CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION CASE HAS COLLATERAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES
EXCEPTIONS TO MOOTNESS SYMBOLIC FUNCTION OF THE COURT TO EDUCATE THE BAR AND THE BENCH
MOOT BUT CAPABLE OF REPETITION AND EVADING REVIEW: GONZALES vs. COMELEC
Amendment to the Constitution – Political Question vs Justiciable Question
In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law
that the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be
held (November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned
groups as they argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the
proposals to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general
election rather than in the issues involving the plebiscite.
Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came
up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and
other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by
the courts because it is a political question.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question;
(2) Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.
HELD: (1) No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as
well as the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general
grant of legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to
Congress. On the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository of
sovereignty in a republican state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes
amendments, it is not actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent
assembly. Such act is not a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the
constituent assembly is within constitutional limitations; (2) Yes. There is no prohibition to the
effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special election. SC held that there is nothing in
this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that the election therein referred to is a
special, not a general election. The circumstance that the previous amendment to the
Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special elections merely
shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does
not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.
Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on a
special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should
be able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.
CASE RENDERED MOOT BY THE UNILATERAL ACT OF DESISTANCE OF THE DEFENDANT BUT
THERE IS REASONABLE GROUNDS TO BELIEVE THAT THE WRONG COMPLAINED OF WILL BE
REPEATED
SALONGA vs. CRUZ PANO
FACTS: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty
guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established
to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks this Court to
prohibit and prevent the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress,
and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the Philippines.
Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he was
implicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro
Manila. He was tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations for
two reasons (1) because his house was used as a contact point; and (2) because of his remarks
during the party of Raul Daza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a
violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted immediately by then President
Marcos.
When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the charges against him. Neither was
counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order
directing that his lawyers be permitted to visit him. Only after four months of detention was
the petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the
preliminary investigation, the petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint but the same was
denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an
information after finding that a prima facie case had been established against the forty
persons accused.
Hence, this petition questioning the resolution of the judge.
HELD: After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the
prosecution utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie case against the petitioner. We grant
the petition.
The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash
or to dismiss, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since
the question of dismissal will again be considered by the court when it decides the case, the
movant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that
public interest dictates that criminal prosecutions should not be enjoined.
The SC held that infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of
criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest
and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a
democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty
persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy
exists.
 EASTERN BROADCASTING CORP (DYRE) V. DANS J
Facts: A petition was filed to reopen the Radio Station DYRE. DYRE was “summarily closed” on
grounds of national security. The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition.
Petitioner, DYRE contends that they were denied due process. There was no hearing to
establish factual evidence for the closure. Furthermore, the closure of the radio station
violates freedom of expression. Before the court could even promulgate adecision upon the
Issue raised, Petitioner, through its president Mr. Rene Espina, filed a motion to withdraw the
petition. The rights of the station were sold to a new owner, Manuel Pastrana; who is no
longer interested in pursuing the case. Despite the case becoming moot and academic,
(because there are no longer interested parties, thus the dismissal of the case) the Supreme
Court still finds that there is need to pass a “RESOLUTION” for the guidance of inferior courts
and administrative tribunals in matters as this case.
Issues: (1) Whether or not due process was exercised in the case of DYRE; (2) Whether or not
the closure of DYRE is a violation of the Constitutional Right of Freedom of Expression.
Held: The court finds that the closure of the Radio Station in 1980 as null and void. The
absence of a hearing is a violation of Constitutional Rights. The primary requirements in
administrative proceedings are laid down in the case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relation (69 Phil.635). The Ang Tibay Doctrine should be followed before any broadcast
station may be closed. The Ang Tibay Doctrine provides the following requirements: The
right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence presented, The
tribunal must consider the evidence presented, The decision must have something to support
itself, Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is adequate to support
conclusion), Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing, The tribunal body
must act on its own independent consideration of law and facts and not simply accept
subordinate’s views
Court must render decision in such a manner that the proceeding can know the various issued
involved and reasons for decisions rendered. The court stresses that while there is no
controlling and precise definition of Due Process, it gives an unavoidable standard that
government actions must conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty and property is
valid.
The closure of the radio station is like wise a violation of the constitutional right of freedom of
speech and expression. The court stresses that allforms of media, whether print or broadcast
are entitled to this constitutional right. Although the government still has the right to be
protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. The test for
the limitation of freedom of expression is the “clear and present danger” rule. If in the
circumstances that the media is used in such nature as to create this danger that will bring in
such evils, then the law has the right to prevent it. However, Radio and television may not be
used to organize a rebellion or signal a start of widespread uprising. The freedom to comment
on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. The people
continues to have the right to be informed on public affairs and broadcast media continues to
have the pervasive influence to the people being the most accessible form of media.
Therefore, broadcast stations deserve the the special protection given to all forms of media by
the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
DE LA CAMARA vs. ENAGE
Facts: Mayor de la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his
alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of
the Tirador Logging Co. 18 days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed cases of multiple
frustrated murder and for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and
Galgo. On January 14, 1969 an application for bail was filed by petitioner which was granted
and the amount was fixed at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00.
ISSUE: WON the amount of the bailbond is excessive
HELD: Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right
to bail becomes meaningless. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the amount of
P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this constitutional provision under the circumstances.
LOCUS STANDI
IN GENERAL: KILOSBAYAN VS. MAROTO
Facts: GR 113375 (KIlosbayan vs. Guingona) held invalidity of the contract between Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line lottery system. The contract
violated the provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from holding and conducting
lotteries through a collaboration, association, or joint venture. Both parties again signed an
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories on January 25,
1995. The agreement are as follow:
Rental is 4.3% of gross amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less than an
annual rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in commercial operation.
Rent is computed bi-weekly. Term is 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon expiration of term, PCSO can purchase the equipment at
P25M. Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended ELA invalid because: It is the same
as the old contract of lease; It is still violative of PCSO’s charter; It is violative of the law
regarding public bidding. It has not been approved by the President and it is not most
advantageous to the government; PCSO and PGMC filed separate comment; ELA is a different
lease contract with none of the vestiges in the prior contract; ELA is not subject to public
bidding because it fell in the exception provided in EO No. 301; Power to determine if ELA is
advantageous vests in the Board of Directors of PCSO; Lack of funds. PCSO cannot purchase its
own online lottery equipment. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do
not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract.
Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioner Kilosbayan, Incorporated has a legal standing to sue; (2)
Whether or not the ELA between PCSO and PGMC in operating an online lottery is valid.
Rulings: In the resolution of the case, the Court held that:
(1) Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue; (2) STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The
previous ruling sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled
rulings on real parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually involved; (3)
LAW OF THE CASE (opinion delivered on a former appeal) cannot also apply. Since the present
case is not the same one litigated by the parties before in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, Jr., the
ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as “the law of this case”. The parties are the same
but the cases are not; (4) RULE ON “CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT” cannot still apply. An
issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn
in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different cause of action.
But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. When the second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with,
but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the
second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue.
Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the
petitioner’s standing. Standing is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional
question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are ‘real
parties of interest’. Question of contract of law: The real parties are those who are parties to
the agreement or are bound either principally or are prejudiced in their rights with respect to
one of the contracting parties and can show the detriment which would positively result to
them from the contract. Petitioners do not have such present substantial interest. Questions
to the nature or validity of public contracts maybe made before COA or before the
Ombudsman.
Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) is valid. It is different with the prior lease agreement: PCSO
now bears all losses because the operation of the system is completely in its hands. Fixing the
rental rate to a minimum is a matter of business judgment and the Court is not inclined to
review. Rental rate is within the 15% net receipts fixed by law as a maximum. (4.3% of gross
receipt is discussed in the dissenting opinion of Feliciano, J.) In the contract, it stated that the
parties can change their agreement. Petitioners state that this would allow PGMC to control
and operate the on-line lottery system. The Court held that the claim is speculative. In any
case, in the construction of statutes, the resumption is that in making contracts, the
government has acted in good faith. The doctrine that the possibility of abuse is not a reason
for denying power. It was held in Kilosbayan Vs. Guingona that PCSO does not have the power
to enter into any contract which would involve it in any form of “collaboration, association, or
joint venture” for the holding of sweepstakes activities. This only mentions that PCSO is
prohibited from investing in any activities that would compete in their own activities.
It is claimed that ELA is a joint venture agreement which does not compete with their own
activities. The Court held that is also based on speculation. Evidence is needed to show that
the transfer of technology would involve the PCSO and its personnel in prohibited association
with the PGMC. The law of public bidding) applies only to contracts for the purchase of
supplies, materials and equipment and not on the contracts of lease. Public bidding for leases
are only for privately-owned buildings or spaces for government use or of government owned
buildings or spaces for private use. Petitioners have no standing. ELA is a valid lease contract.
The motion for reconsideration of petitioners is DENIED with finality.
TAXPAYER’S SUIT: Wenceslao Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works and Communications
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 “for the
construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals”.
Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be
improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose
Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA.
Pascual claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those
terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers
if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other
hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The
subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not
cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was
still a private property cannot be ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power
must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only
for public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land
on which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the
result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
CITIZENS ACTION: TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or
cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders. The
Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case,
contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute
becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this
provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would
be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official
Gazette…. The word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter
of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential
issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a
rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985.
Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and
laws which are not as to their publication; (2) Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
HELD: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does
not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in
any other date, without its previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to
them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive
law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
LOZANO vs. NOGRALES
Facts: Petitioners hoped for the nullification of House Resolution No. 1109 entitled “A
Resolution Calling upon the members of Congress to convene for the purpose of considering
proposal to amend or revise the Constitution, upon a 3/4 vote of all members of Congress”.
The petition seeks to trigger a justiciable controversy that would warrant a definitive
interpretation by this Court of Section 1, Article 17, which provides for the procedure for
amending or revising the Constitution.
The duty of the judiciary is to say what the law is. The determination of the nature, scope and
extent of the powers of government is the exclusive province of the judiciary. This Court’s
power to review is limited to actual cases and controversies dealing with parties having
adversely legal claims, to be exercised after full opportunity of arguments by the parties, and
limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. The
“case-or-controversy” requirement bans this court from deciding “abstract, hypothetical or
contingent questions”. An aspect of the “case-or-controversy” requirement is the requisite of
“ripeness”.
Another approach is the evaluation of the twofold aspect of ripeness: The fitness of the issues
for judicial decision The hardship to the parties entailed by withholding court consideration. In
our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is generally treated in terms of actual injury to the
plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a
direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners’ case has met the requirements for a judicial review.
Ruling: The fitness of petitioners’ case for the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. 1)
The petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse injury or hardship from the act
complained of. 2) House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the House of Representatives
shall convene at a future time for the purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No convention has yet transpired, no rules of procedure have yet been adopted,
and no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of power or gross abuse of
discretion has yet taken place. House Resolution No. 1109 involves a typical example of an
uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at all.
There is no room for the interposition of judicial oversight since the proposed amendments is
still unacted. Only after it has made concrete what it intends to submit for ratification may the
appropriate case be instituted.
Locus standi or standing to sue: Generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can
demonstrate that 1) he has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action; 3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the remedy of sought.