graded by the correctors in all cases of
injustice which came to her knowledge, or which
might be brought to her attention (page 781, s.
n.), her testimony lacks foundation, because it is
absurd to believe that her revision of the
compositions of her coaccused Luis Mabunay
was due only and solely to a happy coincidence.
Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no
effort to contradict the evidence for the
prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of
the amount of P600 from his savings account in
the Philippine Trust Company on the second
day of March, 1927, or three days before the
publication of the result of the examinations
(Exhibit I) which, when correlated with the
deposit of the sum of P400 made by the
accused Estela Romualdez in her current

account (Exhibit H) with the Bank of the
Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said
March, 1927, may, perhaps, give an explanation
of the motive of said accused for increasing the
grades of Mabunay with just the necessary
points to reach the lowest passing general
average. It is also true that Estela Romualdez
testified that said amount had been sent to her
by her cousin named Prisca Magpayo Redona
from the province for the purchase of
merchandise for sale at the latter's store (page
791, s. n.), but the testimony in that respect was
not corroborated either by her said cousin, or by
any other persons mentioned by her as the
bearers of said amount, or by the corresponding
check or postal money order, as she had done
when referring other deposits in the bank.
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing considerations, the
court finds that the allegations of the information
are sufficiently supported by the evidence and
that the accused, Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt;
the former as principal and the latter as
accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official
documents with which they are charged and,
therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing
Estela Romualdez, who was a Government
employee at the time of the commission of the
crime, to suffer, in accordance with article 300
of the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of
Act No. 2712, six years and one day of prision
mayor with the accessory penalties of the law,
to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, without
subsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature of
the penalty, and also to suffer the penalty of
perpetual disqualification from public office; and
her coaccused Luis Mabunay, who was a
private individual with respect to said
examination, to suffer, under the provisions of
article 301 as amended by section 2 of Act No.
2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the
penalty of four months and one day of arresto
mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law,
and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to
pay one-half part of the costs.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 11
The appellant Estela Romualdez through her
attorneys makes the following assignments of
error:
I. The trial court erred in finding the accused,
Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of
"falsification of public and official documents"
and in sentencing her to suffer imprisonment
without due process of law, contrary to section
3, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, entitled
"An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of
the United States as to the future Political Status
of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to
Provide a More Autonomous Government for
those Islands".
II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the
accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully
authorized to make the alterations she in fact
made on the composition papers of Luis
Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2 of the
Government, and in denying full credit to the
uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Justice
Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar
examining committee for the year 1926,
concerning the authority granted her.
III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the
accused Estela Romualdez a fair and impartial
trial.
The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay
allege that the trial court committed the following
errors:
I. The trial court erred in not crediting the
uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez
with reference to his authority as chairman of
the bar examination committee of the year 1926,
to confer upon the accused Estela Romualdez,
the powers he in fact conferred upon her, in
connection with said examination.
II. It also erred in not crediting the
uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez
as to the fact that he, as chairman of the bar
examination committee of 1926, really and truly
conferred upon the accused Estela Romualdez
the powers which she exercised in that
examination.
III. It also erred in concluding that the accused
Estela Romualdez did not exercise the powers
conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar

examination committee of 1926, within the limits
fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new
revision and grading of the compositions be
made in order to do justice thereto, and before
the names of the corresponding candidates
were known.
IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the
accused Estela Romualdez changed the
general average and the grades of candidate
Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial law on
the list Exhibit C-1.
V. The lower court erred in not admitting the
expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo
Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits
26 and 27, containing the opinion of said
lawyers as to the grades to which said
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly
entitled.
VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo
Samson used the same powers exercised by
the accused in the bar examination of 1926.
VII. Granting that the accused Estela
Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-
1 and B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis
Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded
them, the court erred in concluding that said act
constitutes the offense charged in the
information.
VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as
chairman of the bar examination committee of
1926, was not authorized by the Supreme Court
to confer upon Estela Romualdez the powers
which she exercised in that examination, the
court erred in concluding that she altered the
grades of said compositions willfully and
feloniously.
IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that
Estela Romualdez intended to conceal her
identity when she revised and regraded
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
X. It also erred in concluding that the accused
Estela Romualdez, in exercising her powers as
supervisor of the correctors in said bar
examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-
1 and B-2 only, in order to regrade them.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 12
XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in
revising and regrading said compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had
received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay the
sum of P400.
XII. Granting that the accused Estela
Romualdez committed the offense of
falsification with which she is charged, the lower
court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay
participated in its commission.
In addition to the usual brief for each of the
accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a
joint memorandum on July 10, 1929. The
Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the
People of the Philippine Islands and a reply to
the memorandum for the defense.
The court at that time consisted of nine
members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez,
was disqualified to sit in this case. Upon a
consideration of the case on its merits, four
justices were in favor of affirming the decision of
the trial court and the same number were in
favor of acquitting the defendants. The court
being unable to reach a decision in the usual
course, an attempt was made on February 11,
1930 to break the deadlock, as is evidenced by
the following resolution:
The court having under consideration again the
case of People vs. Romualdez, et al., No.
31012, those participating being all the
members of the court, except Mr. Justice
Romualdez, who was disqualified, it was moved
that following precedents elsewhere,
particularly in the United States Supreme Court,
to the effect that when there is an equal division
in the court and there is no prospect of a change
in the vote the judgment appealed from stand
affirmed, and in accordance with the action
taken in the case of Nacionalista
Party vs.Municipal Board of Manila, No. 21265
— the judgment in the case at bar be affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Avanceña and Messrs.
Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and Johns voted in
favor of the motion. Messrs. Justices Johnson,
Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real voted against
the motion. Mr. Justice Johnson based his
dissent on the peculiar statutory provisions in

force in the Philippine Islands. For want of a
majority, the motion was lost.
The court thereupon directed that the clerk
retain the record in the case until the further
order of the court.
On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a
motion praying that the case against him be
considered separately and he be absolved from
the complaint. This motion was denied by the
court. He renewed his motion on August 1,
1931. This motion was also denied on the
ground that no severance had been asked for in
the lower court, and for the further reason that
there was a prospect that the membership of the
court would soon be increased.
The membership of the court was finally
increased to eleven, and due to the death or
retirement of three justices only six of the former
members remained. On June 23, 1932
Courtney Whitney as attorney for Estela
Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case
be set for a rehearing before the court as newly
constituted. This motion was granted. On July 2,
1932 he filed a motion for the dismissal of the
information, alleging that because of the inability
of the court to reach a determination from the
facts as to the guilt or innocence of the
defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she
had been denied her right to a speedy trial. This
motion was denied.
After a reargument of the case, the attorney for
Estela Romualdez filed an additional
memorandum, to which the Attorney-General
filed a reply.
Under the first assignment of error, the
attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that
even if the lower court's findings of fact be
justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to
sustain that any criminal offense, recognized
under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has
been committed." They contend that the
appointment of the committee of attorneys by
Justice Romualdez to read and grade the
examination papers was not warranted by law,
and that therefore the alteration by the
defendant Estela Romualdez, under the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 13
circumstances alleged in the information, of the
grades in question did not constitute a crime.
The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was
a witness for the defense, completely refutes
this contention. He testified that the bar
examining committee was composed of two
groups of attorneys: Those that were appointed
to prepare the questions, and those that were
appointed to grade the papers. He further
testified that the court was informed of the way
in which the examination was conducted and
that it approved thereof. There were more than
a thousand candidates and some eight
thousand papers. According to the contention of
appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneys
appointed to prepare the questions or the court
itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such a
contention is clearly untenable. The attorneys
that prepared the questions did not intervene in
the grading of the papers, but they prepared a
key to the questions, which served the other
group of attorneys, the readers or "correctors",
as a guide in grading the papers. The
intervention of the "correctors" was just as legal
as that of the attorneys that prepared the
questions, and the intervention of the two
groups of attorneys was perfectly regular and
valid.
It is also contended that the examination papers
which the defendant Estela Romualdez altered
were not public or official documents. That
contention is likewise without merit. As stated by
her attorneys, the examination of candidates for
admission to the bar is a judicial function. It
cannot therefore be maintained with any show
of reason that the papers submitted by the
candidates in the course of the examination
were not public and official documents, or that
the alteration, under the circumstances alleged
in the information, of the grades given to such
papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. (In
re Del Rosario, 52 Phil., 399, where this court
refers to the falsification of his examination
papers as "falsification of public documents";
People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where
the conviction of Castro for the falsification of his
examination papers was affirmed.)

In accordance with the established practice of
the court to have one of its members each year
make all the necessary arrangements for the
bar examination, the Chief Justice in 1926
designated Justice Romualdez for that purpose,
and in pursuance thereof he appointed one
group of attorneys to prepare the questions and
another group to grade the papers. If any of
these attorneys were designated by the clerk of
the court, it was with the advice and consent and
on the authority of Justice Romualdez.
The phrase "falsification of a document" is not
used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal code
in the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a
technical meaning, and according to article 300
may be committed in the following eight ways:
1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature, or rubric.
2. By causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when they
did not in fact so participate.
3. By attributing to persons who have
participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them.
4. By making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts.
5. By altering true dates.
6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its meaning.
7. By issuing in authenticated form a document
purporting to be a copy of an original document
when no such original exists, or by including in
such a copy a statement contrary to, or different
from, that of the genuine original.
8. By intercalating any instrument or note
relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry or official book.
The acts of the accused are covered by
paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the
alterations in the grades in such a way as to
make it appear that the "correctors" had
participated therein, because she blotted out the
grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and
increased grades opposite their initials, without
indicating by her own initials that she had made
the alterations. She in that way attributed to the
"correctors" statements other than those in fact
made by them. Her only explanation of why she
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 14
altered the grades in that way was that it
pleased her to do so.
A decision in point has just come to hand. It is
reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to in
the American Bar Association Journal for
August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in the
Massachusetts Senate prohibiting the marking
of the examination papers of applicants for
admission to the bar by any person not a
member of the board of bar examiners. The
Senate wished to know whether such a bill, if
enacted, would be an unconstitutional
interference with the functions of the Judicial
Department, and asked the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion.
They replied that such a law would be
unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion
they said: "If the judicial department decides that
the marking of the written examinations may be
performed by competent persons not members
of the board but acting under the direction of
such members, that pertains directly to the
ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants.
It is a definite attribute of the judicial department
and not an immaterial incident." It was also
stated that the plan of employing assistants to
aid the bar examiners in marking the papers had
been approved by the Supreme Judicial Court.
In the second assignment of error, the attorney
for Estela Romualdez maintains that the trial
court erred in not finding that she was fully
authorized to make the alterations she in fact
made on the examination papers of Luis
Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in denying
full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of
Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the
bar examining committee for the year 1926,
concerning the authority granted her.
In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that
Justice Romualdez ever gave the accused the
authority which she claims to have received;
and in the second place, even if it be assumed
that he gave her the alleged authority, she did
not exercise it in accordance with the terms
thereof.
The defense would have us believe that Justice
Romualdez regarded his secretary, Estela
Romualdez, and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo
Samson, who were themselves "correctors" as

supervisors of the other "correctors", and that he
authorized Estela Romualdez to revise any
grade to correct an injustice, without consulting
or notifying the other supervisor, Samson, or the
"correctors' who had graded the paper, without
requiring her to initial the alteration, or to make
any record thereof or any report to him or to
anybody else.
Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief
Justice to conduct the examination in
accordance with the law and the Rules of Court.
He himself had no such authority as he is
alleged to have given his secretary. He is
presumed to have discharged his duties in
accordance with the law, and it is inconceivable
that he would without any warrant of law give or
attempt to give his secretary the unlimited
authority which she claims to have received,
thereby enabling her to alter at will any grade or
any paper, without making any record thereof or
any report to anybody. The mere statement of
such a claim shows that it is preposterous.
No such authority was given to Samson, who
according to Justice Romualdez was regarded
by him as a supervisor of equal rank with Estela
Romualdez. Samson was never notified that he
was regarded as a supervisor, and he never
acted in that capacity.
Let us notice how this unlimited authority is
alleged to have been granted to the accused
Estela Romualdez.
It was not in writing or evidenced by any
memorandum. It was not even a positive
statement. Justice Romualdez testified that he
believed that on a certain occasion he gave his
secretary to understand that if a case should be
brought to her attention she might revise any
grade to prevent an injustice, so long as she did
not know the name of the candidate to whom the
paper belonged. When asked where she was
when the pretended authority was given to her,
the accused could not remember.
There was according to the theory of the
defense nothing to prevent Samson from
revising the revision of Estela Romualdez,
because she did not initial the changes made by
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 15
her, and he was supposed to be a supervisor of
equal rank.
If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the
accused Estela Romualdez was given the
authority which she claims to have received,
nevertheless she was not authorized to change
the grades now in question, because when she
made the changes she already knew that the
papers belonged to her coaccused Luis
Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining that
conclusion is carefully set forth by the trial court,
and it is unnecessary for us to review it. The
testimony of Justice Romualdez to the effect
that the accused acted within the authority
granted her in changing the grades in question
was a mere expression of opinion. It was clearly
inadmissible and not binding on the court. The
accused Estela Romualdez did not even
attempt to explain under what circumstances
she raised the grades of her coaccused so as to
enable him to obtain the necessary general
average of 75 per cent. She did not confer with
the "correctors" who had graded the papers in
question. She di not attempt to explain how she
arrived at the increased grades, or how she
came to revise the grades in question, how she
happened to pick these two papers out of eight
thousand. She could not point to any other
grades that had been altered by her.
Under the second assignment of error the
attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that
she freely and voluntarily admitted from the start
of the trial of her case that the alterations had
been made by her, and concludes therefrom
that she acted in good faith. We cannot agree
either with the statement of fact or the
conclusion. The accused Estela Romualdez did
not admit that the alterations were made by her
until after the prosecuting attorney had
presented three hundred and fifty pages of
testimony and announced his readiness to
prove by three handwriting experts that the
alterations were in the handwriting of the
accused. The evidence shows that before the
trial defendant's attorney from the fiscal's office
a photograph that had been made for the
purpose of comparing a specimen of
defendant's handwriting and that of the altered
grades. The fact that the defendant Estela

Romualdez made the alterations under the
circumstances which we have mentioned, when
she already knew that the papers belonged to
Mabunay, disproves any contention that she
acted in good faith.
In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros
(25 Phil., 634), this court said:
When the unlawful acts charged against an
accused are established by competent
evidence, criminal intent may be and will be
presumed, unless such intent is rebutted by the
introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome
this presumption, and satisfactorily disclosing
the absence of such criminal intent.
The third assignment of error made by the
appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial court
erred in failing to extend to her a fair and
impartial trial. We shall not waste much time on
this assignment of error, which is utterly without
merit. The record itself completely refutes any
such contention. If the learned trial judge erred,
it was in permitting the attorneys for the
defendants too great latitude in arguing their
objections. Arguments four and five pages long
were incorporated into the stenographic record
of the evidence. The record shows a most
unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscal
and a persistent effort to embarrass him in
presenting his evidence against the accused.
The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve
assignments of error. They are for the most part
embraced in the assignments of error of his
coaccused which we have already considered.
These remain only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth
assignments of error. In his fifth assignment of
error it is alleged that the lower court erred in not
admitting the expert testimony of attorneys Wm.
J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto,
and in rejecting Exhibits 26 and 27, which
contain the opinion of said attorneys as to the
correct grades which the examination papers
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.
The lower court sustained the objection to the
admission of the testimony of these three
attorneys on the ground that it was not the best
evidence, and suggested that the defense might
call the members of the examining committee
that prepared the questions in Remedial Law
and Civil Law and the key thereto. The attorneys
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 16
for the defense did not see fit to adopt the
suggestion of the court. It is not true therefore
that the lower court deprived the accused of an
opportunity of showing that the examination
papers in question deserved the increased
grades which the defendant Estela Romualdez
gave them. The attorneys that prepared the
questions and the key to the answers were
certainly the persons best qualified to decide
whether or not the questions were correctly
answered. The opinion of other attorneys, who
had nothing to do with the examination, would
only lead to confusion. We find no merit in this
assignment of error.
The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial
court erred in insinuating that the motive of the
accused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and
regrading the examination papers Exhibits B-1
and B-2 was the fact that she had received four
hundred pesos from her co-accused Luis
Mabunay.
The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be
assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez
committed the crime of falsification imputed to
her in the information, the court erred in
concluding that the accused Luis Mabunay
participated in its commission.
For the sake of convenience we shall consider
these two assignments of error together.
In the first place we should like to say that there
is no evidence to show that Estela Romualdez
ever reviewed the examination papers of her
coaccused. So far as the evidence shows, she
merely raised his grades in two subjects, thus
giving him by "a happy coincidence", to use her
own words, a passing mark. She could not or
would not enlighten the court as to why she
raised the grades of Luis Mabunay so as to
enable him to be admitted to the bar. As already
stated, the record does not show that she raised
the grades of any other candidate.
The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had
failed in two previous examinations, and that he
failed in the examination in question, receiving a
general average of only 72.8%. The bar
examining committee recommended that not
only those having the required general average
of 75 per cent be admitted, but also that those

who had received between 70 and 75 per cent.
This is referred to in the record as "an automatic
increase". It was not automatic but arbitrary, and
was disapproved by the Supreme Court, and the
committee was directed to prepare a new list
and to include therein only those who had
obtained a general average of 75 per cent. The
name of Luis Mabunay was included in the new
list submitted three days later, notwithstanding
the fact that he had obtained a general average
of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela
Romualdez had in the meantime raised the
grades now in question so that he appeared to
have obtained the general average required for
admission to the bar.
The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis
Mabunay withdrew P600 from the Philippine
Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela
Romualdez deposited P510 in the Bank of the
Philippine Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify,
and he did not present any evidence to show for
what purpose he withdrew P600 from the bank
immediately after the first list was disapproved.
In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil.,
303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the
court said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to
himself if not to the State. If he does not perform
that duty he may not always expect the State to
perform it for him. If he fails to meet the
obligation which he owes to himself, when to
meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is hardy
indeed if he demand and expect the same full
and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable
effort seek to help themselves. This is
particularly so when he not only declines to help
himself but actively conceals from the State the
very means by which it may assist him.
In the famous case of the
Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295,
316), Chief Justice Shaw laid down the following
rule:
When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is
produced, tending to support the charge, and it
is apparent that the accused is so situated that
he could offer evidence of all the facts and
circumstances as they existed, and show, if
such was the truth, that the suspicious
circumstances can be accounted for
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 17
consistency with his innocence, and he fails to
offer such proof, the natural conclusion is, that
the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting,
would tend to sustain the charge. But this is to
be cautiously applied, and only in cases where
it is manifest that proofs are in the power of the
accused, not accessible to the prosecution.
Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of
P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and
only P10 by her brother, but she could not
satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400
came from. She said it was sent to her by her
cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the
purchase of goods, but she could not name the
person that brought the money to her, or explain
why she deposited it in the bank. She did not
attempt to show that she had paid it out by
means of checks for the purchase of goods for
her cousin. She did not call her cousin as a
witness.
An accused person runs the risk of an inference
against him because of failure to produce
evidence. The inference, unless the failure to
produce evidence is explained away, is that the
tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would
not support the party's case. (U. S. vs. Sarikala,
37 Phil., 486.)
In the case just cited the court quoted with
approval the following rules as stated by Dean
Wigmore in his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p.
3148:
The failure to produce evidence, in general,
other than his own testimony, is open to
inference against a party accused, with the
same limitations applicable to civil parties. Here
the effect of the burden of proof has sometimes
tended to confuse. It is true that the burden is on
the prosecution, and that the accused is not
required by any rule of law to produce evidence;
but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference
from nonproduction. This seeming paradox,
which has been already sufficiently noticed in
treating of the general principle, has misled a
few courts to deny that any inference may be
drawn.
The alterations in the grades made by Estela
Romualdez were made for the sole use and
benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They
were made willfully and illegally, and after the
Supreme Court had rejected those candidates

that had received less than 75 per cent. The
alterations were therefore made after Mabunay
had failed, and he withdrew the money after he
had time to learn from his coaccused that he had
failed. It was under those circumstances
incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to
present evidence to show for what purpose he
withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank.
As this court said in the case of Worcester vs.
Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):
When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the
liability on a party who has it in his power to offer
evidence of all the facts as they existed and
rebut the inferences which the circumstances in
proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such
proof, the natural conclusion is that the proof, if
produced, instead of rebutting would support the
inferences against him, and the court is justified
in acting upon that conclusion.
The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is
directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed for the
third time in the bar examination of 1926. He
then filed a motion for the revision of his grades,
based on an alleged mistake in computation.
This motion was granted, and he was admitted
to the bar. It was subsequently found that
alterations had been made in his examination
papers, and he and Juan Villaflor were
prosecuted for the falsification of a public
document. Villaflor assumed full responsibility
for the commission of the crime, and testified
that Del Rosario did not know anything about
the making of the alterations. The trial court
acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the
case for the purpose of taking disciplinary actin
against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the
court in banc, said:
It is asking a great deal of the members of the
court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal
machinations culminating in the falsification of
public documents, of which he was the sole
beneficiary.
The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario
was cancelled.
In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53
Phil., 158), the accused was charged with the
falsification of a public document. The evidence
showed that in the Register of Attorneys the
name of an attorney had been erased, and that
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 18
the accused had written his own name in that
space, although he had not admitted to the bar.
The accused contended that he wrote his name
in the register under the direction of an
employee of the court, and that he acted in good
faith. He was convicted, and on appeal the
decision was affirmed. This court in its decision
said: "The trial court suggests in the opinion that
the offense committed required the participation
of some unfaithful employee of the court. But
this fact, as the court found, did not lessen the
criminal responsibility of the appellant."
It is alleged in the information that the accused
conspired together and acted in common accord
in the commission of the crime. As the Attorney-
General says, a conspiracy can seldom be
proved except by circumstantial evidence, but
once it is proved, the acts of one of the
conspirators are the acts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil.,
27 Phil., 530.)
The existence of the assent of minds which is
involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred
by the jury from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together,
apparently indicate that they are merely parts of
some complete whole. If it is proved that two or
more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their acts, though
apparently independent, were in fact connected
and cooperative, indicating a closeness of
personal association and a concurrence of
sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though
no actual meeting among them to concert
means is proved. Evidence of actual
participation, rather than of passive
acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of
acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of
others is relevant to show the criminal intention
of the passive party, and generally the smallest
degree of consent or collusion among parties
lets in the act or words of one against the others.
(Underhill on Criminal Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the
conclusions of the trial court are fully justified by
the evidence.
As the accused Estela Romualdez took
advantage of her official position in committing
the crime, the trial court found her guilty of a
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 19

violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as

amended by Act No. 2712, and sentenced her
to suffer six years and one day of prision mayor,
and the accessory penalties provided by law, to
pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to suffer
perpetual disqualification to hold any public
office.
The penalty provided by the Penal Code is
prision mayor in full extent, or from six years and
one day to twelve years, and the penalty under
the Revised Penal Code being the same, and
there being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance present in the commission of the
crime, the penalty should be imposed in the
medium degree, which is from eight years and
one day to ten years. The penalty imposed on
the appellant Estela Romualdez is therefore
increased to eight years and one day of prision
mayor.
The trial court found the defendant Luis
Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article
301 of the Penal Code, the crime not being
connected with the performance of his duties as
an employee of the Government, and sentenced
him to suffer four months and one day of arresto
mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by
law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants were each sentenced to pay
one-half of the costs.
We find that the lower court erred in holding that
Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice. He
was a conspirator and coprincipal of Estela
Romualdez. The penalty provided by article 301
of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No.
2712, is prision correccional in the maximum
degree, but that has been changed by the
Revised Penal Code to prision correccional in
the medium and maximum degrees, and the
medium degree of that penalty is from three
years, six months, and twenty-one days to four
years, nine months and ten days. The prison
sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore
increased to three years, six months, and
twenty- one days of prision correccional.
The decision of the trial court is modified as
hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is
affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.
Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte,
JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981
SALUD P. BERADIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, Salud P.
Beradio, an election registrar of the COMELEC
in Rosales, Pangasinan, who was convicted on
four (4) counts of the crime of falsification of
public or official documents of the seven (7)
separate informations filed against her for
making false entries in her daily time records,
elevates to the Court, the decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 20319 to 20322
promulgated on September 18, 1978, affirming
in toto the judgment of conviction rendered on
July 30, 1976 by the Circuit Criminal Court,
Third Judicial District, Dagupan City. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the lower
court reads as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION, and
with the prosecution not having established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
herein accused and for insufficiency of evidence
or the lack of it, the Court hereby finds. as it so
holds, accussed Salud P. Beradio NOT GUILTY
of the charges in Criminal cases Nos. CCC-
0258, CCC-0259, and CCC-0263;
consequently, she is hereby acquitted therefrom
with costs de oficio; and decreeing the bail
bonds posted for her provisional release in
these cases cancelled and discharged.
On the other hand, however, the Court so finds
and holds accused Salud P. Beradio GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
falsification of public or official document as
charged in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 as to
entry on July 13, 1973 only, Criminal Case No.
CCC-0261; Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 as to
entry on May 28, 1973 only, and Criminal Case
No. CCC-0264, defined and penalized under
Article 17 1, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal
Code, and absent any aggravating or mitigating
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 20
circumstance and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Act, hereby accordingly sentences
said Salud P. Beradio to serve an indeterminate
prison term in the following manner, to wit:
a) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 — a prison
term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum, with the accessories of the law, to
pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000) but without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency and, to pay the cost;
b) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0261 — a prison
term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of prision mayor, as maximum, with the
accessories of the law, to pay a fine of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the cost;
c) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 - a prison
term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correcional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessories of the law, to
pay a fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS
(P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the cost.
d) In Criminal Case No. CCC-026-1 — a prison
term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR(4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision
correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS
and 0NE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessories of the law, to
pay fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2.000)
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the cost.
The penalties herein imposed shall be served
successively with the maximum duration of the
sentences not to exceed threefold the length of
tune corresponding to one penalty imposed
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 21

upon tier in accordance with Article 70 of the

Revised Penal Code. 1:00 p.m. to

As to charges of falsification on July 12, 1973 in 5:00 p.m.

Criminal Case No. CCC-0260, and on May 30,
1973, the Court finds no sufficient Evidence to 4) June 6, 1973
hold the accused liable. Consequently, the
accused is hereby absolved therefrom. 7:30 a.m.

The facts pertinent to the specified dates of 12:00 n ;

falsification as found by the Court of Appeals are
as follows:

... On the following particular dates, as reflected 1:00 p.m. to

in her daily time records (Exhs. "D" to "H"),
BERADIO reported her attendance in office and 5:00 p.m.
actual hours of work performed as:
5) June 22, 1973
On
7:35 a.m.
1) March 15, 1973
12:00 n ;
7:35 a.m.

12:00 n.;
1:00 p.m. to

5:00 p.m.
1:00 p.m. to
6) July 13,1973
5:00 p.m.
8:00 a.m.
2) March 23, 1973
12:00 n ;
7:30 a.m.

12:00 n ;
1:00 p.m. to

1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

5:00 p.m. The veracity of the foregoing reports were

negated by the following:
3) May 28, 1973
1) On March l5, 1973, BERADIO appeared
7:45 a.m. as counsel for the applicants at the initial
hearing and reception of evidence in land
12:00 n; Registration Case No. 19-R before the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV,

Rosales, in both morning and afternoon
sessions (Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "K-2").
2) In the morning of March 23, 1973, BERADIO
appeared as counsel for the petitioner in the
hearing of Special Proceedings No. 24-R
(summary settlement of the estate of Vicente
Oria, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch XIV, at Resales, which was called first in
open court and later, in chambers (Exhs. "M"
and M-1 ").
3) On May 28, 1973, in the same case, Sp.
Proc. No. 24-R, BERADIO again appeared as
counsel for the petitioner in the same court
which held sessions from 8:45 to 11:45 (Exh.
"M").
4) In the morning of June 6, 1973, BERADIO
appeared as counsel for the defendant in CAR
Case No. 19882-.TP '73, entitled "Pepito Felipe
vs. Ismael Pontes and Camilo Tamce before
CAR Branch 11 in Tayug, Pangasinan (Exh.
"J"). Minutes of the pre-trial conference which
the appellant attended are manifest in the pre-
trial order that was dictated in open court (Exh.
"J-1").
5) In the morning of June 22, 1973, Beradio
appeared in Sp. Proc. No. 24-R before the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV at
Rosales (Exh. "M").
6) In the morning of July 13, 1973, Beradio
appeared as counsel for plaintiff at the pre-trial
conference of Civil Case No. 137R, "Venancia
Diaz vs. Armando Ordonio" before Branch XIV
of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
(Exhs. "L" to "I-3").
It is thus clear that while in the six
abovementioned dates, BERADIO made it
appear in her daily time records that she was in
her office and performed her work on the dates
and hours she specified, the facts were that she
was elsewhere attending court sessions. 2
From the said decision of the Court of Appeals
and the denial of her motion for reconsideration
on November 28, 1978, Salud Beradio filed the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 22
instant petition for review on certiorari to the
Court. We asked the Solicitor General to
comment on the petition and thereafter, We
resolved to give due course to said petition it
appearing that the issues raised are, in the main
questions of law rendered novel by the peculiar
circumstances of the case. Thus, he raised the
following legal issues:
I
WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLE 171, PARAGRAPH
4, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS LEGAL
AND PROPER.
II
WHETHER THE PETITIONER COULD STILL
BE LEGALLY AND PROPERLY
PROSECUTED FOR AN OFFENSE WHERE
SHE WAS NO LONGER A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
III
WHETHER PETITIONER !S UNDER LEGAL
OBLIGATION TO FILL UP AND SUBMIT TIME
RECORD.
IV
ASSUMING THAT SHE IS, DO THE
STATEMENTS THEREIN REFLECTED IN
HER TIME RECORD BEAR ANY' COLOR OF
TRUTH'.
V
WHETHER DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT
IN FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL
DOCUMENT IS TOTALLY OF NO MOMENT.
VI
IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT. UNDER THE
ESTABLISHED FACTS, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE LAW AND WELL-SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONER IS

ENTITLED TO ACQUITTAL ON THE GROUND
OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
Salud P. Beradio, petitioner, is a lady-lawyer
appointed as an election registrar of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on
February 1, 1964 (Exhibits A and A-1). In 1972
and 1973, she was stationed in Resales,
Pangasinan, as Chief of Office, Office of the
Election Registrar, COMELEC holding office
beside the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to
12:00 noon and from 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon. As the nature of her job was
field work, she was required to fill up and submit
to the COMELEC's main office in Manila her
daily time records after having been counter-
signed by her provincial supervisor. 3
On March 29, 1973, the COMELEC by
resolution (Exhibits 1 and 1-A, CCC-0261)
granted her request for permission to appear as
counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in
the case before the Court of Agrarian Relations
in Rosales, Pangasinan. 4
During her assignment as Election Registrar of
Rosales, Pangasinan, one Raymundo Valdez
filed with the COMELEC, sometime in
September, 1973, an administrative complaint
charging her of unauthorized practice of law. On
the other hand, Salud Beradio tendered her
resignation as Election Registrar of Rosales,
Pangasinan, which, by COMELEC resolution
(Exhibit B) of October 25, 1973, was accepted
and made to retroact on the close of office hours
on September 30, 1973. She was duly granted
clearance by all the offices of the COMELEC,
and she received her retirement benefits under
the law.
Raymundo Valdez made an inquiry with the
COMELEC on the status of his administrative
case against Salud P. Beradio, and upon being
informed of her separation from the service, he
initiated the filing of criminal charges against
Salud Beradio on grounds of falsification of daily
time records defined and penalized under
Article 17 1, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code as falsification of public documents. In the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 23
where he lodged the criminal charges, Jose
Peralta, and his wife Paz de Guzman-Peralta,
trial attorney of Agrarian Legal Assistance
(DAR) submitted affidavits in support of the
charges against Salud P. Beradio.
On August 4, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan filed seven (7) separate
informations all dated July 7, 1975 with the
Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District,
Dagupan City, charging Salud P. Beradio with
falsification of public or official documents for
making false entries in her daily time .records
on: 1) October 12, 1972 in Criminal Case CCC-
0258; 2) September 4, 1973 in Criminal Case
CCC-0259; 3) July 12 and 13, 1973 in Criminal
Case CCC-0260; 4) June 6 and 22, 1973 in
Criminal Case CCC-0261; 5) May 28 and 30,
1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0262; 6) April 3,
1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0263; and 7) March
15 and 23, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0264
that she submitted to the Commission on
Election in Manila. 5 The separate informations
allege that petitioner was absent the whole day
on the days mentioned therein but to the
"damage and prejudice of the National
Government," she made it appear in her time
records that she was not so absent from the
office, when in fact she well knew that on such
date or time she was in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Resales,
Pangasinan, appearing in her cases .
While petitioner raised the above-quoted legal
issues which, to Us, point to the more basic
issues inherent in acts mala in se as contra
distinguished from mala prohibita, We narrowed
down these issues, for proper disposition of the
instant case, into whether or not the alleged acts
of falsification of public documents imputed
against the petitioner were tainted with criminal
intent (dolo), and whether or not the act of
alleged false narration of facts in the daily time
record bears, under the law, some semblance of
colorable truth. This We did in full
considerations of the peculiar circumstances
which render the instant case novel in some
respects, worthy of pronouncements from this
Court.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a
conviction of the offense of falsification of public
or official documents, defined and penalized
under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code, the requisite elements thereof must
be clearly established, namely: 1) the offender
makes in a document false statements in a
narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3)
the facts narrated by him are absolutely false,
and 4) the perversion of truth in the narration of
facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person. 6
Of weight in Our criminal justice system is the
principle that the essence of an offense is the
wrongful intent (dolo), without which it cannot
exist. 7 Actus non facit reum nisi mens set rea,
the act itself does not make a man guilty unless
his intentions were so. Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code clearly indicates that malice or
criminal intent (dolo) in some form is an
essential requisite of all crimes and offenses
defined in the Code, except in those cases
where the element required is negligence
(culpa).
On one point, however, the claim of the
petitioner that she is not under strict obligation
to keep and submit a time record is not at all
empty with justification. While it is true, as held
by the respondent court, 8 that the obligation to
disclose the literal truth in filling up the daily time
record is required of all officers and employees
in the civil service of the government in
accordance with Civil Service Rule XV,
Executive Order No. 5, Series of 1909, this
vague provision, however, is rendered clear by
Section 4, Rule XV of the Civil Service Rule,
dated December 3, 1962, later Memorandum
Circular No. II, Series of 1965 which exempt
from requirements of keeping and submitting
the daily time records three categories of public
officers, namely: 1) Presidential appointees; 2)
chiefs and assistant chiefs of agencies; and 3)
officers in the three branches of the
government. Clearly thus, petitioner as Chief of
theOffice, Office ofElection Registrar,
COMELEC in the municipality of Rosales,
Pangasinan exercising supervision over four (4)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 24
subordinate employess, would fall under the
third category aforementioned. An Election
Registrar of the municipality performing the
powers, dutied , responsibilities of the
COMELEC, a constitutional body, in the conduct
of national or local election, referenda, and
plebiscites, in aparticular voting district may be
regarded as an officer who rank higher thab
such chiefs or assistant chiefs of agencies
although he may not be a presidential
appointee. Notwithstan ding such an exemption,
if the election registrars of the various
municipalities all throughout the country, who
occassionaly work more than ordinary eight-
hours on the last day of the registration or on
lection day, are keeping and submitting the daily
time records to the main office in Manila, it may
be only to the sake of adminstrative procedural
convenience or as a matter of practice, but by
reason of strict legal obligation.
On the main point, assuming, however, that
petitioner is under strict legal obligation to keep
and submit the daily time records, We are
definitely inclined to the view that the alleged
false entries made in the time records on the
specified dates contained in the information do
not constitute falsification for having been made
with no malice or deliberate intent. Noteworthy
is the fact that petitioner consistently did not
dispute, but admitted in all candor her
appearances in six (6) different ways, on March
15, March 23, May 28, June 22, July 13,, all in
1973 before the Court of First Instance, Branch
XIV, Rosales, Pangasinan, in the
aforementiones cases, claiming that she did not
reflect this absences in her daily time records
because they were for few minute-duration, the
longest was on March 15, 1973 being for forty-
five (45) minutes; they could be absorbed within
the allowed coffee breaks of 30 minutes in the
morning and in the afternoon; that as Chief of
Office, and all Election Registrars of the
COMELEC for that matter, she is allowed to
have one (1) day leave during week days
provided she worked on a Saturday: and that
her brief absences did not in any way interfere
with or interrupt her official duties as an Election
Registrar. Above all, petitioner categorically
emphasized that her appearances in court were

duly authorized by the COMELEC, which in
certain instances were as counsel de oficio, and
no remuneration whatsoever from her clients
was received by her,
Finding that the justifications claimed by Beradio
as unavailing, the Court of Appeals ruled that
her various appearances in court were not on
official business, and the permission granted
her by the COMELEC was to appear in behalf of
her relatives, and she was still obligated to
reflect in her daily time records only the hours
when she was actually in the office. 9
We are not convinced. The Court of First
Instance, Branch XIV, in Rosales, Pangasinan,
is only two (2) meters from her own office as
Election Registrar in the said municipality. She
had standing authority to act as de oficio
counsel given by the COMELEC evidently in
furtherance of the free legal aid service program
of the Integrated Bar, and an Identical policy of
the Government itself, 10 especially as
COMELEC lawyers, before any election had
been held during the regime of martial law, did
not have much office work to keep them busy.
This state of virtual absence of electoral
activities is what prompted COMELEC to
authorize its lawyers to take active part in the
free legal aid program above adverted to, if to
do so would not unduly interfere with their work.
In recognition of the long standing policy of the
COMELEC in response to the legal aid program
of the Government 11 and the "free access to
the courts" provision of the 1973 Constitution,
12 the COMELEC, by Resolution No. 1401, 13
formally created the Legal Assistance Office
thereby constituting all COMELEC lawyers with
rank of division chief and below as COMELEC
Legal Assistance Officers. Even prior to the
formal creation of the Legal Assistance Office,
the liberal policy of the COMELEC in allowing its
Election Registrars to act as counsel in areas
where there are no lawyers available is, indeed,
laudable.
Under the attendant facts and circumstances in
the instant case, no criminal intent to commit the
crime with which she is charged can be imputed
against the petitioner. In the information, it was
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 25
alleged that the petitioner was not in her office
for the full office hours from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00
noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the
specified dates therein as she was then busy
attending her cases in court. On the contrary,
the evidence of the prosecution belies its
allegation of the wholeday absence in office as
Election Registrar. Records reveal that
petitioner had stayed in court for only 5, 30, 40
or 45 minutes a day for her appearances
therein, at no instance exceeding one (1) hours.
If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the
six days in question making it appear that she
attended her office from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon
and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. there is more
than color of truth in the entry made. It is not
shown that she did not report first to her office
as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan,
before going to the courtroom just two (2)
meters away. Petitioner thus likened her
appearance to going out for the usual coffee
breaks. The comparison is not even apt for
during the while she appeared in court, she was
rendering service more, if not wholly, for the
public good, than just for her own well-being as
when she goes out for snack during the coffee-
break period. The court being only two (2)
meters away from her office, she did not even
have to go so far as when one goes out for
snack. What is more, everytime she appeared
in court, she surely must have made this fact
officially of record in the court proceedings,
something which is not done with leaving the
office room for coffee breaks. In fine, the entries
in petitioner's daily time records were not
absolutely false. The alleged false entry may be
said to have a color of truth, not a downright and
willful falsehood which alone would constitute
falsification as a crime. 14 As Cuello Calon
stated: "La mera inexacted tio es bastante para
integrar este delito (Cuello Calon, Derecho
Penal 6th Ed. Vol. 11, p. 216, cited in People vs.
Villena, et al., 51 O.G. 5691; People vs. La
Corte, CA-G. R. No. 05818-CR; U.S. vs. Bayot,
10 Phil. 518)."
In thus preparing her daily time record the way
she did, it was evidently in her belief in her belief
that she was just making of record the fact that,

as was her honest opinion, she was entitled to
receive her full pay even for those days she
appeared in court, rendering what she felt was
no less a public service, being in furtherance of
a public policy on free legal assistance. As a
lawyer, and as in officer of the court, she, for
one, aids in the administration of justice,
oathbound servant of society whose duty is not
solely for the benefit of her clients but for the
public, particularly in the administration of
justice. The court a quo itself recognize, that the
COMELEC registrars, at that time, are directed
to appear as counsel de oficio when there are
no lawyers to represent the parties in litigation.
15 If petitioner is not at all appointed as counsel
de oficio strictly in accordance with the Revised
Rules of Court, Rule 138, it is an undisputed
fact, as reflected in court records, that petitioner,
true to her oath, acted as counsel in certain
cases. On this point, if one fills up his daily time
record in the belief that, on the basis of the time
so indicated therein, she is merely making an
honest claim for the pay corresponding to the
time so indicated, no intent to commit the crime
of falsification of public document can be
ascribed to her. In the case of the herein
petitioner, she was only submitting a time record
she knew would be the basis for computing the
pay she honestly felt she deserved for the
period indicated. Indeed, the time record is
required primarily, if not solely, for the purpose
of serving as basis for the determination of the
amount of pay an employee is entitled to receive
for a given period.
Further, on the issue of malus animus or
criminal intent, it was ruled by the court a quo,
confirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals,
that in falsification of public document, in
contradistinction to private document, the Idea
of gain or the intent to injure a third person is
unnecessary, for, what is penalized is the
undermining or infringement of the public faith
and the violation of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed, invoking the case of People vs. Po
Giok Te, 96 Phil. 918. Arguing against this
ruling, petitioner cited the case of People us.
Pacana, 47 Phil. 48, which the ponente in the
instant case upheld in the case of People vs.
Motus, CA-G.R. No. 18267-CR when he was in
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 26
the Court of Appeals, that although the Idea of
gain or the intent to injure a third person is
unnecessary, htis Court emphasized that "it
must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the
change in th epublic document must be such as
to affect the integrity of the same or change in
the public document must be such as to affect
the integrity of the same or change the effects
which it would otherwise produce; for, unless
that happens, there could not exist the essential
element of the intention to commit the crime
which is required by Article 1 (now Article 3) of
the Penal Code.
We find the petitioner's stand tenable. the
evident purpose of requiring government
employees to keep time record is to show their
attendance in office to work and to be paid
accordingly. Closely adhering tot he policy of no
work no pay, a daily time record is primarily, if
not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss
tot he government as would result in instances
where it pays an employee for no work done.
The integrity of the daily time record as an
official document, however, remains
untarnished if the damages sought to be
prevented has not been produced. As this
ponente observed in the case of People v.
Motus, supra while it is true that a time record is
an official document, it is not criminally falsified
if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as
when it does not cause damage to the
government. It may be different in the case of a
public document with continuing interest
affecting the public welfare which is naturally
damaged if that document is falsified where the
truth is necessary for the safeguard and
protection of that general interest. In the instant
case, the time records have already served their
purpose. They have not caused any damage to
the government or third person because under
the facts duly proven, petitioner may be said to
have rendered service in the interest of the
public, with proper permission from her
superiors. They may now even be condemned
as having no more use to require their continued
safe- keeping. Public interest has not been
harmed by their contents, and continuing faith in
their verity is not affected.
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 27

As pointed out, the obligation to make entries in pale of the criminal offense of falsification of
the daily time records of officers and employees public document with which she is charged.
in the Government service is a matter of
administrative procedural convenience in the WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of petitioner not
computation of salary for a given period, to have been established beyond reasonable
characteristically, not an outright and strict doubt, the judgment of conviction rendered by
measure of professional discipline, efficiency, respondent court in affirming that of the trial
dedication, honestly and competence. court is hereby reversed, and petitioner,
acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de
Under the proven and admitted facts, petitioner- oficio.
appellant surely is entitled to receive the pay as
if she had stayed in her office the whole period SO ORDERED.
covered by the official hours prescribed. ,She
had perhaps made herself even more useful in
the general benefit of the public than if she had
remained practically Idle in her office as Election
Registrar with perhaps no work at all to attend
to, its is generally the case long before elections
take place, specially during the martial law
regime. The COMELEC must have been fully
cognizant of the legal implications of the
peculiar facts and circumstances that obtained
in this case, when it gave petitioner full
clearance after she presented her resignation
when an administrative charge was filed against
her by the same complainant as in the criminal
charge. The courts, in the present criminal
prosecution, should do no less. It would be too
harsh and cruel for the courts to punish
petitioner not only with imprisonment but with
general disqualification and possible
disbarment, for an act or omission which she
performed or failed to perform without any
criminal intent. Such an insignificant
transgression, if ever it is one, would not beam
the scales of justice against the petitioner, for
courts must always be, as they are, the
repositories of fairness and justice. It is
inconceivable that a person who, without any
attempt to conceal her appearances in court for
this is a matter always made officially of record
in the court proceedings, emphatically, not for
his own private gain, but animated by the zeal
of service not wanting in public benefit, and as
an officer of the court, petitioner could have
acted with a deliberate criminal intent.
Moreover, what she stated in her daily time
record, as earlier observed, had more than a
mere color of truth to exclude such act from the

G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22,
1982
PILAR S. LUAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 22414-16 CR which
affirmed the decision of The Court of First
Instance of Samar, Branch X, convicting the
petitioner of three counts of falsification of
commercial documents in Criminal Cases Nos.
599, 600 and 601.
The facts are stated in the poorly written
decision of the Court of Appeals thus:
Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district
office of Laoang II, Northern Samar, died at the
G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital at around 7:00
o'clock in the evening of January 24, 1972 after
he was confined in said hospital since January
3, 1972.
Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools
sent the deceased's salary warrants [Exhibits A
(599), A (600) and A (601)] to the
Superintendent of schools at Catarman
Northern Samar who in turn forwarded them to
the District Supervisor, Florencio Guillermo. A
payroll-warrant register accompanied the
checks.
The paychecks delivered, Florencio Guillermo
signed the payroll-warrant registers certifying
that on his official oath, each employee whose
name appeared on the rolls had received the
salary warrant indicated opposite his name on
February 7, 1972, February 17, 1972 and
February 25, 1972, respectively, and returned
the same to Jose Figueroa, the District
Administrative Officer of Northern Samar.
Exhibit A (599) was personally received by Pilar
S. Luague, while Exhibit A (600) was received
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 28
by Glen S. Luague. Exhibit A (601) was received
by Edmundo Echano, a relative of Iliuminado
Luague and who claimed to be employed in the
Office of the District Supervisor.
Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon
discovering his mistake, he asked appellant to
return the treasury warrants issued in the name
of her husband Iluminado Luague, further
claiming that appellant promised to do so, but
actually did not. Upon the receipt of the xerox
copies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of
Public Schools, Guillermo discovered that the
treasury warrants in question had been
encashed by appellant and Glen Luague with
different local stores at Laoang. Exhibit A (599)
was cleared on February 22, 1972, while Exhibit
A (600) was deposited to the account of a
certain Lee and/or Nicol Chu, Jr. at Philippine
Bank of Communications; and Exhibit A (601)
was deposited to the account of Colgate-
Palmolive Philippines, Inc. Appellant admitted
having endorsed the treasury warrants by
means of which she was able to encash the
same.
For signing the name of her husband Iluminado
Luague as payee on three treasury warrants for
purposes of endorsement, appellant stands
charged with the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Document. [Note:
The appellant was charged with three counts of
estafa thru falsification of commercial document
but was convicted of falsification only.]
It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well
as in the Court of Appeals that she acted in good
faith or had no criminal intent when she cashed
her deceased husband's paychecks. As stated
in the decision of the Court of Appeals:
Appellant puts up the defense of good faith in
signing theme of her deceased husband in the
treasury warrants in question.
Her version: The late Iluminado Luague was on
leave from January 3 to February 9, 1972, as
evidenced by his approved application for sick
leave. On January 23, 1972, the Principal, Jose
Infante, while visiting Iluminado Luague in the

hospital, handed to Luague a check
representing his differentials. Luague in turn
handed over the check to his wife, the herein
appellant, who was then present. Before Infante
left, he informed the Luague spouses that
Luague's pay check for the second half of
January 1972 had arrived and advised Mrs.
Luague to get the same from Florencio
Guillermo so that she could use it to pay for
medicine and hospital expenses of her
husband.
Iluminado Luague instructed her [his (sic)] wife
to get the check from Florencio Guillermo.
Appellant went to the house of Guillermo in the
afternoon of January 23, 1972. Guillermo asked
her to sign the name of her husband on the
payroll warrant register and counter-sign with
her initials. Guillermo then handed her the
treasury warrant [Exhibit A (599)].
Iluminado Luague died on January 24, 1972.
From the proceeds of the warrants they
received were paid the amount the Luague
family owed the drugstores owned by Amor
Carandang, Purisima Saba and Luz Tan. A
treasury warrant was also paid to Edward Kam
from whom they bought construction materials
for the tomb of the deceased and to Ong Kiat
store for the payment of materials used for the
coffin of the late Iluminado Luague which were
purchased on credit.
Upon the instruction of Amor Carandang and on
her belief and upon suggestion of Florencio
Guillermo himself that the warrants could be
used to settle their financial obligations incurred
by the hospitalization and death of her late
husband, appellant indorsed the said treasury
warrants by signing the name of Iluminado
Luague.
Heirs of deceased government employees are
entitled to whatever unpaid salaries the
deceased employee failed to receive. Appellant
claims that it was upon this honest belief that
she endorsed the treasury warrants of her late
husband to defray for the necessary expenses
incurred due to the latter's hospitalization,
funeral and burial.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 29
The Court of Appeals did not reject the
petitioner's version, except in respect of the date
when the first paycheck was delivered. In
affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court
of Appeals followed the simplistic procedure of
applying literally the letter of the law, namely:
there was falsification because the petitioner
"signed her husband's name in indorsing the
treasury warrants in question." The Court of
Appeals failed to take into account the following
facts: That the petitioner signed her husband's
name to the checks because they were
delivered to her by no less than her husband's
district supervisor long after the husband's
death which was known to the supervisor; that
she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for
the expenses of her husband's last illness and
his burial; and that she believed that she was
entitled to the money as an advance payment
for her husband's vacation and sick leave
credits the money value of which exceeded the
value of the checks. In the fight of these
circumstances, We cannot ascribe criminal
intent to the petitioner. We sustain her claim that
she acted in good faith.
During the hearing, it was brought out that the
government did not sustain any financial loss
due to the encashment of the checks because
the petitioner's husband had accumulated
vacation and sick leaves the money value of
which exceeded the value of the three
paychecks and the value of the checks was
simply deducted from the money value of the
leaves. This explains why the petitioner was not
convicted of estafa but of falsification only.
While we do not mean to imply that if there is no
damage there can be no falsification, We do say
that the absence of damage is an element to be
considered to determine whether or not there is
criminal intent.
We notice here the lack of compassion on the
part of the prosecuting fiscal, the trial judge, and
the Court of Appeals. Even the Solicitor General
who is alert in seeking to correct improper
convictions by trial courts has somehow
misappreciated the evidence in this case.
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 30

The accused is a poor widow who was obviously

in a state of bewilderment due to the recent
death of her husband when she cashed the
paychecks. She was also in dire need of money
to settle the expenses for her husband's last
illness and his burial. A compassionate attitude
repeatedly urged by the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda
R. Marcos, would have been highly in order
under the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted;

the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed;
the petitioner is acquitted of the charges against
her. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-67472 July 3, 1987
DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
PARAS, J.:
Under separate informations both dated
September 20, 1982, the Office of the
Tanodbayan charges Dario Cabigas y Cacho
and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez on two (2)
counts, with the crime of Falsification of Official
Documents allegedly committed in the following
manner:
(1) Criminal Case No. 6529
That on or about March 29, 1982, in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes
y Lopez, both public officers being then
employed as Securities Custodian and
Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the
Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch, a
government-owned and/or controlled
corporation, conspiring together, taking
advantage of their official position and
committing the crime herein charged in relation
to their Office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify ... Securities
Delivery Receipt dated March 9, 1982 ...
evidencing, among others, receipt by them in
their official capacity of Treasury Bills bearing
Serial No. A-000064 up to A000082 of the 795th
series, by then and there making alterations
and/or intercalations thereon to the effect that
only treasury bills bearing SN-A-000064 to A-
000076 were received by them on March 9,
1982, for the purpose of hiding or concealing the
loss while in their custody of six (6) treasury bills
bearing SN-A-000077 to A-000082 of the 795th
series, thereby changing the meaning of said
Securities Delivery Receipt.
(2) Criminal Case No. 6938
That on or about March 30, 1982 in the
Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 31
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused
Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes
y Lopez, both public officers, being then
employed as Securities Custodian and
Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the
Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch, a
government-owned and/or controlled
corporation, conspiring together, and taking
advantage of their official positions and
committing the crime herein charged in relation
to their office, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify the Daily
Report of Securities/Documents under custody
dated March 30, 1982, which is an official
document evidencing the securities
transactions and/or operations of the Makati
Branch of the aforenamed bank, and which it
was their official duty to prepare and submit to
their superiors, by then and there indicating in
said document, for the purpose of hiding the
loss or disappearance while in their custody of
six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series, with face
value of P500,000.00 each, that the beginning
balance of securities under their custody as to
volume was 1,533 pieces, when, the ending
balance as to volume in the previous day's
report was 1,539 pieces and that the beginning
balance as to face value in the previous day's
report was P610,095,000.00 and thereafter
falsely stating in the footnote of the same
document that the reduction was due to
"Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming)
dated 3/09/82" the truth being that the six (6)
pieces of treasury bills with aggregate face
value of P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously
entered in either the Securities Delivery Receipt
or the Daily Report of Securities /Documents
under Custody, both dated March 9, 1982, but
were discovered to have been missing after an
inventory conducted by accused on March 20,
1982, thereby making an untruthful statement in
a narration of facts in violation of par. 4 of
Articles 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision in both cases, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
judgment is hereby rendered:

1. In Criminal Case No. 6529 ACQUITTING the
accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto
Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio and
ordering their bail bonds in the said case
cancelled.
2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:
a) Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal
of the crime of Falsification of a Public or Official
Document defined and penalized under Article
171, paragraph No. 6 of the Revised Penal
Code without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances; and applying the indeterminate
Sentence Law, hereby sentencing him to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2)
YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor,
as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the costs.
b) ACQUITTING accused Benedicto Reynes y
Lopez, with costs de officio, an ordering his bail
bond cancelled.
SO ORDERED.
The instant petition is an appeal, interposed by
herein petitioner Dario Cabigas y Cacho from
the foregoing decision in Criminal Case No.
6938.
The following pertinent facts are not disputed:
Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the Securities
Custodian of the Securities Section of the Land
Bank of the Philippines assigned to its branch at
Makati, Metro Manila. Assisting him in his work
is Benedicto Reynes, the securities receiving
clerk. The Fund Management Department
(FMD) of the Land Bank of the Philippines is
engaged in money market and securities trading
transactions. The securities which are in the
form of treasury notes and bills are in turn
deposited with the Securities Section of the
Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 32
On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management
Department, delivered to the Securities Section,
Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the
Philippines, for safekeeping, 112 pieces of
treasury notes and treasury bills worth
P46,000,000.00 and for which a copy of the
Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) Exh. D, was
issued to the Fund Management Dept. while the
original of the same was retained by the
Securities Section. Included in the securities
received on March 9, 1982 are 19 pieces of
treasury bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to A-
000082, 795th series, in the denomination of
P500,000.00 each, or a total amount of
P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities,
the accused would prepare the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR
SDUC) evidencing the securities transactions
and operations of the Makati Branch of the Land
Bank of the Philippines. This has been the
routine procedure being adopted by the
accused in the performance of his duty as a
Security Custodian.
On March 29, 1982, in the course of their
inventory of treasury notes and bills deposited
with them, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the
loss of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series
with a total value of P3,000,000.00. Upon
verification that Securities Delivery Receipt
(SDR) dated March 9, 1982, Exhibit C, was the
source document of the missing securities
which were delivered to them for safekeeping,
accused Reynes crossed out with a red ink in
the said document the last two digits "82" and
the addition after them of the figure "76" on the
serial numbers A-000064 to A-000082 of the 19
treasury bills of the 795th series with a total
maturity value of P9,500,000.00. Then at the
bottom of the SDR Cabigas placed the notation
"For adjustment" and below it the date
"3/29/82." Then upon Cabigas' suggestion,
Reynes reported the incident to their branch
manager, Aurora Pigram When the DR SDUC
for March 29, 1982 was prepared, the number
of treasury bills of the 795th series stood at
1,539 pieces with a total face value of
P610,095,000.00.

The following day, Reynes prepared a draft
report for March 30, 1982 by Carrying forward
the ending balance of the treasury bills of the
795th series reflected in the DR SDUC dated
March 29, 1982. However, instead of following
the draft prepared by Reynes, Cabigas
prepared his own report-DR SDUC (Exh. "G ")
dated March 30, 1982 wherein he indicated
1,533 pieces of treasury bills of the 795th series
with a total amount of P607,095,000.00 which
the latter claimed to be the number of securities
of the 795th series in his possession at the time
of the preparation of said report. At the bottom
of DR SDUC (Exh. "G") Cabigas place the
notation "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry
(incoming) dated March 9, 1982" as legend of
the asterisk (*) sign which appears after the
figure "1,533."
On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was
found to be authenticating with the Central Bank
of the Philippines a treasury bill of the 795th
series with Serial No. A-000082 in the amount
of P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI
agents, it was discovered that the Land Bank of
the Philippines Makati Branch Manager, Aurora
Pigram was the one who negotiated the said
treasury bill with the Gainsbo Commodities.
Further investigation revealed that the five (5)
missing treasury bills with series numbers A-
000077 to A-000081 were negotiated by Pigram
with the Home Savings Bank to secure a loan.
The Land Bank immediately sought the
assistance of the NBI in investigating the case.
On May 24, 1982, Cabigas and Reynes were
investigated by NBI agents. After the
investigation, Cabigas and Reynes were
arrested for having allegedly conspired together
in falsifying the Securities Delivery Receipt
(SDR) dated March 9, 1982 (Exh. "C") and the
Daily Report on Securities/Documents under
custody (DR SDUC) Exh. G dated March 30,
1982 and for which the corresponding
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Both accused were acquitted in Criminal Case
No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y
Cacho was convicted in Criminal Case No.
6938, while his co-accused was acquitted
therein.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 33
In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho,
the Sandiganbayan stated in its now assailed
Decision that
In the case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR
SDUC) for March 30, 1982, the alleged
falsification consists of the following entries
(figures) pertaining to treasury bills: "1,533",
"607,095,000.00", "1,533 and 607,095,000.00
"marked on the document as Exhibit G-1, and
the legend of the asterisk (*) sign at the bottom
portion reading, "Adjustment on erroneous entry
(incoming) dated 3/09/82" marked as Exhibit G-
2. The numbers "1,533" and "607,095,000.00"
represent the volume and the total face/maturity
value, respectively, of the treasury bills
supposedly in the custody of the Securities
Section as of March 30, 1982. Those entries
were falsifications, the prosecution maintains,
because the correct number of treasury bills
deposited with the Securities Section as of that
date was 1,539 valued at P610,095,000.00; that
the said figures were altered to "1,533 and
607,095,000.00," respectively, to conceal the
loss or disappearance of 6 treasury bills worth
P3,000,000.00, and that the footnote at the
bottom portion of the document (Exh. G-2) was
written to attribute the reduction in the number
of treasury bills from "1,539" to "1,533" to
mistake or error in the entries in the Securities
Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C).
The discrepancy in the figures is indeed
apparent. In the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982
(Exh. F), the ending balance on the number of
treasury bills at the close of office hours on that
day was 1,539 pieces with a total face/maturity
value of P610,095,000.00 (Exh. F-1).
Accordingly, the beginning balance on the
number of the same treasury bills on the
following day, March 30, 1982, must also be
1,539 pieces with a total face/Maturity value of
P610,095,000.00. But as it was made to appear
in the DR SDUC for March 30, 1982 (Exhs. G
and G-1), the beginning and ending balances on
the number and value of treasury bills for that
date were 1,533 pieces and P607,095,000.00
maturity value.1avvphi1

The question now is, who caused the alterations
and what was caused the alteration and what
was the purpose behind them.
xxx xxx xxx
By changing the original figures in the draft of
the DR SDUC from "1,539" and "610" to "1,533"
and "607" respectively, and causing Reynes to
type the final copy of the DR SDUC on the basis
of the corrected draft Cabigas caused the
document to show that the treasury bills in their
custody as of March 30, 1982 were 1,533 pieces
with a total face/maturity value of
P607,095,000.00. By placing, likewise, an
asterisk (*) sign after the figure "1,533" and
writing the words "Adjustment on erroneous
entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" as legend of the
asterisk (*) sign, Cabigas caused to make it
appear that the discrepancy of 6 treasury bills
valued at P3,000,000.00 was due to error in the
entries in the Securities Delivery Receipt of
March 9, 1982(Exh. C). Considering that the
said SDR of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C) did not
contain any error but reflected the number of
securities received by them on that day, it is
obvious that Cabigas made the alterations in
Exhibit G and the misleading footnote (Exh. G-
2) in order to suppress, hide or conceal the fact
that the 6 treasury bills comprising the
discrepancy were lost while in their custody.
The alterations amounted to falsification of
Exhibit G, a public or official document, under
paragraph No. 4, Article 171, of the Revised
Penal Code, by making untruthful statements in
a narration of facts. As Securities Custodian,
Cabigas was under obligation to disclose in the
said document the correct number and total
maturity value of the securities under his official
custody as of March 30, 1982.
It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an
employee under par. No. 4 of Article 171, which
reads-"by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts,"-the following elements must
concur-
(a) That the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 34
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him;
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are
absolutely false; and
(d) That the perversion of truth in the narration
of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person.
Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing
elements are not present in the case at bar. The
correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533
pieces to conform to the actual number of
treasury under custody is not falsification
because it was made to speak the truth (US vs.
Mateo, 25 Phil. 324). The placing of an asterisk
(*) sign after the figure "1,533" and writing the
words, "Adjustment on erroneous entry
(incoming) dated 3/09/82" as legend of the
asterisk sign, contrary to the ruling of the
respondent court, was not effected to hide or
conceal the fact that the missing 6 treasury bills
were lost. It would be far more difficult to detect
or discover the loss if there was no asterisk or
footnote in the DR SDUC Exh. G. In fact, the
evidence discloses that immediately upon
discovery of the loss on March 29, 1982,
petitioner reported the matter to his immediate
supervisor, Estela L. Espiritu and Branch
Manager of the Securities Section, Aurora
Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of
motive on the part of petitioner to conceal the
said loss.
Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report
on Securities/Documents under Custody (DR
SDUC) is a form purely devised and adopted by
him. This form was never required, neither was
it introduced nor prescribed by the Land Bank.
Petitioner, therefore, was not under "legal
obligation" to disclose in the DR SDUC or SDR,
the correct number and total maturity value of
the securities under their official custody as of a
given date. It is purely optional on the part of
petitioner to use the said forms.
The Honorable Solicitor General recommends
that the accused be acquitted because —
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 35

There is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated

March 30, 1982, Exh. G, for the alleged
falsification of which petitioner was convicted in
Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the
submission of which was or is required by law.
In the petition for review, petitioner points out
that as testified by him the form was not an
official form of the Land Bank. The form was his
own initiative adopted "for our own convenience
and also for reference purposes." Petitioner
therefore, was not under legal obligation to
disclose or reveal the truth by said DR SDUC. In
the absence of such obligation and of the
alleged wrongful intent, defendant cannot be
legally convicted of the crime of falsification of
public document with which he is charged.
(People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333).

WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt,

the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 6938 is hereby REVERSED and
another one rendered ACQUITTING the
petitioner, Dario Cabigas y Cacho.

Cost de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253
January 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON
and ANASTACIO QUIRIMIT, defendants.
JUAN SAMSON and defendant-appellant.
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended
party-appellee,
vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO,
defendants-appellants. *
Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant
Sendaydiego.
Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
In these three cases of malversation through
falsification, the prosecution's theory is that in
1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial
treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with
Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a
lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City,
and with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial
auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged
provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from
the road and bridge fund the total sum of
P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has
several parts. In the upper part with the legend
"ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the
obligation incurred is indicated. That part is
supposed to be signed by two officials of the
provincial engineer's office and by the
governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five
numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is a
certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is
stated therein that the creditor vouches that the
expenses "were actually and necessarily
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 36
incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1 was
not signed presumably because it is not relevant
to the purchase of materials for public works
projects.
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses
are correct and have been lawfully incurred. It is
signed by the provincial engineer.
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved
for pre-audit and payment, appropriations and
funds being available therefore." This is signed
by the provincial treasurer.
Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up
in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated February
28, 1969, reads:
I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited
and same may be paid in the amount of sixteen
thought seven hundred twenty-seven and
52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check,
provided there is sufficient fund cover the
payment.
This is signed by the auditor.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the
provincial treasurer that the account mentioned
in the provincial engineer's certification "was
paid in the amount and on the date shown below
and is chargeable as shown in the summary
hereof. ... ." It may be noted that the provincial
treasurer signs two part of the voucher.
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to
therein, is the receipt of the signed by the
creditor. As accomplished in Exhibit K, the
receipt reads (it was signed according to the
prosecution by Juan Samson, a point which is
disputed by him):
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L
P. Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinan the
sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos &
52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment of the above
stated account, which I hereby certify to be
correct. Paid by Check No. .................................

CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.)
JUAN SAMSON
According to the prosecution, Samson also
signed on the left margin of the six vouchers
below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov.
Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial
voucher, dated February 28, 1969, evidences
the payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried
Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan City for
lumber and hardware materials supposedly
used in the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad
at the Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan
along the Nueva Ecija boundary (Exh. K). The
voucher makes reference to invoice No. 3327
and other supporting papers.
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven
by the following intances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the
bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never
received by the Carried Construction Supply Co
The alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the
company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is
forged.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in
Exhibit K were never delivered by the company
to the provincial government
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and
in the supporting requisition and issue voucher
(RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh.
A), covering the same lumber and hardware ma
the signatures of the following office were
forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior civil
engineer; Rodolfo P. Mencias, supervising civil
engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting
provincial engineer, and Ricardo B. Probincias,
chief of equipment of the governor's office.
These four office denied that their signatures in
the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are their
genuine signatures.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 37
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on
Exhibits A and B, containing the words
"Approved: For and By Authority of the
Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of
Equipment", is not the imprint of the genuine
rubber stamp used in Primicias office.
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried
Construction Supply Co. dated February 18,
1969, containing a description and the prices of
the lumber and hardware material (Exh. B), is
fake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes,
the company's assistant manager, the
company's invoice No. 3327 was issued to the
Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1).
Oropilla denied that his alleged signature on
Exhibit B is his signature.
(g) That three other documents, supporting the
provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also forged.
Those documents are the taxpayer's cate dated
February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating that no tax is
due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No.
3327 and the two certificates as to the samples
of lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried
Construction Supply Co., (Exh. D and E).
Narciso P. Martinez, a district forester, denied
that his signatures in Exhibits D and E are his
signatures.
(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the
provincial auditor's office, denied that his
signature on the left margin is his signature
(Exh. A-10).
The forged character of provincial voucher No.
10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.
Other five forged voucher. — Five other
provincial vouchers evidencing supposed
payments of certain amounts to the Carried
Construction Supply Co. for lumber and
hardware materials supposingly used in the
repair of other bridges were also falsified. These
five vouchers are the following:
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969
evidencing the payment of P14,571.81 for
number and hardware materials allegedly used

in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the
Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969
evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or lumber
and hardware materials allegedly used in the
repair of the Panganiban bridge at the
UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969
evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for lumber
and hardware materials allegedly used in the
repair of the Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-
Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969
evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for lumber
and hardware materials allegedly used in the
repair of the Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-
San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969
evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for lumber
and hardware materials allegedly used in the
repair of the Baracbac bridge at the Umingan-
Guimba Road (Exh. S).
As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K),
Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that
their signatures in the said five vouchers are not
their genuine signatures. Samson, who hand-
carried the said vouchers for processing, did not
turn over to the provincial auditor's office the
papers supporting the said vouchers after the
vouchers had been pre-audited. Hence, those
supporting papers could not be presented in
evidence.
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant
manager of the Carried Construction Supply
Co., testified that the lumber and hardware
materials mentioned in the five vouchers were
never delivered by his company to the provincial
government. The charge invoices mentioned in
the said vouchers were cancelled invoices
issued to the Mountain Agricultural College. The
projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious.
The company's cashier testified that the
company never received the payments for the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 38
lumber and hardware materials. The receipts
evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4 are
fake official receipts. The cashier produced in
court the genuine official receipts (Exh. LL to LL-
7) bearing the serial numbers of the fake
receipts. The genuine receipts do not refer to
transactions with the provincial government.
Samson played a stellar role in the processing
of the six vouchers. He used to be an employee
of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and
worked with several firms doing business with
the provincial government. In 1969 he was the
collector of the Carried Construction Supply Co.
He represented that firm in its dealings with the
offices of the governor, provincial auditor,
provincial engineer and provincial treasurer. He
was personally known to those provincial
officials and the employees of their offices (21-
22 Sendaydiego's brief).
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their
respective supporting papers, were hand-
carried by Samson. He delivered the papers to
Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in the
provincial engineer's office, for recording and for
her signature (Ekh. DD).
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the
provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo Crusade, a
laborer in that office who performed the chore of
recording the vouchers and payrolls, recorded
Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh.
P, R and S). Crusadas initials appear on the
upper lefthand corner of the said vouchers with
the date 4/17/69.
Samson signed on the left margin of the
vouchers to indicate that he presented them to
the provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after
Samson had presented the said papers to him,
Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the
book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's office
for processing and for the latter's signature
(Exh. WW).
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the
vouchers to the provincial auditor's office. He
asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same
(Exh. CC).

Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the
assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled the
voucher After Rosete had initialled the
vouchers, Samson went to the provincial
treasurer's office where the amounts covered by
the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to him in
cash (instead of by check) as representative of
the Carried Construction Supply Co. (Exh. EE).
He received the payments on March 31 and
April 29 and 28 (four payments on that date) as
shown on the face of the vouchers.
The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the
auditor, on the said six vouchers are admittedly
authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers
ahead of Rosete, his assistant. Sendaydiego's
defense is that he signed the vouchers in the
honest belief that the signatures therein of the
provincial office concerned were genuine
because the voucher had been pre-audited and
approved by the auditor.
Samson denied the authenticity of his two
signatures on each of the six vouchers showing
that he received from Sendaydiego the amounts
covered thereby as representative of the lumber
and hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he
presented the vouchers to the provincial s
treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson).
Sendaydiego testified that Samson's signatures
are genuine.
In connection with the six vouchers,
Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were
charged with malversation through falsification
in three docketed as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving
provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February
28, 1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-
33252.
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving
provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871
dated April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for
the respective amounts of P5,187.28,
P6,290.60, P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four
vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-33253.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 39
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving
provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29,
1969 in the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-
33254.
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor,
Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and Samnson
guilty of malversation through falsification of
public or official documents imposing each of
the following penalties:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an
indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one-days, as minimum, to
eighteen years, two months and twenty-one
days of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a
fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity
the provincial government of Pangasinan in the
same amount;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P29,748.90
and to indemnify solidarily the provincial
government of Pangasinan in the same amount;
and
(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an
indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten
months and twenty-one days, as minimum, to
eighteen year two months and twenty-one days
of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine
of P14,571.81 and to indemnify solidarity the
provincial government of Pangasinan in the
same amount.
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this
Court.
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His
appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed.
Death extinguished his criminal liability
remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977
dismissing Sendaydiego's appeal read s
follows:
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the
pendency of his appeal or before the judgment
of conviction rendered against him by the lower
court became final and executory extinguished
his criminal liability meaning his obligation to

serve the personal or imprisonment penalties
and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary
penalties (Art. 89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1
Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).
The claim of complainant Province of
Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after
final judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted
him of three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification and ordered him to
indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed
impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the
absence of express waiver or its reservation in
a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules
of court). The civil action for the civil liability is
separate and distinct from the criminal action
(People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287;
Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money
and the defendant dies before final judgment in
the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed
to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec.
21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after
a money judgment had been rendered against
him by the Court of First Instance, the action
survives him. It may be continued on appeal
(Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October
24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly
liable for the funds improperly disbursed
although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs.
Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank
vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the
dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is
concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his
possible civil liability for the money claims of the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 40
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged
criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal
case had been instituted against him, thus
making applicable, in determining his civil
liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The
lower court had issued an order of attachment
against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of
P36,487 and in the brief for said appellant, there
is no specific assignment of error affecting the
civil liability fixed by the trial court.) and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this
Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or
not his estate is under administration and has a
duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs
or administrator will be substituted for the
deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3,
Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's
brief, he had a wife and ten children named
Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo,
Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo
(deceased).
The title of this case should be amended to
show its civil aspect by adding thereto the
following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of
Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for
the purpose of showing his criminal liability
which is the basis of the civil liability for which
his estate would be liable for which his estate
would be liable.
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate.
— In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not
necessary to resolve his first two assignments
of error, wherein he assails the imposition of
reclusion perpetua as a cruel and unusual
penalty and wherein it is argued that there is no
complex crime of malversation through
falsification committed by negligence.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended
that the trial court erred in allowing private
prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute
the case thereby allegledly subjecting the
accused to proceedings marked by undue

publicity, pre-judgment, bias and political self-
interest.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the
provincial board actually handled the
prosecution of the case from the preliminary
investigation, which started on June 5, 1969, up
to the termination of the trial on July 29, 1970.
At the commencement of the preliminary
investigation, the counsel for the accused
auditor inquired whether Atty. Millora was
authorized by the provincial board to act as
private prosecutor in representation of the
province of Pangasinan, the offended party.
Atty. Millora replied that there was a board
resolution designating him as a private
prosecutor.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the
complaints manifested to the trial court that he
had authorized Atty. Millora to act as private
prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
Another defense counsel filed a written motion
to inhibit Millora and the others as private
prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion
in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record of
Criminal Case No. 23350).
After the termination of the p investigation
conducted by the lower court, the provincial
fiscal of Pangasinan and the city final of
Dagupan City filed three informations against
the accused all dated November 4, 1969.
At the commencement of the trial on February
23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant provincial
fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor,
appeared for the prosecution. The city fiscal
moved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be
authorized to conduct the examination subject
to our (the fiscal's) control and supervision". The
trial court granted the motion (7 tsn).
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city
fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be authorized
to examine the prosecution witnesses under his
supervision and control The trial court granted
the motion (155 tsn).
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 41
The record shows that at every hearing the
provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant
fiscal were present together with the private
prosecutor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe
that there was substantial compliance with the
rule that the criminal action should be
"prosecuted under the direction and control of
the fiscal" and that "the provincial fiscal shall
represent the province" in any court (Sec.4,
Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683, Revised
Administrative Code).
The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that
the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could have
been the result of the undue publicity,
prejudgment, bias and political interest which
attended the proceedings ", is not well-founded.
The trial court's decision dispels any doubt as to
its impartiality. The evidence in the three cases
is mainly documentary. The unassailable
probative value of the documents involved
rather than bias and prejudice, was the decisive
factor on which the trial court anchored the
judgment of conviction.
Moreover, as already adverted to,
Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the
issue as to the propriety of the imposition of
reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later,
reclusion perpetua cannot be imposed in these
cases because the crimes committed were not
complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by
Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial court's
conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation
through falsification or, specifically, that the
provincial treasurer, in signing the six vouchers,
evinced "malice or fraud and that there must
have been connivance between" the two.
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego
conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the
assistant provincial treasurer, testified that,
contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his
initial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after

Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to
that unusual procedure because the interested
party, Samson who hand-carried the vouchers,
approached Rosete after he (Samson) had
conferred with the provincial treasurer and
Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher
because it was areglado na (already settled)
since the treasurer had already signed the
voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute
appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial
court erred in finding that he signed the
questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed
his initial in them. After the treasurer had signed
the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was only
ministerial (75 tsn July 3, 1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified
that he indicated in the vouchers that the
amounts covered thereby should be paid in
cash. That indication was made by means of the
symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the
vouchers under the column "Account Number".
The bookkeeper was in. instructed by Samson
to place that symbol Samson told him that he
(Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer
Sendaydiego that the payment should be made
in cas. There were instances when the treasurer
insisted on payment by check to creditors other
than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in
the inner office of the provincial treasurer where
the cashier was summoned to make the cash
payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p. 11, Exh.
EE). As noted by the trial court, it was unusual
that the payments should be made in the
treasurer's office when that was a ministerial
chore of the cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even
if Samson had no power of attorney from the
Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing
him to receive the payments. The space in the
vouchers for the signature of the witness, who
should be present when the payments were
received, was blank. The treasurer did not
bother to have a witness to attest to the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 42
payments or to require the exhibition of
Samson's residence certificate.
Another apt observation of the trial court is that
the forged character of the six vouchers would
have been unmasked by the supposed creditor,
Carried Construction Supply Co., if the
payments had been made by means of checks.
The company on receiving the checks would
have returned them to the treasurer because it
knew that there was no reason to make any
payments at all. The trial court said that the cash
payments prove Sendaydiego's collusion with
Samson.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's
finding that there was a conspiracy between the
provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that
the amounts covered by the vouchers were paid
to Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner
office. That point was testified to by Rosete, the
assistant provincial treasurer.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have
been the beet witness on how and where the
payments were made. However, Ulanday died
before the preliminary investigation was started.
On May 27, 1969, after the anomalies were
unearthed, he wrote a letter to the provincial ,
stating that he paid to Samson the amounts
covered by five vouchers in the of Salazar K.
Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13).
Rosete was in a position to state that the cash
payments were made to Samson in the
treasurers inner office because his table was
near the main door of the treasurers office or
was about fifteen meters away (18 tsn). Rosete
always knew when the cashier went to the
treasurers office because the cashier was oned
by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when the
cashier came out of the treasurer's office, he
would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross
negligence can be imputed to the treasurer
(malversation is a crime which can be
committed by means of dolo or culpa and the
penalty in either case is the same). This
argument does not deserve serious

consideration because the facts proven by the
prosecution show that he had a tieup with
Samson and that he acted maliciously in signing
the six questioned vouchers.
The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego
is that, because the trial court acquitted the
auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration follows
as a matter of course. We see no merit in that
contention because the evidence for the
prosecution against Sendaydiego is not the
same as its evidence against the auditor. For
that reason the auditor was charged only as an
accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was
charged as a principal. The auditor based his
defense on the undeniable fact that the
treasurer had approved the six vouchers "for
pre-audit and payment" before they were
passed upon by the auditor. In short, the auditor
was misled by the treasurer's certification which
the auditor apparently assumed to have been
made in good faith when in truth it was made in
bad faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination
of the documentary and oral evidence and an
unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of
Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal liability
was established beyond reasonable doubt and,
therefore, the civil liability fo his estate for the
amounts malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no
statement of facts. He contends that the trial
court erred in disregarding the expert testimony
that his signatures on the vouchers are not his
signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers
and received the proceeds thereof, and in
relying on circumstantial evidence as proof of
conspiracy.
As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that
Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited
himself "in fairness to the accused, in the
interest of justice, and as a gesture of
delivadeza" because he had conducted the
preliminary investigation.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain
Samson's insinuation that he was prejudiced by
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 43
the fact that Judge, who conducted the
preliminary investigation, was the one who tried
the case and convicted him. Judge Bello tried
the case fairly. His conduct of the trial does not
show that he had already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in
allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a
preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it
from trying the case after it had found probable
cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the
Court, had filed the corresponding information.
The rule assumes that the Judge, who
conducted the preliminary investigation, could
impartially try the case on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are
opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch that
they would invariably be iron-bound by their
findings at the preliminary investigation.
The case of a Judge of the Court of First
Instance, who conducts a preliminary
investigation and then tries the case on the
merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior
court conducts a preliminary investigation of a
grave or less grave offense falling within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case,
the inferior court after terminating the
preliminary investigation is not obligated (por
delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of
First Instance for trial. The inferior court has the
option to try the case on the merits (People vs.
Palmon, 86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs. Robles, 87
Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196).
The assumption is that the inferior court can try
the case without any ingrained bias or undue
prejudice.
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant
Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the
Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting
expert, that his signatures on the vouchers are
not his signatures.
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures
and the alleged genuine signatures (exemplars)
of Samson have fundamental differences. The
expert concluded that the questioned signatures

and the exemplar signatures of Samson were
not written by one and the same person (Exh.
20).
After examining the questioned and genuine
signatures and analysing the evidence and
contentions of the parties, we find that the
expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted
by the trial court) there are radical differences
between the questioned and authentic
signatures.
But the expert is in error in concluding that
Samson did not forge the questioned signatures
or in implying that Samson had no hand in the
writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used two forms of
signature. His supposed genuine signatures
found in his residence certificates, income tax
returns and the genuine office receipt of the
Carried Construction Supply Co. are "in an
arcade form or rounded form of writing". The
surname Samson is encircled.
On the other hand, the questioned signatures
used in Samson's transactions with the
provincial government are in angular form; his
surname is not encircled, and the questioned
signatures terminate in angular and horizontal
strokes.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing
that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious
transactions, he used therein his fake signature,
or the signature which is different from his
signature in genuine documents. He used his
forged signatures in the six fake official receipts
of the Carried Construction Supply Co., stating
that the amounts covered by the six vouchers
were received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4).
the expert admitted that a person may have two
forms of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970).
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with
the dishonest intention of denying the same as
and when necessary (Mehta, Identification of
Handwriting and Cross Examination of Experts,
pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect
Documents 418-419).
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 44
Sendaydiego himself testified that the
questioned signatures of Samson in the six
vouchers were Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn
July 31, 1969).
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared
that the questioned signatures of Samson in the
vouchers were written by only one person (264-
265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson,
as the representative or collector of the
supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply
Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question to
the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer
and auditor and then back to the treasurer's
office for payment. He actually received the
cash payments. Under those circumstances,
Samson is presumed to be the forger of the
vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession
a falsified document and be made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification. This is
especially true if the use or uttering of the forged
documents was so closely connected in time
with the forgery that the user or possessor may
be proven to have the capacity of committing the
forgery, or to have close connection with the
forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the
forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil., 453; People
vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo,
49 Phil. 28; People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338
People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one
who is found in possession of a forged
document and who used or uttered it is
presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of
Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA
688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December
27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his
crooked transactions with the provincial
government and another form of signatures of
his valid transactions or papers shows the

deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in
these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed the
certification in the first voucher, Exhibit K,
stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same
certification in the other five forged vouchers,
Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).
As to the question of conspiracy, the statement
of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that "the
trial court made absolutely no finding of any
supposed conspiracy' between Samson and
Sendaydiego, is not correct.
We have already noted that the trial court
explicitly stated that the circumstance that
Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of
his assistant shows that there was "malice or
fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego and that there
was conivance between Samson and
Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the
vouchers were paid to Samson in
Sendaydiego's inner office, instead of in the
cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to
Samson's brief). The trial court said that the fact
that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash
shows "his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
Samson's contention that the trial court merely
conjectured that he had received the proceeds
of the vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's
finding on that point is based on very strong
circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was
not proven that Samson signed the vouchers).
Samson vehemently argues that there is no
evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid
under the six vouchers "was really
misappropriated". He asserts that the six
vouchers are genuine (although he contends
that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and
that there is no proof that the amounts covered
thereby were not paid for the construction
materials shown in the six vouchers were never
delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
These contentions appear to be untenable in
thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the
assistant manager of Carried Construction
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 45
Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the
materials shown in the six vouchers were never
delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial
engineer), who was employed as cashier of the
carried Construction Supply Co., denied that
Samson turned over to the company the
proceeds of the six vouchers which he was
supposed to have collected for the company
from Sendaydiego. The six vouchers appear to
be fake principally because they evidence
fictitious sales of construction materials.
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be
contended that there was no malversation after
Sendaydiego admtte that Samson
acknowledged in the six vouchers that he
received from Treasurer Sendaydiego the total
sum of P57,048.23.
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29
of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is
based on a shaky foundation or is predicated on
circumstances which wre not proven, is not
correct.
Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that
the provincial treasurer wants to base his
exculpation on his belief that in the six vouchers
the signatures of Samson and the officials in the
provincial engineer's office appeared to be
genuine and on the fact that the auditor had
approved the vouchers. The tresurer claimed
that he acted in good faith in approving the
payments of the proceeds of the vouchers to
Samson as the representative of the supplier,
Carried Construction Co.
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his
signatures in the vouchers, denied that he
received the said amounts from the cashier of
the treasurer's office.
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and
Samson have to be resolved in the light of the
inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-
carried the voucehrs and followed up their
processing in the offices of the provicial
government the construction materials

described in the six vouchers and denied having
received from Samson the prices of the alleged
sales.
The result is the Samson's denial of his
signatures in the six vouchers and in the six
receipts (Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the
provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted
in good faith or having committed an honest
mistake have to be disbelieved.
The unavoidable conclusion is that
Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to
defraud the provincial government and to
camouflage the defraudation by means of the
six vouchers which have some genuine features
and which appear to be extrinsically authentic
but which were intrinsically fake.
Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed
that three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification of public documents were
committed in this case. That assumption is
wrong.
The crimes committed in these three cases are
not complex. Separate crimes of falsification
and malversation were committed. These are
not cases where the execution of a single act
constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or
where the falsification was used as a means to
commit malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to
conceal the malversation. It is settled that if the
falsification was resorted to for the purpose of
hiding the malversation, the falsification and
malversation are separate offenses (People vs.
Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs. Villanueva, 58 Phil.
671; People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People
vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
In the Regis case, supra where the modus
operandi is similar to the instant cases, the
municipal treasurer made it appear in two official
payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931 that
some persons worked as laborers in a certain
street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu. In that
way, the two amounts covered by the payrolls,
P473.70 and P271.60, were appropriated and
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 46
taken from the municipal funds. As a matter of
fact, no such work was done in the said street
project and the persons mentioned in both
payrolls had not performed any labor.
It was held in the Regis case, that the
falsification and malversation did not constitute
a complex crime because the falsifications were
not necessary means for the co on of the
malversations. Each falsification and each
malversation constituted independent offenses
which must be punished separately.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two
falsifications and two malversations. Four
distinct penalties were imposed.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the
custodian than of the money forming part of the
road and bridge could have malversed or
misappropriated it without falsifiying any
voucher. The falsification was used as a device
to prevent detection of the malversation.
The falsifications cannot be regarded as
constituting one continuing offense impelled by
a single criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one
crime. The falsification of six vouchers
constitutes six separate or distinct offenses
(People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a
provincial voucher constitutes a separate crimes
of malversation were committed. Appellant
Samson is a co-principal in each of the said
twelve offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the
author of the falsification because he was in
possession of the forged vouchers and he used
them in order to receive public monies from the
provincial treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of
malversation because he conspired with the
provincial treasurer in committing those
offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a
private person conspiring with an accountable

public officer in committing malversation is also
guilty of malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105
Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379; U.S. vs.
Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell,
11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil. 457).
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to
a stranger taking part in the commission of
parricide or qualified theft. In such cases, the
stranger is not guilty of parricide or qualfied theft
but only of murder or homicide, as the case may
be, and simple theft, by reason of paragraph 3,
article 62 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs.
Patricio, 46 Phil. 245).
Falsification of a public document committed by
a private person is punished in article 172(1) of
the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional
in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
of not more than P5,000.
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28
and P4,501.38, respectively covered by
vouchers Nos. 11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S),
the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of article of
the Revised Penal Code is prision mayor
minimum and medium.
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60
andP9,769.64, respectively covered by
vouchers Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R)
the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of article
217 is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal minimum.
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52
and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty provided
in paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion
temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal
to the amount malversed should be added to the
imprisonment penalty.
In the twelve cases the penalty should be
imposed in the medium peiod since there are no
modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685,
Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to an
indeterminate sentence.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 47
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six
crimes of falsification of a public document and
six crimes of malversation.
In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court,
he is sentenced to the following penalties:
For each of the six falsification of the vouchers
(Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2)
years of prison correccional minimum, as
minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional medium, as maximum, and to pay
a fine of three thousand pesos.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52
covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor
maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to
pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the
same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-
33252).
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81
covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor
maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum; to
pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to
indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the
same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-
33254).
For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60
covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q),
Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate
penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of
reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to
pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the
province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64
covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 48

penalty of nine (9) years of prision mayor Code). Samson should pay one-half of the
medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of costs.
reclusion temporal minimum, as maximum; to
pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the SO ORDERED.
province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28,

covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision
mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a fine of
P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case
No. 23350, L-33253).

For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38

covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay a
fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province
of Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal
Case No. 23350, L-33253).

In the service of the twelve penalties meted to

Samson, the threefold limit provided for in article
70 of the Revised Penal Code should be
observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677),
meaning that the maximum penalty that he
should serve is three times the indeterminate
sentence of twelve (12) years to seventeen (17)
years, the severest penalty imposed on him, or
thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see
People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).

The maximum duration of his sentences should

not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate par. of
art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People
vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil. 530 and
69 Phil. 58).

The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is

ordered to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.

Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable

for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised Penal

G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989
MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The information charging petitioner Manuel L.
Siquian, the then municipal mayor of
Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of falsification
of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of the
Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant
Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the
Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela reads
as follows:
That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the
Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela,
and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this
Honorable court, the accused Manuel L.
Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of
Angadanan, Isabela, taking advantage of his
position as such Municipal Mayor did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare
and, sign a false document, knowing it to be
false, to wit. An official communication to the
Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975,
which is required by law in order to support the
appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon to
the position of clerk in the Office of the Municipal
Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by
stating and making it appear in said document
that there was such a position existing and that
funds therefore were available. When in truth
and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic),
there was no such position or item and no funds
were available for said position in the Fiscal
Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, nor was
there any special ordinance creating said
position and appropriating the necessary funds
therefor.
x x x
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 49
[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty
to the offense charged and the trial of the case
ensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) are as follows:
It appears from the evidence that sometime in
June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single
and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the
accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the
Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela,
to apply for employment in the office of the
Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the
Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask information
if there was any vacancy. When she was
informed that there was, she went to see the
accused in his house.
The accused must have agreed to appoint her
because he accompanied her to the office of the
Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The
latter, however, was not there. Even so, the
accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work
the following day and that she should be
included in the budget. The accused then
accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed
that she could report for work.
One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to
the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was
there. When she went to the accused, she was
told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to
work for her appointment papers.
She was appointed clerk to the Municipal
Secretary in the Office of the Municipal
Secretary, on July 1, 1975 by the accused.
x x x
Accompanying her appointment is the
certification, among others, of the availability of
funds CS Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975,
issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian,
pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum
Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the

Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh.
"C").
x x x Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J"
Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-
l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to work
on the same day. Her monthly salary was P
120.00. She rendered services for the months of
July, August, September, October, November
and December 1975 (Exhibits "B", "B-l" to "B-
5"). She was not, however, paid. As early as
October 1975, she went to the Municipal
Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told
that there was no money yet. In November
1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter
told her to see the treasurer. She went to the
treasurer who told her that there was no money.
because of this, she went to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan,
Isabela, to ask (sic) information regarding her
unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty.
Efren Ambrosia Provincial Administrator. Atty.
Ambrosio asked her if she had complete
appointment papers. hereafter, she filed her
verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against
the accused. Her complaint is addressed to
Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-
1").
It also appears from the evidence that the
Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed
to enact the annual budget for the municipality
for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H", "H-l",
and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No.
477, the annual budget for the previous Fiscal
Year 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh.
"H- l"). Thus, the Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the
same as the Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal
Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget was
enacted by the municipal council of Angadanan.
In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975,
which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal
Year 1975-1976, there was no new item or
appropriation for the position of clerk in the
Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan,
Isabela. The new position of clerk in the office of
the Municipal Council appearing in the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 50
Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit "H-2")
for 1974- 1975, was filled up as early as October
16, 1974 by the accused when he appointed
and "J-2"). With respect to the new position of a
Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the
Plantilla for 1974-1975, it was already filled-up
by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on
June 16, 1975, by the accused (Exhibits "K" and
"K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same
position was held by Miss Felicidad Visitacion
who was appointed by the accused, but she
resigned (Exhs. "K" and "K-l").
x x x
[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]
After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
and decreed:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L.
Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public document as
charged in the information, the Court hereby
sentences said accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN
YEARS of prision mayor as maximum and to
pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00)
PESOS.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals
ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in
accordance with law and the evidence and is
hereby therefore affirmed. Costs against the
accused- appellant.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]
Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal
of the CA decision and the acquittal of petitioner
Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the
respondent court has decided a question of

substance not in accord with law and
jurisprudence when it affirmed the decision of
the trial court convicting him of the crime of
falsification despite the following
A. The evidence on record which consists of
the testimony of the prosecution's principal
witness, shows the absence of criminal intent on
the part of the accused.
B. There is no evidence that the accused
took advantage of his position as Municipal
Mayor when he made the allegedly falsified
certification.
C. The statement that "Funds for the
position are available" is not a narration of facts
but a conclusion of law.
D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to
due process of law when the trial court
proceeded with the trial in his absence despite
a pending petition for change of venue with the
Supreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]
Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of
any merit.
The offense of falsification by a public officer
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code is
committed by "any public officer, employee or
notary who, taking advantage of his official
position, shall falsify a document by committing
any of the following acts: . . . 4. Making untruthful
statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled
that in this fourth kind of falsification, the
following requisites must concur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender
are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No.
67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.
All these requisites had been fully met in the
case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 51
then the mayor of the municipality of
Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful
statement in the narration of facts contained in
the certification which he issued in connection
with the appointment of complainant Jesusa
Carreon. The certification, having been issued
by a public official in the exercise of the function
of his office is a public document [U.S. v. Asensi,
34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or
not the Civil Service Commissioner to whom the
certification was addressed received the
document issued by petitioner. Since the
certification was prepared by petitioner in
accordance with the standard forms prescribed
by the government (specifically the Civil Service
Commission) pursuant to law, the certification
was invested with the character of a public
document [People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v.
Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of
which is punishable under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such
document was committed when the petitioner
stated that funds were available for the position
to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when
he knew that, in reality, the position itself did not
even exist and no funds had been appropriated
therefor.
Petitioner's stance that the certification which he
issued contained no narration of facts but rather
a conclusion of law is not meritorious. The
respondent court, upholding the Solicitor
General's arguments, correctly ruled as follows:
Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition
not arrived at by any process of natural
reasoning from a fact or combination of facts
stated but by the application of the artificial rules
of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno,
71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law Dict., p.
362].
From the above-cited definition, it can be
deduced that the certification by the appellant
that 'funds for the position are available' does
not require the application of the artificial rules
of law. To certify that funds are available for the
position what one should do was (sic) to refer to
the budget and plantilla of personnel of the

applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item
exists and funds are allocated therefor.
In the present case, despite the presence of the
records which shows that there is no position
and funds therefor referred to in the certification,
the appellant, fully aware of the data provided
by the records, certified falsely that "funds for
the position are available" [Rollo, p. 41).
It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of
Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget of
the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976
and therefore, the annual budget for the last
fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted
under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the
Annual Budget for the Municipality of
Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-
1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the
Municipal Secretary in the Office of the
Municipal Secretary, the position to which
Jesusa Carreon was appointed. Accordingly,
there is no appropriation made in the Annual
Budget for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such
position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in
his certification utterly false. The requisite of
absolute falsity of the statement made in the
document is met when there exists not even an
iota of colorable truth in what is declared in the
narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518
(1908)], as in this case. From the foregoing, it
can be seen that the first and third requirements
laid down in the Cabigas case, supra, are fully
satisfied.
The second element of the offense is likewise
present. Under the civil service rules and
regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the
Preparation of Appointment for Original
Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a
certification of the availability of funds for the
position to be filled up is required to be signed
by the head of office or any officer who has been
delegated the authority to sign. As an officer
authorized by law to issue this certification
which is designated as Civil Service Form No.
203, as revised, the petitioner has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him in said certification which
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 52
includes information as to the availability of the
funds for the position being filled up.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a
wrongful intent to injure a third person is not
necessary when the falsified document is a
public document. This has already been
authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of
People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The
Court in the aforementioned case explicitly
stated that wrongful intent on the part of the
accused to injure a third person is not an
essential element of the crime of falsification of
public document. The rationale for this principal
distinction between falsification of public and
private documents has been stated by the Court
in this wise: "In the falsification of public or
official documents, whether by public officials or
private persons, it is unnecessary that there be
present the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person, for the reason that, in
contradistinction to private documents, the
principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of truth as
therein solemnly proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok
To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47
Phil. 48 (1924)]. In falsification of public
documents therefore, the controlling
consideration is the public character of a
document and the existence of any prejudice
caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to
cause such damage becomes immaterial
[People v. Pacana, supra].
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that
the evidence for the prosecution shows the
absence of criminal intent on his part must be
denied. While this Court has declared good faith
as a valid defense to falsification of public
documents by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604
(1907)], such defense cannot serve to
exonerate the petitioner since the element of
good faith has not clearly been shown to exist in
the case at bar.
Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner,
as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela
presides at all meetings of the municipal council
[Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative Code]

and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed
by the municipal council [Section 2624 (c),
Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus
aware that (1) for failure to enact a budget for
the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of
the Municipal Council of Angadanan, Isabela
which was the Municipal Annual Budget of
Angadanan, Isabela for Fiscal Year 1974-1975
was re-enacted and (2) that under the Municipal
Plantilla of Personnel for that fiscal year, there
were no funds appropriated for the position of
clerk to the municipal secretary. His knowledge
of these facts is shown by the fact that he even
affixed his signature in attestation to the
correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance
No. V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See
Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp.
27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a
certification of the availability of funds for the
questioned position since at the time he issued
such certification on July 1, 1975, the fiscal year
1975- 1976 had already commenced and no
new ordinance creating the new position to
which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been
enacted by the municipal council.
In view of the foregoing considerations,
petitioner must be held criminally liable for his
act of issuing the absolutely false certification as
to the availability of funds for the subject
position. The law considers his act criminal
since it amounts to an untruthful statement in a
narration of facts in a public document [Article
171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal intent
and the will to commit a crime are presumed to
exist on the part of the person who executes an
act which the law punishes, unless the contrary
shall appear [United States v. Apostol, 14 Phil.
92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption that
petitioner committed the act with criminal
intention, which arose from proof of his
commission of the unlawful act, stands
unrebutted.
Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that
he took advantage of his official position in
falsifying the document should likewise be
rejected. This essential element of falsification
of a public document by public officer requires
that the offender "abuse his office or use the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 53
influences prestige or ascendancy which his
office gives him, in committing the crime" [U.S.
v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of
public office is considered present when the
offender falsifies a document in connection with
the duties of his office which consist of either
making or preparing or otherwise intervening in
the preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto
20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101
Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner
who was charged with the duty of issuing the
certification necessary for the appointment of
Jesusa Carreon.
Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law
committed by the trial court when it proceeded
with the trial of the case in the absence of the
petitioner despite a pending petition for change
of venue with the Supreme Court is totally
unfounded. A careful and thorough review of the
record reveals that petitioner had been afforded
due process when the trial court, in view of the
absence of petitioner, granted continuances to
enable the defense to present its evidence
although the prosecution had rested its case as
early as December 7, 1978. [See Original
Records, p. 253, et seq.]
It is a basic postulate in law that what is
repugnant to due process is not lack of previous
notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be
heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos. L-
48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA
438]. Hence, this Court laid down this criterion
to determine whether an accused in a criminal
case has been properly accorded due process
of law:
. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of
competent jurisdiction and proceeded against
under the orderly processes of law, and only
punished after inquiry and investigation, upon
notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard,
and a judgment awarded within the authority of
a constitutional law, then he has had due
process of law. . . . [People v. Muit G.R. No. L-
48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing
People v. Castillo, 776 Phil. 73 (1946);
Emphasis supplied.]
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 54

Thus, there is no denial of due process when an

accused is afforded the chance to present
evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated,
unjustifiable failure to appear at the hearings,
the trial court ordered the case to be deemed
submitted upon the evidence presented by the
prosecution. For under such circumstances, he
will be deemed to have waived his right to be
present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115
of the Revised Rules of Court] and his right to
adduce evidence on his behalf [People v.
Angco, 103 Phil. 33 (1958).]

It is true that he filed a petition for change of

venue with the Supreme Court. However, on the
date set for the hearing of the petitioner's urgent
motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial
court due to the pendency of the petition for
change of venue, he also failed to appear [See
Order dated January 18, 1985, Original
Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo Calixto,
one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested
before the trial court that he was - withdrawing
as counsel for his client for the reason that he
has lost contact with the latter who already went
abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence,
the trial court cannot be faulted for rendering its
decision on the basis solely of the evidence
presented by the prosecution.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in

conformity with law and settled jurisprudence,
the same is AFFIRMED and the instant petition
is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG
VILLALON and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN,
Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari
is the order rendered by Judge Manuel
Castañeda on January 28, 1976 dismissing
Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, and the order
rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976
by his successor, the herein public respondent,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid order of dismissal.
Culled from the records, 1 it appears that
complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother,
Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of
land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley,
Pangasinan, registered in their names under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly
executed a special power of attorney before
Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming
private respondent Federico de Guzman as his
lawful attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964,
private respondent mortgaged the parcel of land
with the People's Bank and Trust Company in
Dagupan City using the said special power of
attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of
P8,500.00 as a loan from the mortgagee bank.
Both the special power of attorney and the
mortgage contract were duly registered in the
Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan on February
13, 1964.:- nad
After the expiration of the term of the mortgage,
and the mortgage account not having been paid,
the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage
and the land was sold to one Ramon Serafica
and Vileta Quinto who were issued Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 85181 for said property.
In January, 1972, complainant allegedly
discovered that their property was already
registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 55
when the latter filed on said date an action for
the ejectment of the former from the premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868
for estafa thru falsification of a public document
was filed against private respondent in the then
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, the
information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February,
1964, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the
abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE
GUZMAN, being then a private individual, after
having in his possession Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 47682, did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the
signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a
Power of Attorney, causing and making it
appear that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA,
signed and affixed his signature in the said
Power of Attorney, which is a public document,
when as a matter of fact and in truth, said
MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic)
participate in any acts thereof, nor gave his
permission, and in order to make good the acts
of falsification, with intent of gain and by means
of fraud and other deceits, the said accused
FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said falsified
public document (Power of Attorney) did
succeed in securing the loan from the People's
Bank and Trust Company in the amount of
EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS
(P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the
knowledge and consent of said MARIANO F.
CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the
latter in the amount of P4,250.00, and other
consequential damages." 2
After arraignment where private respondent
pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial
and the prosecution presented complainant
Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig
from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Pangasinan. Another witness, Col.
Jose G. Fernandez, a handwriting expert, gave
his partial testimony but the same was not
continued as counsel for private respondent
moved for and was granted leave to file a motion
to dismiss.

On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3
was filed, wherein it was alleged that the crime
charged would not lie due to the partial
testimony of complainant allegedly to the effect
that he authorized private respondent to
mortgage the said one-half portion of the land
owned by him and his brother. Said partial
testimony of complainant was quoted, with the
emphasized portions, as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to
the title of your property at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.
Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?
A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the
Bank. Do you know the reason why it was
foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was
foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother
Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked me
to sign a document as a witness and I asked him
he interpreted that this is an authorization to
Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank
on the half portion of the land which belongs to
me, my brother said.
Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother
Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and asked
you to sign a power of attorney authorizing de
Guzman to mortgage the one-half portion of that
land owned by you and your brother. Do you
have any document to show that?
xxx
ATTY. DIAZ:
Q Can you recognize that document which you
signed in 1964 if shown to you?
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 56
A Yes, sir.
Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a
document which is, your Honor, for the purpose
of identification, and may we request that it be
marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution. This
document consist (sic) of two pages, your
Honor, and the first page be marked as Exhibit
B and the second page be marked as Exhibit B-
1, page two. Will you tell this Honorable Court
what is this?
A This is the document brought by my brother to
Manila for me to sign, sir.
xxx
(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis
supplied)" 4
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private
respondent contends that there is no sufficient
basis for the charge and this fact warrants the
dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime
has prescribed since more than ten (10) years
had elapsed from the time the crime was
committed. Since the information charges the
complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a
public document, then the penalty shall be that
for the more serious crime which shall be
applied in its maximum period, as provided for
by Article 48 of the Penal Code. The more
serious crime in the present case is the
falsification of the public document which is
punishable with prision correccional in its
medium and maximum period and a fine not
exceeding P5,000.00. Prision correccional
being a correctional penalty, the same
prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the
information filed in the case merely alleged the
date of the commission of the crime which was
February 5, 1964 and the information was filed
only on March 29, 1974. This being the case,
private respondent claims that more than ten
(10) years has passed from the commission of

the crime to the filing of the information. No other
allegation having been made as to the discovery
of the alleged crime, private respondent claimed
that the period of prescription commenced on
the day on which the crime was committed. He
asserts that, from the date appearing in the
transfer certificate of title covering the land
mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage
documents were duly registered with the
Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February
13, 1984, hence the alleged crime became
public knowledge on the same date. To support
his theory, private respondent made the
following citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run
from the date of the commission of the crime if
it is known at the time of its commission.:-cralaw
"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or
needed to be discovered, because the entire
series of transactions was by public
instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa
committed in connection with said transaction
was known to the offended party when it was
committed and the period of prescription
commenced to run from the date of its
commission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G.
12th Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by
Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967,
Vol. I, pp. 711-712)." 5
The prosecution countered that the testimony of
Mariano Carrera shows that what was intended
was an authority to mortgage only the one-half
portion pertaining to his brother and he was only
quoting what his brother told him when he said
that ". . . this is an authority to Federico de
Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half
portion of the land which belongs to me, my
brother said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not
filed out of time since the date to be considered
should not be the date of registration of the
alleged power of attorney on February 13, 1964.
It argued that the crime was actually discovered
only in January, 1972 when Ramon S. Serafica
filed an action to eject complainant from the
premises, which fact was not alleged in the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 57
information because it was considered by the
prosecution as a mere evidentiary matter which
would not be in accord with the legal truism that
an "information must allege only ultimate facts
and not evidentiary matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay
cited by private respondent, petitioner submits
that "(t)he same has only a persuasive effect
and not to be considered as an interpretation of
Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code as the
same is the sole prerogative of the Supreme
Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel
Castañeda of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on
January 28, 1976 on the ground that the crime
had prescribed. The People's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the succeeding
Presiding Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a
notice of appeal from both orders of the trial
court. In a resolution dated May 13, 1976, this
Court required the prosecution to file a petition
for review on Certiorari in accordance with
Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter, said
petition for review and the corresponding
comment and reply of the parties having been
filed, on February 21, 1977 the Court resolved
to treat said petition as a special civil action and
required petitioner and private respondent to
submit their respective memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is
tasked with the resolution of the following
issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the
order of dismissal because the private
respondent would thereby be placed in double
jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification
of a public document filed against the private
respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law
and in fact; and,

3. Whether the offense charged in the
aforementioned criminal case is already
extinguished by prescription. 11
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the
present recourse. As enunciated in People vs.
City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination
of the case after arraignment and plea of the
defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to
another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or
frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the complaint or information (Section 9, Rule
113). However, an appeal by the prosecution
from the order of dismissal (of the criminal case)
by the trial court shall not constitute double
jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon
motion, or with the express consent, of the
defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an
acquittal or based upon consideration of the
evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate
court is purely legal so that should the dismissal
be found incorrect, the case would have to be
remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence
of the defendant." 12
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa
thru falsification of a public document has
sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law, we
hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a
public document may be a means of committing
estafa because before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an
element of the crime of falsification of public,
official or commercial documents. The damage
to another is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification of the document,
hence, the falsification of the public, official or
commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is
supported by the fact that what was intended to
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 58
be mortgaged was the one-half portion
pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion
pertaining to complainant, otherwise
complainant would not have quoted his
brother's words. The theory of petitioner and the
findings of public respondent are substantially
the same. We agree that the offense charged
does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the
findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the
partial testimony of complainant Mariano
Carrera and of the record, as regards the first
ground, the court finds that the contention of the
defense that the authorization given to him to
mortgage the whole property is not sustained by
the evidence because a cursory study of the
answer made by the witness complainant
clearly shows that what was intended to be
mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion
pertaining only to Severo Carrera, excluding
that portion pertaining to said complainant.
(T.S.N.. pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In
other words, the alleged authorization given to
Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank
on the half portion of the land referred to the
share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is
based on the following quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that
this is an authorization to Federico de Guzman
to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of
the land which belongs to me, my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the
above-quoted testimony. He merely quoted his
brother Severo Carrera to whom the half portion
of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as quoted
by Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase
`which belongs to you.'" 14
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on
the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, the resolution
of the issue on prescription is, however,
determinative of the validity of the impugned
orders of public respondent.:
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides
that the penalty for a complex crime is that for

the most serious component offense, the same
to be applied in its maximum period. In the crime
of estafa thru falsification of a public document,
the more serious crime is the falsification which
carries with it the correctional penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00
imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes
punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in
ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the Code,
and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptive
period commences to run "from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
The document which was allegedly falsified was
a notarized special power of attorney registered
in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on
February 13, 1964 authorizing private
respondent to mortgage a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
47682 in order to secure a loan of P8,500.00
from the People's Bank and Trust Company.
The information for estafa thru falsification of a
public document was filed only on March 29,
1974. We reject petitioner's claim that the ten-
year period commenced when complainant
supposedly discovered the crime in January,
1972 by reason of the ejectment suit against
him.
People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well
established rule that registration in a public
registry is a notice to the whole world. The
record is constructive notice of its contents as
well as all interests, legal and equitable,
included therein. All persons are charged with
knowledge of what it contains. On these
considerations, it holds that the prior ruling in
Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., 16 to the effect that
in the crime of falsification of a public document
the prescriptive period commences from the
time the offended party had constructive notice
of the alleged forgery after the document was
registered with the Register of Deeds is not
without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca,
et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from the
discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 59
Code which authorizes annulment, in case of
mistake or fraud, within four years from the time
of the discovery of the same, the Court also held
that the discovery must be reckoned to have
taken place from the time the document was
registered in the Register of Deeds, for the
familiar rule is that registration is a notice to the
whole world and this should apply to both
criminal and civil cases.
We are further in accord with the conclusion in
Reyes that the application of said rule on
constructive notice in the interpretation of Article
91 of the Revised Penal Code would most
certainly be favorable to private respondent
herein, since the prescriptive period of the crime
shall have to be reckoned with earlier, that is,
from the time the questioned documents were
recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
In the instant case, the special power of attorney
involved was registered on February 13, 1964.
The criminal information against private
respondent having been filed only on March 29,
1974, or more than ten (10) years thereafter, the
crime with which private respondent was
charged has indubitably prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged
orders of public respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENTS
G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991
MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents.
KV. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.
FERNAN, C.J.:
On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along
Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal,
petitioner Michael T. Dava, then holder of non-
professional driver's license No. 14744271 with
official receipt No. 7023037,2 bumped
pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and
Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to former and
physical injuries to the latter.
As a consequence of said incident, Dava was
brought to Mandaluyong Police headquarters
where his driver's license was confiscated by
Cpl. Daniel Severino who later submitted Dava's
driver's license to the fiscal's office in Pasig,
Rizal. license was thereafter presented as
prosecution evidence in criminal case for
homicide and serious physical injuries reckless
imprudence filed against Dava in the then Court
First Instance of Rizal in Pasig.3
On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of
Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava
driving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car
with plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing that Dava's
driver's license was used as an exhibit in court
and that no traffic violation receipt had been
issued to Dava, Roxas sought the help of then
Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in
apprehending Dava for driving without a
license.4 The Ministry of Defense later indorsed
Roxas' request for assistance to the
Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG).
At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978,
M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo Viduya
of the CHPG saw the maroon Volkswagen car
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 60
described by Roxas parked in front of the
Uniwide Department Store near the then Nation
theater in Cubao, Quezon City. When the driver
and his companion arrived, Lising and Viduya
confronted them and asked the driver for his
license. They were shown non-professional
driver's license No. 27068875 with official
receipt No. 06058706 issued by Agency 2L
Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava.
When asked about the source of his license,
Dava informed them that his officemate had
secured it for him.
Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG
office in Camp Crame, Quezon City for
questioning. Dava refused to give a statement
upon the advice of his lawyer. Lising then
submitted a spot report to Col. Maristela stating
therein that "subject had violated Section 31 of
RA 4136 for false representation in the
application of a driver's license intended to be
used as a legal license."7 In his affidavit of
apprehension dated November 16, 1978, Lising
stated that he was 'about to book him for
violation of Section 31 of Rep. Act 4136, when
subsequent investigation revealed that the
Driver's License above-mentioned is a Fake and
a Falsity' and therefore a case for falsification
and use of falsified documents under Section
172 of the Revised Penal Code should be filed
against Dava.8 Lising concluded that Dava's
driver's license was fake because when he
compared it with the xerox copy of Dava's
license which was attached to the record of the
criminal case in Pasig, the signatures and the
dates of birth indicated in the two licenses did
"not tally."9
Accordingly, an information for falsification of a
public document was filed against Dava in the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V
at Quezon City.10 One of the prosecution
witnesses was Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles
City branch of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT). He testified that hen was
then the registrar of the said office when Dava's
driver' license was brought to him by lawyer
Jose Francisco who was interested in knowing
whether it was genuine or fake and if was issued
by the Angeles City agency of the BLT. He

examine it and found out that it was "fake or
illegally issued" because form No. 2706887 was
one of the fifty (50) forms which had been
reported missing from their office sometime in
November, 1976 and that it was never issued to
any applicant for a license.11 He added that any
license that was not included their office index
card was considered as "coming from illegal
source' and "not legally issued by any
agency."12
Vinluan stated that although the form used for
the license was genuine,13 the signature of the
issuing official was fake.14 He "believed" certain
persons had been apprehended for
"plasticization" of licenses outside their office15
and that sometime November, 1976, agents of
the National Bureau of Investigation raided the
house of a certain person who had in his
possession some of the forms which had been
missing from office.16 He concluded that the
license was fake because the form was issued
by the central office to the Angeles agency, the
license appeared on its face to have been
issued the San Fernando, Pampanga
agency.17
Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He
appealed to then Court of Appeals18 which
affirmed the lower court's decision on January
29, 1982. Dava filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said decision contending
that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the
case. On April 27, 1982, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside its decision and issued a
resolution the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is
hereby reconsidered and set aside, and another
judgment shall be entered annulling the
proceedings in the court a quo without prejudice
to the refiling of the charges with the proper
court. (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)
Consequently, the case was refiled with the
Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 47 at
San Fernando as Criminal Case No. 2422. The
information for falsification of a public document
reads as follows:
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 61
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and
for sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of
San Fernando, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused
MICHAEL T. DAVA, a private individual, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified, a Non-
Professional Driver's license with Serial No.
2706887 covered by Official Receipt No.
0605870, dated January 24, 1978, a public
document, by making it appear that the
signatories therein who are officials of the
Pampanga LTC Agency participated in the
preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact
they did not so participate and the accused
made use of the same knowing it to be falsified.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio
Roxas who testified on how he saw Dava driving
a car and that, knowing that Dava's license had
been confiscated as a result of the filing of the
homicide and serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence case, he thereafter sought
the assistance of then Minister Enrile in
apprehending Dava for driving without a
license.19 For his part, Domingo Lising, who
apprehended Dava, narrated in court how he
first saw Daya driving a car along Banahaw and
N. Domingo Sts. in Quezon City until he finally
confronted Dava at the vicinity of the Araneta
Coliseum and confiscated his driver's license.
As earlier stated, he conclude that the driver's
license shown to him by Dava was fake because
he noticed that, when compared with the license
attached to record of the criminal case filed
against Dava, the license confiscated bore a
different signature and date of birth.20
Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong
police, testified that he investigated the traffic
incident along Shaw Boulevard on October 19,
1975 which involved Dava and the two relatives
of Antonio Roxas. He himself confiscated
Dava's no professional driver's license No.
1474427 which he later turn over to the fiscal's
office.21

In the course of Severino's testimony, the
defense counsel informed the court that, upon a
resolution of the Court of Appeals, Dava was
allowed by the lower court having jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 16474 to withdraw his
driver's license 1474427 from the records of
said case.22 When confronted by the court,
Dava volunteered that he withdrew said license
in December, 1982 and surrendered it to the
BLT Western District Office so that he could
renew his license.23 Hence, the evidence
presented before the Court was a mere xerox
copy of said license24 which also bears a
notation that Dava received original driver's
license and its receipt on December 15, 1982.25
Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San
Fernando Pampanga branch of the BLT and
whose name appears registrar thereof in official
receipt No. 0605870 which was supposed to be
attached to Dava's driver's license No. 270688
admitted that the form of the said license was
genuine although he could not tell whether its
contents were likewise genuine because it was
"opened" and "spliced."26 He asserted,
however, that since the said form "did not
emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was
not printed" over his name, said license was "not
OK".27
Martin said that he was informed by the property
section of the BLT regional office that the
number in the license was one of "the numbers
requisitioned by (the) Angeles City agency."28
He affirmed that drivers license No. 2706887
"was not issued by (their) agency"29 although
when recalled to the stand, he admitted that the
"2L" filled in the space for "Agency Code No." on
the face of license No. 2706887 referred to the
San Fernando agency.30 Martin also confirmed
the genuineness of official receipt No. 0605870
although it was his assistant who signed it for
him31 and affirmed that the amount of P10.00
indicated therein had been collected and
received by his office.32
Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to
the Angeles City office of the BLT to see its chief
and inquire about the number of driver's license
issued to Dava and whether said office had
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 62
indeed issued them. According to him, the head
of the office, Caroline Vinluan, advised him to
verify from the index card in the possession of
the License Division head whether the Angeles
City agency had indeed issued Dava's
license.33 Thereafter, the officer-in-charge of
the License Division of the BLT in East Avenue,
Quezon City, Leonardo R. Medina, issued a
certification dated December 24, 1979 to the
effect that non-professional drivers license No.
2706887 in the name of Dava was "not
registered in (their) Index Card."34
Francisco also informed the court that Carolino
Vinluan, the former head of the Angeles City
BLT agency, had died on May 12, 1980.35 He
offered in evidence Vinluan's death certificate
as Exh. J.
Another evidence presented by the prosecution
was the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimony of Carolino Vinluan which was taken
on January 8, 1980 at the trial of Criminal Case
No. Q-10759 before the then Court of First
Instance Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City. It was
marked as Exh. K said exhibit was part of the
record of Criminal Case No. 10759 which was
transmitted to the Regional Trial Court
Pampanga.36
The defense presented only one witness:
Felizardo Manalili. A friend of Dava and his
former co-trainee at the Sandoz Philippines, a
pharmaceutical firm, Manalili testified that Dava
quested him to secure a driver's license for him
because he had none. Manalili went to the San
Fernando office of the Land Transportation
Commission (LTC) where he used to secure
own license. At the LTC branch office, he was
"approached"37 the fixers who roamed around
the compound. When he as them how much it
would cost to secure a driver's license, he told
that it would amount to P70 .00.38 He agreed to
pay amount and gave the fixers the personal
data of Dava.39
After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the
license which was inside a plastic jacket.
(Manalili identified the license as Exh. B.) He
examined it and found out that it looked "like a

genuine and authentic driver's license" to him.
The license, which opened and unsealed, bore
a signature in the portion which showed the
name Romeo Edu and contained all the
personal data of Dava. Because it did not bear
the signature of Dava Manalili immediately gave
the license to Dava and told him to sign it
immediately. Dava did so in Manalili's
presence.40
On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a
decision41 finding that the license in question
was "fake or spurious", that was not duly issued
by any proper government licensing age and
that the accused directly participated in the
commission of the falsification or caused said
falsification. The court took into account the
facts that Dava was "in dire need' of a license
because of his work as a detailman; that he
received his genuine license from the court only
on December 15, 1982, and that Dava himself
personally requested his friend, Manalili, to
secure the license for him. It arrived at the
conclusion that since Dava was the possessor
or user of the fake license, he himself was the
forger or the one who caused its forgery or
falsification. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds
the accused Michael T. Dava guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal of the came of
Falsification of a Public Document, as defined
and penalized under the provisions of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code, and considering
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentences him under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment of one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correecional as
minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and
ten (10) days of prision correccional as
maximum; and to pay a fine of Two Thousand
Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency, plus the costs of this suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dava appealed to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court,42 which on September 30,
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 63
1985 affirmed in in toto the decision of the trial
court. On February 27, 1986, the appellate court
denied Dava's motion for the reconsideration of
said decision finding that no new grounds had
been raised therein. Hence, the instant petition
for review on certiorari.
Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the
courts below on the testimony of Carolino
Vinluan on the ground that being a part of the
annulled proceedings in Criminal Case No. Q-
10759, it may not be considered as admissible
in evidence as it cannot qualify as a "testimony
at a former trial" under the provisions of Section
41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious.
The resolution of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR,
expressly annulled the proceedings had in
Criminal Case No. Q-10759 for lack of
jurisdiction of the Quezon City court over the
case. That ruling is founded on solid
jurisprudence. We had time and again held that
in the absence of proof that the party raising the
issue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by
estoppel,43 a decision rendered by a court
without jurisdiction is a total nullity.44 Being
worthless in itself, all the proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless.45 Hence, the
testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in
evidence but may well be considered as totally
nonexistent.
With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan
out of the way, is there sufficient evidence to
warrant the conviction of petitioner for the crime
charged?
The information specifically charges the
petitioner with having made it appear in his
driver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of the
Pampanga LTC agency participated" in in-
preparation and with having used the said
driver's license knowing that it was falsified. The
charges therefore are found on the provisions of
Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code which
punishes any private individual who shall
commit any the falsification enumerated in
Article 171 specifically paragraph 2 thereof

which penalizes the act of causing it to appear
that persons (public officials) have participated
in any act proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate. The information also charges
Dava with having knowingly used a false
document under the last paragraph of Article
172.
The evidence at hand proves that petitioner,
misrepresenting that he had no driver's license,
asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him.
Sometime in November, 1976, Manalili, who
used to get his own driver's license in San
Fernando, Pampanga, was able to secure
petitioner's driver's license No. 2706887 through
fixers at the Land Transportation Commission
(LTC) agency in said locality.46 On January 24,
1978, petitioner renewed his license at the said
office by paying the amount of P10.00 for which
he was issued official receipt No. 0605870.47
In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice
then was simply to present an official receipt
showing that at the previous year the licensee
had paid for his driver's license to any agency of
the LTC, and to pay the renewal fee. As long as
the transaction did not involve the issuance of
"another form," a driver did not have to fill up an
application form for the renewal of a license.
The said agency would then issue an official
receipt evidencing the renewal of the license but
the driver's license itself would not be
changed.48
Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's
license No. 2706887 together with official
receipt No. 86432149 were presented to the
San Fernando LTC agency, the personnel
therein issued official-receipt No. 0605870 in the
name of petitioner. Although the receipt was not
personally signed by office registrar Victor
Martin but by his assistant, the receipt50 was
genuine and the amount indicated therein was
actually paid to and collected by the San
Fernando agency.51 The driver's license itself
may not have been issued by said agency52 but
its form was likewise genuine. However,
according to Martin, it was 'not OK' because it
"did not emanate" from his office and "a
facsimile was not printed over" his name
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 64
therein.53 Moreover, according to the officer-in-
charge of the license Division of the Bureau of
Land Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon
City, non-professional driver's license No.
2706887 in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa "is
not registered" in their index card.54
Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's
license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the
evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the
actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there
are pieces of evidence which prove beyond
reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification
and made use of the falsified driver's license
knowing it to be so.
The elements of the crime of using a falsified
document in transaction (other than as evidence
in a judicial proceed penalized under the last
paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the
offender knew that a document was falsified by
another person; (b) the false document is
embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions
Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c he used such
document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d)
the use of the false document caused damage
to another or at last it was used with intent to
cause such damage.55 Except for last, all of
these elements have been proven beyond
reason doubt in this case.
It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself
who requested Manalili to get him a license. He
misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at
any time been issued a driver's license.56
Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing
on Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of
obtaining a driver's license the shortest time
possible to enable petitioner to perform duties
as detailman, petitioner was able, in a very
subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal
with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's
license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili
could obtain a drivers license in so short a
without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as
petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to
have been motivated by a sincere desire to help
a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers
whom he knew were not employees of the LTC
to whom he paid P70.00 for the license even if

the legal fee then was only P15.00.57 As it was
in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili
with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the
fact that it was Manalili and not petitioner who
dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate
petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is,
beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by
inducement in the commission of said crime.
Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the
spurious character of his second driver's license
No. 2706887. Having already obtained a driver's
license, he knew that it was not legally possible
for him to secure another one. Otherwise, there
would have been no need for him to
misrepresent to his friend Manalili that he was
not then a holder of a driver's license. But even
with this misrepresentation, petitioner cannot
even begin to believe that Manalili would be able
to secure a driver's license through legal means
in about an hour's time.58 The patent irregularity
in obtaining driver's license No. 2706887 was
more than sufficient to arouse the suspicion of
an ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its
genuineness and authenticity. In fact, Manalili
testified that he himself was surprised when the
fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the
driver's license of Michael Dava on November
4, 1976, a few hours after he had sought the
fixer's assistance.59 In those days, all plastic
jackets emanated from the LTC Central Office,
which accounted for the delay in the release of
the license applied for. Under these
circumstances, no "reasonable and fairminded
man" would say that petitioner did not know that
his license was a fake.60
A driver's license is a public document within the
purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form
of the drivers license becomes a public
document the moment it is accomplished.61
Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was
filled up with petitioner's personal data and the
signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC
agency was affixed therein, even if the same
was simulated, the driver's license became a
public document.
The third element of use of the falsified
document is proven by the fact that when
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 65
petitioner was apprehended by Lising on April
12, 1978 it was in his possession and it was
what he presented Lising to show that he had a
license. Because he was a detailman who did
his job with the use of a car, it is probable that
from November 4, 1976 (its date of issuance)
until April 12, 1978, petitioner used driver's
license No. 2706887.
The driver's license being a public document,
proof of the fourth element of damage caused to
another person or at least an intent to cause
such damage has become immaterial. In
falsification of public or official documents, the
principal thing being punished is the violation of
the public faith and the destruction of the truth
proclaimed therein.62
In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts
that the following ruling in People vs.
Sendaydiego,63 should be applied in his favor:
The rule is that if a person had in his possession
a falsified document and he made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification. This is
especially true if the use or uttering of the forged
documents was so closely connected in time
with the forgery that the user or possessor may
be proven to have the capacity of committing the
forgery, or to have close connection with the
forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the
forgery (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People vs.
De Lara, 45 PMI. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49
Phil. 28: People vs. Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338;
People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). In the
absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who
is found in possession of a forged document and
who used or uttered it is presumed to be the
forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.
Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
(Emphasis supplied.)
We agree with the petitioner that the
presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego
case is not absolute as it is subject to the
exception that the accused should have a
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 66

satisfactory explanation why he is in possession

of a false document.64 His explanation,
however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly
in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As
stated above, Manalili himself could not have
acted on his own accord without the prodding of
petitioner.

We cannot help but comment on petitioner's

allegations on the role of fixers in government
agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil"
who could do things fast for the right amount. He
is "not necessarily involved in the commission of
forgery or falsification of official documents" and
he shares his fees with "insiders."65

Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures

in government licensing agencies. Why they
proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our
bureaucracy but also on our own people. While
not all fixers are engaged in illegal activities for
some simple serve as "facilitators," they
nonetheless provide sources for exploitation of
the unknowing common people who transact
business with the government and for corruption
of the gullible government employees. Their
unwanted presence must be dealt with
accordingly and the soonest this is undertaken
by our government agencies the better for all of
us.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent

appellate court is hereby affirmed. Let a copy of
this decision be served on that Department of
Transportation and Communication. Cost
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

OTHER FALSITIES
G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988
MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER,
petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents.
YAP, C.J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision
of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-
G.R. No. 01119 entitled "People of the
Philippines v. Melencio Gigantoni y Javier,"
promulgated on November 13, 1985, which
affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 159, Pasig, Metro Manila, finding the
accused guilty of usurpation of authority under
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code with
modification of the penalty by reducing the same
to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto
mayor to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional, after crediting the accused with a
mitigating circumstance analogous to voluntary
confession of guilt.
Petitioner Melencio Gigantoni y Javier, was
charged before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Pasig, with the crime of usurpation of authority
in violation of Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code upon an information alleging that the
crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th and 15th day of May,
1981, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is not a bonafide agent of the CIS,
Philippine Constabulary, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and falsely
represented himself as a bonafide agent of the
CIS, Philippine Constabulary, said accused,
knowing fully well his representation to be false.
After arraignment during which the accused
pleaded not guilty and after trial, the lower court
rendered judgment finding the accused guilty as
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 67
charged. On appeal to the appellate court, the
judgment was affirmed with modification only as
to the penalty imposed.
The facts of the case, as recited in the decision
of the appellate court, are as follows:
During the period material to this case, or in
1981, accused-appellant Melencio Gigantoni
was an employee of Black Mountain Mining Inc.
and Tetra Management Corporation, which are
both private companies doing business in the
Philippines .... On May 14, 1981, as an
employee of said companies, Gigantoni went to
the office of the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) at
Vernida Building, Legaspi Street, Makati, Metro
Manila, allegedly to conduct verification of some
travels made by Black Mountain's officials.
Upon reaching the said PAL office, he falsely
represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a
PC-CIS agent investigating a kidnapping case,
and requested that he be shown the PAL
records particularly the passenger manifests for
Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering the
period February 1 to 3 1981. He explained that
he was then at the tracking stage of
aforementioned kidnapping case. ... To further
convince the PAL officials of his supposed
mission, Gigantoni exhibited his Identification
card purporting to show that he was a PC-CIS
agent. ... Thereupon, his aforesaid request was
granted, and PAL legal officer Atty. Conrado A.
Boro showed to him the requested PAL records.
Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the
requested manifest ...and the used PAL tickets
of one Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor,
and that of a certain Daisy Britanico, an
employee of Black Mountain. Thereafter, he left
the PAL premises.
When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL
general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr., inquired
from Atty. Boro about Gigantoni's purpose in
securing copies of PAL records. They then
became suspicious of the accused" real identity
prompting them to conduct verification from the
PC-CIS office. They subsequently learned from
General Uy of PC-CIS that Gigantoni was no
longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he
had been dismissed from the service for gross

misconduct ... brought about by the extortion
charges filed against him and his final conviction
by the Sandiganbayan for the said offense....
Upon discovering the foregoing, Atty. Puno
immediately alerted the NBI as Gigantoni would
be coming back to the PAL office the following
day. ...
On May 15, 1981, when Gigantoni returned to
the Makati PAL office, he was brought by Atty.
Puno to their conference room while awaiting for
the arrival of the NBI agents who were earlier
contacted. In the presence of Atty. Boro and a
PAL security, Gigantoni was confronted by Atty.
Puno as to his real Identity. He later admitted
that he was no longer with the CIS; that he was
working for the Black Mountain Mining
Corporation; and that he was just checking on a
claim for per diem of one of their employees who
had travelled. ...
Upon the arrival of NBI agents Teodoro
Pangilinan, Lolito Utitco and Dante Crisologo,
Attys. Puno and Boro turned over the person of
Gigantoni to the NBI. They also submitted a
complaint affidavit against Gigantoni .... On that
same day, after the investigation, arrest and
booking conducted by the NBI, Gigantoni was
charged before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal, thru its office in Makati, with the
crime of Usurpation of Authority.
The petitioner-accused raised substantially the
same errors on appeal to respondent appellate
court, to wit:
1. The appellate court erred in interpreting
that presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed, its applicable in the case at
bar;
2. The appellate court erred in its
interpretation of the difference between
suspension and dismissal.
The gist of petitioner's contention is that he
could not be guilty of the crime charged because
at the time of the alleged commission of the
offense, he was still a CIS agent who was
merely suspended and was not yet informed of
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 68
his termination from the service. Furthermore,
he avers that the receipt by him of the notice of
dismissal, if there was any, could not be
established on mere presumption of law that
official duty has been regularly performed.
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on
usurpation of authority or official functions,
under which the petitioner was charged,
punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and
falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent
or representative of any department or agency
of the Philippine Government or of any foreign
government; or (b) who, under pretense of
official position, performs any act pertaining to
any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign
government or any agency thereof, without
being lawfully entitled to do so. The former
constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority
under which the petitioner stands charged, while
the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation
of official functions.
The question before us is—did petitioner
knowingly and falsely represent himself as an
agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary?
Petitioner admits that he received a notice of his
suspension from the CIS effective June 20,
1980. This admission is supported by the record
(Annex "D") which shows the letter of Lt. Col.
Sabas Edades to petitioner, dated June 23,
1980, regarding said action. Said official letter
was also sent to the Commissioner of the Merit
Systems Board, Civil Service Commission, the
Minister of National Defense and the
Commanding General of the CIS. However, as
to petitioner's alleged dismissal effective June
20, 1980, he denies having been informed
thereof. The record is bereft of any evidence or
proof adduced by the prosecution showing that
the dismissal was actually conveyed to
petitioner. That is why the court, in convicting
him, relied on the disputable presumption that
official duty has been regularly performed, that
is, that it is presumed that he was duly notified
of his dismissal.
The failure of the prosecution to prove that
petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal from
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 69

the service negatives the charge that he
"knowingly and falsely" represented himself to
be a CIS agent. The constitutional presumption
of innocence can only be overturned by
competent and credible proof and never by
mere disputable presumptions, as what the
lower and appellate courts did when they
presumed that petitioner was duly notified of his
dismissal by applying the disputable
presumption "that official duty has been
regularly performed." It was not for the accused
to prove a negative fact, namely, that he did not
receive the order of dismissal. In criminal cases,
the burden of proof as to the offense charged
lies on the prosecution. Hence, it was incumbent
upon the prosecution to establish by positive
evidence the allegation that the accused falsely
represented himself as a CIS agent, by
presenting proof that he knew that he was no
longer a CIS agent, having been duly notified of
his dismissal. It is essential to present proof that
he actually knew at the time of the alleged
commission of the offense that he was already
dismissed from the service. A mere disputable
presumption that he received notice of his
dismissal would not be sufficient.
he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his
official function. He was not charged in the
information for such an offense. In fact, it
appears from the record of the case that the
information, which was not claimed to be secret
and confidential, was readily made available to
the accused because PAL officials believed at
the time that he was a CIS agent. And this was
the only offense with which he was charged in
the information, that he knowingly and falsely
represented himself to be a CIS agent.
Premises considered, the decision of the
respondent Appellate Court affirming the
judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial
Court is reversed and set aside. Petitioner-
accused, Melencio Gigantoni y Javier is hereby
aquitted of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.

The Solicitor General has argued in his

memorandum, that it makes no difference
whether the accused was suspended or
dismissed from the service, "for both imply the
absence of power to represent oneself as
vested with authority to perform acts pertaining
to an office to which he knowingly was deprived
of " (Emphasis supplied). The observation of the
Solicitor General is correct if the accused were
charged with usurpation of official function
(second part of Article 177), but not if he is
charged merely with usurpation of authority (first
part of Article 177). The information charges the
accused with the crime of usurpation of authority
for "knowingly and falsely representing himself
to be an officer, agent or representative of any
department or agency of the Philippine
Government."

Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official

functions. It has not been shown that the
information given by PAL to the accused was
confidential and was given to him only because

AN ACT TO REGULATE THE USE OF
ALIASES
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 142
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary
purposes, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was
christened or by which he has been known since
his childhood, or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court.
The name shall comprise the patronymic name
and one or two surnames.
Section 2. Any person desiring to use an alias
or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in
proceedings like those legally provided to obtain
judicial authority for a change of name.
Separate proceedings shall be had for each
alias, and each new petition shall set forth the
original name and the alias or aliases for the use
of which judicial authority has been obtained,
specifying the proceedings and the date on
which such authority was granted. Judicial
authorities for the use of aliases shall be
recorded in the proper civil register.
Section 3. No person having obtained judicial
authority to use an alias or aliases shall sign or
execute any document without stating his real
name and all aliases he may have been
authorized to use.
Section 4. Any violation of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment for from one month
to six months.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect on its
approval.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6085
AN ACT AMENDING COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED FORTY-TWO
REGULATING THE USE OF ALIASES.
Section 1. Section one of Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby
amended to read as follows:
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 70
"Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for
literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any
name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil
registry, or with which he was baptized for the
first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he
was registered in the bureau of immigration
upon entry; or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons, whose births have not
been registered in any local civil registry and
who have not been baptized, have one year
from the approval of this act within which to
register their names in the civil registry of their
residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames."
Section 2. Section Two of Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias
shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings
like those legally provided to obtain judicial
authority for a change of name, and no person
shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority
for more than one alias. The petition for an alias
shall set forth the person's baptismal and family
name and the name recorded in the civil
registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an
alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names
other than his original or real name, specifying
the reason or reasons for the use of the desired
alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias
the Christian name and the alien immigrant's
name shall be recorded in the proper local civil
registry, and no person shall use any name or
names other, than his original or real name
unless the same is or are duly recorded in the
proper local civil registry."
Section 3. Section three of Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred forty-two, is hereby
amended to read as Follows:
"Sec. 3. No person having been baptized with a
name different from that with which he was

registered at birth in the local civil registry, or in
case of an alien, registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry, or any person who
obtained judicial authority to use an alias, or
who uses a pseudonym, shall represent himself
in any public or private transaction or shall sign
or execute any public or private document
without stating or affixing his real or original
name and all names or aliases or pseudonym
he is or may have been authorized to use."
Section 4. Commonwealth Act Numbered One
hundred forty-two is hereby amended by the
insertion of the following new section to be
designated Section four to read as follows:
"Sec. 4. Six months from the approval of this act
and subject to the provisions of section 1 hereof,
all persons who have used any name and/or
names and alias or aliases different from those
authorized in section one of this act and duly
recorded in the local civil registry, shall be
prohibited to use such other name or names
and/or alias or aliases."
Section 5. Section four of Commonwealth Act
Numbered One hundred forty-two is hereby
amended to read as Section five, as follows:
"Sec. 5. Any violation of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment of from one year to
five years and a fine of P5,000 to P10,000."
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval, and all Acts, rules or regulations of
laws inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Approved: August 4, 1969.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 71
G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984
CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.
Felipe O. Pascual for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent
Appellate Court.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review and
reverse a decision of the Intermediate Appellate
Court.
In the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila,
Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias
in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, as
amended. The information against her reads:
That on or about November 4th, 1974, and for
sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully use the
substitute or alias name CORAZON L. REYES,
which is different from Corazon Legamia y
Rivera with which she was christened or by
which she has been known since childhood, nor
as a pseudonym for literary purpose and without
having been previously authorized by a
competent Court to do so; that it was discovered
only on or about November 4th, 1974. (Rollo,
pp. 11-12.)
She was convicted by the trial court which
sentenced her to an indeterminate prison term
of only (1) year, as minimum, to two (2) years,
as maximum; to pay a fine a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to
pay the costs. The trial court recommended,
however, that she be extended executive
clemency. On appeal to the Intermediate
Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in
toto. Hence the instant petition.

The facts:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for
19 years from November 8, 1955 to September
26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in
arrangement they produced a boy who was
named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He
was born on October 18, 1971.
From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together
until the latter's death, Corazon was known as
Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs.
Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to friends as
Mrs. Reyes.
Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga
Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration
when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly
after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in
behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit
Administration for death benefits. The letter was
signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher
evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the
amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon
L. Reyes."
For using the name Reyes although she was not
married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who was
married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to
Corazon's prosecution. Parenthetically, the
amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of
that which is due to each legitimate child in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code" per advice given by Atty. Diomedes A.
Bragado of the Agricultural Credit
Administration to Felicisima. (Rollo, pp. 14-15.)
The law:
Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section
1:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for
literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events
where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any
name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil
registry, or with which he was baptized for the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 72
first time, or in case of an alien, with which he
was registered in the Bureau of Immigration
upon entry; or such substitute name as may
have been authorized by a competent court:
Provided, That persons, whose births have not
been registered in any local civil registry and
who have not been baptized have one year from
the approval of this act within which to register
their names in the civil registry of their
residence. The name shall comprise the
patronymic name and one or two surnames. (As
amended by R.A. No. 6085.)
The issue:
Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of
the facts abovestated?
The resolution:
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a
woman to represent herself as the wife and use
the name of the man she is living with despite
the fact that the man is married to another
woman. The practice, to be sure, is not
encouraged but neither is it unduly frowned
upon. A number of women can be Identified who
are living with men prominent in political,
business and social circles. The woman publicly
holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his
family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is
not her husband. And yet none of the women
has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142
because ours is not a bigoted but a tolerant and
understanding society. It is in the light of our
cultural environment that the law must be
construed.
In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with
Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced her to
the public as his wife and she assumed that role
and his name without any sinister purpose or
personal material gain in mind. She applied for
benefits upon his death not for herself but for
Michael who as a boy of tender years was under
her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could
not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had
done especially because some of them probably
had their own Corazons.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is
hereby set aside; the petitioner is acquitted of
the charge. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 75
AN ACT TO PENALIZE ACTS WHICH WOULD
IMPAIR THE PROPER OBSERVANCE BY
THE REPUBLIC AND INHABITANTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES OF THE IMMUNITIES, RIGHT,
AND PRIVILEGES OF DULY ACCREDITED
FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
AGENTS IN THE PHILIPPINES
Section 1. Any person who shall falsely assume
and take upon himself to act as a diplomatic,
consular, or any other official of a foreign
government duly accredited as such to the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
with intent to defraud such foreign government
or the Government of the Philippines, or any
person, or in such pretended character shall
demand or obtain, or attempt to obtain from
person or from said foreign government or the
Government of the Philippines, or from any
officer thereof, any money, paper, document, or
other thing, of value, shall be fined not more
than five thousand pesos, or shall be imprisoned
for not more than five years, or both, in addition
to the penalties that may be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code.
Section 2. Any person, other than a diplomatic
or consular officer or attaché, who shall act in
the Republic of the Philippines as an agent of a
foreign government without prior notification to,
and registration with, the Secretary of Foreign
Affairs shall be fined not more than five
thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both, aside from other penalties
that may be imposed by law.
Section 3. Any person, who with intent to
deceive or mislead, within the jurisdiction of the
Republic, wear any naval, military, police, or
other official uniform, decoration, or regalia of
any foreign State, nation or government with
which the Republic of the Philippines is at
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 73
peace, or any uniform, decoration or regalia so
nearly resembling the same as to be calculated
to deceive, unless such wearing thereof be
authorized by such State, nation, or
government, shall upon conviction, be punished
by a fine not exceeding two hundred pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or by
both such fine and imprisonment.1awphil-itc-alf
Section 4. Any writ or process sued out or
prosecuted by any person in any court of the
Republic of the Philippines, or by any judge or
justice, whereby the person of any ambassador
or public minister of any foreign State,
authorized and received as such by the
President, or any domestic or domestic servant
of any such ambassador or minister is arrested
or imprisoned, or his goods or chattels are
distrained, seized, or attached, shall be deemed
void, and every person by whom the same is
obtained or prosecuted, whether as party or as
attorney, and every officer concerned in
executing it, shall upon conviction, be punished
by imprisonment for not more than three years
and a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos
in the discretion of the court.
Section 5. The provisions of section four hereof
shall not apply to any case where the person
against whom the process is issued is a citizen
or inhabitant of the Republic of the Philippines,
in the service of an ambassador or a public
minister, and the process is founded upon a
debt contracted before he entered upon such
service; nor shall the said section apply to any
case where the person against whom the
process is issued is a domestic servant of an
ambassador or a public minister, unless the
name of the servant has, before the issuing
thereof, been registered in the Department of
Foreign Affairs, and transmitted by the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs to the Chief of
Police of the City of Manila, who shall upon
receipt thereof post the same in some public
place in his office. All persons shall have resort
to the list of names so posted in the office of the
Chief of Police, and take copies without fee.
Section 6. Any person who assaults, strikes,
wounds, imprisons or in any other manner offers

violence to the person of an ambassador or a
public minister, in violation of the law of nations,
shall be imprisoned not more than three years,
and fined not exceeding two hundred pesos, in
the discretion of the court, in addition to the
penalties that may be imposed under the
Revised Penal Code.
Section 7. The provisions of this Act shall be
applicable only in case where the country of the
diplomatic or consular representative adversely
affected has provided for similar protection to
duly accredited diplomatic or consular
representatives of the Republic of the
Philippines by prescribing like or similar
penalties for like or similar offenses herein
contained.itc-alf
Section 8. This Act shall take effect upon its
approval.
Approved: October 21, 1946
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 493 - AN ACT TO
PROHIBIT THE USE OR CONFERRING OF
MILITARY OR NAVAL GRADES OR TITLES
BY OR UPON PERSONS NOT IN THE
SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES OR THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY, TO REGULATE THE
WEARING, USE, MANUFACTURE AND SALE
OF INSIGNIAS, DECORATIONS AND
MEDALS, BADGES, PATCHES AND
IDENTIFICATION CARDS PRESCRIBED FOR
THE SAID ARMED FORCES OR
CONSTABULARY, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 1. Hereafter it shall be unlawful for any
person or association or persons not in the
service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
of the Philippine Constabulary to use, or confer
upon himself or another who is not in the service
of the said Armed Forces or Constabulary, any
military or naval grade or title which is, or may
hereafter be, prescribed by laws and regulations
for the use of the Armed Forces or
Constabulary: Provided, That the foregoing
shall not be construed as prohibiting the use of
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 74
such military or naval grades or title by
personnel or persons now authorized by law
and by the following persons:
(a) All veterans of any war when recognized
by the Philippine or United States Government
and only for the ranks for which they are
recognized;
(b) Commissioned officers and personnel,
retired or in active duty, of the Bureau of Coast
and Geodetic Survey, of the quarantine service,
and of the customs service;
(c) Commissioned and enlisted reservists
including recognized guerrilla officers on
inactive status when using their authorized
grades for a purely military purposes;
(d) Trainees in the Armed Forces while
undergoing any period of trainee instruction
pursuant to law.
Sec. 2. Hereafter it shall be unlawful for any
person not in the service of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines or the Philippine Constabulary,
except those excluded from the prohibition in
section one of this Act, to use or wear the duly
prescribed insignia, badge or emblem or rank of
the members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines or the Philippine Constabulary, or
any colorable imitation thereof: Provided, That
the foregoing shall not be construed as
prohibiting any person from using or wearing
any military or naval insignia, badge or emblem
of rank in any play-house or theater or in
moving-picture films while actually engaged in
representing therein a military or naval
character not tending to bring discredit or
reproach upon the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary or the
Bureau of Coast and Geodetic Survey:
Provided, further, That the use or wearing of any
military or naval insignia, badge or emblem of
rank while engaged in representing a military or
naval character as hereinabove described, shall
be subject to supervision and regulation by the
Secretary of National Defense. The phrase
"duly prescribed insignia, badge or emblem of
rank" shall, for the purpose of this Act, mean any
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 75

insignia, badge or emblem of rank which is, or

may hereafter be, prescribed by Congress, the
Secretary of National Defense or the Chief of
Constabulary.

Sec. 3. Hereafter the use, wearing,

manufacture and sale of any medal or
decoration, badge, insignia, patch, or
identification card which has been, or may
hereafter be, authorized by Congress or
prescribed or awarded by the President of the
Philippines or the Secretary of National Defense
for the members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, or any colorable imitation thereof, is
prohibited, except when authorized under such
regulations as the Secretary of National
Defense shall prescribe.

Sec. 4. Any person who confers upon himself

or another any military or naval grade or title in
violation of section one of this Act shall, upon
conviction, be punished by a fine of not less than
two thousand pesos and not exceeding five
thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not less
than two years and not exceeding five years, or
both. Any person who violates any other
provision of this Act shall, upon conviction, be
punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
pesos and not exceeding two thousand pesos,
or by imprisonment for not less than one month
and not exceeding two years, or both. In case
the violation is committed by a corporation, the
manager and all the members of the board of
directors or governing body thereof, shall be
liable individually in accordance with this
section.

Sec. 5. All laws or portions thereof inconsistent

with the provisions of this Act, are hereby
repealed.

Sec. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its

approval.

FALSE TESTIMONY
G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990
REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,
respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 934 of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District,
Branch VI, San Fernando, Pampanga, petitioner
Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of
Falsification of Official Document committed as
follows:
That on or about the 5th day of December 1972,
in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of
Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, Reolandi M. DIAZ, then a
Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High
School and, therefore, a public employee, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit falsification of official
documents, to wit: by executing and filing in the
office of the Civil Service Commission of said
municipality a Personal Data Sheet, CS Form
No. 212(65), an official document, stating and
malting it appear therein that he was a fourth
year Bachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges which
document is a requirement for his
reappointment as School Administrative
Assistant I of the Jose Abad Santos High School
and wherein the academic requirement to said
Position is at least a fourth year college
undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the
said accused well knew that the statement is
false and he did not reach the fourth year in a
Bachelor of Arts degree course, and
consequently, by reason of said untruthful
narration of facts, his appointment to the said
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 76
position was approved by the Civil Service
Commission.
All contrary to law. (p. 44, Rollo)
After trial following a plea of not guilty upon
arraignment, petitioner was found guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the trial
court's decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing,
this Court finds the accused Reolandi M. Diaz
guilty as charged of the crime of falsification of
official document penalized under Article 171,
paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and he
is therefore sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00)
PESOS without subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
Costs against the accused. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid judgment of
conviction to the Intermediate Appellate Court,
said appeal being docketed thereat as CA-G.R.
No. 24580- Cr.
In its Decision promulgated on April 7,1983, the
respondent court modified the trial court's
decision by increasing the maximum of the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment in the
event of non-payment of the fine due to
insolvency, but affirmed the verdict of conviction
in all other respects. The pertinent and
dispositive portions of respondent court's
decision read:
The penalty for the offense of falsification of an
official document committed under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is
(prision mayor) and a fine not to exceed
P5,000.00. The correct penalty that should be
imposed on the appellant applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is imprisonment of
Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day
of (prison correctional) as minimum to Eight (8)

Years and One (1) Day of (prision mayor) as
maximum In cam of non-payment of the fine of
P1,000.00 due to insolvency, the appellant
should be subject to subsidiary imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as
to the penalty and the imposition of subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, the decision
appealed from is affirmed in all other respects
with costs against accused- appellant' (P. 68,
Rollo)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was
denied, hence, the present recourse.
It is the contention of petitioner that he is entitled
to an acquittal because—
1. The findings of the lower court adopted
by the respondent intermediate Appellate Court
that he was not a fourth year A-B. College
student is contrary to the evidence presented.
2. The respondent intermediate Appellate
Court gravely commuted an error of law in
convicting him as he did not have any legal
obligation to state in CS Form 212 that he was
a fourth year college student.
3. The Intermediate Appellate Court
committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding
that the transcript of records (Exhibit I) is
spurious.
Upon the following facts, found by both the trial
court and respondent Intermediate Appellate
Court, to have been sufficiently and
satisfactorily established by the evidence on
record, it appears that petitioner Reolandi Diaz
was a senior clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High
School in San Fernando, Pampanga.
In 1972 he sought appointment as School
Administrative Assistant I of the same school
and as one of the requirements for appointment
to said position, filled up the prescribed personal
information sheet, Civil Service Form 212, and
swore to the truth and veracity of the data and
information therein furnished by him before the
proper administering officer. As one of the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 77
required informations, he indicated in Exh "A"
that his highest educational attainment was
Fourth Year A.B. (Liberal Arts) allegedly
pursued or obtained at the Cosmopolitan and
Harvardian Colleges, respectively, during the
years 1950 to 1954 inclusive. On the basis
thereof, he was extended an appointment as
School Administrative Assistant I (Exh. "B"). His
personal information sheet (Exh. "A") together
with his appointment paper (Exh. "B"), the
certification as to the availability of funds for the
position (Exh. "C") and the resolution of the
Provincial Board of Pampanga creating the
position (Exh. "D") were all forwarded to the Civil
Service Commission for the approval of
petitioner's appointment.
But contrary to petitioner's claim that his highest
educational attainment was Fourth Year A.B.
which he allegedly took at the Cosmopolitan and
Harvardian Colleges during the years 1950 to
1954, he was never enrolled at the
Cosmopolitan Colleges which later became the
Abad Santos Educational Institution and still
later the Ortanez University-at any time during
the period covering the years from 1950 to
1954, inclusive as certified to by the Registrar of
Ortanez University, Mr. Atilano D. Solomon.
Likewise, petitioner was never a student at the
Harvardian Colleges in Tondo, during the first
quarter of school year 1953-1954, inclusive, as
certified to by the school's President, Mrs.
Virginia King vda. de Yap.
Neither did petitioner ever enroll as a collegiate
student at the Harvardian Colleges in San
Fernando, Pampanga after he finished his
secondary course in the same school in June
1950, as certified to by its Executive Director,
Atty. Arnulfo Garcia.
Also, the name of petitioner was not included in
all the enrollment lists of college students
submitted to the then Bureau of Private Schools
of the Department of Education by the
Harvardian Colleges at San Fernando,
Pampanga and at Tondo, Manila, during the
period during which petitioner claimed to have
been enrolled. The same thing is true with the

list submitted by the Cosmopolitan Colleges to
the said bureau.
The petitioner did not take the witness stand. He
only presented in evidence an alleged transcript
of record (Exh. 1) purporting to show that he
took up collegiate courses at the Philippine
Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning
from the first quarter of the school year 1951-
1952 up to the first quarter of school year 1953-
1954 which transcript of record was allegedly
signed by Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap, for
and in behalf of the then President of the school,
Ildefonso Yap. But Mrs. Virginia Yap, testifying
for the prosecution disowned the said signature.
Besides, at the bottom portion of the transcript
is a printed notation reading — this is only valid
with the college seal and signature of Pres.
Ildefonso D. Yap. Exhibit "I" lacks the imprint of
the college seal and the signature of President
Ildefonso Yap himself. No other corroborating
piece of evidence was presented by petitioner.
Contrary to petitioner's posture, there was
ample, solid and conclusive evidence adduced
by the prosecution to prove that he was not a
fourth year A.B. undergraduate.
It was clearly established that the statement
made by the accused — that he reached fourth
year A.B. and that he studied for this course
(Liberal Arts) at the Cosmopolitan Colleges and
the Harvardian Colleges from the years 1950-
1954, is devoid of truth. The records of these
colleges do not at all reveal that petitioner was
even enrolled at any time from 1950 to 1954 in
its College of Liberal Arts. His name does not
appear and could not be found in the enrollment
lists submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools
by these colleges.
While the petitioner in his defense presented an
alleged transcript (Exh. purporting to show that
he took up collegiate course at the Philippine
Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning
from the first quarter of the school year 1951-
1952 up to the first quarter of the school year
1953-1954, both the trial court and the
respondent court correctly disregarded said
transcript as having emanated from a spurious
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 78
source. The transcript presented lacks the
authenticating marks-the imprint of the college
seal and the signature of the President of the
college.
As correctly observed by the trial court —
It is also quite significant to note in this score
that the accused in his defense failed to present
any corroborating piece of evidence which will
show that he was indeed enrolled in the
Philippine Harvardian Colleges from the first
quarter of the school year 1953- 1954. If he had
enrolled as a student during this period of time
and he was positive that the transcript of records
issued to him and in his possession is genuine
and valid, it could have been easy for him to
introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the
testimony of any of his classmates or teachers
in the different subjects that he took to support
his claim that he studied and passed these
collegiate courses at the said school. But this he
failed to do despite all the opportunities open to
him and in the face of damning evidence all
showing that he had not really enrolled in this
school or in the other school mentioned by him
the personal information sheet that he filed up
as requirement for his appointment. (p. 53,
Rollo)
Following the doctrine laid down, however, in
the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz, No. L-
15132, May 25,1960,108 Phil. 255 and the
earlier case of United States v. Tupasi Molina,
29 Phil. 119, the crime committed under the
foregoing facts, is perjury. This offense, as
defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood
under oath or affirmation administered by
authority of law on a material matter. The said
article provides —
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and
perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period shall be
imposed upon any person who, knowingly
making untruthful statements and not being
included in the provisions of the next preceding
articles, shall testify under oath or make an

affidavit upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an
oath in cases in which the law so requires.
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation
made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the three
preceding articles of this section shall suffer
respective penalties provided therein.
In that case of People v. Cruz, supra, the
accused Rufo B. Cruz failed up an application
form (Civil Service Form No. 2) for the
patrolman examination. He stated therein that
he had never been accused, indicted or tried for
violation of any law, ordinance or regulation
before any court, when in truth and in fact, as
the accused well knew, he had been prosecuted
and tried before the Justice of the Peace of
Cainta, Rizal, for different crimes. The
application was signed and sworn to by him
before the municipal mayor of Cainta, Rizal.
This Court in that case held:
This article is similar to Section 3 of Act No.
1697 of the Philippine Commission, which was
formerly the law punishing perjury. Under said
section 3 of that Act, this Court, in the case of
United States v. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119),
held that a person, who stated under oath in his
application to take police examination that he
had never been convicted of any crime, when as
a matter of fact he has previous convictions,
committed perjury. The facts in that case are
almost exactly analogous to those in the
present, and we find no reason, either in law or
in the arguments of the Solicitor General to
modify or reverse the conclusion of this Court
therein. More so, because all the elements of
the offense of perjury defined in Art. 183 of the
Revised Penal Code concur in the present case.
The elements of the crime of perjury are —
(a) That the accused made a statement
under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 79
(b) That the statement or affidavit was made
before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath.
(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the
accused made a and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood.
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit
containing the falsity is required by law or made
for a legal purpose.
All the foregoing elements are present in the
case at bar.
Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal
Code carries a lesser penalty. The penalty for
this crime is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum
period. Since there is no mitigating and
aggravating circumstance the penalty should be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
should be from four (4) months of arresto mayor
as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of
prision correccional as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
considerations, the decision appealed from is
modified as follows:
(a) The accused Reolandi Diaz is found
guilty of the crime of perjury defined and
penalized under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal
Code; and
(b) The accused is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of from four (4) months of
arrests mayor as minimum to one (1) year and
one (1) day of prision correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 80

FRAUDS Postpone Sale (Agreements).[7] These

[G.R. No. 129279. March 4, 2003]
ALFREDO M. OUANO, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, and HEIRS OF JULIETA M.
OUANO, respondents.
Agreements were addressed to the sheriff,
requesting the latter to defer the auction sale to
another date at the same time and place,
without any further republication of the Notice.
The first of the four pro-forma Agreements
reads, as follows:

DECISION AGREEMENT TO POSTPONE SALE

AZCUNA, J.: Provincial Sheriff

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari Mandaue City

against the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals on CA-GR CV No. 33499[1] affirming Sir:
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu,
Branch 19, in Civil Case No. CEB-596, which In accordance with this agreement of the parties
set aside the extrajudicial foreclosure in the above named case, it is respectfully
proceedings involving respondents properties. requested that the auction sale of the properties
of the mortgagor, scheduled to take place on
From the documentary evidence and the December 5, 1980 at 9:00 oclock in the morning
Stipulation of Facts[2] filed by the parties before at Office of the City Sheriff of Mandaue City be
the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, the facts of the postponed to February 5, 1981, at the same
case are, as follows: time and place, without any further republication
of the notice of sale as required by law. [italics
On June 8, 1977, respondent Julieta M. Ouano supplied]
(Julieta), now deceased, obtained a loan from
the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in the Cebu City, December 11,1980.
amount of P104,280.00. As security for said
loan, she executed a real estate mortgage over PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
two parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue
City.[3] She defaulted on her obligation. On (Mortgagee)
September 29, 1980, PNB filed a petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure with the City Sheriff of By: _____________________
Mandaue City.
(SGD.) F.B. Briones
On November 4, 1980, the sheriff prepared a
notice of sale setting the date of public auction Cebu Branch
of the two parcels of land on December 5, 1980
at 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.[4] He caused the notice Branch Attorney
to be published in the Cebu Daily Times, a
newspaper of general circulation in Mandaue ____________________
City, in its issues of November 13, 20 and 27,
1980.[5] He likewise posted copies thereof in (SGD.)JULIETA M. OUANO
public places in Mandaue City and in the place
where the properties are located.[6] (Mortgagor)

However, the sale as scheduled and published Address: Opao, Mandaue City
did not take place as the parties, on four
separate dates, executed Agreements to

On December 3, 1980, two days prior to the date
of the sale as published, the parties executed
and filed with the sheriff the Agreement to
Postpone Sale moving the date of sale from
December 5, 1980 to February 5, 1981.[8] On
February 5, 1981, however, no sale occurred.
Eight days later, on February 13, 1981, the
parties executed and filed for the second time a
similar agreement moving the date of sale to
February 28, 1981.[9] Again, on February 28,
1981, no sale occurred.
Ten days later, on March 10, 1981, the parties
executed and filed for the third time a similar
agreement moving the date of sale to March 30,
1981.[10] No sale occurred on this date.
On March 30, 1981, the parties executed for the
fourth time a similar agreement moving the date
of sale to May 29, 1981.[11] This agreement
was filed with the sheriff on April 30, 1981.
In all these postponements, no new notice of
sale was issued, nor was there any
republication or reposting of notice for the
rescheduled dates.
Finally, on May 29, 1981, the sheriff conducted
the auction sale, awarding the two parcels of
land to PNB, the only bidder. He executed a
Certificate of Sale certifying the sale for and in
consideration of P195, 510.50.[12]
As Julieta failed to redeem the properties within
the one year period from registration of sale,
PNB consolidated its title on February 12,
1983.[13] On February 23 of the same year, it
conveyed the properties to herein petitioner
Alfredo Ouano, the brother of Julieta, under a
Deed of Promise to Sell payable in five
years.[14]
On March 28, 1983, Julieta sent demand letters
to PNB and petitioner, pointing out irregularities
in the foreclosure sale.[15] On April 18, 1983,
Julieta filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Cebu for the nullification of the
May 29, 1981 foreclosure sale.[16] Petitioner
filed a motion for leave to intervene in said case,
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 81
and filed his Answer in Intervention to protect his
rights over the properties.[17]
While the case was pending, on February 25,
1986, PNB executed a Deed of Sale in favor of
petitioner.[18] The Register of Deeds of
Mandaue City accordingly cancelled the TCTs
in PNBs name and issued in lieu thereof TCTs
in the name of petitioner over the two parcels of
land.[19]
On January 29, 1990, the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu rendered a decision in favor of Julieta,
holding that the lack of republication rendered
the foreclosure sale void. The dispositive portion
of said decision states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered,
1. declaring as null and void:
a) the auction sale by the City Sheriff of
Mandaue City on May 29, 1981 over the
aforesaid properties of plaintiff Julieta Ouano;
b) the Certificate of Sale (Exhibit K) issued by
the City Sheriff of Mandaue City on May 29,
1981, in favor of the Philippine National Bank;
c) the Deed of Sale (Exhibit L) executed by PNB
to itself;
d) the Deed of Promise to Sell (Exhibit O)
executed by PNB on February 23, 1983 in favor
of Alfredo Ouano
e) the Deed of Sale (Exhibit 24) executed by
PNB on February 5, 1986 in favor of Alfredo
Ouano;
f) TCT No. 17929 (Exhibit M) and TCT No.
17930 (Exhibit N) in the name of PNB;
g) TCT No. 21982 (Exhibit 21) and TCT No.
21987 (Exhibit 22) in the name of Alfredo
Ouano;
2. ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue
City to cancel the aforementioned titles (TCT
Nos. 17929 and 17930, as well as TCT Nos.

21982 and 21987), and to reinstate TCT Nos.
15724 (5033) and 24377 (6876) in the name of
Julieta Ouano;
3. ordering the City Sheriff of Mandaue City to
conduct a new auction sale strictly complying
with the requirements for publication and
posting as required by Act 3135, as amended by
Act 4118;
4. ordering PNB to return to Alfredo Ouano all
amounts the latter has paid to the said bank;
5. ordering Alfredo Ouano to vacate the
premises in question and turn them over to
Julieta Ouano;
6. ordering PNB to pay the plaintiff the sum
equivalent to 10% of the market value of the
properties in question as indicated in Tax
Declaration Nos. 01134 and 00510, as
attorneys fees, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Not satisfied, PNB and petitioner brought the
case to the Court of Appeals.[21] In its decision
dated February 17, 1997, said court affirmed the
trial courts ruling on the same ground that there
was no compliance with the mandatory
requirements of posting and publication of
notice of sale.[22] Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied for lack of
merit by the same court on April 15, 1997.[23]
PNB and petitioner filed their own petitions for
review on certiorari before us. PNBs petition
however was dismissed on July 21, 1997 for
being filed out of time and for lack of certification
of non-forum-shopping.[24] The petition herein
remaining is the one filed by petitioner.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE FINDING OF
THE LOWER COURT THAT THE
POSTPONED AUCTION SALE OF SUBJECT
PROPERTIES HELD ON MAY 29, 1981 UPON
WRITTEN AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 82
WAS NULL AND VOID FOR LACK OF
PUBLICATION OF NOTICE OF SALE ON THE
SAID DATE ALTHOUGH THE
REQUIREMENTS OF PUBLICATION OF
NOTICE OF SALE ON THE ORIGINALLY
INTENDED DATE [WERE] FULLY COMPLIED
WITH.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROVISION
OF SEC. 24, RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF
COURT WHICH ALLOWS THE SHERIFF TO
ADJOURN ANY SALE UPON EXECUTION TO
ANY DATE AGREED UPON BY THE PARTIES
IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
III. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JULIETA M.
OUANO IS NOT ESTOPPED FROM
CHALLENGING THE VALIDITY OF THE
AUCTION SALE SINCE THE SALE WAS
REPEATEDLY POSTPONED UPON HER
REQUEST AND WRITTEN AGREEMENT[S]
THAT THERE WOULD BE NO
REPUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF SALE.
IV RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF
THE LOWER COURT ALTHOUGH JULIETA M.
OUANO FILED HER COMPLAINT AFTER
ALMOST TWO YEARS FROM THE DATE OF
THE AUCTION SALE.[25]
The main issue before us is whether or not the
requirements of Act No. 3135 were complied
with in the May 29, 1981 foreclosure sale.
The governing law for extrajudicial foreclosures
is Act No. 3135 as amended by Act No. 4118.
The provision relevant to this case is Section 3,
which provides:
SEC. 3. Notice shall be given by posting notices
of the sale for not less than twenty (20) days in
at least three public places of the municipality or
city where the property is situated, and if such
property is worth more than four hundred pesos,
such notice shall also be published once a week
for at least three consecutive weeks in a

newspaper of general circulation in the
municipality of city.
It is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions
governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with,
and that even slight deviations therefrom will
invalidate the notice and render the sale at least
voidable.[26] In a number of cases, we have
consistently held that failure to advertise a
mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with
statutory requirements constitutes a right to waive the posting and publication
jurisdictional defect invalidating the sale.[27]
Consequently, such defect renders the sale
absolutely void and no title passes.[28]
Petitioner, however, insists that there was
substantial compliance with the publication
requirement, considering that prior publication
and posting of the notice of the first date were
made.
In Tambunting v. Court of Appeals,[29] we held
that republication in the manner prescribed by
Act No. 3135 is necessary for the validity of a
postponed extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Thus
we stated:
Where required by the statute or by the terms of
the foreclosure decree, public notice of the
place and time of the mortgage foreclosure sale
must be given, a statute requiring it being held
applicable to subsequent sales as well as to the
first advertised sale of the property.
[underscoring supplied].
Petitioner further contends that republication
may be waived voluntarily by the parties.[30]
This argument has no basis in law. The issue of
whether republication may be waived is not
novel, as we have passed upon the same query
in Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno
Productions Inc,.[31] Petitioner therein sought
extrajudicial foreclosure of respondents
mortgaged properties with the Sheriffs Office of
Pasig, Rizal. Initially scheduled on August 12,
1976, the auction sale was re-scheduled several
times without republication of the notice of sale,
as stipulated in their Agreements to Postpone
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 83
Sale. Finally, the auction sale proceeded on
December 20, 1976, with petitioner as the
highest bidder. Aggrieved, respondents sued to
nullify the foreclosure sale. The trial court
declared the sale void for non-compliance with
Act No. 3135. This decision was affirmed in toto
by the Court of Appeals. Upholding the
conclusions of the trial and appellate court, we
categorically held:
Petitioner and respondents have absolutely no
requirements of Act No. 3135.
In People v. Donato, the Court expounded on
what rights and privileges may be waived, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
[T]he principle is recognized that everyone has
a right to waive, and agree to waive, the
advantage of a law or rule made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his
private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and
relinquished without infringing on any public
right, and without detriment to the community at
large.
xxx xxx xxx
Although the general rule is that any right or
privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by
constitution may be waived, a waiver in
derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and
a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes
on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest
may be waived.
xxx xxx xxx
The principal object of a notice of sale in a
foreclosure of mortgage is not so much to notify
the mortgagor as to inform the public generally
of the nature and condition of the property to be
sold, and of the time, place, and terms of the
sale. Notices are given to secure bidders and
prevent a sacrifice of the property. Clearly, the
statutory requirements of posting and
publication are mandated, not for the

mortgagors benefit, but for the public or third
persons. In fact, personal notice to the
mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings is not even necessary, unless
stipulated. As such, it is imbued with public
policy considerations and any waiver thereon
would be inconsistent with the intent and letter
of Act No. 3135.
Publication, therefore, is required to give the
foreclosure sale a reasonably wide publicity
such that those interested might attend the
public sale.[32] To allow the parties to waive this
jurisdictional requirement would result in
converting into a private sale what ought to be a
public auction.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the written
waivers are valid, we find noticeable flaws that
would nevertheless invalidate the foreclosure
proceedings. First, the Agreements, as worded,
only waived further republication of the notice of
sale. Nothing in the Agreements indicates that
the parties likewise dispensed with the reposting
of the notices of sale. As there was no reposting
of notice of the May 29, 1981 sale, the
foreclosure fell short of the requirements of Act
No. 3135. Second, we observe that the
Agreements were executed and filed with the
sheriff several days after each rescheduled
date. As stated in the facts, the first agreement
was timely filed, two days prior to the originally
scheduled sale on December 5, 1980. The
second agreement, however, was executed and
filed eight days after the rescheduled sale on
February 5, 1981. The third agreement was
executed and filed ten days after the
rescheduled sale on February 28, 1981. The
fourth agreement was timely executed, but was
filed with the sheriff one month after the
rescheduled sale on March 30, 1981. On the
rescheduled dates, therefore, no public sale
occurred, nor was there any request to
postpone filed with the sheriff, except for the first
one. In short, the Agreements are clearly
defective for having been belatedly executed
and filed with the sheriff. The party who may be
said to be at fault for this failure, and who should
bear the consequences, is no other than PNB,
the mortgagee in the case at bar. It is the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 84
mortgagee who causes the mortgaged property
to be sold, and the date of sale is fixed upon his
instruction.[33] We have held that the
mortgagees right to foreclose a mortgage must
be exercised according to the clear mandate of
the law. Every requirement of the law must be
complied with, lest the valid exercise of the right
would end.[34] PNBs inaction on the scheduled
date of sale and belated filing of requests to
postpone may be deemed as an abandonment
of the petition to foreclose it filed with the sheriff.
Consequently, its right to foreclose the
mortgage based on said petition lapsed.
In a vain attempt to uphold the validity of the
aforesaid waiver, petitioner asserts that the
Court of Appeals should have applied Rule 39,
Section 24 of the Rules of Court, which allows
adjournment of execution sales by agreement of
the parties. The said provision provides:
Sec. 24. Adjournment of Sale By written consent
of debtor and creditor, the officer may adjourn
any sale upon execution to any date agreed
upon in writing by the parties. Without such
agreement, he may adjourn the sale from day to
day, if it becomes necessary to do so for lack of
time to complete the sale on the day fixed in the
notice.[35]
Petitioner submits that the language of the
abovecited provision implies that the written
request of the parties suffices to authorize the
sheriff to reset the sale without republication or
reposting.[36]
At the outset, distinction should be made of the
three different kinds of sales under the law,
namely: an ordinary execution sale, a judicial
foreclosure sale, and an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. An ordinary execution sale is
governed by the pertinent provisions of Rule 39
of the Rules of Court. Rule 68 of the Rules of
Court applies in cases of judicial foreclosure
sale. On the other hand, Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118 otherwise known as
An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under
Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real
Estate Mortgages applies in cases of
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. A different set of

law applies to each class of sale mentioned.[37]
The cited provision in the Rules of Court hence
does not apply to an extrajudicial foreclosure
sale.
Moreover, even assuming that the aforecited
provision applies, all it authorizes is the
adjournment of the execution sale by agreement
of the parties. Nowhere does it state that
republication and reposting of notice for the
postponed sale may be waived. Thus, it cannot,
by any means, sanction the waiver in the case
at bar.
Next, petitioner maintains that Julietas act of
requesting the postponement and repeatedly
signing the Agreements had placed her under
estoppel, barring her from challenging the lack
of publication of the auction sale.[38]
We rule otherwise. Julieta did request for the
postponement of the foreclosure sale to extend
the period to settle her obligation.[39] However,
the records do not show that she requested the
postponement without need of republication and
reposting of notice of sale. In Nepomuceno,[40]
we held:
xxx To request postponement of the sale is one
thing; to request it without need of compliance
with the statutory requirements is another.
Respondents, therefore, did not commit any act
that would have estopped them from
questioning the validity of the foreclosure sale
for non-compliance with Act No. 3135. xxx
In addition, we observe herein that the
Agreements prepared by the counsel of PNB
were in standard forms of the bank, labeled as
Legal Form No. 41. The Nepomuceno[41] case
likewise involved an Agreement to Postpone
Sale that was in a ready-made form, and the
only participation of respondents therein was to
affix or adhere their signatures thereto. We
there held that said agreement partakes of the
nature of a contract of adhesion, i.e., one in
which one of the contracting parties imposes a
ready-made form of contract which the other
party may accept or reject, but cannot modify.
One party prepares the stipulation in the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 85
contract, while the other party merely affixes his
signature or his adhesion thereto, giving no
room for negotiation, and depriving the latter of
the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. [42]
As such, their terms are construed strictly
against the party who drafted it.[43]
More importantly, the waiver being void for
being contrary to the express mandate of Act
No. 3135, such cannot be ratified by
estoppel.[44] Estoppel cannot give validity to an
act that is prohibited by law or one that is against
public policy.[45] Neither can the defense of
illegality be waived.[46]
Petitioner, moreover, makes much of the fact
that Julieta filed her complaint with the trial court
after almost two years from the May 29, 1981
auction sale, thus arguing that the delayed filing
was a clear case of laches.[47]
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to
do that which by exercising due diligence, could
or should have been done earlier.[48] In the
case at bar, Julieta only realized the defect in
the foreclosure sale upon conferring with her
counsel who discovered the irregularity.[49]
Thus, on March 25, 1983, Julieta filed her
adverse claim with the Registrar of Deeds.[50]
Three days after, she sent demand letters to
PNB and petitioner.[51] Soon after they replied
on April 6 and 7, 1983,[52] she promptly sued to
nullify the foreclosure sale in the Regional Trial
Court of Mandaue City on April 20, 1983.[53]
She likewise filed a suit for forcible entry against
petitioner in the Municipal Trial Court of
Mandaue City.[54] Considering all these, we
find the delay of almost two years not
unreasonable. Julieta cannot be guilty of laches.
Her prompt actions upon discovering her cause
of action negate the claim that she has
abandoned her right to claim the properties.
Besides, this defense lacks merit in light of the
Civil Code stating that an action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe.[55]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision dated February 17, 1997 in CA-G.R.

CV No. 33499 and the Resolution therein dated
April 15, 1997 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 10667
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A NATIONAL
COMPETITION POLICY PROHIBITING ANTI-
COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS, ABUSE OF
DOMINANT POSITION AND ANTI-
COMPETITIVE MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS, ESTABLISHING THE
PHILIPPINE COMPETITION COMMISSION
AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known
as the "Philippine Competition Act".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – The efficiency
of market competition as a mechanism for
allocating goods and services is a generally
accepted precept. The State recognizes that
past measures undertaken to liberalize key
sectors in the economy need to be reinforced by
measures that safeguard competitive
conditions. The State also recognizes that the
provision of equal opportunities to all promotes
entrepreneurial spirit, encourages private
investments, facilitates technology development
and transfer and enhances resource
productivity. Unencumbered market competition
also serves the interest of consumers by
allowing them to exercise their right of choice
over goods and services offered in the market.
Pursuant to the constitutional goals for the
national economy to attain a more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income, and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of
goods and services produced by the nation for
the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 86
life for all, especially the underprivileged and the
constitutional mandate that the State shall
regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public
interest so requires and that no combinations in
restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be
allowed, the State shall:
(a) Enhance economic efficiency and promote
free and fair competition in trade, industry and
all commercial economic activities, as well as
establish a National Competition Policy to be
implemented by the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and all of its political
agencies as a whole;
(b) Prevent economic concentration which will
control the production, distribution, trade, or
industry that will unduly stifle competition,
lessen, manipulate or constrict the discipline of
free markets; and
(c) Penalize all forms of anti-competitive
agreements, abuse of dominant position and
anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, with
the objective of protecting consumer welfare
and advancing domestic and international trade
and economic development.
Section 3. Scope and Application. — This Act
shall be enforceable against any person or
entity engaged in any trade, industry and
commerce in the Republic of the Philippines. It
shall likewise be applicable to international trade
having direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effects in trade, industry, or
commerce in the Republic of the Philippines,
including those that result from acts done
outside the Republic of the Philippines.
This Act shall not apply to the combinations or
activities of workers or employees nor to
agreements or arrangements with their
employers when such combinations, activities,
agreements, or arrangements are designed
solely to facilitate collective bargaining in
respect of conditions of employment.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. – As used in this
Act:

(a) Acquisition refers to the purchase of
securities or assets, through contract or other
means, for the purpose of obtaining control by:
(1) One (1) entity of the whole or part of another;
(2) Two (2) or more entities over another; or
(3) One (1) or more entities over one (1) or more
entities;
(b) Agreement refers to any type or form of
contract, arrangement, understanding,
collective recommendation, or concerted action,
whether formal or informal, explicit or tacit,
written or oral;
(c) Conduct refers to any type or form of
undertaking, collective recommendation,
independent or concerted action or practice,
whether formal or informal;
(d) Commission refers to the Philippine
Competition Commission created under this
Act;
(e) Confidential business information refers to
information which concerns or relates to the
operations, production, sales, shipments,
purchases, transfers, identification of
customers, inventories, or amount or source of
any income, profits, losses, expenditures;
(f) Control refers to the ability to substantially
influence or direct the actions or decisions of an
entity, whether by contract, agency or
otherwise;
(g) Dominant position refers to a position of
economic strength that an entity or entities hold
which makes it capable of controlling the
relevant market independently from any or a
combination of the following: competitors,
customers, suppliers, or consumers;
(h) Entity refers to any person, natural or
juridical, sole proprietorship, partnership,
combination or association in any form, whether
incorporated or not, domestic or foreign,
including those owned or controlled by the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 87
government, engaged directly or indirectly in
any economic activity;
(i) Market refers to the group of goods or
services that are sufficiently interchangeable or
substitutable and the object of competition, and
the geographic area where said goods or
services are offered;
(j) Merger refers to the joining of two (2) or more
entities into an existing entity or to form a new
entity;
(k) Relevant market refers to the market in
which a particular good or service is sold and
which is a combination of the relevant product
market and the relevant geographic market,
defined as follows:
(1) A relevant product market comprises all
those goods and/or services which are regarded
as interchangeable or substitutable by the
consumer or the customer, by reason of the
goods and/or services’ characteristics, their
prices and their intended use; and
(2) The relevant geographic market comprises
the area in which the entity concerned is
involved in the supply and demand of goods and
services, in which the conditions of competition
are sufficiently homogenous and which can be
distinguished from neighboring areas because
the conditions of competition are different in
those areas.
CHAPTER II
PHILIPPINE COMPETITION COMMISSION
Section 5. Philippine Competition Commission.
– To implement the national competition policy
and attain the objectives and purposes of this
Act, an independent quasi-judicial body is
hereby created, which shall be known as the
Philippine Competition Commission (PCC),
hereinafter referred to as the Commission, and
which shall be organized within sixty (60) days
after the effectivity of this Act. Upon
establishment of the Commission, Executive
Order No. 45 designating the Department of
Justice as the Competition Authority is hereby

amended. The Office for Competition (OFC)
under the Office of the Secretary of Justice shall
however be retained, with its powers and
functions modified pursuant to Section 13 of this
Chapter.
The Commission shall be an attached agency to
the Office of the President.
Section 6. Composition of the Commission. –
The Commission shall be composed of a
Chairperson and four (4) Commissioners. The
Chairperson and the Commissioners shall be
citizens and residents of the Philippines, of good
moral character, of recognized probity and
independence and must have distinguished
themselves professionally in public, civic or
academic service in any of the following fields:
economics, law, finance, commerce or
engineering. They must have been in the active
practice of their professions for at least ten (10)
years, and must not have been candidates for
any elective national or local office in the
immediately preceding elections, whether
regular or special: Provided, That at least one
(1) shall be a member of the Philippine Bar with
at least ten (10) years of experience in the active
practice of law, and at least one (1) shall be an
economist. The Chairperson and the
Commissioners who shall have the rank
equivalent of cabinet secretary and
undersecretary, respectively, shall be appointed
by the President.
Section 7. Term of Office. – The term of office of
the Chairperson and the Commissioners shall
be seven (7) years without reappointment. Of
the first set of appointees, the Chairperson shall
hold office for seven (7) years and of the first
four (4) Commissioners, two (2) shall hold office
for a term of seven (7) years and two (2) for a
term of five (5) years. In case a vacancy occurs
before the expiration of the term of office, the
appointment to such vacancy shall only be for
the unexpired term of the predecessor.
The Chairperson and the Commissioners shall
enjoy security of tenure and shall not be
suspended or removed from office except for
just cause as provided by law.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 88
Section 8. Prohibitions and Disqualifications. –
The Commissioners shall not, during their
tenure, hold any other office or employment.
They shall not, during their tenure, directly or
indirectly practice any profession, except in a
teaching capacity, participate in any business,
or be financially interested in any contract with,
or any franchise, or special privileges granted by
the government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-
owned and -controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of
interest in the conduct of their office. They shall
not be qualified to run for any office in the
election immediately succeeding their cessation
from office: Provided, That the election
mentioned hereof is not a Barangay election or
a Sangguniang Kabataan election. Provided,
they shall not be allowed to personally appear
or practice as counsel or agent on any matter
pending before the Commission for two (2)
years following their cessation from office.
No spouse or relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree of any of the
Commissioners, the Chairperson and the
Executive Director of the Commission may
appear as counsel nor agent on any matter
pending before the Commission or transact
business directly or indirectly therein during
incumbency and within two (2) years from
cessation of office.
Section 9. Compensation and Other
Emoluments for Members and Personnel of the
Commission.— The compensation and other
emoluments for the members and personnel of
the Commission shall be exempted from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise
known as the "Salary Standardization Act". For
this purpose, the salaries and other emoluments
of the Chairperson, the Commissioners, and
personnel of the Commission shall be set based
on an objective classification system, taking into
consideration the importance and
responsibilities attached to the respective
positions, and shall be submitted to the
President of the Philippines for his approval.

Section 10. Quorum. – Three (3) members of
the Commission shall constitute a quorum and
the affirmative vote of three (3) members shall
be necessary for the adoption of any rule, ruling,
order, resolution, decision or other acts of the
Commission.
Section 11. Staff. – The Commission shall
appoint, fix the compensation, and determine
the status, qualifications, and duties of an
adequate staff, which shall include an Executive
Director of the Commission. The Executive
Director shall be appointed by the Commission
and shall have relevant experience in any of the
fields of law, economics, commerce,
management, finance or engineering for at least
ten (10) years. The members of the technical
staff, except those performing purely clerical
functions, shall possess at least a Bachelor’s
Degree in any of the following lines of
specialization: economics, law, finance,
commerce, engineering, accounting, or
management.
Section 12. Powers and Functions. — The
Commission shall have original and primary
jurisdiction over the enforcement and
implementation of the provisions of this Act, and
its implementing rules and regulations. The
Commission shall exercise the following powers
and functions:
(a) Conduct inquiry, investigate, and hear and
decide on cases involving any violation of this
Act and other existing competition laws motu
proprio or upon receipt of a verified complaint
from an interested party or upon referral by the
concerned regulatory agency, and institute the
appropriate civil or criminal proceedings;
(b) Review proposed mergers and acquisitions,
determine thresholds for notification, determine
the requirements and procedures for
notification, and upon exercise of its powers to
review, prohibit mergers and acquisitions that
will substantially prevent, restrict, or lessen
competition in the relevant market;
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 89
(c) Monitor and undertake consultation with
stakeholders and affected agencies for the
purpose of understanding market behavior;
(d) Upon finding, based on substantial evidence,
that an entity has entered into an anti-
competitive agreement or has abused its
dominant position after due notice and hearing,
stop or redress the same, by applying remedies,
such as, but not limited to, issuance of
injunctions, requirement of divestment, and
disgorgement of excess profits under such
reasonable parameters that shall be prescribed
by the rules and regulations implementing this
Act;
(e) Conduct administrative proceedings, impose
sanctions, fines or penalties for any
noncompliance with or breach of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) and
punish for contempt;
(f) Issue subpoena duces tecum and subpoena
ad testificandum to require the production of
books, records, or other documents or data
which relate to any matter relevant to the
investigation and personal appearance before
the Commission, summon witnesses,
administer oaths, and issue interim orders such
as show cause orders and cease and desist
orders after due notice and hearing in
accordance with the rules and regulations
implementing this Act;
(g) Upon order of the court, undertake
inspections of business premises and other
offices, land and vehicles, as used by the entity,
where it reasonably suspects that relevant
books, tax records, or other documents which
relate to any matter relevant to the investigation
are kept, in order to prevent the removal,
concealment, tampering with, or destruction of
the books, records, or other documents;
(h) Issue adjustment or divestiture orders
including orders for corporate reorganization or
divestment in the manner and under such terms
and conditions as may be prescribed in the rules
and regulations implementing this Act.

Adjustment or divestiture orders, which are
structural remedies, should only be imposed:
(1) Where there is no equally effective
behavioral remedy; or
(2) Where any equally effective behavioral
remedy would be more burdensome for the
enterprise concerned than the structural
remedy. Changes to the structure of an
enterprise as it existed before the infringement
was committed would only be proportionate to
the substantial risk of a lasting or repeated
infringement that derives from the very structure
of the enterprise;
(i) Deputize any and all enforcement agencies
of the government or enlist the aid and support
of any private institution, corporation, entity or
association, in the implementation of its powers
and functions;
(j) Monitor compliance by the person or entities
concerned with the cease and desist order or
consent judgment;
(k) Issue advisory opinions and guidelines on
competition matters for the effective
enforcement of this Act and submit annual and
special reports to Congress, including proposed
legislation for the regulation of commerce, trade,
or industry;
(l) Monitor and analyze the practice of
competition in markets that affect the Philippine
economy; implement and oversee measures to
promote transparency and accountability; and
ensure that prohibitions and requirements of
competition laws are adhered to;
(m) Conduct, publish, and disseminate studies
and reports on anti-competitive conduct and
agreements to inform and guide the industry
and consumers;
(n) Intervene or participate in administrative and
regulatory proceedings requiring consideration
of the provisions of this Act that are initiated by
government agencies such as the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Energy
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 90
Regulatory Commission and the National
Telecommunications Commission;
(o) Assist the National Economic and
Development Authority, in consultation with
relevant agencies and sectors, in the
preparation and formulation of a national
competition policy;
(p) Act as the official representative of the
Philippine government in international
competition matters;
(q) Promote capacity building and the sharing of
best practices with other competition-related
bodies;
(r) Advocate pro-competitive policies of the
government by:
(1) Reviewing economic and administrative
regulations, motu proprio or upon request, as to
whether or not they adversely affect relevant
market competition, and advising the concerned
agencies against such regulations; and
(2) Advising the Executive Branch on the
competitive implications of government actions,
policies and programs; and
(s) Charging reasonable fees to defray the
administrative cost of the services rendered.
Section 13. Office for Competition (OFC),
Powers and Functions. — The OFC under the
Department of Justice (DOJ-OFC) shall only
conduct preliminary investigation and undertake
prosecution of all criminal offenses arising under
this Act and other competition-related laws in
accordance with Section 31 of Chapter VI of this
Act. The OFC shall be reorganized and
allocated resources as may be required therefor
to effectively pursue such mandate.
CHAPTER III
PROHIBITED ACTS
Section 14. Anti-Competitive Agreements. –

(a) The following agreements, between or
among competitors, are per se prohibited:
(1) Restricting competition as to price, or
components thereof, or other terms of trade;
(2) Fixing price at an auction or in any form of
bidding including cover bidding, bid
suppression, bid rotation and market allocation
and other analogous practices of bid
manipulation;
(b) The following agreements, between or
among competitors which have the object or
effect of substantially preventing, restricting or
lessening competition shall be prohibited:
(1) Setting, Kmiting, or controlling production,
markets, technical development, or investment;
(2) Dividing or sharing the market, whether by
volume of sales or purchases, territory, type of
goods or services, buyers or sellers or any other
means;
(c) Agreements other than those specified in (a)
and (b) of this section which have the object or
effect of substantially preventing, restricting or
lessening competition shall also be prohibited:
Provided, Those which contribute to improving
the production or distribution of goods and
services or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share
of the resulting benefits, may not necessarily be
deemed a violation of this Act.
An entity that controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with another entity or
entities, have common economic interests, and
are not otherwise able to decide or act
independently of each other, shall not be
considered competitors for purposes of this
section.
Section 15. Abuse of Dominant Position. – It
shall be prohibited for one or more entities to
abuse their dominant position by engaging in
conduct that would substantially prevent, restrict
or lessen competition:
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 91
(a) Selling goods or services below cost with the
object of driving competition out of the relevant
market: Provided, That in the Commission’s
evaluation of this fact, it shall consider whether
the entity or entities have no such object and the
price established was in good faith to meet or
compete with the lower price of a competitor in
the same market selling the same or
comparable product or service of like quality;
(b) Imposing barriers to entry or committing acts
that prevent competitors from growing within the
market in an anti-competitive manner except
those that develop in the market as a result of or
arising from a superior product or process,
business acumen, or legal rights or laws;
(c) Making a transaction subject to acceptance
by the other parties of other obligations which,
by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the transaction;
(d) Setting prices or other terms or conditions
that discriminate unreasonably between
customers or sellers of the same goods or
services, where such customers or sellers are
contemporaneously trading on similar terms and
conditions, where the effect may be to lessen
competition substantially: Provided, That the
following shall be considered permissible price
differentials:
(1) Socialized pricing for the less fortunate
sector of the economy;
(2) Price differential which reasonably or
approximately reflect differences in the cost of
manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from
differing methods, technical conditions, or
quantities in which the goods or services are
sold or delivered to the buyers or sellers;
(3) Price differential or terms of sale offered in
response to the competitive price of payments,
services or changes in the facilities furnished by
a competitor; and
(4) Price changes in response to changing
market conditions, marketability of goods or
services, or volume;

(e) Imposing restrictions on the lease or contract
for sale or trade of goods or services concerning
where, to whom, or in what forms goods or
services may be sold or traded, such as fixing
prices, giving preferential discounts or rebate
upon such price, or imposing conditions not to
deal with competing entities, where the object or
effect of the restrictions is to prevent, restrict or
lessen competition substantially: Provided, That
nothing contained in this Act shall prohibit or
render unlawful:
(1) Permissible franchising, licensing, exclusive
merchandising or exclusive distributorship
agreements such as those which give each
party the right to unilaterally terminate the
agreement; or
(2) Agreements protecting intellectual property
rights, confidential information, or trade secrets;
(f) Making supply of particular goods or services
dependent upon the purchase of other goods or
services from the supplier which have no direct
connection with the main goods or services to
be supplied;
(g) Directly or indirectly imposing unfairly low
purchase prices for the goods or services of,
among others, marginalized agricultural
producers, fisherfolk, micro-, small-, medium-
scale enterprises, and other marginalized
service providers and producers;
(h) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair
purchase or selling price on their competitors,
customers, suppliers or consumers, provided
that prices that develop in the market as a result
of or due to a superior product or process,
business acumen or legal rights or laws shall not
be considered unfair prices; and
(i) Limiting production, markets or technical
development to the prejudice of consumers,
provided that limitations that develop in the
market as a result of or due to a superior product
or process, business acumen or legal rights or
laws shall not be a violation of this Act:
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 92
Provided, That nothing in this Act shall be
construed or interpreted as a prohibition on
having a dominant position in a relevant market
or on acquiring, maintaining and increasing
market share through legitimate means that do
not substantially prevent, restrict or lessen
competition:
Provided, further, That any conduct which
contributes to improving production or
distribution of goods or services within the
relevant market, or promoting technical and
economic progress while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit may not
necessarily be considered an abuse of
dominant position:
Provided, finally, That the foregoing shall not
constrain the Commission or the relevant
regulator from pursuing measures that would
promote fair competition or more competition as
provided in this Act.
CHAPTER IV
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Section 16. Review of Mergers and
Acquisitions. — The Commission shall have the
power to review mergers and acquisitions based
on factors deemed relevant by the Commission.
Section 17. Compulsory Notification. – Parties
to the merger or acquisition agreement referred
to in the preceding section wherein the value of
the transaction exceeds one billion pesos
(P1,000,000,000.00) are prohibited from
consummating their agreement until thirty (30)
days after providing notification to the
Commission in the form and containing the
information specified in the regulations issued
by the Commission: Provided, That the
Commission shall promulgate other criteria,
such as increased market share in the relevant
market in excess of minimum thresholds, that
may be applied specifically to a sector, or across
some or all sectors, in determining whether
parties to a merger or acquisition shall notify the
Commission under this Chapter.

An agreement consummated in violation of this
requirement to notify the Commission shall be
considered void and subject the parties to an
administrative fine of one percent (1%) to five
percent (5%) of the value of the transaction.
Should the Commission deem it necessary, it
may request further information that are
reasonably necessary and directly relevant to
the prohibition under Section 20 hereof from the
parties to the agreement before the expiration of
the thirty (30)-day period referred. The issuance
of such a request has the effect of extending the
period within which the agreement may not be
consummated for an additional sixty (60) days,
beginning on the day after the request for
information is received by the parties: Provided,
That, in no case shall the total period for review
by the Commission of the subject agreement
exceed ninety (90) days from initial notification
by the parties.
When the above periods have expired and no
decision has been promulgated for whatever
reason, the merger or acquisition shall be
deemed approved and the parties may proceed
to implement or consummate it. All notices,
documents and information provided to or
emanating from the Commission under this
section shall be subject to confidentiality rule
under Section 34 of this Act except when the
release of information contained therein is with
the consent of the notifying entity or is
mandatorily required to be disclosed by law or
by a valid order of a court of competent
jurisdiction, or of a government or regulatory
agency, including an exchange.
In the case of the merger or acquisition of banks,
banking institutions, building and loan
associations, trust companies, insurance
companies, public utilities, educational
institutions and other special corporations
governed by special laws, a favorable or no-
objection ruling by the Commission shall not be
construed as dispensing of the requirement for
a favorable recommendation by the appropriate
government agency under Section 79 of the
Corporation Code of the Philippines.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 93
A favorable recommendation by a governmental
agency with a competition mandate shall give
rise to a disputable presumption that the
proposed merger or acquisition is not violative
of this Act.
Section 18. Effect of Notification. — If within the
relevant periods stipulated in the preceding
section, the Commission determines that such
agreement is prohibited under Section 20 and
does not qualify for exemption under Section 21
of this Chapter, the Commission may:
(a) Prohibit the implementation of the
agreement;
(b) Prohibit the implementation of the
agreement unless and until it is modified by
changes specified by the Commission.
(c) Prohibit the implementation of the agreement
unless and until the pertinent party or parties
enter into legally enforceable agreements
specified by the Commission.
Section 19. Notification Threshold. – The
Commission shall, from time to time, adopt and
publish regulations stipulating:
(a) The transaction value threshold and such
other criteria subject to the notification
requirement of Section 17 of this Act;
(b) The information that must be supplied for
notified merger or acquisition;
(c) Exceptions or exemptions from the
notification requirement; and
(d) Other rules relating to the notification
procedures.
Section 20. Prohibited. Mergers and
Acquisitions. – Merger or acquisition
agreements that substantially prevent, restrict or
lessen competition in the relevant market or in
the market for goods or services as may be
determined by the Commission shall be
prohibited.

Section 21. Exemptions from Prohibited.
Mergers and Acquisitions. – Merger or
acquisition agreement prohibited under Section
20 of this Chapter may, nonetheless, be exempt
from prohibition by the Commission when the
parties establish either of the following:
(a) The concentration has brought about or is
likely to bring about gains in efficiencies that are
greater than the effects of any limitation on
competition that result or likely to result from the
merger or acquisition agreement; or
(b) A party to the merger or acquisition
agreement is faced with actual or imminent
financial failure, and the agreement represents
the least anti-competitive arrangement among
the known alternative uses for the failing entity’s
assets:
Provided, That an entity shall not be prohibited
from continuing to own and hold the stock or
other share capital or assets of another
corporation which it acquired prior to the
approval of this Act or acquiring or maintaining
its market share in a relevant market through
such means without violating the provisions of
this Act:
Provided, further, That the acquisition of the
stock or other share capital of one or more
corporations solely for investment and not used
for voting or exercising control and not to
otherwise bring about, or attempt to bring about
the prevention, restriction, or lessening of
competition in the relevant market shall not be
prohibited.
Section 22. Burden of Proof. – The burden of
proof under Section 21 lies with the parties
seeking the exemption. A party seeking to rely
on the exemption specified in Section 21(a)
must demonstrate that if the agreement were
not implemented, significant efficiency gains
would not be realized.
Section 23. Finality of Ridings on Mergers and
Acquisitions. – Merger or acquisition
agreements that have received a favorable
ruling from the Commission, except when such
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 94
ruling was obtained on the basis of fraud or false
material information, may not be challenged
under this Act.
CHAPTER V
DISPOSITION OF CASES
Section 24. Relevant Market. – For purposes of
determining the relevant market, the following
factors, among others, affecting the
substitutability among goods or services
constituting such market and the geographic
area delineating the boundaries of the market
shall be considered:
(a) The possibilities of substituting the goods or
services in question, with others of domestic or
foreign origin, considering the technological
possibilities, extent to which substitutes are
available to consumers and time required for
such substitution;
(b) The cost of distribution of the good or
service, its raw materials, its supplements and
substitutes from other areas and abroad,
considering freight, insurance, import duties and
non-tariff restrictions; the restrictions imposed
by economic agents or by their associations;
and the time required to supply the market from
those areas;
(c) The cost and probability of users or
consumers seeking other markets; and
(d) National, local or international restrictions
which limit access by users or consumers to
alternate sources of supply or the access of
suppliers to alternate consumers.
Section 25. Control of an Entity. – In determining
the control of an entity, the Commission may
consider the following:
Control is presumed to exist when the parent
owns directly or indirectly, through subsidiaries,
more than one half (1/2) of the voting power of
an entity, unless in exceptional circumstances,
it can clearly be demonstrated that such
ownership does not constitute control. Control
also exists even when an entity owns one half

(1/2) or less of the voting power of another entity
when:
(a) There is power over more than one half (1/2)
of the voting rights by virtue of an agreement
with investors;
(b) There is power to direct or govern the
financial and operating policies of the entity
under a statute or agreement;
(c) There is power to appoint or remove the
majority of the members of the board of
directors or equivalent governing body;
(d) There is power to cast the majority votes at
meetings of the board of directors or equivalent
governing body;
(e) There exists ownership over or the right to
use all or a significant part of the assets of the
entity;
(f) There exist rights or contracts which confer
decisive influence on the decisions of the entity.
Section 26. Determination of Anti-Competitive
Agreement or Conduct. – In determining
whether anti-competitive agreement or conduct
has been committed, the Commission shall:
(a) Define the relevant market allegedly affected
by the anti-competitive agreement or conduct,
following the principles laid out in Section 24 of
this Chapter;
(b) Determine if there is actual or potential
adverse impact on competition in the relevant
market caused by the alleged agreement or
conduct, and if such impact is substantial and
outweighs the actual or potential efficiency
gains that result from the agreement or conduct;
(c) Adopt a broad and forward-looking
perspective, recognizing future market
developments, any overriding need to make the
goods or services available to consumers, the
requirements of large investments in
infrastructure, the requirements of law, and the
need of our economy to respond to international
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 95
competition, but also taking account of past
behavior of the parties involved and prevailing
market conditions;
(d) Balance the need to ensure that competition
is not prevented or substantially restricted and
the risk that competition efficiency, productivity,
innovation, or development of priority areas or
industries in the general interest of the country
may be deterred by overzealous or undue
intervention; and
(e) Assess the totality of evidence on whether it
is more likely than not that the entity has
engaged in anti-competitive agreement or
conduct including whether the entity’s conduct
was done with a reasonable commercial
purpose such as but not limited to phasing out
of a product or closure of a business, or as a
reasonable commercial response to the market
entry or conduct of a competitor.
Section 27. Market Dominant Position. – In
determining whether an entity has market
dominant position for purposes of this Act, the
Commission shall consider the following:
(a) The share of the entity in the relevant market
and whether it is able to fix prices unilaterally or
to restrict supply in the relevant market;
(b) The existence of barriers to entry and the
elements which could foreseeably alter both
said barriers and the supply from competitors;
(c) The existence and power of its competitors;
(d) The possibility of access by its competitors
or other entities to its sources of inputs;
(e) The power of its customers to switch to other
goods or services;
(f) Its recent conducts; and
(g) Other criteria established by the regulations
of this Act.
There shall be a rebuttable presumption of
market dominant position if the market share of

an entity in the relevant market is at least fifty
percent (50%), unless a new market share
threshold is determined by the Commission for
that particular sector.
The Commission shall from time to time
determine and publish the threshold for
dominant position or minimum level of share in
the relevant market that could give rise to a
presumption of dominant position. In such
determination, the Commission would consider
the structure of the relevant market, degree of
integration, access to end-users, technology
and financial resources, and other factors
affecting the control of a market, as provided in
subsections (a) to (g) of this section.
The Commission shall not consider the
acquiring, maintaining and increasing of market
share through legitimate means not
substantially preventing, restricting, or
lessening competition in the market such as but
not limited to having superior skills, rendering
superior service, producing or distributing
quality products, having business acumen, and
the enjoyment and use of protected intellectual
property rights as violative of this Act.
Section 28. Forbearance. – The Commission
may forbear from applying the provisions of this
Act, for a limited time, in whole or in part, in all
or specific cases, on an entity or group of
entities, if in its determination:
(a) Enforcement is not necessary to the
attainment of the policy objectives of this Act;
(b) Forbearance will neither impede competition
in the market where the entity or group of
entities seeking exemption operates nor in
related markets; and
(c) Forbearance is consistent with public interest
and the benefit and welfare of the consumers.
A public hearing shall be held to assist the
Commission in making this determination.
The Commission’s order exempting the relevant
entity or group of entities under this section shall
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 96
be made public. Conditions may be attached to
the forbearance if the Commission deems it
appropriate to ensure the long-term interest of
consumers.
In the event that the basis for the issuance of the
exemption order ceases to be valid, the order
may be withdrawn by the Commission.
CHAPTER VI
FINES AND PENALTIES
Section 29. Administrative Penalties. –
(a) Administrative Fines. – In any investigation
under Chapter III, Sections 14 and 15, and
Chapter IV, Sections 17 and 20 of this Act, after
due notice and hearing, the Commission may
impose the following schedule of administrative
fines on any entity found to have violated the
said sections:
First offense: Fine of up to one hundred million
pesos (P100,000,000.00);
Second offense: Fine of not less than one
hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) but
not more than two hundred fifty million pesos
(P250,000,000.00).
In fixing the amount of the fine, the Commission
shall have regard to both the gravity and the
duration of the violation.
(b) Failure to Comply With an Order of the
Commission. – An entity which fails or refuses
to comply with a ruling, order or decision issued
by the Commission shall pay a penalty of not
less than fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) up
to two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) for each
violation and a similar amount of penalty for
each day thereafter until the said entity fully
complies. Provided that these fines shall only
accrue daily beginning forty-five (45) days from
the time that the said decision, order or ruling
was received.
(c) Supply of Incorrect or Misleading
Information. – The Commission may likewise
impose upon any entity fines of up to one million

pesos (PI,000,000.00) where, intentionally or
negligently, they supply incorrect or misleading
information in any document, application or
other paper filed with or submitted to the
Commission or supply incorrect or misleading
information in an application for a binding ruling,
a proposal for a consent judgment, proceedings
relating to a show cause order, or application for
modification of the Commission’s ruling, order or
approval, as the case may be.
(d) Any other violations not specifically
penalized under the relevant provisions of this
Act shall be penalized by a fine of not less than
fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) up to two
million pesos (P2,000,000.00).
Provided that the schedule of fines indicated in
this section shall be increased by the
Commission every five (5) years to maintain
their real value from the time it was set.
Section 30. Criminal Penalties. – An entity that
enters into any anti-competitive agreement as
covered by Chapter III, Section 14(a) and 14(b)
under this Act shall, for each and every violation,
be penalized by imprisonment from two (2) to
seven (7) years, and a fine of not less than fifty
million pesos (P50,000,000.00) but not more
than two hundred fifty million pesos
(P250,000,000.00). The penalty of
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the
responsible officers, and directors of the entity.
When the entities involved are juridical persons,
the penalty of. imprisonment shall be imposed
on its officers, directors, or employees holding
managerial positions, who are knowingly and
willfully responsible for such violation.
CHAPTER VII
ENFORCEMENT
Section 31. Fact Finding; Preliminary Inquiry. –
The Commission, motu proprio, or upon the
filing of a verified complaint by an interested
party or upon referral by a regulatory agency,
shall have the sole and exclusive authority to
initiate and conduct a fact-finding or preliminary
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 97
inquiry for the enforcement of this Act based on
reasonable grounds.
The Commission, after considering the
statements made, or documents or articles
produced in the course of the fact-finding or
preliminary inquiry, shall terminate the same by:
(a) Issuing a resolution ordering its closure if no
violation or infringement of this Act is found; or
(b) Issuing a resolution to proceed, on the basis
of reasonable grounds, to the conduct of a full
administrative investigation.
The Commission, after due notice and hearing,
and on the basis of facts and evidence
presented, may issue an order for the temporary
cessation or desistance from the performance of
certain acts by the respondent entity, the
continued performance of which would result in
a material and adverse effect on consumers or
competition in the relevant market.
If the evidence so warrants, the Commission
may file before the DOJ criminal complaints for
violations of this Act or relevant laws for
preliminary investigation and prosecution before
the proper court. The DOJ shall conduct such
preliminary investigation in accordance with the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The preliminary inquiry shall, in all cases, be
completed by the Commission within ninety (90)
days from submission of the verified complaint,
referral, or date of initiation by the Commission,
motu proprio, of the same.
Except as provided in Section 12(i) of Chapter II
of this Act, no law enforcement agency shall
conduct any kind of fact-finding, inquiry or
investigation into any competition-related
matters.
Section 32. Relationship With Sector
Regulators. – The Commission shall have
original and primary jurisdiction in the
enforcement and regulation of all competition-
related issues.

The Commission shall still have jurisdiction if the
issue involves both competition and
noncompetition issues, but the concerned
sector regulator shall be consulted and afforded
reasonable opportunity to submit its own opinion
and recommendation on the matter before the
Commission makes a decision on any case.
Where appropriate, the Commission and the
sector regulators shall work together to issue
rules and regulations to promote competition,
protect consumers, and prevent abuse of
market power by dominant players within their
respective sectors.
Section 33. Power to Investigate and Enforce
Orders and Resolutions. – The Commission
shall conduct inquiries by administering oaths,
issuing subpoena duces tecum and summoning
witnesses, and commissioning consultants or
experts. It shall determine if any provision of this
Act has been violated, enforce its orders and
carry out its resolutions by making use of any
available means, provisional or otherwise,
under existing laws and procedures including
the power to punish for contempt and to impose
fines.
Section 34. Confidentiality of Information. –
Confidential business information submitted by
entities, relevant to any inquiry or investigation
being conducted pursuant to this Act as well as
any deliberation in relation thereto, shall not, in
any manner, be directly or indirectly disclosed,
published, transferred, copied, or disseminated.
Likewise, the Commission shall, to the extent
possible, subject such information to the
confidentiality rule provided under this section
when it issues notices, bulletins, rulings and
other documents: Pi’ovided., That the
confidentiality rule shall not apply if the notifying
entity consents to the disclosure, or the
document or information is mandatorily required
to be disclosed by law or by a valid order of a
court of competent jurisdiction or of a
government or regulatory agency, including an
exchange. The identity of the persons who
provide information to the Commission under
condition of anonymity, shall remain
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 98
confidential, unless such confidentiality is
expressly waived by these persons.
Any violation of this provision shall be imposed
a fine of not less than one million pesos
(PI,000,000.00) but not more than five million
pesos (P5,000,000.00).
Section 35. Leniency Program. – The
Commission shall develop a Leniency Program
to be granted to any entity in the form of
immunity from suit or reduction of any fine which
would otherwise be imposed on a participant in
an anti-competitive agreement as provided in
Section 14(a) and 14(b) of this Act in exchange
for the voluntary disclosure of information
regarding such an agreement which satisfies
specific criteria prior to or during the fact-finding
or preliminary inquiry stage of the case.
Immunity from suit will be granted to an entity
reporting illegal anti-competitive activity before
a fact-finding or preliminary inquiry has begun if
the following conditions are met:
(a) At the time the entity comes forward, the
Commission has not received information about
the activity from any other source;
(b) Upon the entity’s discovery of illegal activity,
it took prompt and effective action to terminate
its participation therein;
(c) The entity reports the wrongdoing with
candor and completeness and provides full,
continuing, and complete cooperation
throughout the investigation; and
(d) The entity did not coerce another party to
participate in the activity and clearly was not the
leader in, or the originator of, the activity.
Even after the Commission has received
information about the illegal activity after a fact-
finding or preliminary inquiry has commenced,
the reporting entity will be granted leniency,
provided preceding conditions (b) and (c) and
the following additional requirements are
complied with:

(1) The entity is the first to come forward and
qualify for leniency;
(2) At the time the entity comes forward, the
Commission does not have evidence against
the entity that is likely to result in a sustainable
conviction; and
(3) The Commission determines that granting
leniency would not be unfair to others.
Such program shall include the immunity from
any suit or charge of affected parties and third
parties, exemption, waiver, or gradation of fines
and/or penalties giving precedence to the entity
submitting such evidence. An entity cooperating
or furnishing information, document or data to
the Commission in connection to an
investigation being conducted shall not be
subjected to any form of reprisal or
discrimination. Such reprisal or discrimination
shall be considered a violation of this Act subject
to the sanctions provided in this Act.
Nothing in this section shall preclude
prosecution for entities that report to the
Commission false, misleading, or malicious
information, data or documents damaging to the
business or integrity of the entities under inquiry
as a violation of said section. An entity found to
have reported false, misleading or malicious
information, data, or document may be
penalized by a fine not less than the penalty
imposed in the section reported to have been
violated by the entity complained of.
The DOJ-OFC may likewise grant leniency or
immunity as provided in this section in the event
that there is already a preliminary investigation
pending before it.
Section 36. Nolo Contendere. – An entity
charged in a criminal proceeding pursuant to
Section 14(a) and 14(b) of this Act may enter a
plea of Nolo Contendere, in which he does not
accept nor deny responsibility for the charges
but agrees to accept punishment as if he had
pleaded guilty. The plea cannot be used against
the defendant entity to prove liability in a civil suit
arising from the criminal action nor in another
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 99
cause of action: Provided, That a plea of Nolo
Contendere may be entered only up to
arraignment and subsequently, only with the
permission of the court which shall accept it only
after weighing its effect on the parties, the public
and the administration of justice.
Section 37. Non-Adversarial Remedies. — As
an implementing and enforcement policy, the
Commission shall, under such rules and
regulations it may prescribe, encourage
voluntary compliance with this Act and other
competition laws by making available to the
parties concerned the following and other
analogous non-adversarial administrative
remedies, before the institution of
administrative, civil or criminal action:
(a) Binding Ruling. — Where no prior complaint
or investigation has been initiated, any entity
that is in doubt as to whether a contemplated
act, course of conduct, agreement, or decision,
is in compliance with, is exempt from, or is in
violation of any of the provisions of this Act,
other competition laws, or implementing rules
and regulations thereof, may request the
Commission, in writing, to render a binding
ruling thereon: Provided, That the ruling is for a
specified period, subject to extension as may be
determined by the Commission, and based on
substantial evidence.
In the event of an adverse binding ruling on an
act, course or conduct, agreement, or decision,
the applicant shall be provided with a
reasonable period, which in no case shall be
more than ninety (90) days, to abide by the
ruling of the Commission and shall not be
subject to administrative, civil, or criminal action
unless the applicant fails to comply with the
provisions of this Act;
(b) Show Cause Order. — Upon preliminary
findings motu proprio or on written complaint
under oath by an interested party that any entity
is conducting its business, in whole or in part in
a manner that may not be in accord with the
provisions of this Act or other competition laws,
and it finds that the issuance of a show cause
order would be in the interest of the public, the

Commission shall issue and serve upon such
entity or entities a written description of its
business conduct complained of, a statement of
the facts, data, and information together with a
summary of the evidence thereof, with an order
requiring the said entity or entities to show
cause, within the period therein fixed, why no
order shall issue requiring such person or
persons to cease and desist from continuing
with its identified business conduct, or pay the
administrative fine therein specified, or readjust
its business conduct or practices;
(c) Consent Order. – At any time prior to the
conclusion by the Commission of its inquiry, any
entity under inquiry may, without in any manner
admitting a violation of this Act or any other
competition laws, submit to the Commission a
written proposal for the entry of a consent order,
specifying therein the terms and conditions of
the proposed consent order which shall include
among others the following:
(1) The payment of an amount within the range
of fines provided for under this Act;
(2) The required compliance report as well as an
entity to submit regular compliance reports;
(3) Payment of damages to any private
party/parties who may have suffered injury; and
(4) Other terms and conditions that the
Commission deems appropriate and necessary
for the effective enforcement of this Act or other
Competition Laws:
Provided, That a consent order shall not bar any
inquiry for the same or similar acts if continued
or repeated;
(d) Monitoring of Compliance. – The
Commission shall monitor the compliance by
the entity or entities concerned, their officers,
and employees, with the final and executory
binding ruling, cease and desist order, or
approval of a consent judgment. Upon motion of
an interested party/parties, the Commission
shall issue a certification or resolution to the
effect that the entity or entities concerned have,
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 100
or have not, as the case may be, complied with
a final and executory ruling, order, or approval.
(e) Inadmissibility of Evidence in Criminal
Proceedings. – The request for a binding ruling,
the show cause order, or the proposal for
consent order; the facts, data, and information
therein contained or subsequently supplied by
the entity or entities concerned; admissions, oral
or written, made by them against their interest;
all other documents filed by them, including their
evidence presented in the proceedings before
the Commission; and the judgment or order
rendered thereon; shall not be admissible as
evidence in any criminal proceedings arising
from the same act subject of the binding ruling,
show cause order or consent order against such
entity or entities, their officers, employees, and
agents.
Section 38. Contempt. — The Commission may
summarily punish for contempt by imprisonment
not exceeding thirty (30) days or by a fine not
exceeding one hundred thousand pesos (P
100,000.00), or both, any entity guilty of such
misconduct in the presence of the Commission
in its vicinity as to seriously interrupt any
hearing, session or any proceeding before it,
including cases in which an entity willfully fails
or refuses, without just cause, to comply with a
summons, subpoena or subpoena duces tecum
legally issued by the Commission being present
at a hearing, proceeding, session or
investigation, refused to be sworn as a witness
or to answer questions or to furnish information
when lawfully required to do so.
Section 39. Appeals of the Decisions of the
Commission. – Decisions of the Commission
shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals in
accordance with the Rules of Court. The appeal
shall not stay the order, ruling or decision sought
to be reviewed, unless the Court of Appeals
shall direct otherwise upon such terms and
conditions it may deem just. In the appeal, the
Commission shall be included as a party
respondent to the case.
Section 40. ‘Writ of Execution. – Upon the
finality of its binding ruling, order, resolution,

decision, judgment, or rule or regulation,
collectively, the Commission may issue a writ of
execution to enforce its decision and the
payment of the administrative fines provided in
the preceding sections.
Section 41. Basic Necessities and Prime
Commodities. – If the violation involves the
trade or movement of basic necessities and
prime commodities as defined by Republic Act
No. 7581, as amended, the fine imposed by the
Commission or the courts, as the case may be,
shall be tripled.
Section 42. Immunity from Suit. – The
Chairperson,the Commissioners, officers,
employees and agents of the Commission shall
not be subject to any action, claim or demand in
connection with any act done or omitted by them
in the performance of their duties and exercise
of their powers except for those actions and
omissions done in evident bad faith or gross
negligence.
Section 43. Indemnity. – Unless the actions of
the Commission or its Chairperson, any of its
Commissioners, officers, employees and
agents are found to be in willful violation of this
Act, performed with evident bad faith or gross
negligence, the Commission, its Chairperson,
Commissioners, officers, employees and
agents are held free and harmless to the fullest
extent permitted by law from any liability, and
they shall be indemnified for any and all
liabilities, losses, claims, demands, damages,
deficiencies, costs and expenses of whatsoever
kind and nature that may arise in connection
with the exercise of their powers and
performance of their duties and functions.
The Commission shall underwrite or advance
litigation costs and expenses, including legal
fees and other expenses of external counsel, or
provide legal assistance to its Chairperson,
Commissioners, officers, employees, or agents
in connection with any civil, criminal,
administrative or any other action or proceeding,
to which they are made a party by reason of, or
in connection with, the exercise of authority or
performance of duties and functions under this
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 101
Act: Provided, That such legal protection shall
not apply to any civil, criminal, administrative, or
any action or proceeding that may be initiated
by the Commission, against such Chairperson,
Commissioners, officers, employees, or agents:
Provided, further, That the Chairperson,
Commissioners, officers, employees, or agents,
who shall resign, retire, transfer to another
agency or be separated from the service, shall
continue to be provided with such legal
protection in connection with any act done or
omitted to be done by them in good faith during
their tenure or employment with the
Commission: Provided, finally, That in the event
of a settlement or compromise, indemnification
shall be provided only in connection with such
matters covered by the settlement as to which
the Commission is advised by counsel that the
persons to be indemnified did not commit any
negligence or misconduct.
The costs and expenses incurred in defending
the aforementioned action, suit or proceeding
may be paid by the Commission in advance of
the final disposition of such action, suit or
proceeding upon receipt of an undertaking by or
on behalf of the Chairperson, Commissioner,
officer, employee, or agent to repay the amount
advanced should it ultimately be determined by
the Commission that one is not entitled to be
indemnified as provided in this section.
Section 44. Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court. – The Regional Trial Court of the city or
province where the entity or any of the entities
whose business act or conduct Constitutes the
subject matter of a case, conducts its principal
place of business, shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the
penalties and fines herein imposed, of all
criminal and civil cases involving violations of
this Act and other competition-related laws. If
the defendant or anyone is charged in the
capacity of a director, officer, shareholder,
employee, or agent of a corporation or other
juridical entity who knowingly and willfully
authorized the commission of the offense
charged, the Regional Trial Court of the city or
province where such corporation or juridical

entity conducts its principal place of business,
shall have jurisdiction.
Section 45. Private Action. – Any person who
suffers direct injury by reason of any violation of
this Act may institute a separate and
independent civil action after the Commission
has completed the preliminary inquiry provided
under Section 31.
CHAPTER VIII
OTHER PROVISIONS
Section 46. Statute of Limitations. — Any action
arising from a violation of any provision of this
Act shall be forever barred unless commenced
within five (5) years from:
For criminal actions, the time the violation is
discovered by the offended party, the
authorities, or their agents; and
For administrative and civil actions, the time the
cause of action accrues.
Section 47. Prohibition on the Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Orders, Preliminary
Injunctions and Preliminary Mandatory
Injunctions. — Except for the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court, no other court shall
issue any temporary restraining order,
preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction against the Commission in the
exercise of its duties or functions: Provided,
That, this prohibition shall apply in all cases,
disputes or controversies instituted by a private
party, including, but not limited to, cases filed by
entities or those claiming to have rights through
such entities: Provided, however, That, this
prohibition shall not apply when the matter is of
extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that the non-issuance of a
temporary restraining order will result in grave
injustice and irreparable injury to the public:
Provided, further, That, the applicant shall file a
bond, in an amount to be fixed by the Court, but
in no case shall it exceed twenty percent (20%)
of the imposable fines provided for under
Chapter VI, Section 29 of this Act: Provided,
finally, That in the event that the court finally
decides that the applicant was not entitled to the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 102
relief applied for, the bond shall accrue in favor
of the Commission.
Any temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction
issued in violation of this section is void and of
no force and effect. Any judge who violates this
section shall be penalized by suspension of at
least one (1) year without pay in addition to other
criminal, civil or administrative penalties.
Section 48. Trade Associations. – Nothing
contained in this Act shall be construed to
prohibit the existence and operation of trade
associations organized to promote quality
standards and safety issues: Pi’ovided, That,
these associations shall not in any way be used
to justify any violation of this Act: Provided,
however, That it shall not be illegal to use the
association as a forum to discuss or promote
quality standards, efficiency, safety, security,
productivity, competitiveness and other matters
of common interest involving the industry:
Provided, further, That such is done without any
anti-competitive intent or effect.
Section 49. Congressional Oversight
Committee. – To oversee the implementation of
this Act, there shall be created a Congressional
Oversight Committee on Competition (COCC)
to be composed of the Chairpersons of the
Senate Committees on Trade and Commerce,
Economic Affairs, and Finance, the
Chairpersons of the House of Representatives
Committees on Economic Affairs, Trade and
Industry, and Appropriations and two (2)
members each from the Senate and the House
of Representatives who shall be designated by
the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives: Provided, That one
(1) of the two (2) Senators and one (1) of the two
(2) House Members shall be nominated by the
respective Minority Leaders of the Senate and
the House of Representatives. The
Congressional Oversight Committee shall be
jointly chaired by the Chairpersons of the
Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce
and the House of Representatives Committee
on Economic Affairs. The Vice Chairperson of
the Congressional Oversight Committee shall

be jointly held by the Chairpersons of the
Senate Committee on Economic Affairs and the
House of Representatives Committee on Trade
and Industry.
The Secretariat of the COCC shall be drawn
from the existing personnel of the Senate and
House of Representatives committees
comprising the Congressional Oversight
Committee.
CHAPTER IX
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 50. Implementing Rules and
Regulations. — Within one hundred eighty (180)
days from the effectivity of this Act, the
Commission, in consultation with the DOJ-OFC
and concerned sector regulators shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules
and regulations for the implementation of this
Act: Provided, That, the Commission may revise
such implementing rules and regulations as it
deems necessary: Provided, however, That
such revised implementing rules and
regulations shall only take effect fifteen (15)
days following its publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Section 51. Appropriations and Use of Fees,
Charges and Penalties. – The initial budgetary
requirements of the Commission of three
hundred million pesos (P300,000,000.00) is
hereby appropriated.
All fees, fines, penalties collected by the
Commission shall not be retained by the
Commission, but will be remitted to the National
Treasury and shall accrue to the general funds.
Such funds necessary for the continuous and
effective operation of the Commission shall be
included in the annual General Appropriations
Act.
Section 52. Transparency Clause. — Final
decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission
shall be published on the official website subject
to Section 34 of this Act.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 103
Records of public proceedings shall be made
available to the public subject to Section 34 of
this Act.1âwphi1
Section 53. Transitional Clause. — In order to
allow affected parties time to renegotiate
agreements or restructure their business to
comply with the provisions of this Act, an
existing business structure, conduct, practice or
any act that may be in violation of this Act shall
be subject to the administrative, civil and
criminal penalties prescribed herein only if it is
not cured or is continuing upon the expiration of
two (2) years after the effectivity of this Act:
Provided, That this section shall not apply to
administrative, civil and criminal proceedings
against anti-competitive agreement or conduct,
abuse of dominant position, and anti-
competitive mergers and acquisitions, initiated
prior to the entry into force of this Act: Provided,
further, That during the said two (2)-year period,
the government shall undertake an advocac
program to inform the general public of the
provisions of this Act.
Section 54. Separability Clause. – If any clause,
sentence, section or part of this Act shall be
adjudged by a court of competent jurisdiction to
be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair
or invalidate the remainder of this Act, but shall
be confined in its operation to the clause,
sentence, paragraph, section, or part thereof
directly involved in the controversy.
Section 55. Repealing Clause. – The following
laws, and all other laws, decrees, executive
orders and regulations, or part or parts thereof
inconsistent with any provision of this Act, are
hereby repealed, amended or otherwise
modified accordingly:
(a) Article 186 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known
as the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That
violations of Article 186 of the Revised Penal
Code committed before the effectivity of this Act
may continue to be prosecuted unless the same
have been barred by prescription, and subject to
the procedure under Section 31 of this Act;
(b) Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 138;
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 104

(c) Section 43(u) on Functions of the ERC of

Republic Act No. 9136, entitled "An Act
Ordaining Reforms in the Electric Power
Industry, Amending for the Purpose Certain
Laws and for Other Purposes", otherwise known
as the "Electric Power Industry Reform Act
of2001", insofar as the provision thereof is
inconsistent with this Act;

(d) Section 24 on Illegal Acts of Price

Manipulation and Section 25 on Penalty for
Illegal Acts of Price Manipulation of Republic Act
No. 9502, entitled "An Act Providing for Cheaper
and Quality Medicines, Amending for the
Purpose Republic Act No. 8293 or the
Intellectual Property Code, Republic Act No.
6675 or the Generics Act of 1988, and Republic
Act No. 5921 or the Pharmacy Law, and for
Other Purposes", otherwise known as the
"Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quabrty
Medicines Act of 2008". insofar as the
provisions thereof are inconsistent with this Act;
and

(e) Executive Order No. 45, Series of 2011,

Designating the Department of Justice as the
Competition Authority, Department of Justice
Circular 005 Series of 2015, and other related
issuances, insofar as they are inconsistent with
the provisions of this Act.

Section 56.Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall

take effect fifteen (15) days following its
publication in the Official Gazette or at least two
(2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Notwithstanding any provision herein, this Act
shall have no retroactive effect.
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 105

Republic Act No. 8293 June 6, 1997 repression of unfair competition, to which the
Philippines is also a party, or extends reciprocal
AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE INTELLECTUAL rights to nationals of the Philippines by law, shall
PROPERTY CODE AND ESTABLISHING THE be entitled to benefits to the extent necessary to
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, give effect to any provision of such convention,
PROVIDING FOR ITS POWERS AND treaty or reciprocal law, in addition to the rights
FUNCTIONS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES to which any owner of an intellectual property
right is otherwise entitled by this Act. (n)
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress Section 4. Definitions. - 4.1. The term
assembled:: "intellectual property rights" consists of:

PART I a) Copyright and Related Rights;

THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE
b) Trademarks and Service Marks;
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the
"Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines." c) Geographic Indications;

Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The d) Industrial Designs;

State recognizes that an effective intellectual
and industrial property system is vital to the e) Patents;
development of domestic and creative activity,
facilitates transfer of technology, attracts foreign f) Layout-Designs (Topographies) of
investments, and ensures market access for our Integrated Circuits; and
products. It shall protect and secure the
exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists g) Protection of Undisclosed Information (n,
and other gifted citizens to their intellectual TRIPS).
property and creations, particularly when
beneficial to the people, for such periods as 4.2. The term "technology transfer
provided in this Act. arrangements" refers to contracts or
agreements involving the transfer of systematic
The use of intellectual property bears a social knowledge for the manufacture of a product, the
function. To this end, the State shall promote the application of a process, or rendering of a
diffusion of knowledge and information for the service including management contracts; and
promotion of national development and the transfer, assignment or licensing of all forms
progress and the common good. of intellectual property rights, including licensing
of computer software except computer software
It is also the policy of the State to streamline developed for mass market.
administrative procedures of registering
patents, trademarks and copyright, to liberalize 4.3. The term "Office" refers to the Intellectual
the registration on the transfer of technology, Property Office created by this Act.
and to enhance the enforcement of intellectual
property rights in the Philippines. (n) 4.4. The term "IPO Gazette" refers to the
gazette published by the Office under this Act.
Section 3. International Conventions and (n)
Reciprocity. - Any person who is a national or
who is domiciled or has a real and effective Section 5. Functions of the Intellectual Property
industrial establishment in a country which is a Office (IPO). - 5.1. To administer and implement
party to any convention, treaty or agreement the State policies declared in this Act, there is
relating to intellectual property rights or the

hereby created the Intellectual Property Office
(IPO) which shall have the following functions:
a) Examine applications for grant of letters
patent for inventions and register utility models
and industrial designs;
b) Examine applications for the registration
of marks, geographic indication, integrated
circuits;
c) Register technology transfer
arrangements and settle disputes involving
technology transfer payments covered by the
provisions of Part II, Chapter IX on Voluntary
Licensing and develop and implement
strategies to promote and facilitate technology
transfer;
d) Promote the use of patent information as
a tool for technology development;
e) Publish regularly in its own publication
the patents, marks, utility models and industrial
designs, issued and approved, and the
technology transfer arrangements registered;
f) Administratively adjudicate contested
proceedings affecting intellectual property
rights; and
g) Coordinate with other government
agencies and the private sector efforts to
formulate and implement plans and policies to
strengthen the protection of intellectual property
rights in the country.
5.2. The Office shall have custody of all
records, books, drawings, specifications,
documents, and other papers and things
relating to intellectual property rights
applications filed with the Office. (n)
Section 6. The Organizational Structure of the
IPO. - 6.1. The Office shall be headed by a
Director General who shall be assisted by two
(2) Deputies Director General.
6.2. The Office shall be divided into six (6)
Bureaus, each of which shall be headed by a
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 106
Director and assisted by an Assistant Director.
These Bureaus are:
a) The Bureau of Patents;
b) The Bureau of Trademarks;
c) The Bureau of Legal Affairs;
d) The Documentation, Information and
Technology Transfer Bureau;
e) The Management Information System
and EDP Bureau; and
f) The Administrative, Financial and
Personnel Services Bureau.
6.3. The Director General, Deputies Director
General, Directors and Assistant Directors shall
be appointed by the President, and the other
officers and employees of the Office by the
Secretary of Trade and Industry, conformably
with and under the Civil Service Law. (n)
Section 7. The Director General and Deputies
Director General. - 7.1. Functions. - The Director
General shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
a) Manage and direct all functions and
activities of the Office, including the
promulgation of rules and regulations to
implement the objectives, policies, plans,
programs and projects of the Office: Provided,
That in the exercise of the authority to propose
policies and standards in relation to the
following: (1) the effective, efficient, and
economical operations of the Office requiring
statutory enactment; (2) coordination with other
agencies of government in relation to the
enforcement of intellectual property rights; (3)
the recognition of attorneys, agents, or other
persons representing applicants or other parties
before the Office; and (4) the establishment of
fees for the filing and processing of an
application for a patent, utility model or industrial
design or mark or a collective mark, geographic
indication and other marks of ownership, and for
all other services performed and materials

furnished by the Office, the Director General
shall be subject to the supervision of the
Secretary of Trade and Industry;
b) Exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over all decisions rendered by the Director of
Legal Affairs, the Director of Patents, the
Director of Trademarks, and the Director of the
Documentation, Information and Technology
Transfer Bureau. The decisions of the Director
General in the exercise of his appellate
jurisdiction in respect of the decisions of the
Director of Patents, and the Director of
Trademarks shall be appealable to the Court of
Appeals in accordance with the Rules of Court;
and those in respect of the decisions of the
Director of Documentation, Information and
Technology Transfer Bureau shall be
appealable to the Secretary of Trade and
Industry; and
c) Exercise original jurisdiction to resolve
disputes relating to the terms of a license
involving the author's right to public
performance or other communication of his
work. The decisions of the Director General in
these cases shall be appealable to the
Secretary of Trade and Industry.
7.2. Qualifications. - The Director General
and the Deputies Director General must be
natural born citizens of the Philippines, at least
thirty-five (35) years of age on the day of their
appointment, holders of a college degree, and
of proven competence, integrity, probity and
independence: Provided, That the Director
General and at least one (1) Deputy Director
General shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten (10) years: Provided further, That in the
selection of the Director General and the
Deputies Director General, consideration shall
be given to such qualifications as would result,
as far as practicable, in the balanced
representation in the Directorate General of the
various fields of intellectual property.
7.3. Term of Office. - The Director General
and the Deputies Director General shall be
appointed by the President for a term of five (5)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 107
years and shall be eligible for reappointment
only once: Provided, That the first Director
General shall have a first term of seven (7)
years. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor.
7.4. The Office of the Director General. - The
Office of the Director General shall consist of the
Director General and the Deputies Director
General, their immediate staff and such Offices
and Services that the Director General will set
up to support directly the Office of the Director
General. (n)
Section 8. The Bureau of Patents. - The Bureau
of Patents shall have the following functions:
8.1. Search and examination of patent
applications and the grant of patents;
8.2. Registration of utility models, industrial
designs, and integrated circuits; and
8.3. Conduct studies and researches in the
field of patents in order to assist the Director
General in formulating policies on the
administration and examination of patents. (n)
Section 9. The Bureau of Trademarks. - The
Bureau of Trademarks shall have the following
functions:
9.1. Search and examination of the
applications for the registration of marks,
geographic indications and other marks of
ownership and the issuance of the certificates of
registration; and
9.2. Conduct studies and researches in the
field of trademarks in order to assist the Director
General in formulating policies on the
administration and examination of trademarks.
(n)
Section 10. The Bureau of Legal Affairs. - The
Bureau of Legal Affairs shall have the following
functions:
10.1. Hear and decide opposition to the
application for registration of marks;

cancellation of trademarks; subject to the
provisions of Section 64, cancellation of patents,
utility models, and industrial designs; and
petitions for compulsory licensing of patents;
10.2. (a) Exercise original jurisdiction in
administrative complaints for violations of laws
involving intellectual property rights: Provided,
That its jurisdiction is limited to complaints
where the total damages claimed are not less
than Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000):
Provided further, That availment of the
provisional remedies may be granted in
accordance with the Rules of Court. The
Director of Legal Affairs shall have the power to
hold and punish for contempt all those who
disregard orders or writs issued in the course of
the proceedings. (n)
(b) After formal investigation, the Director for
Legal Affairs may impose one (1) or more of the
following administrative penalties:
(i) The issuance of a cease and desist order
which shall specify the acts that the respondent
shall cease and desist from and shall require
him to submit a compliance report within a
reasonable time which shall be fixed in the
order;
(ii) The acceptance of a voluntary assurance
of compliance or discontinuance as may be
imposed. Such voluntary assurance may
include one or more of the following:
(1) An assurance to comply with the
provisions of the intellectual property law
violated;
(2) An assurance to refrain from engaging in
unlawful and unfair acts and practices subject of
the formal investigation;
(3) An assurance to recall, replace, repair, or
refund the money value of defective goods
distributed in commerce; and
(4) An assurance to reimburse the
complainant the expenses and costs incurred in
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 108
prosecuting the case in the Bureau of Legal
Affairs.
The Director of Legal Affairs may also require
the respondent to submit periodic compliance
reports and file a bond to guarantee compliance
of his undertaking;
(iii) The condemnation or seizure of products
which are subject of the offense. The goods
seized hereunder shall be disposed of in such
manner as may be deemed appropriate by the
Director of Legal Affairs, such as by sale,
donation to distressed local governments or to
charitable or relief institutions, exportation,
recycling into other goods, or any combination
thereof, under such guidelines as he may
provide;
(iv) The forfeiture of paraphernalia and all
real and personal properties which have been
used in the commission of the offense;
(v) The imposition of administrative fines in
such amount as deemed reasonable by the
Director of Legal Affairs, which shall in no case
be less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) nor
more than One hundred fifty thousand pesos
(P150,000). In addition, an additional fine of not
more than One thousand pesos (P1,000) shall
be imposed for each day of continuing violation;
(vi) The cancellation of any permit, license,
authority, or registration which may have been
granted by the Office, or the suspension of the
validity thereof for such period of time as the
Director of Legal Affairs may deem reasonable
which shall not exceed one (1) year;
(vii) The withholding of any permit, license,
authority, or registration which is being secured
by the respondent from the Office;
(viii) The assessment of damages;
(ix) Censure; and
(x) Other analogous penalties or sanctions.
(Secs. 6, 7, 8, and 9, Executive Order No. 913
[1983]a)

10.3. The Director General may by Regulations
establish the procedure to govern the
implementation of this Section. (n)
Section 11. The Documentation, Information
and Technology Transfer Bureau. - The
Documentation, Information and Technology
Transfer Bureau shall have the following
functions:
11.1. Support the search and examination
activities of the Office through the following
activities:
(a) Maintain and upkeep classification
systems whether they be national or
international such as the International Patent
Classification (IPC) system;
(b) Provide advisory services for the
determination of search patterns;
(c) Maintain search files and search rooms
and reference libraries; and
(d) Adapt and package industrial property
information.
11.2. Establish networks or intermediaries or
regional representatives;
11.3. Educate the public and build awareness
on intellectual property through the conduct of
seminars and lectures, and other similar
activities;
11.4. Establish working relations with research
and development institutions as well as with
local and international intellectual property
professional groups and the like;
11.5. Perform state-of-the-art searches;
11.6. Promote the use of patent information as
an effective tool to facilitate the development of
technology in the country;
11.7. Provide technical, advisory, and other
services relating to the licensing and promotion
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 109
of technology, and carry out an efficient and
effective program for technology transfer; and
11.8. Register technology transfer
arrangements, and settle disputes involving
technology transfer payments. (n)
Section 12. The Management Information
Services and EDP Bureau. - The Management
Information Services and EDP Bureau shall:
12.1. Conduct automation planning, research
and development, testing of systems, contracts
with firms, contracting, purchase and
maintenance of equipment, design and
maintenance of systems, user consultation, and
the like; and
12.2. Provide management information support
and service to the Office. (n)
Section 13. The Administrative, Financial and
Human Resource Development Service
Bureau. - 13.1. The Administrative Service shall:
(a) Provide services relative to procurement and
allocation of supplies and equipment,
transportation, messengerial work, cashiering,
payment of salaries and other Office's
obligations, office maintenance, proper safety
and security, and other utility services; and
comply with government regulatory
requirements in the areas of performance
appraisal, compensation and benefits,
employment records and reports;
(b) Receive all applications filed with the
Office and collect fees therefor, and
(c) Publish patent applications and grants,
trademark applications, and registration of
marks, industrial designs, utility models,
geographic indication, and lay-out-designs of
integrated circuits registrations.
13.2. The Patent and Trademark Administration
Services shall perform the following functions
among others:

(a) Maintain registers of assignments,
mergings, licenses, and bibliographic on patents
and trademarks;
(b) Collect maintenance fees, issue certified
copies of documents in its custody and perform
similar other activities; and
(c) Hold in custody all the applications filed
with the office, and all patent grants, certificate
of registrations issued by the office, and the like.
13.3. The Financial Service shall formulate and
manage a financial program to ensure
availability and proper utilization of funds;
provide for an effective monitoring system of the
financial operations of the Office; and
13.4. The Human Resource Development
Service shall design and implement human
resource development plans and programs for
the personnel of the Office; provide for present
and future manpower needs of the organization;
maintain high morale and favorable employee
attitudes towards the organization through the
continuing design and implementation of
employee development programs. (n)
Section 14. Use of Intellectual Property Rights
Fees by the IPO. - 14.1. For a more effective
and expeditious implementation of this Act, the
Director General shall be authorized to retain,
without need of a separate approval from any
government agency, and subject only to the
existing accounting and auditing rules and
regulations, all the fees, fines, royalties and
other charges, collected by the Office under this
Act and the other laws that the Office will be
mandated to administer, for use in its
operations, like upgrading of its facilities,
equipment outlay, human resource
development, and the acquisition of the
appropriate office space, among others, to
improve the delivery of its services to the public.
This amount, which shall be in addition to the
Office's annual budget, shall be deposited and
maintained in a separate account or fund, which
may be used or disbursed directly by the
Director General.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 110
14.2. After five (5) years from the coming into
force of this Act, the Director General shall,
subject to the approval of the Secretary of Trade
and Industry, determine if the fees and charges
mentioned in Subsection 14.1 hereof that the
Office shall collect are sufficient to meet its
budgetary requirements. If so, it shall retain all
the fees and charges it shall collect under the
same conditions indicated in said Subsection
14.1 but shall forthwith, cease to receive any
funds from the annual budget of the National
Government; if not, the provisions of said
Subsection 14.1 shall continue to apply until
such time when the Director General, subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Trade and
Industry, certifies that the above-stated fees and
charges the Office shall collect are enough to
fund its operations. (n)
Section 15. Special Technical and Scientific
Assistance. - The Director General is
empowered to obtain the assistance of
technical, scientific or other qualified officers
and employees of other departments, bureaus,
offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the
Government, including corporations owned,
controlled or operated by the Government,
when deemed necessary in the consideration of
any matter submitted to the Office relative to the
enforcement of the provisions of this Act. (Sec.
3, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 16. Seal of Office. - The Office shall
have a seal, the form and design of which shall
be approved by the Director General. (Sec. 4,
R.A. No. 165a)
Section 17. Publication of Laws and
Regulations. - The Director General shall cause
to be printed and make available for distribution,
pamphlet copies of this Act, other pertinent
laws, executive orders and information circulars
relating to matters within the jurisdiction of the
Office. (Sec. 5, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 18. The IPO Gazette. - All matters
required to be published under this Act shall be
published in the Office's own publication to be
known as the IPO Gazette. (n)

Section 19. Disqualification of Officers and
Employees of the Office. - All officers and
employees of the Office shall not apply or act as
an attorney or patent agent of an application for
a grant of patent, for the registration of a utility
model, industrial design or mark nor acquire,
except by hereditary succession, any patent or
utility model, design registration, or mark or any
right, title or interest therein during their
employment and for one (1) year thereafter.
(Sec. 77, R.A. No. 165a)
PART II
THE LAW ON PATENTS
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 20. Definition of Terms Used in Part II,
The Law on Patents. - As used in Part II, the
following terms shall have the following
meanings:
20.1. "Bureau" means the Bureau of Patents,
20.2. "Director" means the Director of Patents;
20.3. "Regulations" means the Rules of Practice
in Patent Cases formulated by the Director of
Patents and promulgated by the Director
General;
20.4. "Examiner" means the patent examiner;
20.5. "Patent application" or "application"
means an application for a patent for an
invention except in Chapters XII and XIII, where
"application" means an application for a utility
model and an industrial design, respectively;
and
20.6. "Priority date" means the date of filing of
the foreign application for the same invention
referred to in Section 31 of this Act. (n)
CHAPTER II
PATENTABILITY
Section 21. Patentable Inventions. - Any
technical solution of a problem in any field of
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 111
human activity which is new, involves an
inventive step and is industrially applicable shall
be Patentable. It may be, or may relate to, a
product, or process, or an improvement of any
of the foregoing. (Sec. 7, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 22. Non-Patentable Inventions. - The
following shall be excluded from patent
protection:
22.1. Discoveries, scientific theories and
mathematical methods;
22.2. Schemes, rules and methods of
performing mental acts, playing games or doing
business, and programs for computers;
22.3. Methods for treatment of the human or
animal body by surgery or therapy and
diagnostic methods practiced on the human or
animal body. This provision shall not apply to
products and composition for use in any of these
methods;
22.4. Plant varieties or animal breeds or
essentially biological process for the production
of plants or animals. This provision shall not
apply to micro-organisms and non-biological
and microbiological processes.
Provisions under this subsection shall not
preclude Congress to consider the enactment of
a law providing sui generis protection of plant
varieties and animal breeds and a system of
community intellectual rights protection:
22.5. Aesthetic creations; and
22.6. Anything which is contrary to public order
or morality. (Sec. 8, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 23. Novelty. . - An invention shall not be
considered new if it forms part of a prior art.
(Sec. 9, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 24. Prior Art. - Prior art shall consist of:
24.1. Everything which has been made
available to the public anywhere in the world,

before the filing date or the priority date of the
application claiming the invention; and
24.2. The whole contents of an application for a
patent, utility model, or industrial design
registration, published in accordance with this
Act, filed or effective in the Philippines, with a
filing or priority date that is earlier than the filing
or priority date of the application: Provided, That
the application which has validly claimed the
filing date of an earlier application under Section
31 of this Act, shall be prior art with effect as of
the filing date of such earlier application:
Provided further, That the applicant or the
inventor identified in both applications are not
one and the same. (Sec. 9, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 25. Non-Prejudicial Disclosure. . - 25.1.
The disclosure of information contained in the
application during the twelve (12) months
preceding the filing date or the priority date of
the application shall not prejudice the applicant
on the ground of lack of novelty if such
disclosure was made by:
(a) The inventor;
(b) A patent office and the information was
contained (a) in another application filed by the
inventor and should not have been disclosed by
the office, or (b) in an application filed without
the knowledge or consent of the inventor by a
third party which obtained the information
directly or indirectly from the inventor; or
(c) A third party which obtained the
information directly or indirectly from the
inventor.
25.2. For the purposes of Subsection 25.1,
"inventor" also means any person who, at the
filing date of application, had the right to the
patent. (n)
Section 26. Inventive Step. - An invention
involves an inventive step if, having regard to
prior art, it is not obvious to a person skilled in
the art at the time of the filing date or priority
date of the application claiming the invention. (n)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 112
Section 27. Industrial Applicability. - An
invention that can be produced and used in any
industry shall be industrially applicable. (n)
CHAPTER III
RIGHT TO A PATENT
Section 28. Right to a Patent. - The right to a
patent belongs to the inventor, his heirs, or
assigns. When two (2) or more persons have
jointly made an invention, the right to a patent
shall belong to them jointly. (Sec. 10, R.A. No.
165a)
Section 29. First to File Rule. - If two (2) or more
persons have made the invention separately
and independently of each other, the right to the
patent shall belong to the person who filed an
application for such invention, or where two or
more applications are filed for the same
invention, to the applicant who has the earliest
filing date or, the earliest priority date. (3rd
sentence, Sec. 10, R.A. No. 165a.)
Section 30. Inventions Created Pursuant to a
Commission. - 30.1. The person who
commissions the work shall own the patent,
unless otherwise provided in the contract.
30.2. In case the employee made the invention
in the course of his employment contract, the
patent shall belong to:
(a) The employee, if the inventive activity is
not a part of his regular duties even if the
employee uses the time, facilities and materials
of the employer.
(b) The employer, if the invention is the
result of the performance of his regularly-
assigned duties, unless there is an agreement,
express or implied, to the contrary. (n)
Section 31. Right of Priority. . - An application
for patent filed by any person who has
previously applied for the same invention in
another country which by treaty, convention, or
law affords similar privileges to Filipino citizens,
shall be considered as filed as of the date of
filing the foreign application: Provided, That: (a)

the local application expressly claims priority;
(b) it is filed within twelve (12) months from the
date the earliest foreign application was filed;
and (c) a certified copy of the foreign application
together with an English translation is filed
within six (6) months from the date of filing in the
Philippines. (Sec. 15, R.A. No. 165a)
CHAPTER IV
PATENT APPLICATION
Section 32. The Application. - 32.1. The patent
application shall be in Filipino or English and
shall contain the following:
(a) A request for the grant of a patent;
(b) A description of the invention;
(c) Drawings necessary for the
understanding of the invention;
(d) One or more claims; and
(e) An abstract.
32.2. No patent may be granted unless the
application identifies the inventor. If the
applicant is not the inventor, the Office may
require him to submit said authority. (Sec. 13,
R.A. No. 165a)
Section 33. Appointment of Agent or
Representative. - An applicant who is not a
resident of the Philippines must appoint and
maintain a resident agent or representative in
the Philippines upon whom notice or process for
judicial or administrative procedure relating to
the application for patent or the patent may be
served. (Sec. 11, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 34. The Request. - The request shall
contain a petition for the grant of the patent, the
name and other data of the applicant, the
inventor and the agent and the title of the
invention. (n)
Section 35. Disclosure and Description of the
Invention. - 35.1. Disclosure. - The application
shall disclose the invention in a manner
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 113
sufficiently clear and complete for it to be carried
out by a person skilled in the art. Where the
application concerns a microbiological process
or the product thereof and involves the use of a
micro-organism which cannot be sufficiently
disclosed in the application in such a way as to
enable the invention to be carried out by a
person skilled in the art, and such material is not
available to the public, the application shall be
supplemented by a deposit of such material with
an international depository institution.
35.2. Description. - The Regulations shall
prescribe the contents of the description and the
order of presentation. (Sec. 14, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 36. The Claims. - 36.1. The application
shall contain one (1) or more claims which shall
define the matter for which protection is sought.
Each claim shall be clear and concise, and shall
be supported by the description.
36.2. The Regulations shall prescribe the
manner of the presentation of claims. (n)
Section 37. The Abstract. - The abstract shall
consist of a concise summary of the disclosure
of the invention as contained in the description,
claims and drawings in preferably not more than
one hundred fifty (150) words. It must be drafted
in a way which allows the clear understanding of
the technical problem, the gist of the solution of
that problem through the invention, and the
principal use or uses of the invention. The
abstract shall merely serve for technical
information. (n)
Section 38. Unity of Invention. - 38.1. The
application shall relate to one invention only or
to a group of inventions forming a single general
inventive concept.
38.2. If several independent inventions which do
not form a single general inventive concept are
claimed in one application, the Director may
require that the application be restricted to a
single invention. A later application filed for an
invention divided out shall be considered as
having been filed on the same day as the first
application: Provided, That the later application

is filed within four (4) months after the
requirement to divide becomes final or within
such additional time, not exceeding four (4)
months, as may be granted: Provided further,
That each divisional application shall not go
beyond the disclosure in the initial application.
38.3. The fact that a patent has been granted on
an application that did not comply with the
requirement of unity of invention shall not be a
ground to cancel the patent. (Sec. 17, R.A. No.
165a)
Section 39. Information Concerning
Corresponding Foreign Application for Patents.
- The applicant shall, at the request of the
Director, furnish him with the date and number
of any application for a patent filed by him
abroad, hereafter referred to as the "foreign
application," relating to the same or essentially
the same invention as that claimed in the
application filed with the Office and other
documents relating to the foreign application. (n)
CHAPTER V
PROCEDURE FOR GRANT OF PATENT
Section 40. Filing Date Requirements. - 40.1.
The filing date of a patent application shall be
the date of receipt by the Office of at least the
following elements:
(a) An express or implicit indication that a
Philippine patent is sought;
(b) Information identifying the applicant; and
(c) Description of the invention and one (1)
or more claims in Filipino or English.
40.2. If any of these elements is not submitted
within the period set by the Regulations, the
application shall be considered withdrawn. (n)
Section 41. According a Filing Date. - The Office
shall examine whether the patent application
satisfies the requirements for the grant of date
of filing as provided in Section 40 hereof. If the
date of filing cannot be accorded, the applicant
shall be given an opportunity to correct the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 114
deficiencies in accordance with the
implementing Regulations. If the application
does not contain all the elements indicated in
Section 40, the filing date should be that date
when all the elements are received. If the
deficiencies are not remedied within the
prescribed time limit, the application shall be
considered withdrawn. (n)
Section 42. Formality Examination. - 42.1. After
the patent application has been accorded a filing
date and the required fees have been paid on
time in accordance with the Regulations, the
applicant shall comply with the formal
requirements specified by Section 32 and the
Regulations within the prescribed period,
otherwise the application shall be considered
withdrawn.
42.2. The Regulations shall determine the
procedure for the re-examination and revival of
an application as well as the appeal to the
Director of Patents from any final action by the
examiner. (Sec. 16, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 43. Classification and Search. - An
application that has complied with the formal
requirements shall be classified and a search
conducted to determine the prior art. (n)
Section 44. Publication of Patent Application. -
44.1. The patent application shall be published
in the IPO Gazette together with a search
document established by or on behalf of the
Office citing any documents that reflect prior art,
after the expiration of eighteen ( 18) months
from the filing date or priority date.
44.2. After publication of a patent application,
any interested party may inspect the application
documents filed with the Office.
44.3. The Director General subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Trade and Industry,
may prohibit or restrict the publication of an
application, if in his opinion, to do so would be
prejudicial to the national security and interests
of the Republic of the Philippines. (n)

Section 45. Confidentiality Before Publication. -
A patent application, which has not yet been
published, and all related documents, shall not
be made available for inspection without the
consent of the applicant. (n)
Section 46. Rights Conferred by a Patent
Application After Publication. - The applicant
shall have all the rights of a patentee under
Section 76 against any person who, without his
authorization, exercised any of the rights
conferred under Section 71 of this Act in relation
to the invention claimed in the published patent
application, as if a patent had been granted for
that invention: Provided, That the said person
had:
46.1. Actual knowledge that the invention that
he was using was the subject matter of a
published application; or
46.2. Received written notice that the invention
that he was using was the subject matter of a
published application being identified in the said
notice by its serial number: Provided, That the
action may not be filed until after the grant of a
patent on the published application and within
four (4) years from the commission of the acts
complained of. (n)
Section 47. Observation by Third Parties. -
Following the publication of the patent
application, any person may present
observations in writing concerning the
patentability of the invention. Such observations
shall be communicated to the applicant who
may comment on them. The Office shall
acknowledge and put such observations and
comment in the file of the application to which it
relates. (n)
Section 48. Request for Substantive
Examination. - 48.1. The application shall be
deemed withdrawn unless within six (6) months
from the date of publication under Section 41, a
written request to determine whether a patent
application meets the requirements of Sections
21 to 27 and Sections 32 to 39 and the fees
have been paid on time.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 115
48.2. Withdrawal of the request for examination
shall be irrevocable and shall not authorize the
refund of any fee. (n)
Section 49. Amendment of Application. - An
applicant may amend the patent application
during examination: Provided, That such
amendment shall not include new matter
outside the scope of the disclosure contained in
the application as filed. (n)
Section 50. Grant of Patent. - 50.1. If the
application meets the requirements of this Act,
the Office shall grant the patent: Provided, That
all the fees are paid on time.
50.2. If the required fees for grant and printing
are not paid in due time, the application shall be
deemed to be withdrawn.
50.3. A patent shall take effect on the date of the
publication of the grant of the patent in the IPO
Gazette. (Sec. 18, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 51. Refusal of the Application. - 51.1.
The final order of refusal of the examiner to
grant the patent shall be appealable to the
Director in accordance with this Act.
51.2. The Regulations shall provide for the
procedure by which an appeal from the order of
refusal from the Director shall be undertaken.
(n)
Section 52. Publication Upon Grant of Patent. -
52.1. The grant of the patent together with other
related information shall be published in the IPO
Gazette within the time prescribed by the
Regulations.
52.2. Any interested party may inspect the
complete description, claims, and drawings of
the patent on file with the Office. (Sec. 18, R.A.
No. 165a)
Section 53. Contents of Patent. - The patent
shall be issued in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines under the seal of the Office and
shall be signed by the Director, and registered
together with the description, claims, and

drawings, if any, in books and records of the
Office. (Secs. 19 and 20, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 54. Term of Patent. - The term of a
patent shall be twenty (20) years from the filing
date of the application. (Sec. 21, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 55. Annual Fees. - 55.1. To maintain the
patent application or patent, an annual fee shall
be paid upon the expiration of four (4) years
from the date the application was published
pursuant to Section 44 hereof, and on each
subsequent anniversary of such date. Payment
may be made within three (3) months before the
due date. The obligation to pay the annual fees
shall terminate should the application be
withdrawn, refused, or cancelled.
55.2. If the annual fee is not paid, the patent
application shall be deemed withdrawn or the
patent considered as lapsed from the day
following the expiration of the period within
which the annual fees were due. A notice that
the application is deemed withdrawn or the
lapse of a patent for non-payment of any annual
fee shall be published in the IPO Gazette and
the lapse shall be recorded in the Register of the
Office.
55.3. A grace period of six (6) months shall be
granted for the payment of the annual fee, upon
payment of the prescribed surcharge for
delayed payment. (Sec. 22, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 56. Surrender of Patent. - 56.1. The
owner of the patent, with the consent of all
persons having grants or licenses or other right,
title or interest in and to the patent and the
invention covered thereby, which have been
recorded in the Office, may surrender his patent
or any claim or claims forming part thereof to the
Office for cancellation.
56.2. A person may give notice to the Office of
his opposition to the surrender of a patent under
this section, and if he does so, the Bureau shall
notify the proprietor of the patent and determine
the question.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 116
56.3. If the Office is satisfied that the patent may
properly be surrendered, he may accept the
offer and, as from the day when notice of his
acceptance is published in the IPO Gazette, the
patent shall cease to have effect, but no action
for infringement shall lie and no right
compensation shall accrue for any use of the
patented invention before that day for the
services of the government. (Sec. 24, R.A. No.
165a)
Section 57. Correction of Mistakes of the Office.
- The Director shall have the power to correct,
without fee, any mistake in a patent incurred
through the fault of the Office when clearly
disclosed in the records thereof, to make the
patent conform to the records. (Sec. 25, R.A.
No. 165)
Section 58. Correction of Mistake in the
Application. - On request of any interested
person and payment of the prescribed fee, the
Director is authorized to correct any mistake in
a patent of a formal and clerical nature, not
incurred through the fault of the Office. (Sec. 26,
R.A. No. 165a)
Section 59. Changes in Patents. - 59.1. The
owner of a patent shall have the right to request
the Bureau to make the changes in the patent in
order to:
(a) Limit the extent of the protection
conferred by it;
(b) Correct obvious mistakes or to correct
clerical errors; and
(c) Correct mistakes or errors, other than
those referred to in letter (b), made in good faith:
Provided, That where the change would result
in a broadening of the extent of protection
conferred by the patent, no request may be
made after the expiration of two (2) years from
the grant of a patent and the change shall not
affect the rights of any third party which has
relied on the patent, as published.
59.2. No change in the patent shall be permitted
under this section, where the change would

result in the disclosure contained in the patent
going beyond the disclosure contained in the
application filed.
59.3. If, and to the extent to which the Office
changes the patent according to this section, it
shall publish the same. (n)
Section 60. Form and Publication of
Amendment. - An amendment or correction of a
patent shall be accomplished by a certificate of
such amendment or correction, authenticated
by the seal of the Office and signed by the
Director, which certificate shall be attached to
the patent. Notice of such amendment or
correction shall be published in the IPO Gazette
and copies of the patent kept or furnished by the
Office shall include a copy of the certificate of
amendment or correction. (Sec. 27, R.A. No.
165)
CHAPTER VI
CANCELLATION OF PATENTS AND
SUBSTITUTION OF PATENTEE
Section 61. Cancellation of Patents. - 61.1. Any
interested person may, upon payment of the
required fee, petition to cancel the patent or any
claim thereof, or parts of the claim, on any of the
following grounds:
(a) That what is claimed as the invention is
not new or Patentable;
(b) That the patent does not disclose the
invention in a manner sufficiently clear and
complete for it to be carried out by any person
skilled in the art; or
(c) That the patent is contrary to public order
or morality.
61.2. Where the grounds for cancellation relate
to some of the claims or parts of the claim,
cancellation may be effected to such extent
only. (Secs. 28 and 29, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 62. Requirement of the Petition. - The
petition for cancellation shall be in writing,
verified by the petitioner or by any person in his
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 117
behalf who knows the facts, specify the grounds
upon which it is based, include a statement of
the facts to be relied upon, and filed with the
Office. Copies of printed publications or of
patents of other countries, and other supporting
documents mentioned in the petition shall be
attached thereto, together with the translation
thereof in English, if not in the English language.
(Sec. 30, R.A. No. 165)
Section 63. Notice of Hearing. - Upon filing of a
petition for cancellation, the Director of Legal
Affairs shall forthwith serve notice of the filing
thereof upon the patentee and all persons
having grants or licenses, or any other right, title
or interest in and to the patent and the invention
covered thereby, as appears of record in the
Office, and of notice of the date of hearing
thereon on such persons and the petitioner.
Notice of the filing of the petition shall be
published in the IPO Gazette. (Sec. 31, R.A. No.
165a)
Section 64. Committee of Three. - In cases
involving highly technical issues, on motion of
any party, the Director of Legal Affairs may
order that the petition be heard and decided by
a committee composed of the Director of Legal
Affairs as chairman and two (2) members who
have the experience or expertise in the field of
technology to which the patent sought to be
cancelled relates. The decision of the committee
shall be appealable to the Director General. (n)
Section 65. Cancellation of the Patent. - 65.1. If
the Committee finds that a case for cancellation
has been proved, it shall order the patent or any
specified claim or claims thereof cancelled.
65.2. If the Committee finds that, taking into
consideration the amendment made by the
patentee during the cancellation proceedings,
the patent and the invention to which it relates
meet the requirement of this Act, it may decide
to maintain the patent as amended: Provided,
That the fee for printing of a new patent is paid
within the time limit prescribed in the
Regulations.

65.3. If the fee for the printing of a new patent is
not paid in due time, the patent should be
revoked.
65.4. If the patent is amended under Subsection
65.2 hereof, the Bureau shall, at the same time
as it publishes the mention of the cancellation
decision, publish the abstract, representative
claims and drawings indicating clearly what the
amendments consist of. (n)
Section 66. Effect of Cancellation of Patent or
Claim. - The rights conferred by the patent or
any specified claim or claims cancelled shall
terminate. Notice of the cancellation shall be
published in the IPO Gazette. Unless restrained
by the Director General, the decision or order to
cancel by Director of Legal Affairs shall be
immediately executory even pending appeal.
(Sec. 32, R.A. No. 165a)
CHAPTER VII
REMEDIES OF A PERSON WITH A RIGHT TO
A PATENT
Section 67. Patent Application by Persons Not
Having the Right to a Patent. . - 67.1. If a person
referred to in Section 29 other than the
applicant, is declared by final court order or
decision as having the right to the patent, such
person may, within three (3) months after the
decision has become final:
(a) Prosecute the application as his own
application in place of the applicant;
(b) File a new patent application in respect of
the same invention;
(c) Request that the application be refused;
or
(d) Seek cancellation of the patent, if one
has already been issued.
67.2. The provisions of Subsection 38.2 shall
apply mutatis mutandis to a new application filed
under Subsection 67. 1(b). (n)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 118
Section 68. Remedies of the True and Actual
Inventor. - If a person, who was deprived of the
patent without his consent or through fraud is
declared by final court order or decision to be
the true and actual inventor, the court shall order
for his substitution as patentee, or at the option
of the true inventor, cancel the patent, and
award actual and other damages in his favor if
warranted by the circumstances. (Sec. 33, R.A.
No. 165a)
Section 69. Publication of the Court Order. - The
court shall furnish the Office a copy of the order
or decision referred to in Sections 67 and 68,
which shall be published in the IPO Gazette
within three (3) months from the date such order
or decision became final and executory, and
shall be recorded in the register of the Office. (n)
Section 70. Time to File Action in Court. - The
actions indicated in Sections 67 and 68 shall be
filed within one (1) year from the date of
publication made in accordance with Sections
44 and 51, respectively. (n)
CHAPTER VIII
RIGHTS OF PATENTEES AND
INFRINGEMENT OF PATENTS
Section 71. Rights Conferred by Patent. - 71.1.
A patent shall confer on its owner the following
exclusive rights:
(a) Where the subject matter of a patent is a
product, to restrain, prohibit and prevent any
unauthorized person or entity from making,
using, offering for sale, selling or importing that
product;
(b) Where the subject matter of a patent is a
process, to restrain, prevent or prohibit any
unauthorized person or entity from using the
process, and from manufacturing, dealing in,
using, selling or offering for sale, or importing
any product obtained directly or indirectly from
such process.
71.2. Patent owners shall also have the right to
assign, or transfer by succession the patent,

and to conclude licensing contracts for the
same. (Sec. 37, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 72. Limitations of Patent Rights. - The
owner of a patent has no right to prevent third
parties from performing, without his
authorization, the acts referred to in Section 71
hereof in the following circumstances:
72.1. Using a patented product which has been
put on the market in the Philippines by the owner
of the product, or with his express consent,
insofar as such use is performed after that
product has been so put on the said market;
72.2. Where the act is done privately and on a
non-commercial scale or for a non-commercial
purpose: Provided, That it does not significantly
prejudice the economic interests of the owner of
the patent;
72.3. Where the act consists of making or using
exclusively for the purpose of experiments that
relate to the subject matter of the patented
invention;
72.4. Where the act consists of the preparation
for individual cases, in a pharmacy or by a
medical professional, of a medicine in
accordance with a medical prescription or acts
concerning the medicine so prepared;
72.5. Where the invention is used in any ship,
vessel, aircraft, or land vehicle of any other
country entering the territory of the Philippines
temporarily or accidentally: Provided, That such
invention is used exclusively for the needs of the
ship, vessel, aircraft, or land vehicle and not
used for the manufacturing of anything to be
sold within the Philippines. (Secs. 38 and 39,
R.A. No. 165a)
Section 73. Prior User. - 73.1. Notwithstanding
Section 72 hereof, any prior user, who, in good
faith was using the invention or has undertaken
serious preparations to use the invention in his
enterprise or business, before the filing date or
priority date of the application on which a patent
is granted, shall have the right to continue the
use thereof as envisaged in such preparations
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 119
within the territory where the patent produces its
effect.
73.2. The right of the prior user may only be
transferred or assigned together with his
enterprise or business, or with that part of his
enterprise or business in which the use or
preparations for use have been made. (Sec. 40,
R.A. No. 165a)
Section 74. Use of Invention by Government. -
74.1. A Government agency or third person
authorized by the Government may exploit the
invention even without agreement of the patent
owner where:
(a) The public interest, in particular, national
security, nutrition, health or the development of
other sectors, as determined by the appropriate
agency of the government, so requires; or
(b) A judicial or administrative body has
determined that the manner of exploitation, by
the owner of the patent or his licensee is anti-
competitive.
74.2. The use by the Government, or third
person authorized by the Government shall be
subject, mutatis mutandis, to the conditions set
forth in Sections 95 to 97 and 100 to 102. (Sec.
41, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 75. Extent of Protection and
Interpretation of Claims. - 75.1. The extent of
protection conferred by the patent shall be
determined by the claims, which are to be
interpreted in the light of the description and
drawings.
75.2. For the purpose of determining the extent
of protection conferred by the patent, due
account shall be taken of elements which are
equivalent to the elements expressed in the
claims, so that a claim shall be considered to
cover not only all the elements as expressed
therein, but also equivalents. (n)
Section 76. Civil Action for Infringement. - 76.1.
The making, using, offering for sale, selling, or
importing a patented product or a product

obtained directly or indirectly from a patented
process, or the use of a patented process
without the authorization of the patentee
constitutes patent infringement.
76.2. Any patentee, or anyone possessing any
right, title or interest in and to the patented
invention, whose rights have been infringed,
may bring a civil action before a court of
competent jurisdiction, to recover from the
infringer such damages sustained thereby, plus
attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation,
and to secure an injunction for the protection of
his rights.
76.3. If the damages are inadequate or cannot
be readily ascertained with reasonable
certainty, the court may award by way of
damages a sum equivalent to reasonable
royalty.
76.4. The court may, according to the
circumstances of the case, award damages in a
sum above the amount found as actual
damages sustained: Provided, That the award
does not exceed three (3) times the amount of
such actual damages.
76.5. The court may, in its discretion, order that
the infringing goods, materials and implements
predominantly used in the infringement be
disposed of outside the channels of commerce
or destroyed, without compensation.
76.6. Anyone who actively induces the
infringement of a patent or provides the infringer
with a component of a patented product or of a
product produced because of a patented
process knowing it to be especially adopted for
infringing the patented invention and not
suitable for substantial non-infringing use shall
be liable as a contributory infringer and shall be
jointly and severally liable with the infringer.
(Sec. 42, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 77. Infringement Action by a Foreign
National. - Any foreign national or juridical entity
who meets the requirements of Section 3 and
not engaged in business in the Philippines, to
which a patent has been granted or assigned
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 120
under this Act, may bring an action for
infringement of patent, whether or not it is
licensed to do business in the Philippines under
existing law. (Sec. 41-A, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 78. Process Patents; Burden of Proof .
- If the subject matter of a patent is a process for
obtaining a product, any identical product shall
be presumed to have been obtained through the
use of the patented process if the product is new
or there is substantial likelihood that the
identical product was made by the process and
the owner of the patent has been unable despite
reasonable efforts, to determine the process
actually used. In ordering the defendant to prove
that the process to obtain the identical product
is different from the patented process, the court
shall adopt measures to protect, as far as
practicable, his manufacturing and business
secrets. (n)
Section 79. Limitation of Action for Damages. -
No damages can be recovered for acts of
infringement committed more than four (4) years
before the institution of the action for
infringement. (Sec. 43, R.A. No. 165)
Section 80. Damages, Requirement of Notice. -
Damages cannot be recovered for acts of
infringement committed before the infringer had
known, or had reasonable grounds to know of
the patent. It is presumed that the infringer had
known of the patent if on the patented product,
or on the container or package in which the
article is supplied to the public, or on the
advertising material relating to the patented
product or process, are placed the words
"Philippine Patent" with the number of the
patent. (Sec. 44, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 81. Defenses in Action for Infringement.
- In an action for infringement, the defendant, in
addition to other defenses available to him, may
show the invalidity of the patent, or any claim
thereof, on any of the grounds on which a
petition of cancellation can be brought under
Section 61 hereof. (Sec. 45, R.A. No. 165)
Section 82. Patent Found Invalid May be
Cancelled. - In an action for infringement, if the

court shall find the patent or any claim to be
invalid, it shall cancel the same, and the Director
of Legal Affairs upon receipt of the final
judgment of cancellation by the court, shall
record that fact in the register of the Office and
shall publish a notice to that effect in the IPO
Gazette. (Sec. 46, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 83. Assessor in Infringement Action. -
83.1. Two (2) or more assessors may be
appointed by the court. The assessors shall be
possessed of the necessary scientific and
technical knowledge required by the subject
matter in litigation. Either party may challenge
the fitness of any assessor proposed for
appointment.
83.2. Each assessor shall receive a
compensation in an amount to be fixed by the
court and advanced by the complaining party,
which shall be awarded as part of his costs
should he prevail in the action. (Sec. 47, R.A.
No. 165a)
Section 84. Criminal Action for Repetition of
Infringement. - If infringement is repeated by the
infringer or by anyone in connivance with him
after finality of the judgment of the court against
the infringer, the offenders shall, without
prejudice to the institution of a civil action for
damages, be criminally liable therefor and, upon
conviction, shall suffer imprisonment for the
period of not less than six (6) months but not
more than three (3) years and/or a fine of not
less than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000) but not more than Three hundred
thousand pesos (P300,000), at the discretion of
the court. The criminal action herein provided
shall prescribe in three (3) years from date of the
commission of the crime. (Sec. 48, R.A. No.
165a)
CHAPTER IX
VOLUNTARY LICENSING
Section 85. Voluntary License Contract. - To
encourage the transfer and dissemination of
technology, prevent or control practices and
conditions that may in particular cases
constitute an abuse of intellectual property
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 121
rights having an adverse effect on competition
and trade, all technology transfer arrangements
shall comply with the provisions of this Chapter.
(n)
Section 86. Jurisdiction to Settle Disputes on
Royalties. - The Director of the Documentation,
Information and Technology Transfer Bureau
shall exercise quasi-judicial jurisdiction in the
settlement of disputes between parties to a
technology transfer arrangement arising from
technology transfer payments, including the
fixing of appropriate amount or rate of royalty.
(n)
Section 87. Prohibited Clauses. - Except in
cases under Section 91, the following provisions
shall be deemed prima facie to have an adverse
effect on competition and trade:
87.1. Those which impose upon the licensee the
obligation to acquire from a specific source
capital goods, intermediate products, raw
materials, and other technologies, or of
permanently employing personnel indicated by
the licensor;
87.2. Those pursuant to which the licensor
reserves the right to fix the sale or resale prices
of the products manufactured on the basis of the
license;
87.3. Those that contain restrictions regarding
the volume and structure of production;
87.4. Those that prohibit the use of competitive
technologies in a non-exclusive technology
transfer agreement;
87.5. Those that establish a full or partial
purchase option in favor of the licensor;
87.6. Those that obligate the licensee to transfer
for free to the licensor the inventions or
improvements that may be obtained through the
use of the licensed technology;
87.7. Those that require payment of royalties to
the owners of patents for patents which are not
used;

87.8. Those that prohibit the licensee to export
the licensed product unless justified for the
protection of the legitimate interest of the
licensor such as exports to countries where
exclusive licenses to manufacture and/or
distribute the licensed product(s) have already
been granted;
87.9. Those which restrict the use of the
technology supplied after the expiration of the
technology transfer arrangement, except in
cases of early termination of the technology
transfer arrangement due to reason(s)
attributable to the licensee;
87.10. Those which require payments for
patents and other industrial property rights after
their expiration, termination arrangement;
87.11. Those which require that the technology
recipient shall not contest the validity of any of
the patents of the technology supplier;
87.12. Those which restrict the research and
development activities of the licensee designed
to absorb and adapt the transferred technology
to local conditions or to initiate research and
development programs in connection with new
products, processes or equipment;
87.13. Those which prevent the licensee from
adapting the imported technology to local
conditions, or introducing innovation to it, as
long as it does not impair the quality standards
prescribed by the licensor;
87.14. Those which exempt the licensor for
liability for non-fulfilment of his responsibilities
under the technology transfer arrangement
and/or liability arising from third party suits
brought about by the use of the licensed product
or the licensed technology; and
87.15. Other clauses with equivalent effects.
(Sec. 33-C (2), R.A 165a)
Section 88. Mandatory Provisions. - The
following provisions shall be included in
voluntary license contracts:
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 122
88.1. That the laws of the Philippines shall
govern the interpretation of the same and in the
event of litigation, the venue shall be the proper
court in the place where the licensee has its
principal office;
88.2. Continued access to improvements in
techniques and processes related to the
technology shall be made available during the
period of the technology transfer arrangement;
88.3. In the event the technology transfer
arrangement shall provide for arbitration, the
Procedure of Arbitration of the Arbitration Law of
the Philippines or the Arbitration Rules of the
United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) or the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) shall apply and
the venue of arbitration shall be the Philippines
or any neutral country; and
88.4. The Philippine taxes on all payments
relating to the technology transfer arrangement
shall be borne by the licensor. (n)
Section 89. Rights of Licensor. - In the absence
of any provision to the contrary in the technology
transfer arrangement, the grant of a license
shall not prevent the licensor from granting
further licenses to third person nor from
exploiting the subject matter of the technology
transfer arrangement himself. (Sec. 33-B, R.A.
165a)
Section 90. Rights of Licensee. - The licensee
shall be entitled to exploit the subject matter of
the technology transfer arrangement during the
whole term of the technology transfer
arrangement. (Sec. 33-C (1), R.A. 165a)
Section 91. Exceptional Cases. - In exceptional
or meritorious cases where substantial benefits
will accrue to the economy, such as high
technology content, increase in foreign
exchange earnings, employment generation,
regional dispersal of industries and/or
substitution with or use of local raw materials, or
in the case of Board of Investments, registered

companies with pioneer status, exemption from
any of the above requirements may be allowed
by the Documentation, Information and
Technology Transfer Bureau after evaluation
thereof on a case by case basis. (n)
Section 92. Non-Registration with the
Documentation, Information and Technology
Transfer Bureau. - Technology transfer
arrangements that conform with the provisions
of Sections 86 and 87 need not be registered
with the Documentation, Information and
Technology Transfer Bureau. Non-conformance
with any of the provisions of Sections 87 and 88,
however, shall automatically render the
technology transfer arrangement
unenforceable, unless said technology transfer
arrangement is approved and registered with
the Documentation, Information and
Technology Transfer Bureau under the
provisions of Section 91 on exceptional cases.
(n)
CHAPTER X
COMPULSORY LICENSING
Section 93. Grounds for Compulsory Licensing.
- The Director of Legal Affairs may grant a
license to exploit a patented invention, even
without the agreement of the patent owner, in
favor of any person who has shown his
capability to exploit the invention, under any of
the following circumstances:
93.1. National emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency;
93.2. Where the public interest, in particular,
national security, nutrition, health or the
development of other vital sectors of the
national economy as determined by the
appropriate agency of the Government, so
requires; or
93.3. Where a judicial or administrative body
has determined that the manner of exploitation
by the owner of the patent or his licensee is anti-
competitive; or
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 123
93.4. In case of public non-commercial use of
the patent by the patentee, without satisfactory
reason;
93.5. If the patented invention is not being
worked in the Philippines on a commercial
scale, although capable of being worked,
without satisfactory reason: Provided, That the
importation of the patented article shall
constitute working or using the patent. (Secs.
34, 34-A, 34-B, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 94. Period for Filing a Petition for a
Compulsory License. - 94.1. A compulsory
license may not be applied for on the ground
stated in Subsection 93.5 before the expiration
of a period of four (4) years from the date of filing
of the application or three (3) years from the
date of the patent whichever period expires last.
94.2. A compulsory license which is applied for
on any of the grounds stated in Subsections
93.2, 93.3, and 93.4 and Section 97 may be
applied for at any time after the grant of the
patent. (Sec. 34(1), R.A. No. 165)
Section 95. Requirement to Obtain a License on
Reasonable Commercial Terms. - 95.1. The
license will only be granted after the petitioner
has made efforts to obtain authorization from
the patent owner on reasonable commercial
terms and conditions but such efforts have not
been successful within a reasonable period of
time.
95.2. The requirement under Subsection 95.1
shall not apply in the following cases:
(a) Where the petition for compulsory license
seeks to remedy a practice determined after
judicial or administrative process to be anti-
competitive;
(b) In situations of national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency;
(c) In cases of public non-commercial use.
95.3. In situations of national emergency or
other circumstances of extreme urgency, the

right holder shall be notified as soon as
reasonably practicable.
95.4. In the case of public non-commercial use,
where the government or contractor, without
making a patent search, knows or has
demonstrable grounds to know that a valid
patent is or will be used by or for the
government, the right holder shall be informed
promptly. (n)
Section 96. Compulsory Licensing of Patents
Involving Semi-Conductor Technology. - In the
case of compulsory licensing of patents
involving semi-conductor technology, the
license may only be granted in case of public
non-commercial use or to remedy a practice
determined after judicial or administrative
process to be anti-competitive. (n)
Section 97. Compulsory License Based on
Interdependence of Patents. - If the invention
protected by a patent, hereafter referred to as
the "second patent," within the country cannot
be worked without infringing another patent,
hereafter referred to as the "first patent,"
granted on a prior application or benefiting from
an earlier priority, a compulsory license may be
granted to the owner of the second patent to the
extent necessary for the working of his
invention, subject to the following conditions:
97.1. The invention claimed in the second
patent involves an important technical advance
of considerable economic significance in
relation to the first patent;
97.2. The owner of the first patent shall be
entitled to a cross-license on reasonable terms
to use the invention claimed in the second
patent;
97.3. The use authorized in respect of the first
patent shall be non-assignable except with the
assignment of the second patent; and
97.4. The terms and conditions of Sections 95,
96 and 98 to 100 of this Act. (Sec. 34-C, R.A.
No. 165a)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 124
Section 98. Form and Contents of Petition. - The
petition for compulsory licensing must be in
writing, verified by the petitioner and
accompanied by payment of the required filing
fee. It shall contain the name and address of the
petitioner as well as those of the respondents,
the number and date of issue of the patent in
connection with which compulsory license is
sought, the name of the patentee, the title of the
invention, the statutory grounds upon which
compulsory license is sought, the ultimate facts
constituting the petitioner's cause of action, and
the relief prayed for. (Sec. 34-D, R.A. No. 165)
Section 99. Notice of Hearing. - 99.1. Upon filing
of a petition, the Director of Legal Affairs shall
forthwith serve notice of the filing thereof upon
the patent owner and all persons having grants
or licenses, or any other right, title or interest in
and to the patent and invention covered thereby
as appears of record in the Office, and of notice
of the date of hearing thereon, on such persons
and petitioner. The resident agent or
representative appointed in accordance with
Section 33 hereof, shall be bound to accept
service of notice of the filing of the petition within
the meaning of this Section.
99.2. In every case, the notice shall be
published by the said Office in a newspaper of
general circulation, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks and once in the IPO Gazette
at applicant's expense. (Sec. 34-E, R.A. No.
165)
Section 100. Terms and Conditions of
Compulsory License. - The basic terms and
conditions including the rate of royalties of a
compulsory license shall be fixed by the Director
of Legal Affairs subject to the following
conditions:
100.1. The scope and duration of such license
shall be limited to the purpose for which it was
authorized;
100.2. The license shall be non-exclusive;
100.3. The license shall be non-assignable,
except with that part of the enterprise or

business with which the invention is being
exploited;
100.4. Use of the subject matter of the license
shall be devoted predominantly for the supply of
the Philippine market: Provided, That this
limitation shall not apply where the grant of the
license is based on the ground that the
patentee's manner of exploiting the patent is
determined by judicial or administrative process,
to be anti-competitive.
100.5. The license may be terminated upon
proper showing that circumstances which led to
its grant have ceased to exist and are unlikely to
recur: Provided, That adequate protection shall
be afforded to the legitimate interest of the
licensee; and
100.6. The patentee shall be paid adequate
remuneration taking into account the economic
value of the grant or authorization, except that
in cases where the license was granted to
remedy a practice which was determined after
judicial or administrative process, to be anti-
competitive, the need to correct the anti-
competitive practice may be taken into account
in fixing the amount of remuneration. (Sec. 35-
B, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 101. Amendment, Cancellation,
Surrender of Compulsory License. - 101.1.
Upon the request of the patentee or the
licensee, the Director of Legal Affairs may
amend the decision granting the compulsory
license, upon proper showing of new facts or
circumstances justifying such amendment.
101.2. Upon the request of the patentee, the
said Director may cancel the compulsory
license:
(a) If the ground for the grant of the
compulsory license no longer exists and is
unlikely to recur;
(b) If the licensee has neither begun to
supply the domestic market nor made serious
preparation therefor;
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 125
(c) If the licensee has not complied with the
prescribed terms of the license;
101.3. The licensee may surrender the license
by a written declaration submitted to the Office.
101.4. The said Director shall cause the
amendment, surrender, or cancellation in the
Register, notify the patentee, and/or the
licensee, and cause notice thereof to be
published in the IPO Gazette. (Sec. 35-D, R.A.
No. 165a)
Section 102. Licensee's Exemption from
Liability. - Any person who works a patented
product, substance and/or process under a
license granted under this Chapter, shall be free
from any liability for infringement: Provided
however, That in the case of voluntary licensing,
no collusion with the licensor is proven. This is
without prejudice to the right of the rightful
owner of the patent to recover from the licensor
whatever he may have received as royalties
under the license. (Sec. 35-E, R.A. No. 165a)
CHAPTER XI
ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSMISSION OF
RIGHTS
Section 103. Transmission of Rights. - 103.1.
Patents or applications for patents and invention
to which they relate, shall be protected in the
same way as the rights of other property under
the Civil Code.
103.2. Inventions and any right, title or interest
in and to patents and inventions covered
thereby, may be assigned or transmitted by
inheritance or bequest or may be the subject of
a license contract. (Sec. 50, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 104. Assignment of Inventions. - An
assignment may be of the entire right, title or
interest in and to the patent and the invention
covered thereby, or of an undivided share of the
entire patent and invention, in which event the
parties become joint owners thereof. An
assignment may be limited to a specified
territory. (Sec. 51, R.A. No. 165)

Section 105. Form of Assignment. - The
assignment must be in writing, acknowledged
before a notary public or other officer authorized
to administer oath or perform notarial acts, and
certified under the hand and official seal of the
notary or such other officer. (Sec. 52, R.A. No.
165)
Section 106. Recording. - 106.1. The Office
shall record assignments, licenses and other
instruments relating to the transmission of any
right, title or interest in and to inventions, and
patents or application for patents or inventions
to which they relate, which are presented in due
form to the Office for registration, in books and
records kept for the purpose. The original
documents together with a signed duplicate
thereof shall be filed, and the contents thereof
should be kept confidential. If the original is not
available, an authenticated copy thereof in
duplicate may be filed. Upon recording, the
Office shall retain the duplicate, return the
original or the authenticated copy to the party
who filed the same and notice of the recording
shall be published in the IPO Gazette.
106.2. Such instruments shall be void as against
any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for
valuable consideration and without notice,
unless, it is so recorded in the Office, within
three (3) months from the date of said
instrument, or prior to the subsequent purchase
or mortgage. (Sec. 53, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 107. Rights of Joint Owners. - If two (2)
or more persons jointly own a patent and the
invention covered thereby, either by the
issuance of the patent in their joint favor or by
reason of the assignment of an undivided share
in the patent and invention or by reason of the
succession in title to such share, each of the
joint owners shall be entitled to personally
make, use, sell, or import the invention for his
own profit: Provided, however, That neither of
the joint owners shall be entitled to grant
licenses or to assign his right, title or interest or
part thereof without the consent of the other
owner or owners, or without proportionally
dividing the proceeds with such other owner or
owners. (Sec. 54, R.A. No. 165)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 126
CHAPTER XII
REGISTRATION OF UTILITY MODELS
Section 108. Applicability of Provisions Relating
to Patents. - 108.1. Subject to Section 109, the
provisions governing patents shall apply,
mutatis mutandis, to the registration of utility
models.
108.2. Where the right to a patent conflicts with
the right to a utility model registration in the case
referred to in Section 29, the said provision shall
apply as if the word "patent" were replaced by
the words "patent or utility model registration".
(Sec. 55, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 109. Special Provisions Relating to
Utility Models. - 109.1. (a) An invention qualifies
for registration as a utility model if it is new and
industrially applicable.
(b) Section 21, "Patentable Inventions", shall
apply except the reference to inventive step as
a condition of protection.
109.2. Sections 43 to 49 shall not apply in the
case of applications for registration of a utility
model.
109.3. A utility model registration shall expire,
without any possibility of renewal, at the end of
the seventh year after the date of the filing of the
application.
109.4. In proceedings under Sections 61 to 64,
the utility model registration shall be canceled
on the following grounds:
(a) That the claimed invention does not
qualify for registration as a utility model and
does not meet the requirements of registrability,
in particular having regard to Subsection 109.1
and Sections 22, 23, 24 and 27;
(b) That the description and the claims do
not comply with the prescribed requirements;

(c) That any drawing which is necessary for
the understanding of the invention has not been
furnished;
(d) That the owner of the utility model
registration is not the inventor or his successor
in title. (Secs. 55, 56, and 57, R.A. No. 165a)
Section 110. Conversion of Patent Applications
or Applications for Utility Model Registration. -
110.1. At any time before the grant or refusal of
a patent, an applicant for a patent may, upon
payment of the prescribed fee, convert his
application into an application for registration of
a utility model, which shall be accorded the filing
date of the initial application. An application may
be converted only once.
110.2. At any time before the grant or refusal of
a utility model registration, an applicant for a
utility model registration may, upon payment of
the prescribed fee, convert his application into a
patent application, which shall be accorded the
filing date of the initial application. (Sec. 58, R.A.
No. 165a)
Section 111. Prohibition against Filing of
Parallel Applications. - An applicant may not file
two (2) applications for the same subject, one
for utility model registration and the other for the
grant of a patent whether simultaneously or
consecutively. (Sec. 59, R.A. No. 165a)
CHAPTER XIII
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN
Section 112. Definition of Industrial Design. - An
industrial design is any composition of lines or
colors or any three-dimensional form, whether
or not associated-with lines or colors: Provided,
That such composition or form gives a special
appearance to and can serve as pattern for an
industrial product or handicraft. (Sec. 55, R.A.
No. 165a)
Section 113. Substantive Conditions for
Protection. - 113.1. Only industrial designs that
are new or original shall benefit from protection
under this Act.
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 127
113.2. Industrial designs dictated essentially by
technical or functional considerations to obtain
a technical result or those that are contrary to
public order, health or morals shall not be
protected. (n)
Section 114. Contents of the Application. -
114.1. Every application for registration of an
industrial design shall contain:
(a) A request for registration of the industrial
design;
(b) Information identifying the applicant;
(c) An indication of the kind of article of
manufacture or handicraft to which the design
shall be applied;
(d) A representation of the article of
manufacture or handicraft by way of drawings,
photographs or other adequate graphic
representation of the design as applied to the
article of manufacture or handicraft which
clearly and fully discloses those features for
which design protection is claimed; and
(e) The name and address of the creator, or
where the applicant is not the creator, a
statement indicating the origin of the right to the
industrial design registration.
114.2. The application may be accompanied by
a specimen of the article embodying the
industrial design and shall be subject to the
payment of the prescribed fee.(n)
Section 115. Several Industrial Designs in One
Application. - Two (2) or more industrial designs
may be the subject of the same application:
Provided, That they relate to the same sub-class
of the International Classification or to the same
set or composition of articles. (n)
Section 116. Examination. - 116.1. The
Office shall accord as the filing date the date of
receipt of the application containing indications
allowing the identity of the applicant to be
established and a representation of the article

embodying the industrial design or a pictorial
representation thereof.
116.2. If the application does not meet these
requirements the filing date should be that date
when all the elements specified in Section 105
are filed or the mistakes corrected. Otherwise if
the requirements are not complied within the
prescribed period, the application shall be
considered withdrawn.
116.3. After the application has been accorded
a filing date and the required fees paid on time,
the applicant shall comply with the requirements
of Section 114 within the prescribed period,
otherwise the application shall be considered
withdrawn.
116.4. The Office shall examine whether the
industrial design complies with requirements of
Section 112 and Subsections 113.2 and 113.3.
(n)
Section 117. Registration. - 117.1. Where the
Office finds that the conditions referred to in
Section 113 are fulfilled, it shall order that
registration be effected in the industrial design
register and cause the issuance of an industrial
design certificate of registration, otherwise, it
shall refuse the application.
117.2. The form and contents of an industrial
design certificate shall be established by the
Regulations: Provided, That the name and
address of the creator shall be mentioned in
every case.
117.3. Registration shall be published in the
form and within the period fixed by the
Regulations.
117.4. The Office shall record in the register any
change in the identity of the proprietor of the
industrial design or his representative, if proof
thereof is furnished to it. A fee shall be paid, with
the request to record the change in the identity
of the proprietor. If the fee is not paid, the
request shall be deemed not to have been filed.
In such case, the former proprietor and the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 128
former representative shall remain subject to the
rights and obligations as provided in this Act.
117.5. Anyone may inspect the Register and the
files of registered industrial designs including
the files of cancellation proceedings. (n)
Section 118. The Term of Industrial Design
Registration. - 118.1 The registration of an
industrial design shall be for a period of five (5)
years from the filing date of the application.
118.2. The registration of an industrial design
may be renewed for not more than two (2)
consecutive periods of five (5) years each, by
paying the renewal fee.
118.3. The renewal fee shall be paid within
twelve (12) months preceding the expiration of
the period of registration. However, a grace
period of six (6) months shall be granted for
payment of the fees after such expiration, upon
payment of a surcharge
118.4. The Regulations shall fix the amount of
renewal fee, the surcharge and other
requirements regarding the recording of
renewals of registration.
Section 119. Application of Other Sections and
Chapters. - 119.1. The following provisions
relating to patents shall apply mutatis mutandis
to an industrial design registration:
Section 21 - Novelty:
Section 24 - Prior art: Provided, That
the disclosure is contained in printed documents
or in any tangible form;
Section 25 - Non-prejudicial Disclosure;
Section 27 - Inventions Created
Pursuant to a Commission;
Section 28 - Right to a Patent;
Section 29 - First to File Rule;
Section 31 - Right of Priority: Provided,
That the application for industrial design shall be
filed within six (6) months from the earliest filing
date of the corresponding foreign application;
Section 33 - Appointment of Agent or
Representative;
Section 51 - Refusal of the Application;

Sections 56 to 60 - Surrender,
Correction of and Changes in Patent;
CHAPTER VII - Remedies of a
Person with a Right to Patent;
CHAPTER VIII - Rights of Patentees
and Infringement of Patents; and
CHAPTER XI - Assignment and
Transmission of Rights.
119.2. If the essential elements of an industrial
design which is the subject of an application
have been obtained from the creation of another
person without his consent, protection under
this Chapter cannot be invoked against the
injured party. (n)
Section 120. Cancellation of Design
Registration. - 120.1. At any time during the
term of the industrial design registration, any
person upon payment of the required fee, may
petition the Director of Legal Affairs to cancel
the industrial design on any of the following
grounds:
(a) If the subject matter of the industrial
design is not registrable within the terms of
Sections 112 and 113;
(b) If the subject matter is not new; or
(c) If the subject matter of the industrial
design extends beyond the content of the
application as originally filed.
120.2. Where the grounds for cancellation relate
to a part of the industrial design, cancellation
may be effected to such extent only. The
restriction may be effected in the form of an
alteration of the effected features of the design.
(n)
PART III
THE LAW ON TRADEMARKS, SERVICE
MARKS AND TRADE NAMES
Section 121. Definitions. - As used in Part III, the
following terms have the following meanings:
121.1. "Mark" means any visible sign capable of
distinguishing the goods (trademark) or services
(service mark) of an enterprise and shall include
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 129
a stamped or marked container of goods; (Sec.
38, R.A. No. 166a)
121.2. "Collective mark" means any visible sign
designated as such in the application for
registration and capable of distinguishing the
origin or any other common characteristic,
including the quality of goods or services of
different enterprises which use the sign under
the control of the registered owner of the
collective mark; (Sec. 40, R.A. No. 166a)
121.3. "Trade name" means the name or
designation identifying or distinguishing an
enterprise; (Sec. 38, R.A. No. 166a)
121.4. "Bureau" means the Bureau of
Trademarks;
121.5. "Director" means the Director of
Trademarks;
121.6. "Regulations" means the Rules of
Practice in Trademarks and Service Marks
formulated by the Director of Trademarks and
approved by the Director General; and
121.7. "Examiner" means the trademark
examiner. (Sec. 38, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 122. How Marks are Acquired. - The
rights in a mark shall be acquired through
registration made validly in accordance with the
provisions of this law. (Sec. 2-A, R A. No. 166a)
Section 123. Registrability. - 123.1. A mark
cannot be registered if it:
(a) Consists of immoral, deceptive or
scandalous matter, or matter which may
disparage or falsely suggest a connection with
persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or
national symbols, or bring them into contempt or
disrepute;
(b) Consists of the flag or coat of arms or
other insignia of the Philippines or any of its
political subdivisions, or of any foreign nation, or
any simulation thereof;

(c) Consists of a name, portrait or signature
identifying a particular living individual except by
his written consent, or the name, signature, or
portrait of a deceased President of the
Philippines, during the life of his widow, if any,
except by written consent of the widow;
(d) Is identical with a registered mark
belonging to a different proprietor or a mark with
an earlier filing or priority date, in respect of:
(i) The same goods or services, or
(ii) Closely related goods or services, or
(iii) If it nearly resembles such a mark as to
be likely to deceive or cause confusion;
(e) Is identical with, or confusingly similar to,
or constitutes a translation of a mark which is
considered by the competent authority of the
Philippines to be well-known internationally and
in the Philippines, whether or not it is registered
here, as being already the mark of a person
other than the applicant for registration, and
used for identical or similar goods or services:
Provided, That in determining whether a mark is
well-known, account shall be taken of the
knowledge of the relevant sector of the public,
rather than of the public at large, including
knowledge in the Philippines which has been
obtained as a result of the promotion of the
mark;
(f) Is identical with, or confusingly similar to,
or constitutes a translation of a mark considered
well-known in accordance with the preceding
paragraph, which is registered in the Philippines
with respect to goods or services which are not
similar to those with respect to which
registration is applied for: Provided, That use of
the mark in relation to those goods or services
would indicate a connection between those
goods or services, and the owner of the
registered mark: Provided further, That the
interests of the owner of the registered mark are
likely to be damaged by such use;
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 130
(g) Is likely to mislead the public, particularly
as to the nature, quality, characteristics or
geographical origin of the goods or services;
(h) Consists exclusively of signs that are
generic for the goods or services that they seek
to identify;
(i) Consists exclusively of signs or of
indications that have become customary or
usual to designate the goods or services in
everyday language or in bona fide and
established trade practice;
(j) Consists exclusively of signs or of
indications that may serve in trade to designate
the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose,
value, geographical origin, time or production of
the goods or rendering of the services, or other
characteristics of the goods or services;
(k) Consists of shapes that may be
necessitated by technical factors or by the
nature of the goods themselves or factors that
affect their intrinsic value;
(l) Consists of color alone, unless defined
by a given form; or
(m) Is contrary to public order or morality.
123.2. As regards signs or devices mentioned in
paragraphs (j), (k), and (l), nothing shall prevent
the registration of any such sign or device which
has become distinctive in relation to the goods
for which registration is requested as a result of
the use that have been made of it in commerce
in the Philippines. The Office may accept as
prima facie evidence that the mark has become
distinctive, as used in connection with the
applicant's goods or services in commerce,
proof of substantially exclusive and continuous
use thereof by the applicant in commerce in the
Philippines for five (5) years before the date on
which the claim of distinctiveness is made.
123.3. The nature of the goods to which the
mark is applied will not constitute an obstacle to
registration. (Sec. 4, R.A. No. 166a)

Section 124. Requirements of Application. -
124.1. The application for the registration of the
mark shall be in Filipino or in English and shall
contain the following:
(a) A request for registration;
(b) The name and address of the applicant;
(c) The name of a State of which the
applicant is a national or where he has domicile;
and the name of a State in which the applicant
has a real and effective industrial or commercial
establishment, if any;
(d) Where the applicant is a juridical entity,
the law under which it is organized and existing;
(e) The appointment of an agent or
representative, if the applicant is not domiciled
in the Philippines;
(f) Where the applicant claims the priority of
an earlier application, an indication of:
i) The name of the State with whose
national office the earlier application was filed or
if filed with an office other than a national office,
the name of that office,
ii) The date on which the earlier application
was filed, and
iii) Where available, the application number
of the earlier application;
(g) Where the applicant claims color as a
distinctive feature of the mark, a statement to
that effect as well as the name or names of the
color or colors claimed and an indication, in
respect of each color, of the principal parts of
the mark which are in that color;
(h) Where the mark is a three-dimensional
mark, a statement to that effect;
(i) One or more reproductions of the mark,
as prescribed in the Regulations;
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 131
(j) A transliteration or translation of the mark
or of some parts of the mark, as prescribed in
the Regulations;
(k) The names of the goods or services for
which the registration is sought, grouped
according to the classes of the Nice
Classification, together with the number of the
class of the said Classification to which each
group of goods or services belongs; and
(l) A signature by, or other self-identification
of, the applicant or his representative.
124.2. The applicant or the registrant shall file a
declaration of actual use of the mark with
evidence to that effect, as prescribed by the
Regulations within three (3) years from the filing
date of the application. Otherwise, the
application shall be refused or the mark shall be
removed from the Register by the Director.
124.3. One (1) application may relate to several
goods and/or services, whether they belong to
one (1) class or to several classes of the Nice
Classification.
124.4. If during the examination of the
application, the Office finds factual basis to
reasonably doubt the veracity of any indication
or element in the application, it may require the
applicant to submit sufficient evidence to
remove the doubt. (Sec. 5, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 125. Representation; Address for
Service. - If the applicant is not domiciled or has
no real and effective commercial establishment
in the Philippines, he shall designate by a
written document filed in the Office, the name
and address of a Philippine resident who may
be served notices or process in proceedings
affecting the mark. Such notices or services
may be served upon the person so designated
by leaving a copy thereof at the address
specified in the last designation filed. If the
person so designated cannot be found at the
address given in the last designation, such
notice or process may be served upon the
Director. (Sec. 3, R.A. No. 166a)

Section 126. Disclaimers. - The Office may
allow or require the applicant to disclaim an
unregistrable component of an otherwise
registrable mark but such disclaimer shall not
prejudice or affect the applicant's or owner's
rights then existing or thereafter arising in the
disclaimed matter, nor such shall disclaimer
prejudice or affect the applicant's or owner's
right on another application of later date if the
disclaimed matter became distinctive of the
applicant's or owner's goods, business or
services. (Sec. 13, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 127. Filing Date. - 127.1. Requirements.
- The filing date of an application shall be the
date on which the Office received the following
indications and elements in English or Filipino:
(a) An express or implicit indication that the
registration of a mark is sought;
(b) The identity of the applicant;
(c) Indications sufficient to contact the
applicant or his representative, if any;
(d) A reproduction of the mark whose
registration is sought; and
(e) The list of the goods or services for which
the registration is sought.
127.2. No filing date shall be accorded until the
required fee is paid. (n)
Section 128. Single Registration for Goods
and/or Services. - Where goods and/or services
belonging to several classes of the Nice
Classification have been included in one (1)
application, such an application shall result in
one registration. (n)
Section 129. Division of Application. - Any
application referring to several goods or
services, hereafter referred to as the "initial
application," may be divided by the applicant
into two (2) or more applications, hereafter
referred to as the "divisional applications," by
distributing among the latter the goods or
services referred to in the initial application. The
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 132
divisional applications shall preserve the filing
date of the initial application or the benefit of the
right of priority. (n)
Section 130. Signature and Other Means of
Self-Identification. - 130.1. Where a signature is
required, the Office shall accept:
(a) A hand-written signature; or
(b) The use of other forms of signature, such
as a printed or stamped signature, or the use of
a seal instead of a hand-written signature:
Provided, That where a seal is used, it should
be accompanied by an indication in letters of the
name of the signatory.
130.2. The Office shall accept communications
to it by telecopier, or by electronic means
subject to the conditions or requirements that
will be prescribed by the Regulations. When
communications are made by telefacsimile, the
reproduction of the signature, or the
reproduction of the seal together with, where
required, the indication in letters of the name of
the natural person whose seal is used, appears.
The original communications must be received
by the Office within thirty (30) days from date of
receipt of the telefacsimile.
130.3. No attestation, notarization,
authentication, legalization or other certification
of any signature or other means of self-
identification referred to in the preceding
paragraphs, will be required, except, where the
signature concerns the surrender of a
registration. (n)
Section 131. Priority Right. - 131.1. An
application for registration of a mark filed in the
Philippines by a person referred to in Section 3,
and who previously duly filed an application for
registration of the same mark in one of those
countries, shall be considered as filed as of the
day the application was first filed in the foreign
country.
131.2. No registration of a mark in the
Philippines by a person described in this section
shall be granted until such mark has been

registered in the country of origin of the
applicant.
131.3. Nothing in this section shall entitle the
owner of a registration granted under this
section to sue for acts committed prior to the
date on which his mark was registered in this
country: Provided, That, notwithstanding the
foregoing, the owner of a well-known mark as
defined in Section 123.1(e) of this Act, that is not
registered in the Philippines, may, against an
identical or confusingly similar mark, oppose its
registration, or petition the cancellation of its
registration or sue for unfair competition, without
prejudice to availing himself of other remedies
provided for under the law.
131.4. In like manner and subject to the same
conditions and requirements, the right provided
in this section may be based upon a subsequent
regularly filed application in the same foreign
country: Provided, That any foreign application
filed prior to such subsequent application has
been withdrawn, abandoned, or otherwise
disposed of, without having been laid open to
public inspection and without leaving any rights
outstanding, and has not served, nor thereafter
shall serve, as a basis for claiming a right of
priority. (Sec. 37, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 132. Application Number and Filing
Date. - 132.1. The Office shall examine whether
the application satisfies the requirements for the
grant of a filing date as provided in Section 127
and Regulations relating thereto. If the
application does not satisfy the filing
requirements, the Office shall notify the
applicant who shall within a period fixed by the
Regulations complete or correct the application
as required, otherwise, the application shall be
considered withdrawn.
132.2 Once an application meets the filing
requirements of Section 127, it shall be
numbered in the sequential order, and the
applicant shall be informed of the application
number and the filing date of the application will
be deemed to have been abandoned. (n)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 133
Section 133. Examination and Publication. -
133.1. Once the application meets the filing
requirements of Section 127, the Office shall
examine whether the application meets the
requirements of Section 124 and the mark as
defined in Section 121 is registrable under
Section 123.
133.2. Where the Office finds that the conditions
referred to in Subsection 133.1 are fulfilled, it
shall upon payment of the prescribed fee,
forthwith cause the application, as filed, to be
published in the prescribed manner.
133.3. If after the examination, the applicant is
not entitled to registration for any reason, the
Office shall advise the applicant thereof and the
reasons therefor. The applicant shall have a
period of four (4) months in which to reply or
amend his application, which shall then be re-
examined. The Regulations shall determine the
procedure for the re-examination or revival of an
application as well as the appeal to the Director
of Trademarks from any final action by the
Examiner.
133.4. An abandoned application may be
revived as a pending application within three (3)
months from the date of abandonment, upon
good cause shown and the payment of the
required fee.
133.5. The final decision of refusal of the
Director of Trademarks shall be appealable to
the Director General in accordance with the
procedure fixed by the Regulations. (Sec. 7,
R.A. No. 166a)
Section 134. Opposition. - Any person who
believes that he would be damaged by the
registration of a mark may, upon payment of the
required fee and within thirty (30) days after the
publication referred to in Subsection 133.2, file
with the Office an opposition to the application.
Such opposition shall be in writing and verified
by the oppositor or by any person on his behalf
who knows the facts, and shall specify the
grounds on which it is based and include a
statement of the facts relied upon. Copies of
certificates of registration of marks registered in

other countries or other supporting documents
mentioned in the opposition shall be filed
therewith, together with the translation in
English, if not in the English language. For good
cause shown and upon payment of the required
surcharge, the time for filing an opposition may
be extended by the Director of Legal Affairs,
who shall notify the applicant of such extension.
The Regulations shall fix the maximum period of
time within which to file the opposition. (Sec. 8,
R.A. No. 165a)
Section 135. Notice and Hearing. - Upon the
filing of an opposition, the Office shall serve
notice of the filing on the applicant, and of the
date of the hearing thereof upon the applicant
and the oppositor and all other persons having
any right, title or interest in the mark covered by
the application, as appear of record in the
Office. (Sec. 9, R.A. No. 165)
Section 136. Issuance and Publication of
Certificate. - When the period for filing the
opposition has expired, or when the Director of
Legal Affairs shall have denied the opposition,
the Office upon payment of the required fee,
shall issue the certificate of registration. Upon
issuance of a certificate of registration, notice
thereof making reference to the publication of
the application shall be published in the IPO
Gazette. (Sec. 10, R.A. No. 165)
Section 137. Registration of Mark and Issuance
of a Certificate to the Owner or his Assignee. -
137.1. The Office shall maintain a Register in
which shall be registered marks, numbered in
the order of their registration, and all
transactions in respect of each mark, required to
be recorded by virtue of this law.
137.2. The registration of a mark shall include a
reproduction of the mark and shall mention: its
number; the name and address of the registered
owner and, if the registered owner's address is
outside the country, his address for service
within the country; the dates of application and
registration; if priority is claimed, an indication of
this fact, and the number, date and country of
the application, basis of the priority claims; the
list of goods or services in respect of which
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 134
registration has been granted, with the
indication of the corresponding class or classes;
and such other data as the Regulations may
prescribe from time to time.
137.3. A certificate of registration of a mark may
be issued to the assignee of the applicant:
Provided, That the assignment is recorded in
the Office. In case of a change of ownership, the
Office shall at the written request signed by the
owner, or his representative, or by the new
owner, or his representative and upon a proper
showing and the payment of the prescribed fee,
issue to such assignee a new certificate of
registration of the said mark in the name of such
assignee, and for the unexpired part of the
original period.
137.4. The Office shall record any change of
address, or address for service, which shall be
notified to it by the registered owner.
137.5. In the absence of any provision to the
contrary in this Act, communications to be made
to the registered owner by virtue of this Act shall
be sent to him at his last recorded address and,
at the same, at his last recorded address for
service. (Sec. 19, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 138. Certificates of Registration. - A
certificate of registration of a mark shall be
prima facie evidence of the validity of the
registration, the registrant's ownership of the
mark, and of the registrant's exclusive right to
use the same in connection with the goods or
services and those that are related thereto
specified in the certificate. (Sec. 20, R.A. No.
165)
Section 139. Publication of Registered Marks;
Inspection of Register. - 139.1. The Office shall
publish, in the form and within the period fixed
by the Regulations, the marks registered, in the
order of their registration, reproducing all the
particulars referred to in Subsection 137.2.
139.2. Marks registered at the Office may be
inspected free of charge and any person may
obtain copies thereof at his own expense. This

provision shall also be applicable to transactions
recorded in respect of any registered mark. (n)
Section 140. Cancellation upon Application by
Registrant; Amendment or Disclaimer of
Registration. - Upon application of the
registrant, the Office may permit any registration
to be surrendered for cancellation, and upon
cancellation the appropriate entry shall be made
in the records of the Office. Upon application of
the registrant and payment of the prescribed
fee, the Office for good cause may permit any
registration to be amended or to be disclaimed
in part: Provided, That the amendment or
disclaimer does not alter materially the
character of the mark. Appropriate entry shall be
made in the records of the Office upon the
certificate of registration or, if said certificate is
lost or destroyed, upon a certified copy thereof
(Sec. 14, R.A. No. 166)
Section 141. Sealed and Certified Copies as
Evidence. - Copies of any records, books,
papers, or drawings belonging to the Office
relating to marks, and copies of registrations,
when authenticated by the seal of the Office and
certified by the Director of the Administrative,
Financial and Human Resource Development
Service Bureau or in his name by an employee
of the Office duly authorized by said Director,
shall be evidence in all cases wherein the
originals would be evidence; and any person
who applies and pays the prescribed fee shall
secure such copies. (n)
Section 142. Correction of Mistakes Made by
the Office. - Whenever a material mistake in a
registration incurred through the fault of the
Office is clearly disclosed by the records of the
Office, a certificate stating the fact and nature of
such mistake shall be issued without charge,
recorded and a printed copy thereof shall be
attached to each printed copy of the registration.
Such corrected registration shall thereafter have
the same effect as the original certificate; or in
the discretion of the Director of the
Administrative, Financial and Human Resource
Development Service Bureau a new certificate
of registration may be issued without charge. All
certificates of correction heretofore issued in
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 135
accordance with the Regulations and the
registration to which they are attached shall
have the same force and effect as if such
certificates and their issuance had been
authorized by this Act. (n)
Section 143. Correction of Mistakes Made by
Applicant. - Whenever a mistake is made in a
registration and such mistake occurred in good
faith through the fault of the applicant, the Office
may issue a certificate upon the payment of the
prescribed fee: Provided, That the correction
does not involve any change in the registration
that requires republication of the mark. (n)
Section 144. Classification of Goods and
Services. - 144.1. Each registration, and any
publication of the Office which concerns an
application or registration effected by the Office
shall indicate the goods or services by their
names, grouped according to the classes of the
Nice Classification, and each group shall be
preceded by the number of the class of that
Classification to which that group of goods or
services belongs, presented in the order of the
classes of the said Classification.
144.2. Goods or services may not be
considered as being similar or dissimilar to each
other on the ground that, in any registration or
publication by the Office, they appear in different
classes of the Nice Classification. (Sec. 6, R.A.
No. 166a)
Section 145. Duration. - A certificate of
registration shall remain in force for ten (10)
years: Provided, That the registrant shall file a
declaration of actual use and evidence to that
effect, or shall show valid reasons based on the
existence of obstacles to such use, as
prescribed by the Regulations, within one (1)
year from the fifth anniversary of the date of the
registration of the mark. Otherwise, the mark
shall be removed from the Register by the
Office. (Sec. 12, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 146. Renewal. - 146.1. A certificate of
registration may be renewed for periods of ten
(10) years at its expiration upon payment of the

prescribed fee and upon filing of a request. The
request shall contain the following indications:
(a) An indication that renewal is sought;
(b) The name and address of the registrant
or his successor-in-interest, hereafter referred
to as the "right holder";
(c) The registration number of the
registration concerned;
(d) The filing date of the application which
resulted in the registration concerned to be
renewed;
(e) Where the right holder has a
representative, the name and address of that
representative;
(f) The names of the recorded goods or
services for which the renewal is requested or
the names of the recorded goods or services for
which the renewal is not requested, grouped
according to the classes of the Nice
Classification to which that group of goods or
services belongs and presented in the order of
the classes of the said Classification; and
(g) A signature by the right holder or his
representative.
146.2. Such request shall be in Filipino or
English and may be made at any time within six
(6) months before the expiration of the period for
which the registration was issued or renewed, or
it may be made within six (6) months after such
expiration on payment of the additional fee
herein prescribed.
146.3. If the Office refuses to renew the
registration, it shall notify the registrant of his
refusal and the reasons therefor.
146.4. An applicant for renewal not domiciled in
the Philippines shall be subject to and comply
with the requirements of this Act. (Sec. 15, R.A.
No. 166a)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 136
Section 147. Rights Conferred. - 147.1. The
owner of a registered mark shall have the
exclusive right to prevent all third parties not
having the owner's consent from using in the
course of trade identical or similar signs or
containers for goods or services which are
identical or similar to those in respect of which
the trademark is registered where such use
would result in a likelihood of confusion. In case
of the use of an identical sign for identical goods
or services, a likelihood of confusion shall be
presumed.
147.2. The exclusive right of the owner of a well-
known mark defined in Subsection 123.1(e)
which is registered in the Philippines, shall
extend to goods and services which are not
similar to those in respect of which the mark is
registered: Provided, That use of that mark in
relation to those goods or services would
indicate a connection between those goods or
services and the owner of the registered mark:
Provided further, That the interests of the owner
of the registered mark are likely to be damaged
by such use. (n)
Section 148. Use of Indications by Third Parties
for Purposes Other than those for which the
Mark is Used. - Registration of the mark shall
not confer on the registered owner the right to
preclude third parties from using bona fide their
names, addresses, pseudonyms, a
geographical name, or exact indications
concerning the kind, quality, quantity,
destination, value, place of origin, or time of
production or of supply, of their goods or
services: Provided, That such use is confined to
the purposes of mere identification or
information and cannot mislead the public as to
the source of the goods or services. (n)
Section 149. Assignment and Transfer of
Application and Registration. - 149.1. An
application for registration of a mark, or its
registration, may be assigned or transferred with
or without the transfer of the business using the
mark. (n)
149.2. Such assignment or transfer shall,
however, be null and void if it is liable to mislead

the public, particularly as regards the nature,
source, manufacturing process, characteristics,
or suitability for their purpose, of the goods or
services to which the mark is applied.
149.3. The assignment of the application for
registration of a mark, or of its registration, shall
be in writing and require the signatures of the
contracting parties. Transfers by mergers or
other forms of succession may be made by any
document supporting such transfer.
149.4. Assignments and transfers of
registrations of marks shall be recorded at the
Office on payment of the prescribed fee;
assignment and transfers of applications for
registration shall, on payment of the same fee,
be provisionally recorded, and the mark, when
registered, shall be in the name of the assignee
or transferee.
149.5. Assignments and transfers shall have no
effect against third parties until they are
recorded at the Office. (Sec. 31, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 150. License Contracts. - 150.1. Any
license contract concerning the registration of a
mark, or an application therefor, shall provide for
effective control by the licensor of the quality of
the goods or services of the licensee in
connection with which the mark is used. If the
license contract does not provide for such
quality control, or if such quality control is not
effectively carried out, the license contract shall
not be valid.
150.2. A license contract shall be submitted to
the Office which shall keep its contents
confidential but shall record it and publish a
reference thereto. A license contract shall have
no effect against third parties until such
recording is effected. The Regulations shall fix
the procedure for the recording of the license
contract. (n)
Section 151. Cancellation. - 151.1. A petition to
cancel a registration of a mark under this Act
may be filed with the Bureau of Legal Affairs by
any person who believes that he is or will be
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 137
damaged by the registration of a mark under this
Act as follows:
(a) Within five (5) years from the date of the
registration of the mark under this Act.
(b) At any time, if the registered mark
becomes the generic name for the goods or
services, or a portion thereof, for which it is
registered, or has been abandoned, or its
registration was obtained fraudulently or
contrary to the provisions of this Act, or if the
registered mark is being used by, or with the
permission of, the registrant so as to
misrepresent the source of the goods or
services on or in connection with which the mark
is used. If the registered mark becomes the
generic name for less than all of the goods or
services for which it is registered, a petition to
cancel the registration for only those goods or
services may be filed. A registered mark shall
not be deemed to be the generic name of goods
or services solely because such mark is also
used as a name of or to identify a unique product
or service. The primary significance of the
registered mark to the relevant public rather
than purchaser motivation shall be the test for
determining whether the registered mark has
become the generic name of goods or services
on or in connection with which it has been used.
(n)
(c) At any time, if the registered owner of the
mark without legitimate reason fails to use the
mark within the Philippines, or to cause it to be
used in the Philippines by virtue of a license
during an uninterrupted period of three (3) years
or longer.
151.2. Notwithstanding the foregoing
provisions, the court or the administrative
agency vested with jurisdiction to hear and
adjudicate any action to enforce the rights to a
registered mark shall likewise exercise
jurisdiction to determine whether the registration
of said mark may be cancelled in accordance
with this Act. The filing of a suit to enforce the
registered mark with the proper court or agency
shall exclude any other court or agency from
assuming jurisdiction over a subsequently filed

petition to cancel the same mark. On the other
hand, the earlier filing of petition to cancel the
mark with the Bureau of Legal Affairs shall not
constitute a prejudicial question that must be
resolved before an action to enforce the rights
to same registered mark may be decided. (Sec.
17, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 152. Non-use of a Mark When Excused.
- 152.1. Non-use of a mark may be excused if
caused by circumstances arising independently
of the will of the trademark owner. Lack of funds
shall not excuse non-use of a mark.
152.2. The use of the mark in a form different
from the form in which it is registered, which
does not alter its distinctive character, shall not
be ground for cancellation or removal of the
mark and shall not diminish the protection
granted to the mark.
152.3. The use of a mark in connection with one
or more of the goods or services belonging to
the class in respect of which the mark is
registered shall prevent its cancellation or
removal in respect of all other goods or services
of the same class.
152.4. The use of a mark by a company related
with the registrant or applicant shall inure to the
latter's benefit, and such use shall not affect the
validity of such mark or of its registration:
Provided, That such mark is not used in such
manner as to deceive the public. If use of a mark
by a person is controlled by the registrant or
applicant with respect to the nature and quality
of the goods or services, such use shall inure to
the benefit of the registrant or applicant. (n)
Section 153. Requirements of Petition; Notice
and Hearing. - Insofar as applicable, the petition
for cancellation shall be in the same form as that
provided in Section 134 hereof, and notice and
hearing shall be as provided in Section 135
hereof.
Section 154. Cancellation of Registration. - If the
Bureau of Legal Affairs finds that a case for
cancellation has been made out, it shall order
the cancellation of the registration. When the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 138
order or judgment becomes final, any right
conferred by such registration upon the
registrant or any person in interest of record
shall terminate. Notice of cancellation shall be
published in the IPO Gazette. (Sec. 19, R.A. No.
166a)
Section 155. Remedies; Infringement. - Any
person who shall, without the consent of the
owner of the registered mark:
155.1. Use in commerce any reproduction,
counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark or the same container or a
dominant feature thereof in connection with the
sale, offering for sale, distribution, advertising of
any goods or services including other
preparatory steps necessary to carry out the
sale of any goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive; or
155.2. Reproduce, counterfeit, copy or colorably
imitate a registered mark or a dominant feature
thereof and apply such reproduction,
counterfeit, copy or colorable imitation to labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles
or advertisements intended to be used in
commerce upon or in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil
action for infringement by the registrant for the
remedies hereinafter set forth: Provided, That
the infringement takes place at the moment any
of the acts stated in Subsection 155.1 or this
subsection are committed regardless of whether
there is actual sale of goods or services using
the infringing material. (Sec. 22, R.A. No 166a)
Section 156. Actions, and Damages and
Injunction for Infringement. - 156.1. The owner
of a registered mark may recover damages from
any person who infringes his rights, and the
measure of the damages suffered shall be either
the reasonable profit which the complaining
party would have made, had the defendant not
infringed his rights, or the profit which the

defendant actually made out of the infringement,
or in the event such measure of damages
cannot be readily ascertained with reasonable
certainty, then the court may award as damages
a reasonable percentage based upon the
amount of gross sales of the defendant or the
value of the services in connection with which
the mark or trade name was used in the
infringement of the rights of the complaining
party. (Sec. 23, first par., R.A. No. 166a)
156.2. On application of the complainant, the
court may impound during the pendency of the
action, sales invoices and other documents
evidencing sales. (n)
156.3. In cases where actual intent to mislead
the public or to defraud the complainant is
shown, in the discretion of the court, the
damages may be doubled. (Sec. 23, first par.,
R.A. No. 166)
156.4. The complainant, upon proper showing,
may also be granted injunction. (Sec. 23,
second par., R.A. No. 166a)
Section 157. Power of Court to Order Infringing
Material Destroyed. - 157.1 In any action arising
under this Act, in which a violation of any right
of the owner of the registered mark is
established, the court may order that goods
found to be infringing be, without compensation
of any sort, disposed of outside the channels of
commerce in such a manner as to avoid any
harm caused to the right holder, or destroyed;
and all labels, signs, prints, packages,
wrappers, receptacles and advertisements in
the possession of the defendant, bearing the
registered mark or trade name or any
reproduction, counterfeit, copy or colorable
imitation thereof, all plates, molds, matrices and
other means of making the same, shall be
delivered up and destroyed.
157.2. In regard to counterfeit goods, the simple
removal of the trademark affixed shall not be
sufficient other than in exceptional cases which
shall be determined by the Regulations, to
permit the release of the goods into the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 139
channels of commerce. (Sec. 24, R.A. No.
166a)
Section 158. Damages; Requirement of Notice.
- In any suit for infringement, the owner of the
registered mark shall not be entitled to recover
profits or damages unless the acts have been
committed with knowledge that such imitation is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive. Such knowledge is presumed if
the registrant gives notice that his mark is
registered by displaying with the mark the words
'"Registered Mark" or the letter R within a circle
or if the defendant had otherwise actual notice
of the registration. (Sec. 21, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 159. Limitations to Actions for
Infringement. - Notwithstanding any other
provision of this Act, the remedies given to the
owner of a right infringed under this Act shall be
limited as follows:
159.1. Notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 155 hereof, a registered mark shall
have no effect against any person who, in good
faith, before the filing date or the priority date,
was using the mark for the purposes of his
business or enterprise: Provided, That his right
may only be transferred or assigned together
with his enterprise or business or with that part
of his enterprise or business in which the mark
is used.
159.2. Where an infringer who is engaged solely
in the business of printing the mark or other
infringing materials for others is an innocent
infringer, the owner of the right infringed shall be
entitled as against such infringer only to an
injunction against future printing.
159.3. Where the infringement complained of is
contained in or is part of paid advertisement in a
newspaper, magazine, or other similar
periodical or in an electronic communication, the
remedies of the owner of the right infringed as
against the publisher or distributor of such
newspaper, magazine, or other similar
periodical or electronic communication shall be
limited to an injunction against the presentation
of such advertising matter in future issues of

such newspapers, magazines, or other similar
periodicals or in future transmissions of such
electronic communications. The limitations of
this subparagraph shall apply only to innocent
infringers: Provided, That such injunctive relief
shall not be available to the owner of the right
infringed with respect to an issue of a
newspaper, magazine, or other similar
periodical or an electronic communication
containing infringing matter where restraining
the dissemination of such infringing matter in
any particular issue of such periodical or in an
electronic communication would delay the
delivery of such issue or transmission of such
electronic communication is customarily
conducted in accordance with the sound
business practice, and not due to any method or
device adopted to evade this section or to
prevent or delay the issuance of an injunction or
restraining order with respect to such infringing
matter. (n)
Section 160. Right of Foreign Corporation to
Sue in Trademark or Service Mark Enforcement
Action. - Any foreign national or juridical person
who meets the requirements of Section 3 of this
Act and does not engage in business in the
Philippines may bring a civil or administrative
action hereunder for opposition, cancellation,
infringement, unfair competition, or false
designation of origin and false description,
whether or not it is licensed to do business in the
Philippines under existing laws. (Sec. 21-A, R.A.
No. 166a)
Section 161. Authority to Determine Right to
Registration. - In any action involving a
registered mark, the court may determine the
right to registration, order the cancellation of a
registration, in whole or in part, and otherwise
rectify the register with respect to the
registration of any party to the action in the
exercise of this. Judgment and orders shall be
certified by the court to the Director, who shall
make appropriate entry upon the records of the
Bureau, and shall be controlled thereby. (Sec.
25, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 162. Action for False or Fraudulent
Declaration. - Any person who shall procure
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 140
registration in the Office of a mark by a false or
fraudulent declaration or representation,
whether oral or in writing, or by any false means,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person
injured thereby for any damages sustained in
consequence thereof (Sec. 26, R.A. No. 166)
Section 163. Jurisdiction of Court. - All actions
under Sections 150, 155, 164, and 166 to 169
shall be brought before the proper courts with
appropriate jurisdiction under existing laws.
(Sec. 27, R.A. No. 166)
Section 164. Notice of Filing Suit Given to the
Director. - It shall be the duty of the clerks of
such courts within one (1) month after the filing
of any action, suit, or proceeding involving a
mark registered under the provisions of this Act,
to notify the Director in writing setting forth: the
names and addresses of the litigants and
designating the number of the registration or
registrations and within one (1) month after the
judgment is entered or an appeal is taken, the
clerk of court shall give notice thereof to the
Office, and the latter shall endorse the same
upon the filewrapper of the said registration or
registrations and incorporate the same as a part
of the contents of said filewrapper. (n)
Section 165. Trade Names or Business Names.
- 165.1. A name or designation may not be used
as a trade name if by its nature or the use to
which such name or designation may be put, it
is contrary to public order or morals and if, in
particular, it is liable to deceive trade circles or
the public as to the nature of the enterprise
identified by that name.
165.2.(a) Notwithstanding any laws or
regulations providing for any obligation to
register trade names, such names shall be
protected, even prior to or without registration,
against any unlawful act committed by third
parties.
(b) In particular, any subsequent use of the
trade name by a third party, whether as a trade
name or a mark or collective mark, or any such
use of a similar trade name or mark, likely to
mislead the public, shall be deemed unlawful.

165.3. The remedies provided for in Sections
153 to 156 and Sections 166 and 167 shall
apply mutatis mutandis.
165.4. Any change in the ownership of a trade
name shall be made with the transfer of the
enterprise or part thereof identified by that
name. The provisions of Subsections 149.2 to
149.4 shall apply mutatis mutandis.
Section 166. Goods Bearing Infringing Marks or
Trade Names. - No article of imported
merchandise which shall copy or simulate the
name of any domestic product, or manufacturer,
or dealer, or which shall copy or simulate a mark
registered in accordance with the provisions of
this Act, or shall bear a mark or trade name
calculated to induce the public to believe that
the article is manufactured in the Philippines, or
that it is manufactured in any foreign country or
locality other than the country or locality where
it is in fact manufactured, shall be admitted to
entry at any customhouse of the Philippines. In
order to aid the officers of the customs service
in enforcing this prohibition, any person who is
entitled to the benefits of this Act, may require
that his name and residence, and the name of
the locality in which his goods are
manufactured, a copy of the certificate of
registration of his mark or trade name, to be
recorded in books which shall be kept for this
purpose in the Bureau of Customs, under such
regulations as the Collector of Customs with the
approval of the Secretary of Finance shall
prescribe, and may furnish to the said Bureau
facsimiles of his name, the name of the locality
in which his goods are manufactured, or his
registered mark or trade name, and thereupon
the Collector of Customs shall cause one (1) or
more copies of the same to be transmitted to
each collector or to other proper officer of the
Bureau of Customs. (Sec. 35, R.A. No. 166)
Section 167. Collective Marks. - 167.1. Subject
to Subsections 167.2 and 167.3, Sections 122
to 164 and 166 shall apply to collective marks,
except that references therein to "mark" shall be
read as "collective mark".
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 141
167.2.(a) An application for registration of a
collective mark shall designate the mark as a
collective mark and shall be accompanied by a
copy of the agreement, if any, governing the use
of the collective mark.
(b) The registered owner of a collective mark
shall notify the Director of any changes made in
respect of the agreement referred to in
paragraph (a).
167.3. In addition to the grounds provided in
Section 149, the Court shall cancel the
registration of a collective mark if the person
requesting the cancellation proves that only the
registered owner uses the mark, or that he uses
or permits its use in contravention of the
agreements referred to in Subsection 166.2 or
that he uses or permits its use in a manner liable
to deceive trade circles or the public as to the
origin or any other common characteristics of
the goods or services concerned.
167.4. The registration of a collective mark, or
an application therefor shall not be the subject
of a license contract. (Sec. 40, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 168. Unfair Competition, Rights,
Regulation and Remedies. - 168.1. A person
who has identified in the mind of the public the
goods he manufactures or deals in, his business
or services from those of others, whether or not
a registered mark is employed, has a property
right in the goodwill of the said goods, business
or services so identified, which will be protected
in the same manner as other property rights.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception
or any other means contrary to good faith by
which he shall pass off the goods manufactured
by him or in which he deals, or his business, or
services for those of the one having established
such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts
calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty
of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an
action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way
limiting the scope of protection against unfair

competition, the following shall be deemed
guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and
gives them the general appearance of goods of
another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the
goods themselves or in the wrapping of the
packages in which they are contained, or the
devices or words thereon, or in any other feature
of their appearance, which would be likely to
influence purchasers to believe that the goods
offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer,
other than the actual manufacturer or dealer, or
who otherwise clothes the goods with such
appearance as shall deceive the public and
defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any
subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent
of any vendor engaged in selling such goods
with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or
device, or who employs any other means
calculated to induce the false belief that such
person is offering the services of another who
has identified such services in the mind of the
public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false
statement in the course of trade or who shall
commit any other act contrary to good faith of a
nature calculated to discredit the goods,
business or services of another.
168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156,
157 and 161 shall apply mutatis mutandis. (Sec.
29, R.A. No. 166a)
Section 169. False Designations of Origin; False
Description or Representation. - 169.1. Any
person who, on or in connection with any goods
or services, or any container for goods, uses in
commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false
designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading
representation of fact, which:
(a) Is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation,
connection, or association of such person with
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 142
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship,
or approval of his or her goods, services, or
commercial activities by another person; or
(b) In commercial advertising or promotion,
misrepresents the nature, characteristics,
qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or
another person's goods, services, or
commercial activities, shall be liable to a civil
action for damages and injunction provided in
Sections 156 and 157 of this Act by any person
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
169.2. Any goods marked or labelled in
contravention of the provisions of this Section
shall not be imported into the Philippines or
admitted entry at any customhouse of the
Philippines. The owner, importer, or consignee
of goods refused entry at any customhouse
under this section may have any recourse under
the customs revenue laws or may have the
remedy given by this Act in cases involving
goods refused entry or seized. (Sec. 30, R.A.
No. 166a)
Section 170. Penalties. - Independent of the civil
and administrative sanctions imposed by law, a
criminal penalty of imprisonment from two (2)
years to five (5) years and a fine ranging from
Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) to Two hundred
thousand pesos(P200,000), shall be imposed
on any person who is found guilty of committing
any of the acts mentioned in Section 155,
Section 168 and Subsection 169.1. (Arts. 188
and 189, Revised Penal Code)
PART IV
THE LAW ON COPYRIGHT
CHAPTER I
PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Section 171. Definitions. - For the purpose of
this Act, the following terms have the following
meaning:
171.1. "Author" is the natural person who has
created the work;

171.2. A "collective work" is a work which has
been created by two (2) or more natural persons
at the initiative and under the direction of
another with the understanding that it will be
disclosed by the latter under his own name and
that contributing natural persons will not be
identified;
171.3. "Communication to the public" or
"communicate to the public" means the making
of a work available to the public by wire or
wireless means in such a way that members of
the public may access these works from a place
and time individually chosen by them;
171.4. A "computer" is an electronic or similar
device having information-processing
capabilities, and a "computer program" is a set
of instructions expressed in words, codes,
schemes or in any other form, which is capable
when incorporated in a medium that the
computer can read, of causing the computer to
perform or achieve a particular task or result;
171.5. "Public lending" is the transfer of
possession of the original or a copy of a work or
sound recording for a limited period, for non-
profit purposes, by an institution the services of
which are available to the public, such as public
library or archive;
171.6. "Public performance", in the case of a
work other than an audiovisual work, is the
recitation, playing, dancing, acting or otherwise
performing the work, either directly or by means
of any device or process; in the case of an
audiovisual work, the showing of its images in
sequence and the making of the sounds
accompanying it audible; and, in the case of a
sound recording, making the recorded sounds
audible at a place or at places where persons
outside the normal circle of a family and that
family's closest social acquaintances are or can
be present, irrespective of whether they are or
can be present at the same place and at the
same time, or at different places and/or at
different times, and where the performance can
be perceived without the need for
communication within the meaning of
Subsection 171.3;
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 143
171.7. "Published works" means works, which,
with the consent of the authors, are made
available to the public by wire or wireless means
in such a way that members of the public may
access these works from a place and time
individually chosen by them: Provided, That
availability of such copies has been such, as to
satisfy the reasonable requirements of the
public, having regard to the nature of the work;
171.8. "Rental" is the transfer of the possession
of the original or a copy of a work or a sound
recording for a limited period of time, for profit-
making purposes;
171.9. "Reproduction" is the making of one (1)
or more copies of a work or a sound recording
in any manner or form (Sec. 41 (E), P.D. No. 49
a);
171.10. A "work of applied art" is an artistic
creation with utilitarian functions or incorporated
in a useful article, whether made by hand or
produced on an industrial scale;
171.11. A "work of the Government of the
Philippines" is a work created by an officer or
employee of the Philippine Government or any
of its subdivisions and instrumentalities,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations as a part of his regularly prescribed
official duties.
CHAPTER II
ORIGINAL WORKS
Section 172. Literary and Artistic Works. - 172.1.
Literary and artistic works, hereinafter referred
to as "works", are original intellectual creations
in the literary and artistic domain protected from
the moment of their creation and shall include in
particular:
(a) Books, pamphlets, articles and other
writings;
(b) Periodicals and newspapers;
 ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 144

(c) Lectures, sermons, addresses, CHAPTER III

dissertations prepared for oral delivery, whether DERIVATIVE WORKS
or not reduced in writing or other material form;
Section 173. Derivative Works. - 173.1. The
(d) Letters; following derivative works shall also be
protected by copyright:
(e) Dramatic or dramatico-musical
compositions; choreographic works or (a) Dramatizations, translations,
entertainment in dumb shows; adaptations, abridgments, arrangements, and
other alterations of literary or artistic works; and
(f) Musical compositions, with or without
words; (b) Collections of literary, scholarly or artistic
works, and compilations of data and other
(g) Works of drawing, painting, architecture, materials which are original by reason of the
sculpture, engraving, lithography or other works selection or coordination or arrangement of their
of art; models or designs for works of art; contents. (Sec. 2, [P] and [Q], P.D. No. 49)

(h) Original ornamental designs or models
for articles of manufacture, whether or not
registrable as an industrial design, and other
works of applied art;
(i) Illustrations, maps, plans, sketches,
charts and three-dimensional works relative to
geography, topography, architecture or science;
(j) Drawings or plastic works of a scientific
or technical character;
(k) Photographic works including works
produced by a process analogous to
photography; lantern slides;
(l) Audiovisual works and cinematographic
works and works produced by a process
analogous to cinematography or any process for
making audio-visual recordings;
173.2. The works referred to in paragraphs (a)
and (b) of Subsection 173.1 shall be protected
as new works: Provided however, That such
new work shall not affect the force of any
subsisting copyright upon the original works
employed or any part thereof, or be construed to
imply any right to such use of the original works,
or to secure or extend copyright in such original
works. (Sec. 8, P.D. 49; Art. 10, TRIPS)
Section 174. Published Edition of Work. - In
addition to the right to publish granted by the
author, his heirs, or assigns, the publisher shall
have a copyright consisting merely of the right
of reproduction of the typographical
arrangement of the published edition of the
work. (n)
CHAPTER IV
WORKS NOT PROTECTED

(m) Pictorial illustrations and advertisements;
(n) Computer programs; and
(o) Other literary, scholarly, scientific and
artistic works.
172.2. Works are protected by the sole fact of
their creation, irrespective of their mode or form
of expression, as well as of their content, quality
and purpose. (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 49a)
Section 175. Unprotected Subject Matter. -
Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 172
and 173, no protection shall extend, under this
law, to any idea, procedure, system, method or
operation, concept, principle, discovery or mere
data as such, even if they are expressed,
explained, illustrated or embodied in a work;
news of the day and other miscellaneous facts
having the character of mere items of press
information; or any official text of a legislative,
administrative or legal nature, as well as any
official translation thereof (n)

Section 176. Works of the Government. - 176.1.
No copyright shall subsist in any work of the
Government of the Philippines. However, prior
approval of the government agency or office
wherein the work is created shall be necessary
for exploitation of such work for profit. Such
agency or office may, among other things,
impose as a condition the payment of royalties.
No prior approval or conditions shall be required
for the use of any purpose of statutes, rules and
regulations, and speeches, lectures, sermons,
addresses, and dissertations, pronounced, read
or rendered in courts of justice, before
administrative agencies, in deliberative
assemblies and in meetings of public character.
(Sec. 9, first par., P.D. No. 49)
176.2. The author of speeches, lectures,
sermons, addresses, and dissertations
mentioned in the preceding paragraphs shall
have the exclusive right of making a collection
of his works. (n)
176.3. Notwithstanding the foregoing
provisions, the Government is not precluded
from receiving and holding copyrights
transferred to it by assignment, bequest or
otherwise; nor shall publication or republication
by the Government in a public document of any
work in which copyright is subsisting be taken to
cause any abridgment or annulment of the
copyright or to authorize any use or
appropriation of such work without the consent
of the copyright owner. (Sec. 9, third par., P.D.
No. 49)
CHAPTER V
COPYRIGHT OR ECONOMIC RIGHTS
Section 177. Copyright or Economic Rights. -
Subject to the provisions of Chapter VIII,
copyright or economic rights shall consist of the
exclusive right to carry out, authorize or prevent
the following acts:
177.1. Reproduction of the work or substantial
portion of the work;
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 145
177.2. Dramatization, translation, adaptation,
abridgment, arrangement or other
transformation of the work;
177.3. The first public distribution of the original
and each copy of the work by sale or other forms
of transfer of ownership;
177.4. Rental of the original or a copy of an
audiovisual or cinematographic work, a work
embodied in a sound recording, a computer
program, a compilation of data and other
materials or a musical work in graphic form,
irrespective of the ownership of the original or
the copy which is the subject of the rental; (n)
177.5. Public display of the original or a copy of
the work;
177.6. Public performance of the work; and
177.7. Other communication to the public of the
work. (Sec. 5, P. D. No. 49a)
CHAPTER VI
OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHT
Section 178. Rules on Copyright Ownership. -
Copyright ownership shall be governed by the
following rules:
178.1 Subject to the provisions of this section,
in the case of original literary and artistic works,
copyright shall belong to the author of the work;
178.2. In the case of works of joint authorship,
the co-authors shall be the original owners of
the copyright and in the absence of agreement,
their rights shall be governed by the rules on co-
ownership. If, however, a work of joint
authorship consists of parts that can be used
separately and the author of each part can be
identified, the author of each part shall be the
original owner of the copyright in the part that he
has created;
178.3. In the case of work created by an author
during and in the course of his employment, the
copyright shall belong to:

(a) The employee, if the creation of the
object of copyright is not a part of his regular
duties even if the employee uses the time,
facilities and materials of the employer.
(b) The employer, if the work is the result of
the performance of his regularly-assigned
duties, unless there is an agreement, express or
implied, to the contrary.
178.4. In the case of a work commissioned by a
person other than an employer of the author and
who pays for it and the work is made in
pursuance of the commission, the person who
so commissioned the work shall have ownership
of the work, but the copyright thereto shall
remain with the creator, unless there is a written
stipulation to the contrary;
178.5. In the case of audiovisual work, the
copyright shall belong to the producer, the
author of the scenario, the composer of the
music, the film director, and the author of the
work so adapted. However, subject to contrary
or other stipulations among the creators, the
producer shall exercise the copyright to an
extent required for the exhibition of the work in
any manner, except for the right to collect
performing license fees for the performance of
musical compositions, with or without words,
which are incorporated into the work; and
178.6. In respect of letters, the copyright shall
belong to the writer subject to the provisions of
Article 723 of the Civil Code. (Sec. 6, P.D. No.
49a)
Section 179. Anonymous and Pseudonymous
Works. - For purposes of this Act, the publishers
shall be deemed to represent the authors of
articles and other writings published without the
names of the authors or under pseudonyms,
unless the contrary appears, or the pseudonyms
or adopted name leaves no doubt as to the
author's identity, or if the author of the
anonymous works discloses his identity. (Sec.
7, P.D. 49)
CHAPTER VII
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 146
TRANSFER OR ASSIGNMENT OF
COPYRIGHT
Section 180. Rights of Assignee. - 180.1. The
copyright may be assigned in whole or in part.
Within the scope of the assignment, the
assignee is entitled to all the rights and
remedies which the assignor had with respect to
the copyright.
180.2. The copyright is not deemed assigned
inter vivos in whole or in part unless there is a
written indication of such intention.
180.3. The submission of a literary,
photographic or artistic work to a newspaper,
magazine or periodical for publication shall
constitute only a license to make a single
publication unless a greater right is expressly
granted. If two (2) or more persons jointly own a
copyright or any part thereof, neither of the
owners shall be entitled to grant licenses without
the prior written consent of the other owner or
owners. (Sec. 15, P.D. No. 49a)
Section 181. Copyright and Material Object. -
The copyright is distinct from the property in the
material object subject to it. Consequently, the
transfer or assignment of the copyright shall not
itself constitute a transfer of the material object.
Nor shall a transfer or assignment of the sole
copy or of one or several copies of the work
imply transfer or assignment of the copyright.
(Sec. 16, P.D. No. 49)
Section 182. Filing of Assignment or License. -
An assignment or exclusive license may be filed
in duplicate with the National Library upon
payment of the prescribed fee for registration in
books and records kept for the purpose. Upon
recording, a copy of the instrument shall be
returned to the sender with a notation of the fact
of record. Notice of the record shall be published
in the IPO Gazette. (Sec. 19, P.D. No. 49a)
Section 183. Designation of Society. - The
copyright owners or their heirs may designate a
society of artists, writers or composers to
enforce their economic rights and moral rights
on their behalf. (Sec. 32, P.D. No. 49a)

CHAPTER VIII
LIMITATIONS ON COPYRIGHT
Section 184. Limitations on Copyright. - 184.1.
Notwithstanding the provisions of Chapter V, the
following acts shall not constitute infringement
of copyright:
(a) The recitation or performance of a work,
once it has been lawfully made accessible to the
public, if done privately and free of charge or if
made strictly for a charitable or religious
institution or society; (Sec. 10(1), P.D. No. 49)
(b) The making of quotations from a
published work if they are compatible with fair
use and only to the extent justified for the
purpose, including quotations from newspaper
articles and periodicals in the form of press
summaries: Provided, That the source and the
name of the author, if appearing on the work,
are mentioned; (Sec. 11, third par., P.D. No. 49)
(c) The reproduction or communication to
the public by mass media of articles on current
political, social, economic, scientific or religious
topic, lectures, addresses and other works of
the same nature, which are delivered in public if
such use is for information purposes and has
not been expressly reserved: Provided, That the
source is clearly indicated; (Sec. 11, P.D. No.
49)
(d) The reproduction and communication to
the public of literary, scientific or artistic works
as part of reports of current events by means of
photography, cinematography or broadcasting
to the extent necessary for the purpose; (Sec.
12, P.D. No. 49)
(e) The inclusion of a work in a publication,
broadcast, or other communication to the public,
sound recording or film, if such inclusion is
made by way of illustration for teaching
purposes and is compatible with fair use:
Provided, That the source and of the name of
the author, if appearing in the work, are
mentioned;
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 147
(f) The recording made in schools,
universities, or educational institutions of a work
included in a broadcast for the use of such
schools, universities or educational institutions:
Provided, That such recording must be deleted
within a reasonable period after they were first
broadcast: Provided, further, That such
recording may not be made from audiovisual
works which are part of the general cinema
repertoire of feature films except for brief
excerpts of the work;
(g) The making of ephemeral recordings by
a broadcasting organization by means of its own
facilities and for use in its own broadcast;
(h) The use made of a work by or under the
direction or control of the Government, by the
National Library or by educational, scientific or
professional institutions where such use is in the
public interest and is compatible with fair use;
(i) The public performance or the
communication to the public of a work, in a place
where no admission fee is charged in respect of
such public performance or communication, by
a club or institution for charitable or educational
purpose only, whose aim is not profit making,
subject to such other limitations as may be
provided in the Regulations; (n)
(j) Public display of the original or a copy of
the work not made by means of a film, slide,
television image or otherwise on screen or by
means of any other device or process: Provided,
That either the work has been published, or, that
the original or the copy displayed has been sold,
given away or otherwise transferred to another
person by the author or his successor in title;
and
(k) Any use made of a work for the purpose
of any judicial proceedings or for the giving of
professional advice by a legal practitioner.
184.2. The provisions of this section shall be
interpreted in such a way as to allow the work to
be used in a manner which does not conflict with
the normal exploitation of the work and does not

unreasonably prejudice the right holder's
legitimate interests.
Section 185. Fair Use of a Copyrighted Work. -
185.1. The fair use of a copyrighted work for
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
including multiple copies for classroom use,
scholarship, research, and similar purposes is
not an infringement of copyright. Decompilation,
which is understood here to be the reproduction
of the code and translation of the forms of the
computer program to achieve the inter-
operability of an independently created
computer program with other programs may
also constitute fair use. In determining whether
the use made of a work in any particular case is
fair use, the factors to be considered shall
include:
(a) The purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(b) The nature of the copyrighted work;
(c) The amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
as a whole; and
(d) The effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
185.2. The fact that a work is unpublished shall
not by itself bar a finding of fair use if such
finding is made upon consideration of all the
above factors.
Section 186. Work of Architecture. - Copyright
in a work of architecture shall include the right to
control the erection of any building which
reproduces the whole or a substantial part of the
work either in its original form or in any form
recognizably derived from the original:
Provided, That the copyright in any such work
shall not include the right to control the
reconstruction or rehabilitation in the same style
as the original of a building to which that
copyright relates. (n)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 148
Section 187. Reproduction of Published Work. -
187.1. Notwithstanding the provision of Section
177, and subject to the provisions of Subsection
187.2, the private reproduction of a published
work in a single copy, where the reproduction is
made by a natural person exclusively for
research and private study, shall be permitted,
without the authorization of the owner of
copyright in the work.
187.2. The permission granted under
Subsection 187.1 shall not extend to the
reproduction of:
(a) A work of architecture in the form of
building or other construction;
(b) An entire book, or a substantial part
thereof, or of a musical work in graphic form by
reprographic means;
(c) A compilation of data and other
materials;
(d) A computer program except as provided
in Section 189; and
(e) Any work in cases where reproduction
would unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work or would otherwise
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the author. (n)
Section 188. Reprographic Reproduction by
Libraries. - 188.1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Subsection 177.6, any library or
archive whose activities are not for profit may,
without the authorization of the author of
copyright owner, make a single copy of the work
by reprographic reproduction:
(a) Where the work by reason of its fragile
character or rarity cannot be lent to user in its
original form;
(b) Where the works are isolated articles
contained in composite works or brief portions
of other published works and the reproduction is
necessary to supply them, when this is
considered expedient, to persons requesting

their loan for purposes of research or study
instead of lending the volumes or booklets
which contain them; and
(c) Where the making of such a copy is in
order to preserve and, if necessary in the event
that it is lost, destroyed or rendered unusable,
replace a copy, or to replace, in the permanent
collection of another similar library or archive, a
copy which has been lost, destroyed or
rendered unusable and copies are not available
with the publisher.
188.2. Notwithstanding the above provisions, it
shall not be permissible to produce a volume of
a work published in several volumes or to
produce missing tomes or pages of magazines
or similar works, unless the volume, tome or part
is out of stock: Provided, That every library
which, by law, is entitled to receive copies of a
printed work, shall be entitled, when special
reasons so require, to reproduce a copy of a
published work which is considered necessary
for the collection of the library but which is out of
stock. (Sec. 13, P.D. 49a)
Section 189. Reproduction of Computer
Program. - 189.1. Notwithstanding the
provisions of Section 177, the reproduction in
one (1) back-up copy or adaptation of a
computer program shall be permitted, without
the authorization of the author of, or other owner
of copyright in, a computer program, by the
lawful owner of that computer program:
Provided, That the copy or adaptation is
necessary for:
(a) The use of the computer program in
conjunction with a computer for the purpose,
and to the extent, for which the computer
program has been obtained; and
(b) Archival purposes, and, for the
replacement of the lawfully owned copy of the
computer program in the event that the lawfully
obtained copy of the computer program is lost,
destroyed or rendered unusable.
189.2. No copy or adaptation mentioned in this
Section shall be used for any purpose other than
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 149
the ones determined in this Section, and any
such copy or adaptation shall be destroyed in
the event that continued possession of the copy
of the computer program ceases to be lawful.
189.3. This provision shall be without prejudice
to the application of Section 185 whenever
appropriate. (n)
Section 190. Importation for Personal Purposes.
- 190.1. Notwithstanding the provision of
Subsection 177.6, but subject to the limitation
under the Subsection 185.2, the importation of
a copy of a work by an individual for his personal
purposes shall be permitted without the
authorization of the author of, or other owner of
copyright in, the work under the following
circumstances:
(a) When copies of the work are not
available in the Philippines and:
(i) Not more than one (1) copy at one time
is imported for strictly individual use only; or
(ii) The importation is by authority of and for
the use of the Philippine Government; or
(iii) The importation, consisting of not more
than three (3) such copies or likenesses in any
one invoice, is not for sale but for the use only
of any religious, charitable, or educational
society or institution duly incorporated or
registered, or is for the encouragement of the
fine arts, or for any state school, college,
university, or free public library in the
Philippines.
(b) When such copies form parts of libraries
and personal baggage belonging to persons or
families arriving from foreign countries and are
not intended for sale: Provided, That such
copies do not exceed three (3).
190.2. Copies imported as allowed by this
Section may not lawfully be used in any way to
violate the rights of owner the copyright or annul
or limit the protection secured by this Act, and
such unlawful use shall be deemed an
infringement and shall be punishable as such

without prejudice to the proprietor's right of
action.
190.3. Subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Finance, the Commissioner of Customs is
hereby empowered to make rules and
regulations for preventing the importation of
articles the importation of which is prohibited
under this Section and under treaties and
conventions to which the Philippines may be a
party and for seizing and condemning and
disposing of the same in case they are
discovered after they have been imported. (Sec.
30, P.D. No. 49)
CHAPTER IX
DEPOSIT AND NOTICE
Section 191. Registration and Deposit with
National Library and the Supreme Court Library.
- After the first public dissemination of
performance by authority of the copyright owner
of a work falling under Subsections 172.1, 172.2
and 172.3 of this Act, there shall, for the purpose
of completing the records of the National Library
and the Supreme Court Library, within three (3)
weeks, be registered and deposited with it, by
personal delivery or by registered mail two (2)
complete copies or reproductions of the work in
such form as the directors of said libraries may
prescribe. A certificate of deposit shall be issued
for which the prescribed fee shall be collected
and the copyright owner shall be exempt from
making additional deposit of the works with the
National Library and the Supreme Court Library
under other laws. If, within three (3) weeks after
receipt by the copyright owner of a written
demand from the directors for such deposit, the
required copies or reproductions are not
delivered and the fee is not paid, the copyright
owner shall be liable to pay a fine equivalent to
the required fee per month of delay and to pay
to the National Library and the Supreme Court
Library the amount of the retail price of the best
edition of the work. Only the above mentioned
classes of work shall be accepted for deposit by
the National Library and the Supreme Court
Library. (Sec. 26, P.D. No. 49a)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 150
Section 192. Notice of Copyright. - Each copy of
a work published or offered for sale may contain
a notice bearing the name of the copyright
owner, and the year of its first publication, and,
in copies produced after the creator's death, the
year of such death. (Sec. 27, P.D. No. 49a)
CHAPTER X
MORAL RIGHTS
Section 193. Scope of Moral Rights. - The
author of a work shall, independently of the
economic rights in Section 177 or the grant of
an assignment or license with respect to such
right, have the right:
193.1. To require that the authorship of the
works be attributed to him, in particular, the right
that his name, as far as practicable, be indicated
in a prominent way on the copies, and in
connection with the public use of his work;
193.2. To make any alterations of his work prior
to, or to withhold it from publication;
193.3. To object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action
in relation to, his work which would be
prejudicial to his honor or reputation; and
193.4. To restrain the use of his name with
respect to any work not of his own creation or in
a distorted version of his work. (Sec. 34, P.D.
No. 49)
Section 194. Breach of Contract. - An author
cannot be compelled to perform his contract to
create a work or for the publication of his work
already in existence. However, he may be held
liable for damages for breach of such contract.
(Sec. 35, P.D. No. 49)
Section 195. Waiver of Moral Rights. - An author
may waive his rights mentioned in Section 193
by a written instrument, but no such waiver shall
be valid where its effects is to permit another:
195.1. To use the name of the author, or the title
of his work, or otherwise to make use of his
reputation with respect to any version or

adaptation of his work which, because of
alterations therein, would substantially tend to
injure the literary or artistic reputation of another
author; or
195.2. To use the name of the author with
respect to a work he did not create. (Sec. 36,
P.D. No. 49)
Section 196. Contribution to Collective Work. -
When an author contributes to a collective work,
his right to have his contribution attributed to him
is deemed waived unless he expressly reserves
it. (Sec. 37, P.D. No. 49)
Section 197. Editing, Arranging and Adaptation
of Work. - In the absence of a contrary
stipulation at the time an author licenses or
permits another to use his work, the necessary
editing, arranging or adaptation of such work, for
publication, broadcast, use in a motion picture,
dramatization, or mechanical or electrical
reproduction in accordance with the reasonable
and customary standards or requirements of the
medium in which the work is to be used, shall
not be deemed to contravene the author's rights
secured by this chapter. Nor shall complete
destruction of a work unconditionally transferred
by the author be deemed to violate such rights.
(Sec. 38, P.D. No. 49)
Section 198. Term of Moral Rights. - 198.1. The
rights of an author under this chapter shall last
during the lifetime of the author and for fifty (50)
years after his death and shall not be assignable
or subject to license. The person or persons to
be charged with the posthumous enforcement of
these rights shall be named in writing to be filed
with the National Library. In default of such
person or persons, such enforcement shall
devolve upon either the author's heirs, and in
default of the heirs, the Director of the National
Library.
198.2. For purposes of this Section, "Person"
shall mean any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or society. The
Director of the National Library may prescribe
reasonable fees to be charged for his services
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 151
in the application of provisions of this Section.
(Sec. 39, P.D. No. 49)
Section 199. Enforcement Remedies. - Violation
of any of the rights conferred by this Chapter
shall entitle those charged with their
enforcement to the same rights and remedies
available to a copyright owner. In addition,
damages which may be availed of under the
Civil Code may also be recovered. Any damage
recovered after the creator's death shall be held
in trust for and remitted to his heirs, and in
default of the heirs, shall belong to the
government. (Sec. 40, P D No. 49)
CHAPTER XI
RIGHTS TO PROCEEDS IN SUBSEQUENT
TRANSFERS
Section 200. Sale or Lease of Work. - In every
sale or lease of an original work of painting or
sculpture or of the original manuscript of a writer
or composer, subsequent to the first disposition
thereof by the author, the author or his heirs
shall have an inalienable right to participate in
the gross proceeds of the sale or lease to the
extent of five percent (5%). This right shall exist
during the lifetime of the author and for fifty (50)
years after his death. (Sec. 31, P.D. No. 49)
Section 201. Works Not Covered. - The
provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to
prints, etchings, engravings, works of applied
art, or works of similar kind wherein the author
primarily derives gain from the proceeds of
reproductions. (Sec. 33, P.D. No. 49)
CHAPTER XII
RIGHTS OF PERFORMERS, PRODUCERS
OF SOUNDS RECORDINGS AND
BROADCASTING ORGANIZATIONS
Section 202. Definitions. - For the purpose of
this Act, the following terms shall have the
following meanings:
202.1. "Performers" are actors, singers,
musicians, dancers, and other persons who act,
sing, declaim, play in, interpret, or otherwise
perform literary and artistic work;

202.2. "Sound recording" means the fixation of
the sounds of a performance or of other sounds,
or representation of sound, other than in the
form of a fixation incorporated in a
cinematographic or other audiovisual work;
202.3. An "audiovisual work or fixation" is a work
that consists of a series of related images which
impart the impression of motion, with or without
accompanying sounds, susceptible of being
made visible and, where accompanied by
sounds, susceptible of being made audible;
202.4. "Fixation" means the embodiment of
sounds, or of the representations thereof, from
which they can be perceived, reproduced or
communicated through a device;
202. 5. "Producer of a sound recording"
means the person, or the legal entity, who or
which takes the initiative and has the
responsibility for the first fixation of the sounds
of a performance or other sounds, or the
representation of sounds;
202.6. "Publication of a fixed performance or a
sound recording" means the offering of copies
of the fixed performance or the sound recording
to the public, with the consent of the right holder:
Provided, That copies are offered to the public
in reasonable quality;
202.7. "Broadcasting" means the transmission
by wireless means for the public reception of
sounds or of images or of representations
thereof; such transmission by satellite is also
"broadcasting" where the means for decrypting
are provided to the public by the broadcasting
organization or with its consent;
202.8. "Broadcasting organization" shall include
a natural person or a juridical entity duly
authorized to engage in broadcasting; and
202.9 "Communication to the public of a
performance or a sound recording" means the
transmission to the public, by any medium,
otherwise than by broadcasting, of sounds of a
performance or the representations of sounds
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 152
fixed in a sound recording. For purposes of
Section 209, "communication to the public"
includes making the sounds or representations
of sounds fixed in a sound recording audible to
the public.
Section 203. Scope of Performers' Rights. -
Subject to the provisions of Section 212,
performers shall enjoy the following exclusive
rights:
203.1. As regards their performances, the right
of authorizing:
(a) The broadcasting and other
communication to the public of their
performance; and
(b) The fixation of their unfixed performance.
203.2. The right of authorizing the direct or
indirect reproduction of their performances fixed
in sound recordings, in any manner or form;
203.3. Subject to the provisions of Section 206,
the right of authorizing the first public distribution
of the original and copies of their performance
fixed in the sound recording through sale or
rental or other forms of transfer of ownership;
203.4. The right of authorizing the commercial
rental to the public of the original and copies of
their performances fixed in sound recordings,
even after distribution of them by, or pursuant to
the authorization by the performer; and
203.5. The right of authorizing the making
available to the public of their performances
fixed in sound recordings, by wire or wireless
means, in such a way that members of the
public may access them from a place and time
individually chosen by them. (Sec. 42, P.D. No.
49a)
Section 204. Moral Rights of Performers. -
204.1. Independently of a performer's economic
rights, the performer, shall, as regards his live
aural performances or performances fixed in
sound recordings, have the right to claim to be
identified as the performer of his performances,

except where the omission is dictated by the
manner of the use of the performance, and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other
modification of his performances that would be
prejudicial to his reputation.
204.2. The rights granted to a performer in
accordance with Subsection 203.1 shall be
maintained and exercised fifty (50) years after
his death, by his heirs, and in default of heirs,
the government, where protection is claimed.
(Sec. 43, P.D. No. 49)
Section 205. Limitation on Right. - 205.1.
Subject to the provisions of Section 206, once
the performer has authorized the broadcasting
or fixation of his performance, the provisions of
Sections 203 shall have no further application.
205.2. The provisions of Section 184 and
Section 185 shall apply mutatis mutandis to
performers. (n)
Section 206. Additional Remuneration for
Subsequent Communications or Broadcasts. -
Unless otherwise provided in the contract, in
every communication to the public or broadcast
of a performance subsequent to the first
communication or broadcast thereof by the
broadcasting organization, the performer shall
be entitled to an additional remuneration
equivalent to at least five percent (5%) of the
original compensation he or she received for the
first communication or broadcast. (n)
Section 207. Contract Terms. - Nothing in this
Chapter shall be construed to deprive
performers of the right to agree by contracts on
terms and conditions more favorable for them in
respect of any use of their performance. (n)
CHAPTER XIII
PRODUCERS OF SOUND RECORDINGS
Section 208. Scope of Right. - Subject to the
provisions of Section 212, producers of sound
recordings shall enjoy the following exclusive
rights:
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 153
208.1. The right to authorize the direct or
indirect reproduction of their sound recordings,
in any manner or form; the placing of these
reproductions in the market and the right of
rental or lending;
208.2. The right to authorize the first public
distribution of the original and copies of their
sound recordings through sale or rental or other
forms of transferring ownership; and
208.3. The right to authorize the commercial
rental to the public of the original and copies of
their sound recordings, even after distribution by
them by or pursuant to authorization by the
producer. (Sec. 46, P.D. No. 49a)
Section 209. Communication to the Public. - If a
sound recording published for commercial
purposes, or a reproduction of such sound
recording, is used directly for broadcasting or for
other communication to the public, or is publicly
performed with the intention of making and
enhancing profit, a single equitable
remuneration for the performer or performers,
and the producer of the sound recording shall
be paid by the user to both the performers and
the producer, who, in the absence of any
agreement shall share equally. (Sec. 47, P.D.
No. 49a)
Section 210. Limitation of Right. - Sections 184
and 185 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the
producer of sound recordings. (Sec. 48, P.D.
No. 49a)
CHAPTER XIV
BROADCASTING ORGANIZATIONS
Section 211. Scope of Right. - Subject to the
provisions of Section 212, broadcasting
organizations shall enjoy the exclusive right to
carry out, authorize or prevent any of the
following acts:
211.1. The rebroadcasting of their broadcasts;
211.2. The recording in any manner, including
the making of films or the use of video tape, of
their broadcasts for the purpose of

communication to the public of television
broadcasts of the same; and
211.3. The use of such records for fresh
transmissions or for fresh recording. (Sec. 52,
P.D. No. 49)
CHAPTER XV
LIMITATIONS ON PROTECTION
Section 212. Limitations on Rights. - Sections
203, 208 and 209 shall not apply where the acts
referred to in those Sections are related to:
212.1. The use by a natural person exclusively
for his own personal purposes;
212.2. Using short excerpts for reporting current
events;
212.3. Use solely for the purpose of teaching or
for scientific research; and
212.4. Fair use of the broadcast subject to the
conditions under Section 185. (Sec. 44, P.D.
No. 49a)
CHAPTER XVI
TERM OF PROTECTION
Section 213. Term of Protection. - 213.1.
Subject to the provisions of Subsections 213.2
to 213.5, the copyright in works under Sections
172 and 173 shall be protected during the life of
the author and for fifty (50) years after his death.
This rule also applies to posthumous works.
(Sec. 21, first sentence, P.D. No. 49a)
213.2. In case of works of joint authorship, the
economic rights shall be protected during the life
of the last surviving author and for fifty (50)
years after his death. (Sec. 21, second
sentence, P.D. No. 49)
213.3. In case of anonymous or pseudonymous
works, the copyright shall be protected for fifty
(50) years from the date on which the work was
first lawfully published: Provided, That where,
before the expiration of the said period, the
author's identity is revealed or is no longer in
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 154
doubt, the provisions of Subsections 213.1. and
213.2 shall apply, as the case may be: Provided,
further, That such works if not published before
shall be protected for fifty (50) years counted
from the making of the work. (Sec. 23, P.D. No.
49)
213.4. In case of works of applied art the
protection shall be for a period of twenty-five
(25) years from the date of making. (Sec. 24(B),
P.D. No. 49a)
213.5. In case of photographic works, the
protection shall be for fifty (50) years from
publication of the work and, if unpublished, fifty
(50) years from the making. (Sec. 24(C), P.D.
49a)
213.6. In case of audio-visual works including
those produced by process analogous to
photography or any process for making audio-
visual recordings, the term shall be fifty (50)
years from date of publication and, if
unpublished, from the date of making. (Sec.
24(C), P.D. No. 49a)
Section 214. Calculation of Term. - The term of
protection subsequent to the death of the author
provided in the preceding Section shall run from
the date of his death or of publication, but such
terms shall always be deemed to begin on the
first day of January of the year following the
event which gave rise to them. (Sec. 25, P.D.
No. 49)
Section 215. Term of Protection for Performers,
Producers and Broadcasting Organizations. -
215.1. The rights granted to performers and
producers of sound recordings under this law
shall expire:
(a) For performances not incorporated in
recordings, fifty (50) years from the end of the
year in which the performance took place; and
(b) For sound or image and sound
recordings and for performances incorporated
therein, fifty (50) years from the end of the year
in which the recording took place.

215.2. In case of broadcasts, the term shall be
twenty (20) years from the date the broadcast
took place. The extended term shall be applied
only to old works with subsisting protection
under the prior law. (Sec. 55, P.D. No. 49a)
CHAPTER XVII
INFRINGEMENT
Section 216. Remedies for Infringement. -
216.1. Any person infringing a right protected
under this law shall be liable:
(a) To an injunction restraining such
infringement. The court may also order the
defendant to desist from an infringement,
among others, to prevent the entry into the
channels of commerce of imported goods that
involve an infringement, immediately after
customs clearance of such goods.
(b) Pay to the copyright proprietor or his
assigns or heirs such actual damages, including
legal costs and other expenses, as he may have
incurred due to the infringement as well as the
profits the infringer may have made due to such
infringement, and in proving profits the plaintiff
shall be required to prove sales only and the
defendant shall be required to prove every
element of cost which he claims, or, in lieu of
actual damages and profits, such damages
which to the court shall appear to be just and
shall not be regarded as penalty.
(c) Deliver under oath, for impounding
during the pendency of the action, upon such
terms and conditions as the court may
prescribe, sales invoices and other documents
evidencing sales, all articles and their packaging
alleged to infringe a copyright and implements
for making them.
(d) Deliver under oath for destruction without
any compensation all infringing copies or
devices, as well as all plates, molds, or other
means for making such infringing copies as the
court may order.
(e) Such other terms and conditions,
including the payment of moral and exemplary
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 155
damages, which the court may deem proper,
wise and equitable and the destruction of
infringing copies of the work even in the event
of acquittal in a criminal case.
216.2. In an infringement action, the court shall
also have the power to order the seizure and
impounding of any article which may serve as
evidence in the court proceedings. (Sec. 28,
P.D. No. 49a)
Section 217. Criminal Penalties. - 217.1. Any
person infringing any right secured by
provisions of Part IV of this Act or aiding or
abetting such infringement shall be guilty of a
crime punishable by:
(a) Imprisonment of one (1) year to three (3)
years plus a fine ranging from Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) to One hundred fifty thousand
pesos (P150,000) for the first offense.
(b) Imprisonment of three (3) years and one
(1) day to six (6) years plus a fine ranging from
One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000) to
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) for
the second offense.
(c) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1)
day to nine (9) years plus a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000) to One
million five hundred thousand pesos
(P1,500,000) for the third and subsequent
offenses.
(d) In all cases, subsidiary imprisonment in
cases of insolvency.
217.2. In determining the number of years of
imprisonment and the amount of fine, the court
shall consider the value of the infringing
materials that the defendant has produced or
manufactured and the damage that the
copyright owner has suffered by reason of the
infringement.
217.3. Any person who at the time when
copyright subsists in a work has in his
possession an article which he knows, or ought

to know, to be an infringing copy of the work for
the purpose of:
(a) Selling, letting for hire, or by way of trade
offering or exposing for sale, or hire, the article;
(b) Distributing the article for purpose of
trade, or for any other purpose to an extent that
will prejudice the rights of the copyright owner in
the work; or
(c) Trade exhibit of the article in public, shall
be guilty of an offense and shall be liable on
conviction to imprisonment and fine as above
mentioned. (Sec. 29, P.D. No. 49a)
Section 218. Affidavit Evidence. - 218.1. In an
action under this Chapter, an affidavit made
before a notary public by or on behalf of the
owner of the copyright in any work or other
subject matter and stating that:
(a) At the time specified therein, copyright
subsisted in the work or other subject matter;
(b) He or the person named therein is the
owner of the copyright; and
(c) The copy of the work or other subject
matter annexed thereto is a true copy thereof,
shall be admitted in evidence in any
proceedings for an offense under this Chapter
and shall be prima facie proof of the matters
therein stated until the contrary is proved, and
the court before which such affidavit is produced
shall assume that the affidavit was made by or
on behalf of the owner of the copyright.
218.2. In an action under this Chapter:
(a) Copyright shall be presumed to subsist in
the work or other subject matter to which the
action relates if the defendant does not put in
issue the question whether copyright subsists in
the work or other subject matter; and
(b) Where the subsistence of the copyright is
established, the plaintiff shall be presumed to be
the owner of the copyright if he claims to be the
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 156
owner of the copyright and the defendant does
not put in issue the question of his ownership.
(c) Where the defendant, without good faith,
puts in issue the questions of whether copyright
subsists in a work or other subject matter to
which the action relates, or the ownership of
copyright in such work or subject matter,
thereby occasioning unnecessary costs or delay
in the proceedings, the court may direct that any
costs to the defendant in respect of the action
shall not be allowed by him and that any costs
occasioned by the defendant to other parties
shall be paid by him to such other parties. (n)
Section 219. Presumption of Authorship. -
219.1. The natural person whose name is
indicated on a work in the usual manner as the
author shall, in the absence of proof to the
contrary, be presumed to be the author of the
work. This provision shall be applicable even if
the name is a pseudonym, where the
pseudonym leaves no doubt as to the identity of
the author.
219.2. The person or body corporate whose
name appears on a audio-visual work in the
usual manner shall, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be presumed to be the maker of
said work. (n)
Section 220. International Registration of
Works. - A statement concerning a work,
recorded in an international register in
accordance with an international treaty to which
the Philippines is or may become a party, shall
be construed as true until the contrary is proved
except:
220.1. Where the statement cannot be valid
under this Act or any other law concerning
intellectual property.
220.2. Where the statement is contradicted by
another statement recorded in the international
register. (n)
CHAPTER XVIII
SCOPE OF APPLICATION

Section 221. Points of Attachment for Works
under Sections 172 and 173. - 221.1. The
protection afforded by this Act to copyrightable
works under Sections 172 and 173 shall apply
to:
(a) Works of authors who are nationals of, or
have their habitual residence in, the Philippines;
(b) Audio-visual works the producer of which
has his headquarters or habitual residence in
the Philippines;
(c) Works of architecture erected in the
Philippines or other artistic works incorporated
in a building or other structure located in the
Philippines;
(d) Works first published in the Philippines;
and
(e) Works first published in another country
but also published in the Philippines within thirty
days, irrespective of the nationality or residence
of the authors.
221.2. The provisions of this Act shall also apply
to works that are to be protected by virtue of and
in accordance with any international convention
or other international agreement to which the
Philippines is a party. (n)
Section 222. Points of Attachment for
Performers. - The provisions of this Act on the
protection of performers shall apply to:
222.1. Performers who are nationals of the
Philippines;
222.2. Performers who are not nationals of the
Philippines but whose performances:
(a) Take place in the Philippines; or
(b) Are incorporated in sound recordings that
are protected under this Act; or
(c) Which has not been fixed in sound
recording but are carried by broadcast qualifying
for protection under this Act. (n)
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 157
Section 223. Points of Attachment for Sound
Recordings. - The provisions of this Act on the
protection of sound recordings shall apply to:
223.1. Sound recordings the producers of which
are nationals of the Philippines; and
223.2. Sound recordings that were first
published in the Philippines. (n)
Section 224. Points of Attachment for
Broadcasts. - 224.1. The provisions of this Act
on the protection of broadcasts shall apply to:
(a) Broadcasts of broadcasting
organizations the headquarters of which are
situated in the Philippines; and
(b) Broadcasts transmitted from transmitters
situated in the Philippines.
224.2. The provisions of this Act shall also apply
to performers who, and to producers of sound
recordings and broadcasting organizations
which, are to be protected by virtue of and in
accordance with any international convention or
other international agreement to which the
Philippines is a party. (n)
CHAPTER XIX
INSTITUTION OF ACTIONS
Section 225. Jurisdiction. - Without prejudice to
the provisions of Subsection 7.1(c), actions
under this Act shall be cognizable by the courts
with appropriate jurisdiction under existing law.
(Sec. 57, P.D. No. 49a)
Section 226. Damages. - No damages may be
recovered under this Act after four (4) years
from the time the cause of action arose. (Sec.
58, P.D. No. 49)
CHAPTER XX
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
Section 227. Ownership of Deposit and
Instruments. - All copies deposited and
instruments in writing filed with the National

Library and the Supreme Court Library in
accordance with the provisions of this Act shall
become the property of the Government. (Sec.
60, P.D. No. 49)
Section 228. Public Records. - The section or
division of the National Library and the Supreme
Court Library charged with receiving copies and
instruments deposited and with keeping records
required under this Act and everything in it shall
be opened to public inspection. The Director of
the National Library is empowered to issue such
safeguards and regulations as may be
necessary to implement this Section and other
provisions of this Act. (Sec. 61, P.D. No. 49)
Section 229. Copyright Division; Fees. - The
Copyright Section of the National Library shall
be classified as a Division upon the effectivity of
this Act. The National Library shall have the
power to collect, for the discharge of its services
under this Act, such fees as may be
promulgated by it from time to time subject to
the approval of the Department Head. (Sec. 62,
P.D. 49a)
PART V
FINAL PROVISIONS
Section 230. Equitable Principles to Govern
Proceedings. - In all inter partes proceedings in
the Office under this Act, the equitable principles
of laches, estoppel, and acquiescence where
applicable, may be considered and applied.
(Sec. 9-A, R.A. No. 165)
Section 231. Reverse Reciprocity of Foreign
Laws. - Any condition, restriction, limitation,
diminution, requirement, penalty or any similar
burden imposed by the law of a foreign country
on a Philippine national seeking protection of
intellectual property rights in that country, shall
reciprocally be enforceable upon nationals of
said country, within Philippine jurisdiction. (n)
Section 232. Appeals. - 232.1. Appeals from
decisions of regular courts shall be governed by
the Rules of Court. Unless restrained by a
higher court, the judgment of the trial court shall
be executory even pending appeal under such
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 158
terms and conditions as the court may
prescribe.
232.2. Unless expressly provided in this Act or
other statutes, appeals from decisions of
administrative officials shall be provided in the
Regulations. (n)
Section 233. Organization of the Office;
Exemption from the Salary Standardization Law
and the Attrition Law. - 233.1. The Office shall
be organized within one (1) year after the
approval of this Act. It shall not be subject to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7430.
233.2. The Office shall institute its own
compensation structure: Provided, That the
Office shall make its own system conform as
closely as possible with the principles provided
for under Republic Act No. 6758. (n)
Section 234. Abolition of the Bureau of Patents,
Trademarks, and Technology Transfer. - The
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and
Technology Transfer under the Department of
Trade and Industry is hereby abolished. All
unexpended funds and fees, fines, royalties and
other charges collected for the calendar year,
properties, equipment and records of the
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology
Transfer, and such personnel as may be
necessary are hereby transferred to the Office.
Personnel not absorbed or transferred to the
Office shall enjoy the retirement benefits
granted under existing law, otherwise, they shall
be paid the equivalent of one month basic salary
for every year of service, or the equivalent
nearest fractions thereof favorable to them on
the basis of the highest salary received.(n)
Section 235. Applications Pending on Effective
Date of Act. - 235.1. All applications for patents
pending in the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks
and Technology Transfer shall be proceeded
with and patents thereon granted in accordance
with the Acts under which said applications were
filed, and said Acts are hereby continued to be
enforced, to this extent and for this purpose
only, notwithstanding the foregoing general
repeal thereof: Provided, That applications for

utility models or industrial designs pending at
the effective date of this Act, shall be proceeded
with in accordance with the provisions of this
Act, unless the applicants elect to prosecute
said applications in accordance with the Acts
under which they were filed.
235.2. All applications for registration of marks
or trade names pending in the Bureau of
Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer
at the effective date of this Act may be
amended, if practicable to bring them under the
provisions of this Act. The prosecution of such
applications so amended and the grant of
registrations thereon shall be proceeded with in
accordance with the provisions of this Act. If
such amendments are not made, the
prosecution of said applications shall be
proceeded with and registrations thereon
granted in accordance with the Acts under
which said applications were filed, and said Acts
are hereby continued in force to this extent for
this purpose only, notwithstanding the foregoing
general repeal thereof (n)
Section 236. Preservation of Existing Rights. -
Nothing herein shall adversely affect the rights
on the enforcement of rights in patents, utility
models, industrial designs, marks and works,
acquired in good faith prior to the effective date
of this Act. (n)
Section 237. Notification on Berne Appendix. -
The Philippines shall by proper compliance with
the requirements set forth under the Appendix
of the Berne Convention (Paris Act, 1971) avail
itself of the special provisions regarding
developing countries, including provisions for
licenses grantable by competent authority under
the Appendix. (n)
Section 238. Appropriations. - The funds
needed to carry out the provisions of this Act
shall be charged to the appropriations of the
Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and
Technology Transfer under the current General
Appropriations Act and the fees, fines, royalties
and other charges collected by the Bureau for
the calendar year pursuant to Sections 14.1 and
234 of this Act. Thereafter such sums as may be
ACJUCO CRIMINAL LAW TITLE IV 159
necessary for its continued implementations
shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act. (n)
Section 239. Repeals. - 239.1. All Acts and
parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more
particularly Republic Act No. 165, as amended;
Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles
188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code;
Presidential Decree No. 49, including
Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are
hereby repealed.
239.2. Marks registered under Republic Act No.
166 shall remain in force but shall be deemed to
have been granted under this Act and shall be
due for renewal within the period provided for
under this Act and, upon renewal shall be
reclassified in accordance with the International
Classification. Trade names and marks
registered in the Supplemental Register under
Republic Act No. 166 shall remain in force but
shall no longer be subject to renewal.
239.3. The provisions of this Act shall apply to
works in which copyright protection obtained
prior to the effectivity of this Act is subsisting:
Provided, That the application of this Act shall
not result in the diminution of such protection.
(n)
Section 240. Separability. - If any provision of
this Act or the application of such provision to
any circumstances is held invalid, the remainder
of the Act shall not be affected thereby. (n)
Section 241. Effectivity. - This Act shall take
effect on 1 January 1998. (n)
Approved: June 6, 1997