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I- Wigmore (Group 2)
AND
The conjunctive word ‘and’ has legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a
surplusage in the law. It means ‘in addition to’ (McCaull Webster Elevator
Company versus Adams, 167 Northwestern Reporter, 330, page 332). The
word ‘and’ connects words, phrases, or full sentences. It relates one thing to
another.
OR
A case that perfectly illustrates the significance of the word “and” is the
case of GMRC v. Bell Telecom (271 SCRA 790, 1997).
Facts: On 19 October 1993, Bell Telecom (BellTel) filed with the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) an application for a certificate of
public convenience with a further request for the issuance of a provisional
authority (NTC Case 93-481). On 25th of March 1994, RA 7692 was enacted
which granted Bell Telecom a legislative franchise to operate business of
providing telecommunication services.On the 12th of July 1994, Bell Telecom
filed a second application for a certificate of public convenience, proposing to
install 2.6 million telephone lines in 10 years and to provide a 100% digital
local exchange network (NTC Case 94-229). It also moved for the withdrawal
of the first application, without prejudice, which was granted by the NTC. Bell
Telecom’s application (2nd ) was opposed by various telecommunication
companies. Bell Telecom’s application was referred to the Common Carriers
Authorization Department (CCAD), which found its proposal technically
feasible and the company to be financially capable. The two deputy
commissioners of the NTC signified their approval of the CCAD
recommendation. The working draft was prepared by the legal department,
was initialed by the two deputy commissioners, but was not signed by NTC
Commissioner Simeon Kintanar. BellTel filed a motion to promulgate, after
previously filing two urgent ex parte motions to resolve the applications which
were not acted upon by the NTC. On the 4th of July 1995, the NTC denied the
motion in an order signed solely by Commissioner Kintanar. On 17 July 1995,
BellTel filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition against NTC
before the Supreme Court. The Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals pursuant to Paragraph 1, Section 9 of BP 129. The Court of Appeals
granted BellTel’s position. Hence, this petition for review was filed by
Commissioner Kintanar and the other opposing telecommunications
companies.
Issue: Is the vote of the Chairman of the Commission alone sufficient to
legally render an NTC order, resolution or decision?
Three cases that clearly illustrate the importance of the word “or” are the
cases of US v. De la Santa (9 Phil 22, 1907), Hda. Luisita Inc. V. PARC
(G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 20-11), & Romulo v. HDM found below:
US v. DE LA SANTA
FACTS: The complaint charges the defendant, De la santa, with the crime of
seduction (estupro) of a woman over 12 and under 23 years of age, as
defined and penalized in article 443 of the Penal Code. It is alleged that the
defendant seduced Teofila Sevilla under promise of marriage early in the year
1902, at which time she was less than 21 years of age. The complaint was
not filed until February, 1906, when she was more than 24 though less than
25 years of age, and was signed, sworn, and submitted by one Esteban
Sevilla, at whose "instance" these proceedings were had, he appearing as the
private prosecutor and alleging that he is the father of the said Teofila Sevilla.
FACTS: On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously
(11-0) to dismiss the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with modifications the
resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and
placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the
Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and
which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the
revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give
way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or
[choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs
and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical
implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in
secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing
their thumb marks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”
The respondents argue that the operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity
which may only be applied in the absence of a law. According to them, there
is a positive law which mandates the distribution of the land as a result of the
revocation of the SDP.
ISSUE (which is relevant to the topic): Can the operative fact doctrine be
applied in the instant case?
HELD: The operative fact doctrine can be applied in the case. the last
paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657 states, “If within two (2) years from the
approval of this Act, the land or stock transfer envisioned above is not made
or realized or the plan for such stock distribution approved by the PARC
within the same period, the agricultural land of the corporate owners or
corporation shall be subject to the compulsory coverage of this Act.”
Markedly, the use of the word or under the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA
6657 connotes that the law gives the corporate landowner an option to avail
of the stock distribution option or to have the SDP approved within two (2)
years from the approval of RA 6657. This interpretation is consistent with the
well-established principle in statutory construction that the word or is a
disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from
the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in
which it ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Given that HLI secured
approval of its SDP in November 1989, well within the two-year period
reckoned from June 1988 when RA 6657 took effect, then HLI did not violate
the last paragraph of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. Pertinently, said provision does not
bar the Court from applying the operative fact doctrine.
ROMULO v. HDMF
PETITIONER filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals but was
dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the board of HDMF exceeded its delegated power.
HELD: Yes, the board of HDMF has exceeded its power. It seems to us clear
from the language of the enabling law that Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752
intended that an employer with a provident plan or an employee housing plan
superior to that of the fund may obtain exemption from coverage. If the law
had intended that the employee [sic] should have both a superior provident
plan and a housing plan in order to qualify for exemption, it would have used
the words “and” instead of “and/or.” Notably, paragraph (a) of Section 19
requires for annual certification of waiver or suspension, that the features of
the plan or plans are superior to the fund or continue to be so. The law
obviously contemplates that the existence of either plan is considered as
sufficient basis for the grant of an exemption; needless to state, the
concurrence of both plans is more than sufficient. To require the existence of
both plans would radically impose a more stringent condition for waiver which
was not clearly envisioned by the basic law. By removing the disjunctive word
“or” in the implementing rules, the respondent Board has exceeded its
authority.
US v. DE LA SABTA
The word “or” in Sec 2, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court authorizing a municipal
judge (now municipal trial judge) to conduct preliminary examination or
investigation may mean and because under the law he has authority to
conduct both the first and second stages of preliminary investigation
GONZALES v. COMELEC
FACTS: In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the
Constitution. It was provided in the said law that the plebiscite shall be held on
the same day that the general national elections shall be held (November 14,
1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups
as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper
submission of the proposals to the people who would be more interested in
the issues involved in the general election rather than in the issues involving
the plebiscite.
HELD: Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be
held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the
[1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a special,
not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the
circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
“PRINCIPALLY/PRIMARILY v. EXCLUSIVELY”
PRINCIPALLY/PRIMARILY
EXCLUSIVELY
This word is used to signify the exclusion of others not mentioned. It can be
held to mean “only” or “solely”.
ISSUE: Did the lower court err in interpreting Article 364 of the Civil Code and
dismissing the petition?
HELD: Yes. The lower court should have granted the petition. The only
reason why the lower court denied the petitioner's prayer to change her
surname is that as legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon she
should principally use the surname of her father invoking Art. 364 of the Civil
Code. But the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not
equivalent to "exclusively" so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is
equally entitled.
FLORESCA v. PHILLEX MINING (136 SCRA 142, 1985)
ISSUE: Is Phillex’s contention that, the action to file benefits under the WCA
is exclusive, correct?
HELD: Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they
filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding
with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the
civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the
WCA.
Notices of public bidding to become NHA’s venture partner for SMDRP were
published in newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the
bidding process. Then-President Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint
Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for
eventual development into a low cost housing complex and
industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance the development of
Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay
Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey
Mountain will be owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is
revoked or terminated by the Government through no fault of RBI or by
mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate RBI for its actual
expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not
exceeding that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date
of such revocation, cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed
upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of
the project involves clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of
temporary housing units for the current residents on the cleared and levelled
site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced incineration area for the
on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the
JVA was amended and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design
changes and additional work to be done to successfully implement the
project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were decreased to
2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40
hectares to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of
Proclamation No. 465 by President Ramos. The revision also provided for the
119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made
the establishment of an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at
Smokey Mountain necessary. On August 1, 1998, the project was
suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner’s contention that, the power and authority to reclaim
lands of the public domain is vested exclusively in PEA, correct?
HELD: Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible
for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government. This does not mean that it shall be
responsible for all. The requisites for a valid and legal reclamation project are
approval by the President, favourable recommendation of PEA (which were
seen as a part of its recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken
either by PEA or entity under contract of PEA or by the National Government
Agency (NHA is a government agency whose authority to reclaim lands under
consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727 and RA 7279).
“TERM v. TENURE”
TERM
A term is a fixed period of time, whereas tenure is not.
TENURE
The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the
office.
FACTS: On January 15, 1960, private respondent approved the following
Resolution No.13, hereby appointing Mr. Bruno Aparri, as general manager of
NARRA, with all the rights, prerogatives and compensations to take effect on
January 116, 1960. On March 15, 1962, the board of directors approved
Resolution No. 24 which stating thereat that the incumbent general manager
shall perform his duty up to the close of office hour on March 31, 1962. In
accordance with the provisions of section 8, sub-section 2 of RA 1160. It
hereby fixes the term of office of the incumbent general manager until march
31, 1962. Petitioner filed a mandamus with preliminary injunction with the first
instance court. The petition pray for the annulment of the resolution of
NARRA board.
HELD: It was affirmed that the term of office of petitioner expired on March
31, 1962. It is necessary in each case to interpret the word “term” with the
purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to
the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed
by law. However, the power to fix the term is rested in the board of directors
subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the
approval of the President of the Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no
removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner. The statute is
undeniably clear. "It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrases of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous. Its meaning and intention
of the legislative must be determined from the language employed and where
there is no ambiguity in words, there is no room for construction.
The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his term
rather, his right to hold office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962, of
his term to hold such office.
“EVERY”
"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all possible
and all taken one by one.