Analysis of Through the Eyes of the Enemy by Stanislav Lunev

(Chapter 8,9,10)
by Dr. Jeffrey Russell, PhD

Stanislav Lunev was a Soviet GRU agent who defected to the United States in
March of 1992 after a successful career of intelligence gathering from China and
the United States. As the highest-ranking military defector to the U.S., he is in a
unique position to detail the intelligence aspect of the cold war and the
emergence of the Russian mafia as a threat to national security. His only book to
date was published May 25, 1998.
[Note: This book was published 20 years ago and much has changed with
geopolitics. The purpose of this analysis, in relation to Q post #827 on February
24, 2018, is to aid in decoding the meaning of the post.]

Chapter 8 Singapore

When we arrived in Singapore to “attend the university”, about half of us were

GRU with the other half being KGB. There were a few “clean” students mixed in
with us but not very many. I was assigned to second year Chinese language and
history classes. In my class there were 2 Japanese and 3 Americans. I was
surprised to learn that the Americans knew nothing about Russia while I knew
everything about America. Each week we would report to the Soviet embassy for
a “meeting” which was really just reporting our progress to Moscow. We were
told to make contacts but go no further.
A few weeks later we got a new commander at our field office and he reversed
everything. Now he wanted recruits and he wanted intel on Singapore Air
Defense. The most important target was U.S. Naval personnel. The USS
Enterprise was docking in the harbor soon and the crew was our target. Although
we did our best, it was obvious the crew had been warned against talking to
strangers—especially those from Russia.
My first real success came by accident. I was buying a stereo to send home at
an electronics store. The owner, Lamar, told me he could get anything from
Japan. When I asked my commander if he needed anything from Japan, he gave
me a 50-page listing. I negotiated the list with Lamar and ended up getting
everything at a discount. I was even able to get extremely sensitive microchips
costing thousands of dollars.
When we returned to Moscow, I was promoted to a major because of my
success with Lamar. My next assignment was in China, but I couldn’t go for a year
because I had to learn to be a correspondent for TASS. This was a let-down for
me, but it actually turned out very well. In fact, many of my articles would run on
front pages of newspapers and magazines all over Russia.

Chapter 9 Learning the Craft

I began my training at the mysterious First GRU Subdirectorate. I was told to

go to a furniture store and call a number. Then an office would come and get me.
This elite unit was located behind the furniture store through a thick metal door.
There were 25 operational groups trained there such as correspondents, Aeroflot
pilots and stewardesses, the Soviet merchant marine, and atomic energy
specialists. The main task of each agent was to establish contact with foreigners
with the purpose of recruitment as agents. [Note: The CIA has likewise developed
agents in these categories since its inception, especially in the field of foreign
correspondents.]
The First Subdirectorate was responsible for 50 percent of all collection by the
GRU and considered the most elite. This unit served as the Director’s
representative to the Military Industrial Commission which had monthly meetings
to decide what information as required from the GRU and the KGB. These
requests along with funding went into the Annual Tasking Document which was
the collection bible for all GRU and KGB officers worldwide.
 I was assigned to Group Zero and my commander was the senior European
editor for TASS. I started off as the TASS junior editor in the Reporters Editorial
Section. Most of my coworkers knew that I was not “clean.” They knew that no
one moves from Leningrad to Moscow except for special reasons. They also knew
that at least 60% of TASS reporters abroad and 30% of reporters at HQ were
either KGB or GRU. Everyone assumed that I was KGB, so they were very careful
around me. My formal training as a reporter/editor lasted for a year and after
being reviewed by the Central Committee Deputy secretary, I was sent to Beijing
with my wife and daughter. We arrived in China on May 15, 1980.

Chapter 10 China

The capitol of China seemed to be a huge collection of small gray homes with
no electricity or indoor plumbing. Beijing’s cultural revolutions had crushed any
technological progress. The Russian embassy was a grand compound covering
almost 50 acres. We had our own apartment there with 2 beds and a separate
kitchen and bath. I found the Chinese people to be hard-working, friendly, and
unpretentious.
My studies were progressing but after a few months the Chinese
counterintelligence began watching me 24 hours a day. It was here in China that I
first discovered how “paper agents” were used. These are developed contacts
who really never offer anything of importance, but they are used by the agent as
a “source” to make the information more solid. It seemed that every time I would
meet an American correspondent and start getting to know them, a KGB agent
would tell me to stay away from the person as that was their source.
Finally, I was able to recruit a Portuguese correspondent named Manolo.
Again, a KGB agent told me to stay away. This time when I reported it to Moscow,
they told the KGB agent to back off. It was possible for Manolo to be recruited by
the CIA, DIA, GRU, KGB, MI-5, MI-6, and the Mossad. At least the KGB was
eliminated. I was also able to recruit a Czechoslovakian correspondent named
Charda and an Italian correspondent named Antonio.
 I had quite a bit of success in China as I was the first Russian agent in at least 5
years to recruit a Chinese national. My method was to lose my Chinese
surveillance first and then stroll around a park and ask questions on Chinese
culture. I would have long conversations with strangers under the guise of
improving my Chinese. I would thank them with small gifts and then later money.
They were all paid so poorly that money was very important to them. The trick
was getting them to trust me. But once I did, they opened up and talked a lot.
My first Chinese recruit was Zhan. He was a student at Beijing University and the
son of the local Army District Commander.
My tour in China pushed my skills to their limits and was successful in
developing contacts and agents. But in the war of espionage, nobody really
knows who is winning and who is losing.