CANON 10

G.R. No. 78252 April 12, 1989

PALUWAGAN NG BAYAN SAVINGS BANK, petitioner,

vs.
ANGELO KING, KEN SUY WAT JOSE FERRER, JR., QUINTIN CALDERON, FE SARINO and DOMINGO K. LI, respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.

Simeon C. Sato for respondent Domingo K Li.

Syquia Law Offices for respondents King, Ken Suy Wat, Calderon and Ferrer, Jr.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The rule on service of summons in this jurisdiction is too well-known. In civil cases, the service of summons on a defendant is made by handing a copy
thereof to the defendant in person, or if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. 1 Such service of summons may be made at the defendant's
dwelling house or residence or at his office or regular place of business. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the
summons to the defendant himself.

However, when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time, substituted service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the
summons at the defendant's dwelling house or residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendant's office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof. 2

It is only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time that substituted service maybe resorted to. The impossibility of
prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact that such efforts failed. This statement should
be made in the proof of service. This is necessary because substituted service is in derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that this
method of service is "in derogation of the common law; it is a method extraordinary in character, and hence may be used only as prescribed and in the
circumstances authorized by statute." Thus, under the controlling decisions, the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly,
faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by the statute is considered ineffective. 3

The application of the foregoing rules is the issue in this petition for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in G.R. CV No. 03386
entitled "Paluwagan ng Bayan Savings Bank vs. Mercantile Financing Corporation, et al." dated January 27, 1987, and its resolution dated April 22,
1987. 4

The facts are undisputed. Petitioner sued Mercantile Financing Corporation MFC, and private respondents, as directors and officers of MFC, for the
recovery of money market placements through certain promissory notes. They were charged jointly and solidarily in accordance with Section 31 of the
Corporation Code 5which provides as follows:

Section 31. Liability of Directors, Trustees, Officers.-Directors or trustees who willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently
unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation shall be
liable jointly and severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or members and other
persons.

Summons and copies of the complaints were served upon MFC and private respondents at the 4th Floor, LTA Building, No. 118 Perea Street, Makati,
Metro Manila, which is the stated office address of MFC in the complaint, through its Assistant Manager Mr. Nasario S. Najomot Jr. who acknowledged
receipt thereof for and in behalf of MFC and the private respondents. This is so recited in the certification of deputy sheriff Bernardo San Juan dated May
11, 1983.

On May 24, 1983, the law firm of Guillermo E. Aragones and Associates filed a motion for extension of time to file a responsible pleading and/or motion
to dismiss. The said motion was signed by Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones as counsel for the defendants. The motion was granted in an order dated May
26, 1983 giving the defendants an extension of twenty (20) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file the responsive
pleading and/or motion to dismiss. On June 13, 1983, said counsel for defendants filed a motion asking for a suspension of the action for a period of
sixty (60) days on the ground that there was an on-going negotiation for an amicable settlement of the case between the parties. The motion was
denied. On June 27, 1983, counsel for plaintiff filed a motion to declare defendants in default for failure to file an answer. This motion was granted in an
order dated June 29, 1983. On July 14, 1983, the parties, assisted by their counsel, submitted a compromise Agreement for the approval of the court. It
reads as follows:

1. The defendants propose to pay, jointly and severally, then account with the plaintiff as of June 15, 1983, in the sum of
P707,500.01 with 20% interest per annum as follows:

P100,000.00-on or before July 18, 1983

100,000.00-on or before August 30, 1983

 100,000.00-on or before September 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before October 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before November 30, 1983

100,000.00--on or before December 30, 1983

100,000.00-on or before January 30, 1984.

2. Except those mentioned above, the plaintiff has no more claim against the defendants.

3. The plaintiff agrees to the proposal of settlement offered by the defendants provided that in case the latter fail to pay, jointly and
severally, two or more successive monthly installments, the plaintiff is entitled to secure from the Court a writ of execution for the
collection of the unpaid account of the defendants. 6

On July 18, 1983, a decision was rendered by the trial court approving the said Compromise Agreement and enjoining the parties to comply with the
terms and conditions embodied therein. Partial payments were made under the compromise judgment. Upon failure of private respondent to make the
other payments, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution of judgment. The trial court granted the motion on December 16, 1983.

On January 16,1984, counsel for defendants filed a pleading entitled "Clarification" thereby seeking a correction of the compromise judgment on the
ground that he erroneously filed the Compromise Agreement in behalf of all the defendants when in fact he was the counsel for MFC only. On January
17, 1984, said counsel filed a "Motion To Correct Compromise Agreement" attaching thereto a copy of the resolution of the Board of Directors of MFC of
July 6,1983 showing that he was the attorney-in-fact of MFC only, and praying for the correction of the judgment, accordingly. The motion for clarification
was denied on January 20,1984.

On January 24, 1984, the Syquia Law Offices, in behalf of private respondents Angelo King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon and Jose J. Ferrer, Jr.,
filed a motion to set aside the decision dated July 18,1983, the Compromise Agreement and the writ of execution dated December 21, 1983 on the
ground that there was no service of summons upon each of them as the corporate address of the corporation was not their address as they were no
longer connected therewith; that Atty. Aragones had no authority to represent them in the action and compromise agreement; that they were not served
copies of the decision of the court; that they learned about the same only when it was being executed; and that they did not participate as directors or
officers of MFC in the subject transaction.

On January 26,1984, private respondent Domingo F. Li filed a petition for relief from judgment with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction alleging therein that there was no service of summons upon him and that Atty. Aragones was not authorized to represent him or to enter into
the Compromise Agreement. After an opposition to said motion was filed by the petitioner, the lower court denied the same in its order dated April 6,
1984. Separate motions for reconsideration filed by the private respondents were also denied on May 4,1984.

Thus, private respondents appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals, reiterating that there was no service of summons upon each of them as service
of summons was made at the address of the firm with which they had severed connections; that the counsel of record of MFC has no authority to
represent them in the case and in the Compromise Agreement; that they have not ratified the same by a partial payment of the compromise judgment;
and that they were no longer connected with MFC at the time they were sued. In due time, a decision was rendered by the appellate court on January
27, 1987, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

In view of the foregoing, the other errors assigned by the appellants need not be resolved: Wherefore:

(1) the decision dated July 18, 1983 approving the compromise agreement rendered by the lower court as well as the writ of
execution issued pursuant thereto as against appellants Angelo King, Keng Suy Wat, Quintin Calderon, Jose Ferrer, Jr., and
Domingo Li are hereby SET ASIDE; and

(2) the case is remanded to the court of origin which is hereby ordered to direct proper service of summons on the aforesaid
individual appellants at their respective correct addresses and thereafter to proceed in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED. 7

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision filed by petitioner was denied by the appellate court on April 22, 1987. Hence, the instant petition
predicated on the following grounds:

(A) THAT THE CASE AT BAR (a) PERTAINS TO (AN) APPEAL FROM ORDER OF TRIAL COURT DATED APRIL 6,1984,
DENYING (i) PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOMINGO K LI'S 'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT' FILED JANUARY 25,
1984, AND (ii) MOTION TO SET ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH EXECUTION FILED JANUARY
14,1984 BY PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ANGELO KING, KING SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON and JOSE FERRER, JR. and (b)
DOES NOT INVOLVE ANY APPEAL FROM TRIAL COURT'S DECISION DATED JULY 19,1983 APPROVING THE COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT WHICH HAS LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.

(B) THAT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMPLETELY IGNORED THE BASIC QUESTION OF WHETHER (a) PRIVATE
RESPONDENT DOMINGO K. LI'S 'PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT FILED JANUARY 25,1984, and (b)'THE MOTION
TO SET ASIDE DECISION, COMPROMISE AGREEMENT AND QUASH EXECUTION' FILED JANUARY 14,1984 BY PRIVATE
 RESPONDENTS ANGELO KING, KENG SUY WAT, QUINTIN CALDERON AND JOSE FERRER, JR., WERE FILED OUT OF
TIME.

(C) THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO WERE SUED AS DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF MFC WERE PROPERLY
SERVED WITH SUMMONS.

The petition is devoid of merit.

Although private respondents were sued in their capacity as directors and officers of MFC, they are, nevertheless, being held personally liable for the
obligation subject of the litigation under the complaint filed by petitioner. Hence, the rule on personal service of summons must be observed in that
summons must be served personally on private respondents or, if they refuse to receive the same, by tendering it to them.

The proof of service prepared by the sheriff does not show that such personal service of summons was effected. The office address of the corporation
as indicated in the complaint does not appear to be the office address of private respondents as they were no longer connected with the corporation
then. Personal service of summons should have been made on them at their residences as shown in the records of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Central Bank. Instead, the sheriff effected substituted service by leaving copies of the summons with the Assistant Manager of
MFC at the place of business of said corporation with which as above stated private respondents were no longer connected. Such substituted service is
not valid. There was no compliance with the requirements of the rule that there must be a previous personal service and a failure to effect the same
before substituted service could be resorted to. As the private respondents have not been duly served with summons, the trial court never acquired
jurisdiction over their persons.

It is true that Atty. Aragones, who entered his appearance in behalf of MFC and private respondents, sought an extension of time to file an answer or a
responsive pleading, and a suspension of the proceedings pending a possible settlement of the case; that thereafter, he signed a Compromise
Agreement in behalf of MFC and private respondents which was submitted to the court on the basis of which a compromise judgment was rendered; that
said judgment was partially complied with but upon default in the payment of the balance, a writ of execution was sought from and granted by the trial
court; and that it was only then that Atty. Aragones informed the court that he committed an oversight in having filed the Compromise Agreement in
behalf of private respondents when it was only MFC which hired his services. If Atty. Aragones was duly authorized to appear in behalf of the
defendants, his voluntary appearance in their behalf by the filing of the aforementioned pleadings and the Compromise Agreement would constitute a
waiver of the defect in the service of summons. However, the lack of authority of Atty. Aragones was revealed when he produced the resolution of the
Board of Directors of MFC to the effect that the authority of said counsel was in behalf of said corporation only and not in behalf of the private
respondents.

Since the Compromise Agreement was signed by Atty. Aragones in behalf of the private respondents without their authority, the same is null and void in
so far as they are concerned. By the same token, the compromise judgment is also null and void as to private respondents. The ruling of the lower court
that the motion to set aside the judgment and the petition for relief from judgment were filed beyond the reglementary period is untenable. An action to
declare the nullity of a void judgment does not prescribe. 8

One last word, Atty. Aragones' appears to be remiss in his duties and reckless in the performance of his responsibility as counsel of record in said case.
He represented himself to be the counsel for the defendants including the private respondents not only in the motions he filed but also in the
Compromise Agreement he submitted. It was only after the writ of execution of the compromise judgment was being enforced that he perked up by
saying that he committed an oversight and that he was not authorized by the private respondents to represent them as counsel, much less in the
Compromise Agreement. Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer. To say one thing today and another tomorrow is a
transgression of this imperative. Counsel should be made to account before his peers.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for an appropriate administrative
investigation, report and recommendation on Atty. Guillermo E. Aragones who holds office at the 9th Floor of the Finasia Building, 6774 Ayala Avenue,
Makati, Metro Manila. No costs. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 118584 October 24, 1995

AURELIA S. GOMEZ, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, Branch 15, Ozamis City; COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In our resolution of 31 May 1995 dismissing this petition for "utter lack of merit," we required attorneys for petitioner to show cause "why they should not
be disciplinarily dealt with for impeding the execution of the judgment in Criminal case No. 85-49 and for misusing the rules of procedure to defeat the
ends of justice in violation of Rule 10.03, Canon 10 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility." The backdrop of our order is
summarized in the resolution in this wise:

The petitioner seeks the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari and mandamus to annul and set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ozamis City, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 85-49, the Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 5
 September 1990 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07482, and the Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 108331; and to order the Court of Appeals
to give due course to the petitioner's appeal upon the filing of appellant's brief.

The Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General reveals the following procedural antecedents, some of which are suppressed in
the petition.

In spite of its resolution of 5 September 1990 in CA-G.R. CR No. 07482 dismissing the petitioner's appeal from the RTC decision in
Criminal Case No. 85-49 for failure to file the appellant's brief, the Court of Appeals accepted her Memorandum of 28 September
1990 wherein she raised the errors allegedly committed by the trial court. On 8 April 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
the Appellee's Brief refuting all the assigned errors. Since no reply brief was filed by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals, in its
resolution of 21 June 1991, resolved to consider the case submitted for decision without the said brief.

On 9 June 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, the dispositive portion of which reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aurelia Gomez guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Libel, defined and penalized under Article 355, in relation to Article 355 (sic) end 354 of
the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances present, she is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, to pay a fine of
P2,000.00 to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to pay the offended party Marieto M. Tan, Sr.
the amount of P70,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Her motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals having been denied, the petitioner elevated the case to this Court on a
petition for review on certiorari which was docketed as G.R. No. 108331. This petition was, however, denied for non-compliance with
Circular Nos. 1-88 and 28-91.

Acting on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, this Court, in the resolution of 31 March 1993, reinstated the petition but denied
it nonetheless "for being factual and for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that respondent court had committed any
reversible error in the questioned judgment." Petitioner's motion and supplemental motion for reconsideration of the resolution of 31
March 1993 were denied with finality.

On 28 June 1993, this Court noted without action the petitioner's letter requesting that the issues raised in the supplemental motion
for reconsideration be given due consideration.

In the resolution of 23 August 1993, this Court denied the petitioner's motion to admit second motion for reconsideration and the
second motion for reconsideration. Entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331 was accordingly made on 8 September 1993.

The petition further discloses that this Court denied the petitioner's petition (G.R. No. 116398) to set aside the RTC's denial of her
application for probation. The motion for reconsideration met the same fate. Upon the prosecution's motion for execution of the
judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest.

In the final analysis then, the instant petition is to annul and set aside this Court's final resolution in G.R. No. 108331. The attorneys
for the petitioner know, or ought to know, that the special civil action for certiorari will not lie against a final judgment of this Court.
Even granting for the sake of argument that it could, this petition must fail for being filed one (1) year, four (4) months, and nineteen
(19) days after the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331 or long after the jurisprudentially established "reasonable time" prescribed
for the remedy under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

As this Court sees it, the instant petition is a clever ploy to further delay the execution of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49.

In their Explanation dated 21 June 1995 submitted in compliance with the above show-cause order, attorneys for petitioner, namely: Alvin C. Go,
Fernando C. Cojuangco, Vigor D. Mendoza, II, and Antonio A. Ligon, averred:

Counsel for petitioner beg the indulgence of this Honorable Court in asking for the extraordinary relief of seeking a declaration of
mistrial of the libel case tried in the lower court through the special civil action for certiorari as they were impelled by their conviction
that petitioner performed a moral and legal obligation in writing the letter which was the basis for libel, as she did, which disclosed
the price fixing and price rigging of oil products by the private complainant, Mr. Marieto Tan, for his private benefit (in Criminal Case
No. 85-49, RTC-Ozamiz City).

While counsel for petitioner are aware that their first bounden duty as officers of the Court is to honor and follow Court rules issued
for the orderly and efficient administration of justice (Banogon vs. Zerna, 154 SCRA 593; Toledo vs. Burgos, 168 SCRA 513), they
are equally burdened by their foremost obligation to prevent any miscarriage of justice in accordance with their convictions. Herein
counsel had perused the available pleadings and court processes in the libel against petitioner, and were fully convinced thereof
and impelled by their desire to legally assist the latter to substantiate her innocence for the crime of libel. If they had overstretched
the parameters of the conduct required of lawyers in trying to protect their client's liberty by resorting to this judicial process
of certiorari, herein counsel had acted in good faith and beg the kind indulgence of this Honorable Court for such action.
 Contrary to the representations of the Office of the Solicitor General, herein counsel were candid in the presentation of the factual
and procedural antecedents based on pleadings given to them by their client. Counsel disclosed in the petition in page 10 thereof
that there is already an Entry of Judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49.

Herein counsel similarly disclosed that —

Moreover, up to this date, Atty. Pactolin refused to surrender the records of the aforementioned case, so that
accused-petitioner experienced extreme difficulties in filing the instant petition. And consequently, accused-
petitioner stands helpless in determining the material dates of receipt of all orders, judgments, and other
processes of the trial court, Court of Appeals, and that of this Honorable Court, all of which were addressed to
Atty. Rodolfo
Pactolin. . . .

Hence, it could not be stated that herein counsel misrepresented on the procedural antecedents in this case.

Rather, when counsel did institute the present petition, they were invoking the equity jurisdiction of this Honorable Court such that
procedural rules be set aside to serve the ends of justice, as the liberty of a person is at stake.

Herein counsel comprehend the difficulty in questioning procedural parameters for the efficient and orderly administration of justice
in strictly following Court orders and jurisprudence implementing thereof, but equally compelling is their sworn duty to protect a client
who has been innocently charged and stands to suffer deprivation of liberty should counsel omit to resort to the extraordinary relief
they sought in this petition.

In the resolution of 9 August 1995, we then required the aforenamed lawyers to inform the Court if they were willing to submit the disciplinary matter for
resolution on the basis of their Explanation. In compliance therewith, on 8 September 1995, they filed a Manifestation wherein they expressed that it had
not been their intention to violate the Code of professional Responsibility and likewise apologized to the Court "for whatever inconvenience the filing of
the instant petition may have entailed."

We find the explanation proferred unsatisfactory and the justification set forth for their action flimsy.

As to the charge of suppression of factual and procedural antecedents, we cannot lend credence to the gossamer claim of petitioner's counsel that they
were "candid" in their presentation of these antecedents as evidenced by their disclosure, on page 10 of the petition, that there already was an entry of
judgment in Criminal Case No. 85-49. Neither can we find tenable the allegation that up to the date the petition was filed, Atty. Pactolin refused to
surrender the records of the case, for which reason, petitioner stood "helpless in determining the material dates of receipt of all orders, judgments, and
other processes of the trial court, Court of Appeals and that of this Honorable Court, all of which were addressed to Atty. Rodolfo Pactolin."

In the first place, attorneys for petitioner do not even claim that Atty. Pactolin unreasonably refused to turn over the records to petitioner; ex hypothesi,
he could have legitimately retained them pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court until petitioner paid him his lawful fees. In any event,
Attorneys Go, Cojuangco, Mendoza, and Ligon were fully aware of the existence of their client's (petitioner's) case with the trial court, Court of Appeals,
and this Court, and had unhampered access to the records thereof, especially those of the Court of Appeals and this Court since their office is located
near said Courts. In less than half a day, any one of them or their authorized representatives could have personally sought the information they wanted
from said Courts. Anent the records of the criminal case in Ozamiz City, if for whatever reason petitioner could not personally secure photocopies of
pertinent pleadings, orders, decisions, and other processes therein, counsel could have merely requested the Clerk of Court thereof for the necessary
information. As a matter of fact, the annexes attached to the petition showed beyond cavil that counsel could have, without exerting undue effort,
obtained the requisite information with respect to the cases before the trial court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court.

Obviously then, the suppression of vital facts by counsel for petitioner, exposed by the Office of the Solicitor General, was not due to the unavailability of
such facts to counsel nor the difficulty of obtaining them; in legal contemplation, excusable negligence was not present in the instant case. Plainly, the
concealment resorted to was nothing but a stratagem to give the petition a semblance of a valid grievance or a viable cause of action. Petitioner's
counsel knew, or were reasonably expected to know, the hopelessness of their client's cause since the petition was filed, it bears repeating, one year,
four months, and nineteen days after the entry of judgment in G.R. No. 108331 — long after the lapse of the jurisprudentially established measure of
"reasonable time" prescribed for the remedy under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Howsoever viewed, the filing of the instant petition was nothing but a scheme to frustrate and further delay the execution of the judgment in Criminal
Case No. 85-49. Neither could a claim of denial of due process save the day for petitioner as the judgment of the trial court was affirmed only after due
proceedings by the Court of Appeals which, parenthetically, even extended the utmost liberality to petitioner who failed to file her Brief. Said judgment
was ultimately sustained by us in the resolution of 31 March 1993 in G.R. No. 108331, which had long become final, with the entry of judgment made on
8 September 1993 yet. Thus, no depth of honest belief as to the innocence of the accused could alter the final verdict. Petitioner's counsel, if they are so
minded, can only seek to relieve their client from the effects of the judgment from another forum, e.g., they may consider executive clemency.

Counsel's gambit is condemnable for it clearly disregards a lawyer's duty to maintain absolute candor, fairness, and good faith to the Court (Canon 10,
Code of Professional Responsibility). In Santos vs. Paguio (227 SCRA 770, 779 [1993]), we declared, in no uncertain terms, that this Court can neither
condone nor tolerate attempts to mislead it through suppression of important facts which would have a bearing on its initial action.

We stress once again what we said before, that litigations must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, it being essential to the effective
administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
Hence, courts must guard themselves against any scheme to bring about that result, for constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, they
should frown upon any attempt to prolong it (Lim Kim Tho vs. Go Siu Kao, 82 Phil. 776 [1949]). Public policy and sound practice demand that at the risk
of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit
litium (Tolentino vs. Ongsiako, 7 SCRA 1001 [1963]; Villaflor vs. Reyes, 22 SCRA 385 [1968]). And for lawyers who disregard these postulates, we
stated in Banogon vs. Zerna (154 SCRA 593 [1987]), reiterated in Chua Huat vs. Court of Appeals (199 SCRA 1, 15 [1991]), that:
 As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty
by filing pointless petitions that only add to the workload of the judiciary, especially this Court, which is burdened enough as it is. A
judicious study of the facts and law should advise them when a case, such as this, should not be permitted to be filed to merely
clutter the already congested judicial dockets. They do not advance the cause of law or their clients by commencing litigations that
for sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of the courts.

While lawyers owe entire devotion to the interest of their clients, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of their rights; and the exertion of their
utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing be taken away or be withheld from them, save by the rules of law legally applied (Canon 15, Canons
of Professional Ethics), they should not forget that they are officers of the court, bound to exert every effort and placed under duty, to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice (Canon 12, Canons of Professional Responsibility). They should not, therefore, misuse the rules of
procedure to defeat the ends of justice (Rule 10.03, Canon 10, Id.) or unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes (Rule 12.04, Canon 12, Id.).

As a final point, we wish to state that the apology contained in the Explanation is misplaced. Counsel ought to know that they were not required to show
cause for the inconvenience the filing of the petition caused this Court. The apology insinuates, rather smartly, that we required them to show cause out
of our whims or caprice, which, of course, is baseless, as demonstrated by our observations in the resolution of 31 May 1995, particularly on the
suppression of vital facts by the attorneys for petitioner.

We do not then hesitate to declare that counsel for petitioner, Attorneys Alvin C. Go, Fernando C. Cojuangco, Vigor D. Mendoza, II, and Antonio A.
Ligon have breached the foregoing Canons and Rules.

WHEREFORE, Attorneys ALVIN C. GO, FERNANDO C. COJUANGCO, VIGOR D. MENDOZA, II, and ANTONIO A. LIGON are hereby CENSURED
and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE
PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors1 in response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the
Show Cause Resolution), directing them to show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions of
the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect
contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno) to the
said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of
indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010
Show Cause Resolution and the present decision.

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that with the exception of one respondent whose
compliance was adequate and another who manifested he was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials
and/or tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more urgently behoove this Court to call the attention
of respondent law professors, who are members of the Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to
their civil rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal
or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence, or gives the appearance of
influencing the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds, they must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to
observe ethical standards of their profession, and in particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that
matter, for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism
against a member of this Court is not the real issue here but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual
concern of this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar have crossed the line of decency and
acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules of Court through improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending
case. Preliminarily, it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on their Statement, 2 which they
formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen), for the Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of
speech and academic freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the past by this Court to rule that
freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can
similarly be applied to respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not merely lawyers but lawyers
who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even
if purportedly motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.

To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual antecedents of this case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230)
was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision,
raising solely the following grounds:

I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign policy
prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed
by international human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the relevant international conventions of which the
Philippines is a party.4

II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect the human
rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms. 5

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:

I.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST
THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE
INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of
the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition." 8

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s
article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law; 10 and (3) Mark Ellis’
article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime." 11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted
an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website. 12 The same article appeared on the GMA News
TV website also on July 19, 2010.13

On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque
claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored
with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report 15 on
the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog, Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:

The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The
motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/

The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL
article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion
was filed today.

Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against crimes against humanity,
sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration.18

In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:

Your Honours:

I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of the integrity of my work as an academic and as an
advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international
crime in your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence
Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am
also concerned that your esteemed Court may have misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be
ironic since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law in 2006 has been made available to your
esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee)
pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the
July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo. 21

On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College
of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and on Atty.
Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on
the same date. The statement was likewise posted at the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and
at said college’s website.27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the
Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:

The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice

Subject: Statement of faculty

from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary
Your Honors:

We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight (38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We
hope that its points could be considered by the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures of the alleged signatories but only stated the names
of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.) appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is
reproduced here:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war. After they
courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful
relief from their own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial recourse in the case of Vinuya
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the
individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious threat to the integrity and credibility of the
Philippine Judicial System.

In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating
at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of someone else’s ideas and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into
committing such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were originally created by the taker. It is
dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of
the law of the land, to allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently, this is a complete
perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely copied select portions of other legal writers’ works
and interspersed them into the decision as if they were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus the Court also bears the responsibility for the
Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original writers’ names and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory
explanation is not acceptable, because the original authors’ writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the
plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those
primary sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable,
because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.

But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually
misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue
that the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have attained the status of jus cogens, making it
obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the
contrary conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by
copying works in order to mislead and deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and responsibility for personal injury and damage
suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured parties’ home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely
have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the
Second World War made it incumbent on the Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed
the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the
Supreme Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive Department to take up the claims of
the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most
basic values of decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine legal profession before other
Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of
conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic
society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass
without sanction as this would only further erode faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest
for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of
war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own conduct, whether collectively or through its Members,
is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are
credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction,
then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional
care and practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration of justice in the Philippines. It is also a
very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity
completely above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.

With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of
the Faculty of the University of the Philippine College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and in breach of the high
standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and undermines the foundations
of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases and the establishment of legal precedents through
dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court
as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners
therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and dignity of the Supreme
Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to
any other sanctions that the Court may consider appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts research, prepares drafts, reaches and
finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar
to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law

(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN

Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR DAWAY (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD

Associate Dean and Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA

 Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA
(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA
(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO
(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA
(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG
(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC
(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO
(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA
(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO
(SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH
(SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS
(SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA
(SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO
(SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY
(SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA
(SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ
(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29
(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We
quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,

My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of Glasgow. I am writing to you in relation to the use of one of
my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of your Honourable Court.

The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the section addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes.
As the table annexed to this letter shows, the relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book Enforcing
Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the
Judgment, but as this is in relation to a citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages reproduced in
the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of referencing.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment’s cautious approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a
most cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and
has a firm place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study attempts to demystify aspects of the
‘very mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters
show that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite
approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in which your Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly
acknowledging it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.

I remain

Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31
In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of
certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the
said Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing. 32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement that showed on the
signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement
was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include
former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V. Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by
Dean Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included
among the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.

The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having been formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August
11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations regarding the UP Law Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such
allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited
the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern
of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that
healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed
to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in
the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not
reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V.
Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De
Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo,
Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza,
Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T.
Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not
be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before
the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty
Statement.38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.

Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution

On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the following pleadings:

(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez,
in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
 (2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02
and 10.03; and

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.

Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)

Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common compliance which was signed by their respective counsels
(the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in
the discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,’ and as members of the Bar to speak out on a
matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out
that "none of them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note with concern" that the Show Cause
Resolution’s findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law
professors and officers of the Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."41

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes42 and the courts43 and of tending to influence, or giving the
appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court
but rather to defend its integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was purportedly
evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive action." 45 Respondents’ call in the Statement for the Court "to provide
clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was
reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in
law reform and in the improvement of the administration of justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to
"promote respect for the law and legal processes" (under Canon 1, id.). 46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special interest
and duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome occurrences have a profound impact in the
academe, especially in our law schools."47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as an ‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of
its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at the time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to
them the Court "was not going to take any action on the grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and misrepresentation."49 According to
respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court
Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the matter;50 and (ii)
the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and
misrepresentation charges."51 Respondents claimed that it was their perception of the Court’s indifference to the dangers posed by the
plagiarism allegations against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.

(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and should be held accountable in accordance
with the standards of academic writing

A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of respondents’ charge of plagiarism against Justice
Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals 52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence,
respondents essentially argue that their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and that they
are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the Common Compliance included, among others: (i) the
letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo, LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya
decision likewise lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that appeared in the Anuario
Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court of Justice decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article
entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and International Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their
charge that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution, but this time, in his ponencia in Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54

(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have likewise spoken on the "plagiarism issue"

In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation allegations are legitimate public
issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the
issue of plagiarism, specifically:

(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero; 56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010; 58
 (iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010; 59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the Business Mirror on August
5, 2010;60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 8, 2010; 61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in the Daily Tribune
and the Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University School of Law on the calls
for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August 11,
2010;63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila,
the Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Bulacan
Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16, 2010; 64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on August 10,
2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for sanctions and the charge in the Show Cause Resolution
dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.

(d) Freedom of expression

In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position that in issuing their Statement, "they should
be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members of the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a
democracy who are constitutionally protected in the exercise of free speech." 66 In support of this contention, they cited United States v.
Bustos,67In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880,
Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69

(e) Academic freedom

In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was also issued in the exercise of their academic
freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that
"[t]he national university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy
discussion and communication of a faculty member’s field of study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that had they remained silent on the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised [their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a
culture and generation of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research and pleading; or, worse,
[that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual
integrity has no bearing or relevance to one’s conduct."71

In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion of the dissenting opinion of Justice George A.
Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the
judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought
and courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook
occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case. 73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance stated, thus:

WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and officers of the Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause Resolution, including its conclusions that respondents
have: [a] breached their "obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court, … and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13
and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents respectfully pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of
their due process rights, that before final judgment be rendered:
 1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the findings and conclusions of fact in the Show Cause
Resolution (including especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of malicious intent), and in that connection, that appropriate
procedures and schedules for hearing be adopted and defined that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the
production of and to present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues
in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against
Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC); and

3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions in or relating to, and
accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who were or could have been called in In The Matter of the Charges of
Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and
Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.

Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution.
Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be
punished only after charge and hearing."75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking
one member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were
what motivated her to sign the Statement.

On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally
guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how
lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere in the schools’ exercise of discretion in these
matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the Philippines
and other universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.

Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents’ constitutional right to freedom of expression that can only be
curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest. 78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said
Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of
conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it reportedly contained citations not properly
attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in
principle with the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith. 79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof.
Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto; 80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in
American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he "never had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or
should influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case" 83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s
mind when he signed the Statement."84Unlike his colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what
constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:

13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused the view that willful and deliberate intent to commit
plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the
perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair topic for academic discussion in the College.
Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off as one’s own.85 (Emphases
supplied.)

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been remiss in correctly assessing the effects of such
language [in the Statement] and could have been more careful."86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has
faithfully complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of
the Court.

Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation to his submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty
Statement to this Court

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty Statement, which he described as follows:
 "Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of Law in its signing pages, and the actual signatures of
the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and
Butuyan on 31 August 2010 in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which reflects as signatories the names of thirty-seven (37)
members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law
on 10 August 2010. Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean of the UP College
of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.

"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which presently serves as the official file copy of the Dean’s Office
in the UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty members who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven
original signatories to Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual signatures of eight
(8) other members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten names. 87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain
are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these two documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen alleged, thus:

2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty on a draft statement, Dean Leonen instructed his
staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded
the law faculty roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring Integrity Statement,
Restoring Integrity I, come into being.

2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware that a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable
Court was in the process of convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the faculty. Some faculty members visited the Dean’s
Office to sign the document or had it brought to their classrooms in the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty
members who, for one reason or another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen their
assurances that they would sign as soon as they could manage.

2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been circulated long enough, Dean Leonen instructed his
staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner appropriate for posting in the College of Law. Following his own established practice in
relation to significant public issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing pages so that only the names of those who signed the first
printed draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of non-signatories in the final draft of significant public
issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting
statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters." 90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories in Restoring Integrity II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity
I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean Leonen noticed the inclusion of the
name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed Restoring
Integrity I when it was previously circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the
"(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice Mendoza over the phone on Friday, 06 August 2010.
According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with
its contents. Also according to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he was
leaving for the United States the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics
supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so placed full reliance on her account" 92 as "[t]here were
indeed other faculty members who had also authorized the Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to
affix their signatures physically to the document."93

However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice
Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that this was what actually transpired:

2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the phone, he [Justice Mendoza] indeed initially
agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say
that he authorized the dean to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for him as he
was about to leave for the United States. The dean’s staff informed him that they would, at any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity
Statement to him.
 2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement before he left for the
U.S. the following week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to the College to teach on 24 September 2010, a
day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined to sign. 94

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received from Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice
Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he
declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the Court would take some form of action against the
faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not
wishing to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when he was one of the signatories of Restoring
Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by
38 members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:

Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to him. However, his name was inadvertently left out by
Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the
reformatted signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law faculty signed (the original 37 plus
Justice Mendoza.)96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the
same. He emphasized that the main body of the Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same.
This purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant to continuously draw adherents to its
message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one
reflecting the same text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims that "this is not an instance
where it has been made to appear in a document that a person has participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not
misrepresent which members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or had expressed
their desire to be signatories thereto."99

In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01 and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor
misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be
signatories to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the Statement] through the appropriate
channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice Corona for the latter’s information and proper disposition with the hope that its points
would be duly considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v. Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the
required quantum of proof has not been met in this case and that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an
administrative sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional Responsibility.102

Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and
for access to the records, evidence and witnesses allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation
involving Justice Del Castillo.

Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)

For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the
State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in
2010. He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means the right to speak effectively." 104 Citing the
dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v. Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be
forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of repression, when the very
teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on
the doctrine in In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,108Prof.
Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the
Bill of Rights (i.e., referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech). 109 He also stated that he "has read the Compliance of the other respondents
to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did." 110

ISSUES

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law professors?

3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined as Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11,
and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility?
 4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined as a Member of the Bar under
Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?

5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such hearing, are respondents entitled to
require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No.
162230) and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the
witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?

DISCUSSION

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.

It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered with respondents’ constitutionally
mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this
Court is denying them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting
view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact that respondents had criticized a decision
of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in favor of the
petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause
Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the
issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression
of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth" 111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for reconsideration of
the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to
be "constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as
fair or constructive, to wit:

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to
the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis
of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern
of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression when it stated that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that
healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed
to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the
administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in
the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the
comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not
reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that the right to criticize the courts and judicial
officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference.
In cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline
lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and
common decency.

As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both guilty of contempt and liable administratively for
the following paragraph in his second motion for reconsideration:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely
erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be corrected by the very court which has
committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to
denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to
safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state
sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the
proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice. 117 (Emphases supplied.)

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further held that:

[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the
many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly
improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good
practice can never sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is
insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a
threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in
order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and
increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred
in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would
maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from the minority view of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo
concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in
the Vinuya case and therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting respondents’ theory, Salcedo is
authority for the following principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority
and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the
administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his pleading, by accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here,
the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely ascribing error to the Court.

Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 120 cited in the Common
Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the
press a "Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client committed by the Supreme
Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:

He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this
Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic
symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent
injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his
petition with a prayer that

"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with
reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the
noblest profession."121

It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize
and comment upon actuations of public officers, including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts,
whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case engaged in an even more extensive discussion of
the legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To quote from that decision:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a
gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession
places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows
solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect
due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the
sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is
not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation
is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and
offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their
clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings
which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of
an army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in
rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)

xxxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus,
statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as
to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:

[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has always been considered as misbehavior, tending to
obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried
fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of
the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a pending case made in good
faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well
taken and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision. x x x.

xxxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has
been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision
was rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and
integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their
rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that
they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As
a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the
courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned even from more recent jurisprudence.

In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine, for making malicious and unfounded criticisms
of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and held, thus:

As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than
any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As
we stated in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even
his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:

Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No
law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).

xxxx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.

xxxx

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. x x x.

xxxx

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade
the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107
[1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and
malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in
Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging,
intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse
the lawyer responsible therefor under his duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language in his pleadings and
imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics
against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by
others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified. 128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as protected
free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed
abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained.
There are other societal values that press for recognition. x x x. 130 (Emphasis supplied.)

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial independence and the orderly administration of justice that
immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media statements grossly disrespectful towards the
Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What
respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interest. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between
free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent
institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x. 132 (Emphases supplied.)

For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents 133 that the Statement presents no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate
public interest.

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.

It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine
what they will teach their students and how they will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom
for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a
party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity as teachers.

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous case before this Court, is the question of whether
lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to
pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.

Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully
invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of
members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal
profession and the justice system. To our mind, the reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater
force to the academic freedom of law professors.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v. Monsod, 134lawyers when they teach law are
considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by
their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same canons of
professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that
they are lawyers.

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that their issuance of the Statement was in keeping with
their duty to "participate in the development of the legal system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the
administration of justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have fulfilled that same duty in keeping
with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts.
Members of the Bar cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason that law professors are not
allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just
their preferred portions thereof.

The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.

Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and academic freedom, the Court considers here the other averments in
their submissions.

With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their position regarding the plagiarism charge against
Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur this Court to take the correct action on said issue.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch belief that Justice Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the
majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his
cause there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put the courts and the legal profession into
disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with
more reason, as the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision therein, in a public statement
using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one of the objectives of the Statement could be seen
in the following paragraphs from the same:

And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered
the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.

xxxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate
dispenser of justice to all those who have been left without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein. 135 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was wholly immaterial to their liability for
contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly
inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common
Compliance, respondents even go so far as to attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the present
controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of
the filing of respondents’ submissions in this administrative case. As respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the ethics
case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to
bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially when it has no bearing on their own administrative case.

Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough
to make the intended recipients listen."136 One wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others, callous,
dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow
respondents to send a signal to their students that the only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be
offensive.

This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in the narration of background facts to illustrate the
sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who
would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they
still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do
the same. These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal professionals must deal with each other in good faith and due
respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and
unproductive recriminations.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action" on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some
doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily meant for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media
first before it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by the general public and designed to
capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in
the Vinuya case by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to the Court, particularly when respondents knew
fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were
still both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On this point, respondents allege that at the time
the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under
the belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still, there was a significant lapse of time from the
drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010 and its publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had
already been convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference on the part of the Court then, when it
became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this
supervening event into account in the interest of fairness.

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents’ reliance on various news reports and commentaries in
the print media and the internet as proof that they are being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance
show that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary 137 or contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the
nature of the criticism and weighs the possible repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the
profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other interests in making the criticism are obvious, the
Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However, when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair
commentary and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for such silence would have a grave
implication on legal education in our country.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to be the first time these respondents have been
involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned
in the issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and contumacious language used is plain and
undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this Court expounded in Salcedo:

In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the court or to be recreant to the respect thereto but,
unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and
practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed
are justified by the facts a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not admissible as a defense. Respect for the
judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an
extenuation of liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said
motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad
example, from taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves.139 (Emphases
supplied.)

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under
Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the courts and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending
matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.

With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance compared to his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one
among the respondents who showed true candor and sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to
sign the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle and that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic
of discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought
about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an element of plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he
may have been remiss in failing to assess the effect of the language of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to
retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed below) and without baseless insinuations of
deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all that this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that
they recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of
the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance
satisfactory.

As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota and, therefore, not under the disciplinary
authority of this Court, he should be excused from these proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a
Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from this
Court. For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal
professionals of any nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.

The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.

To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules
10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a "dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful reproduction of the actual signed
copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body, there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the
discrepancies in the signature pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by claiming that it is but
expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses
that he is not administratively liable because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the Restoring Integrity
Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto." 140

To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the signatures in the Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live
public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that
point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s
persuasive authority mainly depends on the reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from respondents’
explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the
plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case.

Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did not from the beginning submit the signed copy,
Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and, instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It
would turn out, according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages due to lapses of his unnamed staff.
First, an unnamed administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the dean inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza
as among the signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty. Armovit when encoding the signature
pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed Restoring Integrity I.

The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed document may have to be reformatted and signatures
may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is not unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate
blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.

However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed document for the Court’s consideration that did not contain the
actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the
actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring
Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and
unsigned portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions for court employees are accountable for the care of
documents and records that may come into their custody. Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain
the actual signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.

Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the course of his explanation of his willingness to accept his administrative
officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only
authorized him to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time Restoring Integrity II was printed,
posted and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition,
that is precisely tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an act when such person or persons did not.

We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the
explanation that there was no misrepresentation when he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all
he had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was only hearsay information that the former
intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no
reason why he could not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in fact signed before transmitting the
Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to
leave for abroad, then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.

We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures before submission of the Statement to this Court. As
respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement
was neither a pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission that Dean Leonen could do at any
time.

In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of
Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems it
sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court as required under Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No.
162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.

In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the Court find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that
the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M.
No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of, and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo. The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed in Dean Leonen’s separate
Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed the sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered
indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing." 141 It is this group of
respondents’ premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due process.

The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.

Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely from its characterization as a special civil action for
indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the
majority’s purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.

However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no
application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.

The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:

SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in other proceedings when the interest of justice
so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower
court, in which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save that the review of the report of
investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the specified officers, is merely discretionary, not
mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A
will be followed.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. We have held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an
opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard,
hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio 143 that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is
rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end
in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by
their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. 144 (Emphases supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the Prohibition from Engaging in the Private Practice of
Law,145 we further observed that:

[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering his actions based on records
showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public
interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus
operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases
sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent may be disciplined for
professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.

xxxx
These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from
immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier,
Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this
Court.146(Emphases supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a right they do not have has no effect on these
proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically
stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.

Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in
the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were
made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request for
access to the records and evidence presented in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the
fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from
that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent
matter from this case.

To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents issued a Statement with language that the Court
deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than
the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their
Common Compliance) and internet sources that are already of public knowledge.

Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement and the circumstances surrounding the drafting,
printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del
Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these
matters the same would be in their possession.

We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics
case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the
Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement’s principles,
could foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court should simply
let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the
bases for the Show Cause Resolution.

If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances or chosen not to make a full defense at this time,
because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’ own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be
aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk
they have taken.

Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of
merit.

A final word

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal, political or social issue.
Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court
is certainly not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer owes to
another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of
the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards
the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to
which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay
L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R.
Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O.
Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos,
Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found UNSATISFACTORY.
These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.
 (3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He
is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to
observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more
severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings. However, he is reminded that while he is
engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED

CANON 10 –ADDITIONAL

G.R. No. 157659 Petitioner, January 25, 2010

ELIGIO P. MALLARI,
vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF PAMPANGA,Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner appeals the decision promulgated on March 17, 2003, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed his
petition for certiorari.

Antecedents

In 1968, the petitioner obtained two loans totaling ₱34,000.00 from respondent Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). To secure the
performance of his obligations, he mortgaged two parcels of land registered under his and his wife Marcelina Mallari’s names. However, he paid GSIS
about ten years after contracting the obligations only ₱10,000.00 on May 22, 1978 and ₱20,000.00 on August 11, 1978. 1

What followed thereafter was the series of inordinate moves of the petitioner to delay the efforts of GSIS to recover on the debt, and to have the
unhampered possession of the foreclosed property.

After reminding the petitioner of his unpaid obligation on May 2, 1979, GSIS sent on November 2, 1981 a telegraphic demand to him to update his
account. On November 10, 1981, he requested a final accounting, but did not do anything more. Nearly three years later, on March 21, 1984, GSIS
applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage by reason of his failure to settle his account. On November 22, 1984, he requested an updated
computation of his outstanding account. On November 29, 1984, he persuaded the sheriff to hold the publication of the foreclosure notice in abeyance,
to await action on his pending request for final accounting (that is, taking his payments of ₱30,000.00 made in 1978 into account). On December 13,
1984, GSIS responded to his request and rendered a detailed explanation of the account. On May 30, 1985, it sent another updated statement of
account. On July 21, 1986, it finally commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against him because he had meanwhile made no further
payments.

On August 22, 1986, the petitioner sued GSIS and the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 44, in San Fernando,
Pampanga, docketed as Civil Case No. 7802,2 ostensibly to enjoin them from proceeding against him for injunction (with an application for preliminary
injunction). The RTC ultimately decided Civil Case No. 7802 in his favor, nullifying the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale; cancelling Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R already issued in the name of GSIS; and reinstating TCT No. 61171-R and TCT No.
54835-R in his and his wife’s names.3

GSIS appealed the adverse decision to the CA, which reversed the RTC on March 27, 1996. 4

The petitioner elevated the CA decision to this Court via petition for review on certiorari (G.R. No. 124468). 5

On September 16, 1996, this Court denied his petition for review. 6 On January 15, 1997, this Court turned down his motion for reconsideration. 7

As a result, the CA decision dated March 27, 1996 became final and executory, rendering unassailable both the extrajudicial foreclosure and auction
sale held on September 22, 1986, and the issuance of TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R in the name of GSIS.

GSIS thus filed an ex parte motion for execution and for a writ of possession on September 2, 1999. 8 Granting the ex parte motion on October 8,
1999,9 the RTC issued a writ of execution cum writ of possession on October 21, 1999, 10 ordering the sheriff to place GSIS in possession of the
properties.
The sheriff failed to serve the writ, however, partly because of the petitioner’s request for an extension of time within which to vacate the properties. It is
noted that GSIS acceded to the request.111avvphi1

Yet, the petitioner did not voluntarily vacate the properties, but instead filed a motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution on March
27, 2000.12 Also, the petitioner commenced a second case against GSIS and the provincial sheriff in the RTC in San Fernando, Pampanga (Civil Case
No. 12053), ostensibly for consignation (coupled with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order). However, the RTC
dismissed Civil Case No. 12053 on November 10, 2000 on the ground of res judicata, impelling him to appeal the dismissal to the CA (C.A.-G.R. CV No.
70300).13

In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed a motion dated April 5, 2000 in Civil Case No. 7802 to hold GSIS, et al.14 in contempt of court for painting the fence
of the properties during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution.15 He filed another motion in the same case,
dated April 17, 2000, to hold GSIS and its local manager Arnulfo B. Cardenas in contempt of court for ordering the electric company to cut off the electric
services to the properties during the pendency of his motion for reconsideration and/or to quash the writ of execution.16>

To prevent the Presiding Judge of Branch 44 of the RTC from resolving the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 7802, GSIS moved to inhibit him for
alleged partiality towards the petitioner as borne out by his failure to act on the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, motions for
contempt of court, and motion for issuance of break open order for more than a year from their filing, praying that the case be re-raffled to another
branch of the RTC.17 Consequently, Civil Case No. 7802 was re-assigned to Branch 48, whose Presiding Judge then denied the motions for contempt of
court on July 30, 2001, and directed the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of possession dated
October 21, 1999.18

The petitioner sought reconsideration,19 but the Presiding Judge of Branch 48 denied his motion for reconsideration on February 11, 2002. 20

Ruling of the CA

By petition for certiorari dated March 15, 2002 filed in the CA, the petitioner assailed the orders of February 11, 2002, July 30, 2001, October 21, 1999,
and October 8, 1999.21

On March 17, 2003, however, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari for lack of merit, 22 stating:

We find the instant petition patently devoid of merit. This Court is not unaware of the legal tactics and maneuvers employed by the petitioner in delaying
the disposition of the subject case (Civil Case No. 7802) which has already become final and executory upon the final resolution by the Supreme Court
affirming the judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals. We construe the actuation of the petitioner in resorting to all kinds of avenues accorded by the
Rules of Court, through the filing of several pleadings and/or motions in litigating this case, as running counter to the intendment of the Rules to be
utilized in promoting the objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.

The issues raised in the present controversy have already been settled in our existing jurisprudence on the subject. In the case of De Jesus vs.
Obnamia, Jr., the Supreme Court ruled that "generally, no notice or even prior hearing of a motion for execution is required before a writ of execution is
issued when a decision has already become final."

The recent accretion to the corpus of our jurisprudence has established the principle of law, as enunciated in Buaya vs. Stronghold Insurance Co.,
Inc. that "once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and the issuance of a Writ of
Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court."

The rule is also firmly entrenched in the aforecited Buaya case that "the effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has
become final, the prevailing party should not be deprived of the fruits of the verdict by subsequent suits on the same issues filed by the same parties.
Courts are duty-bound to put an end to controversies. Any attempt to prolong, resurrect or juggle them should be firmly struck down. The system of
judicial review should not be misused and abused to evade the operation of final and executory judgments."

As succinctly put in Tag Fibers, Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court is emphatic in saying that "the finality of a decision is
a jurisdictional event that cannot be made to depend on the convenience of a party."

We find no cogent reason to discompose the findings of the court below. Thus, we sustain the assailed Orders of the court a quo since no abuse of
discretion has been found to have been committed by the latter in their issuance. Moreover, this Court finds this petition to be part of the dilatory tactics
of the petitioner to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less
than the highest tribunal of the land.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.23

Issues

Hence, this appeal.

The petitioner insists herein that the CA gravely erred in refusing "to accept the nullity of the following orders" of the RTC, to wit:
 1. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 8, 1999, GRANTING THE EX-PARTE MOTION FOR EXECUTION AND/OR
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF EXECUTION OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS;

2. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED OCTOBER 21, 1999 GRANTING THE ISSUANCE AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT
OF EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT GSIS;

3. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED JULY 30, 2001 DIRECTING TO CAUSE THE RE-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WRIT OF
EXECUTION CUM WRIT OF POSSESSION IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT GSIS; and

4. THE ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2002, DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
ORDER DATED SEPTEMBER 14, 2001, IN RELATION TO THE COURT ORDER DATED JULY 30, 2001.24

Ruling of the Court

The petition for review on certiorari absolutely lacks merit.

Petition for Certiorari in CA

Was Filed Beyond Reglementary Period

The petition assailed before the CA on certiorari the following orders of the RTC, to wit:

1. The order dated October 8, 1999 (granting the ex parte motion for execution and/or issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession
of GSIS);25

2. The order dated October 21, 1999 (directing the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession in favor of GSIS);26

3. The order dated July 30, 2001 (requiring the Branch Clerk of Court to cause the re-implementation of the writ of execution cum writ of
possession, and dismissing the motions to hold GSIS, et al. in contempt);27 and

4. The order dated February 11, 2002 (denying the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 seeking the reconsideration of the order
dated July 30, 2001).28

The July 30, 2001 order denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution, and motion to hold GSIS, Tony Dimatulac,
et al. and Arnulfo Cardenas in contempt; and declared GSIS’s motion for issuance of break open order and for designation of special sheriff from GSIS
Legal Services Group as premature. In turn, the motion for reconsideration and/or to quash writ of execution denied by the order of July 30, 2001
hadmerely challenged the orders of October 8, 1999 and October 21, 1999 (granting the writ of execution cum writ of possession as a matter of course).

Considering that the motion for reconsideration dated August 17, 2001 denied by the order dated February 11, 2002 was in reality and effect a prohibited
second motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the orders dated October 21, 1999 and October 8, 1999, the assailed orders dated July 30, 2001, October
21, 1999, and October 8, 1999 could no longer be subject to attack by certiorari. Thus, the petition for certiorari filed only in March 2002 was already
improper and tardy for being made beyond the 60-day limitation defined in Section 4, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, 29 which
requires a petition for certiorari to be filed "not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution," or, in case a motion for
reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, "the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of
the said motion."

It is worth emphasizing that the 60-day limitation is considered inextendible, because the limitation has been prescribed to avoid any unreasonable delay
that violates the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. 30

II

Nature of the Writ of Possession

and its Ministerial Issuance

The petitioner claims that he had not been notified of the motion seeking the issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession; hence, the writ
was invalid.

As earlier shown, the CA disagreed with him.

We sustain the CA, and confirm that the petitioner, as defaulting mortgagor, was not entitled under Act 3135, as amended, and its pertinent
jurisprudence to any prior notice of the application for the issuance of the writ of possession.

A writ of possession, which commands the sheriff to place a person in possession of real property, may be issued in: (1) land registration proceedings
under Section 17 of Act No. 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged property, and no third person, not a party
to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage, pending redemption under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118; and (4) execution sales, pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.31
Anent the redemption of property sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale made pursuant to the special power referred to in Section 132 of Act No.
3135,33 as amended, the debtor, his successor-in-interest, or any judicial creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is sold has the right to redeem the property at anytime within the term of
one year from and after the date of the sale, such redemption to be governed by the provisions of Section 464 to Section 466 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, to the extent that said provisions were not inconsistent with the provisions of Act 3135. 34

In this regard, we clarify that the redemption period envisioned under Act 3135 is reckoned from the date of the registration of the sale, not from and
after the date of the sale, as the text of Act 3135 shows. Although the original Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1940) incorporated Section 464 to
Section 466 of the Code of Civil Procedure as its Section 25 (Section 464); Section 26 (Section 465); and Section 27 (Section 466) of Rule 39, with
Section 27 still expressly reckoning the redemption period to be "at any time within twelve months after the sale;" and although the Revised Rules of
Court (effective on January 1, 1964) continued to provide in Section 30 of Rule 39 that the redemption be made from the purchaser "at any time within

twelve (12) months after the sale,"35 the 12-month period of redemption came to be held as beginning "to run not from the date of the sale but from the
time of registration of the sale in the Office of the Register of Deeds."36 This construction was due to the fact that the sheriff’s sale of registered (and
unregistered) lands did not take effect as a conveyance, or did not bind the land, until the sale was registered in the Register of Deeds. 37

Desiring to avoid any confusion arising from the conflict between the texts of the Rules of Court (1940 and 1964) and Act No. 3135, on one hand, and
the jurisprudence clarifying the reckoning of the redemption period in judicial sales of real property, on the other hand, the Court has incorporated in
Section 28 of Rule 39 of the current Rules of Court (effective on July 1, 1997) the foregoing judicial construction of reckoning the redemption period from
the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, to wit:

Sec. 28. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive redemptions; notice to be given and filed. — The judgment obligor, or redemptioner,
may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any time within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, by paying the
purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the
amount of any assessments or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on such last named amount at the same
rate; and if the purchaser be also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment under which such purchase was
made, the amount of such other lien, with interest.

Property so redeemed may again be redeemed within sixty (60) days after the last redemption upon payment of the sum paid on the last redemption,
with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amount of any assessments or taxes which the last redemptioner may have paid thereon after
redemption by him, with interest on such last-named amount, and in addition, the amount of any liens held by said last redemptioner prior to his own,
with interest. The property may be again, and as often as a redemptioner is so disposed, redeemed from any previous redemptioner within sixty (60)
days after the last redemption, on paying the sum paid on the last previous redemption, with two per centum thereon in addition, and the amounts of any
assessments or taxes which the last previous redemptioner paid after the redemption thereon, with interest thereon, and the amount of any liens held by
the last redemptioner prior to his own, with interest.

Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale and a duplicate filed with the registry of deeds of the place, and if any
assessments or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof
must in like manner be given to the officer and filed with the registry of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property may be redeemed without paying
such assessments, taxes, or liens. (30a) (Emphasis supplied).

Accordingly, the mortgagor or his successor-in-interest must redeem the foreclosed property within one year from the registration of the sale with the
Register of Deeds in order to avoid the title from consolidating in the purchaser. By failing to redeem thuswise, the mortgagor loses all interest over the
foreclosed property.38 The purchaser, who has a right to possession that extends beyond the expiration of the redemption period, becomes the absolute
owner of the property when no redemption is made,39 that it is no longer necessary for the purchaser to file the bond required under Section 7 of Act No.
3135, as amended, considering that the possession of the land becomes his absolute right as the land’s confirmed owner.40 The consolidation of
ownership in the purchaser’s name and the issuance to him of a new TCT then entitles him to demand possession of the property at any time, and the
issuance of a writ of possession to him becomes a matter of right upon the consolidation of title in his name.

The court can neither halt nor hesitate to issue the writ of possession. It cannot exercise any discretion to determine whether or not to issue the writ, for
the issuance of the writ to the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes a ministerial function. 41 Verily, a marked distinction exists between
a discretionary act and a ministerial one. A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the
act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is
discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of
judgment.42

The proceeding upon an application for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature, brought for the benefit of one party only and without
notice being sent by the court to any person adverse in interest. The relief is granted even without giving an opportunity to be heard to the person
against whom the relief is sought.43 Its nature as an ex parte petition under Act No. 3135, as amended, renders the application for the issuance of a writ
of possession a non-litigious proceeding.44

It is clear from the foregoing that a non-redeeming mortgagor like the petitioner had no more right to challenge the issuance of the writ of execution cum
writ of possession upon the ex parte application of GSIS. He could not also impugn anymore the extrajudicial foreclosure, and could not undo the
consolidation in GSIS of the ownership of the properties covered by TCT No. 284272-R and TCT No. 284273-R, which consolidation was already
irreversible. Hence, his moves against the writ of execution cum writ of possession were tainted by bad faith, for he was only too aware, being his own
lawyer, of the dire consequences of his non-redemption within the period provided by law for that purpose.

III

Dismissal of Petitioner’s Motion for Indirect Contempt

Was Proper and In Accord with the Rules of Court

The petitioner insists that the RTC gravely erred in dismissing his charges for indirect contempt against GSIS, et al.; and that the CA should have
consequently granted his petition for certiorari.

The petitioner’s insistence is plainly unwarranted.

First of all, Section 4, Rule 71, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows:

Section 4. How proceedings commenced. — Proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt
was committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of
documents or papers involved therein, and upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the court
concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but
said petition shall be docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the consolidation of the contempt charge and the
principal action for joint hearing and decision. (n) (Emphasis supplied).

Indeed, a person may be charged with indirect contempt only by either of two alternative ways, namely: (1) by a verified petition, if initiated by a party; or
(2) by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt, if made by a court
against which the contempt is committed. In short, a charge of indirect contempt must be initiated through a verified petition, unless the charge is directly
made by the court against which the contemptuous act is committed.

Justice Regalado has explained why the requirement of the filing of a verified petition for contempt is mandatory: 45

1. This new provision clarifies with a regulatory norm the proper procedure for commencing contempt proceedings. While such proceeding has been
classified as a special civil action under the former Rules, the heterogeneous practice, tolerated by the courts, has been for any party to file a mere
motion without paying any docket or lawful fees therefor and without complying with the requirements for initiatory pleadings, which is now required in
the second paragraph of this amended section. Worse, and as a consequence of unregulated motions for contempt, said incidents sometimes remain
pending for resolution although the main case has already been decided. There are other undesirable aspects but, at any rate, the same may now be
eliminated by this amendatory procedure.

Henceforth, except for indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by order of or a formal charge by the offended court, all charges shall be
commenced by a verified petition with full compliance with the requirements therefor and shall be disposed of in accordance with the second paragraph
of this section. (Emphasis supplied).

Clearly, the petitioner’s charging GSIS, et al. with indirect contempt by mere motions was not permitted by the Rules of Court.

And, secondly, even assuming that charges for contempt could be initiated by motion, the petitioner should have tendered filing fees. The need to tender
filing fees derived from the fact that the procedure for indirect contempt under Rule 71, Rules of Court was an independent special civil action. Yet, the
petitioner did not tender and pay filing fees, resulting in the trial court not acquiring jurisdiction over the action. Truly, the omission to tender filing fees
would have also warranted the dismissal of the charges.

It seems to be indubitable from the foregoing that the petitioner initiated the charges for indirect contempt without regard to the requisites of the Rules of
Court simply to vex the adverse party. He thereby disrespected the orderly administration of justice and committed, yet again, an abuse of procedures.

IV

Petitioner Was Guilty of

Misconduct As A Lawyer

The CA deemed it unavoidable to observe that the petition for certiorari brought by the petitioner to the CA was "part of the dilatory tactics of the
petitioner to stall the execution of a final and executory decision in Civil Case No. 7802 which has already been resolved with finality by no less than the
highest tribunal of the land."46

The observation of the CA deserves our concurrence.

Verily, the petitioner wittingly adopted his aforedescribed worthless and vexatious legal maneuvers for no other purpose except to delay the full
enforcement of the writ of possession, despite knowing, being himself a lawyer, that as a non-redeeming mortgagor he could no longer impugn both the
extrajudicial foreclosure and the ex parte issuance of the writ of execution cum writ of possession; and that the enforcement of the duly-issued writ of
possession could not be delayed. He thus deliberately abused court procedures and processes, in order to enable himself to obstruct and stifle the fair
and quick administration of justice in favor of mortgagee and purchaser GSIS.

His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, by which he was enjoined as a lawyer to "observe the rules
of procedure and xxx not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice." By his dilatory moves, he further breached and dishonored his Lawyer’s Oath,
particularly:47
xxx I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as
to my clients xxx

We stress that the petitioner’s being the party litigant himself did not give him the license to resort to dilatory moves. His zeal to defend whatever rights
he then believed he had and to promote his perceived remaining interests in the property already lawfully transferred to GSIS should not exceed the
bounds of the law, for he remained at all times an officer of the Court burdened to conduct himself "with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his]
clients."48His true obligation as a lawyer should not be warped by any misplaced sense of his rights and interests as a litigant, because he was, above
all, bound not to unduly delay a case, not to impede the execution of a judgment, and not to misuse Court processes. 49 Consequently, he must be made
to account for his misconduct as a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, we deny the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit, and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on March 17,
2003, with the costs of suit to be paid by the petitioner.

The Committee on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is directed to investigate the petitioner for what appear to be (a) his deliberate
disregard of the Rules of Court and jurisprudence pertinent to the issuance and implementation of the writ of possession under Act No. 3135, as
amended; and (b) his witting violations of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 10564

MANUEL L. VALIN AND HONORIO L. VALIN, Complainants

vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO T. RUIZ, Respondent

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:

Before the Court is an Administrative Complaint1 filed by complainants Manuel L. Valin (Manuel) and Honorio L. Valin (Honoria) with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) committing forgery and falsification of a deed of absolute sale, in breach of his lawyer's oath
and in violation of the laws.

The complainants averred that they are two of the surviving children of their deceased parents, spouses Pedro F. Valin (Pedro) and Cecilia
Lagadon (Cecilia). Pedro was the original registered owner of a parcel of land (subject land) located in San Andres, Sanchez Mira, Cagayan, with an
area of 833 square meters and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P- 3275(S ).2

Pedro died on December 7, 1992 while he was in Oahu, Honolulu, Hawaii.3

Several years later, Honorio discovered that the subject land has been transferred to respondent, the godson of Pedro, resulting in the cancellation of
OCT No. P-3275(S), and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11655(s)4 in the name of respondent. He learned from the Register of
Deeds of Sanchez Mira, Cagayan (RD) that the subject land was conveyed to respondent in consideration of ₱10,000.00 by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale (subject deed),5 dated July 15, 1996, and executed in Tuguegarao City, Cagayan purportedly by Pedro with the alleged consent of his spouse,
Cecilia.

The complainants alleged that the subject deed was obviously falsified and the signatures therein of Pedro and Cecilia were forgeries because Pedro
was already dead and Cecilia was in Hawaii at that time. They also asserted that Pedro's Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No. 2259388, which was
used to identify Pedro in the deed, was also falsified as it was issued only on January 2, 1996 long after Pedro's death. The complainants pointed to
respondent as the author of the falsifications and forgeries because the latter caused the registration of the subject land unto his name and because he
was the one who benefited from the same.

In his Answer,6 respondent claimed that Rogelio L. Valin (Rogelio), one of the children of Pedro and Cecilia, sold the subject land to him sometime in
1989 allegedly in representation of Pedro. He recalled that Rogelio approached him for financial assistance to defray the expenses of the surgical
operation of his son. Rogelio offered to sell the subject land and claimed that it was his share in their family's properties. Respondent agreed to buy the
subject land out of compassion. He asked Rogelio for his authority to sell the subject land but the latter claimed that he could not locate his authority
from his parents in their house.7 Respondent claimed that he knew that it was hard to transfer the title because the title owner, Pedro, was out of the
country at the time of the sale and without a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) for the purpose; thus, Rogelio undertook to transfer the title.8

Respondent also denied having knowledge regarding the execution of the subject deed in 1996. He insisted that he neither falsified the said deed and
Pedro's CTC No. 2259388 nor forged the signatures of Pedro and Cecilia as it was Rogelio who processed the transfer of the title of the subject land in
his name. He explained that when the subject land was sold in 1989, Rogelio, as the vendor, undertook to process the transfer of the title of the subject
land. Respondent further clarified that in 1996, he instructed his house helper, Judelyn Baligad (Baligad), to sign the release of the title in his name
because at that time he was busy to go to the RD to sign the release for himself as per instruction of Rogelio's messenger. 9

In their Reply,10 the complainants stressed that the document, which was a falsified deed, was executed in 1996. They also pointed out that records from
the RD revealed that on August 19, 1996, the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-11655(s) was released to Baligad, the housemaid of respondent. In
fact, respondent admitted in his answer that he instructed Baligad to pick up the said copy from the RD as he was busy at that time. Thus, respondent's
sweeping denial of any knowledge with respect to the subject deed is unmeritorious and his claim of good faith must be denied.
In his Rejoinder,11 respondent imputed the falsification of the deed to Rogelio arguing that he must have forged the signatures of his parents in his
attempt to have the title of the subject land transferred to respondent.

After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the case was submitted for the IBP-CBD's resolution.

Report and Recommendation

In its Report and Recommendation,12 dated April 26, 2011, the IBP-CBD found respondent to be unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney. It
reasoned that as the beneficiary of the falsified deed, respondent was presumed to be the author thereof. The IBP-CBD opined that he failed to
overcome this presumption despite his attempt to deflect the blame to Rogelio for his failure to adduce evidence in support of his claim.

The IBP-CBD also dismissed respondent's claim that the transaction was a private one and not in connection with his profession. It emphasized that
good moral character and moral fitness transcends the professional personality of a lawyer. Thus, the IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

In its Resolution No. XX-2013-207,13 dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) resolved to adopt and approve the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD for the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration but the IBP Board denied it in the assailed Resolution No. XXI-2014-98,14 dated March 21, 2014.

Dissatisfied, respondent filed a petition before the Court arguing that:

I.

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES - BOARD OF GOVERNORS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN ISSUING THE RESOLUTIONS DATED MARCH 20, 2013 AND MARCH 21, 2014 BY CONCLUDING
[RESPONDENT] HAS COMMITTED A MISCONDUCT IN HIS PRACTICE OF LAW AND AS A CONSEQUENCE RECOMMENDED HIS SUSPENSION
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW;

II.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES - BOARD OF GOVERNORS HAS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE THERE WAS NO FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS IN THE CHARGES AGAINST THE
[RESPONDENT] FOR SERIOUS MISCONDUCT, MUCH MORE AS A BASIS FOR HIS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW AS THE
EXTANT OF THE RECORDS IS DEVOID OF ANY SUPPORT AND FOR BEING GLARINGLY ERRONEOUS. 15

Respondent avers that in 1989, he initially declined to buy the subject property from Rogelio because he could not produce his authority to sell the land;
that he sympathized with Rogelio, thus, he was convinced to buy the subject property with the understanding that the latter would take the necessary
steps to transfer the title in respondent's name; that he acted in good faith in dealing with Rogelio in his private capacity and he paid ₱26,000.00 for the
consideration of the sale; that the subject deed executed in 1996 does not show any participation on the part of respondent; and that the written authority
to sell of Rogelio actually existed and is attached in his petition, but it was not presented before the IBP.

In a Resolution,16 dated October 14, 2014, the Court required the complainants to file their comment within ten (10) days from notice thereof. The
complainants, however, failed to file the required comment within the stated period. 17On March 1, 2016, the case was submitted for resolution. 18

The Court's Ruling

The Court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP-CBD and the recommendation of the IBP Board.

Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Lawyers must conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the public at large, and a violation of the
high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.19

Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from
consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as
well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation
by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the
CPR. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR provides that "[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor
shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice." 20

It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good
behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has afforded him.
Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, and attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him,
based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. 21 In disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by
clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.22
In this case, the complainants allege that respondent breached his lawyer's oath and violated the law because he falsified the subject deed of sale in
1996 to acquire the land of Pedro even though the latter died in 1992. On the other hand, respondent claims that he had nothing to do with the sale in
1996; rather, he imputes the execution of the subject deed and its registration to Rogelio, brother of the complainants.

The Court finds that respondent violated the lawyer's oath, Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR.

Respondent's disclaimer as to his

participation in the forged deed of
absolute sale is incredible as he
benefited from it

As pointed out in the IBP-CBD Report and Recommendation:

The respondent would like the Commission to believe that Rogelio Valin authored the falsification of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996,
present the same to the Register of Deeds so that a new title can be issued in his name. Such allegations are specious at best. No evidence had been
adduced by the respondent to substantiate such allegation. "Bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence are not equivalent to proof' (Real vs. Belo,
513 [SCRA] 111). Moreover the Commission finds it unbelievable that after seven (7) years, Rogelio Valin will be bothered by his conscience for not
fulfilling his commitment to transfer OCT No. P-3275(s) in the name of his father, Pedro Valin, to the name of the respondent by falsifying a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996 and making it appear that his deceased father, Pedro Valin, sold OCT No. P-3275 to herein respondent and in the
process risk being sued for falsification of public documents. Moreover, records will show that Rogelio Valin was one of the complainants who filed cases
against the respondent in connection with the subject property. Such posturing runs counter to respondent's insinuation that Rogelio Valin was the culprit
in the falsification of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 15, 1996.23

From the time that the sale of the subject land was negotiated in 1989 until it was executed and registered through the subject deed in 1996, there were
patent irregularities, which respondent cannot ignore.

First, in 1989, respondent admitted that he entered into with Rogelio a contract of deed of sale over the subject property owned and registered to Pedro
without any SPA. As a lawyer, he knows that "[w]hen a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the authority of the latter shall
be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void."24 Respondent even admitted that it would be difficult to transfer the title of the subject land because the
title owner Pedro is out of the country at the time of the sale and without a SPA for that purpose. 25 As early as 1989, respondent was aware that the sale
of the subject land without proper authorization was null and void.

Second, in spite of the deficient SPA from Rogelio's father, respondent allowed many years to pass without probing him regarding the sale of the land.
He did not exert any effort to communicate with Rogelio. In all those times, respondent did not demand from Rogelio his written authority to sell the
subject land to ensure that the sale would have a mark of regularity considering that he had paid the purchase price. He continued to ignore the reality
that Rogelio was precluded to sell the subject land without the SPA of his parents. This is obviously contrary to human experience.

Third, it is a difficult pill to swallow that respondent was oblivious of Pedro's death in 1992. He admitted in his petition that he is a close family friend
and godson of Pedro.26 Certainly, he could not claim such strong ties to the family of Pedro if he never heard about the latter's demise. Even after the
lapse of four (4) years or in 1996, it would be arduous to believe that respondent was still ignorant of the demise of his close family friend and godfather.

Fourth, in 1996, respondent directed his house helper Baligad to sign the release of the title in his name. He admitted in his answer that he instructed
Baligad to go to the RD and sign for him the release of the title because he was busy at that time. 27 Conchita P. Baustita, a former employee of the RD,
also attested that Baligad indeed came to the RD to sign the release of the title in behalf of respondent on August 19, 1996. 28 Evidently, respondent was
knowledgeable that the title was issued in his name because he instructed his house helper to finalize the release of the title.

Respondent was neither surprised nor doubtful of the title's release in his name in 1996. He never attempted to contact Rogelio to verify if he was the
one who transferred the property to his name. He also did not immediately request the production of his authority to sell the subject land. Respondent
had the opportunity and resources to verify the veracity of the subject deed in 1996, which caused the transfer of Pedro's land to him. Regrettably, he
continued to feign ignorance of the irregularities that attended the transaction.

Fifth, the subject deed executed in 1996 was readily available at the RD. Respondent could have effortlessly and briefly verified the said deed, which
was the basis of the transfer of the title to him. It is to be noted that the subject deed was not signed by Rogelio on behalf of Pedro; rather, it was
purportedly signed by Pedro personally and confirmed by Cecilia. Evidently, the sale contemplated by the said deed was not anymore a sale through an
agent, which was the original agreement of respondent and Rogelio back in 1989. The consideration stated in the subject deed, in the amount of ₱l
0,000.00, did not reflect the alleged purchase price of ₱26,000.00 given by respondent in 1989.

Further, the subject deed was executed in Tugegarao, Cagayan when respondent knows fully well that Pedro and Cecilia are residing in Hawaii as early
as 1989.1âwphi1 In the same light, it would be impossible to notarize the subject deed in 1996 before a notary public considering that Pedro was already
dead. Also, the subject deed mentioned CTC No. 2259388, dated January 2, 1996, issued to Pedro, which is patently falsified because Pedro has
passed away at that time. Again, respondent did not bother to even read the subject deed of sale which contains obvious and palpable irregularities;
rather, he continued to disregard them for his own convenience.

Sixth, as a lawyer, respondent is fully aware of the requisites for the legality of deed of sale and its registration. He knows how important it is to ensure
that the registered instrument is complete and regular on its face. He is also duty-bound to denounce illegally acquired deeds of sale, which deceive and
betray the general public. Instead of assailing its validity, respondent continuously and completely utilized to his benefits the subject land obtained
through the falsified deed. As reflected in TCT No. T-11655(s), he even mortgaged the subject land to Philippine National Bank, Sanchez Mira Branch as
a security for a loan.29
In fine, the Court is convinced that respondent is the author or, at the very least, has connived with the author of the subject deed and Pedro's CTC for
his personal benefits. Respondent incessantly closed his eyes until he became blind to the anomalies surrounding the sale of the subject land. Whether
through deliberate intent or gross negligence, he participated in the successful registration and release of the title that originated from an absolutely
falsified deed of sale. As discussed above, there have been numerous occasions that respondent could have stopped and noted the red flags apparent
throughout the transaction. Disappointingly, he chose to profit from the falsified deed, devoid of any empathy that his actions would damage innocent
third persons. Respondent's acts are inconsistent with the sacred oath to do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any.

Respondent cannot finger

point culpability to Rogelio

Respondent attempts to impute the falsification of the subject deed and Pedro's CTC to Rogelio because it was the latter who allegedly promised to
transfer the title of the subject land.

The Court is not convinced.

It is highly unbelievable that, after seven (7) years and without any communication or notice whatsoever, 30 Rogelio will suddenly process the transfer of
Pedro's property to respondent out of sheer goodwill and that he was willing to move to great lengths to fulfill his promise by falsifying the signature of
his dead father in disposing his parents' land. Curiously, respondent failed to show proof that he demanded from Rogelio to effect the transfer the
subject land; respondent did not even see him anymore after 1989. 31 Rogelio has left for Hawaii and have been residing there up to the present.32

Further, the subject deed of sale does not even reflect the name of Rogelio, but it was signed by Pedro and Cecilia. The sale manifested by the said
deed was not anymore a sale through an agent, which was the agreement between respondent and Rogelio back in 1989. Rogelio does not have any
more participation in the subject deed. Indubitably, since respondent is the ultimate beneficiary of the falsified deed of sale, he is presumed to be the
author of the subject deed.

The purported written authority

of Pedro is immaterial

In his last ditch attempt to evade responsibility, respondent presented for the first time on appeal a purported written authority, dated September 13,
1989, signed by Pedro permitting Rogelio to sell the subject land. 33 The said authority is originally captioned as a special power of attorney; however, it
bore an erasure and it reads as an authorization of attorney.

The written authority, however, is irrelevant and incredible in light of the circumstances in the present case.

Respondent plainly admitted that the title owner Pedro is out of the country at the time of the sale and Rogelio was without a SPA for that
purpose.34 Thus, the Court wonders how the said written authority suspiciously conjured itself out of thin air when respondent had confessed that it was
not existing at the time of the alleged sale in 1989.

Further, the purported written authority deserves scant consideration. The said authority was allegedly executed by Pedro at Sanchez Mira, Cagayan on
September 13, 1989. However, respondent earlier admitted that in 1989, Pedro was out of the country, 35 thus, he could not have signed the same.

The written authority is immaterial because Pedro died in 1992 and it had lost its force and effect then. It cannot be used for any purpose whatsoever.
Moreover, the subject deed in 1996 was not anymore a sale through an agent as it was purportedly signed by Pedro and Cecilia personally. Thus, the
written authority is irrelevant in the subject deed.

In any case, respondent must face the music in view of his questionable actions regarding the registration and release of the subject title through the
falsified deed.

That the transaction is private in

nature, not in relation to the
practice of law, is not an excuse;
proper penalties

Respondent violated the lawyer's oath and Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the CPR when he participated and benefited from the falsified deed. Even though he
acted in his personal capacity in the improper sale and registration of the subject, he is not excused from liability.

A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in
the favorable opinion of the public. There is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional
capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. 36

Jurisprudence provides different ranges of penalties in cases where the lawyer participates in the execution of a falsified deed involving a dead party.
In Magaway v. Avecilla,37 the erring lawyer notarized a deed of sale even though the party was already dead for 27 years and he was suspended from
the practice of law for one year. In Serzo v. Flores,38 the erring lawyer notarized a deed of absolute sale when one of the parties had long been dead and
he was suspended from the practice of law for two years.

On the other hand, in Sicat v. Ariola, Jr.,39 the Court imposed the ultimate penalty of disbarment against a lawyer who falsified a special power of
attorney, which led to the wrongful encashment of a check worth ₱3,700,000.00 to the prejudice of the government. In Velasco v. Doroin,40 two erring
lawyers forged a deed of sale and they forced complainant to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement to deprive her of her share. One of the lawyers
was suspended indefinitely; while the other was disbarred for absconding the criminal case against him.
In this case, respondent participated in the registration and release of subject title in his favor with the use of the falsified deed of sale. Pedro has long
been dead when the subject deed was executed. Respondent did not do anything to verify the validity of the subject deed and its registration in spite of
the numerous badges of fraud. He is presumed the author as he was the only beneficiary thereof. Because of his actions, the complainants were
deprived with their share as compulsory heirs. Accordingly, the Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP-CBD and the resolution of the IBP
Board that respondent should be meted with the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two years.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz is found guilty of violating the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 1.01 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two (2) years effective immediately, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a
similar violation will be dealt with even more severely. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable this Court to determine
when his suspension shall take effect.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent Atty. Rolando T. Ruiz's records. Copies shall
likewise be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.

CANON 11

G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995

THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M. TIONGCO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses WILFREDO and LORENA AGUIRRE, respondents.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, J.:

In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for the petitioners, to show cause why he should not
be dealt with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility considering:

. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court did not read the petition as borne out by the following statement:

". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court had read the petition and the annexes attached thereto
and hold that the same has "failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed a grave abuse
of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment". . .

which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering further his use of intemperate language in the petition, as
exemplified by his characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as having been "crafted in order to fool the winning
party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with
"perfidious character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the prevailing party in the decision did not appeal
therefrom; and by his charge that the respondent Judge was "a bit confused — with that confusion which is the natural product of
having been born, nurtured and brought up amongst the crowded surroundings of the non-propertied class; In fact, His Honor,
Respondent Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had not owned any real property until March 5, 1974 when his Honor was
already either Public-Prosecutor or RTC Judge; — in one scale of the balance, a 311 square meter lot, 6 houses from the Provincial
Road, about 6 kilometers from the Iloilo City Hall of Justice, and, in the other scale, His Honor's brand-new car, impeccable attire,
and dignified "mien"; and his charge that the respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their counsel in a scheme to
unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits of their property for the duration of appeal"; and with respect to the Order
of 30 May 1994, by describing the respondent Judge as a "liar," "perjurer," or "blasphemer."

In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:

If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and "blasphemer" it is because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious
and blasphemer; "this Honorable [sic] First Division, however, forget, that the undersigned alsp [sic] called him a "robber" (Petition,
pp. 13 bottom; 14 bottom), a "rotten manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26) and "abetter" of graft and shady deals (Petition, p. 12
bottom, p. 13 top); On the other hand, if the undersigned called anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he is indeed cross-eyed
— particularly when he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word; Indeed, it must be a lousy Code of Professional
Responsibility and therefore stands in dire need of amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully expose incompetent and
corrupt judges before this Honorable Supreme Court; It is therefore, respectfully submitted, that for all his pains, the undersigned
does not deserve or is entitled to the honors of being dealt with administratively or otherwise.

and prays:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully prays of this Honorable Supreme Court, that it forebear from
turning the undersigned into a martyr to his principles.
Yet, he added the following:

WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE (Constitution, Preamble, 66 word).

It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for violation of Canon 11 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at all read the petition in this case before it
concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a grave abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he tried to
justify as true his descriptions of the respondent judge as a "liar," "thief." perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the rest
of the intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling obviously frustrated at the incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the
intemperate words or phrases, he volunteered to point out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the respondent judge a "robber,"
"rotten manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed."

Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following reasons: first, he impliedly admitted the falsity of his
insinuation that this Court did not read the petition' second, except as to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious'" and "blasphemer," he failed to address
squarely the other intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the resolution of 26 September 1994, which failure amounts to an admission of their
intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon which his defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he miserably failed to show the relevance
of the harsh words and phrase to his petition.

We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court did not at all read the petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only
exhibited his gross disrespect to and contempt for this Court and exposed his plot to discredit the Members of the First Division of the Court and put
them to public contempt or ridicule; he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn duty to render justice, thereby creating or promoting
distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect of "encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation on which rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief" (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).

In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases against the respondent judge which are obviously uncalled for and
entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring falsity is easily demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife
in their case for recovery of possession and damages, and by the dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that the
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty. Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge,
thereby diminishing public confidence in the latter and eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of justice.

Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads as
follows:

CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good fidelity to the courts"; his duty under Section
20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers"; and his duty under the first
canon of the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]), this Court said:

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become commonplace. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the
observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of
the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds
him to conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the
courts "can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold."
[Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92].

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what
he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief
that he may attack court's decision in words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.

Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this Court, in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel(31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), stated:

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice." [People ex
rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
"not to promote distrust in the administration in the administration of justice." [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. faith in the courts a
lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people." [Malcolm legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus has it been said of a lawyer that
"[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard
towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice." [People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580]. (See also In re: Rafael
C. Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]).
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even
his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right. Thus, In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:

Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty
to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judge, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am dec. 657, 665).

"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best opportunity to become conversant with the character
and efficiency of out judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, or no other class has as great an
interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench." (State Board of Examiners in Law vs. Hart, 116 N.W.
212, 216).

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give
advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of
a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence. (State vs. Circuit Court (72 N.W. 196)).

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.

xxx xxx xxx

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. hence, in the
assertion of their client's rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be
exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but
freedom with responsibility. In Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it was held:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free spe ech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this
Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs an occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration justice. There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For
the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly
system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are
accepted by the general community.

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in judicial
administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to
degrade the administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55
SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs. Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]); or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly
baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macando, 158 SCRA 391 [1988], citing the resolution of
19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false and malicious insinuation against this Court, particularly the
Members of the First Division, and the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious. Such could only come from anger,
if not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who "seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he
considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not
accord with his views" (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]). When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or arrogance as when he
even pointed out other intemperate words in his petition which this Court failed to incorporate in the resolution of 26 September 1994, and with seething
sarcasm as when he prays that this Court "forebear[s] from turning . . . [him] into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his Compliance with the
"RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution — Preamble, 66th word), "nothing more can extenuate his liability for gross
violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility and his other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.

WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED
that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more money.

Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the record of Atty. Jose B. Tiongco in this Court.

G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987

NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987

KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND NATIONALISM-OLALIA, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG
and KIMBERLY-CLARK PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent
Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17, 1987 in front of
the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times
obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along
the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their
red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.

These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where
their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets might be
informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their
petitions for as long as the pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the opportunity
to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union
leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record, Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo,
Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales, union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and Nationalism-Olalia in
the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30 A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in
contempt of court. Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be administratively dealt with.

On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court, represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty.
Potenciano Flores, counsel of record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.

Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court for the above-described acts, together with an assurance
that they will not be repeated. He likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were wrong and that the
cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency
considering that the picket was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an
unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the
Kimberly Independent Labor Union. 2

Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control
of the Court and that the Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.

To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said
incident will not be repeated, the Court required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents complied with on July
17, 1987.

We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts
described earlier. The liberal stance taken by this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES UNION vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an
acknowledgment of the euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will not hesitate in future similar
situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case
pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in
keeping with the respect due to the Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice." 3

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may
be, has never been invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4

Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public
clamor. Every citizen has a profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the courts, under the
protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the
dignity of this Court, but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not
aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice
through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any
such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and
heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to
the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is their
duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of
the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.

WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth, no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or
influence courts of justice into acting one way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of any and all
courts.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. MTJ-94-894 June 2, 1995

ATTY. FELIXBERTO N. BOQUIREN, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE EMPERATRIZ DEL ROSARIO-CRUZ; CLERK OF COURT MELINDA D. GATDULA; and ATTY. SATURNINO V. BACTAD, respondents.

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:

This administrative complaint stemmed from Civil Case No. 111 entitled Alex Boquiren, et. al. vs. Mariano Gutierrez, for ejectment and damages, where
complainant Atty. Felixberto N. Boquiren was the plaintiff's counsel. Atty. Saturnino V. Bactad, the defendant's counsel and the incumbent vice-governor
of the province, and Judge Emperatriz del Rosario-Cruz and Atty. Melinda D. Gatdula, the judge and clerk of court respectively of the Municipal Trial
Court, San Antonio, Zambales where the aforementioned civil case was docketed. Judge Cruz dismissed the ejectment suit due to plaintiff's lack of
cause of action which complainant, Atty. Boquiren, seasonably appealed to the Regional Trial Court Branch 70 of Iba, Zambales. On July 5, 1993 Atty.
Boquiren filed an administrative complaint against Judge Cruz and Atty. Gatdula for misconduct, partiality, serious nonfeasance, culpable dereliction of
duty and ignorance of the law relative to the disposition of civil case no. 111.

On the other hand, Atty. Bactad, the defendant's counsel, was charged by the complainant with false representation and employing scheme to defeat
the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure the latter alleging Atty. Bactad's claim and false representation that a motion to dismiss is an
allowable pleading under the Revised Rule on Summary Proceedings.

On January 26, 1994 the Court "DISMISSED the case without prejudice to the refiling of an administrative case at the proper time, it appearing that the
case is on appeal with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales where relief is available". On February 18, 1994 complainant Atty. Boquiren
filed a motion for its reconsideration.

On March 2, 1994 the Court dismissed the complaint for not having been verified and for its failure to show prima facie case against respondent Atty.
Gatdula. In reaction thereto, complainant Atty. Boquiren filed a motion for reconsideration dated March 26, 1994.

We find these two motions for reconsideration devoid of merit.

Civil Case No. 111 from which the subject administrative complaint stemmed has distinct facts from the latter but the subject administrative complaint
can hardly be taken into isolation. We deemed it proper, as we had properly resolved in our January 26, 1994 Resolution, to dismiss the subject
administrative complaint without prejudice since Civil Case No. 111 is now on appeal with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales.
Necessarily, the appeal of Civil Case No. 111 includes all incidents that occurred from the initial filing of the complaint for Forcible Entry and Detainer on
June 5, 1992 up to the MTC Decision dated February 26, 1993 dismissing said complaint. In fact, a cursory reading of Atty. Boquiren's appeal before the
Regional Trial Court shows that he devoted at least twenty pages in his twenty-six page appeal statement detailing the incidents, perceived improper
conduct, orders, proceedings, misrepresentation, misapprehension of facts, ignorance of the law and rules of procedure allegedly all evidencing the
culpability of the Judge, the Clerk of Court and the defendant's counsel for administrative offenses. We note that these are the same grounds that now
constitute the bases of the subject administrative complaint. The issues and matters raised therein were purely judicial in nature which an appeal can
adequately and properly address. The alleged errors committed by Judge Cruz relative to the disposition of a case are at best errors of judgment and
can be amply remedied by any aggrieved party without recourse to the subject administrative complaint. Besides, it is a matter of public policy that in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary action even though such acts are
erroneous (Revita v. Rimando, 98 SCRA 619 [1980]). More important, any finding that this Court would make relative to the administrative complaint
would undoubtedly influence and affect the outcome of Atty. Boquiren's appeal. Needless to say, this would constitute an unwarranted judicial
interference and sway the Regional Trial Court's dispensation of the appeal which we cannot allow to happen.

The Court strongly notes the excessive prose employed by complainant Atty. Boquiren in his Motions for Reconsideration describing the Court's
Resolutions as: "highly questionable"; "based on insufficient or incorrect reasons"; "a classic arbituarily concluded resolution", "a glaring violation of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics"; "pregnant with aptness to mislead, deceptive or delusive quality"; "patently erroneous"; "a BRAZEN LIE and MOCKERY OF
JUSTICE" "classic carelessness, inefficiency, if not lack of industry on the part of Special Asst. to the Office of the Clerk of Court of the 3rd Div. and/or to
the adjudication officer/office"; "mirror[ing] the Adjudicating Tribunal's and/or its staff's BRAZEN MOCKERY OF JUSTICE with their gross violation of the
PUBLIC INTEREST POLICY of the State" [Emphasis in the original]

It appears prima facie that the foregoing words are aimed at seriously undermining the integrity of this Court. Complainant seems to have forgotten his
duty, as a lawyer and as an officer of the court, to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers (Canon 11, Code of
Professional Responsibility).
ACCORDINGLY, finding the motions for reconsideration without merit the same are hereby DISMISSED. Complainant Atty. Felixberto N. Boquiren,
however, is hereby ordered to explain within five (5) days from receipt of this Resolution why he should not be cited for contempt and/or subject to
disciplinary action.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. NO. 10050 December 3, 2013

VICTORIA C. HEENAN, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERLINA ESPEJO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This resolves the administrative complaint filed by Victoria Heenan (Victoria) against Atty. Erlina Espejo (Atty. Espejo) before the Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for violation of lawyer’s oath, docketed as CBD Case No. 10-2631.

The Facts

Sometime in January 2009, Victoria met Atty. Espejo through her godmother, Corazon Eusebio (Corazon). Following the introduction, Corazon told
Victoria that Atty. Espejo was her lawyer in need of money and wanted to borrow two hundred fifty thousand pesos (PhP 250,000) from her (Victoria).
Shortly thereafter, Victoria went to the house of Corazon for a meeting with Atty. Espejo where they discussed the terms of the loan. Since Atty. Espejo
was introduced to her as her godmother’s lawyer, Victoria found no reason to distrust the former. Hence, during the same meeting, Victoria agreed to
accomodate Atty. Espejo and there and then handed to the latter the amount of PhP 250,000. To secure the payment of the loan, Atty. Espejo
simultaneously issued and turned over to Victoria a check 1dated February 2, 2009 for two hundred seventy-five thousand pesos (PhP 275,000) covering
the loan amount and agreed interest. On due date, Atty. Espejo requested Victoria to delay the deposit of the check for the reason that she was still
waiting for the release of the proceeds of a bank loan to fund the check. However, after a couple of months of waiting, Victoria received no word from
Atty. Espejo as to whether or not the check was already funded enough. In July 2009, Victoria received an Espejo-issued check dated July 10, 2009 in
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (PhP 50,000)2 representing the interest which accrued due to the late payment of the principal obligation. Victoria
deposited the said check but, to her dismay, the check bounced due to insufficiency of funds. Atty. Espejo failed to pay despite Victoria’s repeated
demands. Worried that she would not be able to recover the amount thus lent, Victoria decided to deposit to her account the first check in the amount of
PhP 275,000, but without notifying Atty. Espejo of the fact. However, the said check was also dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. Victoria thereafter
became more aggressive in her efforts to recover her money. She, for instance, personally handed to Atty. Espejo a demand letter dated August 3,
2009.3

When Atty. Espejo still refused to pay, Victoria filed a criminal complaint against Atty. Espejo on August 18, 2009 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 and Estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office. 4

Atty. Espejo disregarded the notices and subpoenas issued by the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office which she personally received and continued to
ignore Victoria’s demands. She attended only one (1) scheduled preliminary investigation where she promised to pay her loan obligation. 5

In November 2009, Atty. Espejo issued another check dated December 8, 2009 in the amount of two hundred seventy five thousand pesos (PhP
275,000.). However, to Victoria’s chagrin, the said check was again dishonored due to insufficiency of funds. 6 Atty. Espejo did not file any counter-
affidavit or pleading to answer the charges against her. On November 17, 2009, the case was submitted for resolution without Atty. Espejo’s
participation.7Victoria thereafter filed the instant administrative case against Atty. Espejo before the CBD. On March 1, 2010, the CBD, through Director
for Bar Discipline Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, issued an Order8 directing Atty. Espejo to submit her Answer to Victoria’s administrative complaint failing which
would render her in default. The warning, notwithstanding, Atty. Espejo did not submit any Answer. On May 5, 2010, IBP Commissioner Rebecca
Villanueva-Malala (Commissioner Villanueva-Malala) notified the parties to appear for a mandatory conference set on June 2, 2010. The notice stated
that non-appearance of either of the parties shall be deemed a waiver of her right to participate in further proceedings. 9

At the mandatory conference, only Victoria appeared.10

Thus, Commissioner Villanueva-Malala issued an Order11 noting Atty. Espejo’s failure to appear during the mandatory conference and her failure to file
an Answer. Accordingly, Atty. Espejo was declared in default. Victoria, on the other hand, was directed to file her verified position paper, which she filed
on June 11, 2010.12

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its Report and Recommendation13 dated July 15, 2010, the CBD recommended the suspension of Atty. Espejo from the practice of law and as a
member of the Bar for a period of five (5) years.

The CBD reasoned:

The failure of a lawyer to answer the complaint for disbarment despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled hearings set, shows his flouting
resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrates his deficiency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.
Moreover, respondent[’s] acts of issuing checks with insufficient funds and despite repeated demands [she] failed to comply with her obligation and her
disregard and failure to appear for preliminary investigation and to submit her counter-affidavit to answer the charges against her for Estafa and Violation
of BP 22, constitute grave misconduct that also warrant disciplinary action against respondent.

On December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors passed a Resolution14 adopting the Report and Recommendation of the CBD with the modification
lowering Atty. Espejo’s suspension from five (5) years to two (2) years. Atty. Espejo was also ordered to return to Victoria the amount of PhP 250,000
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made. The Resolution reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and applicable laws and rules, and considering respondent’s grave misconduct, Atty. Erlinda Espejo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and Ordered to Return to complainant the amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand
(₱250,000.00) Pesos within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice with legal interest reckoned from the time the demand was made.

On August 8, 2013, the CBD transmitted to this Court the Notice of the Resolution pertaining to Resolution No. XX-2012-419 along with the records of
this case.15

The Court’s Ruling

We sustain the findings of the IBP and adopt its recommendation in part.1âwphi1 Atty. Espejo did not deny obtaining a loan from Victoria or traverse
allegations that she issued unfunded checks to pay her obligation. It has already been settled that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the
issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned. 16

Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to their clients. In Tomlin II v. Moya II, We explained
that the prompt payment of financial obligations is one of the duties of a lawyer, thus:

In the present case, respondent admitted his monetary obligations to the complaint but offered no justifiable reason for his continued refusal to pay.
Complainant made several demands, both verbal and written, but respondent just ignored them and even made himself scarce. Although he
acknowledged his financial obligations to complainant, respondent never offered nor made arrangements to pay his debt. On the contrary, he refused to
recognize any wrong doing nor shown remorse for issuing worthless checks, an act constituting gross misconduct. Respondent must be reminded that it
is his duty as a lawyer to faithfully perform at all times his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. As part of his duties, he must
promptly pay his financial obligations.17

The fact that Atty. Espejo obtained the loan and issued the worthless checks in her private capacity and not as an attorney of Victoria is of no moment.
As We have held in several cases, a lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession but also for gross misconduct
outside of his professional capacity. While the Court may not ordinarily discipline a lawyer for misconduct committed in his non- professional or private
capacity, the Court may be justified in suspending or removing him as an attorney where his misconduct outside of the lawyer’s professional dealings is
so gross in character as to show him morally unfit and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer. 18

In Wilkie v. Limos, We reiterated that the issuance of a series of worthless checks, which is exactly what Atty. Espejo committed in this case, manifests a
lawyer’s low regard for her commitment to her oath, for which she may be disciplined. Thus:

We have held that the issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against a closed account indicates a lawyer’s unfitness for
the trust and confidence reposed on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render her unworthy of public confidence.
The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the
public interest and public order. It also manifests a lawyer’s low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers,
seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.

xxxx

In Barrios v. Martinez, we disbarred the respondent who issued worthless checks for which he was convicted in the criminal case filed against him. In
Lao v. Medel, we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino
having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property the title of which was only entrusted to him by the
complainant.19

Further, the misconduct of Atty. Espejo is aggravated by her unjustified refusal to obey the orders of the IBP directing her to file an answer to the
complaint of Victoria and to appear at the scheduled mandatory conference. This constitutes blatant disrespect for the IBP which amounts to conduct
unbecoming a lawyer. In Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, We held that a lawyer must maintain respect not only for the courts, but also for judicial officers and
other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP:

The misconduct of respondent is aggravated by his unjustified refusal to heed the orders of the IBP requiring him to file an answer to the complaint-
affidavit and, afterwards, to appear at the mandatory conference. Although respondent did not appear at the conference, the IBP gave him another
chance to defend himself through a position paper. Still, respondent ignored this directive, exhibiting a blatant disrespect for authority. Indeed, he is justly
charged with conduct unbecoming a lawyer, for a lawyer is expected to uphold the law and promote respect for legal processes. Further, a lawyer must
observe and maintain respect not only to the courts, but also to judicial officers and other duly constituted authorities, including the IBP. Under Rule 139-
B of the Rules of Court, the Court has empowered the IBP to conduct proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline of attorneys.20

Undoubtedly, Atty. Espejo’s issuance of worthless checks and her blatant refusal to heed the directives of the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office and the
IBP contravene Canon 1, Rule 1.01; Canon 7, Rule 7.03; and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provide:
CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND
LEGAL PROCESSES. Rule 1.01. – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 – A LAWYER SHALL AT
ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. CANON 11 – A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT
DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICES AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

We find the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2) years, as recommended by the IBP, commensurate under the circumstances. We,
however, cannot sustain the IBP’s recommendation ordering Atty. Espejo to return the money she borrowed from Victoria. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only concern is the
determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material bearing on other judicial action which the parties may to choose me
against each other. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the Court into
the conduct of one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar. Thus, this Court cannot rule on the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainant.22

WHEREFORE, We find Atty. Erlinda B. Espejo GUILTY of gross misconduct and violating Canons 1, 7 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. We SUSPEND respondent from the practice of law for two (2) years affective immediately.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent.

SO ORDERED.

CANON 11- ADDITIONAL

A.C. No. 11836

CARLINA P. ROBIÑOL, Complainant

vs.
ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG, Respondent

DECISION

TIJAM, J.:

This is a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig (Atty. Bassig) for violation of Code of Professional Responsibility and Lawyer's
Oath.

The Facts

In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant Carlina Robiñol (Robiñol) alleged that respondent rented a house from her in Brgy. Tanong, Marikina City, for a
monthly rental of ₱8,500.00. Said lease, without any written contract, was for a period of two years, or from June 12, 2010 to August 12, 2012. Upon the
start of the lease agreement, it was agreed that Atty. Bassig will pay a one month advance and another one month deposit, both of which are equivalent
of one month rental payment. However, he did not comply with the same. Atty. Bassig instead paid the monthly rental from June 13, 2010 to July 13,
2010.1

Atty. Bassig then paid his rents belatedly from July 2010 to January 2012. However, after said period, he stopped making any payment, to wit2 :

Month/s covered Payment date Amount paid

July 13, 2010 to August 13, 2010 August 12, 2010 PhP 8,500.00

August 13, 2010 to October 13, 2010 November 24, 2010 PhP 17,000.00

October 13, 2010 to November 13, 2010 October 13, 2010 PhP 8,500.00

November 13, 2011 to December 13, 2011 January 4, 2012 PhP 8,500.00

December 13, 2011 to January 13, 2012 March13, 2012 PhP 8,500.00
Robiñol alleged that the last payment in the amount of ₱l7,000.00, for two months' rent was made in July 2012, but no receipt was issued upon Atty.
Bassig's instruction. Atty. Bassig told Robiñol that he will be receiving a big amount from his client and that he will thereafter pay the remaining unpaid
rent.3

Believing that Atty. Bassig will remain truthful to his promise, Robiñol allowed him to stay in the premises. However, when Typhoon Habagat struck
Marikina City, Atty. Bassig left the house because of the heavy flood. When he left, he neither informed Robiñol of his intended destination nor satisfied
his unsettled obligation.4

When the situation in Marikina City got better, Atty. Bassig still failed to return to his rented house. 5

Later on, Robiñol chanced upon Atty. Bassig's daughter and learned that Atty. Bassig was living with her. Robiñol then went to the said house and
demanded payment from Atty. Bassig. As a consequence, he executed a promissory note 6 dated August 18, 2012, undertaking to pay the amount of
₱127,500.00 on installment basis. The promissory note indicates that half of the amount due would be paid on August 31, 2012 and the other half on
September 30, 2012. However, Atty. Bassig reneged on his obligation.7

Because of the foregoing incidents, Robiñol was constrained to hire a counsel to protect her interest.1âwphi1 Thus, a demand letter8 was sent to Atty.
Bassig on December 8, 2012.

In an unverified answer, Atty. Bassig acknowledged his obligation to Robiñol and promised to pay the same within the next two months after the answer
was filed. He maintained that he had difficulty in managing his finances as· he was paying for his son's medical expenses and his car's monthly
amortizations.9

A Notice of Mandatory Conference/Hearing10 dated January 21, 2015 was issued by the IBP Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala. However, the
Orders dated February 25, 201511 and March 25, 201512 issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD)
reveals that only Robiñol appeared in the scheduled mandatory conferences. The latter Order also expunged the answer filed by Atty. Bassig for lack of
verification. In view thereof, the parties were directed to file their respective position paper.

In a Report and Recommendation dated November 20, 201513 , the IBP-CBD recommended the suspension of Atty. Bassig from the practice of law for a
period of two years. The IBP Commissioner ruled that Atty. Bassig's failure to file his answer despite due notice and to appear on the scheduled
hearings showed his resistance to lawful orders and illustrated his despiciency for his oath of office as a lawyer, which deserves disciplinary sanction.
The fallothereof reads:

IN VIEW THEREOF, we respectfully recommend that respondent, ATTY. EDILBERTO P. BASSIG, be SUSPENDED for a period of TWO (2) YEARS
from receipt hereof, from the practice of law and as member of the Bar.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.14

In a Resolution No. XXII-2016-165,15 CBD Case No. 14-4447, entitled Carlina P. Robiñol v. Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig, dated February 25, 2016, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted the recommendation of the IBPCBD and disposed thus:

RESOLVED to ADOPT the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner imposing a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for two (2)
years considering that there was a previous sanction of suspension of two (2) years against the same Respondent in another disbarment case.

As this Court has disciplinary authority over members of the bar, We are tasked to resolve the instant case against Atty. Bassig.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant16 and the proper evidentiary threshold is substantial evidence.17

Here, Robiñol failed to discharge the burden of proof. For one, the evidence submitted were inadmissible. It must be noted that the receipts showing
payment of Atty. Bassig to Robiñol and the promissory note executed and signed by Atty. Bassig were photocopies of the original.

A photocopy, being a mere secondary evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable. 18 Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court states:

SEC.5 When original document is unavailable.-When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon
proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

In the case of Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Antonio Lagman19 , the Court held that:

Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or
due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the
absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed. xxx20

In this case, nowhere in the record shows that Robiñol laid down the predicate for the admission of said photocopies. Thus, aside from the bare
allegations in her complaint, Robiñol was not able to present any evidence to prove that Atty. Bassig failed to pay his rent and that he had in fact leased
a house from Robiñol.
Moreover, We cannot deem Atty. Bassig's failure to file his verified answer and to attend in the scheduled mandatory conferences as an admission of
the allegations in the complaint. The consequences of such omission are clearly laid down in Section 5, Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP, to wit:

Section 5. Non-appearance of parties, and Non-verification of Pleadings.- a) Non-appearance at the mandatory conference or at the clarificatory
questioning date shall be deemed a waiver of the right to participate in the proceedings. Ex parte conference or hearings shall then be conducted.
Pleadings submitted or filed which are not verified shall not be given weight by the Investigating Commissioner.

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis-neither purely civil nor purely criminal. They do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but
rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 21 While these proceedings are sui generis, compliance with the basic rules on evidence
may not be altogether dispensed with. More so, in this case when the evidence in consideration fails to comply with basic rules on admissibility.

Nevertheless, Atty. Bassig is not completely exculpated from any administrative liability.

It must be noted that Atty. Bassig, despite due notice, repeatedly failed to abide by the orders of the IBP, i.e. filing a verified answer, appearing in two
mandatory conferences and filing of position paper. In fact, when the IBP ordered him to file a position paper, it is in view of the expunction of his
answer. Notwithstanding, Atty. Bassig still ignored the directive.

For his behavior, Atty. Bassig committed an act in violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

His attitude of refusing to obey the orders of the IBP indicates his lack of respect for the IBP's rules and regulations22 , but also towards the IBP as an
institution. Remarkably, the IBP is empowered by this Court to conduct proceedings regarding the discipline of lawyers.23 Hence, it is but proper for Atty.
Bassig to be mindful of his duty as a member of the bar to maintain his respect towards a duly constituted authority.

Verily, Atty. Bassig's conduct is unbecoming of a lawyer, for lawyers are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to
stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court.24 In disregarding the orders of the IBP, he exhibited a conduct
which runs contrary to his sworn duty as an officer of the court.

As a final note, We commiserate with Robiñol, a nonagenarian, on her unfortunate circumstances as she should no longer be dealing with this kind of
anxiety. Nevertheless, We sanction Atty. Bassig to pay a fine in the amount of ₱l0,000.00 for his arrant neglect to maintain acceptable deportment as
member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Atty. Edilberto P. Bassig is hereby ORDERED to pay a FINE in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(₱l0,000.00) with the STERN WARNING that commission of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe
penalty.

SO ORDERED.

CANON 12

A.C. No. 217 November 27, 1968

NIEVES RILLAS VDA. DE BARRERA, complainant,

vs.
CASIANO U. LAPUT, respondent.

CONCEPCION, C. J.:

Complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera seeks the disbarment of respondent Casiano U. Laput, upon the ground that, being her counsel, as
administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Macario Barrera, in Special Proceedings No. 2-J of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, he (Laput) had
misappropriated several sums of money held by him in trust for said estate and tried to appropriate two (2) parcels of land belonging to the same, as well
as threatened her, in a fit of anger, with a gun, into signing several papers, despite the fact that she is 72 years of age.

In his answer, respondent admitted his former relationship with Mrs. Barrera as attorney and client and, apart from denying the main allegations of her
complaint, averred that the filing thereof was "part of a scheme to beat off" his claim for attorney's fees in said Special Proceedings No. 2-J.

The matter was, pursuant to the Rules of Court,1 referred for investigation, report and recommendation, to the Solicitor General, who after appropriate
proceedings, recommended the dismissal of all the charges preferred against the respondent, for insufficiency of the evidence except as regards the
alleged act of coercion on his part, for which said Officer filed the corresponding complaint alleging, inter alia:

3. That while being such counsel for the administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera, and of the estate, the respondent Casiano U. Laput on January 10,
1955 presented to the complainant Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera at her residence at 854-D D. Jakosalem St., Cebu City, certain pleadings for the
latter's signature in the aforementioned administration proceedings;
4. That the complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera declined to sign said pleadings but requested respondent to leave the papers in
order that she may first ask somebody to translate the same for her;

5. That the respondent Casiano U. Laput instead of acceding to her (his) client's request became angry and told complainant to sign the papers, at the
same time drawing his revolver from its holster and placing it on his lap with the evident purpose of intimidating the complainant, an old woman of 72
years old, into signing the papers or pleadings presented for signature;

6. That complainant administratrix Nieves Rillas Vda. de Barrera intimidated by the threat aforementioned was compelled to sign as in fact she did sign,
said pleadings against her will;

and praying that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year.

In his answer, respondent denied having committed the acts imputed to him in this complaint of the Solicitor General and alleged, in substance that the
papers he caused Mrs. Barrera to sign, on the occasion referred to in said pleading, was a "Notice for Rendition of Final Accounting and Partition of
Estate"; that this "notice" was legally unnecessary and useless; that he, however, caused it to be prepared in order to impress upon Mrs. Barrera the
necessity of filing her final accounts in the aforementioned proceedings and, closing the same, because she was reluctant to do so; that Mrs. Barrera
had, also, filed against him a criminal complaint for coercion with the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu, based upon the same allegations made in her
administrative complaint herein; and that, after due investigation, said criminal complaint was dismissed by the City Fiscal.

From the evidence on record, we gather that, prior to January 10, 1955, Mrs. Barrera was not inclined to cause the proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of Macario Barrera to be closed; that, upon the other hand, respondent wanted to put an end to said proceedings — since there was nothing else
to be done therein — so that he could collect his fees for services rendered to Mrs. Barrera as administratrix of said estate; that he, therefore, prepared a
petition for the declaration of Mrs. Barrera as the universal heir of her deceased husband, for the delivery to her of the residue of his estate and the
termination of the proceedings; that he, moreover, caused to be prepared a notice "for the rendition of the final, accounting and partition" of said estate;
that his purpose in preparing said petition was to induce her to virtually agree and promise to submit her final accounts by signing this notice; that
respondent presented said petition and notice to Mrs. Barrera, on January 10, 1955, for her signature; that she, however, refused to do so and
suggested that the papers be left with her so that she could have them read by somebody else; that, annoyed or angered by this open manifestation of
distrust, respondent sought to offset her adamance by putting his revolver on his lap; and that, although he did not point the firearm at her, its display
attained the intended effect of intimidating Mrs. Barrera, who, accordingly affixed her signature on the petition and the notice aforementioned.

Improper and censurable as these acts inherently are, they become more so when we consider that they were performed by a man dealing with a
woman 72 years of age. The offense in this case is compounded by the circumstance that, being a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, the
offender should have set the example as man of peace and a champion of the Rule of Law. Worse still is the fact that the offended party is the very
person whom the offender was pledged to defend and protect — his own client.

There are, of course, two (2) extenuating circumstance in favor of respondent herein, namely: (1) he evidently considered himself insulted by Mrs.
Barrera and was obfuscated because she clearly indicated her lack of confidence in him, by stating bluntly that she wanted somebody else to read the
papers to her; and (2) he required her to do something really harmless. Still, it cannot be denied that his intent in placing the gun on his lap was to
intimidate his client.

WHEREFORE, as recommended by the Solicitor General, respondent herein is hereby found guilty of gross misconduct in office and accordingly
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year, beginning from the date of entry of judgment in this case. It is so ordered.

JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252

Complainant,
Present:

Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus - Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona, and
Carpio Morales,* JJ
Promulgated:
Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent. October 5, 2004

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

otaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties, which are impressed with public interest. They are enjoined to

comply faithfully with the solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those
N
who violate it or neglect observance thereof.
__________________
*
On leave.

The Case and the Facts

Before us is a verified Complaint[1] filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the

disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

(IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule 138 [2] of the

Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and 1.03[3], Canon 5[4], and Canons 12.07[5] and 12.08

of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in this wise:

x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on
different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of the affiants;
b) enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR
and IBP numbers in the documents he had notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.

Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as
evidence in the case wherein he was actively representing his client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date,
Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter disarmed him
of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting words and veiled threats.[6]

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001 Order of the CBD, [7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were

attached to the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the

non-notation of their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for

affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to

before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva Ecija -- some

of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register

for these documents.

 As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification required by Section 3 of Rule 112 [9] of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the

affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary investigation.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients on substantial

matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted murder.Respondent

averred that since they were in his house when the alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of justice.

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their case by the provincial

prosecutor on January 4, 2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the

next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his allegations, he submitted

Certifications[10] from the Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two police officers who had assisted them.

Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel of Barangay

Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against complainant.

After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001, at two

oclock in the afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the parties by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable to do so, apparently because

he had received the Notice only on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at two oclock in the afternoon.

On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent. The latters Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also received

complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their respective

memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for resolution.

The CBD received complainants Memorandum [18] on September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.

The IBPs Recommendation

 On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172[19] approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that

respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found

his excuse for the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by increasing the fine to P3,000 with a warning that any repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.

The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were

dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Violation of the Notarial Law

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every document

acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue

and date as part of such certification.[21] They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by

them; and to give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to

state therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded. [22] Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their

commission as notaries public.[23]

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to

notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,[24] the Court explained the value and meaning of notarization as follows:

The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries
 public. Notarization converts a private document into a public document thus making that document admissible in evidence without
further proof of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts, administrative
agencies and the public at large must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a notary public and appended to a
private instrument.

For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in their performance

of the notarial act are never to be countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the performance of their duties,[25]which are dictated by

public policy and are impressed with public interest.

It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the

documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the notarial registry.

Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases pending before

the courts and government agencies. He points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.

We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is patently irrelevant. No law

dispenses with these formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that he did away with

the basics of notarial procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad example of others is not an acceptable justification

for breaking the law.

We note further that the documents attached to the verified Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondents clients Ernesto Ramos

and Rey Geronimo, as well as their witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for attempted murder, filed by complainants brother

against the aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of the present Complaint.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires

respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has

personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with
respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with the

certification requirement.

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal

processes.[26] They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be

well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence.[27] It is imperative that they be

conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their

obligations as members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws.[28] No custom

or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by

respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law, the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a notary public.

Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised

with great caution.[29] Disbarment will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and the character of

the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be

decreed.[30] Considering the nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by

the IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client

Complainant further faults respondent for executing before Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the defense of alibi

proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client.

Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:

 Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client, except:

a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;

b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which
event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to another counsel.

Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from being a witness, [31] except only in certain cases pertaining to privileged

communication arising from an attorney-client relationship.[32]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients as witnesses from that

as advocates. Witnesses are expected to tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction, advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and

defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the zeal of an advocate. The question

is one of propriety rather than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.

Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and leave many people to

suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and

if their sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a witness he fortified it

with his own testimony. The testimony of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial and untruthful.[33]

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the preference is for them to

refrain from testifying as witnesses, unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to withdraw from active management of the case.[34]

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we cannot hastily make him

administratively liable for the following reasons:

First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the client, especially in

a criminal action in which the latters life and liberty are at stake. [35] It is the fundamental right of the accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the
charges against them. They are entitled to suggest all those reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their guilt; and to ensure that if

they are convicted, such conviction is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save his clients from

a wrong conviction. He had the duty to present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to

the end that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law. [36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that on the alleged

date and time of the incident, his clients were at his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime charged against them. Notably, in his

Affidavit, complainant does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the falsity of its contents.

Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this instance, the

Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial. [37] Not being a trial of the case on the merits, a

preliminary investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecutions; protecting

them from open and public accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from

useless and expensive prosecutions.[38] The investigation is advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the trial proper.

Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any matter in which he knows or

has reason to believe that he may be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore, in future cases in which his testimony may become

essential to serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these cases.

No Proof of Harassment
 The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by evidence. Allegation is

never equivalent to proof, and a bare charge cannot be equated with liability.[39] It is not the self-serving claim of complainant but the version of

respondent that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the Certifications of

the Cabanatuan City Police.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is

hereby FINED P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9116, March 12, 2014

NESTOR B. FIGUERAS AND BIENVENIDO VICTORIA, JR., Complainants, v. ATTY. DIOSDADO B. JIMENEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review filed by Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez assailing the February 19, 2009 Resolution 1 of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) suspending him from the practice of law for a period of six months for breach of Rule 12.03, 2 Canon 12,3 Canon
17,4 Rule 18.03,5 and Canon 186 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He likewise assails the June 26, 2011 Resolution7 of the IBP Board of
Governors denying his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Congressional Village Homeowner’s Association, Inc. is the entity in charge of the affairs of the homeowners of Congressional Village in Quezon
City. On January 7, 1993, the Spouses Federico and Victoria Santander filed a civil suit for damages against the Association and Ely Mabanag 8 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104 for building a concrete wall which abutted their property and denied them of their right of
way. The spouses Santander likewise alleged that said concrete wall was built in violation of Quezon City Ordinance No. 8633, S-71 which prohibits the
closing, obstructing, preventing or otherwise refusing to the public or vehicular traffic the use of or free access to any subdivision or community
street.9 The Law Firm of Gonzalez Sinense Jimenez and Associates was the legal counsel for the Association, with respondent as the counsel of record
and handling lawyer. After trial and hearing, the RTC rendered a decision10 on October 4, 1996 in favor of the Spouses Santander. The Association,
represented by said law firm, appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). On February 5, 1999, the CA issued a Resolution 11 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577
dismissing the appeal on the ground that the original period to file the appellant’s brief had expired 95 days even before the first motion for extension of
time to file said brief was filed. The CA also stated that the grounds adduced for the said motion as well as the six subsequent motions for extension of
time to file brief were not meritorious. The CA resolution became final.

Eight years later or on April 11, 2007, complainants Nestor Figueras and Bienvenido Victoria, Jr., as members of the Association, filed a Complaint12 for
Disbarment against respondent before the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly
Rule 12.03, Canon 12; Canon 17; and Rule 18.03, Canon 18 thereof for his negligence in handling the appeal and willful violation of his duties as an
officer of the court.

In his Verified Answer with Counter Complaint,13 respondent denied administrative liability. He claimed that although his law firm represented the
homeowner’s association in CA-G.R. CV No. 55577, the case was actually handled by an associate lawyer in his law office. As the partner in charge of
the case, he exercised general supervision over the handling counsel and signed the pleadings prepared by said handling lawyer. Upon discovery of the
omissions of the handling lawyer, appropriate sanctions were imposed on the handling lawyer and he thereafter personally took responsibility and spent
personal funds to negotiate a settlement with Federico Santander at no cost to the Association. No damage whatsoever was caused to the Association.

Respondent likewise alleged that after he defeated complainant Figueras in the election for President of the homeowner’s association in 1996, Figueras
and his compadre, complainant Victoria, stopped paying their association dues and other assessments. Complainants and other delinquent members of
the association were sanctioned by the Board of Directors and were sued by the association before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB). In retaliation, complainants filed the present disbarment case against him and several other cases against him and other officers of the
association before the HLURB to question, among others, the legitimacy of the Association, the election of its officers, and the sanctions imposed by the
Association. Thus, he concluded that the disbarment case was filed to harass him. Respondent added that complainants have no personality to file the
disbarment complaint as they were not his clients; hence, there was likewise no jurisdiction over the complaint on the part of the IBP-CBD.
As counterclaim, respondent prayed for the outright dismissal of the disbarment case for lack of merit, the imposition of sanctions on complainants, and
the payment of damages for the filing of the baseless complaint for disbarment.

On October 3, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD found respondent liable for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
particularly Rule 12.03 of Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 thereof, and recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice
of law for a period of three to six months, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.14crallawlibrary

On February 19, 2009, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XVIII-2009-1415adopting the recommendation with modifications as
follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution [as] Annex “A”; and, finding the recommendation fully
supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondent’s breach of Rule 12.03, Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule
18.03 and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6)
months. The Warning imposed against respondent is hereby deleted.

Respondent sought reconsideration of the resolution but his motion was denied in IBP Resolution No. XIX-2011-480 dated June 26, 2011.16 The IBP
Board of Governors noted that respondent’s motion was a mere reiteration of matters already discussed and there were no substantial grounds to
disturb the February 19, 2009 Resolution.

Respondent now comes to this Court essentially raising the issue whether the IBP correctly found him administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.03,
Canon 12, Canon 17, Rule 18.03, and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

After careful consideration of the records of the case, the Court finds that the suspension of respondent from the practice of law is proper.

The Court finds no merit in respondent’s contention that complainants have no personality to file a disbarment case against him as they were not his
clients and that the present suit was merely instituted to harass him.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate the suit does not apply in disbarment
cases. In fact, the person who called the attention of the court to a lawyer’s misconduct “is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the
outcome.”17crallawlibrary

In Heck v. Judge Santos,18 the Court held that “[a]ny interested person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary proceedings.” The right to
institute disbarment proceedings is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person complaining suffered injury from the alleged
wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the charges.

The Court agrees with the IBP that respondent had been remiss in the performance of his duties as counsel for Congressional Village Homeowner’s
Association, Inc. Records show that respondent filed the first motion for extension of time to file appellant’s brief 95 days after the expiration of the
reglementary period to file said brief, thus causing the dismissal of the appeal of the homeowner’s association. To justify his inexcusable negligence,
respondent alleges that he was merely the supervising lawyer and that the fault lies with the handling lawyer. His contention, however, is belied by the
records for we note that respondent had filed with the CA an Urgent Motion for Extension, which he himself signed on behalf of the law firm, stating that
a previous motion had been filed but “due to the health condition of the undersigned counsel…he was not able to finish said Appellants’ Brief within the
fifteen (15) day period earlier requested by him.”19 Thus, it is clear that respondent was personally in charge of the case.

A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latter’s interest with utmost diligence. In failing to file the
appellant’s brief on behalf of his client, respondent had fallen far short of his duties as counsel as set forth in Rule 12.04,20 Canon 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which exhorts every member of the Bar not to unduly delay a case and to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the same Code also states that:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Canon 18—A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

Rule 18.03.—A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

In In Re: Atty. Santiago F. Marcos21 the Court considered a lawyer’s failure to file brief for his client as amounting to inexcusable negligence. The Court
held:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

An attorney is bound to protect his client’s interest to the best of his ability and with utmost diligence. (Del Rosario vs. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 159)
A failure to file brief for his client certainly constitutes inexcusable negligence on his part. (People vs. Villar, 46 SCRA 107) The respondent has indeed
committed a serious lapse in the duty owed by him to his client as well as to the Court not to delay litigation and to aid in the speedy administration of
justice. (Canons 21 and 22, Canons of Professional Ethics; People vs. Daban, 43 SCRA 185; People vs. Estocada, 43 SCRA 515).

It has been stressed that the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound
judicial discretion.22 The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file a brief or other pleading range from reprimand,23 warning with fine,24 suspension25 and, in
grave cases, disbarment.26 In the present case, we find too harsh the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of six months. Under the circumstances, we deem the penalty of suspension for one month from the practice of law
to be more commensurate with the extent of respondent’s violation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Atty. Diosdado B. Jimenez is found administratively liable for violation of Rule 12.04, Canon 12 and Rule 18.03,
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is suspended from the practice of law for one (1) month effective from finality of this
Resolution, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar violation shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished, upon its finality, to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all the courts in the Philippines, and spread on the
personal record of respondent lawyer in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines.

SO ORDERED.
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ADM. CASE No. 7006
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ.
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:
October 9, 2007
X ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ X

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard

before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.

Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March

14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution was

sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail

Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the

ground that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.[1]

In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2] Judge Buyser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior

Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the

amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.

The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12,

2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order

dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of

Appeals (CA).

Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the

accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing

murder suspect to bail out, reads:

SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.
 Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29
based in Surigao City for ruling on a motionthat sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . .
..

Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.

Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to
allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is weak.

But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the
evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.

xxx

Bagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative
charges of certiorari against the judge.

Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by Judge Tan.

This is the only way that the public would know that there are judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance. he
said.[3]

In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of

the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the

publication of the article which degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.

The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but

sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear

reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent that he was inhibiting himself from the

case due to the harsh insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.

On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the

article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed

such lies, Mr. Francisco answered that his only source was respondent. [4] Mr. Francisco clarified that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser

inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason, the phrase for an unclear reason, was added by the newspapers Executive Editor Herby S.

Gomez.[5]

Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article

until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71

of the Rules of Court.[6] The Courts Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:

ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby
ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for contempt
and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this Court
dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect
contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in
jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.

SO ORDERD.[7]

Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
 Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked

the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial courts disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.

In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days

from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding judge, and why he should

not be suspended from the practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 11.05 of Canon 11[8] and Rule 13.02 of

Canon 13.[9]

In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September

30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2,

2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a judge who does not know the

law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due process to the people.

The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.

On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled

with work of equal importance and needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to properly prepare for his

defense.

In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt

proceedings, and that respondents actions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.

On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared in court nor informed the court of his absence. The trial court

issued an Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for, and ordered him to appear on

January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in the Order dated October

20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be

interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked

him to comment on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted

that he was interviewed by his friend, Tony Consing, at the latters instance. He justified his response during the interview as a simple exercise of his

constitutional right of freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.

On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal
profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law.

Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of
IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and for further
determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo. [10]
 The trial court found respondents denials to be lame as the tape of his interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of

the court and its officers, thus:

TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay ang gamayng panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing
nagpabilin pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna karon?

(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not changed your mind yet?)

BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod
tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.

(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred. Thats it.)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan karon nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga
dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon ako. Nagabasa ako sa
mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya
nako sa kaso nga disbarment niining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga
katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod,
pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod
kining iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .

(Thats true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I
read new jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment case against this
Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that he loses his license. . . . This judge who is
ignorant of the law should not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just
take a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order
given in open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala siya mag-ingon ug
kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .

(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states that this Order was given in open court, and in Gods mercy, he
did not state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)

BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako

siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.

(Because he does not know the law, I said, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Then he
came back and said, BJMP, arrest Bagabuyo.)

xxx

BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.

Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance of the law. . . .

(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you will see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . )

xxx

TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)

BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . .

(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw
kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang ang balaod nga siya in fact at
that time I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .

(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a braggart. . .
.And what I said was based on the law.In fact, at that time, I said he is not conversant of the law,
with regards to the case of murder . . . .)

xxx

BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . . Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan
nga ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong sikopon, iya kong ipa-
 priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios
por Santo, Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong
hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not accord me due
process of law . . . .

(I sat down. . . . Thats it. But what was his purpose? He made me come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested,
he wanted me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he ordered the BMJP. For
Gods sake, Mr. Tan, whats wrong with you, Mr. Tan? Please read the law. What is your
thinking?That when you are a judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a
democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you did not accord
me due process of law. . . .)

TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.

(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.)

BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod
pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man intawon ang balaod ang
iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang
iyang guitunan?

(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed from the
Bench. But what law has he been reading? I heard that he is a mahjong aficionado (mahjongero)
and that is why he is studying mahjong.[11]

The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority

of the court, and should not promote distrust in the administration of justice.

The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [12] for

any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 27[13] of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held

that the requirement of due process has been duly satisfied.

In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29, [14] Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15] Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29,

transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondents suspension from the practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together

with the order of suspension and other relevant documents.

In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold

Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondents criticism of the trial courts Order dated

November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation of oath of office by

respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent

chose to remain silent.

The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the trial courts order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that

respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more

severely.

The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.[16] that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit;
malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the
oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not preclusive in nature
even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his professional
 career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to
his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,

responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. [17] Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.[18] Canon 11 of

the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should

insist on similar conduct by others.Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.

Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements

against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.

Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior

prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star

Daily. Respondents statements in the article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon

13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a

party.

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of

the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of

studying the law, and that he was a liar.

Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and

discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to

the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica[19] held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to
uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for

doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always be maintained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13

of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyers Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year

effective upon finality of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

No costs.
 SO ORDERED.

CANON 13

SEC. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be
used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to
influence the judge. SEC. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with,