Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS
REYES, respondents.

NOCON, J.:

Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent
Court's decision promulgated on November 22, 1990, 1 which affirmed with modification the
agrarian court's decision promulgated January 10, 1990,2 which ordered them and the other
defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to private
respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Said respondent court's decision is now final and
executory as to Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the
respondent court, since they did not appeal the same.

Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of the respondent Court, the same shall be
quoted verbatim and are as follows:

It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant
Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-
38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area
of 23,000 square meters and 19,000 square meters, respectively. Devoted to the
production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz,
husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979.

In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded
him as bona fidetenant of the subject lots; that between July 7 to July 15, 1984,
Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her
daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth,
from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the
instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus
violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the
recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in the meantime.

Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or

appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied
interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant
Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. Claiming that they
have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge
of their official functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and claimed
moral damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P165,000.00 (Answer
with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).
 For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of
the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals,
irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses. He also
demanded actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees (Answer,
pp. 77-78).

During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza of the case in the
lower court, Mendoza was in possession of the subject lots and had cultivated the
same. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise
the harvesting of the palay crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to deposit
the net harvest (after deducting from the expenses incurred), in a bonded
warehouse of the locality subject to the disposition of the court. 3

The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's decision with
the modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it.

The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which was modified, states as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and against

defendants:

On the Mandatory Injunction:

1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the landholding subject of

the action to the plaintiff and enjoining said defendants and any person claiming
under them to desist from molesting them or interfering with the possession and
cultivation of the landholding descriptive in paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:

Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay

Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area
of 23,969 square meters, more or less, owned by a certain Juan
Mendoza, and devoted principally to the production of palay, as
evidenced by a Certification from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
issued on July 30, 1984.

2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of the two landholding in

question and to respect the tenancy rights of plaintiff with respect to the same;

b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto plaintiff 220 cavans of
palay or its equivalent in cash of P33,000.00 from the principal crop year of 1984,
and every harvest time until defendants finally vacate and surrender possession
and cultivation of the landholding in question to plaintiff.

c) the prayer for moral damages, not having been sufficiently proved, the same is
denied.

d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.

The awards herein provided should first be satisfied from the deposits of the
harvests ordered by the Court from which the planting and harvesting expenses
have been paid to defendant Olympio Mendoza; and if said net deposits with the
Court or the warehouses as ordered by the Court are insufficient, then the
balance should be paid by defendants, jointly and severally. 4
Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, present for
the consideration of the Court:

[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held liable, jointly and severally,
with the other defendants, for the harvests of the litigated property, Lot No. 46, or
the money equivalent thereof starting from the principal crop years of 1984 and
every harvest time thereafter until the possession and cultivation of the
aforestated landholding are finally surrendered to the private respondent. 5

It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza
and Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of
the bahay Pare Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the estate,
which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio Mendoza's father, Juan, and
which he later donated to the barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction
of the Bahay Pare Barangay High School. 6 As to their supposed participation in the
dispossession of private respondent from the disputed landholding, petitioners present the
September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by
Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576, 7 wherein private respondent's
complaint against petitioners and the other defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D.
5838 was dismissed, to show that private respondent's "point is already settled and considered
closed." 9 lastly, petitioners claim that they were included in the present controversy so that their
political career would be destroyed.10

Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and contend that it was petitioners who
conspired with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only from Lot No.
46 but also from Lot No. 106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot No. 46 from where they were
ejected and dispossessed, so much so that even if Farmlot No. 106 was removed by the Court of
Appeals from the judgment, as Farmlot No. 46 was harvesting palay worth at least P33,000.00
per year since 1989, private respondents, who are entitled to the possession and peaceful
enjoyment of the farmlot as provided for in Section 23 of the Agrarian Reform Law, should be
compensated for the lost income by the petitioners who are solidarily liable with Olympio
Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo. 11

We find for the private respondents.

It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already presented and
evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent appellate court. Said
evidence served as basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate court's findings of fact. We
shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead put finis to the factual findings in this
case. Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court 12 absent the exceptions which do not obtain in
the instant case. 13

We agree with the appellate court in its retiocination, which We adopt, on why it has to dismiss
the appeal. Said the Court:

In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she "is the tenant of Farm Lots
Nos. 46 and 106 Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square meters, more or less . .
." (Complaint, Record, vol. 1, p.1). However, during Violeta's testimony, she
clarified that actually only Lot No. 106, which contains an area of P19,000 square
meters, is not included in this controversy (T.S.N., August 10, 1989, p. 5; May 8,
1989, p. 12). This statement was corroborated by plaintiff's counsel, Atty. Arturo
Rivera, who informed the court that the 19,000 square meter lot is subject of a
pending case before the MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga (Ibid., p. 15). The
inconsistency between the averment of the complaint and the testimony of the
 witness should not only because there was no showing that she intended to
mislead defendants and even the trial court on the subject matter of the suit. It
would in the complaint since together with Lot 106 had been include in the
complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olympio's father.

We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other
appellants in the dispossession of appellee. They not only knew Olympio
personally, some of them were even asked by Olympio to help him cultivate the
land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olympio, together
with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from entering the land
through "strong arm methods". (Decision of RTC, records, vol. II p. 564).

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the
affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C") although the
affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of
P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian
cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits
and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".

Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than

substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section
18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No.
34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA
226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:

Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant

evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been
defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not
shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record,
direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute
its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining
wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief.14

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 22,
1990 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Nocon and Campos, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Decision, CA-G.R. No. SP 20528 (CAR), penned by Justice Alfredo L.

Benipayo and concurred in by Justices Cesar D. Francisco and Fortunato A.
Vailoces.

2 Decision of the RTC, Branch XLVI, 3rd Judicial Region, San Fernando,
Pampanga acting as an agrarian court; penned by Judge Norberto C. Ponce.
3 Op cit., pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

4 Original Records, pp. 565-566.

5 Petitioners' Memorandum, p.7; Rollo, p. 62.

6 Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 10; Rollo, p.65.

7 Annex "B", Petition; Rollo, pp. 20-21.

8 Prescribing Penalties for the Unlawful Ejectment, Exclusion, Removal or Ouster

of Tenant-farmers from their Farmholdings.

9 Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 65-66.

10 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p.17.

11 Private respondents' Memorandum, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 73-74.

12 Decision, Misa vs. CA, G.R. No. 97291, August 5, 1992, pp. 4-5.

13 The case of Medina v. Asistio, G.R. No. 75450, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224
(1990) enumerates several instances when findings of fact may be passed upon
and reviewed by this Court, none of which obtain herein:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil.
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
(Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil 401 [1958]; (7) The findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 622 [1970]); Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and
(10) The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contraindicated by the evidence on record (Salazar v.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Ibid., p.5.

14 Decision, CA-G.R. SP 20528 (CAR), pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 28-29.