If I Were God, If God Was Us: A Philosophical Analysis of Religion

Andy Snyder
The concept, nature, and existence of God have been at the middle and ed
ge of philosophical reflection. The former because of it s supposed importance an
d the latter because of the inability of our understanding. The creator, design
er, intender of the world (if there is indeed one at all or only one) has been d
eemed to be the source of knowledge about humanity. Perhaps understanding God c
ould help us understand our own lives and their meaning. As the product of God s
purpose, humanity should offer some reflection of God s likeness; we should expect
some relation between the maker and the made. There are disturbing issues of w
hether there is any actual connection between the infinite and finite and--even
if there is--whether we can tell anything about the cause from the effect, the i
ntention from the action, the design from the product. As Hume so powerfully qu
estioned, could it be that a host of half-gods made the world?# Why do we think
that the creator of this world is one that is all-powerful and good? Philosoph
ers have wondered even beyond the question of whether the creation reveals anyth
ing about the creator, the product about the producer (and here we also have que
stions about intentional products and by-products) to that of whether any create
d finite world could reveal anything about the infinite. Disagreement exists ab
out whether any particular best possible world is closer to revealing God by bei
ng the most efficient and perfect choice for a world or whether only an infinite
number of worlds would reveal anything about an infinite chooser. Even infinit
e worlds themselves -- which remain separate or not united, succession of events
and not one simultaneous occurrence -- might fall short of God s simultaneous gra
sp of all of them as a unity.
Perhaps we can look at the world and get transcendent ideas or we have an innate
understanding of them, but there will still be questions of whether we can expe
rience God without a spatial-temporal encounter. Most accounts of meaning requi
re some pinning down or initial baptism: a naming while pointing. Some argue th
at this is the first cause by which it is identified, while others claim that an
intentional content or description is formulated. Yet, it is difficult to poin
t to God even as something that was experienced. Perhaps we can say that God wa
s the cause of an experience or what I just experienced, for which it would be d
ifficult to comprehend but also establish a criterion of identification or recog
nition. Regardless, there needs to be some theory about how religious experienc
e or revelation establish a religion and how a person can share a tradition or b
elief of another in a much different community and surrounding. Ultimately, que
stions of meaning arise about whether a person s belief or experience has a certai
n content and about who decides what the content is or needs to be. If there is
no knowledge claim or content, then there is no disproving it; there is no conf
lict with science. The cost is a devaluing of its worth and blurring of the lin
e between and among the variety of religious (and non) expressions.
The meaning claims will also vary according to whether they been determined by t
he entire community of believers, the individual experiencer, or experts/leaders
. There are both questions of who decides the content and the choosers of the c
ontent. For instance, do the experts select themselves or does everyone decide
who has authority (and if the experts are so much better why trust the rest); ar
en t questions of what a religion means presupposed in deciding what determines th
e community of believers? imperfect understanding and whether it just fails to
completely grasp an essence (Searle) or whether experts are deferred to if a spe
aker would so defer to them (Burge). The debates center around whether an inten
tional content has a certain extension in the world.
Kierkegaard seems to claim that the religious community to which a believer belo
ngs in some way decides their concept of God (but again who decides which commun
ity they belong to). He also claims that the individual subjective stance/passi
on is more important in decisions of truth. Robert Adams notes a similarity to
the parable of a Pharisee saying, I thank you that I am not like other people. Ye
t, here it differs from the story of the person worshiping the idol with passion
and the other having a true conception of God (or being from that community whi
ch has it) but failing to care or worship passionately. This example is that of
a person who had the same concept, but different idea of what belief in it enta
iled. The expert in the tradition did not in fact know the proper implication o
f their belief; he is clearly not in the truth more than the rest.
The pragmatists# question whether a belief is such without the corresponding act
ion, while others (Swinburne) note that a person could very well, for instance,
have a belief in God but do nothing because of it. There must, then, be worries
about whether there is agreement about what God is like. Does someone really b
elieve in God if they have not been changed in the least by that belief? Is thi
s the same God? Certainly, if one thought that God executed justice, they would
want to act justly. Can one really be said to believe in a Being like this and
not at least attempt justice themselves?
In response, it could be argued that if one thought they were not perfect, they
would never try to be. There are in fact many people that don t think we could ev
er act perfectly, but perhaps might think we could always be believing correctly
. There must also be distinctions here between having a bad concept and worship
ing a bad god. It s one thing to have an ill-formulated concept, but quite another
to be aiming at illness. Also, part of sharing beliefs with others in a religio
us tradition is that you believe that a certain type of lifestyle or practice is
indeed the right way to live. The idea of God could be innate and might need t
o be if we are to recognize an experience as of or caused by God. How else woul
d we know how to identify or recognize if we had not some concept already? Ther
e is also a worry of how a concept or doctrine could contain the overflowing.
The tradition of negative theology disclaims attempts at pinning down God s essenc
e or name. Others claim that we need revelation to tell us anything about God w
hile some note that revelation can only be what reason could have discovered any
way. Process theologians claim that God can indeed be known at least in the sen
se that there are not exceptional aspects or properties from the world, but rath
er that these are exceptionally instantiated. Whitehead urged that God was the
chief exemplification of, not contrary to, the way the world is. It is this exc
eptional aspect that both distinguishes God from us and that remains constant.
Whether the infinite exemplification of a property puts the knowledge of it beyo
nd our understanding or in a different kind is still at issue.
There are also questions of how God s continuity or essence could be maintained if
God experiences maximal change through being affected by the world. It s possibl
e to avoid these concerns if God is thought of as timeless: that God already kno
ws how the world will be and is already affected/transfigured by it. Additional
ly, if God did have an unchanging essence (even if it was to be always changing)
, there could be reasons why this would be a limitation on God. If God must be
always loving and merciful, can there be judgment and justice. Similar lines de
velop in divine command discussions about whether God can command anything contr
ary to goodness or the moral law; if not, then God is subject to a higher law.
There could also be possibilities that are inconsistent if simultaneous but can
occur at different times.
The conceptual aspects of religion are often dismissed as less important
than the practical. The conduct and actions (and perhaps the rituals that gene
rate them) are thought to be the real comparative difference between religions.
Even if a tradition shared the same concepts, if they acted on them differently
they would be distinguished. A common core could be abstracted, but that might
take away any meaning content: There is a risk that the actual unique experienc
es could be lost in favor of an empty content; that what is shared is not substa
ntially the same, that what is common is not the essence but a triviality. Freg
e critiqued the abstraction involved in counting and Nietzsche in forming concep
ts or words. Whether what is shared is actually the subjective experience of an
yone or whether the original meaning is present in the core is questioned. Imag
ine the possibility of a content of belief that is abstracted that is actually n
ot like any one belief
Once a concept has a shared meaning, there are issues of whether the mystic who
has the experience can claim any authority over its interpretation. James thoug
ht that the person who experienced a mystical state had the most authority over
its interpretation, but causal concerns also enter. If a person did not know th
ey had been drugged, they might attribute a supernatural cause to a state. Stil
l, there remains the possibility that God might choose to work along such natura
l causes. At issue is whether a more informed audience might be better able to
say whether an experience is caused by God or a miracle since there is often dis
agreement over interpretation: people might think something miraculous (or not s
o) based on different ideas of what s possible.
The entire community of believers or experts might be privileged in an interpret
ation. There are also questions of whether people interpret the experience diff
erently dependent on their background (seeing stars as opposed to holes in the d
ome) or whether certain ideas must be presupposed or certain concepts available
(Samuel unable to recognize or expect God). Perhaps God could give the concept
itself in the experience.
Additionally, there could be no direct connection between action and intent, bel
ief, or desire. A believer might not actually practice anything because of the
content. They might have the same conduct as would be expected or called for fr
om the belief but not actually connect the two. They may have entirely differen
t reasons for what they do or claim no reason at all.
The rules, rituals, creeds, community or tradition are helpful in the identifica
tion of the content of the belief. Yet, it is questionable whether a person can
really tell what rules another is following or what meaning a creed or ritual h
as for them. Say a person is performing a ritual because they are compulsive wh
ere another thinks it is religious and for another it s a habit. A person could be
argued to have the same conception of God as the community of fellow believers
or perhaps the experts of the community. The unique idiosynchratic beliefs that
a person may have would then be abstracted from to get a common core of content
.
If a person were following a different rule, then they would be a part of a diff
erent tradition, so it s possible that a person were deemed to be a member of a di
fferent tradition than the very one from which his conduct was abstracted to for
m the core belief. If they follow a practice or ritual but have a different men
tal state, then it might not be the same practice. If one says Christ is Lord whil
e chopping off a head, it must mean something different or have a different trut
h value than if it is said as an act of worship or praise.
If a person is really using a rule or definition, which is inconsistent with exp
ert use, does this then imply that they do not share the experts beliefs?
If two people have different beliefs about things that are fundamental to the wa
y we experience the world, then it doubtful that that they mean the same sentenc
e. They would actually change the word choice and not the sentence meaning. In
other words, the thought or sense of what they meant by their expression was ac
tually different from the sense of the expert s expression of the same words. Whe
n interpreting the actions or writings of another, we need to understand their p
erspective or world-view, which in turn involves an awareness of their concepts
and pre-understandings or background. Within a certain language-game their expr
essions are given meaning by the grammatical rules that they are following. In
the same way, an interpreter must be aware of the grammar, context, and concepts
of a writer to understand their meaning.
The very concepts and doctrines of a tradition can be formative of the experienc
e. Then, there are questions of whether and how the background or practices of
a believer construct their experiences or reinforce their beliefs.
Religious experience makes these questions even more difficult. If the experien
ced cause (if indeed causality can be experienced) of a religious state is actua
lly a different object or person than that of the founders of that tradition, th
en it would actually be an experience that differed
from the founder. It would therefore have a difference sense when ideas about i
t are expressed.
Causality has often been employed to distinguish and group, so it would be natur
al to expect that it will be helpful to differentiate amongst religious traditio
ns. Perhaps independent of belief content and practice, a person s causal connect
ion to a tradition is the most significant identifier.
There are two common ways of identifying a tradition as such. The descriptive a
ccount claims that there is a description or cluster of descriptions that are us
ed to identify a person or object according to whether they fit that description
. The causal account claims that most people do not have access to such a descr
iption and yet successfully identify the person without it. Kripke, for instanc
e, says that the name given a baby is then spread from person to person like a l
ink in a chain. A passage of communication might reach a speaker who can then r
efer to something without being able to uniquely identify it. When a name is pa
ssed through the causal link, the receiver must intend to use it with the same r
eference as the person he heard it from.
Traditions and forms of religion in particular have not received much attention
from either causal or descriptivist theories. Can there be an essence of a part
icular tradition? If so, then there is a worry of whether it can be lost if it
is not described correctly or is missing the key doctrine. If not, then there
are concerns about how to distinguish amongst different traditions and how to de
termine orthodoxy and heresy. Perhaps this is the same worry as when Bergson sa
ys events, motions, changes cannot be divisible, of how to then distinguish betw
een events themselves.
Either the doctrines of a religion constitute a unique tradition or the uniquene
ss and therefore defining characteristic of the religion is the causal chain lea
ding from the origin. For instance, a person who shares the same beliefs and pr
actices with a believer of a different tradition would actually not thereby diff
er in tradition if the descriptive theory is correct. Whereas the causal theory
might allow people to be considered to belong to the same religion that in fact
have very different beliefs because they are a part of the same causal chain.
There are also questions about how to identify beliefs, so even if religions are
to be grouped and differentiated by belief then similar issues would have to be
discussed with respect to belief.
Consider the fact that a religion was founded in connection with a false experie
nce or hallucination. Say a person has an experience of the devil and then crea
tes a religion in response to this experience, which teaches a way to worship Go
d. If the doctrines of religion detail a unique set of properties that the obje
ct of worship must have, then the worship could be directed to such an object or
person regardless of the actual origin of tradition. In other words, a religio
n could start in response to a hallucination or false experience of God and stil
l through its doctrine or ritual direct the participants toward worship of God.
Thus on this account, the origin and causal chain are less important than the c
ontent of belief and descriptions about the object of belief.
Problem of error arises in either case when have to worry about whether your con
cept or reference of God is in fact correct. There are also difficulties involv
ed with how such a reference is pinned down. Without a spatial temporal referen
ce there have to be worries about how God could be picked out as that person or
thing. Yet, there are still possibilities of whether causes of experience could
be picked out as such
On the contrary, if the causal theory of reference is preferred, the content of
belief would be much less important than the causal connection to the origin. I
n other words, people who shared a belief would in fact have different beliefs i
f they did not share a common origin. In traditions, however, the whole questi
on of whether someone voluntarily joins and thus has to have enough infor to cho
ose and thus descrip
Kripke attacks the descriptivist theory in which a proper name has a given sense
according to a cluster of descriptions. A cluster theory requires that enough
of the descriptions within any given set be connected by sequential use of the p
roper name. Successful reference does not depend on having common properties.
Kripke constructs counterfactual stories in which for every given description th
at is deemed essential for identity, there are plausible scenarios where a perso
n can successfully identify someone without them meeting that description. In o
ther words, the actual reference does not satisfy the description. Instead of t
he descriptive story, Kripke offers an account where a name is ostensively besto
wed (an individual is baptized with a given name, Let s call you ). There are questio
ns of whether God would fit this categorization. For instance, it is doubtful t
hat somebody could pin down/baptize/ostensively define God. Even if God were pr
esent to a person, it is questionable whether all of the properties of God would
be readily accessible and whether God could be uniquely identified in contrast
to the spatial and temporal framework in which we would experience God. There i
s however, the possibility of pointing to an interior experience and claiming th
at God is in fact the cause of this experience or a object perceived in experien
ce. Thus, after having a religious experience a person might say that the inten
tional content or this associated with the experience was in fact God. Without be
ing located in space or time, God could still be identified or picked out within
a person s experience.
The causal theory of reference also includes natural kind terms. We point to a
class of specimens and ostensively define them as a certain type. We then inves
tigate the properties of this paradigmatic class and revise our definition of wh
at the essential properties of it in fact are. For instance, gold would be iden
tified as a certain type of metal and over time the various properties that gold
is thought to have might change, but there is never a question about whether or
not
There are also the Kierkegaardian issues of whether a person s conceptual idea of
God need be correct but rather the passionate stance Luther seemed to say passi
onate disbelief was better than However, according to the causal theory, regard
less of whether the believer had similar content the difference in causal chain
would be enough to qualify as a difference in kind/a different religion.
Kierk notes that the passion with which a person directs their prayer to God is
more important than the community or concept of God from which they
It is possible for someone to be quite apathetic about their actions and therefo
re not have a corresponding act and belief. Richard Swinburne notes that there
might be people that would believe that God exists but that God doesn t care about
them or what they do. Would this person really be said to share a belief with
someone who thinks that God is genuinely concerned for the world? Donald Davids
on asks the same sort of question in regard to people that thought the earth was
flat: if they did not think that the Earth was round, then would they still be
referring to Earth? Michael Devitt says this is surely a reason why the descrip
tive theory is wrong, and here I think is the most worrisome case for a similar
account of religions. We must be willing, particularly when we are dealing with
the infinite, to allow reference without correctness. We would want to say tha
t a prayer is heard regardless of whether the person directed it toward the actu
al true conception. Negative theologians, as mentioned above, claim to be actua
lly talking about God even though there is nothing that can actually be predicat
ed of God, there is nothing that the finite can say about the infinite (but stil
l this is to say something about it). The situation resembles natural kind term
s, which some claim are first pointed to and defined according to surface proper
ties -- and then later more essential properties of it are discovered.
A given word is linked up through a relation of naming or signifying with an obj
ect. Therefore, people might speak different languages since the inner ideas wh
ich correspond to the public object being named might differ. There is no way,
either, to even say which language a person is speaking. Perhaps they mean some
thing different by the utterance of the very same words as another. Kant argued
against the atomism of input: a word cannot be given its meaning in a naming ce
remony. Ostensive definition depends on a learner already knowing a great deal
about the place of a particular word in a language and the grammar of the relati
ve part. Even though naming seems quite simple, a good deal of stage setting is
presupposed if the act of naming is to make sense. The relation between the me
aning and the object depends on the background understanding which we acquire af
ter we learn the whole language. It is not built into the first word-object rel
ation we learn. We must already know what it is for the word to have a certain
place in the whole or the sense of the place the word has that we are trying to
learn. We should not try to read this precondition into the acquisition of our
first language. The background knowledge is not built into particular signs. W
e cannot start off coining our first word and have the background linguistic und
erstanding already incorporated in it. Wittgenstein critiques Augustine for des
cribing the learning of language as if a child came into strange territory -- as
if the child already had one language but not the language that they speak in t
his country.
be able to coordinate their actions together, but there might still be a gap bet
ween the conceptual schemes. The issues of rightness cannot be reduced to succe
ss in tasks.
In addition to concerns over whether enough information is available to direct a
prayer to God, there are also questions of whether more than one being might be
referred to. Yet, some analysis of defined properties should avoid some of the
se issues: more than one being could not both be the creator of everything and u
ncreated. If God is the creator of everything that would include all other poss
ible Gods who would themselves by definition need to be self-created or without
beginning.

Gadamer notes that this change must be discontinuous a rupture of stillness into t
he busy world. He writes, The suprahistorical, sacred time, in which the present is
not the fleeting moment but the fullness of time would obviously have the characte
r of epiphany, but this means that for the experiencing consciousness it would b
e without continuity. The discontinuity of the experience could itself offer dif
ficulties for a causal approach.
whether God s redemptive intent requires a change in God s nature if so can we maint
ain the reference of God Wolterstorff, however, argues that, God the Redeemer ca
nnot be a God eternal.€ This is so because God€the Redeemer is a God who changes"€(Sha
tz p.63).€Even though God could be unchanging in the redemptive€intent, he still cla
ims that there is an ontologically required€variation among states of a redeeming
God.#
whether there is a temporal gap that separates creation and the fall. Along wit
h the last question, arise several questions about God s intent for the world and
whether it could be frustrated. For example, why does God suffer from human sho
rtcoming if in fact that is what fallen creatures are supposed to do: fall short
.
Heidegger argues that God s being is like our being only to an infinite degree. O
f course, the infinite and finite might be different in kind and not just degree
. Many questions are still left with this kind of understanding. Is a change i
n kind implied by Heidegger s distinction that God has a more primal and infinite t
emporality?
There is, however, no eternal unity of all things since the divine is temporal.
Whether the stationary now of a complete and total possession of all possibiliti
es must always exist or come into being at a certain instant remains a theologic
al dilemma. Some claim that time begins at creation and that God existed timele
ssly prior to the free decision to take on the existence of the world. Others c
laim that there was not a time when God did not so make this decision and that G
od has always willed to create and redeem the world.
Temporal succession or change might be requirements for personhood or consciousn
ess, but they needn t be experienced as loss or detraction. The good infinity of Go
d contrasts with the endless self-transcendence of always being able to add more
.#
Kant# claimed that since a historical faith is incapable of universal transmissi
on, some ecclesiastical faith is necessary.# He does not say much about why it
cannot be universally passed down, but if there must be conceptual incommensurab
ility amongst different versions of the same tradition, then how can it be said
to be passed down? Still, the universal, moral religion, which is apparent prio
r to revealed faith, is not explicable without it. The necessity of a historica
l religion/revelation to make explicit the underlying rational religion is like
the painter fixing an example of beauty: We had already perceived something of wh
at they show us. But we had perceived without seeing. It was, for us, a brilli
ant and vanishing vision...The painter has isolated it; he has fixed it so well
on the canvas that henceforth we shall not be able to help seeing in reality wha
t he himself saw. #
could be doing the right or good conduct but not be intentionally trying or not for
the right reasons or not with the right accompanying beliefs
how relate to fashions and trends: are they part of the same group?
what if a trend resurfaces: is it the same even though there is no continued exi
stence or is it just out of fashion and focus and not therefore not available?
A style can always be worn or displayed.
Likewise, if a given religious tradition has no adherents at a point in time, ca
n it be said to have been passed down from generations. Wasn t it dropped or drop
ped out of touch if not out of reach. Still couldn t another religion form, which
had the same form of prepositional belief and could therefore be said to have t
he exact same content and tradition. What therefore is the difference?
Could two traditions co-exist and share the exact propositional belief contents
but then go by different names? What is the actual difference between the tradi
tions and how are they identified: Is it just the belief contents that should be
the criteria or is it also the action/conduct and must the match each other?
Doctrinal significance and religious truth claims will vary from the application
of the same interpretive scheme to a flux of worlds. A practice can maintain i
ts identity while its products differ according to input and situation.#
Critiques range from whether you can print certain attitudes on the mind or chal
lenges of the crystallization bias where an ideology is fully self-conscious and
articulated.
Catherine Bell notes that this dissent may exist amongst people of the same trad
ition or name. They may consent to a dominant value system without internalizin
g the values or accepting them as legitimate. Critics of the ideology worldview
note that it requires just this consent It is common, though to see recently t
he acceptance that ideologies do not operate through single values but many ques
tion whether such totalism is true or whether holistically people are really rep
resented there is no single holistic set which provides the background but rathe
r different sets and classes of properties that are sometimes maximized or minim
ized depending on the current needs and ideals of a the current concrete situati
on
People could very well accept the name and group identity but not concur on all
doctrines in which case the cluster of them deemed essential might override or t
he causal connection over time.
If I have a religious experience because of prayer and meditation but then someo
ne induces the exact brain state without the identification of the experience as
religion is it even the same state if the identification is different
James thought that the person who experiences decides what they experience. Yet
, how does this fit with the dependence of a thought on the surrounding world/co
ntext and expert use. If they would disagree with the experts could they really
be said to follow them or only if the follow what they would mean and therefore
would change what they actually say about their experience
Would it be the same tradition if it lost or shifted what was once a critical po
int and tilts the center to another point. If the essence is different at a dis
tant time it is only the causal connection of the
When do we say no this is some other species or does not fit and if so then is i
t a changed tradition or is it the same since there has always been the handing
down of it and memory from which it was changed?
could the experiences of God really be those of satan or self constructed and th
us the religion founded on them being satan worship or self-deception
What are the effects of a finite force at a time period is it poss that God is n
ever much changed at a time and that this remains enough the same for us
Because it s infinite, even if finite time and large effects still minimal, but do
es this mean that God does not care.
since this is just during a small duration of the infinite then that could not b
e an impact on God s essence which can never be contained because the set is ever
increasing
feeling effect of the finite space over finite time but what if God filled creat
ed infinite worlds