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Sartre and Samkhya- Yoga on Self ll.

point of view on the world. In fact, there is no difference between one's


body and one's self.
One" body has a being for oneself but also a being for the other. The
other's body is understood either as a being-for-itself for which one's body is
an object or as an objeet confronting the gaze of one9sbody, wnihich is incar-
nated by one" cconsciuusncss. In all. human rclrtcions, these two modes of the
body are revealed.
Sartre gives the example of a person A who is sitting on a bench in a park
looking at the trees, the flowers, che park gatc, and the sky. Everything in the
park is measured by reference to this person A, who constitutes the center.
But if at any moment another person B enters the park and looks at person A,
not only is tl-re latter's world snatched away but he or she is also reduced into
a body. In this situation, B's body is perceived as consciousness incarnate
looking at Ks body as an object, This situation could be reversed such &at
person A looks back at B's body by transforming it into an object. When one
person gazes at another, the second person feels the other's consciousness
through bodily awareness and is transformed into an object among other ob-
jccts. And wl-rcn the second person looks back on the first, the first one's
body is transformed into an object. Through these modes Sartre reveals two
w y s in which a person$ self c w l d be identified with one's body.
One's gcrspeceive on tbe ocherss body is not limited to regarding it. as an
object among other otsjects, The other's body is made of flesh and blood.
Whm one sees another person momentarily, the other9sbody is revealed as a
flesh-and-blood object. But as one's acquaintance with this person increases
and continues over time, one is able to see the other's body as constituting
one's past, where freedom is fixed and objectitied. This objectification of the
other's freedom in the body gives unity to one's various acts. This unity may
be regarded as the unique character of the other person. And this other per-
son may be regarded as possessi~~g a moral, immoral, amiable, or unhappy
character that is the sum total of various behavior paRcnrs.
There is also a third dimension of the body, a dinlension i~ltiur~ately con-
nected to the other two. In the first case, one exists as one's body as it is lived
by oneself, and in the second, one exists as one's body as it is used by che
other; but in the third, one exists as oness body as it is known by the other. In
the first dimension, one's consciousness and the body are so intimately con-
nectcd that Cherc are no inner or outer aspects of a person. Howcver, in &c.
second dimension, the other's look can tra~lsforma person illto an object and
thus can create an outer aspect of him or her; and in the third dimension, the
other knows a person by creating an outwardness for him or her cbat escapes
the person's freedom. This exterioriry of a person's body for the other is un-
known to the person and discloses one's alienation from one's own body.
The first, second, and tl-rird dimensions can best be illustrated in terms of
the distinctions among pain, illness, and disease. When one experiences pain