'Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict

Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Civil Conflict
Author(s): Gudrun Østby

Source: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 45, No. 2, Special Issue on Polarization and Conflict
(Mar., 2008), pp. 143-162
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? 2008 Journal ofPeace Research,
vol.45, no.2, 2008, pp. 143-162
Sage Publications (LosAngeles,London,New Delhi
and Singapore) httpilljpr.sagepub.com
DOI10.1177/0022343307087169
Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities and

Violent Civil Conflict*
GUDRUN 0STBY
Department ofPolitical Science, University ofOslo; and Centre for the Study of
Civil War (CSCW), International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)
Recent war conclude that inequality does not increase the risk of violent conflict.
large-N studies of civil
This article argues that such conclusions may be premature because these studies, which usually test the
conflict potential of Vertical inequality' (i.e. income inequality between individuals), tend to neglect the
group aspect of inequality. Case studies suggest thatwhat matters for conflict is a concept closely linked
to both economic and ethnic polarization: 'horizontal inequalities', or inequalities that coincide with
identity-based cleavages. Horizontal inequalities may enhance both grievances and group cohesion
among the relatively deprived and thus facilitate mobilization for conflict. This article provides a quan
titative test of this argument, exploring whether various forms of polarization and horizontal inequali
ties affect the probability of civil conflict onset across 36 developing countries in the period 1986-2004.
National household data from the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) are used to construct
measures of ethnic, social and economic polarization, as well as vertical and horizontal inequalities along
two dimensions: social and economic. The article also introduces a combined measure of ethnic/socio
economic polarization as an alternative to the horizontal inequality measure. Robust results from panel
and cross-section analyses show that social polarization and horizontal social inequality are positively
related to conflict outbreak. Variables for purely ethnic polarization, inter-individual inequalities and
combined ethnic/socio-economic are not
polarization significant.
Introduction distinct in one or more of these ways, when

one of them feels it is discriminated
being
or another which it
Simple inequality between rich and poor is not against, enjoys privileges
to cause violent conflict. What is fears to lose. (Annan, 1999)
enough
is ... 'horizontal' inequality:
highly explosive Over the past few years, prominent
when and resources are large-N
power unequally
studies of civil war seem to have reached a con
distributed between groups that are also
differentiated in other ways ? for instance by sensus that inequality does not increase the
race, religion or language. So-called 'ethnic' riskof civilwar (e.g.Collier & Hoeffler, 2004;
occur between which are
conflicts groups Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre, Gissinger &
*
This article is part of the Polarization and Conflict in those meetings. I am also grateful to Juha Auvinen,
Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Tanja Ellingsen, James Fearon, Scott Gates, Nils Petter
Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. Gleditsch, H?vard Hegre, Jo Thori Lind, Nicholas
This article reflects only the author's views and the Sambanis, Henrik Urdal, two anonymous referees and the
Community is not liable for any use thatmay be made of editors of this special issue forhelpful comments. A special
the information contained therein.An earlier version was thanks toH?vard Strand for useful insights and technical
presented to the PAC Winter Meeting inBarcelona, 10?11 assistance in generating several of the variables. The data,
December 2004 and to the 46th Annual Convention of the codebook and do-files used in the analysis, as well as the
International Studies Association, Honolulu, HI, 1?5 online appendix, are available at http://www.prio.no/jpr/
March 2005, and I thank the discussants and participants datasets. Correspondence: gudrun.ostby@ stv.uio.no.
143

144 journal of Peace Research volume 451 number2 /march 2008
Gleditsch, 2003). I argue in this article The analysis is based on a new dataset
that this conclusion is potentially false, constructed from microdata from the
because these studies largely neglect the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) for
group aspect of inequality. Civil wars are 39 developing countries in the period
? not
conflicts confrontations between 1986-2004. I construct macro
group aggregated
individuals randomly fighting each other indicators of polarization and horizontal
(Duelos, Esteban & Ray, 2004). Hence, the inequalities. The latter refers to inequality
focus should be on or between the two ethnic groups in each
polarization, inequal largest
not between two dimensions:
ity between groups, individuals. country along
economic
Inequalities that coincide with ethnic cleav (ownership of various household assets) and
ages may enhance both
grievances
and group social (educational opportunities).
cohesion among the relativelydeprived and The article is structured as follows: I first
thus facilitate mobilization for conflict discuss some problems with the inequality
(Gurr, 2000; Murshed & Gates, 2005; conflict literature. Next, I present a theoretical
Stewart, 2000). Such systematic inequalities framework for

studying polarization, horizon
between ethnic groups
are
closely related to tal inequalities and civil conflict, followed by
both ethnic and economic
polarization, and the research design. Finally, I present my
empirical results.The main findings are that
are often referred to as 'horizontal
inequali
ties' (His). His should be distinguished from social polarization and horizontal social
Vertical inequality',which relates to inequal inequality
are
positively related to conflict out
itybetween individuals (see Stewart, 2000). break.This indicates that it is too early to reject
Moreover, the majority of
inequality-conflict
the inequality?conflict nexus and that future
studies concentrate
exclusively
on economic research should focus more on the interplay
income inequality, thus failing to capture the between ethnicity and socio-economic distrib
multidimensional nature of inequality. utions. terms for
The purely ethnic polariza
In a series of case studies, Stewart (2002) tion and
purely
socio-economic inter-individual
found that various horizontal inequalities inequalities
are not
significant
in the
analysis.
have provoked some kind of conflict, ranging Neither is the combined measure of ethnic/
from severe criminality inBrazil to civilwar in socio-economic
polarization.
Uganda and Sri Lanka. These studies provide
deep insight into the specific cases but are less Problems with the Inequality?Conflict
suited for to a universal relation
generalizing
Literature
ship between His and conflict. Furthermore,
Stewartmay be criticized for selecting on the A remarkablydiverse literature,theoretical as
(and independent) variable(s), well as has evolved as a response to
dependent empirical,
since she investigates only countries where theproposition thatpolitical violence isa func
His have led to some kind of conflict. In order tion of economic
inequality. There are, in
to assess the between His eco
general relationship theory, five possible relationships between
and conflict, one needs a
systematic, large-N
nomic inequality and political conflict: posi
research The main tive, convex (inverted
quantitative design. objec negative, U-shaped),
tive of this article is to provide such a study concave (U-shaped) or null. The empirical lit
and also to compare pure measures of ethnic erature of all.1 Ever since
provides examples
and socio-economic
polarization, respectively, the publication of a seminal paper byRussett
with HI measures and measures of two
dimensional polarization, which cover both 1
Lichbach (1989) located 43 quantitative studies of the
ethnic and socio-economic aspects. inequality?conflict nexus.

Gudrun 0stby Horizontal Inequalities 145
(1964), scholars have tried to statistically While a standard critique about missing
determine the between vertical control variables, poor data3 and statistical
relationship
inequality and political conflict. However, shortcomings would probably apply to

incompatible results have leftus confused as several of the studies mentioned above, there
to whether there is a relationship between is a more fundamental and conceptual
- and if
inequality and conflict so, what is problem thatproduces the conflicting results
this relationship? (See e.g. Alesina & Perotti, concerning the
inequality?conflict
nexus. All
1996; Auvinen & Nafziger, 1999; Collier & these studies take an individualistic approach
Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Hegre, to
inequality, concentrating exclusively
on
Gissinger & Gleditsch, 2003; M?ller & inequality among individuals, even though
Seligson, 1987; Nagel, 1974; Parvin, 1973; what they are trying to explain is group
Sigelman & Simpson, 1977;Weede, 1981.) conflict. This may explain why
so many
Most traditional studies of inequality and researchers have failed to find a relationship
conflict relate to the theory of relative depri between inequality and civil war.4
vation (see Gurr, 1970). This theory argues The second problem with the inequal
that while absolute poverty may lead to ity-conflict literature is that most studies
and inactivity, with consider economic
apathy comparisons only inequality, usually
those in the same society who do better may measured as income inequality. This is also
result in violence. Recent work on civil war true for the most recent studies, almost all of
has distinguished between so-called greed which use the inequality data provided by
Deininger & Squire (1996) and UNU/
driven and rebellion: on
grievance-driven
the one hand, rationalist theories that focus WIDER & UNDP (2000). Sen (1992: 28)
on the to a rebellion asks a that is essential for the present
opportunities organize question
on the other hand, relative
(greed) and, inquiry: 'Equality of what?', stressing that
theories that focus on motives for can be much more than in
deprivation inequality just
groups to change their situation. Collier & come inequalitymeasured by theGini index.
Hoeffler (2004) discuss several grievances He focuses on three different categories of
(e.g. inequality, lack of political rights, and equality: equality of income or other finan
ethnic divisions) as well as opportunities for cial assets; equality of welfare; and equal
rights and liberties. Stewart (2002) concurs
a rebel access to
forming organization (e.g.
finance and natural resources), and that may occur in eco
inequal inequalities political,
nomic In sum,
ity is among the grievance factors that they and social dimensions. inequal
largelydismiss. The greed-grievance' debate ity is

not
necessarily unrelated to conflict, but
merits further examination. However, it the relationship on whether we focus
depends
should not be framed in either-or' terms, as on individuals or and what dimen
groups,
the key seems to be to understand the inter sion of we try to measure.
inequality
action between grievances and opportunity Finally, there has been a recent focus on the
structures (see Schock, 1996).2 need to measures of polarization
e.g. incorporate
3A
problem with the income inequality data is the high
level of missing observations. Furthermore, this pattern is
2
Although political opportunities may moderate the rela non-random, that is,we have fewer inequality data for con
tionship between His (or polarization) and conflict flict-ridden countries. This problem is likely to be less
(Schock, 1996), such interaction effects are not reported severe here, since theHI data are generated from surveys of
herein, as my focus is the link between various forms of which the original intentionwas not to assess inequalities.
4
polarization, His and conflict. However, I also ran all Exceptions include Besan?on (2005) and Midlarsky
models with measures of political regime type and interac (1999), who do find an impact of (certain kinds of) verti
tionswith His, but the resultswere insignificant. cal inequality on (certain forms of) political violence.

146 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 451 number21 march 2008
as opposed to sheer inequality in the study of to

following: economic polarization is related
civil conflict. While vertical inequality is the alienation that groups of people feel
concerned with the overall distribution, against each other, and this alienation is
polarization (and horizontal inequality) enforced by
notions of
within-group
cohe
imply some sort of clustering in the distribu sion and identity. Esteban & Ray (1994)
tion. The degree of polarization increases argue that traditionalmeasures of inequality
when there are few (equally) large groups are concerned with only interpersonal
alien
with characteristics within each ation, hence to the of

homogenous failing capture aspect
group, and differences in characteristics group identity. I concur with this critique,
between them.Unlike horizontal inequalities assuming that a
country's level of vertical
(which are, by definition,multidimensional), inequality is not necessarily related to the risk

the conflict potential of polarization isusually of armed conflict. What matters for conflict,
measured
along
one
single dimension, such
according toEsteban & Ray (1994), is rather
as ethnicity (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, economic
polarization. They argue that a
2005b) or economic welfare (Esteban & Ray, society that is split into two well-defined
1994). However, questions
are often asked groups with substantial intragroup homo
about the dynamics of polarization between geneity and intergroup heterogeneity in
exogenously given groups, such as urban/rural, incomes is particularly likely to experience
regional, religious or, as in the current study, social unrest. Such a society would be
ethnic groups. Unfortunately, currently marked by both strong group identification
available
polarization
measures are not fit to and sharp divisions (alienation) between the
answer such questions (Fedorov, 2002). To groups. The DHS data allows me to measure
overcome this limitation, this intro economic in terms of household
study polarization
duces a measure of horizontal and assets versus social in terms of
inequality polarization
alternative measures of polarization educational Hence, I suggest
proposes opportunities.
that cover both socio-economic and ethnic the following hypotheses:
dimensions.5 Below, I elaborate on the
H la: The higher the level of economic
mechanisms between various types of
polar in a the
polarization country, higher
ization,HI and the outbreak of civil conflict.
the risk of civil conflict.
H lb: The higher the level of social polariza
Polarization, Horizontal Inequalities tion in a country, the higher the riskof
and Civil Conflict civil conflict.
Since civil wars are

group conflicts, the Esteban & Ray (1994) and Duelos,
central question should be why and how Esteban & Ray (2004: 1738) concentrate on
groups aremobilized (Stewart, 2000). For a pure income polarization, inwhich individ
group to mobilize, it first needs a common uals identifythemselves onlywith thosewith
identity (Gurr, 2000; Tilly, 1978). In their similar income levels.6This implies thatboth
seminal article on Esteban & the concepts of identification and alienation
polarization,
Ray (1994) focus on the concepts of identi are based on the same characteristic. However,
fication and alienation. Their idea is the Esteban & Ray (2005) focus on ethnicity or
5Polarization is sometimes treated as a

sub-category of HI
measures (Stewart, Brown & Mancini, 2005). However,
I argue that polarization can be viewed as an HI measure 6
However, Duelos, Esteban & Ray (2004: 1758-1760)
only if it comprises both demographic and socio-economic also briefly discuss a broader concept of what they call
dimensions. 'social polarization.

religion, rather than class, as the dividing line largerwith few groups.My second hypothesis
of warring groups, stressing that one should derives from this logic:
strive to single out the specific dimension of
H2: The higher the level of ethnic polariza
group divisions that ismost relevant to each
tion in a country, the higher the risk of
specific conflict. In line with this, many
civil conflict.
researchers would argue that, although
perhaps
important for intergroup hostilities, economic Several conflicts today are fought between
welfare (or social, for that matter) is not nec ethnic but there are also ex
groups, many
the most important characteristic for of diverse countries where
essarily amples ethnically
group identityand that one should also focus ethnic groups live peacefully side by side.
on other factors (see Stewart, 2000). Tanzania and Ghana, for have
e.g. example,
Ethnic identity isparticularly conflict-prone, avoided the severe internal conflicts ofmany
since it is based on fundamental factors like of their
neighbours.
Part of the reason may
language, race and religion. Although there be that such countries have avoided socio
aremixed results
regarding differentforms of economic
inequalities between the groups
ethnicity and conflict (see e.g. Ellingsen, (Minority Rights Group International,
2000; Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Montalvo & 1997: 517, 419). Given that a shared ethnic
Reynal-Querol, 2005a,b), civil wars often group identity is not sufficient to explain
seem to have an ethnic dimension, with well mobilization, one should
group investigate
defined identity groups fighting each other whether, and under what circumstances,
(Murshed & Gates, 2005). ethnicity may be a salient factor regarding

The literaturehas introduced two differ violent conflict. In line with Gurr (2000)
ent concepts of ethnic diversity: fractional and Stewart (2002), I argue that ethnic
ization and polarization (see Montalvo & cleavages that coincide with systematic
Reynal-Querol, 2005a,b). Technically, the socio-economic

inequalities may enhance
level of ethnic fractionalization increases both collective grievances and group cohe
when the number of ethnic groups in a sion among the relatively deprived, thus
society increases, and can be interpreted
as
enhancing the levels of both frustration and
the probability that two randomly selected opportunity for group mobilization. A com
individuals belong to different ethnic mon cultural identity

can thus become a
groups. Ethnic
polarization,
on the other powerful mobilizing agent that can lead to a
hand, increaseswhen there are few (equally) range of political disturbances.
with characteris There are many cases in which various
large groups homogenous
tics within each group, and differences in a kinds of His seem to have conflict.
provoked
cluster of characteristics among groups. The civil conflict between the Senegalese
Indices of polarization are highest when government and the Mouvement des Forces
there are two

relatively large groups of D?mocratiques de Casamance (MFDC) may
the same size. to the serve as an Casamance is a southern
exactly According example.
instrumentalist of ethnicity and richer in natural resources than the
explanation region
conflict, leaders often use ethnic iden rest of the country. It most of the
group produces
-
tities to achieve their own and finan country's food, rice and cotton, and prior
political
-
cial objectives. If this is the case, it should be to the armed conflict
generated
much of
easier for group leaders tomobilize groups in Senegal's

tourist revenues. The main ethnic
societies with few rival because few in the are the Diola,
groups, group region among
groups imply clearly defined ethnic divisions, whom separatist sentiments have existed
and because the recruitment becomes since colonial times. This stems from the
pool

148 journal of'Peace Research volume 451 number21 march 2008
Diolas' perception that they do not benefit grievances

are due to discrimination,
they
are
from the wealth, and that are to ethnic-based movements,

region's they likely provoke
discriminated against with regard to educa and when group inequalities intensify,they
tion policy and land allocation decisions might turn into political violence (Schock,
(Humphreys & Mohamed, 2005; Minority 1996). Moreover, Collier & Hoefiler (2004)
Rights Group International, 1997: 449). focus on theviability of rebellionmovements
Gurr (2000) found that ethnic groups are through opportunity
costs. The recruits of
often
subject
to economic discrimination to the rebel groups must be paid, and their cost
the extent that their members have been for joining the rebel organization is likely to
systematically limited in access to desirable decrease the lower their alternative income is.
economic
goods and conditions. Whether In short,mobilizing the relatively deprived
such are due to overt discrimi is and, hence,
inequalities identity groups cheaper,
nation or not,
unequal
access to economic violent conflict should be more likely in
resources by different groups can provoke countries with sharp inequalities between
collective Horizontal
grievances. inequalities identitygroups.
may also have a social dimension, such as Aristotle said thatInferiors revolt in order
when governments and dominant ethnic that theymay be equal, and equals that they
groups use discriminatory educational poli may be superior' (quoted in Sigelman &
cies to oppress minorities. In poor countries, Simpson, 1977: 106). If this is the case, one
the public sector isusually relativelylarge and cannot assume that it is
only
resentment
by
often the main source of
professional employ the deprived that causes political instability.
ment.
Discriminatory barriers to
minority The relativelyprivileged can also attack the
recruitment restrict the economic opportuni unprivileged, fearing that theymay demand
ties and perpetuate material disadvan more resources and or
help political power, they
tages of certain groups. For Sri Lanka may even strive to secede. The latter is the
example,
has tilted university admission policies case with several Indonesian
regions
that
against Tamils (Gurr, 2000: 109). have higher levelsofGDP per capita than the
Why and how do horizontal inequalities national average (Tadjoeddin, 2003). Either
breed violent conflict?A shared identitymay scenario leads to themain proposition of this
overcome collective action
problems, whereby article: that societies of high horizontal
inequalities have higher risksof civil conflict.
are unable to because of
people cooperate
mutual (Olson, 1965). Ethno
suspicions As with polarization, I propose hypotheses
political organizations often use symbols of which distinguish between two different
shared identity and
grievances
as a
strategy
to kinds ofHis:7
build a sense of common interest. If the cul
H3a: The higher the level of horizontal eco
tural group identity is weak, people can
nomic in a the
inequality country,
seldom be mobilized by leaders in response
to a threat (Gurr, 2000: 75). higher the risk of civil conflict.
H3b: The higher the level of horizontal
However, a shared is not a
group identity
social in a the
to inequality country,
sufficient factor violent conflict.
produce
As & Gates higher the risk of civil conflict.
argued by Murshed (2005),
some shared are
group-grievances required
for identity-based conflict. Horizontal in
a collective of
equalities capture aspect 7
Preferably, one should have data on political dimensions
relativedeprivation which can facilitatemobi of His as well, but theDHS do not include any questions
lization for conflict.When such collective which are suited for such a measure.

Gudrun 0stby HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES 149
Measuring Polarization and also seems

satisfactory.
A
good questionnaire
Horizontal Inequalities
should produce
valid measures, ensuring that
the understands what informa

respondent
To no other
my knowledge, quantitative tion is being sought, and most questions
large-N study of civil conflict has applied included in the DHS surveys are standard
on horizontal
systematic and objective data ized and clearly formulated. Because the
across countries. Yet, a handful
inequalities instruments and information in the
survey
of scholars have analyzed the conflict poten are almost the same in all participating
DHS
tial of structural differences between ethnic we
countries, may undertake valid compar
The most is the
groups. prominent example isons of the results across countries and over
Minorities at Risk' (MAR) database, from time within each country. Furthermore, the
which Gurr (2000) concluded that where
indicators used in this article are based on
there are identities with
simple and straightforwardquestions about
strong together large
protest is more likely.
group grievances, educational in years and owner
experience
MAR is the only worldwide dataset with
itswide ship of household assets,which should min
group-level inequality data. Despite imize validity problems.
use, however, MAR suffers from fundamen
tal flaws, notably selection on the dependent

variable (Sambanis, 2002). Research Design
This study tries to avoid some of these a
The study includes all countries where
limitations by constructing objective indica was
and Health Survey under
Demographic
tors of horizontal inequalities based on
taken between 1986 and 2004, given that the
national survey data. The Demographic and
survey included information on the ethnic
Health Surveys (DHS) are generated by an
affinityof the respondents. According to this
ongoing research project initiated by the criterion, I obtain a sample consisting of 39
US Agency for International Development
countries ofwhich 86 national DHS surveys
(USAID) to provide data and analysis on the contained information on ethnic affinity,
women
population, health and nutrition of which made it possible to construct indica
and children in developing countries. Over
tors of His. Three of these countries, India,
the last 20 years, theDHS project has coor
Turkey and the Philippines, are not included
dinated surveys inmore than 70 developing to in
in the analyses, conflicts
owing ongoing
countries. At the time of writing,
the entire period 1986-2004. The reported
questions
about ethnic affiliation are available for 39
In a DHS sample of countries in allmodels, thus, is 36.
countries from theDHS. survey,
Appendix A listsall theDHS surveysused to
women between the ages 15 and 49 are inter
generate the data for the analysis.
viewed about health, fertility and other
issues, such as household assets and educa
a rich data source from
Dependent Variable: Civil Conflict
tion. This
provides The dependent variable is onset of civil con
which one can construct indicators of polar
stem from theUppsala/PRIO
ization and horizontal
flict. The data
inequalities.8 Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al.,
In general, the DHS surveys have high
2002), which uses a threshold of 25 battle
reliability, as evidenced by the large sample
related deaths I on Strand's
per year. rely
sizes, random and standardized
sampling
(2006) onset definition, with a two-year
questionnaires. The validity of theDHS data
criterion for recurring conflicts. The variable
8 The takes the value 1 for when a conflict

DHS data are available at years
http://www.
measuredhs.com. starts and 0 otherwise. Consecutive years of

150 journal of PEACE RESEARCH volume 451 number21 march 2008
conflict are omitted (coded as missing inequality' and Vertical social inequality'.
observations). There are no hypotheses for the relationship
between vertical inequalities and conflict in
Independent Variables: Ethnicity and this article (because I assume that there is no
Socio-Economie Distribution but the variables are neverthe

relationship),
Ethnic in a country-year is less included as alternatives to the almost
polarization given
calculated based on data on ethnic affinityof exclusive use of the Deininger & Squire
the respondents in the DHS surveys: vl31 (1996) inequality data.
I
(respondent's ethnicity). apply the formula In order to testHypotheses la and lb,
presented in Montalvo & Reynal-Querol I construct two
purely
socio-economic mea
-
(2005b:798): sures of polarization economic
polariza
?
tion and 'social polarization' applying
N Esteban & Ray's (1994: 834) formula on the
1/2-7T.
1/2
7T.
(1) DHS individual data on household assets
i=\ and education years respectively:
ER=
where tt? denotes the population share of
K??nrnj\y,-y\ (2)
ethnic group / in a country. The degree of
ethnic increases when there are where tt? and 77. denote the size of groups /
polarization
few (equally) large groups with homogenous andy,
and j/; and y: denote the share of house
characteristicswithin each group, and differ hold assets (or education years) possessed by
ences in a cluster of characteristics the groups. The formula summarizes all per
among
groups. mutations of n groups defined by the asset or
Since theDHS surveys lack information education variables.11 The constant A" is set
on income or
consumption expenditures,9
to 1/2 |jl to allow for comparability across
I use instead the information collected on populations, and a is set to 1. Note that this
other household characteristics.The analysis measure equals theGini coefficient ifa is set
uses two different indicators of socio-economic to 0. As an alternative to this, I also calculate
welfare to calculate measures of socio-economic measures for two-point distrib
polarization
vertical inequalities and polarization: a house utions (bipolarization), dividing the popula
hold asset index and educational attainment. tions in each into two groups, above
country
The household asset index is calculated on and below the country mean, jul.This is
given
the basis of the following variables from the by the formula below (see Esteban & Ray,
DHS surveys: vll9?vl25 (dummies for 1994: 842):
whether or not each household has electric
a a television, a a +
ity, radio, refrigerator, bicycle, />=[7rl+a(l_7r)
a and/or a car). second indi (3)
motorcycle My (l-Try+<*7T](y-x)
cator is based on the variable v 133 (total
years of education For both where tt denotes size and x and
completed).10 group y
household assets and education years, I generate denote the share of household assets (or edu
Gini coefficients to measure vertical economic cation the two
years) possessed by groups
9 Sahn & Stifel

(2003) argue that, owing to developing
countries' lack of capacity to conduct household expendi
ture surveys, one should search for IIThe ordinal nature of the education
simpler ways of mea years and asset index
suring household welfare. forms a convenient basis for selecting a fixed number of
10 For more
details, see the DHS Recode Manual: groups. A group in this context simply consists of all indi
http://www.measuredhs.com/accesssurveys/. viduals with similar scores on the socio-economic variable.

respectively.Dividing the population of a where worst refers to the average share of a
country into two groups

on the basis of jx good owned bymembers of the poorer group
might not fit all societies equally well.
and best refers to the average share of an asset
Hence, I further apply Esteban, Gradin & owned bymembers of the richer group. The
measure potentially ranges from 0 (perfect
Ray's (2007: 6) proposed extension of the
bipolarization measure, which ismore sensi equality) to 1 (horizontal inequalitywith the
tive to the choice of cut-off point: richer group owning
all the assets). Since rel
ativewealth does not necessarily follow from
P(fia,?)=ER(a,p*) group size, I use the following application of

(4) the formula in order to calculate horizontal
?[G(f)-G(p*)]
assets between the
inequalities of household
where ER is equal to (3) above, and where the two
largest groups in a country:
'free'parameter ? is set to 1.G(f) refersto the

Gini coefficient for the entire distribution,
while G(p*) is the corresponding score for the ///= l-exp (6)
distribution. a is set to 1.
t? M
two-point Again,
Unlike the pure measures of polarization
where M is the number of household assets
described above (ethnic and socio-economic,
and Aix refers to the share of group 1 (the
measures of horizontal
respectively), my
ethnic that owns asset /'zn?Ai2
on information about
inequalities are based
largest group)
is the corresponding share of group 2 (the
both ethnic affinity and welfare indicators.
second ethnic For my
in my largest group). sample,
Because many of the countries study
this provides a continuous variable of hori
contain numerous ethnic reliable
groups,
zontal economic inequality ranging from 0
estimation of socio-economic trends for each
(the lowest level of such inequality) to 0.73
group may be problematic. Instead, follow
on (the highest actual level of such inequality).
ingBrockerhoff& Hewett (2000), I focus
the two in each My termhorizontal social inequality reflects
largest groups country,12
that the level of people's educational opportunities. It isbased
assuming inequalities on two variables from theDHS surveys: vl31
between the two largest
ethnic groups gener
(ethnicity) and v133 (total years of education
ally reflects theHis in the country.
completed). The variable is generated along
My first indicator of horizontal inequali the same lines as economic HI and
was ranges
ties, horizontal economic gen
inequality,
from 0 to 0.80.
erated on the basis of the following variables
The HI measures described above could be
from theDHS surveys: vl3I (ethnicity) and
criticized forpotentially leaving out important
vll9-vl25 (dummies for household assets). socio-economic
information about the relative
In order to compare horizontal inequalities
of smaller ethnic groups. Hence,
across different a standardized performance
countries,
I also construct measures for economic/ethnic
measure is needed. For a of two
comparison
and social/ethnic
the measure conceivable polarization polarization,1^
groups, simplest
based on information about all ethnic groups
would be the following:
in a to whether
country,14 investigate they per
form better as of internal conflict
predictors
best
13
Henceforth, I sometimes use the shorthand ethnic/socio
economic polarization for these two variables.
12 14 I include all the ethnic
Alternatively, one could compare the best and the
worst groups in theDHS which con
sisted of at least 1% of the national population.
group regardingwelfare, or the best vs. the rest.

152 journal of Peace Research volume 451 number2 /march 2008
than my
simple
HI ratio measures. Note that
polarization respectively)aremarkedly stronger.
these are not interaction terms for ethnic and This is not since both mea
very surprising,
economic polarization, but rather a hybrid sures are two-dimensional and hence con
measure of which combines related.16
polarization ceptually very closely
ethnic and socio-economic considerations.15
For this purpose, I use the ER polarization
Control Variables and Statistical
formula (2) again, but this time I let thegroups
Model
be exogenously given in terms of ethnicity as
defined byDHS. Ignoring intragrouphomo Since my sample consists of only developing
geneity, I assume that each individual scores countries, I restrict the number of control vari
the mean value of its ethnic group in terms ables to economic size
development, population
of household assets and education years. and conflicthistory}7The direct linkfrom eco
Unlike the HI measure, this alternative, com nomic to internal is one of
development peace
posite polarization
measure is sensitive to themost robust findings in the literature.To
group size and covers all groups in
society. proxy level of development, I use log
For all the variables that stem from the transformed GDP per capita measured
in con
DHS surveys, I interpolate values for inter stant 1996 US$. I also include a term for
vening years and
extrapolate
the value from the
laggedpopulation size.Both variables are lagged
survey nearest in time for
previous and subse by one year and stem fromGleditsch (2002).
quent yearswithin theperiod 1986-2004. For I employ a logistic regressionmodel with
countries with one I use that value standard errors, an exten
only survey, country-clustered
for all years within the period, in order to sion of robust variance estimation. As sug
gested by Beck, Katz & Tucker (1998),

increase the to a more size.
sample manageable
I control for temporal dependence through a
Polarization and Horizontal Inequalities variable
measuring
the time since the last
Compared conflict and cubic Time since last con

splines.
Table I presents the correlation coefficients flict
counts the number of whole years since
between the measures of socio-economic and the end of the last conflict (peaceyears).
ethnic/socio-economic and hor STATA, version 8.2, was used to run the
polarization
izontal inequalities used in this study. analyses. Descriptive statistics for all vari
The correlations between all the measures ables are presented inAppendix B.
are
significantat the 1% level,but the strength
of the varies. The cor
relationship strongest
Results
relations are between the one-dimensional
socio-economic
polarization
measures. The In this section, I test the conflict potential of
lowest correlation is between horizontal eco various variables socio
measuring purely
nomic inequality and the one-dimensional economic distribution and ethnic composi
economic The correlations between tion, the impact of these variables
polarization. contrasting
His and the alternative
polarization
measures with my two indicatorsof horizontal inequal
polarization and ethnic/social
(ethnic/economic ities and the combined
polarization
measures.
15 See
Duelos, Esteban & Ray's (2004: 1760) discussion
on hybrid polarization measures which combine pure 16
Stewart, Brown & Mancini (2005) provide a compre
income polarization and pure social (ethnic) polarization, hensive comparison of polarization and HI measures.
and their suggested 'social polarization with income-medi 17 I reran the
analyses controlling for growth and regime
ated identification. My measure (socio-economic polariza type (single and squared), but, like other studies of similar
tionwith ethnically mediated group identification) can be samples (e.g. Miguel, Satyanath & Sergenti, 2004), these
seen as an alternative to this. standard controls did not yield significant effects.

Gudrun 0stby HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES 153
Table I. Correlation Between Horizontal Inequalities and Polarization Measures in 39 Developing Countries,
1986-2004 (N = 717)
HSI SP SB ESP
Social indicator: Education

Horizontal social inequality (HSI) 1.000***
Social polarization (SP) 0.383*** 1.000***
Socialbipolarization (SB) 0.349*** 0.993*** 1.000***
Ethnic/social (ESP) 0.640*** 0.472*** 0.463*** 1.000***
polarization
Economic indicator: Assets HEI EP EB EEP
Horizontal economic
inequality (HEI) 1.000***
Economic polarization (EP) 0.151*** 1.000***
Economic bipolarization (EB) 0.227*** 0.873*** 1.000***
Ethnic/economic polarization (EEP) 0.582*** 0.210*** 0.304*** 1.000***
***/>< 0.01.
All the models contain the controls for eco as or bipolarization). All
regularpolarization
nomic development, population
size and the four terms are significant at the 10%
conflict history. Models 1-7 in Table II level. These results substantiate Esteban &
report the effects of vertical inequalities, and Rays (1994) argument that societies with
economic, social and ethnic few well-defined or clusters, with
polarization, groups
The terms are introduced but consid
respectively. sepa strong intragroup homogeneity
rately, owing to high multicollinearity and erable divisions between the groups, are
par
partial conceptual overlap. ticularly likely to experience social conflict.

Not unexpectedly, I find no evidence that In other words,
polarization of socio-economic
verticaleconomic inequality (measured as house welfare may contribute to both the intra
hold asset ownership) is related to the outbreak group cohesion and the intergroup alienation
of internalarmed conflict inModel 1.This is in required in order to provoke conflict. The
linewith Collier & Hoeffler (2004), Fearon & log likelihood scores reveal that themodels
Laitin (2003) and others,who fail to establish a with social polarization (Models 4 and 6)
significant link between vertical income perform slightlybetter than themodels with
inequality and conflict. The alternative indica economic polarization (Models 3 and 5).
torof verticalsocial inequalitydoes not turnout As discussed in the theory section,
tobe significanteither (Model 2). In accordance although
the socio-economic
polarization
with the theoreticaldiscussion above, thismay measures seem to be
important, there may be
indicate that simple inequality between indi other and more salient characteristics than
viduals is not to spur violent conflict, socio-economic welfare that create group
enough
because, unlike polarization,
there is no clear identities and mark group boundaries, such
idea of group identification (apart from class) as ethnicity.To test this possibility, Hypo
associated with vertical inequality.
thesis2 posited a positive relationship between
What
happens, then, when I introduce the level of ethnic polarization and conflict,
terms of economic and social for two reasons. First, few sized
polarization? equally
Hypotheses la and lb, assuming higher risks ethnic groups imply clearly defined ethnic
of conflict with higher levels of economic divisions and group identities, and second,
and social receive support in it should be easier for ethnical entrepre
polarization,
Models 3?6, which demonstrate neurs and leaders to mobilize a rebellion
significant
effects of the terms for both economic when the recruitment
pool
increases
positive
polarization and socialpolarization (measured (Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2005 a; Stewart,

154 journal of Peace Research volume451 number21 march 2008
Table II. Conflict Onset in 36 Countries, 1986-2004 (Panel)

Developing
Modell Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Vertical economic 1.87
inequality (0.74)
Vertical social 2.17
inequality (1.38)
Economic 9.46*
polarization (1.88)
Social polarization 4.80*
(1.87)
Economic 9.82*
bipolarization (1.93)
Social bipolarization 4.51*
(1.82)
Ethnic polarization 0.30
(0.27)
GDP per capita (In) -0.55 -0.33 -0.30 -0.36 -0.55 -0.35 -0.83**
(-1.37) (-0.82) (-0.72) (-0.83) (-1.52) (-0.81) (-2.20)
Population (In) -0.23 -0.15 -0.19 -0.19 -0.26 -0.19 -0.24
(-0.82) (-0.56) (-0.80) (-0.63) (-0.97) (-0.64) (-0.85)
Constant 1.06 -1.66 -1.44 -0.69 1.44 -0.72 4.00
(0.24) (-0.39) (-0.34) (-0.14) (0.37) (-0.15) (0.87)

Log likelihood -81.13 -79.97 -79.95 -79.17 -80.10 -79.21 -81.48
Pseudo R2 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.11
N 519 519 519 519 519 519 519
Number of countries 36 36 36 36 36 36 36
Number of civil wars 22 22 22 22 22 22 22
?
Logit estimateswith robust z-statisticsclustered on countries in parentheses. *p< 0.10; **/>^0.05; ***/> 0.01. Estimates for
peace-years and three natural cubic splines not reported.
2002). However, Model 7 suggests that the move on to test the impact of horizontal
assumption thatconflict ismore likelybetween inequalities

as well as two terms for
polarization
two
large
and relatively even-sized ethnic which include aspects of both ethnic identity
is incorrect. This is not so and socio-economic in order to
groups perhaps inequalities,
puzzling after all. Although a shared ethnic see how these indicators perform compared
to
itymay be very relevant for group identity the variables of vertical inequality and pure
formation, it is not obvious that ethnic group socio-economic and ethnic polarization,
differences, as such, are a source of alienation Models
respectively. 8-11 inTable III intro
or Furthermore, the duce these terms.
intergroup hostility.
finding reported here is not incompatible Hypotheses 3a and 3b, assuming a higher
with Esteban & Rays (2008) argument that riskof conflictwith higher levels of horizon
societies with sharp ethnic polarization do tal inequalities between ethnic groups, receive
not have a higher riskof civil conflict (due to mixed support inTable III. As
expected, the
term for economic a
horizontal inequality has
the cost of rebellion) but, rather, are asso
high
ciated with higher conflict intensity.18I now positive sign, as shown inModel 8, but the
relationship is far from statistically signifi
18 cant. The variable horizontal social
An empirical testof the latterwould require a largernumber measuring
of conflict years than is currently included inmy dataset. on the other hand, is
inequality, strong,

Gudrun 0Stby HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES 155
positive and significantly related to conflict access to the education system, civil war may
at the 10% level.The lattermight not seem result.
very impressive,but given the relatively small The difference in the results for economic
sample presented here, with hardly signifi and social His inModels 8 and 9 is some
cant (or non-significant) results for the usual what surprising, but may indicate that
suspects' GDP per capita ana population size, inequality
in outcomes in terms of educa
10% significance should be considered quite tional and
occupational opportunities ismore
convincing. Furthermore, the

marginal
effect crucial with regard to collective group griev
is quite strong. For a
country with mean ances than inequality in inputs in terms of
values on all explanatory factors and low access to household assets. The reason for this
levels of horizontal social inequality (5th could be that social variables, such as education,
percentile), the probability of onset of civil are more

likely
to result from systematic
conflict in any given year is 1.75%. Ifwe group discrimination than are group differ
increase the level of horizontal social in ences in terms of economic assets. Dominant
equality from the 5 th to the 95th percentile ethnic groups tend to control state resources
while the other variables at and often use education to discrim

maintaining policies
theirmean, the probability of conflictmore inate
against minorities, as for
example
in
than doubles, to 3.7%. This finding is con South Africa (Stewart,2002:24) and Sri Lanka
sistent with conclusions drawn from a
(Gurr,2000: 109). Education allows themore
number of case studies (Stewart, 2002) that privileged groups to secure further advan
tages.My findings concur with Murshed &

demonstrate that when there are social
sharp
between ethnic such as Gates who reason that the absence
inequalities groups, (2005),
Table III. Conflict Onset in 36 Developing Countries, 1986-2004 (Panel)
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11
Horizontal economic inequality 1.71

(0.71)
Horizontal social inequality 2.16*
(1.79)
Ethnic/economic polarization 20.18
(0.93)
Ethnic/social polarization 6.59
(0.62)
GDP per capita (In) -0.89* -0.82* -0.86* -0.78*
(-1.79) (-1.75) (-1.96) (-1.96)
Population (In) -0.41 -0.39 -0.36 -0.26
(-0.85) (-1.10) (-0.97) (-0.89)
Constant 5.66 4.51 4.98 3.79
(0.86) (0.87) (0.94) (0.85)
Log likelihood -81.03 -79.64 -80.99 -81.35
Pseudo/?2 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11
N 519 519 519 519
Number of countries 36 36 36 36
Number of civilwars 22 22 22 22
on countries in parentheses. */><0.10;
Logit estimates with robust z-statistics clustered **/>^0.05;
***p<0.01. Estimates for peace-years and three natural cubic splines not reported.

156 journal of Peace Research volume 451 number21 march 2008
of social opportunities associated with ethni The terms are tested inModels 10 and 11.
cally based unequal access to education The effects of ethnic/economicpolarization
indeed contributes to the risk of civilwar. and ethnic/social
polarization
are both positive
However, it is also
quite possible that the
regarding conflict onset, but not significantly
summary measure for economic HI so. Horizontal social seems to be a
relating inequality
to the of various household assets better of conflict.
ownership predictor
does not
capture the
general
structural eco As for the control variables, I find some
nomic differences between ethnic groups in evidence for a negative relationship between
a
country. On the one hand, goods
other GDP per capita and conflict, although not
-
than household assets land tenure, for so. This is not so since
robustly surprising,
-
example may be more important indicators my sample consists of only developing coun
of ethnically based economic distribution in tries.The population term is not significant
many countries. Moreover, the in any model.
developing
distribution of visible status symbols (cars,
motorcycles, etc.) may be a result of differ
Robustness Checks and Alternative
ences in cultural not
preferences, necessarily
actual differences in eco Specifications
reflecting general
nomic resources, such as income. Since the sample of countries included in this
My measures of horizontal inequalities study is limited to those countries that have
focus exclusively
on the ratio between the been surveyed by theDHS project and where
two
largest groups and do not account for ethnicitywas included as one of the ques
group size and tions, we cannot refer to this as a random
intragroup inequalities.
According to Stewart, Brown & Mancini sample. The selection mechanism is likely to
(2005: 22), group weighting by population cause a bias, questioning the
generalizability
would seem desirable in most cases. The of the resultspresented above. The sampling
purely socio-economic
polarization
measure mechanisms work on both the dependent
discussed earlier is sensitive to both group and
independent variables. War-ridden
sizes and However, countries are less to be chosen,
intragroup inequality. likely owing
a restrictionwith thismeasure is that identifi to
security and countries where
problems,
cation and alienation have to be driven by ethnic differences are salient should more
the same characteristic. In fact, Duelos, likely be censored with regard to the eth
Esteban & Ray (2004: 1759) themselves nicity question. The bias is therefore likely to
stress that it more com cases
they would find exclude that would support the theory
pelling to adopt amultidimensional approach presented
in this article, and, hence, the
to alienation to estimates and herein are
polarization, permitting findings reported
depend
on characteristics other than the one
likely to be robust, or perhaps even biased
that defines group identity'. This downwards.
corresponds
well to the logic of the horizontal inequality Second, since the number of onsets relative
conflict argument. In linewith this, I finally to the number of control cases is quite skewed,
test the alternative
operationalization of it isnot unlikely that thefindings reportedhere
horizontal inequality, which is, in fact, could be driven by some highly influential
a combination of the two pure measures of cases. However, the results inTables II and III
(ethnic and socio-economic). are robust to the removal of outliers. In fact,
polarization
Group identity is given by shared ethnicity, the results become much stronger when out
and group alienation is defined as socio liers are censored,
notably the coefficients for
economic
inequalities between the groups. economic and social His and the related

composite
term for ethnic/economic polariza Concluding Remarks
tion (all tests are available in the online
This study has demonstrated that one of the
Appendix D).
suggested indicators of horizontal inequalities
Finally, the analysis presented in this seems tomatter for the riskof conflict indevel
article has potential endogeneity problems,
since some of the inequality/polarization oping countries. Horizontal social inequality
has a robust effect on con
are based on that were carried positive significant
data
flict- both in the panel and the cross-section
surveys
out late in the sample period (e.g. HI could
mea
setup. The socio-economic polarization
result from former conflict instead of the
sures also turn out to be in the
significant panel
other way round). The rationale behind
but the effect of purely economic
a was to retain as analyses,
choosing panel design to insignificance when
much information as possible from theDHS polarization drops
tested The terms for vertical
In order to check robustness of cross-sectionally.
surveys. the
ethnic and the
results for the socio-economic inequalities, polarization
the
significant combined ethnic/socio-economic polarization
polarization terms and horizontal social in measures are not The main con
a significant.
equality, I also applied cross-sectional design clusion one can draw from the is that
one observation study
with only per country (see
other recent studies of the inequality-conflict
Appendix C for descriptive statistics). The
nexus (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon &
variable counts the years of con
dependent
Laitin, 2003; Hegre, Gissinger & Gleditsch,
flict following the year of the first DHS
in each whereas the inde
2003) may be premature in concluding that
survey country,
to conflict.Even though
variables stem from the year of the inequality isunrelated
pendent data suffer from some and
my shortcomings
firstDHS survey in the country.The controls must be regarded as preliminary, this studyhas
are the same as in the apart from
design,
panel
demonstrated that it is too early to reject the
the peaceyears and which are
splines, replaced nexus!
a for whether or not the country inequality?conflict
by dummy
There is still room for improvement with
conflict in the five years
experienced preced to our of the relation
regard understanding
ing the firstDHS survey. Since conflicts do
not tend to end at a constant rate ship^) between polarization, inequality and
(Collier,
conflict. national surveys as a starting
2004), we
Hoeffler & should Using
S?derbom,
for generating various measures seems
some of over-dispersion, which point
expect degree a way forward. First, it is a way of
at a binominal promising
points negative regression are difficult to find
generating new data that
model. The spells observed vary in length elsewhere. for polarization and hori
and each was entered into Figures
country's exposure
zontal can be sensi
as an rather inequalities politically
the equation ancillary parameter
tive, and national are to
governments likely
than as a control variable (Long
& Freese,
2003: 264f). Table IV shows the results from report biased data. Biased information is less
data are from national
tests. likely when generated
the cross-sectional
surveys like theDHS, as the original inten
The term for economic
positive purely was not to assess socio
tion behind these
to insignificance, but the
polarization drops economic between ethnic
inequalities groups.
results for the variables social polarization and
Second, the aggregation of survey data en
horizontal social inequality stillhold. Not sur
sures rather than evaluative data.
a small N, the controls descriptive
prisingly,with such That is, researchers do not need to on
are not rely
for GDP per and population sig
capita as the sole source
their personal judgement
nificant, but the effectof the conflicthistory is scores.
for HI Third, survey
to be in most models. determining
shown positive

158 journal of Peace Research volume 451 number21 march 2008
Table IV. Conflict in 36 Developing Countries, 1986?2004 (Cross-Section)
Model 12 Model 13 Modelle Model 15 Model 16
Economic polarization 10.29

(1.40)
Social polarization 7.08**
(2.49)
Economic 7.70
Social 6.84**
Horizontal social 2.39**
inequality (2.01)
GDP per 0.11 0.07 -0.33 0.07 -0.39
capita (In) (0.17)
(0.15) (-0.62)(0.17) (-0.96)
Population (In) 0.12
0.02 0.09 0.02 -0.07
(0.40) (0.06) (0.29) (0.08) (-0.24)
Conflict history 1.86***
0.89 0.82 1.84*** 0.96*
(1.59) (2.95) (1.32) (2.97) (1.78)
Constant -4.98 -3.99 -0.73 -4.10 0.74
(-0.75) (-0.91) (-0.13) (-0.94) (0.18)
Alpha 1.48
1.70 1.46
1.79 1.50
(1.34) (1.02) (1.49) (0.99) (0.99)
Log likelihood -70.27 -68.00 -70.83 -67.88 -69.25
Pseudo/?2 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.09 0.07
N 36
36 36
36 36
Negative binominal regression estimates with z-statistics in parentheses. */><0.10; **/>^0.05; ***/>^0.01.
data
provide
a source
for
calculating
not of socio-economic distribution and ethnicity
only inequalities between groups, but also when
studying
conflict. We need a measure
inequality within given identity groups. of polarization which combines social

Stewart (2000) argues that intragroup (or ethnic) and economic considerations.
inequalities may reduce the potential for Duelos, Esteban & Ray (2004: 1760) and
intergroup conflict for any given degree of Zhang & Kanbur (2001) suggest some
horizontal inequalities, because it may be hybrid measures for this purpose. One
more difficult to obtain group cohesion variant of such a measure was
proposed
in
where there ishigh intragroup inequality.We this article, but did not yield significant
need to explore how to deal with different results in the analyses.
Future research
levels of
inequality
in the same
analysis. should further explore and apply such mea
Stewart, Brown & Mancini (2005: 9) argue sures of multidimensional polarization with
that although it would be interesting to survey data and test their effects on conflict.
include a measure of
within-group inequal
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Appendix A. DHS SurveysUsed in theAnalysis
Country Year Year

Country
Armenia 2000 Mali 1987

Benin 1996 1995
2001 2001
Bolivia 1989 Mozambique 1997
1994 2003
1998 Namibia 1992
2003 2000
Brazil 1986 Nepal 1996
1991 2001
1996 Niger 1992
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta) 1992 1998
1998 Peru 1986
2003 1992
Cameroon 1991 1996
1998 2000
2004 2004
Central African Republic 1994 Philippines* 1993
Chad 1996 1998
2004 2003
C?te d'Ivoire 1994 Rwanda 1992
1998 2000
Ethiopia 2000 Senegal 1986
Gabon 2000 1992
Ghana 1988 1997
1993 South Africa 1998
1998 SriLanka (Ceylon) 1987
2003 Togo 1988
Guatemala 1987 1998
1995 Trinidad and Tobago 1987
1998 Turkey/Ottoman Empire* 1993
Guinea 1999 1998
India* 1992 Uganda 1988
1998 1995
Kazakhstan 1995 2000
1999 Uzbekistan 1996
Kenya 1989 Vietnam, Democratic Republic of 1997
1993 2002
1998 Zambia 1992
2003 1996
Kyrgyz Republic 1997 2001
Liberia 1986 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) 1988
Malawi 1992 1994
2000 2000
*Countries not included in analyses because all country-years are censored due to ongoing conflicts in the entire period.

162 journal of Peace Research volume451 number21 march 2008
Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics (Panel)
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Civil conflict onset* 524 0.040.20 10

Civil conflict onset 717 0.05 10 0.22
Vertical economic inequality 717 0.44 0.71 0.16
0.13
Vertical social 717 0.510.24 0.08
0.87
inequality
Economic 717 0.10 0.060.03 0.26
polarization
Social 717 0.11
0.13 0.02
0.35
polarization
Economic 717 0.06 0.040.00 0.24
bipolarization
Social 717 0.13 0.12 0.01
0.37
bipolarization
Ethnic polarization 717 0.55 0.210.07 0.98
Horizontal economic 717 0.22 0.00
0.17 0.73
inequality
Horizontal social 717 0.320.22 0.80
0.00
inequality
Ethnic/economic 717 0.02 0.010.00 0.08
polarization
Ethnic/social 717 0.030.02 0.12
0.00
polarization
GDP per capita (In) 712 7.55 0.78 6.10
9.32
Population (In) 712 9.44 1.31 13.83

6.70
*Consecutive conflict years omitted (coded as missing).
Appendix C. Descriptive Statistics (Cross-Section)
Variable N Mean Std. dev. Min. Max.
Civil conflict years 36 3.194.62 160

Conflict 36 0.31 0.47 10
history
Year count 36 11.94 4.68
5 19
Vertical economic inequality 36 0.450.16 0.14
0.71
Vertical social inequality 36 0.510.26 0.08
0.87
Economic 36 0.11 0.060.03 0.23
polarization
Socialpolarization 36 0.13 0.12 0.02
0.35
Economic 36 0.06 0.040.00 0.21
bipolarization
Social bipolarization 36 0.130.12 0.01
0.37
Ethnic polarization 36 0.56 0.210.08 0.91
Horizontal economic 36 0.22 0.02
0.18 0.71
inequality
Horizontal social 36 0.32 0.00
0.22 0.76
inequality
Ethnic/economic 36 0.02 0.02
0.00 0.08
polarization
Ethnic/social 36 0.030.02 0.12
0.00
polarization
GDP per capita (In) 36 7.53 0.77 9.15 6.45
(In) 36 9.19 1.08 11.92

7.09
Population


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