[No. 28607. February 21, 1929] P11,731.
93, with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account
PRATS & COMPANY, a registered partnership, plaintiff and
appellant, vs.PHŒNIX INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD,
CONNECTICUT, a corporation, defendant and appellee.
1. 1.FIRE INSURANCE; AVOIDANCE OF
POLICY; INCENDIARISM ; FRAUDULENT PROOF OF LOSS.—The
insurance policy which was the subject of action in this case
was held to have been avoided by the connivance of the
insured in setting fire to the insured goods and the submission
by the insured of fraudulent proof of loss.
1. 2.EVIDENCE; ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE; LIBERAL ATTITUDE
INDICATED.—The court commends the maintenance of a
liberal attitude on the part of trial judges in the matter of
admission of proof. The practice of excluding evidence on
doubtful objections to its materiality, or relevancy, or
technical objections to the questions, should be avoided.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Concepcion, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila by Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership, for the purpose of
recovering from the Phoenix Insurance Co., of Hartford, Connecticut,
the sum of P117,800.60, with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to
have been sustained by the plaintiff, on August 21, 1924, from a fire, it
being alleged that said loss was covered by policy of insurance No.
600217, for the sum of P200,000, issued by the defendant company to
the plaintiff. For answer, the defendant, Phoenix Insurance Co.,
admitted the issuance of the policy of insurance but, by way of special
def ense, alleged, among other things, that the fire in question had
been set by the plaintiff, or with its connivance, and that the plaintiff
had submitted under oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss,
in contravention of the express terms of the policy. Upon hearing the
cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the complaint with
respect to the obligation created by the policy which was the subject
of the suit, but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant,
of remnants of the insured stock. From this judgment the plaintiff
appealed.
So far as liability under the policy of insurance which is the subject
of this action is concerned, we are of the opinion that the defendant
has sufficiently established two defenses, either of which would be
fatal to the right of recovery, namely, first, that the fire which caused
this loss was of incendiary origin, and that it was set by the procurance
or connivance of the plaintiff for the purpose of defrauding the insurer;
and, secondly, that the plaintiff, after the fire, submitted to the
defendant a fraudulent claim, supported by false proof, in violation of
the terms of the policy. Of these defenses the trial judge sustained the
second but passed the first without express finding. We consider it
important, however, briefly to exhibit the salient facts on both points,
not only because of the considerable sum of money involved, but
because the facts appearing in evidence supply a typical illustration
of the manner in which frauds of this character against insurance
companies may be constructed with some hope of success, when
insurance agents are accessible who, under the incentive of writing
large amounts of insurance, can be induced to close their eyes to
obvious dangers.
On July 10, 1923, Francisco Prats, Elias Hanna and Isidro Bejar
registered two mercantile partnerships in the Bureau of Commerce
and Industry for the purpose of engaging in mercantile business. The
articles of copartnership of these two entities were the same except in
the firm names. It was apparently contemplated, in so far as any
legitimate function may have been intended, that Prats & Co. should
be an importing firm, while Hanna, Bejar & Co. should engage in retail
business. As events show, the existence of the parallel entities,
controlled by the same individuals, supplied, undeniably, suitable
engines for accomplishing an exploit of the kind that was here
attempted. Of the three individuals mentioned Elias Hanna and Isidro
Bejar were Turkish subjects of unsavory reputation in insurance circles
of Manila, while Francisco Prats was a Spanish subject who had had
some success as a merchant and, prior to his connection with the two
associates above mentioned, apparently enjoyed a fair reputation.
Another individual, who figures in the case as an instrument of the
three partners, is one Domingo Romero, who at the time with which we
1
are here concerned, was an employee of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, with a salary of P150 per month. Ramon Prats, a son of
Francisco Prats, was united in marriage to a daughter of Domingo
Romero, with the result that social relations between Francisco Prats
and Domingo Romero were close. Francisco Prats appears to have
acted as manager for both Prats & Co. and Hanna, Bejar & Co.
On May 27, 1924, Prats, acting for Hanna, Bejar & Co., purchased a
one-story building at 95 Plaza Gardenia, Manila; and soon thereafter
he began to assemble in this place the stock of merchandise which
was the subject of insurance in this case. The building referred to was
purchased outright for the sum of P1,600. It was old and was scarcely
more than a shed but had been used in times past for human
habitation. It was located in a part of the city which was inconvenient
of access to traders and out of the ordinary channels of business
activity. After purchasing the building, Prats knocked out the partitions,
removed the floor, and laid a new cement floor on the ground. He
then installed shelving along the center. The main part of the structure
was thus converted into a single store, or bodega, though certain
adjuncts, consisting of kitchen and closets, remained unchanged in
the rear of the building. A sign was then set up over the entrance
bearing the firm name "Hanna, Bejar & Co." In effecting the purchase
of this building Prats availed himself of the service of Domingo Romero,
who lived only two doors away at 97 Plaza Gardenia.
By August 21,1924, there had been assembled and stored by Prats
in the place above described a stock of goods which, according to
the documents exhibited by him, had a valuation of P211,329.72, on
which he had taken out insurance to the extent of P410,000. At
midnight of the day mentioned a fire occurred at 95 Plaza Gardenia,
which destroyed the building and ruined its contents, the amount
realized from the salvage of the stock being P11,731.93.
With respect to the insurance upon this stock at the time of the fire,
the following facts appear: In the month of June preceding the fire,
nine policies aggregating P160,000 were taken out by Prats in the
name of Hanna, Bejar & Co. on merchandise stored at 95 Plaza
Gardenia.
At the time these policies were taken out the valuation of the goods
then in said store could not have been more than P68,753. On June
28,1924, Prats procured from the agent of the def endant in this case
policy of insurance No. 600217 in the amount of P200,000 on
merchandise stored in the same place. The nine policies already
procured had been taken out, as we have seen, in the name of
Hanna, Bejar & Co.; but when Prats applied to the agent of the def
endant for the P200,000 policy last above mentioned, the agent told
him that if Hanna or Bejar had any interest in the stock to be insured
the policy could not be issued (f or the reason that, in such case, the
defendant would not be able to obtain reinsurance for any part of the
policy, owing to the bad reputation of Hanna and Bejar. Accordingly,
at the request of Prats, the policy for P200,000 was now made out in
the name of Prats & Co.; and Prats at the same time assured the agent
that Hanna and Bejar were not partners in Prats & Co. With the writing
of this policy the amount of insurance on the merchandise at 95 Plaza
Gardenia was increased to P360,000, while the value of the stock at
that time was not probably much in excess of P158,000. On August
11,1924, or just ten days before the fire, Prats took out an additional
policy for P50,000 in the name of Prats & Co. on the same stock. This
made a total insurance of P410,000 on the contents of the store at 95
Plaza Gardenia. At the same time, according to Prats himself, the
valuation of the merchandise then in the place was not in excess of
P230,000. Furthermore, Prats, about this time, caused the first nine
policies which had been taken out in the name of Hanna, Bejar & Co.
to be indorsed to Prats & Co., thereby making this firm the sole insured
firm with respect to this stock of merchandise.
With respect to the origin of the stock thus assembled, we find that
part had been purchased in Europe by Prats; and in connection with
its importation from abroad it is noteworthy that on June 18, 1924, Prats
& Co. procured a policy of marine insurance to be issued by
Meerkamp & Co., Ltd., as agents of the East India Insurance Co., Ltd.,
upon twenty-two cases of silk, of a supposed value of P43,400. At the
time this policy was procured Prats informed the insurer that the goods
were soon to arrive from France by the steamer Suwa Maru. For this
policy of insurance Prats paid out the sum of P736.25. Nevertheless, it
now appears that the twenty-two cases of silk covered by this marine
policy were fictitious, as no such purchase of silk had been made by
Prats & Co. in France or elsewhere. This fact was offered in evidence
by the defendant, as tending to reveal a scheme by which, if a
destructive fire should occur, the plaintiff would be able to mislead the
defendant as to the quantity of goods stored in the bodega. This item
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of proof, though circumstantial in its nature, was undoubtedly
competent and should have been admitted by the trial court.
The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that obscure
manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing of merchandise
at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the contents of
the bodega before the fire. In this connection it appears that forty-five
cases of old stock of Hanna, Bejar & Co., at Legaspi, P. I., were
shipped to Manila before the fire, but instead of being taken directly
to 95 Plaza Gardenia, they were housed for a time in the back part of
the lower floor of the Bazar Filipino in which Prats & Co. and Hanna,
Bejar & Co. had their offices. Moreover, a quantity of merchandise
purchased from Talambiras Brothers by Prats & Co. was taken to the
same place shortly before the fire, instead of directly to 95 Plaza
Gardenia; and it is the theory of the defendant that new merchandise
purchased from Talambiras Brothers was substituted for the old stock in
boxes from Hanna, Bejar & Co. at Legaspi, leaving the old goods to be
deposited in the bodega, to swell the debris of the fire. There is
evidence also, which was credited by the court, to the effect that on
various occasions before the fire goods were removed from
the bodega to the store of B. Abolafia, at Manila, where they were
received without invoice. Some of these goods were subsequently sent
away by Abolafia for sale in the provinces.
If overinsurance and the assemblage of goods at inflated values in
the bodega at 95 Plaza Gardenia, together with the surreptitious
abstraction of goods therefrom by the insured, have suggested a
possible intention on the part of its manager to realize improperly on its
insurance policies, this inference is, in our opinion, put beyond reach of
reasonable doubt by facts relative to the destruction of the place. In
this connection we note that at about the time the bodega at 95
Plaza Gardenia had been purchased, Domingo Romero assisted one
Ramon Osete to rent No. 69 Calle Gardenia, which was close to the
rear of the building at 95 Plaza Gardenia. Osete appears to have
been the individual chosen for the role of incendiary, and he slept at
the place mentioned until the night of the fire. A night or two before
the fire this Osete, accompanied by one Antonio Prats, appears to
have brought two cans of petroleum to his lodging place at 69 Calle
Gardenia. After these cans had been taken to Osete's bathroom by
his muchacho, the latter was sent out on an errand; and while he was
gone the petroleum disappeared. After the fire had been started in
the plaintiff's bodega, shortly after midnight on August 21, 1924, Osete
conveyed this boy in his automobile to the fire alarm box on Plaza
Gardenia. Reaching this place, Osete planted the boy there with
instructions to stop anyone who might attempt to turn in the alarm by
telling him that he (the boy) had already done so; and in fact, after
the fire had gained some headway, one Joaquin Silos, who lived near
the bodega, ran to the box to turn on the alarm but was stopped in
the act by a person who stated that he had already given the alarm.
Nevertheless, when Fire Chief Vanderford reached the scene of the
fire a few minutes later, he found that the box had not been disturbed
and he himself turned on the alarm. The boy stated that when he was
on the way with Osete to the alarm box, as just stated, an explosion
took place in the bodega and a dull sound was emitted. Vanderford
says that upon his arrival he saw that the smoke issuing from
the bodega was black, suggesting the combustion of some
inflammable material like petroleum. He also noted the odor of
petroleum, as did also some of the firemen who reached the scene. It
may be added that when the debris of the fire was subsequently
searched, merchandise soaked with petroleum was found in the ruins.
Domingo Romero, who had been living at 97 Plaza Gardenia, had
before the fire taken his family temporarily to the home of Prats in
Pasay. But after the fire was over the family moved back to 97 Plaza
Gardenia, although that place had been considerably damaged by
the flames.
Among those who suffered from the fire were the menbers of the
Artigas family, living at 93 Gardenia, on the side opposite Romero's
house. Another neighbor who likewise suffered from the fire was one
Juan Atayde, occupant of 67 Calle Gardenia, at the side of the house
occupied by Osete. Soon after the fire Domingo Romero quietly
passed a 100-peso bill into the hand of Maria Luisa Artigas, a daughter
belonging to the Artigas family. Romero likewise gave the same
amount to Juan Atayde. It is selfevident that the gifts thus made by
Romero to Luisa Artigas and Juan Atayde had other motives than pure
charity and that the money probably came from some other source
than his own modest earnings. After the fire was over the suspicions of
incendiarism were so strong that a special investigation was made by
the police department with the result that Deputy Chief Lorenzo came
to the conclusion that the fire had originated from an intentional act.
Reflection upon the proof bef ore the court engenders in us the same
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belief and conducts us to the further conclusion that Prats & Co. was
not alien to the deed.
The finding of the trial court to the effect that the plaintiff had
submitted false proof in support of his claim is also, in our opinion, well
founded. That conclusion appears to have been based upon three
items of proof and, with respect to at least two of these, we think that
the conclusion of his Honor was correctly drawn. These two facts are,
first, that the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in the fire as
of a value of P12,800 when the true value of said jewelry was about
P600; and, secondly, that the plantiff had sought to recover from the
insurance company the value of goods which had been surreptitiously
withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the fire. Neither of these two
facts are consistent with good faith on the part of the plaintiff, and
each constituted a breach of the stipulations of the policy against the
use of fraudulent devices and false proof with respect to the loss.
The other point relied upon by his Honor to sustain the conclusion
that the plaintiff had attempted to deceive the defendant with
respect to the extent of the loss was at least competent in its general
bearing on the good faith of the plaintiff, even if, as is probably true,
not alone sufficient to constitute a breach of the same stipulations. The
point is this: After the fire the plaintiff presented to the adjuster certain
cost sheets and copies of supposed invoices in which the prices and
expenses of importation of a quantity of goods were stated at double
the true amount. The adjuster soon discovered the artificial nature of
these documents, and, with his consent, they were withdrawn by Prats
and subsequently destroyed. At the hearing Prats stated that these
documents had been fabricated in order that they might be exhibited
to intending purchasers of the goods, thereby making it appear to
them that the cost of the merchandise had been much greater than it
in fact was—a ruse which is supposed to have been entirely innocent
or at least not directed against the insurer. But a question naturally
arises as to the purpose which these documents might have been
made to serve if the fire, as doubtless intended by its designers, had
been so destructive as to remove all vestiges of the stock actually
involved. Upon the whole we are forced to state the conclusion, not
only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set, or connived therein, but
also that it submitted (f raudulent proof as the trial judge found.
Before concluding this opinion we are constrained to make a few
observations with reference to the trial of this case and the inordinate
amount of time consumed in the proceedings. We are told in the
appellant's brief that the trial of this case covered a period of almost
two years, in which fifty separate sessions were held, without counting
the numerous hearings upon the taking of the deposition of Francisco
Prats, a partner in the plaintiff firm, whose testimony was taken at the
instance of the defendant. Taken all together, the time thus consumed
was out of all proportion to the difficulties of the case. An examination
of the voluminous transcript reveals at least part of the reason for this
inordinate consumption of time; since we find that far too much of the
space in the transcript is taken up with the record of petty skirmishes in
court resulting from objections over the admission of evidence.
In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is
most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where
trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least
favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should
be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know
with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where
there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering
the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony
upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of
the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly
fall into error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and
logical connection is in fact shown. When such a mis-take is made and
the proof is erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal,
often finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the
effects of the error with:out returning the case for a new trial,—a step
which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the
admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to
its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much
harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the
law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish
the relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial. If this
course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court
upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it necessary to
make a correct judgment.
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 In this connection it should be remembered that many of the
technical rules of evidence which are often invoked in our courts were
originally worked out in England and the United States, where the jury
system prevails. These rules were adopted for the purpose of keeping
matter from juries which—it was supposed—might unduly influence
them in deciding on the facts. They have little pertinence to a system
of procedure, like ours, in which the court is judge both of the law and
facts, and in which accordingly it is necessary for the court to know
what the proof .is before it rules upon the propriety of receiving it.
Apart from these considerations is the circumstance mentioned above
that the time consumed in the trial on such collateral points is generally
many times greater than would be consumed if the questionable
testimony should be admitted for what it is worth. What has been said
above finds special relevancy in this case in view of the action of the
trial court in refusing to consider the proof referred to in the opinion
showing that the plaintiff, while engaged in assembling its stock,
procured maritime insurance upon a fictitious importation of silk. We
earnestly commend the maintenance of a liberal practice in the
admission of proof.
Our examination of the case leads to the conclusion that the result
reached by the trial court was correct.
The appealed decision will therefore be affirmed, and it is so
ordered, with costs against the appellant.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner caused the fire to be set or
connived therein and submitted fraudulent proof as the trial judge
found.
RULING: YES. The proof submitted by the defendant tends to show that
obscure manipulations were used by the plaintiff in the storing of
merchandise at 95 Plaza Gardenia and in the removal of part of the
contents of the bodega before the fire. It appears that cases of old
stock were shipped to Manila before the fire but instead of being
taken directly to the bodega they were housed for a time in the back
part of the lower floor where the petitioner had office. Also, the
manipulation of one of their people to attend to the alarm box not to
allow others to touch it and reasoned out that he already have done
it, when in fact the fire chief noticed that it was never touched and he
himself turned on the alarm. The finding of the trial court in the effect
that plaintiff had submitted false proof in the support of his claim is also
well founded. First, the plaintiff had submitted a claim for jewelry lost in
the fire as of a value of P 12,800 when the true value of the said jewelry
was about P 600; and secondly, that the plaintiff had sought to
recover from the insurance company the value of the goods which
had been surreptitiously withdrawn by it from the bodega prior to the
fire. As a conclusion, not only that the plaintiff caused the fire to be set,
or connive therein, but also that it submitted fraudulent proof.

Prats & Company vs. Phoenix Insurance Company

FACTS: Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership instituted an action in the
RTC of the City of Manila for recovery from the Phoenix Insurance Co.
the sum of P117,800.60 with interest, by reason of a loss alleged to
have been sustained by the plaintiff from a fire for said loss was
covered by insurance issued by the defendant company. Phoenix
Insurance admitted the insurance of the insurance but by way of
special defense, alleged that the fire in question had been set by the
plaintiff, or with its connivance, and the plaintiff had submitted under
oath to the defendant a fraudulent claim of loss in contravention of
the express terms of the policy. The trial court absolved the defendant
from the complaint with respect to the obligation created by the
policy but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P11, 731.93 with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account
of moneys received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant,
of remnants of the insured stock.

5

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. HON. FELINO D. ABALOS,
Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch II, 16th Judicial District, and
MOHAMMAD USSAM DAMBONG, respondents.
Remedial law; Criminal procedure; Trial; Rebuttal; Where
prosecution was allowed to introduce rebuttal evidence on new
matter not covered directly by evidence of prosecution; Case at
bar.—The prosecution presented evidence to show that the accused
killed the persons mentioned in the information, as well as wounded
several other specified persons. The accused presented evidence to
establish the contrary—that he did not kill or wound said persons. He,
however, went further, by testifying that it was AH who killed and
wounded the persons abovemetioned. May the prosecution present
the testimony of MA as rebuttal evidence to show that it was the
accused, not AH who committed the crime alleged in the
Information?
HELD: Yes The evidence of the accused that it was AH who killed
and wounded the persons mentioned in the information was
a new matter not covered directly by the evidence for the
prosecution It is true that if it was the accused who caused the deaths
and the injuries alleged, it would follow that AH was ot the author
thereof. The prosecution was entitled, however. as a matter of strict
legal right, to introduce positive evidence to this effect, instead of
relying upon a mere inference from its evidence in chief.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Discretion of trial court to determine
whether or not parties should be allowed to introduce rebuttal
evidence.—Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or
not the parties should be allowed to introduce evidence in rebuttal.
Moreover, its resolutions on these matters are interlocutory in nature
and will not generally be reviewed, except on appeal taken from a
decision rendered on the merits. Judicial discretion, however, is not
unlimited. It must be exercised reasonably, with a view to promoting
the ends of justice, one of which is to ascertain the truth.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Criminal cases.—As a matter of
general practice, it is deemed best to resolve doubts in favor of the
admission of the contested evidence, without prejudice to such action
as the court may deem fit to take in deciding the case on the merits.
This practice has added importance as regards the evidence for the
prosecution in criminal cases, for, once the accused has been
acquitted, there is no means to secure a review by appeal, no matter
how erroneous the action of the lower court may have been.
****
This is a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory injunction, to annul an order of Honorable
Felino D. Abalos, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Sulu,
directing that the testimony of a rebuttal witness for the prosecution in
Criminal Case No, 3158 of said Court be shaken from the records, Soon
after the filing of the petition herein, We issued a temporary restraining
order -directing that the continuation of the trial of said case be
suspended until further orders,
On or about March 9, 1966, an information was filed with said court,
presided over by respondent Judge, accusing Mohammad Ussam
Dambong, Nikki Dambong, Amiril Hahissi and Ahmad Intoman, of the
crime of double murder upon Abdulhadi Maoludani and Maoludani
Habissi, When multiple frustrated murder upon the persons of Sarahani
Maoludani, Marajuko Maoludani and Abdulrasid Maoludani, allegedly
committed on February 6, 1961, in Guimba Asin, municipality of
Panamao, province of Sulu. When the case was called for trial, the
prosecution introduced evidence tending to show that defendant
Mohammad Ussam Dambong had, on February 6, 1961, gone to the
place aforementioned, accompanied by his co-defendants, and then
fired at and killed Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi Maoludani, as well
as shot and wounded the other persons named in the information.
After the reception of said evidence for the prosecution, the defense
proceeded with the presentation of its own evidence, in the course of
which, defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong testified that the
casualties and the injuries adverted to above were due to shots f ired,
not by him, but by Abdulkadil Habbisi, because, as a police sergeant
in the performance of his duty, he (Mohammad Ussam Dambong) had
merely fired late the air, to stop a fight between two (2) groups of
persons, to one of which the victims belonged. The defense having,
thereafter, completed the introduction of its evidence, on April 24,
1968, the prosecution called March Andi as rebuttal witness.
After the preliminary questions propounded to him, thethe defense
objected to further questions, upon the ground that Madjid Andi
appeared to have witnessed the occurrence and that his testimony
should have been introduced when the prosecution presented its
evidence in chief. Respondent Judge sustained the objection, but,
6
later, reconsidered his resolution, as the prosecution explained that it
had discovered Madjid Andi sometime after the introduction of its
evidence in chief and that the testimony of said witness would merely
rebut that of defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong. Thereupon,
the prosecution resumed the examination of Madjid Andi, who said
that he was present when the shooting involved in the case took
place that Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi Manludani were shot by
defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong, not by Abdulkadil Habbisi,
and that the latter was not even at the scene of the occurrence. The
prosecution then asked Madjid Andi whether Mohammad Ussam
Dambong was in the courtroom. The defense objected to this question
as improper for rebuttal, and one that should have been asked during
the presentation by the prosecution of its evidence in chief.
Respondent Judge sustained the objection and ordered the testimony
of Madjid Andi stricken from the record, as improper for rebuttal.
The prosecutor having announced that Madjid Andi would be its
last witness and that he (prosecutor) would appeal from the resolution
of the court as soon as copy thereof had been furnished him,
respondent Judge incorporated his aforementioned resolution in an
order, dated May 2, 1968, directing that the testimony of said witness
be "discarded from the records on the ground that the testimony are
answers to questions not proper in rebuttar and stating that "from the
observation of the Court, the witness in rebuttal should have been
presented as a witness in the presentation of the evidence in chief of
the prosecutor", and declaring that the case would be deemed
submitted for decision on May 15, 1968, unless the parties sought
permission to file memoranda on or before said date.
Hence, this original action for certiorari and mandamus, with
preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by the prosecution against said
respondent Judge and Mohammad Ussam Dambong, for the purpose
stated at the beginning of this decision. In his answer to the petition
herein, respondent Judge reiterated the views expressed by him
during the trial, as well as in the resolution and the order complained
of. Respondent Mohammad Ussam Dambong filed an answer
defending the position taken by respondent Judge. Such position is
utterly untenable.
Referring particularly to the question whether or not respondent
Judge erred in ordering the testimony of Madjid Andi stricken from the
records, We note that the information alleges that defendant
Mohammad Ussam Dambong had fired at and killed Maoludani
Habissi and Abdulhani Maoludani, as well as wounded several other
specified persons. Naturally, the evidence for the prosecution tended
to prove that Mohammad had committed these acts. Upon the other
hand, Mohammad was entitled to establish the contrary—that he did
not kill or wound said person. He, however, went further, to which he
was entitled, by testifying that it was Abdulkadil Habbisi who killed and
wounded the persons above-mentioned. This was a new matter, not
covered directly by the evidence for the prosecution. It is true that, if,
as testified to by its witnesses, it was Mohammad Ussam Dambong
who caused the deaths and the injuries already adverted to, it would
follow that Abdulkadil Habbisi was not the author thereof. The
prosecution was entitled, however, as a matter of strict legal right, to
introduce positive evidence to this effect, instead of relying upon at
mere inference from its evidence in chief. In fact, it was to the interest
of the trial court, in the discharge of its duty to find the truth, to receive
said rebuttal evidence for the prosecution. What is more, a failure to
introduce it on rebuttal could have been regarded as a sign of
weakness in the evidence for the prosecution. Then, too, it would have
been ridiculous for the prosecution, during the presentation of its
evidence in chief, to try to prove that the crimes charged in the
information had not been committed by Abdulkadil Habbisi.
Under the circumstances, it is obvious that, in directing that the
testimony of Madjid Andi be stricken from the record and not allowing
said witness to identify the person who committed the crime
aforementioned, respondent Judge had committed a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction.
Trial courts have ample discretion to determine whether or not the
parties should be allowed to introduce evidence in rebuttal Moreover,
its resolutions on these matters are interlocutory in nature and will not
generally be reviewed, except on appeal taken from a decision
rendered on the merits. Judicial discretion, however, is not unlimited. It
must be exercised reasonably. with a view to promoting the ends of
justice, one of which is to ascertain the truth, Hence, whenever
discretion is vested, it must be understood to be a sound one,
inasmuch as the interest of justice, equity and fair play cannot be
advanced other-wise. This is particularly with respect to rules of
procedure, especially those governing the admission or exclusion of
evidence, As a matter of general practice, it is deemed best to resolve
7
doubts in favor of the admission of the contested evidence, without
prejudice to such action as the court may deem fit to take in deciding
the case on the merits.1 This practice has added importance as
regards the evidence for the prosecution in criminal cases, for, once
the accused has been acquitted, there is no means to secure a
review by appeal, no matter how erroneous the action of the lower
court may have been. Hence, We have been constrained to suspend
the proceedings in the criminal action involved in the case at bar, to
forestall a possible miscarriage of justice,
In issuing a writ of certiorari against a trial Judge who had
rejected, inter alia, certain rebuttal evidence for the prosecution in a
criminal case, We had occasion to point out, in People vs.
Montejo,2 that:
"Upon a review of the record, we are fully satisfied that the lower court
had, not only erred, but, also, committed a grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the resolutions complained of, in rejecting the
aforementioned direct and rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, and
in not permitting the same to propound the questions already
adverted to. It is obvious to us that said direct and rebuttal evidence,
as well as the aforementioned questions, are relevant to the issues
involved in Criminal Case No. 672. Although it is not possible to
determine with precision, at this stage of the proceedings, how far said
exhibits may affect the outcome of that case, it is elemental that all
parties therein are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to establish
their respective pretense. In this connection it should be noted that, in
the light of the allegations of the amended information in said case
and of the records before us, the issue of the guilt or innocence of the
accused therein is bound to hinge heavily upon the veracity of the
opposing witnesses and the weight attached to their respective
testimony. Hence, the parties should be allowed a certain latitude in
the presentation of their evidence, lest they may be so hampered that
the ends of justice may eventually be defeated or appear to be
defeated. The danger of leading to such rasult must be avoided,
particularly in cases of the nature, importance and significance of the
one under consideration."
We, likewise, called attention to the following view, ex pressed in Prats
& Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co. 3 as far back as February 21, 1929:
"In the course of long experience we have observed that justice is
most effectively and expeditiously administered in the courts where
trivial objections to the admission of proof are received with least
favor. The practice of excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its
materiality or technical objections to the form of the questions should
be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge of first
instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know
with any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where
there is no indication of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering
the evidence, the court may as a rule safely accept the testimony
upon the statement of the attorney that the proof offered will be
connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of
the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly
fall into error in judging the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical
connection is in fact shown. When such a mistake is made and the
proof s erroneously ruled out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often
finds itself embarrassed and possibly unable to correct the effects of
the error without returning the case for a new trial—a step which this
court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the admission of
proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form,
materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to
either litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law;
and it is its duty, upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the
relevant and material from the irrelevant and immaterial If this course is
followed and the cause is prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon
appeal, this court then has al the material before it necessary to make
a correct judgment.
and commented that:
"There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases
where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the charges,
from which the People can no longer appeal." as We granted a similar
writ, in People v. Yatco,4 against another trial court that had ordered
the exclusion of an extrajudicial confession sought to be introduced as
part of the evidence for the prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the order complained of is hereby annulled, and
respondent Judge, accordingly, directed to receive the
aforementioned testimony of Madjid Andi, as well as to allow him to
identify the person who caused the deaths and the injuries involved in
the criminal case already adverted to, with the costs of this instance
against respondent Mohammad Ussam Dambong. It is so ordered.