Persons and Family Relations
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
MALLILINv.JAMESOLAMIN (G.R.No.192718,February18,2015)
FACTS
Robert Malilin and Luz Jamesolamin were married on September 6, 1972
and begot three children. The petitioner filed a complaint for nullity of
marriage on the grounds that the respondent allegedly suffered from
psychological and mental incapacity at the time of the marriage
celebration, unpreparedness to enter into such marital life, and to comply
with its essential obligations and responsibilities.
He testified that Luz was already living in California, USA, and married an
American. While they were still together though, Robert disclosed that
respondent did not perform responsibilities of being a housewife like
keeping the house in order, preparing meals, washing clothes and taking
care of the children. He also stated that she dated several men and
contracted loans without his knowledge. In turn Luz filed her answer with
a counterclaim, averring that it was Robert who manifested psychological
incapacity.
On September 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court had rendered a decision
declaring the marriage null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the essential
marital obligations but the Court of Appeals, in its November 20, 2009
Decision, reversed the RT Cdecision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage warranting the annulment of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
RULING
DENIED.
The Supreme Court stated that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the
psychological incapacity of Luz. Other than his self‐serving testimony, no
other witness corroborated his allegations on her behavior. As the Court
has repeatedly stressed, psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
There was also nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had
either been interviewed or was subjected to a psychological examination.
On interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, yes, they are given great respect by our courts, but they are
neither controlling nor decisive.
Lastly, on petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of
proof to show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the
evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the parties, or one of
them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave
and serious psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the
Court is compelled to uphold the in dissolubility of the marital tie.
Republic v. De Gracia
G.R. No. 171557; February 12, 2014
FACTS:
Rodolfo and Natividad were married on February 15, 1969 at a church in
Zamboanga Del Norte. On December 25, 1998, Rodolfo filed a verified
complaint for the declaration of nullity of marriage alleging that Natividad
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential marital
obligations. Petitioner furthered that he was forced to marry her barely 3
months into their courtship in light of her accidental pregnancy. He was
21, she was 18. Natividad left their conjugal abode and sold their house
without his consent. Thereafter, she lived with a certain Engineer Terez.
After cohabiting with Terez, she contracted a second marriage with
another man. Dr. Zalsos stated that both Rodolfo and Natividad were
psychologically incapacitated finding that both parties suffered from
“utter emotional immaturity”.
ISSUE:
Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the RTC’s finding of
psychological incapacity?
HELD:
The petition is meritorious. There exists insufficient factual or legal
basis to conclude that Natividad’s emotional immaturity,
irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, can be equated with
psychological incapacity. The RTC relied heavily on Dr. Zalsos testimony
which does not explain in reasonable detail how Natividad’s condition
could be characterized as grave, deeply‐rooted and incurable within the
parameters of psychological incapacity jurisprudence. The petition is,
therefore, granted and the decision of CA reversed and set aside.
Marcos v. Marcos,
343 SCRA 755, October 19, 2000
FACTS:
Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were
assigned at the Malacanñ ang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and
he as a Presidential Guard of President Ferdinand Marcos. They later on
became sweethearts and got married and had 5 children. After the EDSA
revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. He
engaged to different business ventures but failed. She always urged him to
look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her, as the
head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in
any gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a
consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even force her to
have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical
harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way
he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation, he
would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. She
did not want him to stay in their house anymore so when she saw him in
their house, she was so angry that she lambasted him. He then turned
violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother who came
to her aid. She sought for nullity of their marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Brenda submitted herself to psychologist
Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation. The court a
quo found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to
support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and their
children. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this case.
ISSUE: W/N there is a need for personal medical examination of
respondent to prove psychological incapacity? Whether the totality of
evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity
HELD: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent
is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not
show such incapacity. Although SC is convinced that respondent failed to
provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical
abuse and abandonment, the totality of these acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no
showing that his “defects” were already present at the inception of the
marriage or that they are incurable.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LAILA TANYAG-SAN JOSE and
MANOLITO SAN JOSE, 517 SCRA 123 (2007)
Family Code – Article 36; Psychological Incapacity – Joblessness and
Irresponsibility is not Psychological Incapacity
When examination of the alleged psychologically incapacitated
spouse is needed
Facts:
In 1988, Laila Tanyag, then 19 years old, and Manolito San Jose, then 20
years old, got married to each other, albeit knowing each other for only a
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short period. The next year, they had a daughter.
 Persons and Family Relations
Their marriage turned out to be not an ideal one, however. Manolito
refused to get himself a job. He spent most of his available time with his
friends drinking intoxicating substances and gambling activities. It was
Laila who had to work in order to support the family. Laila gave Manolito
all the chances to change but Manolito never did.
In 1997, Laila gave birth to their second child, a boy. Laila thought this
would be the beginning of change for Manolito but that change never
happened. Thus, in 1998, Laila filed a petition to have their marriage be
declared a nullity on the ground that Manolito is psychologically
incapacitated due the fact that he was oblivious of his marital obligations.
Laila submitted herself to psychological evaluation under Dr. Nedy Tayag.
Laila described Manolito to Tayag as a happy‐go‐lucky individual
spending most of his time hanging out with friends. Considered to be a
bad influence, he was into gambling, drinking sprees and prohibited
drugs as well. Ultimately, Tayag concluded that Manolito is psychologically
incapacitated – this was even without actually examining Manolito. The
RTC denied Laila’s petition but on appeal, the Court of Appeals gave
weight to Dr. Tayag’s expert testimony and the appellate court reversed
the RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manolito San Jose was proven to be
psychologically incapacitated.
HELD: No. It is true that the guidelines set in the case of Republic vs Court
of Appeals and Molina did not require that the person sought to be
declared psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined by
a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at such
declaration. In fact, if such incapacity can be proven by independent
means, there is no reason why the same should not be credited. However,
in this case, the findings, and ultimately the testimony in court, of Dr.
Tayag is merely hearsay. The doctor had no personal knowledge of
the facts he testified to, as these had merely been relayed to him by
Laila. Tayag was working on pure suppositions and secondhand
information fed to him by one side. Consequently, his testimony can be
dismissed as unscientific and unreliable. This is more so because the
questioned CA decision was solely grounded on Tayag’s expert testimony
(which was merely based on the information fed to him by Laila) – there
was no other independent evidence which will support a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on the part of Manolito.
And based on Laila’s description of Manolito, whcih she gave to Tayag,
Manolito’s alleged psychological incapacity was merely premised on his
being jobless and a drug user, as well as his inability to support his family
and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Manolito’s state or condition or attitude has not been shown,
however, to be a malady or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or
debilitating psychological condition. Manolito merely has a “difficulty” if
not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations – but not psychological incapacity.
Note: Compare this with Marcos vs Marcos, in that case, the spouse
who was declared to be psychologically incapacitated was not
personally evaluated by a psychologist. The difference however was
that, said spouse refused to be examined. In this case, there was no
showing that Manolito refused to be examined.
Leonilo Antonio vs Marie Ivonne F. Reyes
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
Doctrine: “Pathological liar” considred as psychological incapacity,
Molina guidelines met.
FACTS:
Antonio and Reyes first got married at Manila City Hall and subsequently
in church on December 8, 1990. A child was born in April 1991 but died 5
months later. Antonio could no longer take her constant lying,
insecurities and jealousies over him so he separated from her in August
1991. He attempted reconciliation but since her behavior did not change,
he finally left her for good in November 1991. Only after their marriage
that he learned about her child with another man.
He then filed a petition in 1993 to have his marriage with Reyes declared
null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The trial court gave credence to Antonio's evidence and thus declared the
marriage null and void.
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. It held that the
totality of evidence presented was insufficient to establish Reyes'
psychological incapacity. It declared that the requirements in the 1997
Molina case had not been satisfied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Antonio has established his cause of action for declaration
of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and, generally, under the
Molina guidelines.
RULING:
Yes. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony, presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant
lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is abnormal and pathological
and corroborated his allegations on his wife's behavior, which
amounts to psychological incapacity.
The factual findings of the trial court are deemed binding on the SC,
owing to the great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of
facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had consistently lied
about many material aspects as to her character and personality. Her
fantastic ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled
her to live in a world of make‐believe. This made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.
The case sufficiently satisfies the Molina guidelines:
First, that Antonio had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the
psychological incapacity of his wife;
Second, that the root cause of Reyes' psychological incapacity has been
medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts,
and was clearly explained in the trial court's decision;
Third, that she fabricated friends and made up letters before she married
him prove that her psychological incapacity was have existed even before
the celebration of marriage;
Fourth, that the gravity of Reyes' psychological incapacity was considered
so grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity
prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from
contracting marriage without their consent;
Fifth, that she being an inveterate pathological liar makes her unable to
commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love,
trust, and respect.
Sixth, that the CA clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration
the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic Church. However,
it is the factual findings of the judicial trier of facts, and not of the
canonical courts, that are accorded significant recognition by this Court.
Seventh, that Reyes' case is incurable considering that Antonio tried to
reconcile with her but her behavior remains unchanged.
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SUBSEQUENT MARRIAGES
 Persons and Family Relations

Terre vs. Terre

211 SCRA 6

FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito Bercenillo, her first
cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre successfully convinced Dorothy that her
marriage was void ab initio for the reason of public policy and that they
are free to contract marriage. They got married in 1977 where he wrote
single under Dorothy’s status. After getting Dorothy pregnant, Atty. Terre
abandoned them and subsequently contracted another marriage to Helina
Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre was charged with abandonment of minor
and bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy is null and
void.

HELD:
Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering that Merlito
is her first cousin thereby against public policy. However, she did not file
any declaration for the nullity of their marriage before she contracted her
marriage with Atty. Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40
states that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be invoked for
the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

ATIENZA v. BRILLANTES, Jr.

March 29, 1995 (A.M. No. MTJ-92-706)

PARTIES:
Complainant: LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA

Respondent: JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial

Court, Branch 28, Manila

FACTS:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.

Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with
whom respondent Judge was cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that
respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has 5
children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a
marriage ceremony (1965) before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same
was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon request of
the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage
ceremony with her in Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage
license. Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in
Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all
legal intents and purposes that he was single because his first marriage
was solemnized without a license. Respondent also argues that the
provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed
by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place
in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.

ISSUE:
ON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.

HELD:
Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of
the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired
by the application of Article 40 to his case.
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