G.R. No.
L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their
capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father
and Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-
appellees.
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-
8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald Hill et al.
dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the
complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from
defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at the time of
the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin
Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs,
named Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally
prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the
ground that his act was not criminal, because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following
grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a
violation of section 1, Rule 107, which is now
Rule III, of the Revised Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment
which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against
defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved
as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon
motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such
denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following
order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed
by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and
after thoroughly examining the arguments
therein contained, the Court finds the same to
be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on
December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by
ordering the dismissal of the above entitled
case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p.
40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the
spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution the
following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST
BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE
107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF
COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111,
RULES OF COURT IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES
2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF
THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE. (page 4,
Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of
plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee Reginald Hill
was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of
the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due
trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was
not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled
with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has
favored Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal,
presumably because appellants do not dispute that
such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision.
And so, when appellants filed their complaint against
appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on
account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the
two decisive issues presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the
action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the
Civil Code he applied against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding
the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence
complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with
and getting subsistenee from his father, was already
legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need
for a reiteration and further clarification of the dual
character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a
source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that
case, this Court postulated, on the basis of a scholarly
dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the nature of culpa
aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions
of the Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized
civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that the
same given act can result in civil liability not only under
the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the
opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows
that the same act machinist. come under both
the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case,
the action of the agent killeth unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held
to be also a proper subject of a civil action
under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to
be noted that it was the employer and not the
employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616, 73
Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the
above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing
the death of the child was punishable by the
Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of
the same act of negligence being a proper
subject matter either of a criminal action with
its consequent civil liability arising from a crime
or of an entirely separate and independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902
of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa
aquiliana, under the Civil Code has been fully
and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a
conviction, he could have been sued for this
civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73
Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited,
this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the
Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House
could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of
his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court
awarded damages in an independent civil action
for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the
Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already
invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are
announcing doctrines that have been little
understood, in the past, it might not he
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365
punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902
to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to
persons and damage to property- through any
degree of negligence - even the slightest -
would have to be Idemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In
such a state of affairs, what sphere would
remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We
are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd
and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold
the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that
giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning
of the law to smother and render almost lifeless
a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-
delito, which is conserved and made enduring in
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a
criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which
can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt,
but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise. there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the
provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the
overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the
character and efficacy of the action for culpa
aquiliana, there has grown up a common
practice to seek damages only by virtue of the
civil responsibility arising from a crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which
is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed
by, our laws, it has nevertheless rendered
practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In
the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it
is high time we pointed out to the harms done
by such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of
quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its
own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under
the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for
the better safeguarding or private rights
because it realtor, an ancient and additional
remedy, and for the further reason that an
independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal
prosecution, and entirely directed by the party
wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (p. 621, 73
Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get
upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the Penal
Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate
only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary
acts - deeper reflection would reveal that the thrust of
the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that
in fact it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be
seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of
the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra,
which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent
act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in
force here at the time of Garcia, provided textually that
obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in
which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of
this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is
precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by
law", that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an
ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the
law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift-
hence, the ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal
meaning of the law to smother and render almost
lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-
grown development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because
Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission
that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is
to be noted that the said Code, which was enacted after
the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law,
whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding
provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is
Article 1162, simply says, "Obligations derived
from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions
of Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts)
and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision,
Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from
 negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing
provision (Article 2177) through at first sight startling, is
not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the
exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former
is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a
"culpa aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin,
having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and "culpa
extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained
by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and
maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by
Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under
the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not
for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But
said article forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the
Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally
refer to only acts of negligence, the same argument of
Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the
spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal
that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be
observed in applying the same. And considering that the
preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and
independence of liability in a civil action for acts
criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of
Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more
congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice, and
more in harmony with modern progress"- to borrow the
felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf
and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that
Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligencia
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled
in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil
liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act charged has not happened or
has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated,
We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in
the criminal case has not extinguished his liability
for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the
instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of
Reginald's emancipation by marriage on the possible
civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that
Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be
upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated
upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code),
and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the
marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear
that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage
of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession
shall terminate parental authority over the child's
person. It shall enable the minor to administer his
property as though he were of age, but he cannot
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property
without the consent of his father or mother, or
guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by
article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor
children who live in their company." In the instant case,
it is not controverted that Reginald, although married,
was living with his father and getting subsistence from
him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and
dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa,
the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of
presuncion with their offending child under Article 2180
is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their
minor children in order to prevent them from causing
damage to third persons. 5 On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or
be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that
such emancipation does not carry with it freedom to
enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-
767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else invites
judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a
minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to
see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give
answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation
or encumbering of real property which cannot be done
by their minor married child without their consent. (Art.
399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180
applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the emancipation
by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is
evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of
equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling,
subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and
the trial court is ordered to proceed in accordance with
the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
G.R. No. 108017 April 3, 1995
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in
behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH,
BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed
DULAY, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON.
TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region,
Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND
SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION, respondents.
This petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 29, 1991
in CA-G.R. CV No. 24646 which affirmed the order of the
Regional Trial Court dismissing Civil Case No. Q-89-1751,
and its resolution dated November 17, 1991 denying
herein, petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno
Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big
Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a
result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on
duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay.
Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the
deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in
behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8, 1989
an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and
herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation and
Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard
Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged employers of
defendant Torzuela. The complaint, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751 among others alleges the following:
1. . . .
Defendants SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND
SECURITY CO., INC., (Defendant Safeguard) and
SUPERGUARD SECURITY CORPORATION
(Defendant Superguard) are corporations duly
organized and existing in accordance with
Philippine laws, with offices at 10th Floor,
Manufacturers Building, Inc., Plaza Santa Cruz,
Manila. They are impleaded as alternative
defendants for, while the former appears to be
the employer of defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA
(defendant TORZUELA), the latter impliedly
acknowledged responsibility for the acts of
defendant TORZUELA by extending its
sympathies to plaintiffs.
Defendant BENIGNO TORZUELA is of legal age,
an employee of defendant SAFEGUARD and/or
defendant SUPERGUARD and, at the time of the
incident complained of, was under their control
and supervision. . . .
3. On December 7, 1988 at around 8:00 a.m.,
defendant TORZUELA, while he was on duty as
security guard at the "Big Bang sa Alabang,"
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila shot
and killed NAPOLEON V. DULAY with a .38
caliber revolver belonging to defendant
 SAFEGUARD, and/or SUPERGUARD (per Police
Report dated January 7, 1989, copy attached as
Annex A);
4. The incident resulting in the death of
NAPOLEON V. DULAY was due to the concurring
negligence of the defendants. Defendant
TORZUELA'S wanton and reckless discharge of
the firearm issued to him by defendant
SAFEGUARD and/or SUPERGUARD was the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury,
while the negligence of defendant SAFEGUARD
and/or SUPERGUARD consists in its having
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of a family in the supervision and control of its
employee to avoid the injury.
xxx xxx xxx
(Rollo, pp. 117-118)
Petitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The said Civil
Case No. Q-89-1751 was raffled to Branch 84 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided by
respondent Judge Teodoro Regino.
On March 2, 1989, private respondent SUPERGUARD
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action.
SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting
Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that
since the alleged act of shooting was committed with
deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:
Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a
felony. — Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a
complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed
by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under
Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private
respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the
complaint is premature considering that the conviction
of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua
non for the employer's subsidiary liability (Rollo, p. 55-
59).
Respondent SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying
that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that
defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees (Rollo, p.
96).
Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their
cause of action against the private respondents is based
on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil
Code, which provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged
in any business or an industry.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioners contended that a suit against alternative
defendants is allowed under Rule 3, Section 13 of the
Rules of Court. Therefore, the inclusion of private
respondents as alternative defendants in the complaint
is justified by the following: the Initial Investigation
Report prepared by Pat. Mario Tubon showing that
Torzuela is an employee of SAFEGUARD; and through
overt acts, SUPERGUARD extended its sympathies to
petitioners (Rollo, pp. 64 and 98).
Meanwhile, an Information dated March 21, 1989
charging Benigno Torzuela with homicide was filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 89-1896.
On April 13, 1989, respondent Judge Regino issued an
order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and
SAFEGUARD'S motion for exclusion as defendant. The
respondent judge held that the complaint did not state
facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict
since it does not mention any negligence on the part of
Torzuela in shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same
was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent
judge ruled that mere allegations of the concurring
negligence of the defendants (private respondents
herein) without stating the facts showing such
negligence are mere conclusions of law (Rollo, p. 106).
Respondent judge also declared that the complaint was
one for damages founded on crimes punishable under
Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as
distinguished from those arising from, quasi-delict. The
dispositive portion of the order dated April 13, 1989
states:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that in view of
the material and ultimate facts alleged in the
verified complaint and in accordance with the
applicable law on the matter as well as
precedents laid down by the Supreme Court,
the complaint against the alternative
defendants Superguard Security Corporation
and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co.,
Inc., must be and (sic) it is hereby dismissed.
(Rollo, p. 110)
The above order was affirmed by the respondent court
and petitioners' motion for reconsideration thereof was
denied.
Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and
insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and
voluntary, citing Andamo v. IAC (191 SCRA 195 [1990]).
Thus, petitioners insist that Torzuela' s act of shooting
Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict actionable
under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code.
Petitioners further contend that under Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily
liable for their negligence either in the selection or
supervision of their employees. This liability is
independent of the employee's own liability for fault or
negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil
liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
The civil action against the employer may therefore
proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant
to Rule 111 Section 3 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners
submit that the question of whether Torzuela is an
employee of respondent SUPERGUARD or SAFEGUARD
would be better resolved after trial.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of
shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the
New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only
a preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the same vein, petitioners cite Section 3, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court which provides:
Rule 111. . . . .
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed
independently — In the cases provided for in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the independent civil action
which has been reserved may be brought by the
offended party, shall proceed independently of
the criminal action, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The term "physical injuries" under Article 33 has been
held to include consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. Thus, petitioners maintain that
Torzuela's prior conviction is unnecessary since the civil
action can proceed independently of the criminal
action. On the other hand, it is the private respondents'
argument that since the act was not committed with
negligence, the petitioners have no cause of action
under Articles 2116 and 2177 of the New Civil Code. The
civil action contemplated in Article 2177 is not
applicable to acts committed with deliberate intent, but
only applies to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code. Torzuela's act of shooting Atty.
Dulay to death, aside from being purely personal, was
done with deliberate intent and could not have been
part of his duties as security guard. And since Article
2180 of the New Civil Code covers only: acts done
within the scope of the employee's assigned tasks, the
private respondents cannot be held liable for damages.
We find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Benigno Torzuela is being
prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shooting of
Napoleon Dulay. Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action , reserves his right to institute it
 separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused. (Emphasis
supplied)
It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil
action before the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far better than a compliance
with the requirement of express reservation (Yakult
Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 357 [1990]).
This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this
case. However, the private respondents opposed the
civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a
delict and not on a quasi-delict as the shooting was not
attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is
the nature of the petitioner's cause of action.
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the
facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause
of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it
is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing
the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by
the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
(De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA
243 [1982]). An examination of the complaint in the
present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners
herein, are invoking their right to recover damages
against the private respondents for their vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by Benigno
Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay, as
stated in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the complaint.
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is
no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of
the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article
2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence,
but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far
back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98
[1977]), this Court already held that:
. . . Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in
character; whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if he is actually charged
also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule
111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as quasi-delict only and not as a
crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts
which may be punishable by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
The same doctrine was echoed in the case of Andamo v.
Intermediate Appellate Court (191 SCRA 195 [1990]),
wherein the Court held:
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or
negligence," covers not only acts criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether
or not he is prosecuted or found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually also
charged criminally), to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. [citing Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472]
(Emphasis supplied)
Private respondents submit that the word "intentional"
in the Andamo case is inaccurate obiter, and should be
read as "voluntary" since intent cannot be coupled with
negligence as defined by Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code. In the absence of more substantial reasons,
this Court will not disturb the above doctrine on the
coverage of Article 2176.
Private respondents further aver that Article 33 of the
New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120
SCRA 193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages
allowed thereunder are ex-delicto. However, the term
"physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing death
(Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the Philippines,
121 Phil. 638 [1965); Carandang v. Santiago, 97 Phil. 94
[1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical
injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and
attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA 293
[1983]). Although in the Marcia case (supra), it was held
that no independent civil action may be filed under
Article 33 where the crime is the result of criminal
negligence, it must be noted however, that Torzuela,
the accused in the case at bar, is charged with homicide,
not with reckless imprudence, whereas the defendant
in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence.
Therefore, in this case, a civil action based on Article 33
lies.
Private respondents also contend that their liability is
subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code; and that they
are not liable for Torzuela's act which is beyond the
scope of his duties as a security guard. It having been
established that the instant action is not ex-delicto,
petitioners may proceed directly against Torzuela and
the private respondents. Under Article 2180 of the New
Civil Code as aforequoted, when an injury is caused by
the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the
part of the master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after selection or both (Layugan v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 [1988]). The liability of
the employer under Article 2180 is direct and
immediate; it is not conditioned upon prior recourse
against the negligent employee and a prior showing of
the insolvency of such employee (Kapalaran Bus Lines v.
Coronado, 176 SCRA 792 [1989]). Therefore, it is
incumbent upon the private respondents to prove that
they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of their employee.
Since Article 2176 covers not only acts of negligence but
also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was
therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to
dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed
to make allegations of attendant negligence
attributable to private respondents.
With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at
hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general rule
is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendants if,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exist if the following elements
are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff
by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or
is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant
violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a
breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery
of damages (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, 210 SCRA
33 [1992]); Development Bank of the Philippines v.
Pundogar, 218 SCRA 118 [1993])
This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the
complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on
the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the
complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon
Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting
occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's
employer and responsible for his acts. This does not
operate however, to establish that the defendants
below are liable. Whether or not the shooting was
actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence
and whether it was actually done within the scope of
Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents
SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the
diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the
defendants are actually liable, are questions which can
be better resolved after trial on the merits where each
party can present evidence to prove their respective
allegations and defenses. In determining whether the
allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a
cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the
complaint does not have to establish or allege the facts
proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset;
this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the
allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis
by which the complaint can be maintained, the same
should not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that
may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Dev't. Corp. v.
CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank &
Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663
[1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause
of action, the complaint must show that the claim for
relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated, is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain
(Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). Since the
petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights
under the law, it would be more just to allow them to
present evidence of such injury.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for
review is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals as well as the Order of the Regional Trial Court
dated April 13, 1989 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Civil Case No. Q-89-1751 is remanded to the
Regional Trial Court for trial on the merits. This decision
is immediately executory.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990
NATIVIDAD V. ANDAMO and EMMANUEL R.
ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (First Civil Cases
Division) and MISSIONARIES OF OUR LADY OF LA
SALETTE, INC., respondents.
The pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus is whether a corporation,
which has built through its agents, waterpaths, water
conductors and contrivances within its land, thereby
causing inundation and damage to an adjacent land, can
be held civilly liable for damages under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts such that the
resulting civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo
are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga
(Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of
private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La
Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.
Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths
and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were
constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded
petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown,
damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away
costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and
their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and
exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
In July 1982, petitioners instituted a criminal action,
docketed as Criminal Case No. TG-907-82, before the
Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 4 (Tagaytay City),
against Efren Musngi, Orlando Sapuay and Rutillo
Mallillin, officers and directors of herein respondent
corporation, for destruction by means of inundation
under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code.
Subsequently, on February 22, 1983, petitioners filed
another action against respondent corporation, this
time a civil case, docketed as Civil Case No. TG-748, for
damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction before the same court. 1
On March 11, 1983, respondent corporation filed its
answer to the complaint and opposition to the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. Hearings were
conducted including ocular inspections on the land.
However, on April 26, 1984, the trial court, acting on
respondent corporation's motion to dismiss or suspend
the civil action, issued an order suspending further
hearings in Civil Case No, TG-748 until after judgment in
the related Criminal Case No. TG-907-82.
Resolving respondent corporation's motion to dismiss
filed on June 22, 1984, the trial court issued on August
27, 1984 the disputed order dismissing Civil Case No.
TG-748 for lack of jurisdiction, as the criminal case
which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still
unresolved. Said order was anchored on the provision
of Section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which
provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the
same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action
cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action." 2
Petitioners appealed from that order to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. 3
On February 17, 1986, respondent Appellate Court, First
Civil Cases Division, promulgated a decision 4 affirming
the questioned order of the trial court. 5 A motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioners was denied by the
Appellate Court in its resolution dated May 19, 1986. 6
Directly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil
Case No. TG-748 in accordance with Section 3 (a) of
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that
the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in
dismissing Civil Case No. TG-748 since it is predicated on
a quasi-delict. Petitioners have raised a valid point.
It is axiomatic that the nature of an action filed in court
is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as
constituting the cause of action. 7 The purpose of an
action or suit and the law to govern it, including the
period of prescription, is to be determined not by the
claim of the party filing the action, made in his
argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief. 8 The nature of an
action is not necessarily determined or controlled by its
title or heading but the body of the pleading or
complaint itself. To avoid possible denial of substantial
justice due to legal technicalities, pleadings as well as
remedial laws should be liberally construed so that the
litigants may have ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims. 9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. TG-748:
4) That within defendant's land, likewise
located at Biga (Biluso), Silang, Cavite, adjacent
on the right side of the aforesaid land of
plaintiffs, defendant constructed waterpaths
starting from the middle-right portion thereof
leading to a big hole or opening, also
constructed by defendant, thru the lower
portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence
situated on the right side of its cemented gate
fronting the provincial highway, and connected
by defendant to a man height inter-connected
cement culverts which were also constructed
and lain by defendant cross-wise beneath the
tip of the said cemented gate, the left-end of
the said inter-connected culverts again
connected by defendant to a big hole or
opening thru the lower portion of the same
concrete hollowblocks fence on the left side of
the said cemented gate, which hole or opening
is likewise connected by defendant to the
cemented mouth of a big canal, also
constructed by defendant, which runs
northward towards a big hole or opening which
was also built by defendant thru the lower
portion of its concrete hollow-blocks fence
which separates the land of plaintiffs from that
of defendant (and which serves as the exit-point
of the floodwater coming from the land of
defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-
point of the same floodwater to the land of
plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy
seasons.
5) That moreover, on the middle-left portion of
its land just beside the land of plaintiffs,
defendant also constructed an artificial lake, the
base of which is soil, which utilizes the water
being channeled thereto from its water system
thru inter-connected galvanized iron pipes (No.
2) and complimented by rain water during rainy
or stormy seasons, so much so that the water
below it seeps into, and the excess water above
it inundates, portions of the adjoining land of
plaintiffs.
6) That as a result of the inundation brought
about by defendant's aforementioned water
conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a
young man was drowned to death, while herein
plaintiffs suffered and will continue to suffer, as
follows:
a) Portions of the land of plaintiffs were
eroded and converted to deep, wide
and long canals, such that the same can
no longer be planted to any crop or
plant.
b) Costly fences constructed by
plaintiffs were, on several occasions,
washed away.
c) During rainy and stormy seasons the
lives of plaintiffs and their laborers are
always in danger.
d) Plants and other improvements on
other portions of the land of plaintiffs
are exposed to destruction. ... 10
A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint
shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the
elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence
of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts
he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant
and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. 11
Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the waterpaths and
contrivances built by respondent corporation are
alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There
is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
between the act of building these waterpaths and the
damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven
constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis
for the recovery of damages.
In the case of Samson vs. Dionisio, 12 the Court applied
Article 1902, now Article 2176 of the Civil Code and held
that "any person who without due authority constructs
a bank or dike, stopping the flow or communication
between a creek or a lake and a river, thereby causing
loss and damages to a third party who, like the rest of
the residents, is entitled to the use and enjoyment of
the stream or lake, shall be liable to the payment of an
indemnity for loss and damages to the injured party.
While the property involved in the cited case belonged
to the public domain and the property subject of the
instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that
petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that
petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain
damage due to the waterpaths and contrivances built
by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the
complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the
petitioners, the act or omission of respondent
corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence,
and the causal connection between the act and the
damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation
between the parties make a clear case of a quasi
delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not
without limitations. Article 431 of the Civil Code
provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use
thereof in such a manner as to injure the rights of a
third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON
LAEDAS. Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual
and reciprocal duties which require that each must use
his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to
infringe upon the rights and interests of others.
Although we recognize the right of an owner to build
structures on his land, such structures must be so
constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners
and can withstand the usual and expected forces of
nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an
adjoining landowner or a third person, the latter can
claim indemnification for the injury or damage suffered.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code imposes a civil liability on
a person for damage caused by his act or omission
constituting fault or negligence, thus:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this chapter.
Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence",
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and
voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil
action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found
guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also
criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the
two cases vary. 13
The distinctness of quasi-delicta is shown in Article 2177
of the Civil Code, which states:
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or
negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
According to the Report of the Code Commission "the
foregoing provision though at first sight startling, is not
so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a distinct
and independent negligence, which is a "culpa
aquiliana" or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having
always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction
between criminal negligence and "culpa extra-
contractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained by
decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain ... 14
In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court
held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate
legal institution under the Civil Code with a
substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from a delict or crime — a
distinction exists between the civil liability arising from
a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligence causing
damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime
under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.
Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal
case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of
course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has
declared that the fact from which the civil action arose
did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal
liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability.
In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in
quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent
of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of
the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than
this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in
the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution
— whether it be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the civil
action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his
action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision dated February 17,
1986 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court affirming
the order of dismissal of the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite, Branch 18 (Tagaytay City) dated August 17, 1984
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The trial court is
ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. TG-748 entitled
"Natividad V. Andamo and Emmanuel R. Andamo vs.
Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette Inc." and to
proceed with the hearing of the case with dispatch. This
decision is immediately executory. Costs against
respondent corporation.
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail,
the judgment meted out becomes final and executory.
The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment
by filing a notice of appeal on its own behalf in the guise
of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both
the primary civil liability of the accused-employee and
the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried
in one single decision that has become final and
executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29, 20002 and
the March 27, 20013 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 59390. Petitioner’s appeal from
the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 2535 was
dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
"WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion
to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is
ordered DISMISSED."4
The second Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.5
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this
wise:
"On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y
Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple
homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to
six (6) years, and to pay damages as follows:
‘a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of
₱25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income
for one year at ₱2,500.00 a month, ₱50,000.00 as
indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the
further sum of ₱300,000.00 as moral damages;
‘b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of
₱237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income
for three years at ₱45,000.00 per annum, and the
further sum of ₱1,000,000.00 as moral damages and
₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees[;]
‘c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of
₱50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum of
₱22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of ₱20,544.94
as medical expenses and her loss of income for 30 years
at ₱1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of
₱100,000.00 for moral damages;
‘d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of ₱229,654.00 as
hospital expenses, doctor’s fees of ₱170,000.00 for the
orthopedic surgeon, ₱22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist,
an additional indemnity [of] at least ₱150,000.00 to
cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and
moral damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00;
‘e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of ₱3,561.46 as medical
expenses, ₱2,000.00 as loss of income, and ₱25,000.00
as moral damages;
‘f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of ₱19,800.47 as
medical expenses, ₱800.00 for loss of income, and
₱25,000.00 as moral damages;
‘g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of ₱580.81 as
medical expenses, ₱4,600.00 as actual damages and her
loss earnings of ₱1,400.00 as well as moral damages in
the amount of ₱10,000.00;
‘h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of ₱12,473.82 as
hospital expenses, ₱14,530.00 as doctor’s fees,
₱1,000.00 for medicines and ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages;
‘i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of ₱155.00 for
medical expenses, ₱87.00 for medicines, ₱1,710.00 as
actual damages and ₱5,000.00 as moral damages;
‘j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of ₱1,395.00 for
hospital bills, ₱500.00 for medicine, ₱2,100.00 as actual
damages, ₱1,200.00 for loss of income and ₱5,000.00 as
moral damages;
‘k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered
owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount of
₱250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the
totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner of the jeepney,
the amount of ₱22,698.38 as actual damages;’
"The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event
of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment
against accused had become final and executory.
"Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-
large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal
when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also
admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a
notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court.
We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in
behalf of accused.
"Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its
notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial court.
On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to
[petitioner’s] notice of appeal. On December 8, 1998,
[petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the
Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of
[petitioner’s] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved
to be excused from filing [respondents’] brief on the
ground that the OSG’s authority to represent People is
confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was
however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On
March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed
the instant motion to dismiss."6 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case
implied the institution also of the civil action arising
from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal
case against the accused-employee, the employer’s
subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
enforceable.
The appellate court further held that to allow an
employer to dispute independently the civil liability
fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee
would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment.
Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had
already been dismissed by the CA, then the judgment of
conviction and the award of civil liability became final
and executory. Included in the civil liability of the
accused was the employer’s subsidiary liability.
Hence, this Petition.7
The Issues
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
"A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully
participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of
conviction independently of the accused.
"B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v.
Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v.
Adil (164 SCRA 494) apply to the instant case."8
There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an
adjunct to Item A.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of
appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends that
the judgment of conviction against the accused-
employee has not attained finality. The former insists
that its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the
fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner
argues that its appeal takes the place of that of the
accused-employee.
We are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure states thus:
"Any party may appeal from a judgment or final
order, unless the accused will be placed in
double jeopardy."
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may
appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so
only if the accused would not thereby be placed in
double jeopardy.9 Furthermore, the prosecution cannot
appeal on the ground that the accused should have
been given a more severe penalty.10 On the other hand,
the offended parties may also appeal the judgment with
respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has
the right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the
offended parties should have the same right to appeal
as much of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.11
Appeal by the Accused Who Jumps Bail
Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that
the appellate court may, upon motion or motu proprio,
dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused
jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule
124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
"The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of
the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the
appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign
country during the pendency of the appeal."12
This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose
their standing in court when they abscond. Unless they
surrender or submit to the court’s jurisdiction, they are
deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial
relief.13
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused
who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one who
does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado
succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
"x x x. When, as in this case, the accused
escaped after his arraignment and during the
trial, but the trial in absentia proceeded
resulting in the promulgation of a judgment
against him and his counsel appealed, since he
nonetheless remained at large his appeal must
be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid
provision of this Rule [Rule 124, §8 of the Rules
on Criminal Procedure]. x x x"14
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal
unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of the
court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from
notice of the judgment against them.15 While at large,
they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are
deemed to have waived the appeal.16
Finality of a Decision in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is
explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
"A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of
the accused, be modified or set aside before it
becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a
judgment becomes final after the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or when the accused has waived in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation."
In the case before us, the accused-employee has
escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his
appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has
become final and executory.17
Liability of an Employer in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the
subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
"In default of the persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other
persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all
cases where a violation of municipal ordinances
or some general or special police regulation
shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
"Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for
restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein,
or for payment of the value thereof, provided
that such guests shall have notified in advance
the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods
within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or
his representative may have given them with
respect to the care and vigilance over such
goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s
employees."
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to
employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
"The subsidiary liability established in the next
preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in
any kind of industry for felonies committed by
their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties."
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now
address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted in the Criminal
Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are
deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
"When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately or institutes
the civil action prior to the criminal action.
"x x x xxx x x x"
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the
crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a
criminal action; that is, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal
action.18 Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the
employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
may be enforced by execution on the basis of the
judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.19
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement
of reserving independent civil actions and allowed these
to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the
civil actions referred to in Articles 32,20 33,21 3422 and
217623of the Civil Code shall remain "separate, distinct
and independent" of any criminal prosecution based on
the same act. Here are some direct consequences of
such revision and omission:
1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based
on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not
deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to
file a separate civil action arising from the crime
charged does not extinguish the right to bring
such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover more than once for the same
act or omission.24
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution
is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se
(civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising
from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-contracts. In fact,
even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex
delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains,
and the offended party may -- subject to the control of
the prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in
order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.25
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised
Penal Code, which states that "[e]very person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable."26
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a
party to the criminal case and is conclusively bound by
the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be
accorded the right to pursue the case to its logical
conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is
not a direct party to the criminal case, which was filed
solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive
list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be
applied to it, because "in all th[o]se cases, the accused’s
employer did not interpose an appeal."27 Indeed,
petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the
employer appealed, precisely because an appeal in such
circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against
their employees.28 Although in substance and in effect,
they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed
in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may
assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former
cannot act independently on their own behalf, but can
only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard Against Double
Jeopardy
Petitioner’s appeal obviously aims to have the accused-
employee absolved of his criminal responsibility and the
judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are
apparent from its Appellant’s Brief29 filed with the CA
and from its Petition30 before us, both of which claim
that the trial court’s finding of guilt "is not supported by
competent evidence."31
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a
waiver of the constitutional safeguard against double
jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review
by the appellate court. The latter is then called upon to
render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the appellant.32 This is the
risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a
sentence of conviction.33 Indeed, appellate courts have
the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of
the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it
imposed.34
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case
against the accused-employee becomes open to review.
It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has
already been imposed by the trial court may be meted
out to him. Petitioner’s appeal would thus violate his
right against double jeopardy, since the judgment
against him could become subject to modification
without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason
why the accused effectively waived his right to appeal
by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may
not appeal without violating his right against double
jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles
governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the
accused impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail
and thereby made the judgment of the court below
final.35 Having been a fugitive from justice for a long
period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to
appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory.
The Court in People v. Ang Gioc36 ruled:
"There are certain fundamental rights which
cannot be waived even by the accused himself,
but the right of appeal is not one of them. This
right is granted solely for the benefit of the
accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases.
He may waive it either expressly or by
implication. When the accused flees after the
case has been submitted to the court for
decision, he will be deemed to have waived his
right to appeal from the judgment rendered
against him. x x x."37
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of
the authority of the court and placed himself in a
position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In
the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice,
but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his
option.38 Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite
leniency on the part of the appellate court.39
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who
escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities becomes final and executory.40
Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right
to appeal the criminal case against the accused-
employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right
to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case
against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner
now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of this
Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab,
Inc.,41 Alvarez v. CA42 and Yusay v. Adil43 do not apply to
the present case, because it has followed the Court’s
directive to the employers in these cases to take part in
the criminal cases against their employees. By
participating in the defense of its employee, herein
petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed
rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases
on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the most
basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employer’s
liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-employee
is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers
are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities
of their employees in the event of the latter’s
insolvency.44 The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are
deemed written into the judgments in the cases to
which they are applicable.45Thus, in the dispositive
portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-
employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily
liable.46 In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.47
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a
criminal case would enable them to amend, nullify or
defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent
court.48 By the same token, to allow them to appeal the
final criminal conviction of their employees without the
latter’s consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case
is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with
regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee.49
Before the employers’ subsidiary liability is exacted,
however, there must be adequate evidence establishing
that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted
employees; (2) that the former are engaged in some
kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by
the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4)
that the execution against the latter has not been
satisfied due to insolvency.50
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a
separate civil action. But the determination must be
based on the evidence that the offended party and the
employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal action
in which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has
been pronounced;51 and in a hearing set for that precise
purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of the
proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the
defense of its accused-employee does not mean that its
liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains
subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its
subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the
accused-employee’s conviction has attained finality,
then the subsidiary liability of the employer ipso
facto attaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness
dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the
proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for
jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In
effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into
two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-
employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident.
There is only one criminal case against the accused-
employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil
aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case
to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not
as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the
conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and
dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter
has become final and enforceable by reason of his
flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also
become immediately enforceable. Respondent is
correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability
is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary
civil liability.
No Deprivation of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due
process, we reiterate that what is sought to be enforced
is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent
upon the employee’s criminal negligence. In other
words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily
liable upon the conviction of the employee and upon
proof of the latter’s insolvency, in the same way that
acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil liability,
but also his employer’s subsidiary liability for his
criminal negligence.52
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a
natural right nor a part of due process.53 It is merely a
procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that
may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the
provisions of law authorizing such exercise.54 Hence, the
legal requirements must be strictly complied with.55
It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of
the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial
technicalities that can be discarded.56 Indeed,
deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated.57 In these
times when court dockets are clogged with numerous
litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties
with greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly
disposition of those cases.58
After a judgment has become final, vested rights are
acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing party
has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, then the former has the correlative right to
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.59
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-
employee, it participated in the proceedings before the
RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was
deprived of due process. It might have lost its right to
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court.60 In fact, it
can be said that by jumping bail, the accused-employee,
not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC
Decision against the accused. It should be clear that
only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary
liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been
sufficiently proven that there exists an employer-
employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in
some kind of industry; and that the employee has been
adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have
committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.
The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that
"[o]n 26 August 1990, while on its regular trip from
Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner,
being then operated by petitioner’s driver, Napoleon
Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x
x."61 Neither does petitioner dispute that there was
already a finding of guilt against the accused while he
was in the discharge of his duties.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the
assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL
GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of
Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's
judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of
the crime of grave coercion on the ground of
reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered
them to pay jointly and severally the amount of
P9,000.00 to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following
information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA,
FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO,
DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR.,
RICARDO CELESTINO, REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN
DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO DOES of
the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose
Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdones,
Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac,
Roberto Rosales, Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega,
Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe
alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating
and mutually helping one another, and acting without
any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats, force
and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family to
close their stall located at the Public Market, Building
No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and by
subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and
thereafter brutally demolishing and destroying said stall
and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and
merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of the said
Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of
P30,000.00 in concept of actual or compensatory and
moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took
advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla,
being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest
of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with
evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth
Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the
accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael
Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and
hereby imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment
of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of
P500.00 each; to pay actual and compensatory damages
in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the
amount of P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for
exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the
accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the
proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon',
David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac,
Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto
Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega, are
hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of
reasonable doubt for their criminal participation
in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to
the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial
court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by
the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town
mayor had the power to order the clearance of market
premises and the removal of the complainants' stall
because the municipality had enacted municipal
ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a
nuisance per se. The petitioners stated that the lower
court erred in finding that the demolition of the
complainants' stall was a violation of the very directive
of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners
seventy two (72) hours to vacate the market premises.
The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison
terms of five months and one day and of accessory
penalties provided by law. They also challenged the
order to pay fines of P500.00 each, P10,000.00 actual
and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral
damages, P10,000.00 exemplary damages, and the
costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment
appealed from in the sense that the appellants
are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt.
but they are ordered to pay jointly and severally
to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as
actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
contending that the acquittal of the defendants-
appellants as to criminal liability results in the extinction
of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the
motion holding that:
xxx xxx xxx
... appellants' acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt whether the crime of
coercion was committed, not on facts that no
unlawful act was committed; as their taking the
law into their hands, destructing (sic)
complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as
evidence on record established that
complainants suffered actual damages, the
imposition of actual damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil
action, contending that:
I
 THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS
PAYMENT OF DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS
AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE CRIME
CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN
ITS RESOLUTION DATED DECEMBER 26, 1974
THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS
BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS
THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS COMMITTED,
THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS
CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL
INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR,
IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION
THAT PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL
ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW INTO THEIR
HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS'
PROPERTIES', AFTER HOLDING IN ITS MAIN
DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE
ACTS FOR WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID
NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND THEY
WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING
THE PETITIONERS HEREIN, APPELLANTS IN CA-
G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO
PAY COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED
ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or
not the respondent court committed a reversible error
in requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the
complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge.
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil
liability which is included in the criminal action is that
arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act,
and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case,
(no civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil
liability arising from the criminal charge could be
imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect
that the liability of the defendant for the return of the
amount received by him may not be enforced in the
criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil
action for the recovery of the said amount (People v.
Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in
Manila Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49
O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People
v. Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA
1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case
before us, the petitioners were acquitted not because
they did not commit the acts stated in the charge
against them. There is no dispute over the forcible
opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and
other instruments, and the carting away of the
merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because
these acts were denominated coercion when they
properly constituted some other offense such as threat
or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing
provision, the violence must be employed
against the person, not against property as
what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be
convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been
prosecuted either for threats or malicious
mischief. But the law does not allow us to
render judgment of conviction for either of
these offenses for the reason that they were
not indicted for, these offenses. The
information under which they were prosecuted
does not allege the elements of either threats
or malicious mischief. Although the information
mentions that the act was by means of threats',
it does not allege the particular threat made. An
accused person is entitled to be informed of the
nature of the acts imputed to him before he can
be made to enter into trial upon a valid
information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has
not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they
nevertheless are liable for the actual damages
suffered by the complainants by reason of the
demolition of the stall and loss of some of their
 properties. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it that of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c),
Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal v. Aliza, 51 OG.R.
1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the
instant case, the fact from which the civil might
arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and
loss of the properties contained therein; exists,
and this is not denied by the accused. And since
there is no showing that the complainants have
reserved or waived their right to institute a
separate civil action, the civil aspect therein is
deemed instituted with the criminal action.
(Rule 111, Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the
fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability
arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with it. There is no implied institution when the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or
reserves his right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v.
Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal
in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex
delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81
SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also
extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the civil
liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through
Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73 Phil.
607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or
omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities against
the accused and, where provided by law, his employer.
'There is the civil liability arising from the act as
a crime and the liability arising from the same act as
a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil
liability may be enforced against the accused, However,
the offended party cannot recover damages under both
types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal
negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence,
Article 2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.
— In all cases not included in the preceding
section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry
with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the
person entitled to the civil action may institute
it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided
by law against the person who may be liable for
restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of
the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might
arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as
only preponderance of evidence is required in civil
cases; where the court expressly declares that the
liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in
nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v.
Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa,
theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain
relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art.
332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability
does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal
act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v.
Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p.
623). Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of
the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in
 case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to
that effect, it may be inferred from the text of
the decision whether or not the acquittal is due
to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the
defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an
obstacle to the filing of a civil case based on the same
acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he
spent said sum for and in the interest of the
Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his
personal benefit is not a declaration that the
fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based
does not exist. The civil action barred by such a
declaration is the civil liability arising from the
offense charged, which is the one impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1,
Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a declaration
would not bar a civil action filed against an
accused who had been acquitted in the criminal
case if the criminal action is predicated on
factual or legal considerations other than the
commission of the offense charged. A person
may be acquitted of malversation where, as in
the case at bar, he could show that he did not
misappropriate the public funds in his
possession, but he could be rendered liable to
restore said funds or at least to make a proper
accounting thereof if he shall spend the same
for purposes which are not authorized nor
intended, and in a manner not permitted by
applicable rules and regulations. (Republic v.
Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a
separate civil action to still be filed considering that the
facts to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where the
accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded
the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal
charged. The constitutional presumption of innocence
called for more vigilant efforts on the part of
prosecuting attorneys and defense counsel, a keener
awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of
perjury, and a more studied consideration by the judge
of the entire records and of applicable statutes and
precedents. To require a separate civil action simply
because the accused was acquitted would mean
needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of
time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly
established by the evidence adduced by both the
prosecution and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then
Chief Galdones, complying with the instructions
contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the
Mayor, and upon seeing that Antonio Vergara
had not vacated the premises in question, with
the aid of his policemen, forced upon the store
or stall and ordered the removal of the goods
inside the store of Vergara, at the same time
taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled
them outside in front of the store and had it
cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods
were taken out from the store, ordered the
demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara.
Since then up to the trial of this case, the
whereabouts of the goods taken out from the
store nor the materials of the demolished stall
have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar
finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the
said Vergaras had not up to that time complied
with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief
of Police Galdones and some members of his
police force, went to the market and, using ax,
crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall of
the Vergaras who were not present or around,
and after having first inventoried the goods and
merchandise found therein, they had them
brought to the municipal building for
safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the
Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
merchandise thus taken away, the latter
refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they
evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
 Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken
8,000.00
P9,600.00
It is not disputed that the accused demolished
the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras
and carted away its contents. The defense that
they did so in order to abate what they
considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This
finds no support in law and in fact. The couple
has been paying rentals for the premises to the
government which allowed them to lease the
stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the
stall was a nuisance per se which could be
summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that
they caused the destruction of the complainant's
market stall and had its contents carted away. They
state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on
Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the
Vergaras were still in the premises, so the
petitioners Chief of Police and members of the
Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to
the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of
the Vergaras, made an inventory of the goods
found in said store, and brought these goods to
the municipal building under the custody of the
Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29
of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the accused
in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that
his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
a civil action for damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted." According to some scholars, this
provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil
action and cannot be modified by a rule of remedial law
even in the interests of economy and simplicity and
following the dictates of logic and common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to
sustain the civil action but inadequate to justify
a conviction in the criminal action, may it
render judgment acquitting the accused on
reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable
nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this
question would be consistent with the doctrine
that the two are distinct and separate actions,
and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of
the same civil action, or one based on quasi-
delict or other independent civil action, and of
presenting the same evidence: (b) save the
injured party unnecessary expenses in the
prosecution of the civil action or enable him to
take advantage of the free services of the fiscal;
and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling
implications of permitting the reinstitution of a
separate civil action whether based on delict, or
quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in
the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the Civil
Code should be amended because it clearly and
expressly provides that the civil action based on
the same act or omission may only be instituted
in a separate action, and therefore, may not
inferentially be resolved in the same criminal
action. To dismiss the civil action upon acquittal
of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of
any other civil action, would likewise render,
unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt
without any significance, and would violate the
doctrine that the two actions are distinct and
separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems
evident that there is much sophistry and no
pragmatism in the doctrine that it is
inconsistent to award in the same proceedings
damages against the accused after acquitting
him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must
recognize the distinct and separate character of
the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on
reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive
effects of a reservation or institution of a
separate civil action, and that the injured party
is entitled to damages not because the act or
omission is punishable but because he was
damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine
Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in
order to allow a court to grant damages despite a
judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What
Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy for
the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in
a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely
emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or
omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that
the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil
action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
statement that such separate filing is the only and
exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in
the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a judgment
awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two
can stand side by side. A judgment of acquittal operates
to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however,
extinguish the civil liability unless there is clear showing
that the act from which civil liability might arise did not
exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil
Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes
an uncalled for burden before one who has already
been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act
may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil
Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they
could not possibly have intended to make it more
difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just
compensation by making a separate civil action
mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in
a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the
Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice,
where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of
the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived
from the the criminal offense, when the latter is
not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused
thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a
clear line of demarcation between criminal
liability and civil responsibility, and to
determine the logical result of the distinction.
The two liabilities are separate and distinct
from each other. One affects the social order
and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while
the other is for reparation of damages suffered
by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper
that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or
fine upon the accused, the offense should be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the
purpose of indemnifying the complaining party,
why should the offense also be proved beyond
reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or
violation of every private right to be proved
only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right
of the aggrieved person any less private
because the wrongful act is also punishable by
the criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-
46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where
additional facts have to be established or more
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal case
has been fully terminated and a separate complaint
would be just as efficacious or even more expedient
than a timely remand to the trial court where the
criminal action was decided for further hearings on the
civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of
course, choose to file a separate action. These do not
exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays
suffered by the case in the trial, appellate, and review
stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this
case to require at this time a separate civil action to be
filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding
damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition
for lack of merit.
G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this
litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of Manila Railroad Company in the
capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived
in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal,
which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the company's
office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a
pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to
ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the
occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff
arose from his seat in the second class-car where he
was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took
his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the
upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the
San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance
away from the company's office and extends along in
front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the
length of several coaches. As the train slowed down
another passenger, named Emilio Zuñiga, also an
employee of the railroad company, got off the same car,
alighting safely at the point where the platform begins
to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had
proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco
stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in
contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that
his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on
the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform
and was drawn under the moving car, where his right
arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that
after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved
forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a
dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly
by a single light located some distance away, objects on
the platform where the accident occurred were difficult
to discern especially to a person emerging from a
lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on
the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the
fact that it was the customary season for harvesting
these melons and a large lot had been brought to the
station for the shipment to the market. They were
contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on
the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony
shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons
and the edge of platform; and it is clear that the fall of
the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted
upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped
upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see
these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an
unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries
which he had received were very serious. He was
therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the
city of Manila where an examination was made and his
arm was amputated. The result of this operation was
unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to
another hospital where a second operation was
performed and the member was again amputated
higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that
the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form
of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in
connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in
the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to
recover damages of the defendant company, founding
his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of
melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed
as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting
from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court
of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the
facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom
his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence
was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact
that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct
passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless,
the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in
alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded
form recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in
favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff
appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the
railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
these sacks on the platform in the manner above
stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as
he alighted from the train; and that they therefore
constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the
defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's
own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem
it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability,
to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant
company and the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal
liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and
that the obligation to respond for the damage which
plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to
exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its
liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in
legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for
the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903
of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the
exercise of due care in their selection and supervision.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-
contractual obligations — or to use the technical form
of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana
and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon
articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points
out this distinction, which was also recognized by this
Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting
upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the
difference between "culpa, substantive and
independent, which of itself constitutes the source of
an obligation between persons not formerly connected
by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in
the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was
made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article
1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of
negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903
of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood
to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where
relations already formed give rise to duties,
whether springing from contract or quasi-
contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the
same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific
Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The
liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain
cases imposed upon employers with respect to
damages occasioned by the negligence of their
employees to persons to whom they are not bound by
contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law,
upon the principle of respondeat superior — if it were,
the master would be liable in every case and
unconditionally — but upon the principle announced in
article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all
persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to
another, the obligation of making good the damage
caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the
hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of
the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty
of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all
the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to
make good the damage arises at the very instant that
the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of
his employment causes the injury. The liability of the
master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not
been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection
and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts
of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his
employment or not, if the damage done by the servant
does not amount to a breach of the contract between
the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care
in the selection and control of the servant relieves the
master from liability for the latter's acts — on the
contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has
never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the
liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always
based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without
willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has
caused damage to another. A master who exercises all
possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into
consideration the qualifications they should possess for
the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to
confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence,
thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he
is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability
whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants,
even within the scope of their employment, such third
person suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903
of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he
has been negligent in the selection or direction of his
servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to
proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting
identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code,
has held that these articles are applicable to cases of
extra-contractual culpa exclusively.
(Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in
its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes,
(30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon
the theory of the extra-contractual liability of the
defendant to respond for the damage caused by the
carelessness of his employee while acting within the
scope of his employment. The Court, after citing the last
paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
 From this article two things are apparent: (1)
That when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence
on the part of the master or employer either in
selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or
both; and (2) that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the
satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved
from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the
master ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant. This is the notable
peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It
is, of course, in striking contrast to the
American doctrine that, in relations with
strangers, the negligence of the servant in
conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect
that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been
some fault attributable to the defendant personally,
and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely
establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete
accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who
says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article
1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties
inherent in the special relations of authority or
superiority existing between the person called upon to
repair the damage and the one who, by his act or
omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and
employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause
damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is
not based upon a mere presumption of the master's
negligence in their selection or control, and proof of
exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard
does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach
of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-
contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation
has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual
duties which civilized society imposes upon it members,
or which arise from these relations, other than
contractual, of certain members of society to others,
generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal
rights of each member of society constitute the
measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly
negative in character, which the existence of those
rights imposes upon all other members of society. The
breach of these general duties whether due to willful
intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury,
give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party.
The fundamental distinction between obligations of this
character and those which arise from contract, rests
upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation
it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself
which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual
relations the vinculum exists independently of the
breach of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties
when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising
from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect — and our
Legislature has so elected — whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for
reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without
regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include
responsibility for the negligence of those person who
acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to
others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which
adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-
contractual liability — with certain well-defined
exceptions — to cases in which moral culpability can be
directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This
moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in the selection and control of one's
agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by
reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency
with respect to the person made liable for their
conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has
undertaken by contract to render service to another, is
wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates.
When the sources of the obligation upon which
plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or
omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence — if he does not his action fails.
But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff,
and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to
specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the
contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the
part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents.
Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is
sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of
extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as
the only fact upon which his action is based;
while on the contrary, in a case of negligence
which presupposes the existence of a
contractual obligation, if the creditor shows
that it exists and that it has been broken, it is
not necessary for him to prove negligence.
(Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the
breach of a contract to show that the breach was due to
the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants,
even though such be in fact the actual cause of the
breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant
that the negligence or omission of his servants or agents
caused the breach of the contract would not constitute
a defense to the action. If the negligence of servants or
agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the
liability arising from contract, the anomalous result
would be that person acting through the medium of
agents or servants in the performance of their
contracts, would be in a better position than those
acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to
watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee,
by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is
unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him
from his liability for the breach of his contract, which
involves the duty to exercise due care in the
preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his
servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a
theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy
practically complete immunity from damages arising
from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent
acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act
through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be
true in most instances that reasonable care had been
taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one
delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral,
and they are lost by reason of the negligence of some
clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and
reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of liability
for the breach of its contract to return the collateral
upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care
had been exercised in the selection and direction of the
clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as
the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a
mere incident to the performance of a contract has
frequently been recognized by the supreme court of
Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20,
1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of
November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action
arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail
himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil
Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected
defendant's contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without
any pre-existing obligation, by fault or
negligence, such as those to which article 1902
of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused
by the defendant's failure to carry out the
undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court
involving the liability of employers for damage done by
the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no
case has the court ever decided that the negligence of
the defendant's servants has been held to constitute a
defense to an action for damages for breach of
contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the
court held that the owner of a carriage was not liable
for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver.
In that case the court commented on the fact that no
evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the
defendant had been negligent in the employment of the
driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill
or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's
Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215),
the plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by
the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was
allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendant's
servants in the course of the performance of a contract
of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp.
29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out
of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we
do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and
1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep.,
374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages
for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of
defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's
automobile in which defendant was riding at the time.
The court found that the damages were caused by the
negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held
that the master was not liable, although he was present
at the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are
continued for a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to observe
them and to direct the driver to desist
therefrom. . . . The act complained of must be
continued in the presence of the owner for such
length of time that the owner by his
acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and
Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is
true that the court rested its conclusion as to the
liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although
the facts disclosed that the injury complaint of by
plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising
out of the contract of transportation. The express
ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903,
in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent
acts of his servants "makes the distinction between
private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the
latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of
negligence in the selection or direction of servants; and
that in the particular case the presumption of
negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case,
the court treated plaintiff's action as though founded in
tort rather than as based upon the breach of the
contract of carriage, and an examination of the
pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of
law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed
from the standpoint of the defendant the practical
result must have been the same in any event. The proof
disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant
was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively
appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence
in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the
direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore,
liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the
breach of the duty were to be regarded as
constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As
Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether
negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself
the source of an extra-contractual undertaking
obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
There is always an act or omission productive of
damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part
of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds
that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to
exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise
proper care in the selection and direction of his
servants, the practical result is identical in either case.
Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred,
because the court held in the Yamada case that
defendant was liable for the damages negligently
caused by its servants to a person to whom it was
bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that
the defendant was negligent in the selection and
control of its servants, that in such a case the court
would have held that it would have been a good
defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the
theory of the breach of the contract, for defendant to
have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the
selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by
directing the attention to the relative spheres of
contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field
of non- contractual obligation is much more broader
than that of contractual obligations, comprising, as it
does, the whole extent of juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that
is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
contractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation
had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried
with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety
and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its
trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-
performance could not be excused by proof that the
fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the
assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon
the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation
to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its
trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury
suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory
negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to
a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of
comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case
(supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiff's own
negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely contributed
to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in
fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the
train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have
occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many
authorities in support of the contention, that it is
negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a
moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this
doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that
this proposition is too badly stated and is at variance
with the experience of every-day life. In this particular
instance, that the train was barely moving when
plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it
came to stop within six meters from the place where he
stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains
under these conditions every day of the year, and
sustain no injury where the company has kept its
platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no
reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any
injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been for
defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to
provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating
to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on
Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the
passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway
train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is
to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent
person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger
acted under the circumstances disclosed by the
evidence. This care has been defined to be, not
the care which may or should be used by the
prudent man generally, but the care which a
man of ordinary prudence would use under
similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
(Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol.
3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used
by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we
may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the
circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he
alighted from the train which would have admonished a
person of average prudence that to get off the train
under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so,
the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his
failure so to desist was contributory
negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact
from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he
stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly
the condition of the platform and while the train was
yet slowly moving. In considering the situation thus
presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff
was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the
obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons
piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was
bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford
to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains,
the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of
some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that
the platform was clear. The place, as we have already
stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof
of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the
performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if
it were by any possibility concede that it had right to
pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the
placing of them adequately so that their presence
would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence
on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform
was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance
from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was
thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as
it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger
a stable and even surface on which to alight.
Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor
and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means
so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving
as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble
person. In determining the question of contributory
negligence in performing such act — that is to say,
whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly —
the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger
are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has
been observed, as a general rule are less capable than
men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as
the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free
movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the
place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his
daily custom to get on and of the train at this station.
There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind
with regard either to the length of the step which he
was required to take or the character of the platform
where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while
the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was
not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the
accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk,
and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently
disabled him from continuing that employment.
Defendant has not shown that any other gainful
occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life,
according to the standard mortality tables, is
approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion
that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by
him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500,
and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the
additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention,
hospital services, and other incidental expenditures
connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is
hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25, and
for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced
petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class
for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various
amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of
the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for
attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the
amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed
decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully
supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a
group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France,
through its authorized agent, Philippine Air
Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class"
round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in
"first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the
"first class" seat that he was occupying because,
in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento,
there was a "white man", who, the Manager
alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the
plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and
told defendant's Manager that his seat would
be taken over his dead body; a commotion
ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G.
Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got
nervous in the tourist class; when they found
out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot
discussion with the white man [manager], they
came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified
Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26,
1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we
review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed
to make complete findings of fact on all the issues
properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts
favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the
appellate court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that
"No decision shall be rendered by any court of record
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed
in the statutory demand that a judgment determining
the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that
"Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain
complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised
before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a
nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however,
solely insists that a decision state the "essential
ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is
drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in
its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented
by one party and the other upon the issues raised.
Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to
specify in the sentence the facts" which a party
"considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the
mental process from which the Court draws the
essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so
clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion,
may result. So long as the decision of the Court of
Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its
conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold
therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to
the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court
well observed, "There is no law that so
requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the
decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to
hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this
setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact
that the findings "were based entirely on the evidence
for the prosecution without taking into consideration or
even mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy
as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the
judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision
the testimony of each witness for, or each item of
evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not
mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or
such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal
presumptions are that official duty has been regularly
performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a
case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required
to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of
the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential
to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon". 16They consist of the
court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative
facts in issue". 17 A question of law, upon the other
hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented by the parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in
an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It
is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter
the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of
whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he
claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he
paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket.
But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent
the true and complete intent and agreement of the
parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have
confirmed reservations for first class on any specific
flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that
such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly
presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which
reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class
seats on the "definite" segments of his journey,
particularly that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention
thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument
that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no
guarantee that the passenger to whom the
same had been issued, would be
accommodated in the first-class compartment,
for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make
arrangements upon arrival at every station for
the necessary first-class reservation. We are not
impressed by such a reasoning. We cannot
understand how a reputable firm like defendant
airplane company could have the indiscretion to
give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It
received the corresponding amount in payment
of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the
passenger to be at the mercy of its employees.
It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of
business that the company should know
 whether or riot the tickets it issues are to be
honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court
similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a
"First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from
his testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-
1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness,
Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and
testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From
what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its
witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class"
airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the
testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot
prevail over written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits
"A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony
of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was
issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own
witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation
for a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was
confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding
with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by
defendant would be subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for
a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount
refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the
Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that
such a judgment of affirmance has merged the
judgment of the lower court. 24Implicit in that
affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals
that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was
free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by
the assignments of error and all questions that might
have been raised are to be regarded as finally
adjudicated against the appellant". So also, the
judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all
error". 25 We reached this policy construction because
nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this
point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any
way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said
affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or
grounds different from those which were made the
basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is
not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the
fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein
confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow
of the hands of an airline. What security then can a
passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an
airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a
verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long
learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a
uniform language; that spoken word could be
notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence
to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here.
The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence
intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the
conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of
Appeals predicated the finding that respondent
Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a
first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the
Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no
"welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of
petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by
petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioner's
accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously
took a first class seat to provoke an issue". 29And this
because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see
the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my
seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see
the Manager". 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take a
first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no
seat? Or, if another had a better right to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral
damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract;
that to authorize an award for moral damages there
must be an averment of fraud or bad faith;31 and that
the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a
finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the
complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air
carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a
valuable consideration, the latter acting as
general agents for and in behalf of the
defendant, under which said contract, plaintiff
was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish
plaintiff, First Class passage on defendant's
plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's
tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting point
up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila,
... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from
Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to
Bangkok, defendant furnished to the plaintiff
First Class accommodation but only after
protestations, arguments and/or insistence
were made by the plaintiff with defendant's
employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First
Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only Tourist Class accommodations from
Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the
plaintiff has been compelled by defendant's
employees to leave the First Class
accommodation berths at Bangkok after he was
already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no
repetition of the inconvenience and
embarrassments brought by defendant's breach
of contract was forced to take a Pan American
World Airways plane on his return trip from
Madrid to Manila.32
xxx xxx xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to
furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff
suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and
humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation,
and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the
amount of P30,000.00. 33
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First,
That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class
passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-
Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached
when petitioner failed to furnish first class
transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was
bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled
Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
berth "after he was already, seated" and to take a seat
in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered
inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations,
thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety,
wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in
moral damages. It is true that there is no specific
mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the
inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the
facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The
contract was averred to establish the relation between
the parties. But the stress of the action is put on
wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start
of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on
guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while
sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso
was ousted by petitioner's manager who gave his seat
to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the
fulfillment of the contract was presented without
objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is
sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award
for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any,
was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to
conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the
question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in
the first class compartment of the plane
belonging to the defendant Air France while at
Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist
class not only without his consent but against
his will, has been sufficiently established by
plaintiff in his testimony before the court,
corroborated by the corresponding entry made
by the purser of the plane in his notebook
which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go
to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto
G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain
 of the plane who was asked by the manager of
defendant company at Bangkok to intervene
even refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no
one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted
or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could
have been easy for defendant to present its
manager at Bangkok to testify at the trial of the
case, or yet to secure his disposition; but
defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated —
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a
prior reservation was made by the white man.
Hence, if the employees of the defendant at
Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all
the seats had already been taken, surely the
plaintiff should not have been picked out as the
one to suffer the consequences and to be
subjected to the humiliation and indignity of
being ejected from his seat in the presence of
others. Instead of explaining to the white man
the improvidence committed by defendant's
employees, the manager adopted the more
drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was
then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We
are strengthened in our belief that this probably
was what happened there, by the testimony of
defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when
asked to explain the meaning of the letters
"O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said
"that the space is confirmed for first class.
Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for
defendant, who was the chief of the
Reservation Office of defendant, testified as
follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-
issuing office know what reservation
the passenger has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for
the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June
19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval
what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a
"better right" to the seat occupied by
Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent.
The defendant airline did not prove
"any better", nay, any right on the part
of the "white man" to the "First class"
seat that the plaintiff was occupying
and for which he paid and was issued a
corresponding "first class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the
action of the defendant's Manager in
Bangkok, the defendant could have
easily proven it by having taken the
testimony of the said Manager by
deposition, but defendant did not do
so; the presumption is that evidence
willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of
Court]; and, under the circumstances,
the Court is constrained to find, as it
does find, that the Manager of the
defendant airline in Bangkok not merely
asked but threatened the plaintiff to
throw him out of the plane if he did not
give up his "first class" seat because the
said Manager wanted to accommodate,
using the words of the witness Ernesto
G. Cuento, the "white man".38
It is really correct to say that the Court of
Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed
did not use the term "bad faith". But can it be
doubted that the recital of facts therein points
to bad faith? The manager not only prevented
Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he
forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him
suffer the humiliation of having to go to the
tourist class compartment - just to give way to
another passenger whose right thereto has not
been established. Certainly, this is bad faith.
Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a
meaning different from what is understood in
law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or will or
for ulterior purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient,
there is the express finding of bad faith in the
judgment of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant
violated its contract of transportation
with plaintiff in bad faith, with the
aggravating circumstances that
 defendant's Manager in Bangkok went
to the extent of threatening the plaintiff
in the presence of many passengers to
have him thrown out of the airplane to
give the "first class" seat that he was
occupying to, again using the words of
the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white
man" whom he (defendant's Manager)
wished to accommodate, and the
defendant has not proven that this
"white man" had any "better right" to
occupy the "first class" seat that the
plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for,
and for which the corresponding "first
class" ticket was issued by the
defendant to him.40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act
of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled
in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's
manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article
21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal
precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are
recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different
in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an
air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the
comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with
a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action
for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation.
They have a right to be treated by the carrier's
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and
abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards
a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a
passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a
tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence
of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was
worthless and demand payment under threat of
ejection, though the language used was not insulting
and she was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although
the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual
both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in
another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train,
when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered
him the cash fare to a point where the train was
scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the
train reached such point he would pay the cash fare
from that point to destination, there was nothing in the
conduct of the passenger which justified the conductor
in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a
lunatic," 48 and the Supreme Court of South Carolina
there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of
said passenger.1awphîl.nèt
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we
have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is
a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier —
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent
Carrascoso's testimony, thus —
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is
that attendant and purser?
A When we left already — that was already in
the trip — I could not help it. So one of the
flight attendants approached me and requested
from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she
said, "We will note that you transferred to the
tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That
is tantamount to accepting my transfer." And I
also said, "You are not going to note anything
there because I am protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel
uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg
room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that
 was next to me and the purser was there. He
told me, "I have recorded the incident in my
notebook." He read it and translated it to me —
because it was recorded in French — "First class
passenger was forced to go to the tourist class
against his will, and that the captain refused to
intervene."
Mr. VALTE —
I move to strike out the last part of the
testimony of the witness because the best
evidence would be the notes. Your Honor.
COURT —
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of
Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the
tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence
[Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent.
We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the
entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry
does not come within the proscription of the best
evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted,
when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be
felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as
part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the
nervous excitement and mental and physical condition
of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser
regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous,
and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident.
Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus
escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part
of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the
Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have
contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really
true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the
purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of
Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code
gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages — in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only
condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal
precept. And this, in addition to moral damages.54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The
grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the
courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break
faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised —
as it was here — should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed
by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of
exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees.
The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the
trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with
the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we
give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of
Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against
petitioner. So ordered.
G.R. No. 151452. July 29, 2005
SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS,
NORA BARNALO, BELINDA LUMACTAD, MARIENELA
DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO
FERRER, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge,
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101, DIONISIO M SIBAYAN,
and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC.,
represented by VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS,
President/Chairman, Respondent.
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 dated March 1,
2002, petitioners assail the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dated September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002,
respectively dismissing their petition for certiorari and
denying their motion for reconsideration, arising from
the dismissal of their complaint to recover civil
indemnity for the death and physical injuries of their
kin.
The following facts are matters of record.
In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M.
Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless
Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide and
Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle
collision between a southbound Viron Transit bus
driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which
claimed the lives of the van’s driver and three (3) of its
passengers, including a two-month old baby, and
caused physical injuries to five (5) of the van’s
passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and
sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years and two (2) months. However, as there was a
reservation to file a separate civil action, no
pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
municipal circuit trial court in its decision promulgated
on December 17, 1998.2
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their
reservation to file a separate civil action.3 They cited
therein the judgment convicting Sibayan.
Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of improper service of summons, prescription
and laches, and defective certification of non-forum
shopping. It also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q.
Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate
personality of Viron Transit from its officers.4
Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending,
among others, that the right to file a separate action in
this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the
finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there
was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the
complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence
was clearly filed within the prescriptive period.
The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal
ground that the cause of action had already prescribed.
According to the trial court, actions based on quasi
delict, as it construed petitioners’ cause of action to be,
prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of
action. Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners
reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the
complaint ought to be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.5
Improper service of summons was likewise cited as a
ground for dismissal of the complaint as summons was
served through a certain Jessica Ubalde of the legal
department without mentioning her designation or
position.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing
out yet again that the complaint is not based on quasi
delictbut on the final judgment of conviction in the
criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the
finality of the judgment.6 The trial court denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration reiterating that
petitioners’ cause of action was based on quasi
delict and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil
Code because the complaint was filed more than four
(4) years after the vehicular accident.7 As regards the
improper service of summons, the trial court
reconsidered its ruling that the complaint ought to be
dismissed on this ground.
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals which dismissed the same for error in the
choice or mode of appeal.8 The appellate court also
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration
reasoning that even if the respondent trial court judge
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
order of dismissal, certiorari is still not the permissible
remedy as appeal was available to petitioners and they
failed to allege that the petition was brought within the
recognized exceptions for the allowance of certiorari in
lieu of appeal.9
In this petition, petitioners argue that a rigid application
of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute for
appeal will result in a judicial rejection of an existing
obligation arising from the criminal liability of private
respondents. Petitioners insist that the liability sought
to be enforced in the complaint arose ex delicto and is
not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly
committed grave abuse of discretion when it insisted
that the cause of action invoked by petitioners is based
on quasi delict and concluded that the action had
prescribed. Since the action is based on the criminal
liability of private respondents, the cause of action
accrued from the finality of the judgment of conviction.
Assuming that their petition with the appellate court
was procedurally flawed, petitioners implore the Court
to exempt this case from the rigid operation of the rules
as they allegedly have a legitimate grievance to
vindicate, i.e., damages for the deaths and physical
injuries caused by private respondents for which no civil
liability had been adjudged by reason of their
reservation of the right to file a separate civil action.
In their Comment10 dated June 13, 2002, private
respondents insist that the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground of prescription was in order. They point
out that the averments in the complaint make out a
cause of action for quasi delict under Articles 2176 and
2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period
of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time the
accident took place.
Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability
cannot be enforced since Sibayan was not ordered to
pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transit’s
contention that the subsidiary liability of the employer
contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
presupposes a situation where the civil aspect of the
case was instituted in the criminal case and no
reservation to file a separate civil case was made.
Private respondents likewise allege that the recourse to
the Court of Appeals via certiorari was improper as
petitioners should have appealed the adverse order of
the trial court. Moreover, they point out several other
procedural lapses allegedly committed by petitioners,
such as lack of certification against forum-shopping;
lack of duplicate original or certified true copy of the
assailed order of the trial court; and non-indication of
the full names and addresses of petitioners in the
petition.
Petitioners filed a Reply11 dated September 14, 2002,
while private respondents filed a Rejoinder12 dated
October 14, 2002, both in reiteration of their
arguments.
We grant the petition.
Our Revised Penal Code provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.13 Such
civil liability may consist of restitution, reparation of the
damage caused and indemnification of consequential
damages.14 When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
liability arising from the offense is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action, subject to three notable
exceptions: first, when the injured party expressly
waives the right to recover damages from the
accused; second, when the offended party reserves his
right to have the civil damages determined in a separate
action in order to take full control and direction of the
prosecution of his cause; and third, when the injured
party actually exercises the right to maintain a private
suit against the offender by instituting a civil action
prior to the filing of the criminal case.
Notably, it was the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended in 1988, which governed the institution of
the criminal action, as well as the reservation of the
right to file a separate civil action. Section 1, Rule 111
thereof states:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.—
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with
the criminal action, unless the offended party waives
the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under
the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the
others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right
to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the
others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate
civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts
to present its evidence and under circumstances
affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity
to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability
against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for
such action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual
damages.
In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than
actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended
party upon filing thereof in court for trial.
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right
to file a separate civil action as a result of the crime
committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation,
the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision convicting
Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the
latter’s civil liability.
Predicating their claim on the judgment of conviction
and their reservation to file a separate civil action made
in the criminal case, petitioners filed a complaint for
damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman. Petitioners assert that by the
institution of the complaint, they seek to recover
private respondents’ civil liability arising from crime.
Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the
allegations in the complaint, the trial court dismissed
the same, declaring that petitioners’ cause of action
was based on quasi delict and should have been
brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of
action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.
A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations
therein are consistent with petitioners’ claim that the
action was brought to recover civil liability arising from
crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on
the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not
necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause
of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the
time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of
action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed. Besides,
in cases of negligence, the offended party has the
choice between an action to enforce civil liability arising
from crime under the Revised Penal Code and an action
for quasi delict under the Civil Code.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa
contractual or obligations arising from law under Article
31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32
and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code.15 Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the plaintiff cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant and the similar proscription against double
recovery under the Rules above-quoted.
At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in
this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue
the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex
delicto. This is so because the prescription of the
action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime
especially as the latter action had been expressly
reserved.
The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company16 was
decided upon a similar set of facts. Therein, the driver
of La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to damage to property. The
plaintiff made an express reservation for the filing of a
separate civil action. The driver was convicted which
conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff
filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi
delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court
upon finding that the action was instituted more than
six (6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had
already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted
another action, this time based on the subsidiary
liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed
the action holding that the dismissal of the earlier civil
case operated as a bar to the filing of the action to
enforce the bus company’s subsidiary liability.
We held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa
aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a
conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the
crime was in the discharge of the duties of the
employees. This is so because Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate
the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of
indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.
Seen in this light, the trial court should not have
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription,
but instead allowed the complaint for damages ex
delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering
petitioners’ allegations in their complaint, opposition to
the motion to dismiss17 and motion for
reconsideration18 of the order of dismissal, insisting that
the action was to recover civil liability arising from
crime.
This does not offend the policy that the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action waives the other
civil actions. The rationale behind this rule is the
avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants
arising out of the same act or omission of the
offender.19 However, since the stale action for damages
based on quasi delict should be considered waived,
there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple
suits against private respondents as the only recourse
available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto. This
interpretation is also consistent with the bar against
double recovery for obvious reasons.
Now the procedural issue. Admittedly, petitioners
should have appealed the order of dismissal of the trial
court instead of filing a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals. Such procedural misstep, however,
should be exempted from the strict application of the
rules in order to promote their fundamental objective
of securing substantial justice.20 We are loathe to
deprive petitioners of the indemnity to which they are
entitled by law and by a final judgment of conviction
based solely on a technicality. It is our duty to prevent
such an injustice.21
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered SETTING
ASIDE the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
September 10, 2001 and January 9, 2002, respectively
dismissing the present action and denying petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, as well as the orders of the
lower court dated February 26, 2001 and July 16, 2001.
Let the case be REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO
CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the
Resolution1 dated December 28, 1999 dismissing the
petition for certiorari and the Resolution2 dated August
24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration, both
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore
Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other owned by
petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and
driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan ("Casupanan"
for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two
cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal case against Casupanan for reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed
as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya
for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was
then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya,
defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the
civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering
the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted
the motion in the Order of March 26, 1999 and
dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and
Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal
case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration
in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas,
Tarlac, Branch 66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of
dismissal.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28,
1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of
merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal
issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of
the case and therefore the proper remedy should have
been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a
special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a
lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even
on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the
civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not
an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in
the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
 "In a certain vehicular accident involving two
parties, each one of them may think and believe
that the accident was caused by the fault of the
other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to
be the aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal
case for reckless imprudence against the second
party. On the other hand, the second party,
together with his operator, believing
themselves to be the real aggrieved parties,
opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private
complainant in the criminal case."4
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a
pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can
validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.
The Court’s Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089,
which the MCTC dismissed on the ground of forum-
shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal
case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused
in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private
complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate
civil action at the proper time. They contend that an
action on quasi-delict is different from an action
resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an
accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a
civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain
that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the
civil case can proceed independently of the criminal
action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not
the only one who filed the independent civil action
based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-
operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the
criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally
defective as it does not state the real antecedents.
Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo
forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal
when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of
appeal. Laroya argues that there is no question of law to
be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and
a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed
appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the
petition raises the legal question of whether there is
forum-shopping since they filed only one action - the
independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on
the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not
state in its order of dismissal5 that the dismissal
was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular,
the order of dismissal is without prejudice to refiling the
complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states
it is with prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that the
dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on
the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing
an action without prejudice is not appealable. The
remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil
action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly
states that "where the judgment or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate
special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas
RTC’s order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the
ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is
erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure
a favorable judgment.8 Forum-shopping is present when
in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights of action and reliefs sought.9 However,
there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because
the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a
separate civil action which can proceed independently
of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property based on the Revised
Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil
action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil
Code. Although these two actions arose from the same
act or omission, they have different causes of action.
The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable
under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is
based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176
and 2177 of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa
aquiliana read:
 "Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate
and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided
he proves, by preponderance of evidence, that he has
suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of
another. Either the private complainant or the accused
can file a separate civil action under these articles.
There is nothing in the law or rules that state only the
private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these
articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity)
expressly requires the accused to litigate his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. – (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint may be filed by the accused in the
criminal case, but any cause of action which
could have been the subject thereof may be
litigated in a separate civil action." (Emphasis
supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a
criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate civil
action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused
files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended in
1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil
action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act
or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the
criminal case. These civil actions referred to the
recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of
damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery of damages
for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code
on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for
quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the offended party
had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring
such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed
"impliedly instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules provided as follows:
"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil
actions. – When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the action,
reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity
under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes
the others. The institution of, or the reservation
of the right to file, any of said civil actions
separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the
separate civil actions shall be made before the
prosecution starts to present its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on
December 1, 2000 and now provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil
actions. – (a) When a criminal action is
 instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged
shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence
and under circumstances affording the
offended party a reasonable opportunity to
make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately
and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon
application with the court trying the latter case.
If the application is granted, the trial of both
actions shall proceed in accordance with section
2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil
and criminal actions." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is
"deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only the
action to recover civil liability arising from the crime
or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer
"deemed instituted," and may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation
in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation
in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a
separate and independent civil action based on these
articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the
civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code
continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of
the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of
the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal
action.10
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still
given the option to file a separate civil action to recover
civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the
criminal action before the prosecution presents its
evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make
such reservation if he files a separate civil action before
filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover
civil liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has
not yet commenced, the civil action may be
consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation
under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions
arising from the same act or omission filed under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.11
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a
separate civil action, if reserved in the criminal action,
could not be filed until after final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil
action was filed before the commencement of the
criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was
suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until
final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This
rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to
recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to
independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed
independently regardless of the filing of the criminal
action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules continues this procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is
suspended. – After the criminal action has been
commenced, the separate civil action arising
therefrom cannot be instituted until final
judgment has been entered in the criminal
action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil
action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless,
before judgment on the merits is rendered in
the civil action, the same may, upon motion of
the offended party, be consolidated with the
criminal action in the court trying the criminal
action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be
deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of
the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal
case and of the parties to present additional
evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil
actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
 During the pendency of the criminal action, the
running of the period of prescription of the civil
action which cannot be instituted separately or
whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not
change the rule that the separate civil action, filed to
recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the
filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present
Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement
of the criminal action, of a separate civil action to
recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and
Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the
criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the
offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111
of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed
independently. - In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, the independent civil action
may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action
and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the
offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal
action." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in
the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows the
"offended party" to bring an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As
stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil
action shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the "offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission
charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the
criminal action can file an independent civil action for
quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended
party" may bring such an action but the "offended
party" may not recover damages twice for the same act
or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly,
Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the
criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling
in Cabaero vs. Cantos12 where the Court held that the
accused therein could validly institute a separate civil
action for quasi-delict against the private complainant
in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the
criminal case filed his Answer with Counterclaim for
malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the
"absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution
on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof." Thus, the
Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to
the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any
counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further ruled
that the accused may file a separate civil case against
the offended party "after the criminal case is
terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules
which may be promulgated." The Court explained that a
cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on
the civil aspect will only unnecessarily complicate the
proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal
case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was
incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to address
the lacunamentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision,
the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-
claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case.
However, the same provision states that "any cause of
action which could have been the subject (of the
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may
be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule
111 mandates the accused to file his counterclaim in a
separate civil actiosn which shall proceed independently
of the criminal action, even as the civil action of the
offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the
independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the
criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The
commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action
under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil
action arising from the crime, if such civil action is
reserved or filed before the commencement of the
criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for
the same act or omission. The first a criminal case
where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-
delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case
for quasi-delict - without violating the rule on non-
forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action
will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The
only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant. In most cases, the offended party will have
no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the accused. In some instances, the accused may be
insolvent, necessitating the filing of another case
against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-
delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in
the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph
6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that
the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a
separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons.
First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any
counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed
instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore
forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the
offended party. If the accused does not file a separate
civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may
set in since the period continues to run until the civil
action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a
right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the
same way that the offended party can avail of this
remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To
disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, while refusing to recognize his
counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due
process of law, access to the courts, and equal
protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed
separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The
order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on
the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the
decision of the trial court in the criminal case may vary
with the decision of the trial court in the independent
civil action. This possibility has always been recognized
ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept
of an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of
the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil
action "may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter."
In Azucena vs. Potenciano,13the Court declared:
"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical
conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil
action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution — whether it
be conviction or acquittal — would render
meaningless the independent character of the
civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31
that this action 'may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter.’"
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code
introduced the concept of a civil action separate and
independent from the criminal action although arising
from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has
yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable
decisions of trial courts, one hearing the criminal case
and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more
apparent than real. In any event, there are sufficient
remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such
remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the
MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28,
1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given
retroactive effect considering the well-settled rule that -
"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the
court will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that
sense and to that extent."14
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December 28,
1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-
C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089
is REINSTATED.
G.R. No. 145804 February 6, 2003
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO
ROMAN, petitioners,
vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR
NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
The case before the Court is an appeal from the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000,
respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled
"Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor
Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has modified
the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent
Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding
Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman
liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor
Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven
o’clock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk,
entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was
standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito
Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area
approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an
altercation between the two apparently ensued that led
to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to
indicate how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the
LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an
LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and
he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein
respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children,
filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin,
Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the
death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a
counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against
Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied
liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while
Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence,
filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to
prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.
On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision;
it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants Prudent
Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay
jointly and severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the
sum of P50,000.00;
"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
"c) Attorney’s fees of P20,000;
"d) Costs of suit.
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo
Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are
likewise dismissed."1
Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August
2000, the appellate court promulgated its now assailed
decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the
LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby
MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any
liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead,
appellees Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit
Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are
hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the
plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the
deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees."2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the
deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train,
a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed
when the victim entered the place where passengers
were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting
the corresponding token therefor. In exempting
Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was
nothing to link the security agency to the death of
Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that
Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the
evidence merely established the fact of death of
Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train
owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the
time by Roman. The appellate court faulted petitioners
for their failure to present expert evidence to establish
the fact that the application of emergency brakes could
not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged
errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:
"I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE
TRIAL COURT
"II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
"III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE
OF LRTA."3
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court
ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the trial
court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping
conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the
part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners
would insist that Escartin’s assault upon Navidad, which
caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a
stranger that could not have been foreseen or
prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate
court’s conclusion on the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked
basis because Roman himself had testified being an
employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate
court, contended that a contract of carriage was
deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the
fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the
latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection
under a contractual relation, and that the appellate
court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the
death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary
diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier,
both from the nature of its business and for reasons of
public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising
utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers.4 The Civil Code, governing the liability of a
common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers,
provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the
passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to
passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death
of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or
willful acts of the former’s employees, although such
employees may have acted beyond the scope of their
authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease
upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for
injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of
strangers, if the common carrier’s employees through
the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers
safely using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons with due regard for all circumstances.5 Such
duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of
the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its
premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to
the contract of carriage.6 The statutory provisions
render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to
passengers (a) through the negligence or wilful acts of
its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if the
common carrier’s employees through the exercise of
due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act
or omission.7 In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent,
and8 by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved
of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of
the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts
upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure.9 In the absence
of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the
accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the
appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption
would be that it has been at fault,10 an exception from
the general rule that negligence must be proved.11
The foundation of LRTA’s liability is the contract of
carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises
from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure
to exercise the high diligence required of the common
carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure
the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its
own employees or avail itself of the services of an
outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task.
In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that
liability could only be for tort under the provisions of
Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction
with Article 2180,13 of the Civil Code. The premise,
however, for the employer’s liability is negligence or
fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is
established, the employer can then be made liable on
the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families
in the selection and supervision of its employees. The
liability is primary and can only be negated by showing
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee, a factual matter that has not been shown.
Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then
must the liability of the common carrier, on the one
hand, and an independent contractor, on the other
hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same
act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a
liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where
tort is that which breaches the contract.16 Stated
differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of
contract would have itself constituted the source of a
quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between
the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.17
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving
spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court
is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of
Appeals that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the
death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the
negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly
proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not
without substantial justification in our own review of
the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner
Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or
omission, he must also be absolved from liability.
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT
and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the
latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only
for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual
damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be
vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.18 It is an established rule that nominal damages
cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.19
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate
court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but only in that
(a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b)
petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No
costs.