I.

INTRODUCTION

A. IMPORTANCE OF LEGAL PROFESSION

B. PRACTICE OF LAW

RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly
Monsod does not possess required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There
shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who
shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least
thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent does not possess the required qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.

HELD:
In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, it stated that the practice of law is
not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters
connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services,
contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement
of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings
in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law
practice. Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. The contention that Atty. Monsod
does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement for the position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the
petition is dismissed.
PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION vs. CELEDONIO AGRAVA
G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.

FACTS:
On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled
an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent
attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office. According to the circular, members of the
Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
are qualified to take the said examination. The petitioner contends that one who has passed
the bar examination sand is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines
and who is in good standing is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office
and that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution
of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice
so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice
before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests,
this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of
their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of
facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other
matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind
of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the
transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or
judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the
case.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ, complainant, vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA, respondent

ADM. CASE NO. 5737 October 25, 2004

FACTS:
Ferdinand A. Cruz, complainant, a fourth year law student appearing for and in his behalf in
his own cases charges Atty. Stanley Cabrera, respondent with misconduct in violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. During a judicial proceeding wherein complainant was
able to represent himself considering that he was appearing in barong tagalog thus the
presiding judge was misled when she issued an order stating"[i]n today’s hearing both
lawyers appeared;" because of which, respondent stated: "Your honor I would like to
manifest that this counsel (referring to complainant) who represents the plaintiff in thiscase is
not a lawyer," to which complainant replied: "The counsel very well know that I am n ot yet a
lawyer;" the reason he informed the court that complainant is not a lawyer was because the
presiding judge did not know that complainant is not a lawyer and complainant did not inform
the presiding judge that he is not a lawyer when he stated: "for the plaintiff your honor;" he
stated "pumasa kamuna" out of indignation because of complainant’s temerity in
misrepresenting himself as lawyer. There mark which the respondent made was allegedly
intended to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign, ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant
before the public.The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
wherein, IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended respondent’s suspension from
the practice of law for a period of three months for violating Rule 8.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. That ’appear ka ng appear,
pumasa ka muna " in whatever manner it was uttered are in itself not only abusive but
insulting specially on the part of law students who have not yet taken nor passed the bar
examination required of them.

ISSUES:
Whether or not complainant is precluded from litigating personally his cases.Whether or not
respondent’s outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" amount to aviolation of
Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

HELD:
Complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases. A party’s right to
conductlitigation personally is recognized by Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court:SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party
mayconduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
thatpurpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigationpersonally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a dulyauthorized member of the bar.

In Maderada vs. Mediodea this Court expounded on the foregoing provision, thus:

This provision means that in litigation, parties may personally do everything during its
progress-- from its commencement to its termination. When they, however, act as their own
attorneys,they are restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified
to practicelaw; otherwise, ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded. Individuals have long
beenpermitted to manage, prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so,
they arenot considered to be in the practice of law. "One does not practice law by acting for
himself anymore than he practices medicine by rendering first aid to himself."

We hold that respondent’s outburst of "appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not
amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single
outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s
suspension or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the
course of an argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too
strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing
cases, and that the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.
RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006

FACTS:

Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.
Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew
the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened
Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of
law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove
that respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February
1995, another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of
April 1996.

ISSUE:

Whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondent’s role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor
Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law

RULING:

1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (“Code”). However, the Court finds respondent liable for
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful
conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act
No. 6713 (“RA 6713”).
Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
discharge of their official duties.” A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not
[to] represent conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The
prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists,
when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when
no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious consequence of
the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x
conduct.” Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to “engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions.”

2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually
or customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.
 Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and
he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is
without merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and
retainer agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term
“practice of law.”

Atty, Ismael G. Khan Jr. vs Atty. Simbillo, A.C. No. 5299 August 10, 2002

FACTS:

i. Resp Atty. Rizalino Simbillo advertised in the PDI and MB his legal services for
annulment cases
ii. Upon investigation by the Pub Info Office, it was confirmed that Simbillo is
offering his services to interested clients.
iii. Ismael Khan, chief of the PIO, filed an administrative charge vs resp for improper
advertising and solicitation of his legal services in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
iv. Resp argues that advertising or solicitation is not per se a prohibited act:

a. Public interest is not served by the absolute prohibition

b. It’s time for the Court to promulgate a ruling that such advertisement is not
contrary to law, public policy and public order.
v. The IBP found the resp guilty and suspended him from the practice of law for 1
year, writing it in a resolution

ISSUE:

W/N resp’s act was a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility

RULING:

Yes.

i. Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code states that a lawyer is prohibited from
performing acts designed to solicit legal business and that he is not permitted to
use self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal
services.
ii. Practice of Law is not a business. It is a profession with public interest as the
primary
duty. It’s not a money-making venture and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The duty is to public service and the
administration of justice. Elements that distinguish it from business:

a. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in

which one may attain the highest eminence without making much money;
b. A relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice
involving
thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability;
c. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;
 d. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

-
The solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to be
proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest
and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar

Bernardo Vs Mejia 531 SCRA 539

FACTS:
On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F.
Mejia, of the following administrative offenses:
1) Misappropriating and converting to his personal use:
a) part of the sum of P27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on
property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a subdivision known as Valle Verde I;
and
b) part of another sum of P40,000.00 entrusted to him for payment of taxes and
expenses in connection with the registration of title of Bernardo to another property
in a subdivision known as Valle Verde V;

2) Falsification of certain documents, to wit:

a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly executed in his
favor by Bernardo (Annex P, par. 51, complainant’s affidavit dates October 4,
1989);
b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982 (Annex O, par. 48, id.); and
c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses Tomas and Remedios
Pastor, in Bernardo’s favor (Annex Q, par. 52, id.);

3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank, in payment of a loan
obtained from Bernardo in the amount of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check
with others known also to be insufficiently funded.

ISSUE:
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on
the sound discretion of the Court.

HELD:
The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character, a fit and proper person to practice law. The Court will take
into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the
disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has passed
since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does
not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that
Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time
during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in
allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of
Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and
he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are
imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.

We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a privilege burdened
with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession are
the continuing requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

Alawi vs. Alauya 268 SCRA 639

FACTS:
Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real
estate and housing company. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on instalments by Alauya
of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of
the termination of his contract with the company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated
because Alawi had resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of Villarosa and the Vice
President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya's letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint against him. One of
her grounds was Alauya‟s usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular
members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically
synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-law." a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim,
adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for
"councilor," "konsehal" or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator beholden
to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of Attorney

HELD:
He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular Philippine bar. As regards
Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence
may only practice law before Shari'a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered
"counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only
the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained
the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Ulep vs Legal Clinic Inc. 223 SCRA 378

FACTS:
In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to
Nogales was to move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the
services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic
because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in
Star Week of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed
of specialists that can take care of a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if
it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and
his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields, can take care of it.
The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems,
labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counselors and attorneys.

As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the
US which now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the
advertisement is merely making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is
allowed; whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not
allowed. The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include
various legal problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple
documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are
undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers
engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being
offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals.
Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true,
honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the
legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without
violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a
merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to
promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law
which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly reprehensible.

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best
advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and
efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself and
catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is
right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and
to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able
service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated
the following as allowed forms of advertisement:
1. Advertisement in a reputable law list
2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
 3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization
In Re Integration of the Philippine Bar, 49 SCRA 22

FACTS:
The Commission on Bar Integration submitted its Report with the “earnest recommendation”
— on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative Case No. 526
of the Court, and “consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the
Commission’s] Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of
the Philippine Bench and Bar” — that “(the) Honorable (Supreme) Court ordain the
integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption and promulgation
of an appropriate Court Rule.” The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to
order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar associations.

ISSUES:
(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

HELD:

YES. On all issues:

The Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “to promulgate rules concerning x x x the
admission to the practice of law.”

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data
contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration
of the Philippine Bar is “perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable,” within the
context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an imperative means to
raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable
the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

The Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
ordained the integration of the Bar of the Philippines effective January 16, 1973.

Privilege – Aguirre vs Rana, B.M. 1036. June 10, 2003; In the matter to continue use of
firm name Ozaeta, Romulo, etc., 92 SCRA 1

FACTS:

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass
oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission
to the Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in an election.

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal

government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate.
As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent

of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging
respondent’s services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not
deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

RULING:

The Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal
profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use
of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.
The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge,
educational attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar
candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations.
The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath.
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer.
The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not
the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know that two
essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s
oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

Profession, not Business – Burbe vs. Maguita, A.C. No. 99-634, June 10, 2002

FACTS:

Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of money
against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the petitioner, which were not
successful and so the former intimated that a case should already be filed. As a result,
petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and included also amounts for the filing of the case.
A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback as to the
status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s office but to no avail.
The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed even invited petitioner to come with
him to the Justice Hall to verify the status of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours
in the prosecutor’s office while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire
about the case. The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court
was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of the clerk of
court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out that no such case has
been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the excuse that the
delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when shown the certification did he
admit that he has not at all filed the complaint because he had spent the money for the filing
fee for his own purpose; and to appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by
issuing two (2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00
and P8,000.00, respectively.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP
as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by complainant with the Respicio Law
Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing
fees for the Regwill complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was
created and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated by his
client. The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing fees
deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of funds of the client,
which caused complainant additional damage and prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest
conduct on his part, unbecoming a member of the law profession. The subsequent
reimbursement by the respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing
fees, does not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.”

C. REGULATION OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION

Zaldivar vs. Gonzales G.R. Nos 79690-707 October 7, 1998

FACTS:

Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt Special Prosecutor (formerly
Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information
against petitioner in criminal case before the Sandiganbayan, and (2) issuing certain
allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in where
respondent is claiming that he is acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman. A Resolution from the
Supreme Court required respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
Portion of the published article from Philippine Daily Globe in his interview:

What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and
influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary
litigant to get his petition to be given due course.

Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the
newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Atty. Gonzales is entitled to invoke freedom of speech as a

defense.

HELD:

NO. Respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie
curiae and of gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.(Section 27,
Rule 138, Rules of Court)

Freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and
that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the
requirements of equally important public interests.

Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava G. R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

FACTS:
A petition was filed by the petitioner for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava,
in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office. On May 27, 1957, respondent
Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office. The petitioner contends that one who has passed the
bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and
who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office and
that the respondent Director’s holding an examination for the purpose is in excess of his
jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.The respondent, in reply, maintains the prosecution
of patent cases “ does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the
application of scientific and technical knowledge and training as a matter of actual practice
so as to include engineers and other individuals who passed the examination can practice
before the Patent office. Furthermore, he stressed that for the long time he is holding tests,
this is the first time that his right has been questioned formally.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appearance before the patent Office and the preparation and the
prosecution of patent application, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the practice of law includes such appearance before the
Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the
prosecution of their applications for patent, their opposition thereto, or the enforcement of
their rights in patent cases. Moreover, the practice before the patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of
facts to be established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court but also embraces all other
matters connected with the law and any work involving the determination by the legal mind
of the legal effects of facts and conditions. Furthermore, the law provides that any party may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director. Thus, if the
transactions of business in the Patent Office involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or
judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the
case.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, 316 Phil. 76

FACTS:

On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray
scheduled on that same day. The public respondent Justice Secretary assailed the issuance
of the TRO arguing that the action of the SC not only violated the rule on finality of judgment
but also encroached on the power of the executive to grant reprieve.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court abused its discretion in granting a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) on the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the finality of judgment has
already been rendered… that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in effect
granted reprieve which is an executive function.

HELD:

No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision is simply the source of power of the
President to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures after
conviction by final judgment. The provision, however, cannot be interpreted as denying the
power of courts to control the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.

The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for the simple reason that there is no higher right than the
right to life.

For the public respondents therefore to contend that only the Executive can protect the right
to life of an accused after his final conviction is to violate the principle of co-equal and
coordinate powers of the three branches of our government.

In Re: Exemption of the NTC from payment of filing fee, A.M. NO. 05-10-20-SC, March
10, 2000
 D. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER

Royong vs. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859

FACTS:

• Complainant Josefina Royong charge the respondent Ariston Oblena, a member of the bar
and bench, with rape. The Solicitor General immediately conducted an investigation and
found out that there was no rape, the carnal knowledge between complainant and
respondent seems to be consensual sex.
• In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not
commit the alleged rape, nevertheless, he was guilty of other misconduct. The Solicitor
General made another complaint charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging
in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character, of
living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the
18 year old Josefina Royong. Thus rendering him unfit to practice law, praying that this Court
render judgment ordering the permanent removal of the respondent as lawyer and judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the illicit relation of the respondent with Josefina Royong and the adulterous
cohabitation of respondent with Briccia Angeles warrants disbarment.

HELD:

Ariston Oblena was disbarred.

The continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral
character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one
who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the
statutes do not specify that as ground for disbarment.

Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his
profession, has nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer.
Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven
in this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by
the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the law.

As former Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required
to show good moral character, or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or
from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public
in the place where he is known.

Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for
admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that
people who knew him sqemed to have acuuiesced to his utatus, did noq render him a
person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered
then or now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
Cordon vs Balicanta, A.C. No. 2797, October 4, 2002

FACTS:

Cordon, along with her daughter, inherited some properties from her husband with the help
of Atty Balicanta. Subsequently, Atty Balicanta enticed them to form a corporation to
develop the real properties inherited. Such corp. was formed, and the properties were
registered in the corp.’s name. Atty Balicanta was the one who single-handedly ran the
corp.’s affairs, by being it’s Chairman, President, General Manager, and treasurer. By being
such officers, he made a number of acts: 1) made Cordon sign a voting trust agreement; 2)
made Cordon sign a SPA to sell/mortgage properties; 3) transferred title of some of the
properties to other people. And by using spurious Board resolutions, Atty Balicanta also
made the following acts: 1) obtained a loan from Land Bank using the properties as
collateral; 2) Sold the Corp’s right to redeem the properties to another person; 3) demolished
the ancestral home of the Cordon’s and sold the lot to another person. In all of these, Atty
Balicanta did not account for the proceeds coming the sales and dispositions.
The Cordons made several demands for Atty Balicanta to give back the properties and to
account the proceeds of the loan. When such demands were unheeded, The Cordons
terminated Balicanta’s services and filed a complaint for disbarment against the latter in the
IBP. The Commissioner, in its report, recommended for Balicanta’s disbarment as well. The
IBP Board of Governors resolved that Balicanta be suspended for 5 years for such conduct.

ISSUE/S:

W/N Balicanta be disbarred .

HELD:

YES, Disbarred.

Deceitful Conduct
The fraudulent acts he carried out against his client followed a well thought of plan to
misappropriate the corporate properties and funds entrusted to him. He started his devious
scheme by making himself the President, Chairman of the Board, Director and Treasurer of
the corporation, although he knew he was prohibited from assuming the position of President
and Treasurer at the same time. He also entered into dishonest transactions under the cloak
of sham resolutions. His misdemeanors reveal a deceitful scheme to use the corporation as
a means to convert for his own personal benefit properties left to him in trust by complainant
and her daughter.

Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character
expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the
pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because “vast interests are committed to his
care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s
property, reputation, his life, his all.”
Narag vs Narag, 291 SCRA 451

FACTS:
Atty. Narag’s spouse filed a petition for disbarment in the IBP alleging that her husband
courted one of his students, later maintaining her as a mistress and having children by her.
Atty. Narag claims that his wife was a possessive, jealous woman who abused him and filed
the complaint out of spite.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Narag should be disbarred.

HELD:
Atty. Dominador Narag failed to prove his innocence because he failed to refute the
testimony given against him and it was proved that his actions were of public knowledge and
brought disrepute and suffering to his wife and children. Good moral character is a
continuing qualification required of every member of the bar. Thus, when a lawyer fails to
meet the exacting standard of moral integrity, the Supreme Court may withdraw his or her
privilege to practice law. (Canons 1&7, Rule 7.03, Code of Ethics for Lawyers) It is not only
a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members.
Hence when a lawyer is found guilty of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or
disbarred. Grossly immoral means it must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency. As a lawyer, one must
not only refrain from adulterous relationships but must not behave in a way that scandalizes
the public by creating a belief that he is flouting those moral standards.

Dantes vs Dantes, A.C. No. 6486, September 22, 2006

FACTS:

Mrs. Dantes alleged that his husband is a philanderer. Atty. Dantes purportedly engaged in
illicit relationships with two women, one after the other, and had illegitimate children with
them. From the time respondents illicit affairs started, he failed to give regular support to his
wife and their children, thus forcing her to work abroad to provide for their children’s needs.

Atty. Dantes admitted the fact of marriage with her and the birth of their children, but alleged
that they have mutually agreed to separate eighteen years before after his wife had
abandoned him in their residence. He further asserted that Mrs. Dantes filed the case just to
force him to remit 70% of his monthly salary to her.

Mrs. Dantes then presented documentary evidence consisting of the birth certificates of Ray
Darwin, Darling, and Christian Dave, all surnamed Dantes, and the affidavits of his husband
and his paramour to prove the fact that he sired three illegitimate children out of his illicit
affairs with two different women.

ISSUE: Whether or not having an illicit relationship during the the subsistence of marriahe
warrants the disbarment of a lawyer.
RULING:

Yes.

The Code of Professional Responsibility forbids lawyers from engaging in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Immoral conduct has been defined as that conduct
which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community.To be the basis of disciplinary action, the lawyers
conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common
sense of decency.

Undoubtedly, respondents acts of engaging in illicit relationships with two different women
during the subsistence of his marriage to the complainant constitutes grossly immoral
conduct warranting the imposition appropriate sanctions. Complainants testimony, taken in
conjunction with the documentary evidence, sufficiently established respondents commission
of marital infidelity and immorality.

Tan vs Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, February 24, 1992

FACTS:

Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in
view of the finding of the Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then,
he had filed numerous petitions for him to be allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where
Sabandal is domiciled to submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of
the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive judge stated in his comment that he is not
aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him to from admission to
the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for
cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator
of the Bureau of Lands, is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title
to a parcel of land which, upon investigation, turned out to be a swampland and not
susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged to the bank.
The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and
respondent has not redeemed the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable
settlement canceled the OCT under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage
in the bank; provided for the surrender of the certificate of title to the RD for proper
annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the aforesaid
certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership
over the said land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he
already submitted three (3) testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending
civil case has been terminated.
HELD:

His petition must be denied.

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to
possess good moral character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands.
Said employment facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which
he could not but have known was a public land. This was manipulative on his part and does
not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of gross dishonesty while in the
public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no
determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This
is a sad reflection of his sense of honor and fair dealings.

Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed
against him during the period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for
reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and truthfulness.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined
as "including at least common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification
for membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

Tapucar vs Tapucar A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998

FACTS:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar

sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances.

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of
six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and
2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation
from service of respondent.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional responsibility

RULING:

Yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.
 A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted
from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield
in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and
responsibility that have been compendiously described as “moral character.” To achieve
such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his
profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.

Father Aquino vs Atty. Pascua, A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007

FACTS:

Complainants:

In his letter-complaint, Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two documents
committed as follows:

(1) He made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B.
Acorda entering the same as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
December 10, 1998".

(2) He also made it appear that he had notarized the "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B.
Domingo entering the same as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of 1998, dated
December 10, 1998.

Father Aquino further alleged that on June 23 and July 26, 1999, Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk
of Court, Regional Trial Court, Tuguegarao, certified that none of the above entries appear in
the Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua; that the last entry therein was Document No. 1200
executed on December 28, 1998; and that, therefore, he could not have notarized
Documents Nos. 1213 and 1214 on December 10, 1998.

Lina M. Garan and other complainants contend that Atty. Pascua's omission was not due to
inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.

Respondent:

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4, 1999, Atty. Pascua admitted
having notarized the two documents on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his
Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli, whose
affidavit was attached to his comment

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties.

HELD:
Atty. Pascua is guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties while Atty. Pascua
claims that the omission was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is
the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the
documents that he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public
and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry which he notarized on
December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on Page 240. On the other hand, the two
affidavit-complaints allegedly notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and
1214, respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the other
complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned
fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not
only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

This is not to mention that the only supporting evidence of the claim of inadvertence by Atty.
Pascua is the affidavit of his own secretary which is hardly credible since the latter cannot be
considered a disinterested witness or party.

Noteworthy also is the fact that the questioned affidavit of Acorda (Doc. No. 1213) was
submitted only when Domingo's affidavit (Doc. No. 1214) was withdrawn in the
administrative case filed by Atty. Pascua against Lina Garan, et al. with the CSC. This
circumstance lends credence to the submission of herein complainants that Atty. Pascua
ante-dated another affidavit-complaint making it appear as notarized on December 10, 1998
and entered as Document No. 1213. It may not be sheer coincidence then that both
documents are dated December 10, 1998 and numbered as 1213 and 1214.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED

from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission, if still existing,
is ordered REVOKED.

The case defined Misconduct:

"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated by a

premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily
imply corruption or criminal intent.

GSIS vs. Judge Pacquing, AM No. RTJ-04-1831, February 2, 2007

FACTS:

In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson) borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner
GSIS and defaulted in the payment of the amortizations. Petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed
the mortgaged properties and sold them at public auction where it emerged as the highest
bidder.

The Regional trial court declared the foreclosure void and directed petitioner to restore to
Bengson the foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.

The CA affirmed with modification the trial courts decision and remanded the case for
reception of evidence on the costs of suit and determination of the replacement value of the
properties should petitioner fail to return them.

When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the new presiding judge of Branch
26, respondent Judge Vicente A. Pacquing, ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value
of the foreclosed properties. Thereafter, Bengson moved that it be permitted to present
evidence on the costs of suit.

Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a quo stating that its counsel, Atty.
Rogelio Terrado, went on AWOL and never informed it of respondent judges order. This
motion, treated as petition for relief from judgment by respondent judge, was dismissed

Petitioner filed an MR of the above decision and, while it was pending resolution at the CA,
respondent judge, on December 16, 1998, issued an alias writ of execution ordering
petitioner to pay Bengson the P31 million.

Petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground that its funds and properties were exempt
from garnishment, levy and execution under Section 39 of RA 8291.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated RA 8291

HELD:

No. OCA found nothing in the records to support petitioners accusations against both
respondents. According to the OCA, even assuming that respondent judge erred in
interpreting RA 8291, such error did not constitute gross ignorance of the law.

On petitioners allegations against respondent Atty. Baez, the OCA likewise found no reason
to hold him liable for failing to defer the execution of the writ.

According to Justice Barrios:

Assuming for the nonce that [respondent judge] erred in issuing the
Order of 16 December 1998 without awaiting the resolution of [petitioners
motion for reconsideration], and in holding that [its] properties are not exempt
from execution, these would not be errors that are gross and patent, or done
maliciously, deliberately or in evident bad faith. [Petitioner] has not presented
proof to the contrary, which with the factual milieu would call for administrative
sanctions against [respondent judge]. As a matter of public policy, the acts of
the judge in his official capacity are not subject to disciplinary action, even
though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt
motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in which a judge
charged with ignorance of [the] law can find refuge.

For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts complained of must
be gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be
contrary to existing law and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or
dishonesty. That certainly does not appear to be the case here as petitioners complaint was
spawned merely by the honest divergence of opinion between petitioner and respondent
judge as to the legal issues and applicable laws involved. Petitioner also proffered no
evidence that respondent judges acts were imbued with malice or bad faith.

In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither biased nor partial against
petitioner when he issued the alias writ of execution. Petitioners assertion that respondent
judge precipitately issued the alias writ is not supported by the records. On the contrary, the
records indicate that the writ was issued more than three years from the finality of the order
directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. Its issuance was not all
tainted with undue haste. In the exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge believed
that the issuance of the alias writ had become forthwith a matter of right following the finality
of said order. The rule is that once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to
a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a courts ministerial duty.
Advincula vs. Atty. Macabata, AC No. 7204, March 7, 2007

FACTS:

Atty. Macabata was the counsel of Cynthia Advincula. In two separate incidents, Atty.
Macabata turnedthe head of Advincula and kissed her on the lips. These kissing incidents
occurred after meetings regarding a case that Advincula was involved in. in both incidents,
Atty. Macabata kissed Advincula inside the car, just before dropping her off in a public street.
Atty. Macabata apologized to Advincula via text messages immediately after the 2nd kissing
incident.
Advincula filed a petition for disbarment against Atty. Macabata on the ground of
grossly immoral character. Atty. Macabata admitted that he did kiss Advincula, but that this
was due to his feelings toward Advincula.

ISSUE: Is Atty. Macabata guilty of grossly immoral character to merit his disbarment?

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Macabata was NOT guilty of grossly immoral character.

Grossly immoral character must be so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so

unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to show the common sense of decency. To merit a disbarment,
the act must be grossly immoral.

Atty. Macabata’s act of kissing Advincula was not grossly immoral. The kiss was not
motivated by malice. This was proven by Atty. Macabata’s immediate apology and the fact
that it happened in a well-populated place. Advincula failed to prove that Atty. Macabata
lured her or took advantage of her.

While the disbarment complaint was dismissed, Atty. Macabata was reprimanded and given
a stern warning. The court described his kissing of Advincula as distasteful.

E. MEMBERSHIP IN THE IBP

In Re: Atty. Edillon, AM No. 1928, August 3, 1978

FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues
assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of membership
fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.

Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
in the sense that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and properly
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and
effect.

ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the
IBP.

HELD:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary.
All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar
including payment a reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court
only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not in violation of his constitutional
freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote
in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory
program – the lawyers.

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to
practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a
penalty designed to enforce its payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary.
Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission, suspension, disbarment,
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their
annual dues.

Letter of Atty. Arevalo, BM No. 1370, May 9, 2005

FACTS:
Atty. Arevalo wrote a letter to the SC requesting for exemption from payment of his IBP dues
from 1977-2005 in the amount of P12,035.00. He contends that after admission to the Bar
he worked at the Civil Service Commission then migrated to the US until his retirement. His
contention to be exempt is that his employment with the CSC prohibits him to practice his
law profession and he did not practice the same while in the US. The compulsion that he
pays his IBP annual membership is oppressive since he has an inactive status as a lawyer.
His removal from the profession because of non-payment of the same constitutes to the
deprivation of his property rights bereft of due process of the law.

ISSUES:
1. Is petitioner entitled to exemption from payment of his dues during the time that he was
inactive in the practice of law that is, when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and
he was working abroad from 1986-2003?
2. Does the enforcement of the penalty of removal amount to a deprivation of property
without due process?

HELD:
1. No. A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation. If the judiciary
has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it may
impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to put on an integrated
Bar program without means to defray the expenses. The doctrine of implied powers
necessarily carries with it the power to impose such exaction.

The payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which no

one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists for as
long as ones membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type
of practice, the member is engaged in.

2. No. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at
length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary
powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry.
And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty
designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyers public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened
with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to abide by any of
them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.

Santos vs. Llamas, AC No. 4749, January 20, 2001

FACTS:
Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues. It appears that
Atty. Llamas, who for a number of years now, has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR
Nos. and data in his pleadings. If at all, he only indicated “IBP Rizal 259060” but he has
been using this for at least 3 years already. On the other hand, respondent, who is now of
age, averred that he is only engaged in a “limited” practice of law and under RA 7432, as a
senior citizen, he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption
is the payment of membership dues.

HELD:
GUILTY. Rule 139-A requires that every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay annual dues
and default thereof for six months shall warrant suspension of membership and if
nonpayment covers a period of 1-year, default shall be a ground for removal of the
delinquent’s name from the Roll of Attorneys. It does not matter whether or not respondent is
only engaged in “limited” practice of law. Moreover, the exemption invoked by respondent
does not include exemption from payment of membership or association dues.

In addition, by indicating “IBP Rizal 259060” in his pleadings and thereby misprepresenting
to the public and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chpater, respondent is
guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Rule 1.01 – A
lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His act is also a
violation of Rule 10.01 which provides that: A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

Lawyer was suspended for 1 year or until he has paid his IBP dues, whichever is later.

F. LAW STUDENT PRACTICE

Cruz vs. Mina, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007

FACTS:
Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private
prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as
private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear
before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner furthermore
avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the
said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to
appear as private prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law
student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in Cantimbuhan; and set
the case for continuation of trial.

ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an
agent or friend of a party litigant

RULING:
The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the
issues and procedure are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his
personal capacity without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his
litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or
by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party
without the supervision of a member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)
 G. CITIZENSHIP REQUIREMENT

In Re: Letter of Estelito P. Mendoza, BM No. 1153, March 9, 2010

B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar
Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The Court
Resolved to APPROVE the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:

SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for admission other
than those referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the
examination, satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed
courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or
university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the
foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted
to the bar examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in
a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law,
remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social
legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar
examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a)
completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree;
(b) recognition or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion
of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly
recognized by the Philippine Government.

SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a
certificate issued by the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of
law, he or she had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high
school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or
sciences.

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its
equivalent in a foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate
bachelor's degree course.

The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to Circularize
this resolution among all law schools in the country.

II. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

A. CANON 1
RULE 1.01

Spouses Yu vs. Atty. Palana, July 14, 2008

FACTS:

- Mr. Mark Anthony U. Uy who introduced himself as the Division Manager of Wealth
Marketing and General Services Corporation engaged in spot currency trading.
- Mr. Uy persuaded the complainants to invest a minimum amount of P100,000.00 or
its dollar equivalent. Wealth Marketing’s promises were false and fraudulent, and
that the checks earlier issued were dishonored for the reason “account closed.” It
had already ceased its operation and a new corporation was formed named Ur-Link
Corporation which supposedly assumed the rights and obligations of the former.
- As Wealth Marketing’s Chairman of the Board of Directors, respondent assured the
complainants that Ur-Link would assume the obligations of the former company.
Respondent signed an Agreement to that effect which, again, turned out to be
another ploy to further deceive the investors.
- complainants lodged a criminal complaint for syndicated estafa against the
respondent and his co-accused.
- Despite the standing warrant for his arrest, respondent went into hiding and has been
successful in defying the law, to this date.
- In an Order dated November 17, 2006, Director for Bar Discipline required
respondent to submit his Answer to the complaint but the latter failed to comply.
Respondent was thereafter declared in default and the case was heard ex parte.
- Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.

ISSUE: W/N Mr. Uy should be disbarred.

HELD: YES.
- Lawyers, instruments in the administration of justice expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing. May be disciplined whether in their professional or in their private capacity
for any conduct that is wanting in morality, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
- Respondent, being a member of the bar, should note that administrative cases
against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may
proceed independently of criminal cases.

- Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:

 A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority to do so. x x x.
 power to disbar must always be exercised with great caution for only the most
imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral
character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.
 The Court notes that this is not the first time that respondent is facing an
administrative case, for he had been previously suspended from the practice of law in
Samala v. Palaña and Sps. Amador and Rosita Tejada v. Palaña. In Samala,
respondent also played an important role in a corporation known as First Imperial
Resources Incorporated, being its legal officer.
  Respondent meted the penalty of suspension for 3 years with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely. Likewise, in
Tejada, he was suspended for 6 months for his continued refusal to settle his loan
obligations.
 The fact that respondent went into hiding in order to avoid service upon him of the
warrant of arrest issued by the court (where his criminal case is pending)
exacerbates his offense.
 Finally, we note that respondent’s case is further highlighted by his lack of regard for
the charges brought against him. His disobedience to the IBP is in reality a gross,
blatant and unpardonable disrespect of the Court.
 The contumacious behaviour of respondent in the instant case which grossly
degrades the legal profession indeed warrants the imposition of a much graver
penalty --- disbarment.

Tapucar vs. Tapucar, A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998

FACTS:

In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar

sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing
grossly immoral conduct for cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances.

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for
conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on
April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of
six months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and
2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the separation
from service of respondent.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional responsibility

RULING:

Yes.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner
to the discredit of the legal profession.

A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted
from him, as a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield
in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency, truthfulness and
responsibility that have been compendiously described as “moral character.” To achieve
such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his
profession, and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.
Samala vs. Atty. Palana, AC No. 6395, April 15, 2005

FACTS:

Complainant Joseph Samala was looking for a company where he could invest his dollar
savings. He was introduced to Taino, a trader-employee of First Imperial Resources. Taino
introduced him to the FIRI manager Agustin, the chief trader, and to Palana, the company's
legal officer.

Respondent assured the complainant that FIRI would be directly putting his investment with
Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited, a company based in the Virgin Islands. Complainant was
convinced by the respondent and other officers of the company to invest his dollar savings
with FIRI. Subsequently, complainant decided to pull out his investments.

Complainant went to the office of Thomas Yiu of Eastern Vanguard. The latter was surprised
when he saw the documents involving complainant's investment. Agustin delivered a check
to the complainant but the same was dishonored as it was drawn against insufficient funds.
Complainant informed respondent of the dishonor of the check. Respondent assured the
complainant that the check would be replaced. Later on, the respondent gave the
complainant 250 thousand in cash and a check in the amounting of 329, 045. 09. The check
was also dishonored. The check was signed by FIRI's president, Desiderio.

Complainant charged Desiderio of Estafa and violation of BP 22. The MTC of Makati issued
a warrant of arrest against Paul Desiderio. It was discovered that the address in FIRI's
documents of Desiderio's address was fake. Complainant alleged that respondent’s act of
representing himself to be the legal officer of FIRI and his assurance that the check he
personally delivered to him was signed in his presence by FIRI Officer Paul Desiderio, when
no such person appears to exist, is clearly fraudulent and violative of the Canons of
Professional Ethics.

The Director for Bar Discipline required respondent to submit his answer to the complaint
filed by Samala but respondent did not submit an answer. The respondent also failed to
appear when the case was set for hearing. Respondent was found to have violated Rule 7.
03 of Canon 7.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent should be penalized according to the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RULING
:
Lawyer guilty. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that “a lawyer shall at all
times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.[3] To this end, nothing should
be done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
In this case, respondent assured complainant that by investing his dollar savings with FIRI,
his investment was in a stable company, even if, as it was later discovered, the by-laws of
FIRI prohibited it from engaging in investment or foreign exchange business and its primary
purpose is “to act as consultant in providing professional expertise and reliable data analysis
related to partnership and so on.”
It is clear that the representations of respondent as legal officer of FIRI caused material
damage to complainant. In so doing, respondent failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and lessened the confidence of the public in the honesty and integrity of
the same.

Spouses Amador vs. Atty. Palana, AC No. 7434, April 15, 2005

FACTS:

- Petitioners-spouses Rosita and Amador Tejada filed a Complaint Affidavit before

the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to initiate disbarment proceedings
against respondent Atty. Antoniutti K. Palaña for his continued refusal to settle his
long overdue loan obligation to the complainants, in violation of his sworn duty as
a lawyer to do justice to every man and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility
- It turned out that all his assurances that he had a torrens title, he will reconstitute
the same and deliver an amount of P170,000.00 to petitioner spouses were all
fraudulent representations on his part or else were only fictitious in character to
defraud petitioner spouses of their hard owned monies
- Despite due notice, respondent failed to file his answer to the complaint as
required by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP. Respondent likewise
failed to appear on the scheduled date of the mandatory conference despite due
notice.
- Investigating Commissioner recommended respondent's suspension from the
practice of law for 3 months.

ISSUE: W/N respondent should be penalized according tothe Code of Responsibility.

HELD: Antoniutti K. Palaña is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of 6
months.

YES.
- Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A high sense of
morality, honesty, and fair dealing is expected and required of a member of the bar.
- strength of the legal profession lies in the dignity and integrity of its members.
- In the instant case, respondent’s unjustified withholding of petitioners’ money years
after it became due and demandable demonstrates his lack of integrity and fairness,
and this is further highlighted by his lack of regard for the charges brought against
him. Instead of meeting the charges head on, respondent did not bother to file an
answer nor did he participate in the proceedings to offer a valid explanation for his
conduct.
- respondent’s acts, which violated the Lawyer's Oath “to delay no man for money or
malice” as well as the Code of Professional Responsibility, warrant the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions against him.
- It is clear that he employed deceit in convincing complainants to part with their hard
earned money and the latter could not have been easily swayed to lend the money
were it not for his misrepresentations and failed promises as a member of the bar.
- Failing in this duty as a member of the bar which is being supervised by the Court
under the Constitution, we find that a heavier sanction should fall on respondent.

Heirs of Lucas vs. Atty. Beradio, AC No. 6270, January 22, 2007
FACTS:

- During their lifetime, the spouses Villanueva acquired several parcels of land in
Pangasinan. Their 5 children, Simeona, Susana, Maria, Alfonso, and Florencia,
survived them.
- Alfonso executed an Affidavit of Adjudication stating that as "the only surviving son
and sole heirs” of the spouses Villanueva. Alfonso then executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale, conveying the property to Adriano Villanueva. Respondent appeared as notary
public on both the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale.
- Contrary to the misrepresentations of Alfonso, his sister Florencia was still alive at
the time he executed the affidavit of adjudication and the deed of sale, as were
descendants of the other children of the spouses Villanueva. Complainants claimed
that respondent was aware of this fact, as respondent had been their neighbor in
Balungao, Pangasinan, from the time of their birth, and respondent constantly
mingled with their family. Complainants accused respondent of knowing the "true
facts and surrounding circumstances" regarding the properties of the spouses
Villanueva, yet conspiring with Alfonso to deprive his co-heirs of their rightful shares
in the property.
- Commissioner Villadolid found that respondent violated the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the spirit and intent of the notarial law when she
notarized the affidavit knowing that Alfonso was not the sole compulsory heir of the
spouses Villanueva. It was recommended that respondent be reprimanded or
suspended from the practice of law for up to 6 months.

ISSUE: W/N respondent should be suspendended for his actions.

HELD: REVOKE the commission as Notary Public, if still existing, and DISQUALIFY from
being commissioned a notary public for 1 year. SUSPEND from the practice of law for 6
months.

YES.
- notary public is empowered to perform a variety of notarial acts, most common of
which are the acknowledgment and affirmation of a document or instrument. In the
performance of such notarial acts, the notary public must be mindful of the
significance of the notarial seal as affixed on a document. The notarial seal converts
the document from private to public, after which it may be presented as evidence
without need for proof of its genuineness and due execution.
- By this instrument, Alfonso claimed a portion of his parents’ estate all to himself, to
the exclusion of his co-heirs. Shortly afterwards, respondent notarized the deed of
sale, knowing that the deed took basis from the unlawful affidavit of adjudication.
- Respondent never disputed complainants’ allegation of her close relationship with the
Villanueva family spanning several decades. Respondent even underscored this
closeness by claiming that Lucas himself requested her to come to his house the day
Lucas handed to Alfonso a copy of OCT No. 2522, allegedly so she could hear the
conversation between them.
- Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or
information contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or
her notarial seal on it, the Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public
accordingly as the circumstances of the case may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity
and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined and public confidence
on notarial documents diminished.
- In this case, respondent’s conduct amounted to a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which requires lawyers to obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for the law and legal processes. Respondent also violated Rule 1.01
 of the Code which proscribes lawyers from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral,
or deceitful conduct.
- We also view with disfavor respondent’s lack of candor before the IBP proceedings.
The transcript of hearings shows that respondent denied preparing or notarizing the
deed of sale, when she already admitted having done so in her Comment.

Guevara vs. Atty. Eala, AC No. 7136, August 1, 2007

FACTS:

- After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read “I love you,” “I
miss you,” or “Meet you at Megamall.”
- Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in
the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When
he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents’ house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. Complainant saw Irene and
respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them
following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. Irene was already residing and
she was pregnant
- The Commissioner recommended that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
- The IBP Board of Governors annulled and set aside the Recommendation by
Resolution XVII-2006-06 CBD Case No. 02-936

ISSUE: W/N Respondent is should be disbarred.

HELD: Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral
conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7,
Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

YES.
- Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.
- In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative
case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is
required.
- As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and
void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law.
- their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje
gave birth to a girl
- It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant’s motion to
withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be
acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.

Advincula vs. Atty. Macabata, AC No. 7204, March 7, 2007

FACTS:
 - complainant Cynthia Advincula seeked the legal advice of the respondent Atty.
Macabata, regarding her collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours.
- After their dinner, respondent sent complainant home and while she is about to step
out of the car, respondent hold her arm and kissed her on the cheek and embraced
her very tightly.
- After the meeting at Starbucks coffee shop in West Avenue, Quezon City,
respondent offered again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. When she
was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully hold her face and
kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her breast. Complainant even in a
state of shocked succeeded in resisting his criminal attempt and immediately
manage to go out of the car.
- In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to respondent informing him
that she decided to refer the case with another lawyer and needs to get back the
case folder from him.
- Respondent replied "talk to my lawyer in due time." Then another message was
received by her at 4:06:33 pm saying "Ano k ba. I’m really sri. Pls. Nxt ime bhave n
me." (Ano ka ba. I’m really sorry. Please next time behave na ko), which is a clear
manifestation of admission of guilt.
- By way of defense, respondent further elucidated that: there was a criminal case for
Acts of Lasciviousness filed by complainant against respondent pending
Legal name of complainant is Cynthia Advincula Toriana since she remains married
to a certain Jinky Torian; complainant was living with a man not her husband;
complainant never bothered to discuss respondent’s fees and it was respondent who
always paid for their bills every time they met and ate at a restaurant.
- Commissioner recommended the imposition of the penalty of 1 month suspension on
respondent for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
- IBP passed Resolution No. XVII-2006-117, approving and adopting, with modification
that Atty. Ernesto A. Macabata is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 3 months

ISSUE: whether respondent committed acts that are grossly immoral or which constitute
serious moral depravity that would warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law.

HELD: Atty. Ernesto Macabata, for alleged immorality, is DISMISSED. However,

REPRIMANDED with a STERN WARNING.

NO.
- Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective
reality.
- requirement of good moral character has 4 ostensible purposes: to protect the public,
to protect the public image of lawyers, to protect prospective clients, to protect errant
lawyers from themselves.
- It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is
"grossly immoral conduct" or to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which
render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that
what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment
- In the case at bar, complainant miserably failed to comply with the burden of proof
required of her. A mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
- Moreover, while respondent admitted having kissed complainant on the lips, the
same was not motivated by malice. We come to this conclusion because right after
the complainant expressed her annoyance at being kissed by the respondent through
a cellular phone text message, respondent immediately extended an apology to
complainant also via cellular phone text message.
 - Be it noted also that the incident happened in a place where there were several
people in the vicinity considering that Roosevelt Avenue is a major jeepney route for
24 hours. If respondent truly had malicious designs on complainant, he could have
brought her to a private place or a more remote place where he could freely
accomplish the same.
- All told, as shown by the above circumstances, respondent’s acts are not grossly
immoral nor highly reprehensible to warrant disbarment or suspension.
- The power to disbar or suspend ought always to be exercised on the preservative
and not on the vindictive principle, with great caution and only for the most weighty
reasons and only on clear cases of misconduct which seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the Bar. Only
those acts which cause loss of moral character should merit disbarment or
suspension, while those acts which neither affect nor erode the moral character of
the lawyer should only justify a lesser sanction unless they are of such nature and to
such extent as to clearly show the lawyer’s unfitness to continue in the practice of
law. The dubious character of the act charged as well as the motivation which
induced the lawyer to commit it must be clearly demonstrated before suspension or
disbarment is meted out. The mitigating or aggravating circumstances that attended
the commission of the offense should also be considered.
- Based on the circumstances of the case as discussed and considering that this is
respondent’s first offense, reprimand would suffice.
- it was difficult and agonizing on complainant’s part to come out in the open and
accuse her lawyer of gross immoral conduct. However, her own assessment of the
incidents is highly subjective and partial, and surely needs to be corroborated or
supported by more objective evidence.

Donton vs. Atty, Tansingco, AC No. 6057, June 27, 2006

FACTS:

Disbarment complaint against respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco for estafa thru
falsification of a public document against Duane O. Stier, a U.S. citizen and thereby
disqualified to own real property in his name, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of the property for
his residence and business operations.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Emmanuel O. Tansingco should be liable for
violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.

HELD: YES. GUILTY. SUSPEND for SIX MONTHS.

· Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code.
- A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which will involve
defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey.
- A lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in violating the
law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action against the lawyer.10

In effect, respondent advised and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents.
- Respondent had sworn(oath) to uphold the Constitution.

Tomlin vs, Atty. Moya, AC No. 6971, February 23, 2006

FACTS:
Atty. Salvador N. Moya II borrowed from Quirino Tomlin II P600,000.00 partially covered by
seven postdated checks which are all dishonored by the drawee bank
- made several demands, the last being a formal letter but still failed and refused to
pay his debt without justifiable reason.
·
Complaint:
- a case for seven counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the respondent before the
Municipal Trial Court
- case for respondent’s disbarment

ISSUES: Whether or not Atty. Salvador N. Moya II is liable for gross misconduct and
violation of the Code.

HELD: YES. GUILTY of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 2 years with a warning that any
further infraction by him shall be dealt with most severely. Good character is an essential
qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for the continuance of such
privilege. Respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complainant but offered no
justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay.
- he refused to recognize any wrongdoing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless
checks, an act constituting gross misconduct
- As part of his duties, he must promptly pay his financial obligations.

Acejas III vs. People, G.R. No. 156643, June 27, 2006

FACTS:

On December 17, 1993, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Agent Vladimir Hernandez,
together with a reporter went to the house of Takao Aoyagi and Bethel Grace Aoyagi. His
purpose was to serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12 issued by BID Commissioner Zafiro
Respicio against Takao Aoyagi, a Japanese national. Hernandez told Takao Aoyagi, through
his wife, Bethel Grace, that there were complaints against him in Japan and that he was
suspected to be a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien.

To prove that he had done nothing wrong, Takao Aoyagi showed his passport to Hernandez
and signed an undertaking issued by the latter. The undertaking stated that Takao Aoyagi
promised to appear in an investigation at the BID on December 20, 1993, and that as a
guarantee for his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez. Hernandez
acknowledged receipt of the passport.

Bethel Grace called Expedito Perlas (one of the accused) and informed him of the taking of
her husband’s passport. Perlas then referred them to Atty. Lucenario. They discussed the
problem with said attorney and, following the advice of the latter, they did not appear before
the BID.

Meanwhile, Hernandez prepared a Progress Report recommending that Aoyagi be placed

under custodial investigation, due to reportedly being a drug dependant and a Yakuza.

On December 22, 1993, the Aoyagi’s met up with Atty Acejas III (a partner in Lucenario’s
firm). He informed then that he would be handling their case.
On December 24, during a family reunion, Bethel Grace informed her brother Jun Pelingon,
Jr., about her husband’s passport.

On January 2, 1994, Jun Pelingon talked to BID Commissioner Respicio in Davao and told
him of Aoyagi’s problem with the BID. Respicio, in turn, gave him his calling card and told
him to call him up in his office.

Several meetings ensued afterwards involving Acejas, Hernandez, Pelingon, and the
spouses Aoyagi regarding the return of the passport. Eventually, there was allegedly a
demand of P1 million made for the return of Aoyagi’s passport.

On January 11, 1994, on account of the alleged P1 million demand, Jun Pelingon called up
Commissioner Respicio. The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica Somera, an NBI Agent
detailed at the BID who then arranged an entrapment operation.

On January 12, 1994, Hernandez returned the passport to Takao Aoyagi at the Coffee Shop
of the Diamond Hotel. The NBI Team arrested Dick Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano
after the latter picked up the brown envelope containing marked money representing the
amount being allegedly demanded.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that the elements of direct bribery, as well as conspiracy in the
commission of the crime, had been proven. Hernandez and Conanan demanded money;
Perlas negotiated and dealt with the complainants; and Acejas accepted the payoff and gave
it to Perlas.

ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty of Direct Bribery and of conspiracy to commit the
same.

HELD:

The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1) agrees to perform an act that
constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present; 2) accepts the gift
in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3) abstains
from the performance of official duties.

Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of direct bribery, which contained the
following elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received the gifts or presents
personally or through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime,
and 4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.

Hernandez claims that the prosecution failed to show his involvement in the crime. Allegedly,
he was merely implementing Mission Order No. 93-04-12, which required him to investigate
Takao Aoyagi. The passport was supposed to have been voluntarily given to him as a
guarantee to appear at the BID office, but he returned it upon the instruction of his superior.

The chain of circumstances, however, contradicts the contention of Hernandez. It was he

who had taken the passport of Takao Aoyagi. On various dates, he met with Takao and
Bethel Grace Aoyagi, and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez
then asked for a down payment on the payoff, during which he directed Bethel Grace to
deliver the money to Acejas.

Acejas, on the other hand, claims that he was merely performing his duty as the lawyer of
the Aoyagis and the said money supposedly contains the balance of the acceptance fee for
his services as the counsel of Aoyagi. But his defense was belied by the fact that during the
payment, he actually gave the envelope containing the money to Perlas instead of keeping
it.

The SC finds that the prosecution proved the elements of direct bribery. First, there is no
question that the offense was committed by a public officer. BID Agent Hernandez extorted
money from the Aoyagi spouses for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance
in procuring a visa. Petitioner Acejas was his co-conspirator. Second, the offenders received
the money as payoff, which Acejas received for the group and then gave to Perlas. Third, the
money was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an act that did not constitute
a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of the passport were made in the
exercise of official duties.

For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are liable as
principals. The evidence shows that the parties conspired to extort money from Spouses
Aoyagi. A conspiracy exists even if all the parties did not commit the same act, if the
participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a
criminal design. The act of one is the act of all.

UNLAWFUL CONDUCT

Grande vs. Atty. De Silva, AC No. 4838, July 29, 2003

FACTS:

Complainant Grande was the private offended party in certain Criminal Cases entitled
“People vs. Sergio Natividad.

During the proceedings, respondent Atty. De Silva, counsel of the accused, tendered to
complainant a check drawn against her account as settlement of the civil aspect of the said
case. Complainant refused to accept it but respondent assured him that the same will be
paid upon its presentment and as a lawyer she will not issue a check which is not sufficiently
funded. So, complainant accepted the check.

When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank
for the reason: “Account Closed”. Then, he wrote a demand letter to the respondent but the
latter ignored it. Hence, complainant instituted a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 and the
instant disbarment case against respondent.

A Resolution requiring her to comment on the complaint was sent to her, but she moved to
another location. So, a second Resolution was sent to her new address, but she refused to
accept it.

The case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline which recommended that
the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for 2 years for deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of Lawyer’s Oath.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the same.

ISSUE: W/N respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath.

RULING:
YES. Respondent assured that the check has sufficient funds. In doing so, she deceived
complainant into withdrawing his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which
she drew against a closed account. It is clear that the breach of trust committed by
respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her
oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes gross
misconduct.
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on
her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal
profession. Her conduct not only underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also
brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders
highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law
and order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice
because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer; as
stated in Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Orbe vs, Adaza, AC No. 5252, May 20, 2004

FACTS:
In November 1996, Attorney Henry Adaza went to Priscilla Orbe to borrow P60k. Orbe
loaned Adaza the said amount. As security, Adaza issued Orbe two checks to cover the loan
plus interest. The checks however bounced (the second check was even post dated by
Adaza to bear the date January 24, 1996- many months before November 1996 when the
loan was made). Subsequently, because of Adaza’s failure to pay despite notices and
demand from Orbe, the latter filed a complaint for grave misconduct against Adaza. Orbe
alleged that Adaza is unfit to be a member of the bar. Eventually, the case was referred to
the respective Integrated Bar of Philippines chapter. Despite notices, Adaza failed to appear
in any of the proceedings. The IBP chapter then recommended Adaza’s suspension for one
year.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza should be suspended.

HELD:
Yes. Adaza’s issuance of worthless checks and his contumacious refusal to comply with his
just obligation for nearly eight years (from SC’s date of decision [2004]) is appalling. The
Supreme Court also elucidated on the following:

A member of the bar may be so removed or suspended from office as an attorney for any
deceit, malpractice, or misconduct in office. The word “conduct” used in the rules is not
limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional
duties but it also refers to any misconduct, although not connected with his professional
duties, that would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him. The grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138, of the
Rules of Court are not limitative and are broad enough to cover any misconduct, including
dishonesty, of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. Such misdeed puts his moral
fiber, as well as his fitness to continue in the advocacy of law, in serious doubt.
Bank of Silay vs. Pilla, 350 SCRA 28

FACTS:

Respondent executed a REM in favour of the complainant over a parcel of land in Sagay,
Negros Occidental, as an attorney in fact of the registered owners, Pedro Torres and Oscar
Granada together with an SPA which was purportedly authorized by the owners to mortgage
the land in favour of the complainant.

The complainant released a loan in the amount of 91,427 Php in favour of the respondent.
Later, the complainant found out that the respondent was not authorized by Oscar Granada
to mortgage the land when he was joined as defendant for removal of cloud on title with
preliminary injunction and damages.

Granada specifically denied having executed an SPA to respondent to support the said loan.
The trial court decided against the respondent, and held that the SPA was forged and
falsified because the spouses Granada have not signed the same. The respondent did not
appeal from the said judgment. The foregoing acts of the respondent in presenting to the
complainant Bank a forged and falsified Power of Attorney for the purpose of obtaining a
loan is a betrayal of his oath as a lawyer to do falsehood to no man and by his conduct
herein has forfeited his right to continue further in the practice of law.

Respondent refuted the charges of deceit and gross misconduct against him.

Upon the instance of the Court, respondent filed his comment refuting the charges of deceit
and gross misconduct against him. Respondent denied employing any deceit or
misrepresentation in obtaining a loan from complainant rural bank. According to respondent,
he did not know that the signature of Oscar Granada on the special power of attorney
appointing him (respondent) as attorney-in-fact was forged. The special power of attorney
purportedly authorized respondent to mortgaged the parcel of land in Sagay, Negros
Occidental in favor of complainant rural bank. Respondent also claimed that if indeed said
document was forged, he was not a party to the forgery. IBP recommended he be
suspended for 5 years which was later reduced to 3.

ISSUE: WON the respondent is guilty of deceit and gross misconduct.

HELD:
SUSPENDED FOR 3 YEARS
Since respondent actually benefited from the falsified document, he is presumed to have a
hand in the falsification of the same. Respondent miserably failed to rebut this presumption
with his barefaced denial that he had no knowledge of the forgery. The Court cannot give
credence to respondent’s negative assertion that he did not know that the special power of
attorney issued in his favor was falsified. As a lawyer, respondent knows or ought to know
that parties to a public document must personally appear before the notary public to attest
that the same is their own free act and deed. In utter disregard of this requirement,
respondent caused the special power of attorney to be notarized without the parties
appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, respondent presented the same to
complainant rural bank in order to obtain a loan therefrom. It is thus apparent that
respondent had a hand in the falsification of the document especially considering that it was
he who chiefly benefited from it. Indeed, “the settled rule is that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification.” Further, “if a person had in his possession a
falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting
thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.”
Respondent’s acts clearly fall short of the standards set by the Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly Rule 1.01 thereof, which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” The fact that the conduct
pertained to respondent’s private dealings with complainant rural bank is of no moment. A
lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity, or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the
practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.

Considering the foregoing, the recommendation of the IBP that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years is approved.

NOTARIAL MALPRACTICE

Zoreta vs. Simpliciano AC No. 6492

FACTS:

Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that he filed a complaint for Breach of COntract and
Damaes against Security Pacific Assurance COrporation (SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to
the latter’s failure to honor SPAC’s Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where respondent
Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latter’s counsel. In said cases, respondent who
was not a dully commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications issued by teh CLerk
of Court of Quezon City Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as
evidenced by presented documents.

ISSUE: WON respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility under the Rules
of Court.

RULING:

Yes. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s
oath to obey the laws (i.e. Notarial Law). Then, too, b making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s
oath similarly proscribes. “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct, “Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility). The
lawyer violates, likewise, Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every lawyer to uphold at
all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

Alintag vs. Garcia, 172 SCRA 162

Fulgencio vs. Martin, AC No. 3223

FACTS:
This is an action against Atty. Bienvenido G. Martin for falsifying and notarizing two
Documents of Sale.

On June 1, 1983, in Isabela, Basilan, respondent notarized two documents, a Deed of

Absolute Sale over a parcel of land and a Bill of Sale over a Toyota sedan, both supposedly
executed by Kua Se Beng (Kua), complainant’s husband. Complainant alleged that the two
documents could not have been executed and notarized in Basilan by her husband Kua,
who died on July 5, 1983, because he was confined at the Makati Medical Center from May
30 to June 30, 1983. She also denied having affixed her signature on the first document.

On the other hand, respondent admitted that he prepared and notarized the questioned
Deed of Absolute Sale and Bill of Sale without the vendor Kua personally appearing before
him. He asserted, however, that he prepared and notarized the deeds upon the express
request of Kua whom he considered as a trusted friend. He insisted that the Kua’s and
complainant’s signature are genuine, he being acquainted with their signatures on account
of his long years of lawyering for Kua and their family corporation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Martin violated Notarial Law.

HELD:

Atty. Martin admitted that Kua did not appear before him when he notarized the deeds in
Basilan but stated, however, in the Acknowledgement portion of each of the documents that
Kua, “on the first day of June 1983, personally appeared before [him]…known to [him] and to
[him] known to be the same person who signed and executed the foregoing instrument and
acknowledged…to him that the same is his free and voluntary act.” He thus made an
untruthful statement, thus violating his oath as a lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood.

Further, Respondent also breached the injunction of the notarial law not to do any notarial
act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction.

Nadayag vs. Grajeda, AC No. 3232, September 27, 1994

FACTS:
Complainant Rosita Nadayag charged respondent Atty. Jose Grageda, a practicing attorney
and notary public in Iligan City, with conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a
“Pacto de Retro” transaction wherein complainant was the vendee.

In her letter-complaint, Nadayag alleged that Grageda prepared and notarized the sale using
a stolen Original Certificate of Land Title, as a result of which she was swindled P108,000
because the land was already sold ahead of her using the owner’s duplicate copy of the title.

Suspicious of the OCT’s appearance, she had brought the matter to Grageda’s attention, to
which he simply answered that the title was all right told her not to worry as he is an attorney
and knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro whose business transactions especially notarial
matter has been and in fact always handled by him. However, the OCT was confiscated by
the Iligan ROD, Atty. Baguio when the complainant applied for registration of the pacto de
retro. Nadayag filed a complaint against the vendor-a-retro and accomplices, including
Grageda coursed through the local Brgy. Captain and city fiscal, but the information did not
include Grageda, hence this report. In his counter-affidavit, Grageda claimed that he
notarization was based on the documents presented.
ISSUE: W/N respondent should be disciplined

HELD:
Yes. The Commission on Bar Discipline found reason to discipline based on respondent’s
admission of notarizing the deed of sale a retro based on title presented to him. It turns out
that the title presented to him is the OCT which only the Register of Deeds has custody of
and he should have sensed foul-play or irregularity. As a lawyer and officer of the court, he
should have been alerted and should have reported the irregularity of an OCT, which should
be in the exclusive safekeeping of the Register of Deeds, in the possession of unauthorized
persons. Even if it were the photostat copy of said Original Certificate of Title that was
presented to him, the same did not bear any certification by the Register of Deeds which
could have alerted him of the irregularity. The testimony that the Original was shown to him
has not been controverted. The Vendee was in fact in possession of the Original because it
was testified that when the Register of Deeds found that respondent was in possession, the
original certificate was confiscated by the Register of Deeds.

The Commission takes special note of a notary public acting more than a notary public and
goes beyond mere certification of the presence of the signatories, their having signed, and
having contracted. By transcending these bounds, such notary public has entered the realm
of giving “legal advice” — thus “acting also as counsel aside from notary public” to the
parties to the contract.

A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. The trust
and confidence necessarily reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts and the public. The bar
should maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing.
Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his
duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to his clients. To this end, nothing should be
done by any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to lessen in any degree the
confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession.

In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in seeing to it that justice
permeated every aspect of a transaction for which his services had been engaged, in
conformity with the avowed duties of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have fully
explained the legal intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as would aid the
parties in making an informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly incumbent upon him,
and failing therein, he must now face the commensurate consequences of his professional
indiscretion. After all, notarization is not an empty routine. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one and renders it admissible in court without further
proof of its authenticity.

Villarin vs. Sabate, AC No. 3324, February 9, 2000

FACTS:
Atty. Restituto Sabate was a counsel in a case defending his clients, in the verification it
shows that he was the one who signed for the defendants, alleging that it was done in good
faith and the word “BY” which suggests that he did not in any manner make it appear that
those persons signed in his presence; aside from the fact that his clients authorized him to
sign for and in their behalf, considering the distance of their place of residence to that of the
respondent and the reglementary period in filing said pleadings he had to reckon with.

ISSUE: Is the contentions of the respondent meritorious?

RULING:
No. But while it would appear that in doing so, he acted in good faith, the fact remains that
the same cannot be condoned. He failed to state in the preliminary statements of said
motion/answer that the three respondents were represented by their designated attorneys-
in-fact. Besides, having signed the Verification of the pleading, he cannot swear that he
appeared before himself as Notary Public.

The function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements. That function would be defeated if the notary public were one of the
signatories to the instrument. For then, he would be interested in sustaining the validity
thereof as it directly involves himself and the validity of his own act. It would place him in an
inconsistent position, and the very purpose of the acknowledgment, which is to minimize
fraud, would be thwarted.

A member of the bar who performs an act as a notary public should not notarize a document
unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who executed and
personally appeared before said notary public to attest to the contents and truth of what are
stated therein. The acts of affiants cannot be delegated to anyone for what are stated therein
are facts they have personal knowledge of and swore to the same personally and not
through any representative. Otherwise, their representative’s names should appear in the
said documents as the ones who executed the same and that is only the time they can affix
their signatures and personally appear before the notary public for notarization of said
document.

As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to the

sacred duties pertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public policy impressed
with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath
in an acknowledgement or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent
upon and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences of his
professional indiscretion.

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an alleged urgent
situation is no excuse at all. As an individual, and even more so as a member of the legal
profession, he is required to obey the laws of the land at all times. For notarizing the
Verification of the Motion to Dismiss With Answer when three of the affiants thereof were not
before him and for notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories, he
failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.

IMMORAL CONDUCT

Paras vs. Paras, 343 SCRA 414

Ui vs. Bonifacio, 333 SCRA 38

Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451

DECEIT

Cordon vs. Balicanta, AC No. 2797, October 4, 2002

Rayos-Ombac vs. Rayos, 265 SCRA 83

Delos Reyes vs. Aznar, 19 SCRA 753

SCANDALOUS CONDUCT/MISCONDUCT

Rau Sheng Mo vs. Atty. Velesco, AC No. 4881, October 6, 2003

Lizaso vs. Amante, AC No. 2019, June 3, 1991

Toledo vs Abalos, AC No. 5141 September 29, 1999

Co vs. Bernardino, AC No. 3919, January 28, 1998

Sebastian vs. Calis, AC No. 5118, September 9, 1999

RULE 1.02

Donton vs. Tansingco, supra

Velez vs. Atty. De Vera, AC No. 6697, September 4, 2009

RULE 1.03

Linsangan vs. Atty. Tolentino, AC No. 6672, September 4, 2009

Atty. Vitriolo vs. Atty. Dasig, AC No. 4984, April 1, 2003

Linsangan vs. Atty. Tolentino, AC No. 6672, September

Saburnido vs. Atty. Madroo, AC No. 4497, September 26, 2001

Abella vs. Atty. Barrios, AC No. 7332, June 18, 2013

Madrid vs. Atty. Dealca, AC No. 7474, September 9, 2014

Saa vs. IBP and Atty. Venida, G.R. No. 132836, September 3, 2009

Delos Santos vs. Atty. Barbosa, AC No. 6681, June 17, 2015

RULE 1.04

De Ysasi vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 104599, March 11, 1994

Caspe vs. Atty. Mejica, AC No. 10679, March 10, 2015

Castaneda vs Ago, July 30, 1975

B. CANON 2

RULE 2.01
Ledesma vs. Climaco, G.R. No. L-23815, June 28, 1974

Canoy vs. Atty. Ortiz, 453 SCRA 410

RULE 2.02

Santiago vs. Atty. Rafanan, AC No. 6252, October 5, 2004

RULE 2.03

Linsangan vs. Atty. Tolentino, AC No. 6672, September 4, 2009

Atty. Khan vs. Atty. Simbolio, AC No. 5299, August 19, 2003

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc. Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378

RULE 2.04

F. F. Manacop Construction vs. CA, G.R. No. 122196, January 15, 1997

C. CANON 3

Ulep vs. Legal Clinic, Inc. Bar Matter No. 553, 17 June 1993, 223 SCRA 378

Linsangan vs. Atty. Tolentino, AC No. 6672, September 4, 2009

RULE 3.01

Atty. Khan vs. Atty. Simbolio, AC No. 5299, August 19, 2003

San Jose Homeowners Assn. vs. Romanillos, AC No. 5580, June 18, 2005

In re Luis B. Tagorda, GR No. 32329, March 23, 1929

RULE 3.02

Sebastian Enterprises vs. CA, GR No. L-41862, February 7, 1992

Dacanay vs. Baker & Mckenzie, AC No. 2131, May 10, 1985

RULE 3.03

Samonte vs. Atty. Gatdula, AM No. P-99-1292, February 26, 1999

RULE 3.04

Cruz vs Salva, GR No. L-12871, July 25, 1959

 D. CANON 4

Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 579

Re: Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid Clients from
Paying Filing, Docket and Other Fees, AM No. 08-11-7-SC, August 28, 2009

E. CANON 5

Hernandez vs. Atty. Padilla, AC No. 9387, June 20, 2012

Dulalia vs. Atty. Cruz, AC No. 6854, April 7, 2007

Williams vs. Atty. Enriquez, AC No. 6352, February 27, 2006

F. CANON 6

Pimentel vs. Llorente, AC No. 4680, August 29, 2000

Vitriolo vs. Atty. Dasig, AC No. 4984, April 1, 2003

Abella vs. Barrios Jr., AC No. 7332 June 18, 2013

Ramos vs. Imbang, AC No. 6788, August 23, 2007

RULE 6.01

Cuenca vs CA, GR No. 109870, December 1, 1995

Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556

RULE 6.02

Ramos vs. Imbang, AC No. 6788, August 23, 2007

Lim-Santiago vs. Atty. Sagucio, AC No. 6705, March 31, 2006

Huyssen vs. Atty. Gutierrez, AC No. 6707, March 24, 2006

Misamin vs. San Juan, AC No. 1415, August 31, 1975

Dinsay vs. Cloco, 264 SCRA 703

Collantes vs. Atty. Renomeron, AC No. 3056, August 16, 1991

Olazo vs. Tinga, AM No. 10-5-7-SC, December 7, 2010

Ali vs. Bubong, AC No. 4018, March 8, 2015

RULE 6.03

PCGG vs. Sandiganbayan, 455 SCRA 536

Huyussen vs. Atty. Gutierrez, AC No. 6707, March 24, 2006

G. CANON 7

Re: 1989 Elections of the IBP, BM No. 491, October 6, 1989

Conception vs. Atty. Rosa, AC No. 10681, February 3, 2015

Dacanay, AC No. 1678, December 17,2007

Bio vs. Atty. Gonzales, AC No. 6634, August 23, 2007

Letter of Atty. Arevalo Jr., BM No. 1370, May 9, 2005

Foodsphere vs. Mauricio, AC No. 7199, July 22, 2009

Santos vs. Llamas, 322 SCRA 529

RULE 7.01

Leda vs. Tabang, AC No. 2505, February 21, 1992

Bernardo vs. Atty. Mejia, supra

Young vs. Batuangas, 403 SCRA 123

RULE 7.02

In re Parazo, 62 Phil. 230

RULE 7.03

Tan vs. Sabandal, BM No. 44, February 24, 1992

Zaguirre vs. Castillo, 398 SCRA 659

Tapucar vs. Tapucar, AC No. 4148, June 30, 1998

Ventura vs. Samson, AC No. 9608, November 22, 2012

Atty. Ecraela vs. Atty. Pangalangan, AC No. 10676, September 8, 2015

H. CANON 8

Que vs. Atty. Revilla Jr., AC No. 7054, December 4, 2009

Atty. Reyes vs. Atty. Chiong Jr., AC No. 5148, July 1, 2003

Atty. Barandon Jr. vs. Atty. Ferrer Sr., AC No. 5768, March 26, 2010

Yap-Paras vs. Atty. Paras, AC No. 4947, June 7, 2007

Likong vs. Atty. Lim, AC No. 3149, August 17, 1994

Camacho vs. Pangulayan, 325 SCRA 636

RULE 8.01

Dallong-Galicinao vs. Atty. Castro, AC No. 6398, October 25, 2005

Atty. Reyes vs. Atty. Chiong, AC No. 5148, July 1, 2003

RULE 8.02

Garcia vs. Atty. Lopez, AC No. 6422, August 28, 2007

In re: Clemente Soriano, June 30, 1970

Laput vs. Remotigue, AM No. 219 (1962)

Linsangan vs. Atty. Tolentino, supra

I. CANON 9

Alawi vs. Alauya, AM SDC-97-2-P, February 24, 1997

Tumbokon vs. Atty. Peficiano, AC No. 6116, August 1, 2012

RULE 9.01

Pp vs. Maceda, GR No. 89591-96, Januray 24, 2000

Zeta vs. Malinao, AM No. P-200, December 20, 1978

Pagayokan vs. Balajadia, GR No. 169517, March 14, 2006

Cambaliza vs. Atty. Cristal-Tenorio, AC No. 6290, July 14, 2004

Gubalia vs. Caguioa, 78 SCRA 302

Robinson vs. Villafuerte, 18 Phil. 121

RULE 9.02

Amalgamated Laborers Assn. vs. CIR, 22 SCRA 1266

Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 113

Tan Tek Beng vs. David, 128 SCRA 389

Five J Taxi vs. NLRC, 236 SCRA 556

Lijuaco vs. Atty. Terrado, AC No. 6317, August 31, 2006

Plus Builders Inc. vs. Atty. Revilla Jr., AC No. 7056, September 13, 2006

J. CANON 10

Vaflor-Fabroa vs. Atty. Paguinto, AC No. 8273, March 15, 2010

Bernardino vs. Atty. Santos, AC No. 10583, February 18, 2015

Que vs. Atty. Revilla Jr., AC No. 7054, December 4, 2009

Perez vs. Lantin, 24 SCRA 291

Cuaresma vs. Daquis, 63 SCRA 257

Director of Lands vs. Adorable, 77 Phil. 468

RULE 10.01

Gonzales vs. Atty. Cabunca, AC No. 6836, January 23, 2006

Samala vs. Atty. Valencia, AC No. 5439

Maligaya vs. Atty. Doronilla Jr., AC No. 6198, September 15, 2006

Fulgencio vs. Atty. Martin, AC No. 3223, May 29, 2003

Bongalonta vs. Atty. Castillo, CBD Case No. 176, January 20, 1995

Libit vs. Atty. Olivia, AC No. 2837, October 7, 1994

Young vs. Atty. Batuegas, AC No. 5379, July 4, 2002

Delos Santos vs. Atty. Barbosa, AC No. 6681, June 17, 2015

Sebastian vs. Atty. Bajar, AC No. 3731, September 7, 2007

Perea vs. Atty. Almadro, AC No. 5246, May 2, 2006

RULE 10.02

Insular Life Insurance Co. Employees vs. Insular Life Assurance, January 30, 1971

Comelec vs. Noynay, July 9, 1998

Adez Realty vs. CA, October 20, 1992

Re: Letter Request of the UP Law Faculty, AM No. 10-10-4-SC, March 8, 2011

RULE 10.03

Sebastian vs. Atty. Bajar, AC No. 3731, September 7, 2007

Que vs. Atty. Revilla Jr., AC No. 7054, December 4, 2009

Villamor vs. Atty. Santos, AC No. 9868, April 22, 2015

Enriquez vs. Atty. Lavadia Jr., AC No. 5686, June 16, 2015

Gomez vs. Presiding Judge, RTC 15, Ozamis City, GR No. 118584, October 24, 1995

K. CANON 11

In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595

In re Letter of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda, 501 SCRA 369

Paragas vs. Cruz, 14 SCRA 809

Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 729

Judge Madrid vs. Atty. Dealca, AC No. 7474, September 4, 2014

Rheem of the Phil. Inc. vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441

Solatan vs. Inocentes, AC No. 6504, August 9, 2005

Guerrero vs. Villamor, November 13, 1989

RULE 11.01

Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Bagabuyo, AC No. 70006, October 9, 2007

Ng vs. Atty. Alar, AC No. 7252, November 22, 2006

Judge Lacurom vs. Atty. Jacoba, AC No. 5921, March 10, 2006

Re; Letter of Atty. Noel Sorreda, 464 SCRA 32

RULE 11.02

De Gracia vs. Warden of Makati, GR No. L-42032, January 9,1976

Re: Suspension of Atty. Rogelio Bagabuyo, AC No. 70006, October 9, 2007

RULE 11.03

Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1

The British Co. vs. De Les Angeles, GR No. L-33720, March 10, 1975

Buenasada vs. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645

In re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562

Sangalang vs. IAC, 177 SCRA 87

Fernandez vs. Bello, 107 Phil. 1140

Atty. Barandon Jr. vs. Atty. Ferrer Sr., AC No. 5768, March 26, 2010

Ng vs. Atty. Alar, AC No. 7252, November 22, 2006

Judge Baculi vs. Atty. Battung, AC No. 8920, September 28, 2011

RULE 11.04

Go vs. Abrogar, 485 SCRA 457

Asean Pacific Planners vs. City of Urdaneta, GR No. 162525, September 23, 2008

Judge Cervantes vs. Atty. Sabio, AC No. 7828, August 11, 2008

RULE 11.05

Maceda vs, Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464

Judge Lacurom vs. Atty. Jacoba, AC No. 5291, March 10, 2006

In re Almacen, GR No. 27654, February 18, 1970; 31 SCRA 562

Re: Atty. Bagabuyo, AC No. 7006, October 9, 2007