CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No.

174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
The Facts:
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455
(Senate Res. No. 455),“directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the
Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote
Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations
and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to
deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio and other commissioners of the PCGG declined the invitation because of
prior commitment. At the same time, they invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.

On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his
office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he
was detained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the
Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.
I S S U E S:

Is the investigation conducted on the petitioners violative of their right to privacy?

H E L D:

The claim of immunity is without merit.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any form of intrusion is
impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous
regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a
“constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,”but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy” and “everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.”
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two guarantees that
explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a person’s “right to be let alone” or the “right to
determine what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed.” Section
2 guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose.” Section
3 renders inviolable the “privacy of communication and correspondence”
and further cautions that “any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.”
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion. Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries
are: first, did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy?; and second, did the government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate’s public hearing to deliberate on
Senate Res. No. 455, particularly “on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the
operations by their respective board of directors.” Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners’ acts
committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly
Philcomsat Holdings Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over
matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly, such
matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overridingcompelling state
interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe, employed the rational basis
relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the
opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote
morality in public administration] In Valmonte v. Belmonte,the Court remarked that as public figures,
the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the
Court ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over
the right to privacy of financial transactions.
Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC and POTC, ranging in
millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its officials are compelling
reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations, as well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary
legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding
PCGG’s efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and
officers over the subject covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not
been violated by respondent Senate Committees.
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio
and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate
with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting
obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
In fine, PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso Nario, Nicasio Conti,
and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG’s nominees to Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, must comply with the Subpoenae Ad
Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in
public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.

VALMONTE vs BELMONTE February 13 1989 G.R No 74930

FACTS: Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager,
requesting to be furnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa
including the ten (10) opposition members who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2 million each on
guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is not possible, an access to those said documents. Apart from
Valmonte’s letter, he is stressing the premise of the request on the present provision of the Freedom
constitution at that time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern. Mr. Belmonte, aware that such request contains serious legal implications seek the
help of Mr. Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy General Counsel. In Mr. Tiro’s reply letter, a confidential relationship
exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts. On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply
of the GSIS Deputy General Counsel, Petitioner Valmonte wrote another letter saying that for failure to receive
a reply, they are now considering themselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to
pursue their desired objective in pursuance of public interest. Separate comments were filed by respondent
Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due
course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was
deemed submitted for decision. In his comment, respondent raise procedural objection to the issuance of a
writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the
GSIS petitioners. However, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is therefore asserted that
since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action

ISSUE: Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his co-petitioners, are entitled to the documents
sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information.

RULING:

The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the state.
Governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Yet,
like all constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. People’s right to information is
limited to “matters of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.”
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various
insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance act of 1977
provide for annual appropriations for to pay for contributions, premiums , interest and other amounts payable
to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines
assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources
with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It is therefore the
legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers
were members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were
therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of
fidelity and that its transactions were above board. Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists
between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate
dissemination of information. He further contends that in view of the right to privacy, which is equally
protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents, evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS
must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information. There can be no doubt that the right to privacy
is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc, speaking through then Mr. Justice
Fernando stated that ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of
the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to
the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Apparent from the
above-quoted statement of the court in Morfe is that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private
capacity, and not to public and the government agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked
by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the
right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its General manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy
of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence, may be invoked only by the person whose
privacy is claimed to be violated. Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions
are private in nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public
concern which guarantees “access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions or decisions” only. Further, they argued that GSIS, is a governmental corporation performing
proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people’s right to access to official records. This
Dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated in ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions
and Government Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government, WHETHER carrying out its
sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS , in granting the loans, was exercising proprietary function would NOT justify the
exclusion of transactions from the coverage and scope of right to information. WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is hereby granted, and the respondent General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System
is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to members of the
former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to time and
manner of inspection, not incompatible with the decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. SO ORDERED.