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The European Legacy: Toward New

Paradigms
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The state in the new international

order
a
Chairperson Montserrat Herrero
a
University of Navarra , Pamplona, E‐31080, Spain
Published online: 23 Jun 2008.

To cite this article: Chairperson Montserrat Herrero (1996) The state in the new
international order, The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms, 1:1, 369-374, DOI:
10.1080/10848779608579421

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 WORKSHOP 15
The Modern State as a Paradigm of European
Political Thought: Can it Survive the
Challenge of the Present Crisis?
Chairperson: Montserrat Herrero (University of Navarra, Spain)
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The State in the New International Order

MONTSERRAT HERRERO

T H E STATE AS A H I S T O R I C A L C O N C E P T

In this study, I will start from the premise that the concept of the State is not a
general idea, but a historical concept that refers to a particular political system, the system
that has represented the political order in Europe from the sixteenth century up to the
present day and that despite having suffered many variations, has faithfully maintained its
principles.1 According to this premise, it is possible to differentiate between the word state
in general and the word State with a capital S. While the latter refers to the modern State,
the former is a very broad concept and has not a very precise meaning; it refers to all
political systems in general and it is valid throughout history. However, only when it has
been historically determined does it acquire a definite meaning.
The concept of the modern State appears today as an end to which all political sys-
tems should tend, despite the fact that it is a historical concept thus surpassing the signifi-
cance that is given to it by the modern State itself. This is so much so, that it could be said,
in the words of Koselleck, a "model of State is beginning to exist, a State in itself and
for itself."2
Every society acquires a structure, and the State is one of these. The fact that the
State is a historical concept means that, with regard to the people, it could be considered as
a "per accidents" system in the sense that the people could adopt another type of political
structure. Each society acquires a particular political structure depending on the historical
situation in which it finds itself. The first premise carries with it an "emergent" theory of
the political structure, as opposed to a constructivist theory. From this it is deduced that

University of Navarra, E-31080 Pamplona, Spain.

The European Legacy, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 369-374, 1996
Copyright © 1996 by the International Society for the Study of European Ideas

369
 370 ("^ MONTSERRAT HERRERO

in the same way that any historical concept was born out of a particular historical situation,
it can also die with it and therefore it will never be elevated above it as an ideal to aspire to.

H I S T O R I C A L E V E N T S L I N K E D T O T H E B I R T H O F T H E STATE

In this point I follow the analysis of Carl Schmitt in his book Der Nomos der Erde,3
which I consider descriptive of the historical situation that determined the birth of the
State.
Firstly, it appears as a new structure, a new answer to the historical question of the
political structure, before the collapse of the empire as a political form and as opposed to
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the feudal order. In Schmitt's words: "what Hobbes wants is to put an end to the anarchy
of the remnants of feudal law which was canonical and class related, and he also wants to
end the remnant civil war; to oppose the medieval pluralism, the pretensions of the church
and other indirect powers, with the rational unity of an unequivocal power which is effi-
ciently protective, and a legal system whose functioning could be reduced to a formula. It
is incumbent upon this national power to face up to any political danger and also in the
same way to be responsible for the protection and security of its subjects."4
It appears as the neutralizing factor in religious wars and therefore as an instrument
of peace. Two fronts had emerged in the historical situation out of which the State was
born: universal Catholicism and a universal Protestantism. The idea of the sovereign politi-
cal decision able to neutralize every contraposition that secularizes political life, despite
the confessionality of the State, appears in France as a consequence of the confessional
civil wars.5
Thirdly, it appears as a new political structure that corresponds to a real change in
the conception of the world. It is the time of the great discoveries. The seas become navi-
gable and new lands are conquered. A new global conception of the world, which until
then had not been possible, is then formed.
Confrontations arose from France, Holland, and England against Spain and Portugal
for the hegemony of the seas. The new order that is a consequence of this new geographical
conception consists of a balance between territories of the States in Europe and the English
maritime empire, with the presumption of the existence of large free expanses of land
and sea.
The world qualitatively delineated by the feudal order, whose structure was a qualita-
tive network of relations, is transformed into a homogeneous quantitative world; the terri-
tories of the States in which the only relevant factor is the amount of occupied space, the
land. For this reason the occupation of land and therefore the delimitation of borders
becomes the central activity of the modern State. It is at this time, which can be described
as "territorial," in which global lines are drawn, with the purpose of fixing the whole world
order. This is the moment in which international law is born.

C O N S E Q U E N C E S OF T H E F O R M A T I O N O F T H E STATE

Firstly, it destroys the former feudal order. While placing the feudal, territorial, class-
based, and ecclesiastical rights under the legislation, administration, and justice centralized
in the rulers, it creates within itself clearly defined competences. This sort of organization
results in the modern day liberal bourgeois State, in which the whole social framework is
 The State in the New International Order o*-> 371

based upon the relationship between the State and the individual and therefore upon the
separation between the private and public realms. The State took the first step towards
mass society.
Secondly, upon the base of a self-contained political entity, the State constitutes a
closed territory, facing other political entities, with fixed borders, which hinders interven-
tion on the part of foreign powers. This brings about an autonomous and independent
development within each State, thus creating a cultural gap between different States, and
giving importance to the concept of foreignness.
The concept of "war in form" is created. War becomes a military relationship be-
tween two States, each one clearly defined in terms of territory. In time, this idea of war
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will develop, resulting in a "criminal" concept of war. War was considered a crime. No
reasonable causes or motives to declare war exist. Reality however, is quite different. In
recent decades we have seen many wars either between States or over a State.
According to these three consequences, which have just been described, it is trans-
formed into a subject with legal capacity, with a will of its own, into a legal entity.6 From
this capacity for action and decision, and from the right to freedom from intervention
within its borders, comes sovereignty as an attribute.
Fourthly, the State is the first step towards the secularization of public life. The solu-
tion that the State provides to the problem raised by religious wars opens the door to
secularization of public life. This has been studied in detail by Böckenförde.7
The State as a political form overcomes the European civil war between the churches
and the religious parties and therefore neutralizes the internal disputes between religions,
thanks to centralized political unity. Thus, a formal concept of peace is born, which has
survived until modern times. Peace was not born, as it was thought in a theologically
oriented period, from an ordering of public life around the truth but from the subduction
of civil war. Formal peace or neutrality appears, as opposed to civil war, as a good in itself.
The king, the ruler, the sovereign, is the neutral agency that stands above the parties
in conflict. At the moment that this peace becomes possible, wars between confessions
cease to be a political dispute and the state returns to its own ambit. The confessionality
of the sixteenth century State was not a question of religion but a political formality. By
this, religious life was life relegated to the realm of private life. This was the first step to
secularization.

E S S E N T I A L C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S OF T H E C O N C E P T O F T H E STATE

From what we have already seen, it can be said that the essential characteristics of
the concept of the State are as follows:

• territorial borders
• sovereignty: (a) legal entity, subject with legal capacity, and (b) indivisibility of
power: It is possible for there to be a relationship between the State and the individ-
ual, but it is not possible between the State and one of its institutions, or at least
the latter must be controlled because institutions are powers.
• neutrality
• defined competences
 372 <^*-> MONTSERRAT HERRERO

FROM W H E R E DOES THE CRISIS OF THE STATE STEM AND

TO W H E R E DOES IT LEAD?

When reference is made to a crisis of State, usually what is referred to is a functional

crisis. That is to say that the State is in crisis because it has ceased to perform the functions
that had been allotted to it, particularly the administrative ones, but also in many cases
those of defense and so on. Nevertheless, functional crisis does not appear to me as a
sufficient reason to proclaim the definitive end of the State, especially since I have consid-
ered it as an essentially historical form. A functional crisis is a technical crisis, but not a
vital one. So perhaps it could be solved through better use of the apparatus of the State.
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The thesis that I put forward is as follows: If the State is in crisis, it is because it has
become, in the words of Tonnies, a phantom,8 that is to say, because it has ceased to re-
spond to a reality, which is the reality of the sociopolitical order.
If the State in any of its forms was defined by means of contraposing it to the preced-
ing political form, as an answer to historical circumstances, in favor of neutrality and so
achieving peace, then if there is a change in the circumstances, it becomes necessary to
start thinking in terms of formulae outside of those of the State in order to respond to the
new historical moment. Those historical premises from which the State was born have
changed substantially in the following ways.
Firstly, no longer can any trace of class structure in society be perceived. Quite to the
contrary, on occasions the State has become a totalitarian power, facing a mass of equal
individuals powerless against it. In this sense, great homogeneity exists within the State,
although there is also an absolute pluralism.
Secondly, the capacity of the State for neutrality towards society has become super-
fluous due to the fact that society, in itself, is neutral, indifferent to values. In a pluralist
society, the neutralizing role of the State is superfluous. In principle, the possibility of war
does not exist. In any case, if it broke out, it could not be said that the State could guarantee
peace, since there exists a world power game, which is not in the hands of a single State to
control totally.
However, the decisive factor in assuming a decline of the State, as a valid political
form, in the new world order, is the change of the conception of the political geography.
A geographical revolution necessarily has to change the world political structure and
the concepts by which it is encapsulated. In which sense can we speak about a geographical
revolution in recent decades? In history there have been moments that have been charac-
terized as by both terrestrial and maritime revolution, as during the fifteenth century. In
the twentieth century, geographical conquests have been made, the moon has been
reached, ami the possibility of life on other planets has even been considered. It seemed
possible that the whole world could be conquered from outer space. Nevertheless, these
recently discovered territories have not produced relevant sociopolitical transformations.
Nowadays the relevant ambit par excellence is still a consequence of those terrestrial
and maritime conquests. It is the magic ambit of the market.
Nowadays, the decisive ambit in the life of the States is not the territorial one but
rather that of economic development. In the present day, this ambit tends towards great
expansion, towards the Grossraum9 in the words of Schmitt, and goes beyond the territorial
boundaries of the national States. It could even be said that it is the strength of this
 The State in the New International Order c^¿> 373

ambit that has brought about the fall of the frontiers of the occidental Russian empire.
Today, terrestrial conquests are no longer possible, only the conquest of new means of
industrial production.10 In this sense, the world opens itself up to an ambit of world devel-
opment, because the nature of the market not only permits it but requires it (Weltraum-
nahme).
According to this, the autonomy and independence of the State are impossible. Since
the existence of a single area of economic development seems impracticable, precisely be-
cause of the cultural and social gaps that exist between the different continents, the cre-
ation of a plurality of large economic areas is expected, rather than a tendency towards the
creation of a single area. In this sense, the future could well lie in the development of the
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underdeveloped zones by the developed nations and therefore in the creation of new areas
of economic development. In this context, the old State structures, although still existing,
cease to be valuable. In order to survive, the States need to integrate themselves into larger
ambits of economic relationships, ambits upon which they depend.
From these, two fundamental consequences ensue, which cause the loss of two of
the State's essential characteristics:

• a loss of importance of its frontiers, which does not mean a total dissolution of
them, which implies the loss of sovereignty; and this leads to the second one,
• a loss of importance of sovereignty within and without its borders. The sovereign
power no longer necessarily corresponds to the image of the State. (The State con-
tinues to exist but ceases to be a sovereign State). From now on a State that is
powerful, that has sovereignty, is one that can set the value of its own currency.

It can be said that although the State is still alive, it is losing its strength, and this strength
is sovereignty. The oxymoron "shared sovereignty" is one of the signs of the necessity of
finding new concepts that permit thinking in terms of categories that are not of the State.
In this evolution there exists an "untimely" phenomenon: the conflict of nationalisms. It
is like the swansong of a State in its death throes.
Ours is not a territorial epoch, but rather an abstract one in which it is impossible
to totally eliminate the idea of territory from the structure of society and from the political
form. It is quite possible that it is the historical truth that the State has bequeathed to us.
National wars demonstrate every now and again that it is not possible to avoid them even
in a predominantly economic world context.
The new organizing concept, although it leans toward the idea of a global territory,
cannot ignore this lesson and for this reason is not universal. It allows for the possibility
of large regions, with different types of limits and frontiers, which are not necessarily of
the same kind as those of the State. It would be a question of finding a middle way between
the territorial conception of the national State and the wish of transforming the world into
an abstraction on behalf of the capital market."
As Kosselleck says, "the existence of a pending and not yet adopted decision is part
of the very essence of the crisis." And likewise the fact that the decision that is going to be
adopted is provisionally unknown is also part of it.12
We can say that we are in an epoch of political decision. The only relevant question,
in a political context, is who will make this decision.
 374 o*.-. MONTSERRAT HERRERO

NOTES
1. See O. Brunner, Land und Herrschaft. Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsgeschichte in Mittelalter
(Vienna: Rithor M. Rother Verlag, 1943); R. Koselleck, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches
Lexikon zur politich-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Stuttgart: Klett-Kota, 1975) 6; C. Schmitt, Ver-
fassungsrechtliche Aufsätze (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1958).
2. Koselleck, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 6, 2.
3. C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde (Cologne: Greven Verlag, 1950).
4. C. Schmitt, El Leviathan en la teoría del Estado de T. Hobbes (Madrid: Eds. Haz, 1941), 116.
5. C. Schmitt, Der Nomos der Erde, 98-99
6. Koselleck, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, vol. 6, 2-3.
7. E. W. Böckenförde, "Die Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Säkularisation," in Säkularisation
und Utopie (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1967), 75-94.
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8. F. Tönnies, "Demokratie und Parlamentarismus," in Schmollers Jahrbuch für Gesetzgebung, Verwaltung

und Volkswirtschaft in Deutschem Reiche, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1927), vol. 1, 43.
9. C. Schmitt, Volkerrechtliche Grossraumordnung (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1939).
10. C. Schmitt, "El orden del mundo despues de la Segunda Guerra Mundial," Revista de Estudios Politicos,
122 (1962), 19-38.
11. C. Schmitt, "Grossraumordnung gegen Universalismus" in Helmut Quartisch, ed., Positionen und
Begriffe (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1940), 296.
12. R. Koselleck, Crítica y crisis del mundo burgués, (Madrid: Ed. Rialp, 1965), 227.