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Sumulong v Guerrero


The NHA sought to expropriate 25 hectares of land in Antipolo, Rizal and among those sought were the properties of
Sumulong and Balaoing.

Petitioners contend that “socialized housing” as defined in PD 1224 for the purpose of condemnation proceeding is not
public use since it will benefit only a hand full of people, bereft of public character. They also contend that it would allow the
taking of “any private land” regardless of size and no matter how small the land expropriated. They claim that there are vast
lands which are owned by few landowners only, and that it it surprising why NHA would include their small land


1. W/N socialized housing can considered as for public use

2. W/N size of land matters for expropriation


1. YES, socialized housing is for public use

Socialized housing: construction of dwelling units for the middle and lower class members of our society, including
construction of supporting infrastructure and other facilities.

Expanded to add:

a. Slum clearance, relocation and resettlement of squatters

b. Slum improvement consists of allocating homelots to the dwellers in the area or property involved, rearrangement and
re-alignment of existing houses and provision of basis facilities and services where there is none.

c. Provision of economic opportunities including development of commercial and industrial estates

d. Other activities to provide and maintain housing for the greatest number of people

Public use requirement for a valid exercise of power of eminent domain is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions. For the taking to be valid, it must be for public use.

The SC held that the Constitution determined what is public use:

a. The expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to individuals

b. The transfer, through the power of eminent domain, of utilities and other private
enterprises to the government

It is accurate to state that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use

Heirs of Juanco Ardona: urban renewal and the construction of low-cost housing is recognized for public purpose, not
only because of expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provision of the Constitution (Art II, sec 9 & Art
XIII, sec 9)

Housing is a basic human need. Shortage of it is a matter of state concern since it affects public health, safety and the
general welfare. Public character of housing doesnt change because units cant be occupied by all but only by those who
met the qualifications

2. NO, size doesnt matter (weh lang HAHAHA jk)

JM Tuason Co Inc v Land Treasure Administration: expropriation is not confined to landed estates

Republic v Baylosis (dissent of JBL Reyes): propriety of exercising power of eminent domain cant be determined on a
purely quantitative or area basis.

Guido v Rural Progress Administration: for a valid expropriation, the test is the area of the land, not number of people
who stood benefited.

JM Tuason departed from Guido because there has evolved a clear pattern of adherence to the “number of people
benefited test”

NHA is vested with broad discretion to designate the particular property to be taken for socialized housing and how much
may be expropriated. Absent of fraud, bad faith or GAD, NHA’s choice will be undisturbed.

The property owner may not interpose objections merely because, in his judgment, some other property would have been
more suitable or just as suitable for the purpose. The right to use of private property must yield to the demands of common

PCA v Panis


Philippines Columbian Association (PCA) is a non-stock domestic corporation engaged in providing sports and recreational
facilities for its members. Its office is located at Paco, Manila and adjacent to it is a parcel of land owned by petitioner.
Respondents are the actual occupants of the parcel of land, and Antonio Gonzales and Karlo Butiong were councilor of
Petitioner instituted ejectment proceedings against respondents before MTC-Manila. Judgement was against respondents
and ordered them to vacate the lot and pay compensation. Judgment was affirmed by RTC, CA and SC. Respondents filed
with RTC branch 27 a petition for injunction and restraining order against MTC to enjoin ejectment from their houses

City of Manila (City) filed a complaint for the expropriation of of the lot subject of the ejectment proceeding with the RTC.
Petitioner filed motion to dismiss alledging that the City had no power to expropriate private land, that it wasnt for public use,
is politically motivated, and the deposit of 2M representing provisional value of the land was insufficient.

RTC branch 41 denied motion of petitioner and declared expropriation proceeding was properly instituted. City filed ex
parte motion for issuance of a writ of possession which was granted.

Because of declaration of expropriation proceeding of branch 41, branch 27 granted writ of preliminary injunction prayed for
by respondents. Petitioner appealed to CA which was denied.

The subject land of the case was formerly part of Fabie Estates which Municipal Board sought to expropriate, and thru
negotiated sales, acquired part of it and subdivided land into homes and distributed to the occupants. The remaining area
was sold by owner to petitioner. Since the sale, land was occupied by respondents.

City Council passed Ordinance 7704 to expropriate remaining lots.

Petitioner argues there must be a law authorizing local gov’t to under take urban reform


W/N City can expropriate property


YES, City can expropriate the property

Revised Charter of City of Manila (Charter) and RA 409, authorizes the City to “condemn private property for public use”. It
expressly grants general power over its territorial jurisdiction, including power of eminent domain.

Charter, sec 100: The City of Manila is authorized to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same into home
lots for sale on easy terms for city residents

City, thru legislative branch, has power to acquire private lands in the city and subdivide it into home lands for sale to bona
fide tenants, laborers and low salaried employees of the city. Even if only few benefit from it, it doesnt diminish its public use

It is of no moment that the land sought was less than half a hectare only. The public use requirement has evolved into a
flexible concept, influenced by changing conditions. Public use now includes the broader notion of indirect public benefit,
including urban land reform and housing

Due process requirement in the expropriation has been complied with. Due process was afforded when it filed its MR of trial
court order.

Republic v De Knecht


RP filed on CFI-Rizal an expropriation proceeding against the owners of the houses standing along Fernando Rein-Del Pan
streets among them Cristina De Knecht et al.

De Knecht (DK) filed an ex parte motion for issuance of trial court of a restraining order to restrain RP from proceeding with
the taking of immediate possession and control of the property. RP filed motion for issuance of a writ of possession of the
property to be expropriated on the ground that it made the required deposit of 10% of the amount of compensation stated in

Lower court issued writ of possession. DK filed with SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition and directed against the
order of the lower court praying the respondent be commanded to desist from proceeding the action. This was granted.

Defendants moved to dismiss expropriation action in compliance with SC’s decision which had become final. RP made no
objection to the said motion to dismiss

Few years later, RP filed a motion to dismiss said case due to the enactment of BP 340 expropriating the same properties.
Lower court dismissed based on the enactment of said law. DK appealed said order to CA which set aside order of lower


W/N the final judgment of a court can bar application of a law to the case at bar


No, it cannot. BP 304 superseded the final decision of SC.

While it is true that said final judgment becomes the law of the case

between the parties, it is equally true that the right of RP to take private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation is provided in the Constitution and in other laws. Expropriation proceedings maybe undertaken by RP not
only by voluntary negotiation but also by taking appropriate court action or by legislation.

No question that in the De Knecht v. Bautista case, it found that the choice of the said streets was arbitrary and should not
receive judicial approval. However, in this case, the social impact that persuaded the SC to consider the extension arbitrary
under the previous ruling has already disappeared in this case, and DK remains as the sole obstacle to the project

Solicitor General: The construction and completion of the Metro Manila Flood Control and drainage project, and ESDA
extension are essential to alleviate the worsening traffic problems in Baclaran and Pasay City. DK, without any more legal
interest in the land, singlehandedly stands in the way of the completion of “The Project” essential to the progress of Metro

The De Knecht decision is not an obstacle to the legislative arm of the gov’t in:

a. Making its own independent assessment of the circumstances then prevailing as to the propriety of undertaking the
expropriation of the said properties and

b. Thereafter enacting the corresponding legislation

Cruz, J, dissenting

BP 304 is not a reversal of De Knecht v Bautista, which was decided under a different set of facts. The supervening events
have changed the factual basis of that decision to justify the subsequent enactment of the statute.

Miners Association v Factoran


This case was brought about by the change introduced by Art XII, sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution on the system of
exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of the country’s natural resources. The utilization of inalienable lands of
public domains through license, concession or lease was no longer allowed.

The concept of Jura regalia, recognition of the importance of the natural resources fro economic development, security and
national defense, ushered the adoption of the policy of full control and supervision by the state in the EDU of the natural

The options open to the state are:

1. Direct undertaking

2. Entering into co-production, joint venture(JV), or production-sharing agreements, or entering into agreements with
foreign-owned corporations for large scale EDU.

To implement legislative acts issued by the president, Sec. Of DENR promulgated AO 57 and 82. Pres. Aquino, in exercise
of her legislative power, promulgated EO 211 prescribing the procedures in processing and approval of applications for the
EDU of minerals to insure the continuity of mining operations and activities.
Pres. Aquino promulgated EO 279 authorizing DENR secretary to negotiate and conclude JV, co-production,
production-sharing agreements for the EDU, and prescribe guidelines for such agreements.

AO 57, Article 9: all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution,
except small scale mining leases and those of sand and gravel and quarry resources covering an area of 20 hectares or
less, shall be converted into production-sharing agreement within 1 year of the effectiveness of the guidelines.

AO 82, sec 3: enumerates the persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent (LOI) and Mineral Production Sharing
Agreements (MPSA) w/in 2 years from effectivity of AO 57. Failure to do so w/in prescribed period shall cause the
abandonment of the claims.

Due to the AOs, Miner’s Association of the Philippines Inc (MAPI) filed the petition assailing their validity and
constitutionality. MAPI contends DENR secretary exceeded rule-making power in issuing AOs. If the AOs dont conform with
the EOs, it violates the non-impairment of contracts because it unduly pre-terminate existing mining leases and other
agreements, automatically converting it to production-sharing.

The court issued TRO enjoining implementation of AOs..


W/N issuance AO 57 and 82 of DENR Secretary, in exercise of his rule making power, tainted with invalidity.

W/N the AOs violates the non-impairment of contracts


1. NO, the AOs issued by the Secretary is valid and consistent with EO 211 and 279.

United States v. Tupasi Molina: the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.

People v Maceren: An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. The rule or regulation should be within
the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. In case of discrepancy between
the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic prevails because said rule or regulations
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law

The reliance of the petitioners on PD 463 is erroneous. PD 463 pertains to the old system of EDU of natural resources
through license, concessions or lease has been disallowed by the present constitution. EO 279 repealed all mining laws
that are inconsistent with it such as PD 463.

Art XII, sec 2 of the Constitution explicitly ordains that the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources
shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.

There is no clear showing that DERN secretary has transcended the bounds demarcated by EO 279 for the exercise of his
rule making power. Said EO expressly authorizes said official to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to effectively implement its provisions. The subject sought to be governed and regulated by the questioned
orders is germane to the objects and purposes of Executive Order No. 279 specifically issued to carry out the mandate of
Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution.

2. No, there is no violation of the non-impairment clause

It is of no moment that the AOs unduly pre-terminate existing mining leases in general. Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution does not apply retroactively to "license, concession or lease" granted by the government under the 1973
Constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.

AO 57, art 9 applies only to all existing mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution pursuant to EO 211. In text of EO 211. 211, there is a reservation clause which provides that the privileges as
well as the terms and conditions of all existing mining leases or agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution pursuant to EO 211, shall be subject to any and all modifications or alterations which Congress may adopt
pursuant to Article XII, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution

The non-impairment of contract to not apply to the mining leases granted after effectivity of the1987 Constitution.

Regardless of the reservation clause, mining leases or agreements granted by the State, are subject to alterations through
a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State.

Ramas v CAR and Ramos: obligations of contracts must yield to a proper exercise of the police power when such power
is exercised to preserve the security of the State and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of
that end and are, therefore, not arbitrary or oppressive.

EDU of the natural resources are matters of vital to public interest and general welfare of the people. The State, in the
exercise of its police power, may not be precluded by the constitutional restriction on non-impairment of contract from
altering, modifying and amending the mining leases or agreements granted under Presidential Decree No. 463.

Nowhere in AO 57 is any provision which lead us to conclude that the order authorizes the automatic conversion of mining
leases and agreements granted after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. The provision in AO 57, art. 9 could not
possibility contemplate a unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing mining leases and
agreements are automatically converted into production-sharing agreements.