FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC

G.R. No. 168338, February 15, 2008

Principle: The Court took cognizance of the case consistent with the principle that it will not
wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions
that greatly impact on public
interest.

FACTS:
As a consequence of the public release of copies of the “Hello Garci” compact disc audiotapes
involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between then-President Gloria Arroyo and
Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned
reporters that those who had copies of the CD and those broadcasting or publishing its contents
could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or
airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he
stated that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations “found to have caused the
spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape.” Meanwhile, respondent NTC
warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful
misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the
licenses or authorizations issued to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a
petition under Rule 65 against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
(1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify straitjacketing the
exercise of freedom of speech and of the press?
(2) Did the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form
of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

RULING:
(1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A governmental action that
restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear
and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast
media. Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of
speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For this failure of the
respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers the national security of the State.
(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constituted a
form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. It is not decisive that
the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders
or circulars. It is sufficient that the press statements were made by respondents while in the
exercise of their official functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an
“act” does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order or official circular.
Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.
Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
G.R. No. L-64261

Principle: For a search: “such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched”

FACTS:
On 7 December 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz-Paño, Executive Judge of the then CFI Rizal [Quezon
City], issued 2 search warrants where the premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and
784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the
“Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and
printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the
printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers,
documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized.
A petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction was filed after 6 months following the raid to question the validity of said search
warrants, and to enjoin the Judge Advocate General of the AFP, the city fiscal of Quezon City,
et.al. from using the articles seized as evidence in Criminal Case Q-022782 of the RTC Quezon
City (People v. Burgos).

ISSUE:
Whether allegations of possession and printing of subversive materials may be the basis of the
issuance of search warrants.

RULING:
Section 3 provides that no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by
law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead
a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
In mandating that “no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the
judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce”; the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his
witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. Herein, a
statement in the effect that Burgos “is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and
other paraphernalia, news publications and other documents which were used and are all
continuously being used as a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under
PD 885, as amended” is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of
probable cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable
cause, said allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant.
Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor
in connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice.
UNIDO v. Comelec

GR 56515, 3 April 198

Principle: Regulatory power over media of transportation, communication and information.

During the election period, the Comelec may regulate enjoyment or utilization of all franchises
and permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication
or information, grants, special privileges, concessions — to ensure equal opportunity, time,
space, right to reply, etc. — with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections.

FACTS:

UNIDO IS a political organization or aggrupation campaigning for "NO" votes to the

amendments to the Constitution of the Philippines of 1973 proposed by the Batasang Pambansa.
Comelec issued 3 resolutions all dated 5 March 1981 (Resolution 1467 providing for Rules and
Regulations for "equal opportunity" on public discussions and debates on the plebiscite questions
to be submitted to the people on 7 April 1981; Resolution 1468 providing "equal time on the use
of the broadcast media [radio and television] in the plebiscite campaign"; and Resolution 1469
providing for "equal space on the use of the print media in the 1981 plebiscite of 7 April 1981".)
UNIDO addressed a letter to Comelec on 10 March 1981 to grant it the same opportunity as
given President Marcos, who was campaigning for “YES”.

It also requested radio and television coverage for its Plaza Miranda meeting on a letter dated 17
March 1981. Comelec issued a resolution on 18 March1981 denying the request of UNIDO;
stating that Marcos conduct his pulong-pulong in light of the official government thrust to amend
the constitution and in his capacity as President/Prime Minister and not as head of any political
party to which the UNIDO or any of its leaders does not have the same constitutional
prerogatives vested in the President/Prime Minister, as such, it has no right to "demand" equal
coverage by media accorded President Marcos. UNIDO sent a letter serving as its motion for
reconsideration.

The Comelec denied the letter-motion for lack of merit in its resolution of 22 March 1981.
UNIDO appealed to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the opposition should be given the same opportunity and facilities given to the President
to communicate and dialogue with the people on matters affecting the plan of government or of
public interest.
RULING:
It is undeniable and but natural that the head of state of every country in the world must, from the
very nature of his position, be accorded certain privileges not equally available to those who are
opposed to him in the sense that, since the head of state has the grave and tremendous
responsibility of planning and implementing the plan of government itself, either by virtue of the
popular mandate given to him under the corresponding provisions of the Constitution and the
laws or any other duly recognized grant of power and authority, the opposition cannot be placed
at par with him, since logically the opposition can only fiscalize the administration and
punctualize its errors and shortcomings to the end that when the duly scheduled time for
the people to exercise their inalienable power to make a better choice, the opposition may have
the chance to make them accept the alternative they can offer.

Therefore, when the head of state is afforded the opportunity or when he feels it incumbent upon
him to communicate and dialogue with the people on any matter affecting the plan of
government or any other matter of public interest, no office or entity of the government is
obliged to give the opposition the same facilities by which its contrary views may be
ventilated.
Osmeña vs. COMELEC

199 SCRA 750

Principle: The regulation is unrelated to the suppression of speech, as any restriction on freedom
of expression occasioned thereby is only incidental and no more than is necessary to achieve the
purpose of promoting equality.

FACTS:

Emilio Osmena and other petitioners are candidates in the National Elections.-R.A. No. 6646, the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print
space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on
Elections.

They contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections
have called into question the validity of the very premises of that decision.

NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged freedom
of speech and of the press. In urging a reexamination of that ruling, petitioners claim that
experience in the last five years since the decision in that case has shown the undesirable effects
of the law because the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing field,
but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidate[s] by depriving them of a
medium which they can afford to pay for while their more affluent rivals can always resort to
other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills.-However, no
empirical data were presented by the petitioners to back up their claim. They instead they make
arguments from which it is clear that their disagreement is with the opinion of the Court on the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6646 and that what they seek is a reargument on the same issue
already decided in that case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the upholding the validity of RA 6646 actually worked in favor of richer
candidates
RULING:

Petition DISMISSED

It is incorrect to claim that the purpose of RA 6646 is equality of the candidates when what its
provisions really speak of is equality in opportunity. The main purpose of the RA is regulatory.
Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it isno more than is necessary to achieve its
purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising.
The restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope.

Assuming that rich candidates can spend for parades, rallies, motorcades, airplanes and the like
in order to campaign while poor candidates can only afford political ads, the gap between the
two will not necessarily be reduced by allowing unlimited mass media advertising because rich
candidates can spend for other propaganda in addition to mass media advertising. Moreover, it is
not true that §11(b)has abolished the playing field.

What it has done, as already stated, is merely to regulate its use through COMELEC-sponsored
advertising in place of advertisements paid for by candidates or donated by their supporters.
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB V COMELEC

GR NO. 1026653, MARCH 5, 1992

Principle: This was held to be within the constitutional power of the Comelec to supervise the
enjoyment or utilization of franchises for the operation of media
of communication and information, for the purpose of ensuring equal opportunity,
time and space and the “right to reply”, as well as uniform and reasonable rates of
charges for the use of such media facilities.

FACTS:
Petitioners in these cases consist of representatives of the mass media which are prevented from
selling or donating space and time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are
candidates for office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May
1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election
Issue and of credentials of the candidates is being curtailed. It is principally argued by petitioners
that Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 66461 invades and violates the constitutional guarantees
comprising freedom of expression.

Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11 (b) amounts to censorship,
because it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only
publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or political propaganda during
the election period of 1992.

It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's role, function and duty to provide
adequate channels of public information and public opinion relevant to election Issue. Further,
petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the
suppression of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those appearing in the
Comelec space of the newspapers and on Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would
bring about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning
candidates and Issue in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to
information and opinion.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 constitutional.

RULING:
Yes. It seems a modest proposition that the provision of the Bill of Rights which enshrines
freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of the press has to be taken in
conjunction with Article IX (C) (4) which may be seen to be a special provision applicable
during a specific limited period — i.e., "during the election period." In our own society, equality
of opportunity to proffer oneself for public office, without regard to the level of financial
resources that one may have at one's disposal, is clearly an important value. One of the basic
state policies given constitutional rank by Article II, Section 26 of the Constitution is the
egalitarian demand that "the State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service
and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." The essential question is whether or
not the assailed legislative or administrative provisions constitute a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the operations of communication and information
enterprises during an election period, or whether such act has gone beyond permissible
supervision or regulation of media operations so as to constitute unconstitutional repression of
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. The Court considers that Section 11 (b) has not
gone outside the permissible bounds of supervision or regulation of media operations during
election periods.

Section 11 (b) is limited in the duration of its applicability and enforceability. By virtue of the
operation of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution, Section 11 (b) is limited in its applicability in
time to election periods. Section 11 (b) does not purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers or radio or television stations of news or news-worthy events relating to candidates,
their qualifications, political parties and programs of government. Moreover, Section 11 (b) does
not reach commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters or broadcasters or
editors or commentators or columnists in respect of candidates, their qualifications, and
programs and so forth, so long at least as such comments, opinions and beliefs are not in fact
advertisements for particular candidates covertly paid for. In sum, Section 11 (b) is not to be read
as reaching any report or commentary other coverage that, in responsible media, is not paid for
by candidates for political office. Section 11 (b) as designed to cover only paid political
advertisements of particular candidates.

The limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech of the candidates themselves
is not unduly repressive or unreasonable.
Adiong vs. Comelec,

G.R. NO. 103956; 31 MAR 1992

Principle: The constitutional objective of giving the rich and poor candidates’ equal opportunity
to inform the electorate is not violated by the posting of decals and stickers on cars and other
vehicles.

FACTS:

Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails
the COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in "mobile"
places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646. In
addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable
injury with this prohibition.

The posting of decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium
to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Finally,
the petitioner states that as of February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not received any
notice from any of the Election Registrars in the entire country as to the location of the supposed
"Comelec Poster Areas."

The petition is impressed with merit. The COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and
stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by
the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. There are various concepts
surrounding the freedom of speech clause which we have adopted as part and parcel of our own
Bill of Rights provision on this basic freedom.

All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have accorded to free
speech the status of a preferred freedom.

ISSUE :

Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals
and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the
authorized posting areas that it fixes.
RULING:

No. The determination of the limits of the Government's power to regulate the exercise by a
citizen of his basic freedoms in order to promote fundamental public interests or policy
objectives is always a difficult and delicate task. The so-called balancing of interests —
individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other — is made even
more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority
to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections.

The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not
endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such
activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of free speech and
expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear
and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a
clamp over one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
FACTS:

A Petition for Certiorari raised by ABS-CBN under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing
Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-14191 dated April 21, 1998. In
the said Resolution, the poll body RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to
stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting such exit
survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same.

The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source
that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV
coverage of the elections . . . and to make [an] exit survey of the . . . vote during the elections for
national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
[broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the
official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel).

It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit
survey. On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by
petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing
the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit
polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem.

ISSUE:

Whether the assailed resolution is valid.

RULING:

The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot be justified. It does not leave open any
alternative channel of communication to gather the type of information obtained through exit
polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the
Comelec end of avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by
exit surveys.

A specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey
groups may be allowed to conduct the same. Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from
the voting center. They may be required to explain to voters that the latter may refuse
interviewed, and that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. The pollsters may
further be required to wear distinctive clothing that would show they are not election officials.48
Additionally, they may be required to undertake an information campaign on the nature of the
exercise and the results to be obtained therefrom. These measures, together with a general
prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and orderly election.
The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a
'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other
liberties. . . . [T]his must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate
that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of
freedom."14 Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech or of the press. In the landmark case Gonzales v. Comelec,16 this Court
enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without prior restraint.

The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the

truth, of securing participation by the people in social and political decision-making, and of
maintaining the balance between stability and change.17 It represents a profound commitment to
the principle that debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.18 It
means more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend
support to official measures, or to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any of public
consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,19 we stress that the
freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the thought we agree with.

In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the
revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also
choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of
exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people. WHEREFORE, the
Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9,
1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec
en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No cost