Rightsizing Defence Organizations:

The Case of the Suriname Armed Forces

by

DAYANAND BANDHOE

FHRISS0308002

FHR Lim A Po Institute for Social Studies

Institute of Social Studies

Thesis Master of Public Administration Program in Governance 2008 – 2009 (MPA Intake III)

SURINAME
2010

i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………… ii
LIST OF DIAGRAMS……………………………….……………………………iv
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………….. iv
LIST OF ACRONYMS………………………………………………………….. v

CHAPTER 1: Introduction……………………………………………….. 1

CHAPTER 2: The Surinamese Defence Organization………………….. 4

2.1 The SAF from a historical perspective………………. 4

2.2 The current SAF………………………………………. 5

CHAPTER 3: Developments affecting armed forces…………………… 8

3.1 The changed security environment…………………....8

3.2 Other developments affecting military action……….10
3.3 Debates regarding the size of armed forces………….12
3.4 The impact of developments affecting armed forces..12

CHAPTER 4: A critical analysis of the SAF…………………………….. 18

4.1 General military trends and the SAF………………... 18

4.1.1 Conscription……………………………………... 18
4.1.2 The budget……………………………………….. 18
4.1.3 The size of armed forces...………………………. 18

4.2 Analysis and findings…………………………………. 19

4.2.1 Conscription.…………………………….............. 19
4.2.2 The budget……………………………………….. 19
4.2.3 The legal tasks of the SAF……………………..... 19
4.2.4 The size of the SAF................................................ 20

4.3 Empirical research findings………………………….. 21

4.3.1 Method and sample……………………………… 21

4.3.2 Results / findings………………………… ……... 22
4.3.3 Discussion……………………………………….. 25

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CHAPTER 5: Conclusion………………………………………………… 27

REFERENCES………………………………………………………………… 30

ANNEXES: 1 Questionnaire…………………………………………… 33
2 Clarification of questionnaire………………………….. 39

iii
List of diagrams:

Page

Diagram 1: Military personnel turnover, Ministry of Defence and SAF..........6

Diagram 2: Number of ongoing civil wars and interstate wars..........................9

Diagram 3: Ending civil wars and building peace 1970 – 2002……………... 10

List of tables:

Table 1: Surinamese defence expenditure as a percentage of

the GNP 2000 – 2008………………………………………………..5

Table 2: Surinamese defense expenditure in local currency…………….....6

Table 3: Conscription statistics of 167 countries in 1997………… ………13

Table 4: Military expenditure by region 2001 – 2006 ...………………….. 14

Table 5: Military expenditure in the Latin American region

1990 – 2006………………………………………………... ………14

Table 6: Armed Forces growth from 1985 to 2000………………………...15

Table 7: Personnel turnover of armed forces in the Latin American

region……………………………………………………………….15

Table 8: Questionnaire: the Primary Task……………………………….. 22

Table 9: Questionnaire: the Special Tasks………………………………... 22

Table 10: Questionnaire: size of the Forces………………………………... 23

Table 11: Questionnaire: outsourcing tasks to the private sector………… 24

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List of Acronyms:

AVF All Volunteer Forces

AWOL Absent Without Leave
BICC Bonn International Centre for Conversion
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GNP Gross National Product
G1/NL Personnel department of NL (= Surinamese Army)
ICT Information Communication and Technology
IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies
IO International Organizations
MoD Ministry of Defence
MP Member of Parliament
NCO Non Commissioned Officer
NL Nationaal Leger (= Surinamese Army)
PSR Public Sector Reform
SAF Suriname Armed Forces
SAP Structural Adjusting Program
SIPRI Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SKM Surinaamse Krijgsmacht (= Suriname Armed Forces)
TRIS Troepenmacht in Suriname (= Military Forces in Suriname)
UN United Nations
US (A) United States (of Americas)

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Chapter 1: Introduction
General

The term Globalization as defined by David Held et al (1999: 16) 1 , covers various dimensions and
domains. One of them is the political domain, including the military aspect.
As a consequence of globalization and other factors, the security environment within which armed
forces have to operate has changed drastically since the end of the Cold War. With the end of the
East-West rivalry, science, technology, and weapons of mass destruction became also available to
non-state actors. Security threats are increasingly coming from non-state actors. Apart from terrorists,
(cross-border) criminal organizations are also taking full advantage of the opportunities, especially in
weak states.

Data presented in the next chapter show that after the 1990s the chance for interstate conflict is
declining, while that for intrastate conflicts is increasing. The apparent dominance of American
values is partly being answered by the emergence of cultural and religious fundamentalism. These
developments lead to a change in the nature of warfare which is becoming more and more
unconventional and asymmetric. The idea to establish and maintain sizeable military organizations to
execute their classical defensive tasks 2 is no longer of crucial importance. Large-scale military efforts
are mainly taking place in a joint, combined, and expeditionary way, often in a foreign and unstable
surrounding. As we will see in this study, these activities, that often take place under the mandate of
International Organizations (IO) like the United Nations (UN), are not about executing the classical
military task, but to enforce and maintain international peace and security.

As a consequence, the view regarding the size of armed forces has also changed in many countries.
Based on the principle of doing more with less, this change has led to an international trend during
the last few decades whereby armed forces are not only transforming but also downsizing.

When looking at the percentage of military personnel of a country’s total labour force from the
database of World Development Indicators, we notice that among 169 countries, Suriname took the
44th place in 2005.
Developing countries often do not have enough financial resources to spend in areas necessary for
their sustainable development. Therefore, Suriname too is compelled to determine priorities for
government spending. It is striking to notice that some ‘poor’ countries, especially on the African
continent spent relatively more on their military apparatus than on sustainable economic
development. It turns out that, while most other countries anticipated the changing circumstances,
Suriname’s defence organization, as we notice from diagram 1 on page 6, has grown over the past
years.
Many people have correctly argued that the size of the government of Suriname is unnecessarily big,
compared with similar countries.
The Surinamese Audit Office report (2005: 7) indicates that the government apparatus increased
hugely, but the growth was not based on a proper plan. The report continued (2005: 32) to state that

1
...process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and
transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – generating transcontinental or inter-
regional flows and networks of activity.
2
To defend nation’s territory against foreign military aggression.

1
approximately 60 percent of the Surinamese labour force is employed by the government. Various
articles published by scientist in local newspapers indicate that the Surinamese government apparatus
has grown beyond acceptable proportions. Therefore, this report suggests reducing the public sector
by 25 percent of the labour force in the coming ten years. This goal can be realized if employment in
the public sector is reduced by 5.3 percent each year.

Although, in my view, it seems that the Surinamese Ministry of Defence (MoD) is not sufficiently
aware of the international trends with respect to the new role of militaries indicated above, I will start
this study from the assumption that much can be done to reduce the size of the Suriname Armed
Forces (SAF) as part of a Public Sector Reform (PSR). Armed forces are pre-eminently suitable to
carry out transformations because of the following two reasons:

- The changed security environment within which these institutions operate (and)
- The existing strong command chains inside these public organizations.

There are two main aspects that influence the Surinamese defence budget, namely: the task related to
the way armed forces cope with security issues and their size related to its organizational structure.

Research objectives

The main research objective is:

To determine whether transformation of the SAF towards a smaller organization is necessary and
possible.

Research question(s)

Main: 1. Does the current size of the SAF sufficiently correspond to its dedicated
tasks?

Sub: 2. What is the size and task of the SAF?

3. Is the size of the SAF in accordance with its tasks and resources?
4. What are the views of the army top concerning transformation?

Relevance and justification

In the past 35 years, only twice a study was done with respect to the size of the Surinamese armed
forces. Therefore, I want to see whether the changed security environment has any effect on armed
forces of developing countries.
Having served for nearly thirty years as a professional soldier, I have noticed that there is a lack of
adaptation by the SAF to its changed environment. Policy decisions are not based on numerical data;
those data are often missing. Also because of these shortcomings, politicians do not have enough
knowledge, perception, and vision to take proper decisions regarding the SAF on the long run.
Indisputable is the fact that the (future) role of the Surinamese armed forces will depend also on
country specific circumstances. The emergence of regionalization can also be a mechanism to

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constrain future intrastate conflicts within the various regions and especially between bordering
countries.

Research methods

The study consists of an in-depth literature survey on armed forces reform with respect to their size
and tasks. It will approach the subject from an explorative and descriptive scope. To explore the
external environment, the study will consider security topics and the need to downsize armed forces.
It will also include a case study of the Surinamese defence organization complemented with the
results of information gathered through a questionnaire. The object in view with this questionnaire is
to find out the prevailing opinions of high rank officers, regarding the tasks and size of the armed
forces. Information regarding the external environment will be then compared with the current
situation of the Surinamese defence organization. Relevant aspects of the SAF, related to the research
questions will be considered, analysed, and interpreted.

Structure

The study consists of five chapters, starting with an introduction. Chapter two includes relevant data
of country’s case study, focusing on the Surinamese Defence Organization starting from a historical
perspective.
The next chapter discusses the literature survey, whereby developments that have an impact on armed
forces will be considered. This chapter will furthermore deal with the way in which these
developments influence armed forces to implement changes both globally and regionally.
Chapter four includes a critical analysis and some findings with regard to the SAF from the scope of
what has been composed earlier in the study. This chapter presents an analysis of the information
gathered through the questionnaire, e.g. the opportunities and constraints involved when moving
towards a smaller military organization in Suriname.
Finally Chapter five closes with a summary of conclusions and recommendations.

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Chapter 2: The Surinamese Defence Organization
2.1 The SAF from a historical perspective

a. The ‘Troepenmacht in Suriname’ (TRIS)

Up to the political independence of Suriname, defence was purely a matter of the Kingdom of the
Netherlands. During the 1960s and 1970s, the defence task was assigned to the TRIS.
The draft dissertation in favor of the policy document regarding SKM shows us that in 1952, first
lieutenant Elstak was sent to Suriname to transform the then military apparatus into an army unit
(Essed 1976: 2). This assignment lasted for three years and the TRIS got the character of a guarantee
army. That meant that it was a part of a bigger entity, the Dutch army. The size of the TRIS was that
of an infantry battalion and their task was to maintain order and security.

b. The ‘Surinaamse Krijgsmacht’ (SKM)

With political independence of Suriname the army passed into Surinamese hands. The Surinamese
Army was established by law on 24 November 1975, better known as de Wet op de Krijgsmacht. The
transition of the TRIS to the SKM, involved negotiations with regard to the size of the army. The
Dutch proposed a kind of paramilitary armed field- police consisting of approximately 300 troops.
Finally, it was decided to start with 620 troops (Hoogbergen et al 2005: 24). At the start, the SKM
consisted of a battalion, including the Military Police and the Marine.
From the Abendanon report (1979) we can read that when designing the SKM, the then government
had decided to follow the model of the TRIS in general. Hereby, they failed to consider that there
were fundamental differences between the tasks assigned to the TRIS and to the SKM. The TRIS was
part of the whole Dutch army and could be compared with a forward post that, when necessary, could
be reinforced with troops from the Netherlands and the Antilles. The TRIS could fall back on the
Dutch army at any time. With the independence of Suriname, the considerations that had led to the
size, structure, and equipment of the TRIS were not valid anymore. From there on, it was necessary
to meet the defence needs of Suriname as an independent nation. Because of the unadjusted
organization of the SKM, this entity was not able to meet the defence needs of a sovereign state.
Consequently, the SKM was at risk of being reduced to an irrelevant institute, unable to safeguard the
country.
The officers and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) of the SKM had received their training and
education largely in the Netherlands and experienced developments within the Dutch army
organization. One of the most striking developments was the democratization process, including
involvement of the military personnel regarding their own legal position 3 . The SKM did not start
with sufficient qualified personnel 4 . Their equipment that had belonged to TRIS was also obsolete.
The personnel were often overburdened, and the pressure to improvise was very high. The
Abendanon report states correctly that the necessity to improvise increased the need for
communication and involvement of the personnel with the defense policy-makers. This involvement
issue and the question whether a union should be tolerated in the army were discussed in detail by the

3
Participate in discussions and decisions by lower in rank with officers when it concerned issues of common interests.
4
At the time of transition from the TRIS to the SKM, many had chosen to go back to the Dutch army to maintain their
better social privileges. The exodus from Suriname to the Netherlands at the same time may be considered as to be well
known.

4
lawyer of the three defendants, committee members of the union of the NCOs, during the court-
martial meeting of February 20, 1980 (Boom 1982: 106 – 10).
Since proper contributions towards these issues failed to occur, there was dissatisfaction and
frustration among the personnel of the SKM. In January 1979, these developments had already led to
an outburst among the NCOs whereby they had abandoned their trust in the army leadership. The
developments thereafter resulted in the military coup of February 25, 1980. After the coup, the name
of SKM was changed into Nationaal Leger (NL).

2.2 The current SAF

a. Conscription

Although compulsory military service still exists in Suriname, it became optional by the amendment
of the Constitution of 1987 5 in 1992. From surveys of the Personnel department of NL (G1/NL), we
can see that in former years before 1992, more than one batch was called up for military service.
Since 1992 till 1997, no batch was called up for military service. After 1997, persons could join the
army on a volunteer basis. These persons are employed on contract basis, often for three years. Not
calling up new batches of soldiers on a regular basis resulted in a sharp rise of the average age of the
military personnel of the army. In February 2004, the Information Communication and Technology
(ICT) unit of MoD found that 87 percent of the personnel were between 35 to 45 years old. Although
young employees did not get a chance to join the army on a regular basis, there has been some
improvement concerning this issue since 2004.

b. The budget

From data as presented by the Ministry of Finance, we can see that the Surinamese defense budget
decreased from 3.48 percent in 1987 6 to 1.44 percent of the Gross National Product (GNP) in 2000.
Since the year 2000, this budget shows an average expenditure of 1.6 percent of the GNP. Details of
military expenditures in Suriname are presented in table 1.

Table 1: Surinamese defense expenditure as a percentage of the GNP 2000 - 2008

Source: Ministry of Finance

Defense expenditure
Year Percentage of GNP
2000 1.44
2001 2.24
2002 1.82
2003 1.82
2004 1.51
2005 1.53
2006 1.05
2007 1.57
2008 1.42

5
Article 180, paragraph 3 of the Suriname’s Constitution states that military service can be obliged for a certain period,
and under conditions to be provided by law.
6
This was the year when Suriname shifted towards a democratic chosen government.

5
Moreover, an article published by a local newspaper (De Ware Tijd of February 09, 2010) under the
headline ‘Defensie trekt beurs flink open’, states expressly some data as presented in the following
table.

Table 2: Surinamese defense expenditure in local currency

Source: De Ware Tijd of February 09, 2010.

Year X 1000 SRD %

2005 57.523
2006 68.197 19
2007 84.287 24
2008 85.067 0.01
2009 107.534 26
2010 161.002 49

What strikes one most from table two is the large increase of the expenditures in 2010 with respect to
the previous year.

c. The size of the SAF

As mentioned above, the SKM was started with 620 troops. From interviews with various military
men who were enlisted in the then army, it turns out that just before the military coup the SKM had
grown to approximately 1000 men. After the coup, the scope of the army changed from the classical
role to one whereby the military power was strongly connected with the political power. The size of
the army increased gradually to reach a maximum during the interior war that lasted from 1986 till
1992. After the election of a democratic civilian government in 1987, the size of the army was
reduced to a more budgetary acceptable level. However, as diagram 1 illustrates, there was again a
rise in the size of the army after the 1990s.

Diagram 1: Military personnel turnover, Ministry of Defense and SAF

Source: G1/SAF

3000

2500

2000

1500 MoD
SAF
1000

500

0
90 92 94 96 98 0 2 4 6 8

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The slight growth in military personnel is proved by the fact that in 1990 there were 1587 troops on
active duty by the MoD, whereas in October 2009 that number increased to 2924. From this number,
1184 people were assigned to the armed forces in 1990 and 2234 in October 2009. A calculation of
these data shows that there is an increase of 184 percent by the MoD and 187 percent by the armed
forces.

d. The legal tasks of the SAF

When it comes to the legal tasks of the army, it is for the time being enough to describe them as
follows:

The primary task:

Article 177 of the Constitution

Par. 1: The SAF has the task to defend the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Suriname
against foreign armed military aggression.
Par. 2: Without prejudice to the previous paragraph, the army can be charged with special tasks
regulated by law.

The special tasks:

Article 3, par. 1 of the Act Nationaal Leger can be summarized as follows:

The army is charged with the following special tasks:
a. Guarding the frontier;
b. Supporting the police;
c. Support to prevent disasters and accidents, and suppressing the consequences involved;
d. Support guarding the maritime area;
e. Supporting the preparation and realization of projects regarding the socio-economic
development of Suriname, or supporting other public bodies;
f. Supporting international organizations.

The message from the foregoing is that both the working force and budget of the SAF are growing.
Issues regarding these tasks will be further discussed in chapter four.

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Chapter 3: Developments affecting armed forces

In this chapter, attention will be paid to certain developments that affect the role and size of armed
forces in the world. Besides the changed security environment also some other relevant developments
will be taken into consideration. Furthermore, a closer look shall be taken at the prevailing debates on
the size of the military. The purpose is to explore these developments and to discover their impact on
the size of armed forces.

3.1 The changed security environment

a. The End of the Cold War

Shortly after the end of the Cold War, many people thought that the international system would set
course for peace and stability. Furthermore, they began to forecast the establishment of a new world
order that would be managed by democratic political institutions. It was assumed that serious threat
to international stability would decline commensurately (Chalk 2001: 666).
In contrast with this view, the world experienced in the past two decades many threats to the
international security, caused by violence mostly used by non-state actors. With regard to this new
strategic environment, former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director James Woolsey has
remarked (Chalk 2001: 666):

We have slain a large dragon, but now we find ourselves living in a jungle with a bewildering
number of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.

Therefore, Dandekar (1994: 639) is correctly stating that after the Cold War there was a shift
from the certainties of the bi-polar standoff between the two superpowers to a more
uncertain, fragmented world of competing centre’s of economic, political, and military
power.

b. The nature of threats and conflicts

The report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of the UN (2004: 2) mentions
six clusters of threat with which the world must be concerned now and in the decades ahead 7 .
Regarding the decreasing chance for interstate conflicts, especially in the western hemisphere, an
example to mention is that recently a maritime border dispute between Suriname and Guyana was
solved by international administration of justice.
Partly due to the above mentioned threats, people are becoming increasingly aware that armed forces
can also be used for non-military purposes.
When it comes to the nature of the conflicts occurred shortly after the Cold War, there is also a
noticeable change that characterized a dramatic increase of intrastate conflicts. Interstate conflicts
were mainly suppressed during the Cold War by the East-West rivalry. After the end

7
These are: (1) economic and social threats, including poverty, infectious diseases and environment degradation, (2)
interstate-state conflicts, (3) internal conflicts, including civil war, genocide, and other large-scale atrocities, (4) nuclear,
radiological and biological weapons, (5) terrorism, and (6) transnational organized crime.

8
of this rivalry, many issues 8 got the chance to float up to the surface to end into internal violent
conflicts. From Diagram 2 we can see clearly the dramatic increase of civil wars shortly after the
Cold War. Fortunately, we notice also a decline in these kinds of conflicts in the recent years.
Nevertheless, the international community should be aware that these kinds of violence still can arise
everywhere and at any time.

Diagram 2: Number of ongoing civil wars and interstate wars

c. Concepts of security

The traditional approach of the concept of national security, defined in terms of territorial
sovereignty, no longer complies in the present complex of geo-strategic surroundings.
According to Theunissen et al (2004: 73) security conceived in a traditional sense, regards the
maintenance of the national sovereignty and the integrity of national territory, as well as the
undisturbed use of international traffic and communication lines. Conceived in a modern sense,
security furthermore regards the unthreatened survival of national welfare and the constitutional state.
Hereby it is also concerned with the protection against terrorism and crime, against harming the
welfare, the environment and public health, and the living conditions of the citizens. That means that
the security of a state no longer limits itself to the traditional job responsibilities of the police
(internal security) and armed forces (external security), but also extends to other sectors of a society.
Currently internal security problems are seen as being intricately tied to the external source of threat.
This blurs the difference between external threat and internal security in which atrocities, civilian

8
Issues like ethnic differences, suppressing minority groups, separatist movements, drug wars, grabbing disputed
territories, etc.

9
casualties, destruction of democratic institutions acquire the character of unavoidable collateral
damage (Navlakha 2000: 1712 – 3).

3.2 Other developments affecting military action

a. A New Role for the UN?

The end of the Cold War seems to open a new opportunity for the UN in achieving their primary
mission 9 in a more effective way. Previous to that, most armed conflicts and struggles
for liberation were viewed through the prism of East-West rivalry. During the Cold War, Security
Council action was largely blocked by the veto given to each of the five permanent members. It was
the first time in the history of this institution, when in 1991 the Security Council unanimously
authorized the use of force against Iraq to liberate Kuwait.
Just one day after the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D. C, a resolution 10 introduced
by France on 12 September 2001 was also unanimously passed, which opened the way for United
States-led military action against the Taliban regime in self-defence (report of the High-level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change of the UN 2004: 12 – 3).
Diagram 3 illustrates the increase of the UN-operations in their attempt to end civil wars.
Diagram 3: Ending civil wars and building peace 1970 – 2002

9
To maintain international peace and security.
10
Resolution 1368/2001.

10
The UN is today the main deployer of peace operation personnel. Every year from 2004 to 2008, the
UN accounted for more than half of all deployments, up from 16 per cent in 1999 (Sipri Fact Sheet,
July 2009: 2).
Moreover, the Secretary-General of the UN has expressed his resolve to strengthen the UN ability to
play its role to the fullest extent in conflict prevention, peacemaking, and peacekeeping and peace
building (Reform at the UN: 1).
When measuring the quantity of UN Peacekeeping Operations, it is striking to notice that during the
Cold War there were only 18 operations, while thereafter and till 2007, 45 operations occurred
worldwide.

b. Increasing interdependence, integration, and regionalism

The nature of current threats to our security, and our ability to meet these threats, compel states to
work together. The report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change of the UN
(2004: 1) indicates that the case for collective security today rests on three basic pillars. Today’s
threats recognize no national boundaries, are connected, and must be
addressed at the global, regional as well as the national levels. No State, no matter how powerful, can
by its own efforts alone make itself invulnerable to today’s threats.
As a consequence of increasing awareness of interdependency in challenging the threats, we notice
globally different attempts to design effective cooperation through processes of integration and
regionalism.
Regional collaboration and integration are a prerequisite for Caribbean and Latin American societies
to become relevant actors in the sphere of security. The executive summary regarding the Military
Balance 2009 of the International Institute for Strategic studies (IISS) states about the Caribbean and
Latin America that a number of cooperation initiatives are underway and governments are keen to
promote defence and security cooperation. Some were highlighted at the Eighth Conference of the
Defence Ministers of the Americas in September 2008, while a month earlier defence ministers met
in Buenos Aires to enact the Latin American Association of Peacekeeping Training Centre’s. June
saw Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua announce the Peacekeeping Operations Unit,
a battalion-sized force that is intended for use in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief missions.
The positive impact of these developments can be illustrated with the recent case in Honduras as
published in the local paper, Times of Suriname of October 31, 2009. President Zelaya of Honduras
came into conflict with the Supreme Court and Parliament, where he did not have the support of the
majority. As a consequence of this, he was removed by militaries on June 28, 2009 and enforced to
leave the country. Four months later, after various negotiations and pressure put on the de facto
president Roberto Micheletti; it seems that he has agreed to an international acceptable solution.

c. Globalization of war and peace

Theunissen et al (2005: 72) is arguing that notwithstanding the existence of sovereign states, the
world is becoming a unity whereby national borders can be crossed more easily. This is not only
important for international cooperation, but also for war in all its forms 11 . Because of this, internal
conflicts nowadays can easily achieve international dimensions. A good example of this development
are the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the USA, which were organized from Afghanistan, further prepared
in Western Europe and the USA and finally executed on USA territory.
11
Like the emergence of international terrorism and cross border crime.

11
3.3 Debates regarding the size of armed forces

Regarding the contemporary and future role of armed forces, debates regarding their size are
concentrated on two major basic assumptions:
1. Downsizing armed forces, because the chance for interstate conflicts are declining (and),
2. It is not wise to downsize armed forces, because sooner or later interstate battles for shrinking
natural resources will evolve or may occur along the fault lines between civilizations and
cultures.

Dandekar (1994: 637 – 8) states that in response to strategic and financial pressures, armed forces are
not only becoming smaller, they are also seeking to achieve greater flexibility in their organization
structure. Furthermore, he states that others have suggested that, with the end of a bi-polar standoff
between the nuclear superpowers, a multi-polar world would experience a rebirth of instability and
the risk of war even amongst the advanced industrial powers. He argues that there is truth in both
these lines of arguments. From my point of view, the first argument lies much closer to small
developing countries like Suriname, while the latter suits existing and emerging superpowers 12 .
With regard to the second assumption, reference can be made to what Gray states in his foreword
(1998: xvii – xviii), when dealing with conflicts that cannot be resolved by market forces. He argues
that the major powers are being drawn into competition for the Earth’s depleting resources13 .
It is striking to notice that in the first decade after the end of the Cold War also the size of the US
forces dropped from 2.1 to 1.4 million and their force structure dropped even more, going from 18 to
10 (Bruner, 2004: 1).

3.4 The impact of developments affecting armed forces

a. Towards an expeditionary force

Because of the absence of a large-scale threat from one nation against another, it is no longer
necessary to maintain large armed forces. On the other hand, the need for worldwide employable
forces for military and humanitarian purposes is growing. Because of this, armed forces get a more
active expeditionary role to fulfill outside their own country.
Whereas expeditionary operations in the past were something for the superpowers, we notice from
different UN reports that nowadays much more countries aspire after these kinds of operations.

b. From conscription to volunteer Armed Forces

Many armed forces all over the world are downsizing and some are eliminating conscription in favor
of all-volunteer forces (AVF). The end of the Cold War and the increasing
sophistication of weapons systems are often cited as reasons for eliminating conscription.

12
In this scope, the statement of MP Nick Harvey during his speech to the House of Commons on 29th January 2009 can
be mentioned, when he said that “as we have observed so many times before, the key problem is overstretch, which
continues to have a severe impact”, http://www,nickharveymp.com/speeches/000011.
13
According to Gray, the last big war of the twentieth century – the Gulf War – was triggered by the threat posed to
western oil supplies. Furthermore, genocide in Rwanda had a number of causes, including the damaging inheritance of the
colonial era, but it was also a struggle for control of water. Competition for water is one of the aggravating factors in the
war between Israel and the Palestinians.

12
Abolishing conscription is a political decision that reflects both international and domestic political
factors, as well as domestic economic and operational military considerations. Conscripts in most
countries are generally prohibited by law from being used in foreign missions.
Whereas most countries had conscription in the past, we can see from table 3 that 70 countries had
abolished it before 1997. From the source of this table, one can further notice that many countries in
the region have also abandoned conscription 14 .

Table 3: Conscription statistics of 167 countries in 1997

Source: http://www.nationmaster.com/red/graph/mil_con-military-conscription, accessed 15/07/09

Comparing conscription between 167 countries

No Conscription 70
Conscription exist 83
Selective 9
Conscription may be ordered 2
Conscription not assessable 3
Total 167

c. Military budgets

According to Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC) Annual Report (2007/2008: 12),
between 2001 and 2006, global military expenditure increased in real terms by approximately 30
percent. To a large extent, the continual rise of the US military budget in this period accounts for the
overall growth of global defence expenditure. Of 171 countries examined by BICC, 69 have
increased their defence budget over 2005 – 2006, whereas a reduction of military spending could be
found in 22 countries. Although global military expenditure has generally increased, a regional
perspective reveals considerable differences.
BICC Annual Report (2006/2007: 14) states that total defence expenditure in Latin America, Central
America and the Caribbean had been in a continual decline since 2001. However, between 2004 and
2005 it actually increased from US $23.7 billion to US $29.4 billion. The report continues to say that
these three regions continue to belong to the least militarized areas of the world. The recent growth in
the region can be mainly attributed to an increase in the defence budget in Brazil and, to a lesser
degree, also in Argentina, Chile, Cuba, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
From an article as published in Times of Suriname on November 13, 2009 under the heading of
‘Wapenwedloop Zuid-Amerika trekt controversiële aandacht’ we can read that except for Peru,
Guyana and Suriname, other South American countries are busy arming themselves.
Their excuse is that their current arsenal is obsolete and should therefore be substituted. Peru that
appears to be a promoter of friendship in the region is correctly stating that the enemies South
American countries have to deal with are poverty, drugs dealing, organized crime, and terrorism.
Table 4, on the next page shows the growth in military expenditure by region.

14
Some of these countries are: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, El Salvador, Guyana, Haiti,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Trinidad & Tobago, and Uruguay.

13
Table 4: Military expenditure by region 2001 – 2006 in billion US dollars
Source: BICC Annual Report 2007/2008, http://www.bicc.de/uploads/pdf/publications

Region 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 % increase

North America 357 399 453 493 518 542 52
Middle East / North Africa 63 61 64 70 79 81 29
Central / South Asia 28 28 30 31 34 36 29
East / South-East Asia 120 127 134 138 144 150 25
Eastern Europe, Caucasia and 61 63 64 64 70 76 25
Russia
Australasia 12 13 13 14 14 15 25
Sub-Saharan Africa 9 9 9 9 10 10 11
Latin America and Caribbean 32 33 30 30 33 35 9
Western Europe 226 231 239 242 239 234 4

It is important to note from table 4 that the growth in military expenditure of Latin America and the
Caribbean is the lowest except Western Europe.
Data, with regard to the military expenditure over a longer period in the region are presented in the
following table.
Table 5: Military expenditure in the Latin American region 1990 – 2006 as percentage of GDP
Source: SIPRI, Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute 15

Country 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 Trend

1 Bahamas 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 Down
2 Guyana 0.9 1 1 0.8 ? ? ? ? ? Down
3 Barbados 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1 0.8 0.8 Up
4 Belize 1.2 1 1.4 1.2 ? ? 0.9 0.8 1 Down
5 Dom. Rep. 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.7 1 0.5 0.5 Down
6 Ecuador 1.9 1.7 1.6 2 2.4 1.7 2 2.2 2.3 Up
7 El Salvador* 2.3 1.9 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 Down
8 Guatemala 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.4 Down
9 Honduras** ? ? ? ? ? 0.5 0.7 0.6 0.5 ±
10 Jamaica 0.6 0.9 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.6 ±
11 Nicaragua*** ? 2.6 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 Down
12 Panama**** 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 1 0 0 0 0 Down
13 Peru***** 0.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 Down

? = Data not available

* = The figures for El Salvador do not include local government spending on the Armed Forces
Pensions Fund or the Pharmaceutical Centre for the Armed Forces.
** = The figures for Honduras do not include arms imports and military pensions.

15
Military expenditure is an input measure. As such it is not directly related to the output of military activities, such as
military capability. SIPRY military expenditure data are entirely based on open sources, and as much as possible on
official data.

14
 *** = The figures for Nicaragua include military aid from USA and Taiwan.
**** = The Panamanian defence forces were disbanded in 1990 and replaced by the National
Guard, consisting of the national police and the air and maritime services.
***** = The figures for Peru before 2001 are based on data from the Peruvian Ministry of
Defence and are suspected to come from different stages of the budget process.
From the 13 countries of table 5, we can see that 9 have more or less a downwards trend in military
expenditure as percentage of the GDP. Since the downward trend cannot be classified as too
significant, it can be argued, in contrast with the findings of BICC, that there is some stability in
military expenditure in the region.
BICC Annual Report (2008/2009: 12) states expressly that the overall growth of global military
expenditure continued in 2007. It amounted to a real-term increase of 6 percent in comparison to
2006 and of 45 percent since 1998.

d. Size of Armed Forces

The trend with regard to the size of armed forces is one whereby most countries are downsizing their
military organizations. Data concerning military personnel turnover of 132 countries over the world
and made available by the IISS, are after processing presented in table 6.

Table 6: Armed Forces growth from 1985 to 2000

Source: http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/mil_arm_for_gro-military-armed-forces-growth,
accessed 15/07/09

Comparing military personnel growth between 132

countries from 1985 to 2000

Downsized 113
No Growth 3
Growth 16
Total 132

Three striking things to notice as also brought forward by this source, are: (1) downsizing occurred in
both advanced and in developing countries, (2) in 98 countries armed forces personnel were reduced
to less than half, and (3) from the 16 countries that expanded their armed forces, 11 were on the
African continent.
The next table presents data of 23 countries from the region with regard to the size of their forces.

Table 7: Personnel turnover of armed forces in the Latin American region 1985 – 2003
Source: http://first.sipri.org/search?country=PRY&dataset=armed-forces, accessed 02/09/09

No. Country 1985 1990 1995 2000 2003 Trend

01 Argentina 129.000 85.000 67.000 71.000 71.000 Down

02 Bahamas ? 3.000 2.000 1.000 1.000 Down
03 Barbados 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
04 Belize 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
05 Bolivia 28.000 30.000 32.000 33.000 32.000 Up
06 Brazil 496.000 295.000 295.000 288.000 288.000 Down

15
 07 Chile 124.000 95.000 99.000 87.000 77.000 Down
08 Colombia 66.000 110.000 146.000 153.000 200.000 Up
09 Cuba 297.000 297.000 105.000 58.000 46.000 Down
10 Dom. Republic 22.000 21.000 24.000 25.000 25.000 Up
11 Ecuador 43.000 53.000 57.000 58.000 60.000 Up
12 El Salvador 48.000 55.000 30.000 17.000 16.000 Down
13 Guatemala 43.000 43.000 44.000 32.000 31.000 Down
14 Guyana 7.000 4.000 2.000 2.000 2.000 Down
15 Honduras 21.000 18.000 18.000 8.000 12.000 Down
16 Jamaica 2.000 3.000 3.000 3.000 3.000
17 Nicaragua 74.000 28.000 12.000 16.000 14.000 Down
18 Paraguay 14.000 16.000 20.000 20.000 19.000 Up
19 Peru 128.000 125.000 115.000 115.000 100.000 Down
20 Suriname 2.000 4.000 2.000 2.000 2.000
21 Trinidad & Tobago 2.000 2.000 2.000 3.000 3.000 Up
22 Uruguay 30.000 25.000 26.000 24.000 24.000 Down
23 Venezuela 71.000 75.000 79.000 79.000 82.000 Up

Table 7 shows that from these 23 nations, 12 reduced the size of their armed forces while 4 remained
with more or less their past size.
Despite the global increase in military expenditure, the number of personnel employed in military and
paramilitary forces has slightly declined since 2001. This suggests that additional financial resources
are invested primarily in acquiring new weapons systems and/or modernizing existing ones (BICC
Annual Report 2007/2008: 16). In contrast to the downward slope of labour turnover until 2003 in
Latin America and the Caribbean, BICC’s report (ibid) states that the military personnel in this region
grew slightly from 2.1 million in 2001 to 2.18 million in 2006.

e. Adjusting tasks

From way back, armed forces were established to safeguard a nation’s territory against foreign
aggression. Although this classical task still stands up right in the task setting of most armed forces in
developing countries, we can observe some changes in armed forces tasks.
According to Lowry (1970: 3) military organizations were established for accomplishing three
purposes: (1) defend the society from external aggression, (2) conduct aggressive military action
against actual or potential enemies, and (3) maintain law and civil order within the society.
The changed environment within which these institutions have to operate brought some modifications
in their tasks. With regard to the advanced countries, the main three tasks of armed forces can be
summarized as follows: (1) safeguarding own and alliance’s territory, (2) promoting international rule
of law, and (3) supporting civil authorities (Kamp 2004: 196). Tasks and functions of these
institutions in the advanced countries are more focused towards international peace issues and
combating terrorism. The opinion concerning the role of armed forces, especially in developing
countries is clearly expressed by Lowry (1970: 4) by arguing that militaries can be used for different
purposes 16 .

16
Some of these purposes meant by Lowry are: nation-building, maintaining order, constructing roads, operating
factories, disseminating mass education, conducting programs aimed at the elimination of poverty, diseases, lack of
education, and the like.

16
f. Improving Civil-Military relations in Latin America and the Caribbean

It is no secret that a dysfunctional relationship has often existed between the armed forces and
civilian political elites in a number of Latin American countries. Booth (2000: 60) refers to seven
basic regime types that encompassed the Central American experience between 1970 and 1998 17 . The
promotion of democratic practices and institutions in the Caribbean is a long-
stated aim of US policy. According to democratic theory, the formulation of security policies should
be a political process fundamentally under the control of the civilian leadership and subject to open
public debate (Muñiz et al, 1994: 123). Democratization in any meaningful sense cannot be achieved
without requiring the armed forces to take their proper place under civilian rule. A military institution
accountable to civilian authorities is a fundamental element of democracy (Mc Sherry, 1992: 484).
Fortunately, we notice a trend towards democratization in this region after the end of the Cold War.
According to Ruhl (1998: 257 – 8), no military regimes now rule in Latin America, but most of the
literature on civil-military relations contends that the military remains an immensely powerful and
autonomous political actor that civilian leaders cannot afford to antagonize. Ruhl continues to state
that new studies have emerged showing how the power and prerogatives of the armed forces have
declined in many Latin American countries.

The changed security environment, other developments affecting military action and the debates
regarding the size of armed forces as described in this chapter have influenced different aspects of
most armies. As we have noticed, most nations were compelled to adjust the role of their armed
forces also towards an expeditionary force. Not only conscription is being abandoned in an increasing
way, but many countries also cut off their military expenditures, adjusted the military tasks, and
downsized personnel. The findings of these trends will be used in the next chapter to analyze issues
like conscription, tasks, and size of the SAF.

17
These regime types were: (1) Military authoritarian, (2) Personalistic military, (3) Reformist military, (4) Civilian
transitional, (5) Revolutionary, (6) Institutionalized revolutionary, and (7) Civilian democratic.

17
Chapter 4: A critical analysis of the SAF

4.1 General military trends and the SAF

4.1.1 Conscription

The trend towards an army existing of volunteers is mainly based on the following points of
departure:

• In most countries domestic legislation does not provide the possibility for conscripts to take
part in operations abroad under the mandate of an international organization.
• Increasing awareness of the importance of certain human rights 18 .
• The decreasing chance for interstate conflicts does not make it necessary to maintain large
armies.
• The progress in ICT increased the effectiveness of weapons systems whereby it is not
considered necessary to have large armies.

Since the SAF exist of volunteers, taking part in abroad military operations is possible. Therefore,
participation of Surinamese military personnel in the Caribbean occurs occasionally.

4.1.2 The budget

Although the global trend in military expenditure has increased over the past years, this increase is
according to data presented by BICC relatively low in Latin America and the Caribbean. In contrast
with data made available by BICC, we notice that SIPRI is arguing that there has been a downward
slope in military expenditure in the past years of most countries in the region. Referring to table 4 of
chapter three on page 14, we can calculate that the average expenditure in the region, excluding
countries with which a small country like Suriname should not be compared 19 was 0.9 percent of the
GDP.
BICC Annual Report (2007/2008: 14) correctly states that in many least developed areas of the world
excessive military expenditure may yet seriously impair human development. For example, in Central
Asia and a few countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, government spending on the military exceeds the
resources devoted to the health sector.
Military expenditure in Suriname should be judged against the background of the executing tasks of
its armed forces. These expenditures should be well-considered and related to the quantity of
employees and some of the special tasks.

4.1.3 The size of armed forces

By taking into account the big work force of the Surinamese government, it will be more than
necessary to reduce gradually the public sector. Because of the trends as mentioned before, the MoD
can be an outstanding example to start with reduction of personnel. Therefore, policy has to be

18
Various Conventions on Human Rights have provisions regarding the prohibition of forced labour, the right to liberty
and security of persons, the right to self-determination, and the right to free choice of employment.
19
Countries like Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, etc.

18
formulated and executed with regard to training and retraining of soldiers so they can find
employment in the private sector.

4.2 Analysis of the findings

4.2.1 Conscription

Taking into account the trend within the region concerning compulsory military service, it would not
be a bad policy to abolish conscription in Suriname. When it comes to a possible future conflict with
one of Suriname’s neighbors, it will be preceded by a long political warning time. In other words,
Suriname will have enough time at its disposal to make the necessary military preparations.
Furthermore, it should be noticed that defending the national sovereignty and the territorial integrity
of Suriname is a social responsibility of the whole nation. In this case, I refer to the provision of the
general compulsory service as formulated in the preamble and article 180 par. 2 of the Surinamese
Constitution 20 .
However, a necessary condition to abolish conscription will include the implementation of an
adequate intake-, and outflow personnel management to prevent ageing.

4.2.2 The budget

The more or less 1.6 percent expenditure of the GNP since 2000 towards the Surinamese defense
organization is in contrast with the decreasing military expenditure in the majority of countries in
Central America and the Caribbean 21 .
Moreover, to spend relatively more on forces to maintain security especially in democratizing
countries like Suriname is not necessarily a bad idea, because development cannot be possible in an
unsecured environment.
Regarding government expenditure in Suriname, however, the following point should be noted:

• Developments that threaten Suriname and to which attention should be paid, are for example;
large-scale pollution of the environment in the interior with mercury used by gold mining and
the increase of road casualties (deaths). Effective dealing with pollution is obstructed due to a
lack of legislation and despite the fact that many policy measures are implemented to improve
traffic safety, it seems like they do not have a positive impact.

4.2.3 The legal tasks of the SAF

The primary task

The primary task as mentioned in chapter 2, has not changed since the independence. It is striking to
note that albeit this task exists since 1975, the military personnel increased from 620 to 2234 troops.
Keeping the big differences of current circumstances with those of the past in mind, study of the
history of Suriname with regard to this task, shows us that the then existing armies were only twice 22

20
The defense of the state is a fundamental duty of each citizen.
21
It should be noted that there is a difference between GDP and GNP. Wikipedia defines them as follows: GDP is the
total (financial) value of all produced goods and services in a country over a certain period (usually a year). GNP = GDP
+ (by own population earned incomes abroad minus the earned incomes by foreigners in the own country).

19
able to fulfill this task in an effective way (Report Abendanon 1979: 208). However, there are more
examples of cases whereby existing armies were not able to fulfill this task in a satisfactory way 23 .
It should also be noted that more recently, during the interior war of 1986 – 1991, the conflict was not
settled through military means but by a peace agreement.

The special tasks

When in 1996 the Act NL came into force, one of the earlier special tasks was abolished and three
new ones were added 24 .
Looking at the intensity of executing these tasks, many people will agree that they happen only
occasionally. Because of this, it can be assumed that no extra burden is put on the army personnel.
In my view, the army could add value to its right to exist by executing these tasks frequently. Hereby,
emphasize should be put on the following four tasks: (1) guarding the frontier, (2) supporting the
police in maintaining law and order and fighting against crime, (3) guarding the maritime area, and
(4) supporting the preparation and executing of projects regarding the socio-economic development.

4.2.4 The size of the SAF

We have noticed that the personnel strength of the Surinamese army has almost doubled after the end
of the Cold War. Since no conscripts joined the army after 1992, it can be assumed that an army
based on volunteers puts an additional pressure on government spending.
Contrary to reports of the Audit Office that propose to downsize the apparatus of government
gradually and the existence of a PSR program, the work force of the Surinamese government is
growing slightly. This stems mainly from the following two reasons: (1) patronage of different
governments that follow each other, and (2) the impossibility of these governments to create
employment in the private sector.
By comparing the place of Suriname with data as presented by Nation Master with regard to the
number of soldiers as a percentage of the total labor force of 169 countries in 2005, it is striking to
note that Suriname took the 44th place 25 . Because of the slight increase in the number of soldiers after
2005, it can be believed that the place of Suriname will be higher by now.
Within the scope of the foregoing, it is worth mentioning some proposals as done in the Abendanon
report (1979: 191 – 208) with regard to some alternatives of army types. In those days, when the size
of the army was approximately 1000 men, this report suggested some organization types existing of
600 men. It was not possible to choose and implement one of these options for downsizing the army,
because of the coup that followed five months later.

22
The attack by Du Casse in 1689 and the first offensive by Jacques Cassard in 1712.
23
The attack by Abraham Crijnssen in 1667, the second offensive by Jacques Cassard in 1712, the British conquests in
1799 and 1816, and the conquest and occupation of the disputed area in the Southwest (known as Post Tigri) by the
Guyanese on August 19, 1969.
24
The new added special tasks are: (1) guarding the frontier, (2) to support guarding the maritime zone, and (3) to support
international organizations.
25
According to World Development Indicators, Suriname’s labor force was 152,370 in 2005. In the same year, there were
2763 militaries on active service (1.8 percent of the labor force).

20
4.3 Empirical Research Findings

Based on the issues raised in this study, a questionnaire was compiled to gain some insight into how
officers feel about some of the questions raised. Similar to the themes, the first set of questions
related to the primary task; the second to the size of the forces; the third to the way the special tasks
are being executed; and the final set of questions, on tasks that can be better outsourced to the private
sector.

4.3.1 Method and sample

A group of officers 26 were selected to respond to the questionnaire during November and December
2009. Participation was voluntary, and the confidentiality of the respondents was guaranteed. Official
approval was obtained from the Commander of the SAF and the Minister of Defence.

Data collected from the ICT-department of the MoD showed the following overview of the target
group on active duty:

Lieutenant-colonels 8
Majors 60
Captains 99
Total 167

By considering educational qualification, experience, service period 27 , and the small difference in
gender 28 , it can be assumed that the group is more or less homogeneous.

For searching the needed sample size, the following calculation 29 was made:

Population 167
Confidential level 95 %
Confidential interval 5
Sample size needed 117

However, from the overview hereunder regarding the number of received questionnaires, one should
notice that the confidential level of the research lies higher than 95 percent.

Lieutenant-colonels 8
Majors 46
Captains 73
Total 127

26
Holding ranks of Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, and Captains. The highest rank within the SAF is Colonel and is held by
the Commander of the SAF.
27
72 percent of the respondents served for a period between 25 – 35 years.
28
Only 5 percent were female (9/167 x 100 % = 5 %).
29
With the help of the calculator available at http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm

21
Most of the data was recorded on a scale of 1 to (3 – 6) 30 . The analysis reflects only the frequency of
responses and the differences in opinions of the respondents. It should be noted that in some cases not
all respondents replied to all questions 31 .

4.3.2 Results / findings

Table 8: The Primary Task

Question Variables Number %
Is SAF able to execute its primary task? Entirely not 15 12
Not 53 42
Neutral 26 21
Yes 31 24
Entirely yes 1 1
Total 126 100

Is a threat of foreign military aggression Very present 4 3

present?
Present 48 38
Not present 66 52
Very not present 9 7
Total 127 100

Table 9: The Special Tasks

Question Variables Number %
What do you think about the way SAF is
executing its special tasks?
a. Guarding the borders More than sufficient 9 8
Sufficient 27 21
Insufficient 77 61
More than insufficient 13 10
Total 126 100

b. Assisting the police More than sufficient 25 20

Sufficient 82 64
Insufficient 19 15
More than insufficient 1 1
Total 127 100

c. Assisting during disasters More than sufficient 21 17

Sufficient 64 53
Insufficient 31 26
More than insufficient 5 4
Total 121 100

30
E.g.: entirely not, not, neutral, yes, entirely yes; yes, neutral, no; very present, present, not present, very not present;
largely sufficient, sufficient, not sufficient, largely not sufficient; very possible, possible, neutral, impossible, very
impossible; and different range of percentages.
31
The range of some not answered questions, from all the 127 respondents, was from 1 to 8. Therefore, by calculating
percentage, the quantity of answered questions was taken into account.

22
d. Assisting guarding the EEZ More than sufficient 6 5
Sufficient 22 18
Insufficient 73 59
More than insufficient 23 18
Total 124 100

e. Supporting the social economic More than sufficient 3 2

development
Sufficient 28 22
Insufficient 79 63
More than insufficient 16 13
Total 126 100

f. Assisting International Organizations More than sufficient 10 8

Sufficient 58 47
Insufficient 49 40
More than insufficient 6 5
Total 123 100

What is the contribution to the special tasks Big contribution 32 25

of the different posts in the interior?
Sufficient contribution 36 28
Insufficient contribution 57 45
No contribution 2 2
Total 127 100

Table 10: Size of the Forces

Question Variables Number %
Can SAF be downsized without affecting Cannot 113 90
the execution of the primary task?
1 – 5% 4 3
6 – 10 % 1 1
11 – 15 % 4 3
16 – 20 % 2 1.5
21 – 25 % 2 1.5
Total 126 100

What percentage of the military personnel is < 50 % 34 27

available for daily duties?
51 – 60 % 24 19
61 – 70 % 28 22
71 – 80 % 26 20
81 – 90 % 15 12
Total 127 100

What do you think about the size of Is too small 115 91

SAF/MoD for executing the special tasks?
Has the proper size 11 8
Is too large 1 1
Total 127 100

For which special task can the personnel be

23
downsized?
a. Guarding the borders Completely possible 1 1
Possible 6 5
Neutral 6 5
Impossible 42 34
Completely impossible 67 55
Total 122 100

b. Assisting the police Completely possible 12 10

Possible 28 23
Neutral 21 17
Impossible 37 31
Completely impossible 23 19
Total 121 100

c. Assisting during disasters Completely possible 1 1

Possible 9 7
Neutral 17 14
Impossible 56 46
Completely impossible 39 32
Total 122 100

d. Assisting guarding the EEZ Completely possible 1 1

Possible 10 8
Neutral 21 18
Impossible 49 41
Completely impossible 38 32
Total 119 100

e. Supporting the social economic Completely possible 2 2

development
Possible 19 15
Neutral 27 22
Impossible 48 39
Completely impossible 27 22
Total 123 100

f. Assisting International Organizations Completely possible 3 3

Possible 15 13
Neutral 33 28
Impossible 46 38
Completely impossible 22 18
Total 119 100

Table 11: Outsourcing tasks to the private sector

Question Variables Number %
Are there tasks that can better be outsourced Yes 53 43
to the private sector?
No 57 46
I don’t know 13 11
Total 123 100

24
4.3.3 Discussion

The Primary Task

Consistent with expectations, the majority of the interviewees (54 percent) indicated that SAF is not
able to execute its primary task in a proper way. A threat of foreign military aggression is according
to 75 percent of the respondents not present.
The Surinamese army is from my point of view not able to fully fulfill this task in a satisfactory way.
It will be impeded by circumstances of geographical and infrastructural nature. Suriname is relatively
large and too thinly populated to be guarded appropriately.
In case of a possible attack by neighboring countries like Brazil and French Guiana (read France),
Suriname will not be able to resist because of the big differences in military power. The only
neighboring country against which the Surinamese army could counterbalance a possible military
aggression is Guyana. It must also be mentioned that Suriname and Guyana still have a border
dispute that should be settled.
Nevertheless, it is necessary to restate that both countries are struggling much more with similar
threats 32 that compel them to cooperate more intensely to fight together against those threats.
Furthermore, there are more reasons 33 to believe that the chance of a possible war between these two
countries will not occur in the future.

The Special Tasks

Opinions with regard to the way SAF is executes these tasks vary. Only for the following tasks:
assisting the police, assisting during disasters, and assisting international organizations 34 , the
majority of the respondents believe that it is done in a sufficient way. It is also striking to note that
opinions with regard to the contribution of the different posts in the interior to the special tasks varied
between 53 percent of the respondents with a view that it contributes in a satisfactory way, while 47
percent judges the opposite.

Size of the Forces

A big majority (90 percent) of the interviewees thinks that SAF cannot be downsized without
affecting the execution of the primary task. In the matter of which part of the military personnel is
available for daily duties, 27 percent responded with less than 50 %, 19 percent with 51 – 60 %, and
22 percent with 61 – 70 %. This indicates that 68 percent of the respondents thinks that only ca. 60 %
of the personnel is daily available. The high percentage of absent without Leave (AWOL’s) can be
explained by:

32
Threats like cross-border crime, HIV infections, pollution of the environment, the consequences of climate change, and
suppressing poverty.
33
Some of these reasons are: the recent settlement of a maritime dispute between these two countries by international
administration of justice, the increasing role of international organizations in maintaining international peace and security,
and the increasing awareness that border disputes cannot be settled permanently by military means.
34
For assisting the police, 84 percent; assisting by disasters, 70 percent; and assisting international organizations, 55
percent.

25
 - Decreased discipline and power relationships as a result of the interior war in
the period 1986 – 1991;
- During the implementation of some SAP’s in the 1990s, the purchasing power of the
salaries of public servants was drastically declined. This compelled many soldiers to earn
additional income outside the military organization 35 .
- Failing to control attendance of military personnel in an effective way.

In contrast with the foregoing and against expectations, 91 percent of the respondents think that the
size of the forces is too small. Therefore, the majority of them find that downsizing personnel for the
special tasks is impossible. This view could be explained by a possible lack of knowledge,
understandings, and perceptions towards the international trend with regard to downsizing armed
forces and fear of being dismissed. This outcome proofs also the educational level of SAF’s high rank
officers. One respondent expressed this issue as follows:

…the problem is not the size of the organization, because you can never have enough
personnel for safeguarding a nation’s borders in a proper way. The problem lies in the
quality of the personnel and the political will to mobilize the armed forces for the
social economic development of the nation…

Outsourcing tasks to the private sector

When it comes to tasks that can better be outsourced to the private sector, it seems that opinions are
diverging. The part of respondents that agree to outsource some tasks is 43 percent, while 46 percent
find that no tasks can be outsourced. Supporters of outsourcing mentioned for instance the following
tasks to be outsourced: cooking in the kitchen, securing civilian objects 36 , the technical department,
services of the military hospital, maintenance of buildings, and managing canteens.
In the scope of outsourcing tasks, a respondent dictated strongly the following sentence:

Militaries should keep themselves busy with military issues and no other things.

35
In the private security branch, the gold mining sector, as taxi drivers, etc.
36
Military personnel are also appointed to secure multinationals.

26
Chapter 5: Conclusion
The study has shown clearly that a changed security environment has affected the size of most armed
forces. It proofs that on the issues that were considered, SAF did not adapt sufficiently to its changing
environment. In the case of the SAF we have noticed that both size and budget are still growing. The
drastic growth of military personnel in Suriname is not based on expanding tasks, but on patronage
and as a way of reducing unemployment.
Within this scope, the changed security environment has a wrong impact on the size of the SAF.
Where security developments compelled many nations to transform and downsize their armed forces,
the SAF failed to become an effective and efficient organization. Discussions must be held regarding
their tasks as formally formulated in the Constitution, their size and structure and the policy with
regard to conscription. As pointed out before both the external and the internal environment of SAF
are unstable.
Three important conditions for changing SAF are:

- A change strategy should be part of a total PSR;

- Because implementing changes is an investment, political commitment has to be reached and
the necessary resources must be made available;
- Changes depend for a large part on the human factor and therefore employees
should be prepared and made willing to change their old fashioned thinking.

In contrast with the view of officers, this study has shown the necessity to downsize the SAF.
Therefore, the policy on the size of the armed forces should be one that can be part of a bigger PSR
plan to downsize gradually the whole apparatus of government.
However, the question to be answered in this respect is to what extent it will be possible to decrease
the armed forces. Two aspects that need to be tackled first are:
(1) abandoning the patronage policy, and (2) building awareness among the personnel for the need to
transform and downsize the organization.
It is clear from this study that there is an area of tension between on the one hand the need to
downsize the army and on the other hand the continuation of patronage policy and the contrasting
views of the army top. To deal with these issues, especially in developing countries, will not be so
easy. What hampers the whole is the fact that patronage will not end soon. A step in the right
direction could be lawmaking and enforcing on this topic and reaching general commitment among
political parties that obtains governing power. In short, downsizing the armed forces cannot take
place as long as patronage lasts.
Armed forces are designed with a centralized decision making structure and strong vertical
information linkages.
Considering the existing power relationships and the strong command chains within armed forces,
and taking other special characteristics of these institutions into account,
change strategies should be planned, mainly based on the action research model as described by
Cummings et al (2004: 24-6), and enforced from the top down. Moreover, the five major activities 37
as brought forward by Cummings et al (2004: 156) should be seriously taken into account.

37
These are: motivating change, creating a vision, developing political support, managing the transition, and sustaining
momentum.

27
For changing the SAF, one should also take notice of Dandekar’s (1994: 639) assumptions that armed
forces are 'Janus-faced' organizations: on the one hand, they have to respond to the changing strategic
context by building militarily effective organizations and, on the other, they have to establish an
organization that is responsive to wider social values and thus to the society that pays for the armed
services and without whose support they can do little. The approach should be a mix of the blue and
red print thinking as described by Caluwé et al (2003: 44-8), whereby the former has to dominate.
The former should also be adjusted in a way that the change process will not be short. The top
management that will have an important role in the change process should be patient for results. If
resistance occurs, commitment can be enforced easily in armed forces. Characteristics of the red print
approach can also be useful, especially when patronage can be minimized. Introducing an adequate
HRM policy, without preferential treatment to employees and nepotism, can enhance the success of
change.
By downsizing the armed forces, one should focus also on creating possibilities to mobilize reserves
when necessary. Finally, concerning the process of successful change, change managers can learn a
lot from Kotter et al (2006: 35) who propose the following eight steps:

Prepare the way:

1. Create a feeling of urgency.
2. Gather a leading team.
Make a plan to deal with the problems:
3. Develop vision and mission for change.
4. Communicate for creating support and involvement.
5. Make it possible for others to act.
6. Generate short-term successes.
7. Keep the tempo high.
Continue the new situation, made it permanent:
8 Create a new culture

As the study has sufficiently clarified, the internal environment of the SAF has also to be changed.
For creating a feeling for urgency and developing vision and mission for change, external change
managers have to look for the so-called champions within the SAF. Their involvement can contribute
to a large extent in promoting the need for change among the army top.
Another aspect that has to be taken into account is the issue of leadership. The undisputed leader
within the MoD is the minister. The Surinamese society thinks correctly that in the past years, the
minister of Justice and Police implemented many positive changes within his ministry. It is argued
that the most important reason for him to be able to do so is because he served the police as a career
man for a long period. Therefore, future ministers of defense that meets the necessary leadership’s
qualifications should be recruited from inside the SAF.
The minister can take into account the four tactics 38 for increasing power for organizations and the
five political tactics 39 for using power as described by Daft (2006: 506 – 508).

38
The four tactics are: (1) enter areas of high uncertainty, (2) create dependencies, (3) provide scarce resources, and (4)
satisfy strategic contingencies.
39
The five political tactics are: (1) build coalitions, (2) expand networks, (3) control decision premises, (4) enhance
legitimacy, and (5) make a direct appeal.

28
Some measures that can be taken to downsize the SAF are:

- Making a new organizational structure with the help of internal and external organization
experts;
- In the new structure unnecessary departments should be removed and attention must be
paid to prevent overlapping activities;
- Taking into account the relative small size of SAF, vertical as well as
horizontal integration must be stimulated.
- Implementing the new structure step by step in different phases;
- Describing jobs after job analysis that fits in the new organizational structure;
- After further study, unnecessary functions have to be removed.
- Implementing an effective intake, flow, and outflow policy for the personnel;
- Implementing a retraining, extra training, and mutation policy;
- Investment in ICT and modern weapon systems related to the changed role of militaries in
developing countries;
- Reducing the number of military posts in the interior and substituting this with regular
patrols in the interior;
- Creating the opportunity to retire earlier.

It is hoped that this study will draw attention to this controversial yet important subject and stimulate
further research.

Mission Impossible?

29
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32
Annex 1: Questionnaire

FHR Lim A Po Institute For Social Studies

QUESTIONNAIRE

Van : Majoor D. Bandhoe

Aan : Luitenant Kolonels, Majoors en Kapiteins

Inleiding:

Ter afronding van mijn studie aan het FHR-Instituut voor Sociale Wetenschappen
moet ik een doctoraal scriptie schrijven. In dat kader ben ik op zoek naar opvattingen
van (hoofd)officieren ten aanzien van de omvang en effectiviteit van de
Defensieorganisatie. Ik verzoek u daarom vriendelijk deze vragenlijst in te vullen en
aan mij te retourneren. Het invullen van deze lijst kost u niet meer dan 10 minuten. Ik
wil u erop wijzen dat het hierbij niet gaat om goede/foute antwoorden, doch om uw
mening over enkele onderwerpen. Het invullen van de vragenlijst is anoniem en de
resultaten zullen met de grootste vertrouwelijkheid worden behandeld. Na analyse
zullen de resultaten worden opgenomen in mijn scriptie, waarbij het niet mogelijk zal
zijn om de antwoorden te herleiden naar u.
Dit onderzoek wordt verricht met toestemming van de Minister van Defensie en de
Bevelhebber van het Nationaal Leger.

Uw medewerking wordt zeer op prijs gesteld!

33
 Vragenlijst
(U dient slechts één hokje aan te kruisen)

1. Wat is uw rang?

Luitenant kolonel / Luitenant kolonel buitendienst

Majoor

Kapitein

2. Hoe lang bent u in dienst van de Defensieorganisatie?

Minder dan 10 jaar

10 – 14 jaar

15 – 19 jaar

20 – 24 jaar

25 – 30 jaar

Meer dan 30 jaar

De primaire taakstelling

3. De primaire taakstelling van het Nationaal Leger ingevolge artikel 177 lid 1 van de Grondwet van
de Republiek Suriname luidt; het Nationaal Leger heeft tot taak de verdediging van de soevereiniteit
en de territoriale integriteit van Suriname tegen buitenlandse gewapende militaire agressie.

Denkt u dat het Nationaal Leger in staat is te voldoen aan deze taakstelling?

Helemaal niet

Niet

Neutraal

Wel

Helemaal wel

34
4. Stel dat het Nationaal Leger zijn (Grond)wettelijk opgedragen taken in samenwerking met andere
legers uit de regio zou uitvoeren.

Zou het Nationaal Leger zijn taken dan met minder personeel kunnen uitvoeren?

Ja

Neutraal

Neen

5. Denkt u dat in deze tijd de kans op een dreiging van buitenlandse gewapende militaire agressie
reëel aanwezig is?

Dreiging is zeer aanwezig

Dreiging is aanwezig

Dreiging is niet aanwezig

Dreiging is helemaal niet aanwezig

6. Stel dat besloten wordt om het militair personeel van de Defensieorganisatie terug te brengen.

Met hoeveel procent zou dat kunnen geschieden zonder dat afbreuk wordt gedaan aan de
uitvoering van de primaire taakstelling?

Kan niet worden teruggebracht

1 – 5%

6 – 10 %

11 – 15 %

16 – 20 %

21 – 25 %

Meer dan 25 % (Hoeveel: ........... %)

35
7. Het militair personeel in dienst van de Defensieorganisatie is ca. 3000 man. Daarvan is
ca. 2000 man ingedeeld bij het Nationaal Leger.

Hoeveel procent van dit personeel is volgens u beschikbaar voor het uitvoeren van de dagelijkse
diensten?

Minder dan 50 %

51 – 60 %

61 – 70 %

71 – 80 %

81 – 90 %

De bijzonder taakstellingen

8. De bijzondere taken van het Nationaal Leger ingevolge artikel 3 lid 1 van de Wet Nationaal Leger
zijn:

a. Grensbewaking;
b. Bijstand verlenen aan de politie;
c. Bijstand en hulp verlenen ter voorkoming van rampem en de bestijding van de gevolgen daarvan;
d. Bijstand verlenen bij de bewaking van het maritiem gebied;
e. Bijstand verlenen bij het voorbereiden en uitvoeren van projecten i.v.m. de sociaal- economische
ontwikeling van Suriname;
f. Bijstand verlenen aan Internationale Organisaties.

Wat is uw mening over de wijze waarop het Nationaal Leger uitvoering geeft aan deze taken?
(De waarde voor alle taken aankruisen overeenkomstig uw mening)

Ruim voldoende Voldoende Onvoldoende Ruim onvoldoende

a. Grensbewaking
b. Bijst. politie
c. Bijst. rampen
d. Bijst. Bew. EEZ
e. Bijst.Soc. Econ.
Ontw.
f. Bijst. I.O.

36
9. Wat is uw mening over de sterkte (omvang) van de Defensieorganisatie/Nationaal Leger m.b.t.
het uitvoeren van de bijzondere taken?

De Defensieorganisatie/het leger is te klein

De Defensieorganisatie/het leger heeft de juiste sterkte

De Defensieorganisatie/het leger is te groot

10. Het Nationaal Leger heeft diverse posten (detacheringen) in het binnenland van Suriname.

Wat is uw mening over de bijdrage die deze posten leveren aan de uitvoering van de bijzondere
taken?

Grote bijdrage

Voldoende bijdrage

Geringe bijdrage

Geen bijdrage

11. Stel dat besloten wordt om het personeel van de Defensieorganisatie te verminderen.

Voor welke van de bijzondere taken zou het personeel kunnen worden verminderd?

(De waarde voor alle taken aankruisen overeenkomstig uw mening)

Helemaal Mogelijk Neutraal Niet mogelijk Helemaal niet

mogelijk mogelijk

a. Grensbewaking
b. Bijst. politie
c. Bijst. rampen
d. Bijst. Bew. EEZ
e. Bijst.Soc. Econ.
Ontw.
f. Bijst. I.O.

37
12. Denkt u dat er voor de Defensieorganisatie taken zijn die beter kunnen worden uitbesteed aan
private bedrijven?

Ja (Noem enkele op)........................................................................................................

...........................................................................................................
...........................................................................................................

Nee

Ik weet het niet

13. Indien u nog aanvullende op- of aanmerkingen heeft, kunt u die vermelden in het
onderstaande vakje.

Thank you for your help!

38
Annex 2: Clarification of Questionnaire

Q1 : Wat is uw rang?

Q2 : Hoe lang bent u in dienst van de Defensieorganisatie?

Q3 : Denkt u dat het Nationaal Leger in staat is te voldoen aan haar primaire
taakstelling (verdediging van het grondgebied)?

Q4 : Zou het leger haar taken met minder personeel kunnen uitvoeren als die in
samenwerking met andere legers uit de regio zou geschieden?

Q5 : Denkt u dat in deze tijd de kans op een dreiging van buitenlandse gewapende
militaire agressie reëel aanwezig is?

Q6 : Stel dat besloten wordt om het militair personeel terug te brengen. Met hoeveel
procent zou dat kunnen geschieden zonder dat afbreuk wordt gedaan aan de
uitvoering van de primaire taakstelling?

Q7 : Hoeveel procent van het militair personeel is beschikbaar voor het uitvoeren van
de dagelijkse diensten?

Q8 : Wat is uw mening over de wijze waarop het leger uitvoering geeft aan haar
bijzondere taken?

a) Grensbewaking
b) Bijstand aan de Politie
c) Bijstand bij rampen
d) Bijstand aan de bewaking van de EEZ
e) Bijstand aan de sociaal economische ontwikkeling
f) Bijstand aan Internationale Organisaties

Q9 : Wat is uw mening over de sterkte (omvang) van de Defensieorganisatie /

Nationaal Leger m.b.t. het uitvoeren van de bijzondere taken?

Q10 : Wat is uw mening over de bijdrage die de diverse detacheringsposten in het

binnenland van Suriname leveren aan de uitvoering van de bijzondere taken?

Q11 : Stel dat besloten wordt om het personeel van de Defensieorganisatie te

verminderen. Voor welke van de bijzondere taken zou het personeel kunnen
worden verminderd?

a) Grensbewaking
b) Bijstand aan de Politie
c) Bijstand bij rampen
d) Bijstand aan de bewaking van de EEZ

39
 e) Bijstand aan de sociaal economische ontwikkeling
f) Bijstand aan Internationale Organisaties

Q12 : Denkt u dat er voor de Defensieorganisatie taken zijn die beter kunnen worden
uitbesteed aan private bedrijven?

Possible answers:

B1 C1 D1 E1 F1

Q1 L-Kol Majoor Kapitein

Q2 10 jr < 10 – 14 jr 15 – 19 jr 20 – 24 jr 25 – 30 jr

Q3 Helemaal niet Niet Neutraal Wel Helemaal wel

Q4 Ja Neutraal Neen

Q5 Zeer aanwezig Aanwezig Niet aanwezig Helemaal niet

aanwezig

Q6 Kan niet 1–5% 6 – 10 % 11 – 15 % 16 – 20 %

Q7 50 % < 51 – 60 % 61 – 70 % 71 – 80 % 81 – 90 %

Q8-a/Grensbew Ruim voldoende Voldoende Onvoldoende Ruim

onvoldoende
Q8-b/Bijst Pol Ruim voldoende Voldoende Onvoldoende Ruim
onvoldoende
Q8-c/Bijst Ruim voldoende Voldoende Onvoldoende Ruim
Ramp onvoldoende
Q8-d/Bijst EEZ Ruim voldoende Voldoende Onvoldoende Ruim
onvoldoende
Q8-e/Bijst Ontw Ruim voldoende Voldoende Onvoldoende Ruim
onvoldoende
Q8-f/Bijst IO Ruim voldoende Voldoende Onvoldoende Ruim
onvoldoende

Q9 Is te klein Heeft juiste sterkte Is te groot

Q10 Grote bijdrage Voldoende bijdrage Geringe bijdrage Geen bijdrage

Q11- Helemaal mogelijk Mogelijk Neutraal Niet mogelijk Helemaal niet mogelijk
a/Grensbew
Q11-b/Bijst Pol Helemaal mogelijk Mogelijk Neutraal Niet mogelijk Helemaal niet mogelijk
Q11-c/Bijst Helemaal mogelijk Mogelijk Neutraal Niet mogelijk Helemaal niet mogelijk
Ram
Q11-d/Bijst Helemaal mogelijl Mogelijk Neutraal Niet mogelijk Helemaal niet mogelijk
EEZ
Q11-e/Bijst Ont Helemaal mogelijk Mogelijk Neutraal Niet mogelijk Helemaal niet mogelijk
Q11-f/Bijst IO Helemaal mogelijk Mogelijk Neutraal Niet mogelijk Helemaal niet mogelijk

40
Q12 Ja Neen Ik weet het niet

Responses:

B1 C1 D1 E1 F1 G1

Q1 8 46 73

Q2 3 3 4 26 47 44

Q3 15 53 26 31 1

Q4 21 25 81

Q5 4 48 66 9

Q6 113 4 1 4 2 2

Q7 34 24 28 26 15

Q8-a/Grensbew 9 27 77 13
Q8-b/Bijst Pol 25 82 19 1
Q8-c/Bijst Ramp 21 64 31 5
Q8-d/Bijst EEZ 6 22 73 23
Q8-e/Bijst Ontw 3 28 79 16
Q8-f/Bijst IO 10 58 49 6

Q9 115 11 1

Q10 32 36 57 2

Q11-a/Grensbew 1 6 6 42 67
Q11-b/Bijst Pol 12 28 21 37 23
Q11-c/Bijst Ram 1 9 17 56 39
Q11-d/Bijst EEZ 1 10 21 49 38
Q11-e/Bijst Ont 2 19 27 48 27
Q11-f/Bijst IO 3 15 33 46 22

Q12 53 57 13

41