175 SCRA 406

Dino vs. Valencia

Petitioner: Irene Dino

Respondents: Hon. Judge Augusto L. Valencia in his capacity as Presiding Judge of CFI of
Rizal, Q.C., Br. 31, and Francisco L. Ong.

FACTS
This is a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition to review the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Br. 31, Quezon City.

Petitioner Irene Dino is the registered owner a parcel of land together with all the improvements
thereon. Private respondent Francisco L. Ong is the adverse claimant, having filed an affidavit of
adverse claim with ROD Quezon City.

In April 26, 1974, private respondent executed a document entitled “AFFIDAVIT and
MEMORANDUM of QUITCLAIM”, where he waived and renounced all his claims, rights and
credits over and against the aforesaid parcel of land. Such act being reflected in the document.
Now petitioner failed to comply with her obligations under the terms of the document.

On March 20, 1975, private respondent filed with CFI-Rizal Q.C., Br. 21 a Complaint against
petitioner for breach of contract and damages, alleging the failure to satisfy payments according
to the agreement, and for which cheques issued have been dishonored due to insufficient funds.
An answer and reply were also filed subsequently.

During the pre-trial conference, petitioner offered to pay her obligations by monthly installments,
but the same was unacceptable to the private respondent. So the pre-trial was terminated.
Thereafter, private respondent’s counsel manifested in open court, and without objection on the
part of the petitioner’s counsel, that he was submitting for resolution by the court his alternative
motion to declare petitioner in default or for a judgment on the pleadings.

On November 22, 1975, petitioner filed an opposition thereto, alleging that there is no room for
judgment on the pleading as her answer to the complaint tender an issue. But on January 26,
1976, respondent judge rendered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff, ordering the
defendant to pay the balance amount plus liquidated damages., and cost of suit. Motion for
reconsideration was denied.

Now petitioner files before the Supreme Court, claiming that:

1. respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
in rendering judgment on the pleadings AND in issuing an order denying her motion
for reconsideration;
2. She has no remedy nor any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of
law except through the present petition.
ISSUE
1. Whether petitioner’s answer to the complaint tendering an issue is untenable or not;

2. Whether respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering judgment on

the pleadings.

RULING
1. NO. Petitioner’s defense is a sham, and did not tender an issue that would require a
hearing for the reception of the evidence. The defense is a mere scheme to devoid or
delay immediate payment.

2. NO. Section 1 Rule 19:

“where an answer admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading,
the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgement of such pleading”

does not state whether the motion for judgment on the pleading maybe considered ex-
parte or only after a notice of hearing serve on the adverse party.

The Supreme Court explained that a motion for judgment on the pleadings, where the
answer admits all the material averments of the complaint, as like in the present case, is
one that may be considered ex-parte because, upon the particular facts thus presented and
laid before the court, the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment. The petitioner is deemed to
have admitted the genuineness and due execution of the “affidavit and memorandum of
quitclaim” for her failure to deny the same under oath.

It further explained that the purpose of the law in requiring the filing of motions, at least
3 days before the hearing thereof, is to avoid surprises upon the opposite party and to
give the opposite party time to study and meet the arguments of the movant.

The questioned judgment on the pleadings is a final judgement; hence it is appealable.

Petitioners could have appealed, but she did not. Having failed to appeal from the said
judgment, she may nor avail of the writ of certiorari to offset the adverse effect of her
omission.