BY: JODELLE 

POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION

LIST OF CASES Most Rev. Pedro D. Arigo, et.al. v. Scott H. Swift, et.al.
(G.R. No. 206510)
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS DATE: 16 September 2014
 Tubbataha was declared a National Marine Park by
1. PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GOV’T OF virtue of Proclamation No. 306 issued by President
PHIL. PEACE PANEL (X) Corazon C. Aquino on 11 August 1988.
2. MAGALLONA V. ERMITA (X)  In 1993, Tubbataha was inscribed by the United
3. UP V. DIZON (X) Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural
4. ARIGO V. SWIFT Organization (UNESCO) as a World Heritage Site.
5. DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH vs.CIR It was recognized as one of the Philippines’ oldest
6. ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMELEC ecosystems.
7. IMBONG V. OCHOA  On 6 April 2010, Congress passed R.A. No. 10067
8. GARCIA V. DRILON (RA 10067), otherwise known as the “Tubbataha
9. REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) Act of 2009”, to ensure
10. INTERNATIONAL SERVICE V. GREENPEACE protection and conservation of the Tubbataha Reefs
11. BELGICA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY into perpetuity for the enjoyment of present and
12. MENDOZA V. PEOPLE future generations.
13. SEMA V. COMELEC  Under the “no take” policy, entry into the waters of
14. NPC DAMA V. NPC the TRNP is strictly regulated and many human
activities are prohibited, penalized or fined,
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT including fishing, gathering, destroying and
disturbing the resources within the TRNP.
DISTRICT REPRESENTATIVE AND QUESTIONS OF  In December 2012, the US Embassy in the
APPORTIONMENT Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the
1. AQUINO III V.COMELEC USS Guardian (the ship) “to enter and exit the
2. ALDABA V. COMELEC territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at
3. NAVARRO V. ERMITA the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship
4. NAVAL V. COMELEC replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.”
5. REYES V. COMELEC  On 6 January 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for
Subic Bay, arriving on 13 January 2013. Two days
PARTY LIST SYSTEM later, it departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
1. BANAT V. COMELEC Makassar, Indonesia.
2. ATONG PAGLAUM V. COMELEC  On 17 January 2013, while transiting the Sulu Sea,
3. SENIOR CITIZENS V. COMELEC the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South
4. LICO V. COMELEC (X) Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs. No one was injured
5. ABANG LINGKOD PARTYLIST V. COMELEC in the incident and there have been no reports of
6. ABAYON V. HRET leaking fuel or oil.

th
On 20 January 2013, US 7 Fleet Commander,
1. LIBAN V. RICHARD J. GORDON
Vice Admiral Scott Swift expressed regret for the
2. POBRE V. SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO
incident in a press statement.
3. NERI V. SENATE COMMITTEE
 On 4 February 2013, US Ambassador to the
4. BELGICA v. OCHOA (X)
Philippine Harry Thomas, Jr. met with Department
5. ARAULLO V. AQUINO
of Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario
6. ABAKADA GURO PARTYLIST V. PURISIMA
regarding the compensation for damage to the reef
caused by the ship.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
 By 30 March 2013, the US Navy-led salvage team
1. PORMENTO V. ESTRADA had finished removing the last piece of the
2. ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, v. PET grounded ship from the coral reef.
 On 17 April 2013, petitioners Arigo, et.al. on their
RULES ON SUCCESSION behalf and in representation of their respective
1. FUNA V. ERMITA sector/organization and others, including minors or
2. FUNA V. AGRA generations yet unborn filed a petition for the
3. DE CASTRO V. JBC issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan with prayer for the
4. VELICARIA-GARAFIL V. OFFICE OF THE issuance of a Temporary Environmental Protection
PRESIDENT Order (TEPO) under the Rules of Procedure for
5. RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS V. REYES (X) Environmental Cases. Their contentions are:
6. ALMARIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY - The grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging
7. MONSANTO V. FACTORAN, JR., operations of the ship cause and continue to
8. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL V. COMELEC cause environmental damage of such magnitude
9. KULAYAN V. GOV. TAN as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antiques,
10. AMPATUAN V.HON. RONALDO PUNO Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Zamboaga del Norte, Basilan,
Sulu and Taw-Tawi which events violate their
constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful
ecology
- There should be a directive from the Supreme
Court for the institution of civil, administrative and
1

criminal suits for acts committed in violation of
environmental laws and regulations in connection
with the grounding incident
- US respondents committed the following
violations under RA 10067: unauthorized entry;
non-payment of conservation fees; obstruction of
law enforcement officer; damages to the reef; and
destroying and disturbing resources
- The VFA provides for a waiver of immunity
from suit
 The respondents consist of the following: Scott
th
Swift in his capacity as Commander of the US 7
Fleet; Mark Rice as the Commanding Officer of the
ship; President Benigno Aquino III as the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines; Hon. Albert del Rosario as the DFA
Secretary; Hon. Paquito Ochoa as the Executive
Secretary; Hon. Ramon Paje as the DENR
Secretary; Vice Admiral Jose Luis Alano as the
Philippine Navy Flag Officer in Command; Admiral
Rodolfo Isorena as Commandant of the Philippine
Coast Guard, Commodore Enrico Efren Evangelista
as the Philippine Coast Guard Palawan, Major Gen.
Virgilio Domingo as Commandant of the AFP and
Lt. Gen. Terry Robling as Co-Director of the US
Marine Corps. Forces. The Philippine respondents
contend that:
- The grounds relied upon by petitioners for the
issuance of TEPO or writ of Kalikasan have
become fait accompli as the salvage operations
on the ship were already completed
- The petition is defective in form and in substance
- The petition improperly raises issues involving
VFA between Philippines and USA
- The determination of the extent of responsibility of
the US Government regarding the damage to the
Tubbataha Reefs rests exclusively with the
executive branch
ISSUES
1. WON the Court has jurisdiction over the US
respondents
2. WON the waiver of immunity provisions of the VFA
applies
3. WON the petition has become moot
4. WON the Court can determine the extent of
responsibility of the US Government
RULING
1. None. The US respondents were sued in their official
capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had
control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its
crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the
unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP
was committed while they were performing official military
duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment
against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is
deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of
State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by
the Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.
It is worthy to note that during the deliberations,
Justice Antonio Carpio took the position that the conduct of
the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted
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BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
area in violation of RA 10067 and caused damage to the
TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS).
While historically, warships enjoy sovereign
immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31
of UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases
where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of
the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s
internal waters and the territorial sea.
Although the US to date has not ratified the
UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy, the US
considers itself bound by customary international rules on
the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.
The Court concurs with Justice Carpio’s view that
non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the
US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal
State over its internal waters and territorial sea. The Court
thus expects the US to bear “international responsibility
under Art. 31 of UNCLOS in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs.
2. No. The waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains
only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions
such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of
Kalikasan.
In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7
of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of
an environmental law is to be filed separately:
“SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions.
– The filing of a petition for the issuance
of the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude
the filing of separate civil, criminal or
administrative actions.”
A ruling on the application or non-application of
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel
who may be found responsible for the grounding of the
USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the
province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The Court
found it unnecessary to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute.
In the same vein, the Court cannot grant damages
which have resulted from the violation of environmental
laws. Section 15, Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for
Environmental Cases enumerates the reliefs which may be
granted in a petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan, to
wit:
Section 15. Judgment. - Within sixty (60)
days from the time the petition is submitted
for decision, the court shall render
judgment granting or denying the privilege
of the writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the
writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently
cease and desist from committing acts or

neglecting the performance of a duty in
violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public
official, government agency, private
person or entity to protect, preserve,
rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public
official, government agency, private
person or entity to monitor strict
compliance with the decision and
orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public
official, government agency, or private
person or entity to make periodic
reports on the execution of the final
judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to
the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology or to the
protection, preservation, rehabilitation
or restoration of the environment,
except the award of damages to
individual petitioners. (Emphasis
supplied)
3. Yes, in the sense that the salvage operation sought to be
enjoined or restrained had already been accomplished.
However, insofar as the directives to Philippine
respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef
structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the
grounding incident are concerned, petitioners are entitled
to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of the
removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.
The Court is mindful of the fact that the US and
Philippine governments both expressed readiness to
negotiate and discuss the matter of compensation for the
damage caused by the USS Guardian. After all, exploring
avenues for settlement of environmental cases is not
proscribed by the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases.
4. No. The Court deferred to the Executive Branch the matter
of compensation and rehabilitation measures through
diplomatic channels. Resolution of these issues impinges
on our relations with another State in the context of
common security interests under the VFA.
It is settled that the conduct of the foreign
relations of our government is committed by the
Constitution to the executive and legislative – “the political”
departments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not
subject to judicial inquiry or decision.
G.R. No. 188550 August 19, 2013
DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA BRANCH, PETITIONER,
vs.COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE, RESPONDENT.

4
In accordance with Section 28(A)(5) of the NIRC of
1997, petitioner withheld and remitted to respondent
on 21 October 2003 the amount of PHP
67,688,553.51, which represented the fifteen
percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT)
on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany)
5
for 2002 and prior taxable years.
 Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT,
petitioner filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers
Assessment and Investigation Division on 4
October 2005 an administrative claim for refund or
issuance of its tax credit certificate in the total
amount of PHP 22,562,851.17. On the same date,
petitioner requested from the International Tax
Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its
entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10% under
6
the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
CTA DIVISION
 However, the claim of petitioner for a refund was
denied on the ground that the application for a tax
treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the
payment by the former of its BPRT and actual
remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or
prior to its availment of the preferential rate of ten
percent (10%) under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty
provision. The court a quo held that petitioner
violated the fifteen (15) day period mandated under
Section III paragraph (2) of Revenue Memorandum
Order (RMO) No. 1-2000.
 Further, the CTA Second Division relied on Mirant
v. CIR where the CTA En Banc ruled that before the
benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a
foreign corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the
latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax
treaty and prove that they indeed apply to the
corporation.
THE CTA EN BANC RULING
 The CTA En Banc affirmed the CTA Second
Division’s Decision dated 29 August 2008 and
Resolution dated 14 January 2009. Citing Mirant,
the CTA En Banc held that a ruling from the ITAD of
the BIR must be secured prior to the availment of a
preferential tax rate under a tax treaty.
ISSUE: This Court is now confronted with the issue of
whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-
2000 will deprive persons or corporations of the benefit
of a tax treaty.
Tax Treaty vs. RMO No. 1-2000
 Our Constitution provides for adherence to the
general principles of international law as part of the
15
law of the land. The time-honored international
principle of pacta sunt servanda demands the
performance in good faith of treaty obligations on
the part of the states that enter into the agreement.
 Tax treaties are entered into "to reconcile the
national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties
and, in turn, help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous
taxations in two different jurisdictions."-- "tax
conventions are drafted with a view towards the
elimination of international juridical double taxation,
which is defined as the imposition of comparable
taxes in two or more states on the same taxpayer in
respect of the same subject matter and for identical
periods. The apparent rationale for doing away with
double taxation is to encourage the free flow of
goods and services and the movement of capital,
technology and persons between countries,

conditions deemed vital in creating robust and
dynamic economies. Foreign investments will only
thrive in a fairly predictable and reasonable
international investment climate and the protection
against double taxation is crucial in creating such a
19
climate."
 "A state that has contracted valid international
obligations is bound to make in its legislations those
modifications that may be necessary to ensure the
20
fulfillment of the obligations undertaken." Thus,
laws and issuances must ensure that the reliefs
granted under tax treaties are accorded to the
parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not impose
additional requirements that would negate the
availment of the reliefs provided for under
international agreements. More so, when the
RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for
any pre-requisite for the availment of the
benefits under said agreement.
 There is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 which would
indicate a deprivation of entitlement to a tax treaty
relief for failure to comply with the 15-day period.
 We cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to
the benefit of a treaty for failure to strictly comply
with an administrative issuance requiring prior
application for tax treaty relief.
Prior Application vs. Claim for Refund
 The underlying principle of prior application with the
Issue:
BIR becomes moot in refund cases, such as the
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of
present case, where the very basis of the claim is
the Constitution;
erroneous or there is excessive payment arising
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on
from non-availment of a tax treaty relief at the first
moral and legal grounds.
instance. In this case, petitioner should not be
faulted for not complying with RMO No. 1-2000 prior
Held:
to the transaction. It could not have applied for a tax
treaty relief within the period prescribed, or 15 days
prior to the payment of its BPRT, precisely because
it erroneously paid the BPRT not on the basis of the
preferential tax rate under the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty, but on the regular rate as prescribed by the
NIRC. Hence, the prior application requirement
becomes illogical. Therefore, the fact that petitioner
invoked the provisions of the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty when it requested for a confirmation from the
ITAD before filing an administrative claim for a
refund should be deemed substantial compliance
with RMO No. 1-2000.
Petitioner is entitled to a refund
 Likewise, both the administrative and the judicial
actions were filed within the two-year prescriptive
period pursuant to Section 229 of the NIRC.
24
 Clearly, there is no reason to deprive petitioner of
the benefit of a preferential tax rate of 10% BPRT in
accordance with the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS
Facts:
 Petitioner is a national organization which
represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a
party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied
the said petition. To buttress their denial,
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic
passages in their decision. It also stated that since
their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy,
they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts
are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code
in its Article 201.
 A motion for reconsideration being denied,
Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation,
insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious
dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also
claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened
its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of
speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws,
as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
 In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that
petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine
national political agenda to benefit the nation and
that the petition was validly dismissed on moral
grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
 Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in
Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that
only those sectors specifically enumerated in the
law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As
we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the
enumeration of marginalized and under-represented
sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not
whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
 Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5
that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is “government
neutrality in religious matters.” Clearly,
“governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus
find that it was grave violation of the non-
establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize
the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of
Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action
must have a secular purpose.
 Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills
are sought to be prevented, or why special
protection is required for the youth. Neither has the

COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioner’s admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the
moral fabric of society.
 We also find the COMELEC’s reference to
purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of
the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act,
omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards
decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any
local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without
judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the
Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires
proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be
emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws
is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public
morals cannot replace the institution of civil or
criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.
 As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without
more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more
to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should
be granted.
 Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in
denying petitioner’s application was a violation of
the non-establishment clause laid down in Article 3
section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by
law relative to acts against morality must be for a
secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited or
sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous
to those conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society"), rather
than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed
to substantiate their allegation that allowing
registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to
society.
 The LGBT community is not exempted from the
exercise of its constitutionally vested rights on the
basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of general
application should apply with equal force to LGBTs,
and they deserve to participate in the party-list
system on the same basis as other marginalized
and under-represented sectors. Discrimination
based on sexual orientation is not tolerated ---not by
our own laws nor by any international laws to which
we adhere.
Imbong v Ochoa, et al. (G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934,
204957, 205003, 205138, 204988, 205043, 205478, 205491,
205720, 206355, 207111, 207172, 207563)
PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review over the controversy.
1. Power of Judicial Review
The petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary
to settle the dispute. “Jurisprudence is replete with the rule
that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting
requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;
(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.
2. Actual Case or Controversy
Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or
the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.In this case, the
Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists
and that the same is ripe for judicial determination.
Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules
have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to
carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that
the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy.
3. Facial Challenge
The Court is not persuaded. In United States (US)
constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the
validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but
also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include
religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the
fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press
and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right
to one’s freedom of expression, as they are modes which
one’s thoughts are externalized. In this jurisdiction, the
application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While
this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover
statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those
involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.
Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
4. Locus Standi
The transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have
potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well
being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper
and just determination is an imperative need. Considering
that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is
primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be
taken away before taking action.
5. Declaratory Relief
Where the case has far-reaching implications and
prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.

6. One Subject/One Title Rule
The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one
bill rule. It is well-settled that the “one title-one subject” rule
does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the
enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully
index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details
therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object
which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the
persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation.
Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or
impede legislation.” In this case, a textual analysis of the
various provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive
health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population
growth.
* SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
A. On the constitutionality of RA 10354/Reproductive
Health (RH) Law
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared
policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in
violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception
1. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to life:
NO. Majority of the Members of the Court believe
that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. However, they agreed
that individual Members could express their own views on
this matter.
Ponente’s view (Justice Mendoza): Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of
family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect
the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception.
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in
statutory construction), the traditional meaning of
“conception” according to reputable dictionaries cited by
the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources
also support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for
(a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In
addition, they did not intend to ban all contraceptives for
being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the
fertilized ovum would be prohibited. Contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female
ovum, and those that similarly take action before fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally
permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for
protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
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Legislature from passing a measure prevent
abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH
Law is in line with this intent and actually prohibits
abortion. By using the word “or” in defining abortifacient
(Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or
devices that prevent implantation but also those that induce
abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the
mother’s womb. The RH Law recognizes that the fertilized
ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty
to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused
their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient
by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients
only those that “primarily induce abortion or the destruction
of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother’s
womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the
approval of contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life
of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same
reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR (Sec
3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck
down.
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right
to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners
posit that the RH Law provides universal access to
contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it
causes cancer and other health problems.
2. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to
health
NO. Petitioners claim that the right to health is
violated by the RH Law because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies in the National Drug
Formulary and in the regular purchase of essential medicines
and supplies of all national hospitals (Section 9 of the RH
Law). They cite risks of getting diseases gained by using e.g.
oral contraceptive pills.
Some petitioners do not question contraception and
contraceptives per se. Rather, they pray that the status quo
under RA 4729 and 5921 be maintained. These laws prohibit
the sale and distribution of contraceptives without the
prescription of a duly-licensed physician.
The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA
4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe
contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH
must keep in mind the provisions of RA 4729:
the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly
licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that
the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and
devices will be done following a prescription of a
qualified medical practitioner.
The provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables,
and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a

determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and
supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress
that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific
examination.
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes
the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for
purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is
included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.
The Court cannot determine whether or not the use
of contraceptives or participation in support of modern RH
measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b)
right or wrong according to one’s dogma or belief. However,
the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the
RH Law contravenes the Constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom.
a.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious
freedom since it mandates the State-sponsored
procurement of contraceptives, which contravene the
religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners
NO. The State may pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any
one religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or
restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of the
Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would
cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and thus,
establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its
population control program through the RH Law even if the
promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious
beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
b.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious
freedom by compelling medical health practitioners,
hospitals, and health care providers, under pain of
penalty, to refer patients to other institutions despite
their conscientious objections
YES. Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Law
obliges a hospital or medical practitioner to immediately refer
a person seeking health care and services under the law to
another accessible healthcare provider despite their
conscientious objections based on religious or ethical
beliefs. These provisions violate the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. They are
contrary to Section 29(2), Article VI of the Constitution or
the Free Exercise Clause, whose basis is the respect for
the inviolability of the human conscience.
The provisions in the RH Law compelling non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group and health care service
providers to refer patients to other providers and penalizing
them if they fail to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as well
as compelling them to disseminate information and perform
RH procedures under pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1) and
(a)(2) in relation to Section 24) also violate (and inhibit) the
freedom of religion. While penalties may be imposed by law
to ensure compliance to it, a constitutionally-protected
right must prevail over the effective implementation of
the law.
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Excluding public health officers from being conscientious
objectors (under Sec. 5.24 of the IRR) also violates the equal
protection clause. There is no perceptible distinction between
public health officers and their private counterparts. In
addition, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual
and the protection of this freedom remains even if he/she is
employed in the government.
Using the compelling state interest test, there is no
compelling state interest to limit the free exercise of
conscientious objectors. There is no immediate danger to
the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario
of the above-quoted provisions. In addition, the limits do not
pertain to life-threatening cases.
The respondents also failed to show that these
provisions are least intrusive means to achieve a
legitimate state objective. The Legislature has already taken
other secular steps to ensure that the right to health is
protected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (The Population Act of
the Philippines) and RA 9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).
c.) WON the RH Law violates the guarantee of religious
freedom by requiring would-be spouses, as a condition
for the issuance of a marriage license, to attend a
seminar on parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding
and infant nutrition
NO. Section 15 of the RH Law, which
requires would-be spouses to attend a seminar on
parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant
nutrition as a condition for the issuance of a marriage
license, is a reasonable exercise of police power by the
government. The law does not even mandate the type of
family planning methods to be included in the seminar.
Those who attend the seminar are free to accept or reject
information they receive and they retain the freedom to
decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the
State.
4. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the right to
privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
YES. The above provision refers to reproductive
health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which,
by their very nature, should require mutual consent and
decision between the husband and the wife as they affect
issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section
3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the State shall
defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One
person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared
by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this
mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the
spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the
other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a
wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in
bitter animosity, and endanger the marriage and the family,
all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a
marked departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.
The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a
minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family
and violates Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, which
states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in
the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the

development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government.” In addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii)
which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of
parents or legal guardian or, in their absence, persons
exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required
only in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the
right of parental authority in cases where what is involved is
“non-surgical procedures.”
5. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the freedom of
expression and academic freedom
NO. The Court declined to rule on the
constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which
mandates the State to provide Age-and Development-
Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although
educators might raise their objection to their participation in
the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.
Any attack on its constitutionality is premature
because the Department of Education has not yet formulated
a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health
education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more
importance on the role of parents in the development of their
children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of
parents in upbringing their youth is superior to that of the
State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and
corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral
development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations,
school officials, and other interest groups in developing the
mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the
program will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners.
6. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the due
process clause -The petitioners contend that the RH Law
suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process
clause of the Constitution.
NO. The RH Law does not violate the due
process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of
several terms as observed by the petitioners are not
vague.
The definition of “private health care service provider” must
be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health
care institution” cited under Section 7 should be seen as
synonymous to “private health care service provider.”
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad
enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious
groups are exempted from rendering RH service and modern
family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the
RH Law) as well as from giving RH information and
procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”.
Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill
motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature
and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.
7. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the equal
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
protection clause -The petitioners also claim that the RH
Law violates the equal protection clause under the
Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it
makes them the primary target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use
NO. To provide that the poor are to be given
priority in the government’s RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which
states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the
underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical
care to paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor
to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. In addition,
the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a
couple may have and does not impose conditions upon
couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks
to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions
from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14
is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom
of private educational institutions especially with respect to
religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards
the teaching of reproductive health education.
8. Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health
(RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the prohibition
against involuntary servitude
NO. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law
for private and non-government health care service providers
to render 48 hours of pro bono RH services does not
amount to involuntary servitude, for two reasons. First, the
practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest
that it is both the power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-
government RH service providers to render pro bono service.
Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed
should they do otherwise.
However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17
as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them to render
RH service, pro bono or otherwise (See Part 3b of this
digest.)
B. WON the delegation of authority to the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) to determine WON a supply or
product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List is
valid
YES. The delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to
be included in the Essential Drugs List is valid, as the FDA
not only has the power but also the competency to evaluate,
register and cover health services and methods (under RA
3720 as amended by RA 9711 or the FDA Act of 2009).
C. WON the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved
to Local Governments and the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
NO. a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that
whether it pertains to the establishment of health care
271 272
facilities, the hiring of skilled health professionals, or the
273
training of barangay health workers, it will be the national
government that will provide for the funding of its
implementation. Local autonomy is not absolute. The

national government still has the say when it comes to
national priority programs which the local government is
called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the
LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services.
There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be
construed as making the availability of these services
mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said
that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment by the
national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.
Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 of RA 9054 or the
Organic Act of the ARMM --These provisions relied upon by
the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be
exercised by the regional government, which can, in no
manner, be characterized as an abdication by the State of its
power to enact legislation that would benefit the general
welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the
ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as
they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in
the relationship between the national and the regional
274
governments. Except for the express and implied
limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress
cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary
power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters
of general concern or common interest.
JESUS C. GARCIA vs.THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T.
DRILON
G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013
 R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's
intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom the woman has a
5
common child. The law provides for protection
orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent
the commission of further acts of VAWC; and
outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay
officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court
personnel, social workers, health care providers,
and other local government officials in responding
to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
 A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of
the equal protection and due process clauses, and
an undue delegation of judicial power to barangay
officials.
 Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before
the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection
Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A.
9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties
Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to
be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological
and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of
financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
 The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to
faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the
said TPO, private-respondent filed another
application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the
same when petitioner failed to comment on why the
TPO should not be modified. After the given time
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer
submitted the required comment as it would be an
“axercise in futility.”
 Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for
prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for
violating the due process and equal protection
clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for
being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”
 The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the
TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to
raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings
before the trial court and the petition for prohibition
to annul protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted collateral attack on said law.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was
denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
 Q: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on
the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not
raised at the earliest opportunity and that the
petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity
of the law.
- Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited
authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle
the complex issue of constitutionality. Inspite of
its designation as a family court, the RTC of
Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as
a court of general original jurisdiction to pass
upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
44
insolvency. It is settled that RTCs have
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
45
statute, "this authority being embraced in the
general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws
by the criterion of their conformity to the
46
fundamental law." The Constitution vests the
power of judicial review or the power to declare
the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court,
but in all RTCs. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible time so that if not raised in the
pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if
not raised in the trial court, it may not be
considered in appeal.
 WON the CA committed serious error in failing to
conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and
violative of the equal protection clause.
- R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of
equal protection of the laws.
- Equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
- R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
- The unequal power relationship between
women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and
the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences

justifying the classification under the law. As
Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the
accommodation of differences ... is the
essence of true equality.
 WON the CA committed grave mistake in not
finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
- RA 9262 is not violative of the due process
clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have
in support of one’s defense. The grant of the
TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process.
 WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does
violence to the policy of the state to protect the
family as a basic social institution
- The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator
is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy
of the State to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution cannot
be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it
ruled that the court shall not refer the case or
any issue thereof to a mediator. This is so
because violence is not a subject for
compromise.
 WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262
as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an
undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
- There is no undue delegation of judicial power
to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of
demandable and enforceable and to determine
law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00,
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?-NO
jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the
issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials
and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
 On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen,
and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo
of the Metropolitan Trial Court Mandaluyong City as
evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with Register
3
No. 2004-1588.
 On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity. She alleged that
immediately after their marriage, they separated
and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their
essential marital obligations. She described their
marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null
and void ab initio
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
 Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file
his answer.
 At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the
prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
 In its April 25, 2008 Decision, the RTC declared the
marriage void ab initio-petitioner shall cease using
the surname of respondent as she never acquired
any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression
that she remains the wife of respondent.
 The RTC was of the view that the parties married
each other for convenience only. Giving credence to
the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to
acquire American citizenship; that in consideration
thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of
$2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the parties went
their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the
United States and never again communicated with
her; and that, in turn, she did not pay him the
$2,000.00 because he never processed her petition
for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than
the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception.
 Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before
the CA.
 In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011,
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking.
 Marriage Fraud in Immigration
 Respondent’s marriage not void
 Consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it
was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice
of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear
intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so
as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would
be created between them, since it was that precise
legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their
goal.
 In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of
consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a
marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a
pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into
as a joke, with no real intention of entering into the
actual marriage status, and with a clear

understanding that the parties would not be bound.
The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a
27
relation. It is a pretended marriage not intended to
be real and with no intention to create any legal ties
whatsoever, hence, the absence of any genuine
consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for
vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine
consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any
purpose.
 The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to
a marriage in jest. There was, thus, an apparent
intention to enter into the actual marriage status and
to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
 The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of
the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life. The possibility that the
parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to
nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with lawTherefore, so long as all the essential and
formal requisites prescribed by law are present, and
it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided
28
by law, it shall be declared valid.
 Although the Court views with disdain the
respondent’s attempt to utilize marriage for
dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage
void. Hence, though the respondent’s marriage may
be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and
continues to be valid and subsisting.
 No less than our Constitution declares that
marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by
32
the State. It must, therefore, be safeguarded from
the whims and caprices of the contracting parties.
This Court cannot leave the impression that
marriage may easily be entered into when it suits
the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified
when no longer needed.
International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc., et.al. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), et.al. (G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301
and 209430) 8 December 2015
 In 1990, President Corazon Aquino signed
Executive Order (EO) No. 430 creating the National
Committee on Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP)
which was tasked to identify and evaluate potential
hazards involved in initiating genetic engineering
experiments and introducing new species and
genetically engineered organisms and recommend
measures to minimize risks.
 In 1991, NCBP formulated the Philippine Biosafety
Guidelines which governs the regulation of the
importation or introduction, movement and field
release of potentially hazardous biological materials
in the Philippines. The same was followed by the
Guidelines on Planned Release of Genetically
Manipulated Organisms (GMOs) and Potentially
Harmful Exotic Species (PHES).
 On 29 December 1993, the Convention on
Biological Diversity (CBD) came into force. This is a
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
multilateral treaty recognizing the great potential of
modern biotechnology for human well-being if
developed and used with adequate safety
measures for the environment and human health.
 In January 2000, an agreement was reached on the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena
Protocol), a supplement to the CBD, which aims to
ensure an adequate level of safe transfer, handling
and use of living modified organisms resulting from
modern biotechnology. The Philippines signed the
same on May 24 of the same year.
 In April 2002, the Department of Agriculture (DA)
issued DA Administrative Order No. 08 which
provides rules and regulations for the importation
and release into the environment of plants and plant
products derived from the use of modern
biotechnology.
 On 17 March 2006, EO No. 514 (EO 514) entitled,
“Establishing the National Biosafety Framework
(NBF), Prescribing Guidelines for its
Implementation, and Strengthening the NCBP” was
issued. It expressly provides that DAO 2002-08,
NCBP Guidelines on the Contained Use of GMOs,
except for provisions on potentially harmful exotic
species which were repealed, and all issuances of
the Bureau of Food and Drugs Authority (FDA) on
products of modern biotechnology, shall continue to
be in force and effect unless amended by the
issuing departments or agencies.
FACTS
 On 24 September 2010, a Memorandum of
Undertaking was executed between International
Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech
Applications, Inc. (ISAAA), University of the
Philippines Los Baños Foundation, Inc. (UPLBFI)
and UP Mindanao Foundation, Inc. (UPMFI), in
pursuance of a collaborative research and
development project on eggplants that are resistant
to the fruit and shoot borer. Other partner agencies
involved were UPLB through its Institute of Plant
Breeding, Maharastra Hybrid Seed Company
(MAHYCO) of India, Cornell University and the
Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II
(ABSPII) of USAID.
 The UPLB Field Trial Proposal states that the pest-
resistant crop subject of the field trial was described
as a “bio-engineered eggplant.” The crystal toxin
genes from the soil bacterium Bacillus thuringiensis
(Bt) were incorporated into the eggplant genome to
produce the protein CrylAc which is toxic to target
insect pests. The latter is said to be highly specific
to lepidopteran larvae such as fruit and shoot borer
(FSB), the most destructive insect pest of eggplant.
 NCBP issued a Certificate of Completion of
Contained Experiment which was conducted from
2007 to 3 March 2009 stating that during the
conduct of experiment, all the biosafety measures
have been complied with and no untoward incident
has occurred.
 On 16 March 2010 and 28 June 2010, the Bureau
of Plant Industry (BPI) issued biosafety permits to
UPLB.
 Field testing commenced on various dates in the
following approved trial sites: Kabacan, North

Cotabato; Sta. Maria, Pangasinan; Pili, Camarines
Sur; Bago Oshiro, Davao City; and Bay, Laguna.
 On 26 April 2012, Greenpeace, MASIPAG and
individual respondents (Greenpeace, et.al.) filed a
petition for writ of kalikasan and writ of continuing
mandamus with prayer for the issuance of
Temporary Environmental Protection Order (TEPO)
alleging that the Bt talong field trials violate their
constitutional right to health and a balanced ecology
considering that:
- The required Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) under PD 1151 was not
secured prior to the project implementation
- There is no independent, peer-reviewed
study on the safety of Bt talong for human
consumption and the environment
- There was a study conducted showing
adverse effects on rats who were fed Bt
corn, local scientists likewise attested to
the harmful effects of GMOs to human and
animal health
- Bt crops can be directly toxic to non-target
species
- There is a failure to comply with the
required public consultation under
Sections 26 and 27 of the Local
Government Code
- The case calls for the application of the
precautionary principle, it being a classic
environmental case where scientific
evidence as to the health, environmental
and socio-economic safety is insufficient or
uncertain and preliminary scientific
evaluation indicates reasonable grounds
for concern that there are potentially
dangerous effects on human health and
the environment
 The following reliefs are prayed for by Greenpeace,
et.al., to wit:
- Issuance of a TEPO enjoining BPI and
Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA) of
the Department of Agriculture (DA) from
processing for field testing and registering
as herbicidal product Bt talong in the
Philippines, stopping all pending field
testing, and ordering the uprooting of
planted Bt talong; and
- Issuance of a writ of continuing mandamus
commanding the ISAAAI, et.al.: (1) to
submit to an environmental impact
statement system under the Environmental
Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR-EMB); (2) to submit an
independent, comprehensive, and rigid risk
assessment, field tests report, and
regulatory compliance reports; (3) to
submit all issued certifications on public
information, public consultation, public
participation and consent from the LGUs
affected by the field testing; (4) to submit
an acceptable draft of an amendment of
the NBF and DAO 2002-08; and (5) for BPI
of DA to conduct balanced nationwide
public information on the nature of Bt
talong and Bt talong field trial, and a
survey of its social acceptability.
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 On 2 May 2012, the SC issued the writ of kalikasan
against ISAAA, EMB, BPI, FPA and UPLB, ordering
them to file a verified return.
 The contentions of the respondents are as follows:
- All environmental laws were complied with,
including public consultations in the
affected communities
- The Bt talong project is not covered by the
Philippine Environmental Impact
Statement Law
- There is a plethora of scientific works and
literature, peer-reviewed, on the safety of
Bt talong for human consumption
- Allegations regarding the safety of Bt
talong are irrelevant in the field trial stage
as none of the eggplants will be consumed
by humans or animals
- There is a non-observance of the rule on
hierarchy of courts
- Greenpeace, et.al. have no legal standing
as they do not stand to suffer any direct
injury as a result of the Bt talong field tests
- The precautionary principle does not apply
since the field testing is only a part of a
continuing study to ensure that the field
trials have no significant and negative
impact on the environment
 SC, in a Resolution dated 10 July 2012, referred the
case to the Court of Appeals.
 On 12 September 2012, the parties submitted the
following procedural issues before the CA: (1)
whether Greenpeace, et.al. has legal standing to file
the petition for writ of kalikasan; (2) whether the
petition has been rendered moot and academic by
the alleged termination of the Bt talong field testing;
and (3) whether the case presented a justiciable
controversy
 CA, in a Resolution dated 12 October 2012,
resolved that: (1) the Greenpeace, et.al. possess
legal standing; (2) the case is not yet moot since it
is capable of repetition yet evading review; and (3)
the alleged non-compliance with environmental and
local government laws present justiciable
controversies for resolution by the court.
 On 17 May 2013, CA rendered a decision in favor of
the Greenpeace, et.al. finding that the precautionary
principle set forth in Section 1, Rule 20 of the Rules
of Procedure for Environmental Cases (the Rules)
finds relevance in the case.
 CA rejected the Motions for Reconsideration filed by
ISAAA, EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI rejecting
the argument that CA violated UPLB’s right to
academic freedom. The writ stops the field trials of
Bt talong as a procedure, it does not stop Bt talong
research. Thus, there is no assault on academic
freedom.
 CA further justified its ruling by expounding on the
theory that introducing a genetically modified plant
into our ecosystem is an “ecologically imbalancing
act.”
 Before the SC is a consolidated petition of ISAAAI,
EMB/BPI/FPA, UPLB and UPLBFI to reverse the
CA decision permanently enjoining the conduct of
field trials for Genetically Modified eggplants.

ISSUES
1. WON Greenpeace, et.al. has a legal standing -yes
2. WON the case is moot and academic -no
3. WON there is a violation of the doctrines of primary
jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative
remedies -no
4. WON there is neglect or unlawful omission
committed by the public respondents in the
processing and evaluation of the applications for Bt
talong field testing -yes
5. WON the Precautionary Principle applies -yes
RULING
1. Yes. The liberalized rule on standing is now enshrined in
the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases which
allows the filing of a citizen suit in environmental cases.
The provision on citizen suits in the Rules “collapses the
tradional rule on personal and direct interest, on the
principle that humans are stewards of nature,” and aims
to “further encourage the protection of the environment.”
There is therefore no dispute on the standing of
respondents to file before this Court their petition for writ
of kalikasan and writ of continuing mandamus.
2. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic
if: first, there is a grave violation of the
Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised
requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the
bench, the bar and the public; and fourth, the case is
48
capable of repetition yet evading review. We find that
the presence of the second and fourth exceptions
justified the CA in not dismissing the case despite the
termination of Bt talong field trials.
While it may be that the project proponents of Bt
talong have terminated the subject field trials, it is not
certain if they have actually completed the field trial
stage for the purpose of data gathering. At any rate, it is
on record that the proponents expect to proceed to the
next phase of the project, the preparation for commercial
propagation of the Bt eggplants. Biosafety permits will
still be issued by the BPI for Bt talong or other GM
crops. Hence, not only does this case fall under the
"capable of repetition yet evading review" exception to
the mootness principle, the human and environmental
health hazards posed by the introduction of a genetically
modified plant, a very popular staple vegetable among
Filipinos, is an issue of paramount public interest.
3. No. the provisions of DAO 08-2002 do not provide a
speedy, or adequate remedy for the respondents "to
determine the questions of unique national and local
importance raised here that pertain to laws and rules for
environmental protection, thus [they were] justified in
50
coming to this Court." We take judicial notice of the
fact that genetically modified food is an intensely
debated global issue, and despite the entry of GMO
crops (Bt corn) into the Philippines in the last decade, it
is only now that such controversy involving alleged
damage or threat to human health and the environment
from GMOs has reached the courts.
4. Yes. It must be stressed that DAO 2002-08 and related
DA order are not the only legal bases for regulating field
trials of GM plants and plant products. EO 514 clearly
provides that the NBF applies to the development,
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adoption and implementation of all biosafety policies,
measures and guidelines and in making biosafety
decisions concerning the research, development,
handling and use, transboundary movement, release
into the environment and management of regulated
articles.
The NBF requires the use of precaution, as
provided in Section 2.6 which reads:
2.6. Using Precaution. – In
accordance with Principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration of 1992 and the
relevant provisions of the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety, in particular
Article 1, 10 (par. 6) and 11 (par. 8),
the precautionary approach shall
guide biosafety decisions. The
principles and elements of this
approach are hereby implemented
through the decision-making system in
the NBF.
It likewise contains general principles and minimum
guidelines that the concerned agencies are expected to
follow and which their respective rules and regulations
must conform with. In cases of conflict in applying the
principles, the principle of protecting the public interest
and welfare shall always prevail, and no provision of the
NBF shall be construed as to limit the legal authority and
mandate of heads of departments and agencies to
consider the national interest and public welfare in
making biosafety decisions.
Notably, Section 7 of NBF mandates a more
transparent, meaningful and participatory public
consultation on the conduct of field trials beyond the
posting and publication of notices and information
sheets, consultations with some residents and
government officials, and submission of written
comments, provided in DAO 2002-08.
The Supreme Court found that ISAAAI, et.al. simply
adhered to the procedures laid down by DAO 2002-08
and no real effort was made to operationalize the
principles of NBF in the conduct of field testing of Bt
talong. Said failure means that the DA lacks
mechanisms to mandate applicants to comply with
international biosafety protocols. For these reasons, the
DAO 2002-08 should be declared invalid.
Parenthetically, during the hearing at the CA, Atty.
Segui of the EMB was evasive in answering the
questions on whether his office undertook the necessary
evaluation on the possible environmental impact of Bt
talong field trials and the release of GMOs into the
environment in general. While he initially cited lack of
budget and competence as reasons for their inaction, he
later said that an amendment of the law should be made
since projects involving GMOS are not covered by
Proclamation No. 2146, entitled “Proclaiming Certain
Areas and Types of Projects as Environmentally Critical
and Within the Scope of the Environmental Impact
Statement System Established Under Presidential
Decree No. 1586”.

The Supreme Court took the above as an indication
of the DENR-EMB’s lack of serious attention to their
mandate under EO 514 to ensure that environmental
assessments are done and impacts identified in
biosafety decisions.
Section 6 of EO 514 likewise directed the DOST,
DENR, DA and DOH to ensure the allocation of funds
for the implementation of the NBF as it was intended to
be a multi-disciplinary effort involving the different
government departments and agencies.
The petitioners government agencies clearly failed
to fulfil their mandates in the implementation of the NBF.
5. Yes. The precautionary principle originated in Germany
in the 1960s, expressing the normative idea that
governments are obliged to “foresee and forestall” harm
to the environment. The Rules incorporated the principle
in Part V, Rule 20, which states:
SEC.1. Applicability. – When there is
a lack of full scientific certainty in
establishing a causal link between
human activity and environmental
effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the
case before it.
The constitutional right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology
shall be given the benefit of the doubt.
SEC 2. Standards for application. – In
applying the precautionary principle,
the following factors, among others,
may be considered: (1) threats to
human life or health; (2) inequity to
present or future generations; or (3)
prejudice to the environment without
legal consideration of the
environmental rights of those affected.
When the features of uncertainty, possibility of
irreversible harm, and possibility of serious harm
coincide, the case for the precautionary principle is
strongest. The Supreme Court found all three (3)
conditions present.
While the goal of increasing crop yields to raise
farm incomes is laudable, independent scientific studies
revealed uncertainties due to unfulfilled economic
benefits from Bt crops and plants, adverse effects on the
environment associated with the use of GE technology
in agriculture, and serious health hazards from
consumption of GM foods. For a biodiversity-rich country
like the Philippines, the natural and unforeseen
consequences of contamination and genetic pollution
would be disastrous and irreversible.
Alongside the aforesaid uncertainties, the non-
implementation of the NBF in the crucial stages of risk
assessment and public consultation, including the
determination of the applicability of the EIS requirements
to the GMO field testing, are compelling reasons for the
application of the precautionary principle.
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There exists a preponderance of evidence that the
release of the GMOs into the environment threatens to
damage our ecosystems and not just the field trial sites,
and eventually the health of our people once the Bt
eggplants are consumed as food.
Adopting the precautionary approach, the Supreme
Court ruled that the principles of the NBF need to be
operationalized first by the coordinated actions of the
concerned departments and agencies before allowing
the release into the environment of genetically modified
eggplant.
Further, the precautionary approach entailed inputs
from stakeholders, including marginalized famers, not
just the scientific community. This proceeds from the
realization that acceptance of uncertainty is not only a
scientific issue, but is related to public policy and
involves an ethical dimension.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
1. The conduct of Bt talong field testing is
permanently enjoined.
2. DAO 2002-08 is declared null and void.
3. Any application for contained use, field testing,
propagation and commercialization, and
importation of GMOs is temporarily enjoined
until a new administrative order is promulgated
in accordance with law.
Belgica v. Executive Secretary
 The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn
affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had
swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for
"ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus,
Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of
the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for
Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for
Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also
recommended to be charged in the complaints are
some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or
representatives, the heads and other officials of
three (3) implementing agencies, and the several
presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
 Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million
from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya
gas project off Palawan province intended for
agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a
dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before
the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel
System" be declared unconstitutional
 G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for
Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition
be issued permanently
 G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent
Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer
For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel
System," presently embodied in the provisions of
the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary

funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts
constituting grave abuse of discretion. Also, they
pray that the Court issue a TRO against
respondents
 UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF
be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and
desist order be issued restraining President
Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino)
and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to
Members of Congress
 In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of
American-English origin) has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature (“Congressional Pork
Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to
certain funds to the Executive. The “Congressional
Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public
Works Act of 1922), the Support for Local
Development Projects during the Marcos period, the
Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas
Development Fund and later the Countrywide
Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon
Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada
administration, as continued by the Gloria-
Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino
III administrations.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
 2. Project Identification. Identification of projects
and/or designation of beneficiaries shall conform to
the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference
shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th
class municipalities or indigents identified under the
MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the
implementing agency shall submit to Congress said
priority list, standard or design within ninety (90)
days from effectivity of this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, identified by a
member of the House of Representatives outside of
his/her legislative district shall have the written
concurrence of the member of the House of
Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary
legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the
House of Representatives.
 3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of
projects to be identified by legislators shall be as
follows:
For Congressional District or Party-List
Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000)
for soft programs and projects listed under Item A
and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for
infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the
purposes of which are in the project menu of
Special Provision No. 1; and
For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed
under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos
(P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed
under Item B, the purposes of which are in the
project menu of Special Provision No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year
and applicable Special Provisions on the use and
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release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the
foregoing amounts may be released in the first
semester and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may
be released in the second semester.
 4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this
Fund may only be allowed once. The Secretaries of
Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works
and Highways, Social Welfare and Development
and Trade and Industry are also authorized to
approve realignment from one project/scope to
another within the allotment received from this
Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure
projects, realignment is within the same
implementing unit and same project category as the
original project; (ii) allotment released has not yet
been obligated for the original project/scope of
work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the
legislator concerned. The DBM must be informed in
writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar
days from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any
realignment under this Fund shall be limited within
the same classification of soft or hard
programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1
hereof: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of
realignments, modifications and revisions of
projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU
concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet
been disbursed and the funds have been deposited
back to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the
project identification shall be submitted to the
House Committee on Appropriations and the
Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing
agency, as the case may be.
 5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds
shall be supported by the documents prescribed
under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be
released to the implementing agencies subject to
the conditions under Special Provision No. 1 and
the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.
PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
 The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the
petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and the
Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund
was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-
President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify,
strengthen, and consolidate government efforts
relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital
to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund
was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869
(1983) or the Charter of the Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended
by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding
facility managed and administered by the
Presidential Management Staff through which the
President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular
budget. It is sourced from the share of the

government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.
* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
involve an actual and justiciable controversy
2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions
are matters of policy subject to judicial review
3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue
4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the
Court) on Philippine Constitution Association v.
Enriquez (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the
Court on Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty
v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP)
bar the re-litigation of the issue of constitutionality of
the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res
judicata and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork
Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are unconstitutional considering
that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions
on…
1.) …separation of powers
2.) …non-delegability of legislative power
3.) …checks and balances
4.) …accountability
5.) …political dynasties
6.) …local autonomy
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
WON the phrases:
a. “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD
910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
b. “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the
Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue
delegations of legislative power
RULING:
A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity
of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by
the Court unless there is compliance with
the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there
must be an actual case or controversy calling for the
exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied
by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the
questions in these consolidated cases are ripe
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for adjudication since the challenged funds and the
provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013
GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential
Social Fund – are currently existing and operational;
hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to
petitioners as a result of the unconstitutional use of these
public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that
the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A
case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the
merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish
the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is
geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject
matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither will
the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished
the PDAF” render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has no
constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal
existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness,
nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and
academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case.” The
Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the
Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of
petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of
the Constitution with respect to the principles of
separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative
power, checks and balances, accountability and local
autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation
and the paramount public interest is involved: This is
also apparent from the nature of the interests involved –
the constitutionality of the very system within which
significant amounts of public funds have been and
continue to be utilized and expended undoubtedly
presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a
matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in
fact, have been lodged at a time when the system’s flaws
have never before been magnified. To the Court’s
mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the
accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and
the government’s own recognition that reforms are
needed “to address the reported abuses of the
PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which
only underscores the importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds
petitioners’ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or
hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court
to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-
mandated audit arm of the government. if only for the
purpose of validating the existence of an actual and
justiciable controversy in these cases, the Court deems
the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
iii.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading
review. This is called for by the recognition that the
preparation and passage of the national budget is,
by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual
occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in
which certain public funds are spent, if not resolved at this

most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence,
must not evade judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork
Barrel System” is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but
rather a legal one which the Constitution itself has
commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the
contours of the system along constitutional lines is a task
that the political branches of government are incapable of
rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial
power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not
only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section
1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the
instant cases. Petitioners have come before the Court in their
respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly,
assert that they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the
National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing
“Pork Barrel System” under which the taxes they pay
have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to
suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the
Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to
sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted through
the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in
these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally
fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they
have raised may be classified as matters “of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance
to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA
Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the
present controversy involves “not [merely] a systems failure”
but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the
seriousness of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import
than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public
funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law
by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a
judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case
if, between the first and second actions, there exists
an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action. This required identity is not attendant hereto
since Philconsa and LAMP involved constitutional challenges
against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article
respectively. However, the cases at bar call for a broader
constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel System”.
Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a
procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the
merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is
a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous
case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent
any powerful countervailing considerations, like cases
ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a limited
response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on
the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification
authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary, the
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a)
the inter-relation between the CDF and PDAF Articles with
each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel
System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment
measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article,
including not only those related to the area of
project identification but also to the areas of fund release and
realignment. The complexity of the issues and the broader
legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore,
considered as a powerful countervailing reason against
a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that
the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare
decisis. Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and
current findings (such as the CoA Report), it must partially
abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as
it validated the post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same was
merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP was dismissed on a procedural
technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling doctrine
susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in
these cases, stare decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork
Barrel”
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently
accorded post-enactment authority to identify the
projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF
Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions
1 to 3 and the second paragraph of Special Provision 4.
Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment
authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5
under the 2013 PDAF Article) and realignment (Special
Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF
Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or
another, authorized to participate in “the various
operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities”
and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the
separation of powers principle. That the said authority is
treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter
its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role
in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards
this end, the Court must therefore abandon its ruling
in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents
have failed to substantiate their position that the identification
authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as
well as all other provisions of law which similarly
allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment
authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget,
the Court also declared that informal practices, through
which legislators have effectively intruded into the
proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as
acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the
same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of
non-delegability since legislators are effectively allowed

to individually exercise the power
of appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged
in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised
only through legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.” The power of
appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary
of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by
law a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article,
individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum
fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project
or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power
of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that
the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators
to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have
been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of
P24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation
limit since the said amount would be further divided among
individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-
sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their
own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations are
made by legislators only after the GAA
is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the
actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been
written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-
sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a
budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of
presentment and consequently impairs the President’s
power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the
President is forced to decide between (a) accepting
the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing
the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not
be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting the
whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with
legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative
identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of
P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding
source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e.
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents,
preservation of historical materials, construction of roads,
flood control, etc). This setup connotes that
the appropriation law leaves the actual amounts
and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a
discernible item which may be subject to the President’s
power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the
CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state auditors from
obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in
more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.”
Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line
budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project,
and per implementing agency.”
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight
would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with
post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking
on activities in which they themselves participate. Also,
this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs
afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where
he may be called upon to act on account of his office.”
Allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases
of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking
undue advantage of their own office.
5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said
provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore,
since there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes
the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.
6.) YES. The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the
system which actually belies the avowed intention of “making
equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF
and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact
of office, without taking into account the specific
interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator
represents. As a result, a district representative of a highly-
urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a
district representative of a far-flung rural province which
would be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the
former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some
years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel
as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of
legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with
the functions of the various Local Development Councils
(LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction.”
Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their
programs, policies and resolutions should not be overridden
nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national
officers that have no law-making authority except only when
acting as a body.
C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”
YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for
such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an
undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine
the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the
purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be
used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose
he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally
appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to
“energy resource development and exploitation

programs and projects of the government” under the
principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general
word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be
restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind
or class as those specifically mentioned, is belied by three
(3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the
government” states a singular and general class and
hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific
things from which the general phrase “for such other
purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also
exhausts the class it represents, namely energy
development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds
for non-energy related purposes under the subject
phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that
it is limited only to “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows
for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to finance energy
resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government,” remains legally effective and
subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD
1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the
Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to
finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails
the authority of the President to spend the Presidential
Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from
calamities. The first indicated purpose, however, gives
him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a
“priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a definition of
“priority infrastructure development projects” and
hence, leaves the President without any guideline to
construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as
one of “infrastructure” is too broad of
a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind
of facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects” must be stricken
down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD
910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all
other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by
PD 1993, remains legally effective and subsisting.
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BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
Separation of Powers: Mendoza vs People G.R. No.
183891 October 19, 2011
Facts:
Romarico Mendoza (petitioner) is a company boss/employer
convicted for violating a special law known as the Social
Security Condonation Law of 2009 for non-remittance of the
Social Security Service (SSS) contributions to his
employees. The offense is criminal in nature. Nevertheless,
Mendoza admitted his fault, as he said, he acted in good
faith. But still, the Court has to render judgment and apply
the proper penalty how harsh it may be dura lex sed lex).
The Court sentenced Mendoza to an indeterminate prison
term. Considering the circumstances, the court the Court
transmitted the case to the Chief Executive, through the
Department of Justice, and RECOMMENDS the grant of
executive clemency to the petitioner.
Issue: Without violating the separation of powers, can the
Supreme Court recommend to the President, the grant of
executive clemency to a convict?
Ruling: YES
Referral to the Chief Executive for possible exercise of
executive clemency
We realize that with the affirmation of the petitioners
conviction for violation of RA No. 8282, he stands to suffer
imprisonment for four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, notwithstanding the payment of his
delinquent contribution.
[12]
Under Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, the courts are
bound to apply the law as it is and impose the proper
penalty, no matter how harsh it might be. The same
provision, however, gives the Court the discretion to
recommend to the President actions it deems appropriate but
are beyond its power when it considers the penalty imposed
as excessive. Although the petitioner was convicted under a
special penal law, the Court is not precluded from giving the
Revised Penal Code suppletory application in light of Article
10
Delegation of Powers
G.R. No. 177597 July 16, 2008
BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P.
DILANGALEN, Respondents.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 178628
PERFECTO F. MARQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of
Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of
3
Cotabato City and eight municipalities. Maguindanao forms
part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No.
6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA
4
9054). Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms
part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not part of
the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its
inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November
1989.

On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM
Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces
5
under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim
Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight
municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act
201 provides: Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon,
Datu Odin Sinsuat, Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan
Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi are hereby separated from
the Province of Maguindanao and constituted into a distinct
and independent province, which is hereby created, to be
known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan..
Except as may be provided by national law, the existing
legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof,
shall remain.
6
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the
original nine municipalities constituting Shariff Kabunsuan,
bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what
was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting
its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of
Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the
Province of Maguindanao.
The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuan’s
creation in a plebiscite held on 29 October 2006.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999 requesting the
COMELEC to "clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of
the conversion of the First District of Maguindanao into a
regular province" under MMA Act 201.
In answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the
status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in
the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No.
07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the
COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum dated
7 the power to create local government units, subject
27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:
However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the
COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No.
7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is
composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of
8
MMA Act 201.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
7902, subject of these petitions, amending Resolution No.
07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly
First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City)."
In G.R. No. 177597, Sema, who was a candidate in the 14
May 2007 elections for Representative of "Shariff Kabunsuan
with Cotabato City," prayed for the nullification of COMELEC
Resolution No. 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of
the votes cast in Cotabato City for that office. Sema
contended that Shariff Kabunsuan is entitled to one
representative in Congress under Section 5 (3), Article VI of
10
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution. Thus, Sema asserted that the COMELEC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing
Resolution No. 7902 which maintained the status quo in
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BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the
COMELEC’s earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845
designating Cotabato City as the lone component of
Maguindanao’s reapportioned first legislative district. Sema
further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the
COMELEC usurped Congress’ power to create or
reapportion legislative districts.
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating
to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and --VOID
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by
the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201
pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled
to one representative in the House of Representatives
without need of a national law creating a legislative
district for such province. –NO.
Whether the ARMM Regional Assembly can Create the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan
 The creation of local government units is governed
by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which
provides: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or
barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established in
the local government code and subject to approval
by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
 Thus, the creation of any of the four local
government units – province, city, municipality or
barangay – must comply with three conditions. First,
the creation of a local government unit must follow
the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code.
Second, such creation must not conflict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected.
 Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies
to reasonable standards and provided no conflict
arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact,
Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and
city and municipal councils, the power to create
25
barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to
compliance with the criteria established in the Local
Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement
in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
However, under the Local Government Code, "only
x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces,
26
cities or municipalities. 1avvphi1
 There is no provision in the Constitution that
conflicts with the delegation to regional legislative
bodies of the power to create municipalities and
barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution is followed. However, the creation of
provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5
(3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the Constitution provides, "Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population
may hereafter increase to more than two hundred

fifty thousand shall be entitled in the immediately
following election to at least one Member x x x."
 For Congress to delegate validly the power to
create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create a
legislative district. The threshold issue then is,
can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create
legislative districts for the House of
Representatives? The answer is in the negative.
Legislative Districts are Created or Reapportioned only
by an Act of Congress
 Under the present Constitution, as well as in
28
past Constitutions, the power to increase the
allowable membership in the House of
Representatives, and to reapportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section
5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: SECTION
5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, ..
 Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to increase, through a law, the
allowable membership in the House of
Representatives. Section 5 (4) empowers Congress
to reapportion legislative districts. The power to
reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of
existing ones. Congress exercises these powers
through a law that Congress itself enacts, and not
through a law that regional or local legislative
bodies enact. The allowable membership of the
House of Representatives can be increased, and
new legislative districts of Congress can be created,
only through a national law passed by Congress.
 Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be
anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to
create or reapportion legislative districts for a
national legislature like Congress. An inferior
legislative body, created by a superior legislative
body, cannot change the membership of the
superior legislative body.
 Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion
legislative districts for Congress.
 On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054
amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, "The
Regional Assembly may exercise legislative
power x x x except on the following matters: x x
x (k) National elections. x x x." Since the ARMM
Regional Assembly has no legislative power to
enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot
create a legislative district whose representative is
elected in national elections. Whenever Congress
enacts a law creating a legislative district, the first
representative is always elected in the "next
30
national elections" from the effectivity of the law.
 In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of
RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities,
is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI
and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as
well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces
and cities because the creation of provinces and
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BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section
3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a
province without a legislative district because the
Constitution mandates that every province shall
have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a
national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative
powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate
only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we
rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM
Regional Assembly and creating the Province of
Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902,
preserving the geographic and legislative district of the First
District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it
merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20
of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
G.R. No. 156208 September 26, 2006
NPC DRIVERS AND MECHANICS ASSOCIATION, (NPC
DAMA), represented by Its President ROGER S. SAN
JUAN, SR., NPC EMPLOYEES & WORKERS UNION
(NEWU) – … petitioners,
vs. THE NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC),
NATIONAL POWER BOARD OF DIRECTORS
(NPB)…. respondents.
 Under said Resolution, all NPC personnel shall be
legally terminated on 31 January 2003, and shall be
entitled to separation benefits. On the same day,
the NPB approved NPB Resolution No. 2002-125,
whereby a Transition Team was constituted to
manage and implement the NPC's Separation
Program.
 In assailing the validity of NPB Resolutions No.
2002-124 and No. 2002-125, petitioners maintain
that said Resolutions were not passed and issued
by a majority of the members of the duly constituted
Board of Directors since only three of its members,
6
as provided under Section 48 of the EPIRA Law,
were present, namely: DOE Secretary Vincent S.
Perez, Jr.; Department of Budget and Management
Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC-
President Rolando S. Quilala. According to
petitioners, the other four members who were
present at the meeting and signed the Resolutions
were not the secretaries of their respective
departments but were merely representatives or
designated alternates of the officials who were
named under the EPIRA Law to sit as members of
the NPB. Petitioners claim that the acts of these
representatives are violative of the well-settled
principle that "delegated power cannot be further
delegated." Thus, petitioners conclude that the
questioned Resolutions have been illegally issued
as it were not issued by a duly constituted board
since no quorum existed because only three of the
nine members, as provided under Section 48 of the
 BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION

EPIRA Law, were present and qualified to sit and Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and
vote. Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
 It is petitioners' submission that even Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
assuming arguendo that there was no undue District From Such Reapportionment." Petitioners
delegation of power to the four representatives who consequently pray that the respondent Commission on
signed the assailed Resolutions, said Resolutions Elections be restrained from making any issuances and from
cannot still be given legal effect because the same taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic
did not comply with the mandatory requirement of Act No. 9716.
endorsement by the Joint Congressional Power
Commission and approval of the President of the In substance, the said law created an additional legislative
Philippines, as provided under Section 47 of the district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
EPIRA Law which the existing first and second legislative districts of the
 pivotal issue to be resolved in this Petition for province.
Injunction is whether or not NPB Resolutions No.
2002-124 and No. 2002-125 were properly enacted.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines
 We agree with petitioners. The department
Sur was estimated to have a population of
secretaries cannot delegate their duties as 2
1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts in
members of the NPB, much less their power to vote
this wise:
and approve board resolutions, because it is their
personal judgment that must be exercised in the
fulfillment of such responsibility. District Municipalities/Cities Population
 There is no question that the enactment of the 1st District Del Gallego Libmanan 417,304
assailed Resolutions involves the exercise of Ragay Minalabac
discretion and not merely a ministerial act that could Lupi Pamplona
be validly performed by a delegate Sipocot Pasacao
 In the case at bar, it is not difficult to comprehend Cabusao San Fernando
that in approving NPB Resolutions No. 2002-124 2nd District Gainza Canaman 474,899
and No. 2002-125, it is the representatives of the Milaor Camaligan
secretaries of the different executive departments Naga Magarao
and not the secretaries themselves who exercised Pili Bombon
judgment in passing the assailed Resolution, as Ocampo Calabanga
shown by the fact that it is the signatures of the 3rd District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
respective representatives that are affixed to the Garchitorena San Jose
questioned Resolutions. This, to our mind, violates Goa Tigaon
the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated Lagonoy Tinamba
department heads to employ their own sound Presentacion Siruma
discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the 4th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
NPC. Evidently, the votes cast by these mere Baao Bula
representatives in favor of the adoption of the said Balatan Nabua
Resolutions must not be considered in determining Bato
whether or not the necessary number of votes was
garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions may Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first
be validly enacted. Hence, there being only three and second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in
valid votes cast out of the nine board members, order to create an additional legislative district for the
namely those of DOE Secretary Vincent S. Perez, province. Hence, the first district municipalities of Libmanan,
Jr.; Department of Budget and Management Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
Secretary Emilia T. Boncodin; and NPC OIC- combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and
President Rolando S. Quilala, NPB Resolutions No. Gainza to form a new second legislative district. The
2002-124 and No. 2002-125 are void and are of no 3
following table illustrates the reapportionment made by
legal effect. Republic Act No. 9716:

G.R. No. 189793 April 7, 2010

District Municipalities/Cities Populati
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR
on
JESSE ROBREDO, Petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON
1st District Del Gallego 176,383
ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R.
Ragay
MELO and its Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO,
Lupi
NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N. TAGLE,
Sipocot
ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH AND
Cabusao
GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
2nd District Libmanan San 276,777
Minalabac Fernando
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Pamplona Gainza
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Pasacao Milaor
Court. In this original action, petitioners Senator Benigno 3rd District Naga Camaligan 439,043
Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor Jesse Robredo, as public (formerly 2nd Pili Magarao
officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the nullification as District) Ocampo Bombon
unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An Act Canaman Calabanga

22

4th District Caramoan Sangay 372,548
(formerly 3rd Garchitorena San Jose
District) Goa Tigaon
Lagonoy Tinamba
Presentacion Siruma
5th District Iriga Buhi 429,070
(formerly 4th Baao Bula
District) Balatan Nabua
Bato
 Concerning the stand of the oppositors of the
bill that a population of at least 250,000 is
required by the Constitution for such new
4 fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
district.
 Petitioners contend that the reapportionment
introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a
minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative
5 From its journal, we can see that the
district. The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first
and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district
will end up with a population of less than 250,000 or
only 176,383.
 On the other hand, the respondents, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of
the present petition based on procedural and
substantive grounds.
 On substantive matters, the respondents call
attention to an apparent distinction between cities
and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede
the existence of a 250,000 population condition, but
argue that a plain and simple reading of the
questioned provision will show that the same has no
application with respect to the creation of legislative
13
districts in provinces. Rather, the 250,000
minimum population is only a requirement for the
creation of a legislative district in a city.
We go directly to the determination of whether or not a
population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district
in a province. We deny the petition.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
 The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of
the Constitution, succinctly provides: "Each city with
a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand,
or each province, shall have at least one
representative."
 The provision draws a plain and clear distinction
between the entitlement of a city to a district on one
hand, and the entitlement of a province to a district
on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned
about population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
 Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a
city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for
a province.
 Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local
Government Code on the creation of a province
which, by virtue of and upon creation, is entitled to
23
BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461 of
the Local Government Code states:
 Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may be
created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less
than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based
on 1991 constant prices and either of the following
requisites:
o a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as
certified by the Lands Management
Bureau; or
o a population of not less than two hundred
certified by the National Statistics Office.
 Notably, the requirement of population is not an
indispensable requirement, but is merely
an alternative addition to the indispensable income
requirement.

29
Constitutional Commission originally divided the
entire country into two hundred (200) districts,
which corresponded to the original number of
district representatives. The 200 seats were
distributed by the Constitutional Commission in this
manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the
seventy-three (73) provinces and the ten (10) cities
30
with a population of at least 250,000; second, the
remaining seats were then redistributed among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in
accordance with the number of their inhabitants on
the basis of a uniform and progressive
31
ratio." Commissioner Davide, who later became a
Member and then Chief Justice of the Court,
32
explained this in his sponsorship remark for the
Ordinance to be appended to the 1987 Constitution:
 Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5,
Article VI of the Constitution can, the petition find
support. And the formulation of the Ordinance in the
implementation of the provision, nay, even the
Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a
population of 250,000 is a constitutional sine qua
non for the formation of an additional legislative
district in a province, whose population growth has
increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an
estimated population of 1,693,821 in 2007 is ─
based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in
nationally apportioning legislative districts among
provinces and cities ─ entitled to two (2) districts in
addition to the four (4) that it was given in the 1986
apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino
40
concedes this point. In other words, Section 5 of
Article VI as clearly written allows and does not
prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9786;
 To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that
in the reapportionment of the first and second
legislative districts of Camarines Sur, the number of
inhabitants in the resulting additional district should
not be considered. Our ruling is that population is

not the only factor but is just one of several
other factors in the composition of the
additional district. Such settlement is in accord
with both the text of the Constitution and the
spirit of the letter, so very clearly given form in
the Constitutional debates on the exact issue
presented by this petition.1avvphi1
 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Republic Act No. 9716 entitled "An Act
Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st)
and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the
Province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a
New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO,
JULIO G. MORADA, and MINERVA ALDABA
MORADA, Petitioners,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
JANUARY 25,2010
Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to
declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly,
the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the
creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1,
2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress
through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693)
and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223,
069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested
to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by
Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of
Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for
failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000
for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a
legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is
unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of
Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.
Issue:
RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Held:
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591 unconstitutional
for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution
YES. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district, the city must have “a population of at least
two hundred fifty thousand.”
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of
Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the
National Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the
population of the City of Malolos “will be 254,030 by the year
2010.” The Certification states that the population of
24
BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
“Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The
Certification further states that it was “issued upon the
request of Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in
connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City as a
lone congressional district of the Province of Bulacan.”
First, certifications on demographic projections can be issued
only if such projections are declared official by the National
Statistics Coordination Board (NSCB). Second, certifications
based on demographic projections can be issued only by the
NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer. Third,
intercensal population projections must be as of the middle
of every year.
Moreover, the Certification states that “the total population of
Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291.” The
Certification also states that the population growth rate of
Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995 and 2000. Based
on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the population of
Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in
2010.
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation
of a legislative district must be based on an official and
credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order
No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be
unreliable or speculative.
G.R No. 188078 March 15, 2010
 THIS IS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
 The COMELEC grounds its motion on the singular
reason, already considered and rejected in the
Decision, that Congress’ reliance on the
Certification of Alberto N. Miranda (Miranda),
Region III Director, National Statistics Office (NSO),
projecting Malolos City’s population in 2010, is non-
justiciable. The COMELEC also calls attention to
the other sources of Malolos City’s population
indicators as of 2007 (2007 Census of Population –
2
PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report ) and as of
2008 (Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water
3
District, dated 31 July 2008, and Certification of the
4
Liga ng Barangay, dated 22 August 2008 ) which
Congress allegedly used in enacting Republic Act
No. 9591 (RA 9591). The COMELEC extends its
non-justiciability argument to these materials.
 compliance with a specific constitutional limitation
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that only cities with at least 250,000
constituents are entitled to representation in
Congress. To fulfill this obligation, the Court, of
necessity, must inquire into the authoritativeness
and reliability of the population indicators Congress
used to comply with the constitutional limitation.
 The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment
act is a judicial question, and not one which the
court cannot consider on the ground that it is a
political question.
 Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135),
the population indicators Congress used to
measure Malolos City’s compliance with the
constitutional limitation are unreliable and non-
authoritative. On Miranda’s Certification, (that the
"projected population of the [City] of Malolos will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population
growth rate of 3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"),
this fell short of EO 135’s requirements that (a) for

intercensal years, the certification should be based
on a set of demographic projections and
estimates declared official by the National Statistical
and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b) certifications
on intercensal population estimates will be as of the
middle of every year; and (c) certifications based on
projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Further, using Miranda’s own growth rate
assumption of 3.78%, Malolos City’s population as
of 1 August 2010 will only be 249,333, below the
constitutional threshold of 250,000 (using as base
Malolos City’s population as of 1 August 2007 which
is 223,069). That Miranda issued his Certification
"by authority of the NSO administrator" does not
make the document reliable as it neither makes
Miranda the NSO Administrator’s designated
certifying officer nor cures the Certification of its
fatal defects for failing to use demographic
projections and estimates declared official by the
NSCB or make the projection as of the middle of
2010.1avvphi1
 Nor are the 2007 Census of Population – PMS 3 –
Progress Enumeration Report, the Certification of
the City of Malolos’ Water District, dated 31 July
2008 and the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay,
dated 22 August 2008, reliable because none of
them qualifies as authoritative population indicator
under EO 135. The 2007 Census of Population –
PMS 3 – Progress Enumeration Report merely
contains preliminary data on the population census
of Bulacan which were subsequently adjusted to
reflect actual population as indicated in the 2007
Census results (showing Malolos City’s population
at 223,069). The COMELEC, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), adopts Malolos City’s
claim that the 2007 census for Malolos City was
"sloped to make it appear that come Year 2010, the
population count for Malolos would still fall short of
8
the constitutional requirement." This unbecoming
attack by the government’s chief counsel on the
integrity of the processes of the government’s
census authority has no place in our judicial system.
The OSG ought to know that absent convincing
proof of so-called data "sloping," the NSO enjoys
the presumption of the regularity in the performance
of its functions.
 The Certification of the City of Malolos’ Water
District fares no better. EO 135 excludes from its
ambit certifications from a public utility gathered
incidentally in the course of pursuing its business.
To elevate the water district’s so-called population
census to the level of credibility NSO certifications
enjoy is to render useless the existence of NSO.
 Similarly, the Certification of the Liga ng Barangay
is not authoritative because much like the Malolos
City Water District, the Liga ng Barangay is not
authorized to conduct population census, much less
during off-census years. The non-NSO entities EO
135 authorizes to conduct population census are
local government units (that is, province, city,
municipality or barangay) subject to the prior
approval of the NSCB and under the technical
supervision of the NSO from planning to data
processing.
9 and the Province of Dinagat Islands (Dinagat), the
 By presenting these alternative population
indicators with their widely divergent population
25
BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
10
figures, the COMELEC unwittingly highlighted the
danger of relying on non-NSO authorized
certifications.
 Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in
Congress only if, before the 10 May 2010 elections,
it breaches the 250,000 population mark following
the mandate in Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more
than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to at least one
Member." COMELEC neither alleged nor proved
that Malolos City is in compliance with Section 3 of
the Ordinance.
 Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section
5(3), Article VI of the Constitution on the population
requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a
legislative district for Malolos City, carving the city
from the former First Legislative District, leaves the
town of Bulacan isolated from the rest of the
15
geographic mass of that district. This contravenes
the requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each
legislative district shall "comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory." It is no argument to say, as the OSG
does, that it was impracticable for Congress to
create a district with contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory because Malolos city lies at the
center of the First Legislative District. The
geographic lay-out of the First Legislative District is
not an insuperable condition making compliance
with Section 5(3) impracticable. To adhere to the
constitutional mandate, and thus maintain fidelity to
its purpose of ensuring efficient representation, the
practicable alternative for Congress was to include
the municipality of Bulacan in Malolos City’s
legislative district. Although unorthodox, the
resulting contiguous and compact district fulfills the
constitutional requirements of geographic unity and
population floor, ensuring efficient representation of
the minimum mass of constituents.
G.R. No. 180050 April 12, 2011
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE
O. MEDINA, Petitioners,
vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
representing the President of the Philippines; Senate of
the Philippines, represented by the SENATE
PRESIDENT…,Respondents,
CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL
T. MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR.,
HON. SIMEON VICENTE G. CASTRENCE…, Intervenors.
 On October 2, 2006, the President of the Republic
approved into law Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355 (An
2
Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands). On
December 3, 2006, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) conducted the mandatory plebiscite for
the ratification of the creation of the province under
3
the Local Government Code (LGC). The plebiscite
yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
4
negative votes. With the approval of the people
from both the mother province of Surigao del Norte
President appointed the interim set of provincial
officials who took their oath of office on January 26,
2007. Later, during the May 14, 2007 synchronized

elections, the Dinagatnons elected their new set of
provincial officials who assumed office on July 1,
5
2007.
Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal and Rene O.
Medina, former political leaders of Surigao del Norte, , as
taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte,
8
filed another petition for certiorari seeking to nullify R.A. No.
9355 for being unconstitutional. They alleged that the
creation of Dinagat as a new province, if uncorrected, would
perpetuate an illegal act of Congress, and would unjustly
deprive the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of
the provincial territory, Internal Revenue Allocation (IRA),
and rich resources from the area. They pointed out that when
the law was passed, Dinagat had a land area of 802.12
square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951,
failing to comply with Section 10, Article X of the Constitution
and of Section 461 of the LGC, on both counts, viz.—
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to the
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
Section 461. Requisites for Creation. – (a) A province may
be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by
the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (₱20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and
either of the following requisites:
(i) a continuous territory of at least two thousand
(2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce
the land area, population, and income of the original
unit or units at the time of said creation to less than
the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated
by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute
to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-
recurring income. (Emphasis supplied.)
 On February 10, 2010, the Court rendered its
9 10
Decision granting the petition. The Decision
declared R.A. No. 9355 unconstitutional for failure
to comply with the requirements on population and
land area in the creation of a province under the
LGC. Consequently, it declared the proclamation of
Dinagat and the election of its officials as null and
void. The Decision likewise declared as null and
void the provision on Article 9(2) of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the LGC (LGC-IRR),
stating that, "[t]he land area requirement shall not
apply where the proposed province is composed of
one (1) or more islands" for being beyond the ambit
of Article 461 of the LGC, inasmuch as such
11
exemption is not expressly provided in the law.
26
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
 They further alleged that, because they are the duly
elected officials of Surigao del Norte whose
positions will be affected by the nullification of the
election results in the event that the May 12, 2010
Resolution is not reversed, they have a legal
interest in the instant case and would be directly
affected by the declaration of nullity of R.A. No.
9355. Simply put, movants-intervenors’ election to
their respective offices would necessarily be
annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its
previous status as part of the First Legislative
District of Surigao del Norte and a special election
will have to be conducted for governor, vice
governor, and House of Representatives member
and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member for the
First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
To be sure, it is actually COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 that
set this controversy into motion anew. To reiterate, the
pertinent portion of the Resolution reads:
c. If the Decision becomes final and executory after the
election, the Province of Dinagat Islands will revert to its
previous status as part of the First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte. The result of the election will have to be
nullified for the same reasons given in Item "b" above. A
special election for Governor, Vice Governor, Member,
House of Representatives, First Legislative District of
Surigao del Norte, and Members, Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, First District, Surigao del Norte (with Dinagat
Islands) will have to be conducted. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Indeed, COMELEC Resolution No. 8790 spawned
the peculiar circumstance of proper party interest
for movants-intervenors only with the specter of the
decision in the main case becoming final and
executory. More importantly, if the intervention be
not entertained, the movants-intervenors would be
left with no other remedy as regards to the
impending nullification of their election to their
respective positions. Thus, to the Court’s mind,
there is an imperative to grant the Urgent Motion to
Recall Entry of Judgment by movants-intervenors.
 Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the
creation of local government units, particularly of a
province, is economic viability. This is the clear
intent of the framers of the LGC.
 The creation of a new province shall not reduce the
land area, population, and income of the original
LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less
than the prescribed minimum requirements. All
expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne
by the petitioners. (Emphasis supplied.)
 But it must be pointed out that when the local
government unit to be created consists of one (1) or
more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442
and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government
unit to be created is a municipality or a component
city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the
enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a
province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it
is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-
IRR.
 Such acts of both Chambers of Congress
definitively show the clear legislative intent to
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION

incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the District Before the After the Enactment
land area requirement, with respect to the creation Enactment of of
of a province when it consists of one or more R.A. No. 9716 R.A. No. 9716
islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR. 1st Libmanan, Del Gallego, Ragay,
Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended Minalabac, Lupi,
by way of the enactment of R.A. No. 9355. Pamplona, Pasacao, Sipocot, Cabusao
 What is more, the land area, while considered as an San
indicator of viability of a local government unit, is Fernando, Del
not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot Gallego,
become a province, taking into account its average Ragay, Lupi, Sipocot,
annual income of ₱82,696,433.23 at the time of its Cabusao
creation, as certified by the Bureau of Local 2nd Naga City, Pili, Libmanan, Minalabac,
Government Finance, which is four times more than Ocampo, Pamplona, Pasacao,
the minimum requirement of ₱20,000,000.00 for the Camaligan, San
creation of a province. The delivery of basic Canaman, Fernando, Gainza,
services to its constituents has been proven Magarao, Bombon, Milaor
9
possible and sustainable. Rather than looking at the Calabanga, Gainza,
results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010 Milaor
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances 3rd Caramoan, Naga City, Pili,
which cannot operate in favor of Dinagat’s Garchitorena, Ocampo,
existence as a province, they must be seen from Goa, Lagonoy, Camaligan,
the perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of Presentacion, Canaman,
becoming a province. This Court should not be Sangay, San Jose, Magarao, Bombon,
instrumental in stunting such capacity. Tigaon, Calabanga
 The provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Tinambac, Siruma
Regulations Implementing the Local Government 4th Iriga City, Baao, Caramoan,
Code of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement Balatan, Garchitorena,
shall not apply where the proposed province is Bato, Buhi, Bula, Goa, Lagonoy,
composed of one (1) or more islands," is Nabua Presentacion, Sangay,
declared VALID. Accordingly, Republic Act No. San
9355 (An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Jose, Tigaon,
Islands) is declared as VALID and Tinambac,
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Siruma
Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of 5th Iriga City, Baao,
the officials thereof are declared VALID Balatan, Bato, Buhi,
Bula, Nabua
G.R. No. 207851 July 8, 2014
ANGEL G. NAVAL, Petitioner,  Notably, 8 out of 10 towns were taken from the old
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NELSON B. Second District to form the present Third District.
JULIA, Respondents. The present Second District is composed of the two
 A politician thinks of the next election – a statesman remaining towns, Gainza and Milaor, merged with
of the next generation. - James Freeman Clarke, five towns from the old First District.
American preacher and author  In the 2010 elections, Naval once again won as
 A provincial board member cannot be elected and among the members of the Sanggunian, Third
serve for more than three consecutive terms. But District. He served until 2013.
then, the Court is now called upon to resolve the  In the 2013 elections, Naval ran anewand was re-
following questions. First.What are the elected as Member of the Sanggunian, Third
consequences to the provincial board member’s District.
eligibility to run for the same elective position if the  Julia was likewise a SanggunianMember candidate
legislative district, which brought him or her to office from the Third District in the 2013 elections. On
to serve the first two consecutive terms, be October 29, 2012, he invoked Section 78 of the
10
reapportioned in such a way that 8 out of its 10 Omnibus Election Code (OEC) and filed beforethe
town constituencies are carved out and renamed as COMELEC a Verified Petition to Deny Due Course
another district? Second. Is the provincial board 11
or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Naval.
member’s election to the same position for the third Julia posited that Naval had fully served the entire
and fourth time, but now in representation ofthe Province of Camarines Sur for three consecutive
renamed district, a violation of the three-term limit terms as a member of the Sanggunian, irrespective
rule? of the district he had been elected from. The three-
 From 2004 to 2007 and 2007 to 2010, Naval had term limit rule’s application is more with reference to
been elected and had served as a member of the the same local elective post, and not necessarily in
Sanggunian, Second District, Province of connection with an identical territorial jurisdiction.
Camarines Sur. Allowing Naval to run as a Sanggunianmember for
 On October 12, 2009, the President approved the fourth time is violative of the inflexible three-
8
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9716, which reapportioned term limit rule enshrined in the Constitution and the
the legislative districts in Camarines Sur in the 12
LGC, which must be strictly construed.
following manner:

27

I. IN FINDING THAT NAVAL HAD ALREADY SERVED FOR
THREE CONSECUTIVE TERMS IN THE SAME
16
GOVERNMENT POST;
II. IN IGNORING THE FACT THAT SANGGUNIAN
MEMBERS ARE ELECTED BY LEGISLATIVE
17
DISTRICTS; and
III. WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PROHIBITION
CONTEMPLATED BY SECTION 8, ARTICLE X OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION AND SECTION 43(B) OF THE LGC
18
APPLIES TO NAVAL.
 The Court denies the petition.
 In Latasa v. COMELEC
o The Court took into account the following
circumstances: (1) That the territorial
jurisdiction of [the] city was the same as
that of the municipality; (2) That the
inhabitants were the same group of voters
who elected the municipal mayor for three
(3) consecutive terms; and (3) That the
inhabitants were the same group of voters
[over] whom he held power and authority
as their chief executive for nine years.
 The Philippines is a democratic and republican
State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
28
government authority emanates from them.
 The verb createmeans to "make or produce
47
something new." On the other hand, the verb
rename means to "give a new name to someone or
48
something." A complete reading of R.A. No. 9716
yields no logical conclusion other than that the
lawmakers intended the old Second District to be
merely renamed as the current Third District.
 It likewise bears noting that the actual difference in
the population of the old Second District from that of
the current Third District amounts to less than 10%
of the population of the latter. This numerical fact
renders the new Third District as essentially,
although not literally, the same as the old Second
District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his
argument that Sanggunian members are elected by
district, it does not alter the fact that the district
which elected him for the third and fourth time is the
same one which brought him to office in 2004 and
2007.
 The application upon Naval of the three-term limit
rule does not undermine the constitutional
requirement to achieve equality of representation
among districts.
 The rationale behind reapportionment is the
constitutional requirement to achieve equality of
49
representation among the districts. It is with this
mindset that the Court should consider Naval’s
argument anent having a new set of constituents
electing him into office in 2010 and 2013.
 Naval’s ineligibility to run, by reason of violation of
the three-term limit rule, does not undermine the
right to equal representation of any of the districts in
Camarines Sur. With or without him, the renamed
Third District, which he labels as a new set of
constituents, would still be represented, albeit by
another eligible person.
 In sum, the Court finds no compelling reason to
grant the reliefs prayed for by Naval. For the Court
to declare otherwise would be to create a
dangerous precedent unintended by the drafters of
our Constitution and of R.A. No. 9716. Considering
28
BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
that the one-term gap or rest after three consecutive
elections is a result of a compromise among the
members of the Constitutional Commission, no
cavalier exemptions or exceptions to its application
is to be allowed. Aldovino affirms this interpretation.
Further, sustaining Naval’s arguments would
practically allow him to hold the same office for 15
years. These are the circumstances the Constitution
explicitly intends to avert.
 WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions dated
March 5, 2013 and June 5, 2013 of the Commission
on Elections in SPA No. 13-166 (DC) are
AFFIRMED.
BAGABUYO v. COMELEC
573 SCRA 290 – Political Law – Local Government –
Reapportionment -Municipal Corporation – Plebiscite
Cagayan de Oro used to have only one legislative district.
But in 2006, CdO Congressman Constantino Jaraula
sponsored a bill to have two legislative districts in CdO
instead. The law was passed (RA 9371) hence two
legislative districts were created. Rogelio Bagabuyo assailed
the validity of the said law and he went immediately to the
Supreme Court to enjoin the COMELEC from enforcing the
law in the upcoming elections. Bagabuyo was contending
nd
that the 2 district was created without a plebiscite which he
averred was required by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case
at bar.
HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA
9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de
Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang
Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration
of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay;
in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or
alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took
place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in
Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income
classification; hence, no plebiscite is required. What
happened here was a reapportionment of a single legislative
district into two legislative districts. Reapportionment is
the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the
constitutional requirement of equality of representation.
Before, Cagayan de Oro had only one congressman and 12
city council members citywide for its population of
approximately 500,000. By having two legislative districts,
each of them with one congressman, Cagayan de Oro now
effectively has two congressmen, each one representing
250,000 of the city’s population. This easily means better
access to their congressman since each one now services
only 250,000 constituents as against the 500,000.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH SOCORRO B.
TAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013
Facts: The petitioners assail through a Petition for Certiorari
with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Preliminary Injunction resolution of the Commission on
Election ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of

Candidacy of petitioner for the position of the Representative
of the lone district of Marinduque.
On October 31. 2012, Joseph Socorro Tan filed with the
Comelec an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to
Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Regina Ongsiako
Reyes, the petitioner, on the ground that it contained
material representations. specifically:
1. That she is single when she is married.
2. That she is a resident of Marinduque when allegedly
she is a resident o Batangas and Quezon City.
3. That her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other
documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July
1959 or 3 July 1960;
4. That she is a permanent resident or an immigrant in
the US; and
5. That she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an
American citizen.
During the course of the proceedings, COMELEC found
newly evidence indicating that Reyes is an American citizen
and a holder of a U.S. passport, as well as using a U.S.
Passport in her various travels abroad. On March 27, 2013,
the COMELEC cancelled the certificate of candidacy of the
petitioner. She filed an MR on April 8, 2013. On May 14,
2013, COMELEC en banc denied her MR.
However, on May 18, 2013, she was proclaimed winner of
the May 13, 2013 Elections. On June 5, 2013, COMELEC
declared the May 14, 2013 Resolution final and Executory.
On the same day, petitioner took her oath of office before
Feliciano Belmonte, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. She has yet to assume office at that time,
as her term officially starts at noon of June 30,
2013.According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of
20
its jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed because
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the “sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications” of the Members of the House of
Representatives.
Issue1: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of member of the
House of Representative of Marinduque.
Held: Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the
jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as
stated in Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. For
one to be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives, there must be a concurrence of these
requisites: (1) valid proclamation; (2) proper oath, and (3)
assumption of office.
Thus the petitioner cannot be considered a member of the
nd
HR yet as she has not assumed office yet. Also, the 2
requirement was not validly complied with as a valid oath
must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although
she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no
indication that it was made during plenary or in open session
and, thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of
office was indeed complied.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if
grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to
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BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
exist. For an act to be struck down as having been done
with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross.
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and
substantially show that grave abuse of discretion exists.
ISSUE2: Whether COMELEC committed a violation of
petitioner’s right to due process of law.
There was no denial of due process in the case as Reyes
was given every opportunity to argue her case before the
COMELEC. From the time the latter rendered its
resolution, Reyes had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the
opportunity given her. Due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right
to be heard. Deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to
be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
PARTY LIST SYSTEM
BANAT v. COMELEC
586 SCRA 210 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Department – Party List System; Proportional
Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction – Rule in Interpreting the Constitution
– Intent of the Framers vs Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs
COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, made a partial proclamation
of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in
May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the
COMELEC considered the following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for
legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall come from
party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of the total
votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one
seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2
seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats –
this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formulafrom the case of Veterans Federation Party vs
COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats
even if if garners more than 6% of the votes cast for the
party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned
the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941
is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a
congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution.
Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to
meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.

BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is
it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2% qualifying
vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible
to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower
house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which
shall be discussed in the “HELD” portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list
candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule (Section
11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not
major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-
list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral
parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in
the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat
valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is
valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for
every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts, there shall be
one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the
1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more
than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule,
200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership
of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional
legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be
seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220 district
representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1
ratio, there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives ÷
0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely
a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list representatives
shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of
the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20%
shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is
no constitutional basis to allow that only party-lists which
garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and
those which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further,
the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to
attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose
there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the
party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us
further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million
30
BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold,
this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the
available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase
the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum
number of parties get two percent of the votes for every
party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied
party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents
an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section
5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the
attainment of “the broadest possible representation of party,
sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list
garners 2% of the votes cast, then it is guaranteed a seat,
and not “qualified”. This allows those party-lists garnering
less than 2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked
from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes
they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least
two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list
system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall
no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as “additional
seats” are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List
System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists which
garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-
percenters) are given their one seat each. The total number
of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted
from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17
party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55
seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38
remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for
the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be
used in the second round, particularly, in determining, first,
the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at
least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the
20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and
multiply it against the remaining number of seats. The
product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional

number of seats allotted for the party list – but the 3 seat limit
rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total
vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total votes cast for
the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x
(remaining seats) = number of additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so
2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter which means it
has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total
of 3 seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the
votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed
and additional seats, and there are still unoccupied seats,
those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists
and those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until
all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to
disallow major political parties (the likes of UNIDO, LABAN,
etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that
there is no prohibition either from the Constitution or from RA
7941 against major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections as the word “party” was not qualified and
that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations
deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a
sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect
participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion,
concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the
people defeats the will of the framers of the Constitution
precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the
Constitution – and the will of the people is that only the
marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the
party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to
ensure that no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
ATONG PAGLAUM v. COMELEC
694 SCRA 477 – Political Law – Constitutional Law –
Legislative Department – Party-List System
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions
totaling 54 with the Supreme Court (SC) in an effort to
reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list
race. The Comelec, in its assailed resolutions issued in
October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among
others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to
represent a marginalized and underrepresented sector, their
nominees do not come from a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations
or groups are not truly representative of the sector they
intend to represent in Congress.
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
Petitioners argued that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in
the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, either by denial of their
new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or
by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation
as party-list organizations; andsecond, whether the criteria
for participating in the party-list system laid down inAng
Bagong Bayani and Barangay Association for National
Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections(BANAT) should be applied by the COMELEC in
the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines
set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayaniand BANAT.
However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to
the COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new
guidelines which abandoned some principles established in
the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as
follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must
use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-
list system: (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations, and
(3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional
parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections
provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district
elections. A political party, whether major or not,
that fields candidates in legislative district elections
can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
“marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in
“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough
that their principal advocacy pertains to the special
interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors
that are “marginalized and underrepresented”
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that
lack “well-defined political constituencies” include
professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized
and underrepresented” sector they represent.
Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack “well-defined
political constituencies” must belong to the sector
they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack
“well-defined political constituencies,” either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a

track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide
members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that they
have at least one nominee who remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed,
as has always been the practice, from participating in the
party-list elections. But, since there’s really no constitutional
prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties
can now participate in the party-list system provided that
they do so through their bona fide sectoral wing (see
parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate,
albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will encourage them
to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
“marginalized and underrepresented” and to those who “lack
well-defined political constituencies.”
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission when they
were drafting the party-list system provision of the
Constitution. The Commissioners deliberated that it was their
intention to include all parties into the party-list elections in
order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and
multiparty. (In the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized
that the will of the people should defeat the intent of the
framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the
1987 Constitution, is that the party-list system should be
reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list
system is NOT RESERVED for the “marginalized and
underrepresented” or for parties who lack “well-defined
political constituencies”. It is also for national or regional
parties. It is also for small ideology-based and cause-
oriented parties who lack “well-defined political
constituencies”. The common denominator however is that
all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery – unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the
legislative districts but they can acquire the needed votes in
a national election system like the party-list system of
elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for
marginalized representation, then the system itself unduly
excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat
in the lower house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list
representation should not be understood to include
only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas
workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be
noted that Section 5 of Republic Act 7941 includes, among
others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically
marginalized but are still qualified as “marginalized,
underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political
constituencies” as they are ideologically marginalized.
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Senior Citizens v. COMELEC
The present petitions were filed by the two rival factions
within the same party-list organization, the Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Phil., Inc. (SENIOR
CITIZENS). One group is headed by Rep.Arquiza (Arquiza
group) and the other by Francisco Datol (Datol group).
SENIOR CITIZENS was allocated one seat in Congress.
Rep. Arquiza, then the organizations first nominee, served as
a member of the House of Representatives.
The nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS signed an agreement,
entitled Irrevocable Covenant, which contains the list of their
candidates and terms on sharing of their powers. It contained
an agreement on who among the candidates will serve the
terms according to the power sharing agreement.
After the conduct of the May 10, 2010 elections, SENIOR
CITIZENS ranked second among all the party-list candidates
and was allocated two seats in the House of
Representatives. The first seat was occupied by its first
nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to its
second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
On December 14, 2011, Rep. Arquiza informed the office of
COMELEC the second nominee of SENIOR CITIZENS, Rep.
Kho, had tendered his resignation. By virtue of such
resignation and as provided under their agreement, Rep.
Arquiza stated that its fourth nominee shall assume position
since their third nominee, Datol, has been previously
expelled in their party. However, the board of the party list,
headed by Rep. Arquiza, recalled the previous acceptance of
the resignation of Rep. Kho.
The COMELEC en Banc issued a resolution that the list
submitted to them is deemed to be permanent as the law
deprives the party the right to change their nominees. Thus,
even if the expulsion of Datol in the petitioner party-list were
true, the list and order of nominees of the Senior Citizens
party-list remains the same in so far as the COMELEC and
the law are concerned as it does not fall under one of the
three grounds mentioned in law for the changing of
nominees. And that the resignation of Kho, pursuant to the
party nominees term-sharing agreement, cannot be
recognized and be given effect so as to create a vacancy in
the list and change the order of the nominees.
December 11, 2012, SC initially granted status quo ante
orders of Senior Citizens and directed COMELEC to include
the name of Senior Citizens in the printing of offcial ballots
for the May 2013 elections. SC later ruled that the
cancellation of registration was in order. Thus, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether or not the right to due process of Senior
Citizens was violated
It is true that during the April 18, 2012 hearing, the rival
groups of SENIOR CITIZENS admitted to the existence of
the term-sharing agreement. Contrary to the claim of

COMELEC, however, said hearing was conducted for
purposes of discussing the petition of the Arquiza Group in
E.M. No. 12-040. To recall, said petition asked for the
confirmation of the replacement of Rep. Kho, who had
tendered his resignation effective on December 31, 2011.
E.M. No. 12-040 was not a proceeding regarding the
qualifications of SENIOR CITIZENS as a party-list group and
the issue of whether the term-sharing agreement may be a
ground for disqualification was neither raised nor resolved in
that case. Chairman Brillantess remonstration was not
sufficient as to constitute a fair warning that the term-sharing
agreement would be considered as a ground for the
cancellation of SENIOR CITIZENS registration and
accreditation.
The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was
manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the April 18,
2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En Banc in E.M.
No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group manifested that it was
withdrawing its petition for confirmation and approval of Rep.
Kho’s replacement. Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June
27, 2012 in E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself
refused to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the
tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even
declared that no vacancy was created despite the execution
of the said agreement. Subsequently, there was also no
indication that the nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried
to implement, much less succeeded in implementing, the
term-sharing agreement. Before this Court, the Arquiza
Group and the Datol Group insist on this fact of non-
implementation of the agreement. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, Rep. Kho continued to hold his seat and served
his term as a member of the House of Representatives, in
accordance with COMELEC Resolution No. 9366 and the
COMELEC En Banc ruling in E.M. No. 12-040. Curiously, the
COMELEC is silent on this point.
Indubitably, if the term-sharing agreement was not actually
implemented by the parties thereto, it appears that SENIOR
CITIZENS, as a party-list organization, had been unfairly and
arbitrarily penalized by the COMELEC En Banc. Verily, how
can there be disobedience on the part of SENIOR CITIZENS
when its nominees, in fact, desisted from carrying out their
agreement? Hence, there was no violation of an election law,
rule, or regulation to speak of. Clearly then, the
disqualification of SENIOR CITIZENS and the cancellation of
its registration and accreditation have no legal leg to stand
on.
*** LICO V. COMELEC (MISSING)
G.R. No. 206952, October 22, 2013
Abang Lingkod Party-list vs COMELEC
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Abang Lingkod
challenging the May 2013 resolution issued by COMELEC
cancelling the Abang Lingkod's party-list registration.
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BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
COMELEC says that it is not enough that the party-list
organization claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented because representation is easy to claim.
Records shows that Abang Lingkod failed to stablish its track
record which is important to prove that the party-list
continuously represents the marginalized.
Abang Lingkod merely offered pictures of some alleged
activities they conducted after the 2010 elections. These
pictures appears to be edited. Under The Party-List System
Act, a group’s registration may be cancelled for declaring
unlawful statements in its petition. Photoshopping images to
establish a fact that did not occur is tantamount to declaring
unlawful statements. It is on this ground that the Commission
cancels ABANG LINGKOD’s registration.
Abang Lingkod filed a motion for reconsideration but it
was denied by COMELEC, thus this current Petition for
certiorari.
 the Court finds that the COMELEC gravely abused
its discretion in cancelling the registration of
ABANG LINGKOD
 The flaw in the COMELEC's disposition lies in the
fact that it insists on requiring party-list groups to
present evidence showing that they have a track
record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented.
 In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay
down the following guidelines, culled from the law
and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its
work.
 First, the political party, sector, organization or
coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Secdon 5 of
RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws,
history, platform of government and track record --
that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized
and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its
membership should belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in
a conflict of interests, it has chosen or is likely to
choose the interest of such sectors. (Emphasis
ours)
 Track record is not the same as the submission or
presentation of "constitution, by-laws, platform of
government, list of officers, coalition agreement,
and other relevant information as may be required
by the COMELEC," which are but mere pieces of
documentary evidence intended to establish that
the group exists and is a going concern. The said
documentary evidence presents an abstract of the
ideals that national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations seek to achieve.
 If at all, evidence showing a track record in
representing the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors is only required from
nominees of sectoral parties or organizations
that represent the marginalized and
underrepresented who do not factually belong
to the sector represented by their party or
organization.
 In the case of sectoral organizations, although they
are still required to represent the marginalized and
underrepresented, they are likewise not required to
show a track record since there would be no reason
for them to feign representation of the marginalized
and underrepresented as they can just register as a
national or regional party or organization. Thus, the

Court, in Atong Paglaum stated that, for purposes of
registration under the party-list system, it is enough
that the principal advocacy of sectoral organizations
pertains to the sector/s they represent.
 There is thus no basis in law and established
jurisprudence to insist that groups seeking
registration under the party-list system still comply
with the track record requirement. Indeed, nowhere
in R.A. No. 7941 is it mandated that groups seeking
registration thereunder must submit evidence to
show their track record as a group.
 Nevertheless, considering that track record is no
longer a requirement, a group’s misrepresentation
as to its track record cannot be used as a ground to
deny or cancel its registration -it is no longer
material to its qualification under the party-list
system. In this case, ABANG LINGKOD s
submission of digitally altered photographs cannot
be considered material to its qualification as a party-
list group.
 Assuming arguendo that the nominees of ABANG
LINGKOD, as opined by the COMELEC, indeed do
not have track records showing their participation in
activities aimed at improving the conditions of the
sector that the group represents, the same would
not affect the registration of ABANG LINGKOD as a
party-list group.
 To stress, in Atong Paglaum the Court pointed out
that [t]he nominees of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent the 'marginalized and
underrepresented,' or that represent those who lack
'well-defined political constituencies,' either must
belong to their respective sectors or must have a
track record o advocacy for their respective sectors.
Stated otherwise, the nominee of a party-list groups
may either be: first one who actually belongs to the
sector which the party-list group represents, in
which case the track record requirement does not
apply; or second one who does not actually belong
to the sector which the party-list group represents
but has a track record showing the nominee's active
participation in activities aimed at uplifting the cause
of the sector which the group represents."
 In the case under consideration, three of the five
nominees of ABANG LINGKOD are farmers and,
thus, are not required to present a track record
showing their active participation in activities aimed
to promote the sector which ABANG LINGKOD
represents, i.e. peasant farmers and fisherfolk. That
two of ABANG LINGKOD's nominees do not
actually belong to the sector it represents is
immaterial and would not result in the cancellation
of ABANG LINGKOD's registration as a party-list
group. This is clear from the sixth parameter laid
down by the Court in tong Paglaum which states
that "national, regional and sectoral organizations
shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees
are disqualified, provided that they have at least
one nominee who remains qualified." At the very
least, ABANG LINGKOD has three (3) qualified
nominees, being farmers by occupation.
 Indeed, the disqualification of one or some of the
nominees of a party-list group should not
automatically result in the disqualification of the
group.1avvphi1 Otherwise it would accord the
nominees the same significance, which the law
holds for the party-list groups; it is still the fact that
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BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
the party-list group satisfied the qualifications of the
law that is material to consider. The disqualification
of the nominees must simply be regarded as failure
to qualify for an office or position. It should not, in
any way, blemish the qualifications of the party-list
group itself with defect. The party-list group must be
treated as separate and distinct from its nominees
such that qualifications of the latter must not be
considered part and parcel of the qualifications of
the former.
 In sum, that ABANG LINGKOD's registration must
be cancelled due to its misrepresentation is a
conclusion derived from a simplistic reading of the
provisions of R.A. No. 7941 and the import of the
Court's disposition in tong Paglaum. Not every
misrepresentation committed by national, regional,
and sectoral groups or organizations would merit
the denial or cancellation of their registration under
the party-list system. The misrepresentation must
relate to their qualification as a party-list group. In
this regard, the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it insisted on requiring ABANG
LINGKOD to prove its track record notwithstanding
that a group s track record is no longer required
pursuant to the Court s pronouncement in Atong
Paglaum
 Likewise, upholding the cancellation of ABANG
LINGKOD s registration, notwithstanding that it was
able to obtain sufficient number of votes for a
legislative seat, would serve no purpose other than
to subvert the will of the electorate who voted to
give ABANG LINGKOD the privilege to represent
them in the House of Representatives.
 WHEREFORE in light of the foregoing disquisitions,
the instant petition is hereby GRANTED.
ABAYON V. HRET (2010)
FACTS:
In G.R. 189466, petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first
nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won
a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007
elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto with
respondent HRET against petitioner Abayon. They claimed
that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the
House of Representatives, since it did not represent the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors since she did not
belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district
representative
 It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the
House of Representatives, and not Abayon who
was just its nominee. All questions involving her
eligibility as first nominee, said Abayon, were
internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the
first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a
seat in the 2007 elections for the members of the House
of Representatives. Lesaca and the others alleged that
Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of
Representatives as party-list nominee because he did
not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors that Bantay represented, namely, the victims of
communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical
Units (CAFGUs), former rebels, and security guards.

 Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had
no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually
the party-list Bantay, not he, that was elected to and
assumed membership in the House of
Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just
Bantay’s nominee. Consequently, any question
involving his eligibility as first nominee was an
internal concern of Bantay. Such question must be
brought, he said, before that party-list group, not
before the HRET.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent HRET has
jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
HELD: YES Although it is the party-list organization that is
voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as
and becomes a member of the House of Representatives.
5
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the
“members” of that House are:
 Sec. 5. (1). The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative
districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance
with the number of their respective inhabitants, and
on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a partylist system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(Underscoring supplied)

9
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides
that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to, among other things, the qualifications of
the members of the House of Representatives.
Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are
“elected members” of the House of
Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to
hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy
with the cases of district representatives, once the
party or organization of the party-list nominee has
been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his
oath and assumed office as member of the House
of Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction
over election contests relating to his qualifications
10
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins.
 The Court holds that respondent HRET did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo
party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its
jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
G. R. No. 175352 January 18, 2011
DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and
SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,
vs. RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, Intervenor.
FACTS:
 Dante V. Liban, together with other petitioners,
petitioned in Court to declare Richard J. Gordon as
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
“having forfeited his seat in the Senate.” The
petitioners were officers of the Board of Directors of
the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, while
respondent is Chairman of the Philippine National
Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
 During Gordon’s incumbency as a member of the
Senate of the Philippines, he was elected Chairman
of the PNRC during the February 23, 2006 meeting
of the PNRC Board of Governors, in which the
petitioners alleged that by accepting the
responsibility, Gordon deemed ceased tobe a
member of the Senate as provided in Sec. 13,
Article VI of the Constitution:
 Sec. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office
oremployment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof,including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
termwithout forfe iting his seat….
 Respondent contested that the petitioners’ citation
of a constitutional provision had no basis, since
PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation. Thus, prohibition under Sec.13, Art. VI
of the Constitution did not apply to his case.
Furthermore, service rendered in PNRC is a
volunteer service to which is neither an office nor an
employment
ISSUE: By accepting the PNRC Chair, did Gordon forfeit his
Senate Seat? NO
 the sui generis status of the PNRC is now
sufficiently established.1âwphi1 Although it is
neither a subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of
the government, nor a government-owned or -
controlled corporation or a subsidiary thereof, as
succinctly explained in the Decision of July 15,
2009, so much so that respondent, under the
Decision, was correctly allowed to hold his position
as Chairman thereof concurrently while he served
as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto
imply that the PNRC is a "private corporation" within
the contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution, that must be organized under the
Corporation Code. As correctly mentioned by
Justice Roberto A. Abad, the sui generis character
of PNRC requires us to approach controversies
involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
 In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an
important ally and auxiliary of the government in the
humanitarian field in accordance with its
commitments under international law.
 WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is
not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for
purposes of the prohibition in Section 13, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.
ANTERO J. POBRE v. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-
SANTIAGO A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with
enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to
the following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos
speech delivered on the Senate floor:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am
foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am

suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like
throwing up to be living my middle years in
a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I
spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the
Supreme Court, I am no longer interested
in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to
be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be
in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x.
To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total
disrespect on the part of the speaker towards then Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other members of the
Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly,
Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary
actions be taken against the lady senator.
 Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution,
which provides: A Senator or Member of
the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six
years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
 Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of the
falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress
does not destroy the privilege. The
disciplinary authority of the assemblyand
the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses
committed in the name of parliamentary
immunity.
 Her privilege speech is not actionable
criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding
under the Rules of Court.
 The Rules of the Senate itself contains a
provision on Unparliamentary Acts and
Language that enjoins a Senator from
using, under any circumstance, offensive
or improper language against another
Senator or against any public institution.
The Senate President had not apparently
called her to order, let alone referred the
matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for
appropriate disciplinary action, as the
Rules dictates under such circumstance.
The lady senator clearly violated the rules
of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that
her peers bent backwards and avoided
imposing their own rules on her.
G.R. No. 180643 September 4, 2008
ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner,
vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE
COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, respondents.
FACTS:
 The Senate issued various Senate Resolutions
directing SBRC, among others, to conduct an
investigation regarding the NBN-ZTE deal. Neri, the
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He disclosed that the
COMELEC Chairman Abalos offered him P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project, that
he informed PGMA about the bribery and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe. However,
when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, he refused to answer, invoking
“executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to
answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to
prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed him
to approve. As a result, the Senate cited him for
contempt.
 Respondent Committees persisted in knowing
petitioner’s answers to these three questions by
requiring him to appear and testify once more on
November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007,
Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to
respondent Committees and requested them to
dispense with petitioner’s testimony on the ground
of executive privilege.
 The senate thereafter issued a show cause order,
unsatisfied with the reply, therefore, issued an
Order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest
and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-
at-Arms until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.
 On the same date, petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the above Order. Denied. Petition
for certiorari and Supplemental Petition for
Certiorari (with Urgent Application for
TRO/Preliminary Injunction) granted by the SC
court.
CORE ISSUES:
I. whether or not there is a recognized presumptive
presidential communications privilege in our legal
system;
II. whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold
that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by executive privilege;
III. whether or not respondent Committees have shown
that the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are critical to the exercise of their
functions; and
IV. whether or not respondent Committees committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt
order.
HELD:
I. There Is a Recognized Presumptive Presidential
Communications Privilege
 Respondent Committees argue as if this were the
first time the presumption in favor of the presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted
in our legal system. That is far from the truth. There,
the Court enumerated the cases in which the claim
of executive privilege was recognized, among them
Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v. PCGG and Chavez
v. PEA.The Court articulated in these cases that,
“”the right to information does not extend to matters
recognized as ‘privileged information’ under the
separation of powers, by which the Court meant
Presidential conversations, correspondences, and
discussions in closed-door Cabinet meetings.”

 In this case, it was the President herself, through
Executive Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive
privilege on a specific matter involving an executive
agreement between the Philippines and China,
which was the subject of the three (3) questions
propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of the
Senate Committees’ investigation.
 A President and those who assist him must be free
to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except
privately. These are the considerations justifying a
presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and inextricably rooted in
the separation of powers under the Constitution
 Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege
of presidential communications when invoked by
the President on a matter clearly within the domain
of the Executive, the said presumption dictates that
the same be recognized and be given preference or
priority, in the absence of proof of a compelling or
critical need for disclosure by the one assailing such
presumption. Any construction to the contrary will
render meaningless the presumption accorded by
settled jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege.
In fact, Senate v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence
citing "the considerations justifying a presumptive
privilege for Presidential communications."
II. There Are Factual and Legal Bases to Hold that the
Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions Are
Covered by Executive Privilege
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.”
 First, respondent Committees contend that the
power to secure a foreign loan does not relate to a
“quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power,” because the Constitution does not vest it in
the President alone, but also in the Monetary Board
which is required to give its prior concurrence and
to report to Congress.
 This argument is unpersuasive.
 The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence
of another entity does not make such power less
executive. The power to enter into an executive
agreement is in essence an executive power. This
authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the
President has to secure the prior concurrence of the
Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a
complete report of its decision before contracting or
guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the
executive nature of the power. In the same way that
certain legislative acts require action from the
President for their validity does not render such acts
less legislative in nature.
B. The “doctrine of operational proximity” was laid down
precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not
conclusive.
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 Second, respondent Committees also seek
reconsideration of the application of the “doctrine of
operational proximity” for the reason that “it maybe
misconstrued to expand the scope of the
presidential communications privilege to
communications between those who are
‘operationally proximate’ to the President but who
may have “no direct communications with her.”
 It must be stressed that the doctrine of “operational
proximity” was laid down in In re: Sealed Case
precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege. In the case at bar, the
danger of expanding the privilege “to a large swath
of the executive branch” (a fear apparently
entertained by respondents) is absent because the
official involved here is a member of the Cabinet,
thus, properly within the term “advisor” of the
President; in fact, her alter ego and a member of
her official family. This goes to show that the
operational proximity test used in the Decision is not
considered conclusive in every case. In determining
which test to use, the main consideration is to limit
the availability of executive privilege only to officials
who stand proximate to the President, not only by
reason of their function, but also by reason of their
positions in the Executive’s organizational structure.
Thus, respondent Committees’ fear that the scope
of the privilege would be unnecessarily expanded
with the use of the operational proximity test is
unfounded.
C. The President’s claim of executive privilege is not merely
based on a generalized interest; and in balancing
respondent Committees’ and the President’s clashing
interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987 Constitutional
provisions on government transparency, accountability and
disclosure of information.
 The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of Executive
Secretary Ermita specified presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic
and economic relations with another sovereign
nation as the bases for the claim. Even in Senate v.
Ermita, it was held that Congress must not require
the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with
such particularity as to compel disclosure of the
information which the privilege is meant to protect.
This is a matter of respect for a coordinate and co-
equal department.
 It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the
disclosure of the President’s communication with
her advisor. The NBN Project involves a foreign
country as a party to the agreement. It was actually
a product of the meeting of minds between officials
of the Philippines and China. Whatever the
President says about the agreement - particularly
while official negotiations are ongoing - are matters
which China will surely view with particular interest.
There is danger in such kind of exposure. It could
adversely affect our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the People’s Republic of China.
 This Court did not rule that the Senate has no
power to investigate the NBN Project in aid of
legislation. There is nothing in the assailed Decision
that prohibits respondent Committees from inquiring
into the NBN Project. They could continue the
investigation and even call petitioner Neri to testify

again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his
willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes
from the scope of respondents’ investigation the
three (3) questions that elicit answers covered by
executive privilege and rules that petitioner cannot
be compelled to appear before respondents to
answer the said questions. We have discussed the
reasons why these answers are covered by
executive privilege. That there is a recognized
public interest in the confidentiality of such
information is a recognized principle in other
democratic States. To put it simply, the right to
information is not an absolute right.
III. Respondent Committees Failed to Show That the
Communications Elicited by the Three Questions Are
Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
 The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in
past decisions on executive privilege is that the
presumption of privilege can only be overturned by
a showing of compelling need for disclosure of the
information covered by executive privilege.
 In the Motion for Reconsideration, respondent
Committees argue that the information elicited by
the three (3) questions are necessary in the
discharge of their legislative functions, among them,
(a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate Bills,
and (b) to curb graft and corruption.
 We remain unpersuaded by respondents’
assertions. The burden to show this is on the
respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude
into the sphere of competence of the President in
order to gather information which, according to said
respondents, would “aid” them in crafting legislation.
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation
cannot be equated with the compelling or
demonstratively critical and specific need for facts
which is so essential to the judicial power to
adjudicate actual controversies.
IV. Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of
Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
 Respondent Committees contend that their Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
(the “Rules”) are beyond the reach of this Court.
While it is true that this Court must refrain from
reviewing the internal processes of Congress, as a
co-equal branch of government, however, when a
constitutional requirement exists, the Court has the
duty to look into Congress’ compliance therewith.
We cannot turn a blind eye to possible violations of
the Constitution simply out of courtesy.
 In the present case, the Court’s exercise of its
power of judicial review is warranted because there
appears to be a clear abuse of the power of
contempt on the part of respondent Committees.
Section 18 of the Rules provides that:
o "The Committee, by a vote of majority of
all its members, may punish for contempt
any witness before it who disobey any
order of the Committee or refuses to be
sworn or to testify or to answer proper
questions by the Committee or any of its
members." (Emphasis supplied)
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 In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a
cloud of doubt as to the validity of the contempt
order because during the deliberation of the three
(3) respondent Committees, only seven (7)
Senators were present. This number could hardly
fulfill the majority requirement needed by
respondent Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations which has a
membership of seventeen (17) Senators and
respondent Committee on National Defense and
Security which has a membership of eighteen (18)
Senators. With respect to respondent Committee on
Trade and Commerce which has a membership of
nine (9) Senators, only three (3) members were
present.
***BELGICA v. OCHOA
Araullo vs Aquino GR 209287 July 1, 2014
Political Law – Constitutional Law – Separation of Powers –
Fund Realignment – Constitutionality of the Disbursement
Acceleration Program -Power of the Purse – Executive
Impoundment
 When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his
administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a
program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP).
 The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the
funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for
next year’s appropriation. So what happens under
the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive
agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn
by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as “savings” by the Executive and said
funds will then be reallotted to other priority
projects. The DAP program did work
to stimulate the economy as economic growth was
in fact reported and portion of such growth was
attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme
Court).
 Other sources of the DAP include the
unprogrammed funds from the General
Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds
are standby appropriations made by Congress in
the GAA.
 Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy
Estrada made an exposé claiming that he, and
other Senators, received Php50M from the
President as an incentive for voting in favor of the
impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona.
Secretary Abad claimed that the money was taken
from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request
of the Senators.
 This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns
out that the DAP does not only realign funds within
the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive
projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B
for the CPLA (Cordillera People’s Liberation Army),
Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro National Liberation

Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-
P100M for certain Senators each, P10B for
Relocation Projects, etc.
 This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson
of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was:
 DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional rule which provides that “no money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.”
 Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on
certain laws particularly the GAA (savings and
augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI
of the Constitution (power of the President to
augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292
(power of the President to suspend expenditures
and authority to use savings, respectively).
Issues:
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle
“no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made
by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be
considered as impoundments by the executive.
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers
are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed
funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact
is applicable.
HELD:
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art.
VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor
is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it
did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In
DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made
by law would have been required. Funds, which
were already appropriated for by the GAA,
were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the
DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend
appropriations or to retain or deduct
appropriations for whatever reason.
Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA
unless there will be an unmanageable national
government budget deficit (which did not
happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because
what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of
funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were
unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of
the government) are allowed by the
Constitution to make realignment of funds,
however, such transfer or realignment should
only be made “within their respective offices”.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations
may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was
violated because funds appropriated by the
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
GAA for the Executive were being transferred
to the Legislative and other non-Executive
agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective
offices” also contemplate realignment of funds
to an existing project in the GAA. Under the
DAP, even though some projects were within
the Executive, these projects are non-existent
insofar as the GAA is concerned because no
funds were appropriated to them in the GAA.
Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the
GAA because they were not provided for by the
GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are “savings”
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary
to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of “savings” in the GAA,
savings only occur, among other instances,
when there is an excess in the funding of a
certain project once it is completed,
finally discontinued, or finally abandoned. The
GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds
withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus,
since the statutory definition of savings was not
complied with under the DAP, there is no basis
at all for the transfers. Further, savings should
only be declared at the end of the fiscal year.
But under the DAP, funds are already being
withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of
the year and then being declared as “savings”
by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA
cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only
be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the
revenue collections have exceeded the
revenue targets. In this case, no such
certification was secured before
unprogrammed funds were used.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which
recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has
funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP,
then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The
beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to
return what they received especially so that
they relied on the validity of the DAP. However,
the Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be
applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the
appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good
faith.
ABAKADA Guro Party List v Purisima
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008
FACTS:
1. This petition for prohibition seeks to prevent
respondents from implementing and enforcing

Republic Act (RA) 9335 (Attrition Act of 2005).
RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-
generation capability and collection of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs
(BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC
officials and employees to exceed their revenue
targets by providing a system of rewards and
sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC
with at least six months of service, regardless of
employment status
2. Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers filed
this petition challenging the constitutionality of RA
9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend that,
by establishing a system of rewards and
incentives, the law "transform[s] the officials
and employees of the BIR and the BOC into
mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will
do their best only in consideration of such
rewards. Petitioners also assail the creation of
a congressional oversight committee on the
ground that it violates the doctrine of separation
of powers, for it permits legislative participation in
the implementation and enforcement of the law.
ISSUE: WON the joint congressional committee is valid and
constitutional
HELD: No. It is unconstitutional.
 In the case of Macalintal, in the discussion of J.
Puno, the power of oversight embraces all
activities undertaken by Congress to enhance
its understanding of and influence over the
implementation of legislation it has enacted.
Clearly, oversight concerns post-enactment
measures undertaken by Congress: (a) to
monitor bureaucratic compliance with program
objectives, (b) to determine whether agencies
are properly administered, (c) to eliminate
executive waste and dishonesty, (d) to prevent
executive usurpation of legislative authority,
and (d) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest. The
power of oversight has been held to be intrinsic in
the grant of legislative power itself and integral to
the checks and balances inherent in a democratic
system of government
 With this backdrop, it is clear that congressional
oversight is not unconstitutional per se, meaning, it
neither necessarily constitutes an encroachment on
the executive power to implement laws nor
undermines the constitutional separation of powers.
Rather, it is integral to the checks and balances
inherent in a democratic system of government. It
may in fact even enhance the separation of powers
as it prevents the over-accumulation of power in the
executive branch.
 However, to forestall the danger of
congressional encroachment "beyond the
legislative sphere," the Constitution imposes
two basic and related constraints on Congress.
It may not vest itself, any of its committees or its
members with either executive or judicial power.
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And, when it exercises its legislative power, it must
follow the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively
considered, procedures" specified under the
Constitution including the procedure for enactment
of laws and presentment.
 Thus, any post-enactment congressional measure
such as this should be limited to scrutiny and
investigation. In particular, congressional oversight
must be confined to the following:
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress' power of
appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of
departments to appear before and be heard by
either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to their
departments and its power of confirmation and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation
of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.

Any action or step beyond that will undermine
the separation of powers guaranteed by the
Constitution. Legislative vetoes fall in this class.
 Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the
President or an administrative agency to present
the proposed implementing rules and regulations of
a law to Congress which, by itself or through a
committee formed by it, retains a "right" or "power"
to approve or disapprove such regulations before
they take effect. As such, a legislative veto in the
form of a congressional oversight committee is in
the form of an inward-turning delegation designed
to attach a congressional leash (other than through
scrutiny and investigation) to an agency to which
Congress has by law initially delegated broad
powers. It radically changes the design or structure
of the Constitution's diagram of power as it entrusts
to Congress a direct role in enforcing, applying or
implementing its own laws.
 Administrative regulations enacted by administrative
agencies to implement and interpret the law which
they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law
49
and are entitled to respect. Such rules and
50
regulations partake of the nature of a statute and
are just as binding as if they have been written in
the statute itself. As such, they have the force and
effect of law and enjoy the presumption of
constitutionality and legality until they are set aside
with finality in an appropriate case by a competent
51
court. Congress, in the guise of assuming the role
of an overseer, may not pass upon their legality by
subjecting them to its stamp of approval without
disturbing the calculated balance of powers
established by the Constitution. In exercising
discretion to approve or disapprove the IRR based
on a determination of whether or not they
conformed with the provisions of RA 9335,
Congress arrogated judicial power unto itself, a
power exclusively vested in this Court by the
Constitution.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Pormento v. Estrada
G.R. No. 191988 August 31, 2010
 What is the proper interpretation of the following
provision of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:
[t]he President shall not be eligible for any
reelection?
 The petition asks whether private respondent
Joseph Ejercito Estrada is covered by the ban on
the President from any reelection. Private
respondent was elected President of the Republic
of the Philippines in the general elections held on
May 11, 1998. He sought the presidency again in
the general elections held on May 10, 2010.
Petitioner Atty. Evillo C. Pormento opposed private
respondents candidacy and filed a petition for
disqualification. However, his petition was denied by
COMELEC. MR denied by COMELEC en banc.
 Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari on
May 7, 2010. However, under the ROC, the filing of
such petition would not stay the execution of the
judgment, final order or resolution of the COMELEC
that is sought to be reviewed. Besides, petitioner
did not even pray for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction.
Hence, private respondent was able to participate
as a candidate for the position of President in the
May 10, 2010 elections where he garnered the
second highest number of votes.
 Private respondent was not elected President the
second time he ran. Since the issue on the proper
interpretation of the phrase any reelection will be
premised on a person’s second (whether immediate
or not) election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case. No live
conflict of legal rights exists. There is in this case no
definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy
that touches on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests…When a case is moot, it
becomes non-justiciable.
 Assuming an actual case or controversy existed
prior to the proclamation of a President who has
been duly elected in the May 10, 2010 elections, the
same is no longer true today. Following the results
of that elections, private respondent was not elected
President for the second time. Thus, any discussion
of his reelection will simply be hypothetical and
speculative. It will serve no useful or practical
purpose. PETITION DENIED.
G.R. No. 191618: November 23, 2010
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, v. PET
 an undesignated petition filed by Atty. Romulo B.
Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal), that questions the
constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) as an illegal and unauthorized progeny of
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution:
o The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
 While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court
is authorized to promulgate its rules for the purpose,
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he chafes at the creation of a purportedly separate
tribunal complemented by a budget allocation, a
seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees,
to effect the constitutional mandate.
 Petitioner reiterates that the constitution of the PET,
with the designation of the Members of the Court as
Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
prohibits the designation of Members of the
Supreme Court and of other courts established by
law to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
WON the constitution of the PET, composed of the
Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates
Section 4, Article VII and Section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution?
WHETHER x x x PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO
FILE THE INSTANT PETITION. -NO
Petitioner appeared before as counsel of former
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Macapagal-Arroyo) in
the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate
Fernando Poe, Jr. before the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, because judicial inquiry, requires that the
constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity. Such appearance as counsel before the
Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first opportunity
to challenge the constitutionality of the Tribunals constitution.
Petitioner is unmistakably estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had
ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction
in 2004. His failure to raise a seasonable constitutional
challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional
acceptance of the Tribunals authority over the case he was
defending, translates to the clear absence of an
indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this
Courts power of judicial review. Even on this score alone, the
petition ought to be dismissed outright.
 We reiterate that the establishment of the PET
simply constitutionalized what was statutory
before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential
context of the PET in our country cannot be denied.
 (trace the historical antecedents of the PET)
o Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the
1987 Constitution is an innovation.
o To fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, the
National Assembly enacted R.A. No. 1793,
establishing an independent PET to try,
hear, and decide protests contesting the
election of President and Vice-President.
o R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed and
superseded by the 1973 Constitution
which replaced the bicameral legislature
under the 1935 Constitution with the
unicameral body of a parliamentary
government.
o These changes prompted the National
Assembly to revive the PET by enacting,
on December 3, 1985, Batas Pambansa
Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential
Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
Election Contests in the Office of the
President and Vice-President of the

Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor
and For Other Purposes.
o With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the
1986 Constitutional Commission
transformed the then statutory PET into a
constitutional institution, albeit without its
traditional nomenclature: FR. BERNAS. x x
x.x x x. So it became necessary to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we
have done is to constitutionalize what was
statutory but it is not an infringement on
the separation of powers because the
power being given to the Supreme Court is
a judicial power.
 It was made in response to the concern aired by
delegate Jose E. Suarez that the additional duty
may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court.
This explicit grant of independence and of the
plenary powers needed to discharge this burden
justifies the budget allocation of the PET.
 The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an
awesome task, includes the means necessary to
carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary
implication.
 A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein,
although the method by which the Supreme Court
exercises this authority is not specified in the
provision, the grant of power does not contain any
limitation on the Supreme Courts exercise thereof.
The Supreme Courts method of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests,
through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the
Supreme Court to promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
 The conferment of full authority to the Supreme
Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate
and the House of Representatives, i.e., the Senate
Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which
we have affirmed on numerous occasions.
 The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion
that the different electoral tribunals, with the
Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are
constitutional bodies, independent of the three
departments of government Executive, Legislative,
and Judiciary but not separate therefrom.
 The PET is not a separate and distinct entity from
the Supreme Court, albeit it has functions peculiar
only to the Tribunal. The adoption of a separate
seal, as well as the change in the nomenclature of
the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into
Chairman and Members of the Tribunal,
respectively, was designed simply to highlight the
singularity and exclusivity of the Tribunals functions
as a special electoral court.
 With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial
power was expanded to include the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
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enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government.The
power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
 The set up embodied in the Constitution and
statutes characterize the resolution of electoral
contests as essentially an exercise of judicial
power.
 We have previously declared that the PET is not
simply an agency to which Members of the Court
were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended
by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the
judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
G.R. No. 184740 February 11, 2010
DENNIS A. B. FUNA, Petitioner,
vs.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA,
Office of the President, SEC. LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, in
his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications, USEC. MARIA
ELENA H. BAUTISTA, in her official capacities as
Undersecretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications and as Officer-in-Charge of the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), Respondents.
 On October 4, 2006, PGMA appointed respondent
Maria Elena H. Bautista as Undersecretary of
DOTC. Bautista was designated as Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport of the department under
Special Order No. 2006-171 dated October 23,
2006.
 On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of
then MARINA Administrator Suazo, Jr., Bautista
was designated as Officer-in-Charge, Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as
DOTC Undersecretary.
 Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity as taxpayer,
concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the instant
petition challenging the constitutionality of Bautista’s
appointment/designation, which is proscribed by the
prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and
assistants to hold any other office or employment.
 On January 5, 2009, during the pendency of this
petition, Bautista was appointed Administrator of the
MARINA vice Vicente T. Suazo, Jr. and she
assumed her duties and responsibilities as such on
February 2, 2009.
Whether or not the designation of respondent Bautista as
OIC of MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport to which she had
been appointed, violated the constitutional proscription
against dual or multiple offices for Cabinet Members and
their deputies and assistants. -yes
 The other objection raised by the respondent is that
the resolution of this case had been overtaken by
events considering the effectivity of respondent
Bautista’s appointment as MARINA Administrator
effective February 2, 2009 and her relinquishment
of her former position as DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport.
o In the present case, the mootness of the
petition does not bar its resolution. The
question of the constitutionality of the

President’s appointment or designation of
a Department Undersecretary as officer-in-
charge of an attached agency will arise in
every such appointment.
SC: Undersecretary Bautistas designation as MARINA
OIC falls under the stricter prohibition under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
o Resolution of the present controversy
hinges on the correct application of
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, which provides: Sec. 13. The
President, Vice-President, the Members of
the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise
provided in this Constitution, hold any
other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure,
directly or indirectly practice any other
profession, participate in any business, or
be financially interested in any contract
with, or in any franchise, or special
privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid
conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.
o On the other hand, Section 7, paragraph
(2), Article IX-B reads: Sec. 7. x x x Unless
otherwise allowed by law or the primary
functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or
employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries.
 Respondent Bautista being then the appointed
Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided
in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
another office is allowed by law or the primary functions
of the position. Neither was she designated OIC of
MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the exception
recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
 The Court similarly finds respondents’ theory that being
just a "designation," and temporary at that, respondent
Bautista was never really "appointed" as OIC
Administrator of MARINA, untenable.
 It must be stressed though that while the designation
was in the nature of an acting and temporary capacity,
the words "hold the office" were employed. Such
holding of office pertains to both appointment and
designation because the appointee or designate
performs the duties and functions of the office. To "hold"
an office means to "possess or occupy" the same, or "to
be in possession and administration," which implies
nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions
and duties of the office
 The disqualification laid down in Section 13, Article VII is
aimed at preventing the concentration of powers in the
Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and
their deputies and assistants.
43
BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
G.R. No. 191644 February 19, 2013
DENNIS A.B. FUNA, Petitioner,
vs.ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALBERTO C.
AGRA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CONCURRENT CAPACITIES AS
ACTING SECRETARY OF THE DOJ AND AS ACTING
SOLICITOR GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
LEANDRO R. MENDOZA, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, Respondents.
o The petitioner alleges that on March 1, 2010, PGMA
appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice;
that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated
Agra as the Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent
capacity;
o that on April 7, 2010, the petitioner, in his capacity
as a taxpayer, a concerned citizen and a lawyer,
commenced this suit to challenge the
constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments
or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution;
o that during the pendency of the suit, President
Aquino III appointed Atty. Cadiz as the Solicitor
General; and that Cadiz assumed as the Solicitor
General and commenced his duties as such on
August 5, 2010.
Did the designation of Agra as the Acting Secretary of
Justice, concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, violate the constitutional prohibition against dual or
multiple offices for the Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies and assistants? Yes. It was unconstitutional and
void for being in violation of the constitutional prohibition
under Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
o Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the
general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the
Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants.
o The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular
instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit:
the Vice-President being appointed as a member of
the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or
acting as President in those instances provided
under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII;
and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council
by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
o Agra could not validly hold any other office or
employment during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor
General, because the Constitution has not
otherwise so provided.
o It was of no moment that Agra’s designation was in
an acting or temporary capacity. To construe
differently is to "open the veritable floodgates of
circumvention of an important constitutional
disqualification of officials in the Executive
Department and of limitations on the President’s
power of appointment in the guise of temporary
designations of Cabinet Members, undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries as officers-in-charge of
government agencies, instrumentalities, or
government-owned or controlled corporations."

o According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v.
Elma, the only two exceptions against the
holding of multiple offices are: (1) those provided
for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article
VII, authorizing the Vice President to become a
member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by
Executive officials specified in Section 13, Article VII
without additional compensation in ex
officio capacities as provided by law and as
required by the primary functions of the officials’
offices.
o It is equally remarkable, therefore, that Agra’s
designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was
not in an ex officio capacity, by which he would
have been validly authorized to concurrently hold
the two positions due to the holding of one office
being the consequence of holding the other
o x x x. The term ex officio means "from office; by
virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived
from official character merely, not expressly
conferred upon the individual character, but rather
annexed to the official position." Ex officio likewise
denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority other than that conferred
by the office." An ex officio member of a board is
one who is a member by virtue of his title to a
certain office, and without further warrant or
appointment. x x x.
o Indeed, the powers and functions of the OSG are
neither required by the primary functions nor
included by the powers of the DOJ, and vice versa.
40
The OSG, while attached to the DOJ, is not a
41
constituent unit of the latter, as, in fact,
the Administrative Code of 1987 decrees that the
42
OSG is independent and autonomous. With the
43
enactment of Republic Act No. 9417, the Solicitor
General is now vested with a cabinet rank, and has
the same qualifications for appointment, rank,
prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and
privileges as those of the Presiding Justice of the
44
Court of Appeals.
o The persons cited in the constitutional provision are
the "Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants." These terms must be given their
common and general acceptation as referring to
the heads of the executive departments, their
undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries. Public officials given the rank
equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary, or
Assistant Secretary are not covered by the
prohibition, nor is the Solicitor General affected
thereby.
o It must be emphasized, however, that despite the
non-applicability of Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution to respondent Elma, he remains
covered by the general prohibition under Section 7,
Article IX-B and his appointments must still comply
with the standard of compatibility of officers laid
down therein; failing which, his appointments are
47
hereby pronounced in violation of the Constitution.
o Accordingly, he was not to be considered as a de
jure officer for the entire period of his tenure as the
Acting Secretary of Justice. That notwithstanding,
Agra was a de facto officer during his tenure as
Acting Secretary of Justice.
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BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
o In order to be clear, therefore, the Court holds that
all official actions of Agra as a de facto Acting
Secretary of Justice, were presumed valid, binding
and effective as if he was the officer legally
appointed and qualified for the office.
DE CASTRO v. JBC | March 17, 2010 | Bersamin
Petitioner: Arturo M. De Castro, Jaime N. Soriano,
Philippine Constitution Association (PHILCONSA)
Respondents: Judicial and Bar Council and PGMA
1
Article VII, Sec. 15 of the Constitution prohibiting the
President to make appointments two months before the
next Presidential election is not applicable to the
2
Judiciary. Article VIII, Sec. 4 (1) which provides that any
vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof is mandatory.
FACTS
● The forthcoming retirement of Chief Justice Puno
on May 17, 2010 (7 days after the Presidential
election led Congressman Matias V. Defensor (an
ex-officio member of the JBC) to address a letter to
the JBC requesting that the process for nominations
be commenced immediately.
● The JBC in its meeting en banc passed a resolution
that they unanimously agree to start the process of
filling up the position of Chief Justice Reynato Puno.
As a result the JBC opened the position of Chief
Justice for application or recommendation and
published its announcement for that purpose.
● Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” the 5 most senior of the
Associate Justices of the Court: Antonio Carpio,
Renato Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales,
Presbiterio J. Velasco, Jr, and Eduardo Nachura (
The last two declined their nominations). Other
candidates either applied or were nominated
o Candidates who accepted their nomination
w/o conditions: Renato Corona (SC),
Teresita Leonardo-De Castro (SC), Arturo
Brion(SC), Edilberto Sandoval
(Sandiganbayan)
o Candidates who accepted their nomination
w/ condition: Antonio Carpio (SC),
Conchita Carpio Morales (SC)
o Declining their nominations: Atty. Henry
Villarica, Atty. Gregorio Batiller
● In its meeting of Feb 8, the JBC resolved to proceed
to the next step of announcing the names of the ff
candidate to invite the public to file their sworn
complaint, written report or opposition if any:
Carpio, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Leonardo-De
Castro, Brion, Sandoval
1
Art. VII, Sec 15 – Two months immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of his term, a President or Acting President
shall not make appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
2
Art. VIII, Sec 4 (1) – The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief
Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall
be filled within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

● Although the JBC has already begun the process
for the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in
accordance with its rules, the JBC is not yet
decided on when to submit to the President the list
of nominees for the position due to the controversy
(whether this was covered by the Constitutional
prohibition prohibiting the President to make
appointments two before the next Presidential
elections)
NOTE: Valenzuela Case
● In this case, the Court held that prohibitions found in
Art VII Section 15 covered even judicial
appointments.
● Petitioners say that this case is valid precedent and
must be applied in the instant case
ISSUE: WON the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII
apply to appointments to fill a vacancy in the SC and other
appointments to the judiciary (NO)
● Two provisions are seemingly in conflict
Art. VII, Sec 15 – Two months immediately before
the next presidential elections and up to the end of
his term, a President or Acting President shall not
make appointments, except temporary
appointments to executive positions when
continued vacancies therein will prejudice public
service or endanger public safety.
Art. VIII, Sec 4 (1) – The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate
Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in
division of three, five, or seven Members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof
❖ The Court held that the President can appoint the
successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his
retirement on the ground that the prohibition
against Presidential appointments under Art.
VII, Sec. 15 does not extend to appointments in
the judiciary.
1. Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Art VII, Sec 15, to the appointment of
SC Members, they could have explicitly done so.
a. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Art VII Section 15
as being equally applicable to the appointment
of SC Members in Article VIII itself
b. The exchanges during the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission show that the filling
of a vacancy in the SC within the 90-day period
was a true mandate of the President
o The usage of the word “shall” imposes on
the President the imperative duty to make an
appointment within 90 days from the
occurrence of the vacancy. The failure by the
President to so will be a clear disobedience
to the Constitution.
c. Valenzuela Case (REVERSED!!!!)
o Reversed as it does not firmly rest on the
deliberations of the Constitutional
Commissions
o The 90-day limitation fixed in Art VIII Sec
4(1) establishes the definite mandate for the
President as appointing power and cannot be
45
BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
defeated by a mere judicial interpretation in
Valenzuela.
2. Art. VII Sec. 15 also does NOT apply to other
appointments in the judiciary.
a. One of the reasons for the adoption of this
Section 15 Art VII was to eliminate midnight
appointments from being made by an outgoing
Chief Executive. (As enunciated in the Aytona
case)
b. The framers did not need to extend the
prohibition to appointments in the Judiciary,
because their establishment of the JBC and
their subjecting the nomination and screening
of candidates for judicial positions to the
unhurried and deliberate prior process of
the JBC ensured that there would no longer
be midnight appointments to the Judiciary.
c. Even candidates for judicial positions at any
level backed by people influential with the
President could not always be assured of being
recommended for the consideration of the
President, because they first had to undergo
the vetting of the JBC and pass muster there.
d. Indeed, the creation of the JBC was precisely
intended to de-politicize the Judiciary by doing
away with the intervention of the Commission
on Appointments.
3. As was confirmed by Associate Justice Regalado,
the election ban had no application to appointments
to the Court of Appeals on the basis of the
Constitutional Commission’s records
4. Three sections in Article VII concern the appointing
powers of the President (sections 14, 15 and 16).
Section 14 and 16 refer only to appointments
within the Executive Department. HENCE
Section 15 must also apply only to the
Executive Department.
a. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that
every part of the statue must be interpreted
with reference to the context
b. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between
Section 14 and Section 16, if they intended
Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential
appointments.
o If that was their intention in respect of
appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if
only to be clear, would have easily and
surely inserted a similar prohibition in Article
VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.
5. If section 15 extends to appointments to the
judiciary, it would undermine the intent of the
Constitution of ensuing the independence of the
judicial department from the executive and
legislative
6. If the regular presidential elections are held on May
8, the period of the prohibition is 115 days. If such
elections are held on May 14, the period of the
prohibition is 109 days. Either period of the
prohibition is longer than the full mandatory 90-
day period.
a. The result is that there are at least 19
occasions (i.e., the difference between the
shortest possible period of the ban of 109 days
and the 90-day mandatory period for
appointments) in which the outgoing President
would be in no position to comply with the

constitutional duty to fill up a vacancy in the
Supreme Court. It is safe to assume that the
framers of the Constitution could not have
intended such an absurdity.
ISSUE: WON the Judiciary Act of 1948 can still address the
situation of having the next President appoint the successor
of Chief Justice (NO)
Section 12. Vacancy in Office of Chief Justice. —
In case of a vacancy in the office of Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court or of his inability to perform the
duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve
upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is removed, or
another Chief Justice is appointed and duly
qualified. This provision shall apply to every
Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of
Chief Justice.
1. To rely on Sec12 f the Judiciary Act is to forestall
the imperative need to appoint the next Chief
Justice the soonest.
a. Appointment by the President of the Chief
Justice is never in an acting capacity. The
framers intended the position to be permanent
and not temporary.
b. Sec 12 only responds to a rare situation in
which the new Chief Justice is not yet
appointed, or in which the incumbent Chief
Justice is unable to perform the duties and
powers of the office. It ought to be
remembered, however, that it was enacted
because the Chief Justice appointed under the
1935 Constitution was subject to the
confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments, and the confirmation process
might take longer than expected
c. The lack of any appointed occupant of the
office of Chief Justice harms the independence
of the Judiciary, because the Chief Justice is
the head of the entire Judiciary. With the entire
Supreme Court being the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal, the Chief Justice is the Chairman of
the Tribunal.
ISSUE: WON a writ of mandamus lie against the JBC (NO)
1.) Section 8(5) and Section 9, Article VIII mandate the
JBC to submit a list of at least three nominees to
the President for every vacancy in the Judiciary.
HOWEVER, Sec 4 (1) and Sec (9) of Art VIII
mandate the President to fill the vacancy in the
Supreme Court within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy, and within 90 days from the
submission of the list, in the case of the lower
courts.
2.) The 90-day period is directed at the President, not
at the JBC. Thus, the JBC should start the
process of selecting the candidates to fill the
vacancy in the Supreme Court before the
occurrence of the vacancy
3.) MINISTERIAL - The duty of the JBC to submit a list
of nominees before the start of the President’s
mandatory 90-day period to appoint
DISCRETIONARY - selection of the candidates
whose names will be in the list to be submitted to
the President
46
BY: JODELLE 
POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
4.) For mandamus to lie against the JBC, therefore,
there should be an unexplained delay on its part
in recommending nominees to the Judiciary, that
is, in submitting the list to the President.
G.R. No. 203372 June 16, 2015
ATTY. CHELOY E. VELICARIA-GARAFIL, Petitioner,
vs.OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT and HON. SOLICITOR
GENERAL JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
 The present consolidated cases involve four
petitions: G.R. No. 203372 with Atty. Cheloy E.
Velicaria-Garafil (Atty. Velicaria-Garafil), who was
appointed State Solicitor II at the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), as petitioner; G.R. No.
206290 with Atty. Dindo G. Venturanza (Atty.
Venturanza), who was appointed Prosecutor IV
(City Prosecutor) of Quezon City, as petitioner; G.R.
No. 209138 with Irma A. Villanueva (Villanueva),
who was appointed Administrator for Visayas of the
Board of Administrators of the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA), and Francisca B.
Rosquita (Rosquita), who was appointed
Commissioner of the National Commission of
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), as petitioners; and
G.R. No. 212030 with Atty. Eddie U. Tamondong
(Atty. Tamondong), who was appointed member of
the Board of Directors of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), as petitioner. All petitions
question the constitutionality of Executive Order No.
2 (EO 2) for being inconsistent with Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 Prior to the conduct of the May 2010 elections, then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (President
Macapagal-Arroyo) issued more than 800
appointments to various positions in several
government offices.
 The ban on midnight appointments in Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution reads:
 Two months immediately before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of his term,
a President or Acting President shall not make
appointments, except temporary appointments to
executive positions when continued vacancies
therein will prejudice public service or endanger
public safety.
 Thus, for purposes of the 2010 elections, 10 March
2010 was the cutoff date for valid appointments and
the next day, 11 March 2010, was the start of the
ban on midnight appointments. Section 15, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution recognizes as an
exception to the ban on midnight appointments only
"temporary appointments to executive positions
when continued vacancies therein will prejudice
public service or endanger public safety."
 None of the petitioners claim that their
appointments fall under this exception.
 On 30 June 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III
(President Aquino) took his oath of office as
President of the Republic of the Philippines. On 30
July 2010, President Aquino issued EO 2 recalling,
withdrawing, and revoking appointments issued by
President Macapagal-Arroyo which violated the
constitutional ban on midnight appointments.

(1) whether petitioners' appointments violate Section 15,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, --yes. All of petitioners'
appointments are midnight appointments and are
(2) whether EO 2 is constitutional. – is constitutional
 This ponencia and the dissent both agree that the
facts in all these cases show that "none of the
petitioners have shown that their appointment
papers (and transmittal letters) have been issued
41
(and released) before the ban." The dates of
receipt by the MRO, which in these cases are the
only reliable evidence of actual transmittal of the
appointment papers by President Macapagal-
Arroyo, are dates clearly falling during the
appointment ban. Thus, this ponencia and the
dissent both agree that all the appointments in
these cases are midnight appointments in violation
of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
 Any valid appointment, including one made under
the exception provided in Section 15, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution, must consist of the President
signing an appointee's appointment paper to a
vacant office, the official transmittal of the
appointment paper (preferably through the MRO),
receipt of the appointment paper by the appointee,
and acceptance of the appointment by the
appointee evidenced by his or her oath of office or
his or her assumption to office.
 During the deliberations for the 1987 Constitution,
then Constitutional Commissioner Hilario G. Davide,
Jr. referred to this Court's ruling in Aytona and
stated that his proposal seeks to prevent a
President, whose term is about to end, from
preempting his successor by appointing his own
people to sensitive positions.
 The following elements should always concur in the
making of a valid (which should be understood as
both complete and effective) appointment: (1)
authority to appoint and evidence of the exercise of
the authority; (2) transmittal of the appointment
paper and evidence of the transmittal; (3) a vacant
position at the time of appointment; and (4) receipt
of the appointment paper and acceptance of the
appointment by the appointee who possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications.
 Petitioners have failed to show compliance with all
four elements of a valid appointment. They cannot
prove with certainty that their appointment papers
were transmitted before the appointment ban took
effect. On the other hand, petitioners admit that they
took their oaths of office during the appointment
ban.
***RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS v. REYES (missing)
ALMARIO v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 189028 July 16, 2013 (701 SCRA 269)
FACTS: The National Artists Awards Committee. and the
NCCA decided to team up and jointly administer the National
Artists Award. There were three deliberations for determining
the nominees and on the final deliberation, a final list of four
names was agreed upon namely: Manuel Conde, Ramon
Santos, Lazaro Francisco and Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz.
47
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION
They submitted this recommendation to the President.
According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was
referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on
Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly
received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups
and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents.
Acting on this recommendation, a series of Proclamations
were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico Aguilar-
Alcuaz and private respondents, Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Masa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists.
Hence, the petition. All of the petitioners claim that former
President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in
disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in
substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation
Panels.
ISSUE: Whether or not the act of the President amounted to
grave abuse of discretion with regards to the violation of the
right to equal protection
 In view of the various stages of deliberation in the
selection process and as a consequence of his/her
duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the
discretion of the President in the matter of the Order
of National Artists is confined to the names
submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP
Boards. This means that the President could not
have considered conferment of the Order of
National Artists on any person not considered and
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
That is the proper import of the provision of
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA
and the CCP "shall advise the President on the
conferment of the Order of National Artists."
Applying this to the instant case, the former
President could not have properly considered
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa
and Moreno, as their names were not
recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
Otherwise, not only will the stringent selection and
meticulous screening process be rendered futile,
the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP
Board of Trustees under relevant laws to administer
the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the
rules and regulations to guide its deliberations,
formulate and implement policies and plans, and
undertake any and all necessary measures in that
regard will also become meaningless.
 There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is
(1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
86
personal bias.
 There was a violation of the equal protection clause
87
of the Constitution when the former President
gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno.1âwp The
manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines and
processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an
arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno.
The conferment of the Order of National Artists on
said respondents was therefore made with grave
abuse of discretion and should be set aside.

 The Court simply declares that, as the former
President committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July
6, 2009, the said proclamations are invalid.
However, nothing in this Decision should be read as
a disqualification on the part of respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno to
be considered for the honor of National Artist in the
future, subject to compliance with the laws, rules
and regulations governing said award.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in
PART. Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July
6, 2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-
Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco
Mañosa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as
National Artists are declared INVALID
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, vs. FULGENCIO
S. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.
The principal question raised in this petition for review is
whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
 Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner Salvacion A.
Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog
City) and three other accused, of the complex crime
of estafa thru falsification of public documents. SC
affirmed the decision
 She then filed a MR but while said motion was
pending, she was extended on December 17, 1984
by then President Marcos absolute pardon which
she accepted on December 21, 1984.
 By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the
Calbayog City treasurer requesting that she be
restored to her former post as assistant city
treasurer since the same was still vacant.
 Petitioner's basic theory is that the general rules on
pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the
fact that she was extended executive clemency
while her conviction was still pending appeal in this
Court. There having been no final judgment of
conviction, her employment therefore as assistant
city treasurer could not be said to have been
terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that
final judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty
of forfeiture of office did not attach and the status of
her employment remained "suspended." More
importantly, when pardon was issued before the
final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because
there was no offense to speak of. In effect, the
President has declared her not guilty of the crime
4
charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.
1. Is Monsanto entitled to backpay? NO. A pardon
19
looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It
makes no amends for the past. This would explain
why petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled
to receive backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
2. Is a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of
a new appointment? No. For petitioner Monsanto,
this is the bottom line: the absolute disqualification
or ineligibility from public office forms part of the
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punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code
for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is
clear from the authorities referred to that when her
guilt and punishment were expunged by her pardon,
this particular disability was likewise removed.
Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment
to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and
suitability for the public post, the facts constituting
her offense must be and should be evaluated and
taken into account to determine ultimately whether
she can once again be entrusted with public funds.
Stated differently, the pardon granted to petitioner
has resulted in removing her disqualification from
holding public employment but it cannot go beyond
that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.
3. May petitioner be exempt from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence?
No. Petitioner has sought exemption from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by
the sentence. The Court cannot oblige her. Civil
liability arising from crime is governed by the
Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, or for any reason the sentence
is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioner's civil liability may only be
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the
Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of
27
creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
G.R. No. 206666 January 21, 2015
ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, Petitioner,
ALFREDO S. LIM Petitioner-Intervenor,
vs. COMELEC and JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, Respondents.
 Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for
Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec
stating that Estrada is disqualified to run for public
office because of his conviction for plunder
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification.
Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local
Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
 The Comelec dismissed the petition for
disqualification holding that President Estrada’s
right to seek public office has been effectively
restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo.
 Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013
elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second
highest votes, intervened and sought to disqualify
Estrada for the same ground as the contention of
Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as
Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE: WON former President Joseph Estrada may run for
public office despite having been convicted of the crime of
plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to hold public office?
HELD:
 Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that
fully restored all his civil and political rights, which

naturally includes the right to seek public elective
office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable,
objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact
conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal
Code.
 The pardon itself does not explicitly impose a
condition or limitation, considering the unqualified
use of the term “civil and political rights”as being
restored. Jurisprudence educates that a preamble is
not an essential part of an act as it is an
introductory or preparatory clause that explains the
reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by
the word “whereas.” Whereas clauses do not form
part of a statute because, strictly speaking, they are
not part of the operative language of the statute. In
this case, the whereas clause at issue is not an
integral part of the decree of the pardon, and
therefore, does not by itself alone operate to make
the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity
contingent upon the fulfilment of the aforementioned
commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
 The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code. A close scrutiny of the
text of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada shows that both the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties
are included in the pardon. The sentence which
states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and
political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
indubitable from the text of the pardon that the
accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly
remitted together with the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua.
 The disqualification of former President Estrada
under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to
Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his
acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to
him While it may be apparent that the proscription
in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute
terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal
escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or
amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows
any person who has been granted plenary pardon
or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an
offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run
for and hold any public office, whether local or
national position.
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G.R. No. 187298 July 03, 2012
JAMAR M. KULAYAN, TEMOGEN S. TULAWIE, HJI. MOH.
YUSOP ISMI, JULHAJAN AWADI, and SPO1 SATTAL H.
JADJULI, Petitioners,
vs.GOV. ABDUSAKUR M. TAN, in his capacity as
Governor of Sulu; GEN. JUANCHO SABAN, COL.
EUGENIO CLEMEN PN, P/SUPT. JULASIRIM KASIM and
P/SUPT. BIENVENIDO G. LATAG, in their capacity as
officers of the Phil. Marines and Phil. National Police,
respectively, Respondents.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the
Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise
by another official, even if he is the local chief executive,
is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation
of Section 465 of the Local Government Code.
 Three members from the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the
vicinity of the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.
Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean
Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water
sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when
they were seized by three armed men who were
later confirmed to be members of the Abu Sayyaf
Group (ASG). A Local Crisis Committee, later
renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee
(Committee) was then formed to investigate the
kidnapping incident. The Committee convened
under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur
Mahail Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
 Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of
2009, declaring a state of emergency in the
province of Sulu. The Proclamation cited the
kidnapping incident as a ground for the said
declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant
to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also
invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code
of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which bestows on the
Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural
disasters and calamities, and to call upon the
appropriate national law enforcement agencies to
suppress disorder and lawless violence. In the
Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the
Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up
checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general
search and seizures including arrests, and other
actions necessary to ensure public safety.
 Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that
Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and
thus null and void, for violating Sections 1 and 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the
President sole authority to exercise emergency
powers and calling-out powers as the chief
executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief
of the armed forces
ISSUE: WON a governor can exercise the calling-out
powers of a President? NO.
Only the President is vested with calling-out powers, as the
commander-in-chief of the Republic
 One executive, one commander-in-chief
o The first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the Executive
Department, begins with the enunciation of
the principle that "The executive power

shall be vested in a President of the
Philippines." This means that the President
of the Philippines is the Executive of the
Government of the Philippines, and no
other. Corollarily, it is only the President,
as Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided
under Section 23, Article VI, of the
Constitution, as well as what became
known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof.
 ii. The exceptional character of Commander-in-
Chief powers dictate that they are exercised by one
president
o it is clear that the framers never intended
for local chief executives to exercise
unbridled control over the police in
emergency situations. This is without
prejudice to their authority over police units
in their jurisdiction as provided by law, and
their prerogative to seek assistance from
the police in day to day situations, as
contemplated by the Constitutional
Commission. But as a civilian agency of
the government, the police, through the
NAPOLCOM, properly comes within, and
is subject to, the exercise by the President
53
of the power of executive control.
 The provincial governor does not possess the same
calling-out powers as the President
o Given the foregoing, respondent provincial
governor is not endowed with the power to
call upon the armed forces at his own
bidding. In issuing the assailed
proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his
authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed
Forces, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers
contemplated under the Constitution is
exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief
executive, is ultra vires, and may not be
justified by the invocation of Section 465 of
the Local Government Code, as will be
discussed subsequently.
Section 465 of the Local Government Code cannot be
invoked to justify the powers enumerated under
Proclamation 1-09
 But a closer look at the said proclamation shows
that there is no provision in the Local Government
Code nor in any law on which the broad and
unwarranted powers granted to the Governor may
be based.
 Respondents cannot rely on paragraph 1,
subparagraph (vii) of Article 465 above, as the said
provision expressly refers to calamities and
disasters, whether man-made or natural. The
governor, as local chief executive of the province, is
certainly empowered to enact and implement
emergency measures during these occurrences.
But the kidnapping incident in the case at bar
cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster.
Respondents cannot find any legal mooring under
this provision to justify their actions.
 Paragraph 2, subparagraph (vi) of the same
provision is equally inapplicable for two reasons.
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First, the Armed Forces of the Philippines does not
fall under the category of a "national law
enforcement agency," to which the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments
belong.
 Its mandate is to uphold the sovereignty of the
Philippines, support the Constitution, and defend
the Republic against all enemies, foreign and
domestic. Its aim is also to secure the integrity of
60
the national territory.
 Second, there was no evidence or even an
allegation on record that the local police forces were
inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend
the violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse
of the provincial governor was to ask the assistance
of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government,
or such other authorized officials, for the assistance
of national law enforcement agencies.
 The Local Government Code does not involve the
diminution of central powers inherently vested in the
National Government, especially not the
prerogatives solely granted by the Constitution to
the President in matters of security and defense.
Provincial governor is not authorized to convene CEF
 Pursuant to the national policy to establish one
police force, the organization of private citizen
armies is proscribed.
 The defense and security of the regions shall be the
responsibility of the National Government."
 the Constitution does not authorize the organization
of private armed groups similar to the CEF
convened by the respondent Governor.
G.R. No. 190259 June 7, 2011
DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG,
REGIE SAHALI-GENERALE Petitioners,
vs.HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary
of the Department of Interior and Local Government and
alter-ego of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, and
anyone acting in his stead and on behalf of the
President of the Philippines, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (AFP), or any of their units operating in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, or any of their units
operating in ARMM, Respondents.
 On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome
massacre of 57 men and women, including some
news reporters, then PGMA issued Proclamation
1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and
Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a
state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the
PNP to undertake such measures as may be
allowed by the Constitution and by law to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the
named places.
 Three days later or on November 27, President
Arroyo also issued AO 273 transferring supervision
of the ARMM from the Office of the President to the
DILG. But, due to issues raised over the
terminology used in AO 273, the President issued
AO 273-A amending the former, by delegating
instead of transferring supervision of the ARMM
to the DILG.
 ARMM officials, filed this petition for prohibition
under Rule 65. They alleged that the proclamation
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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW – CASES COMPILATION

and the orders empowered the DILG Secretary to
take over ARMMs operations and seize the regional
governments powers, in violation of the principle of
local autonomy. The President gave the DILG
Secretary the power to exercise, not merely
administrative supervision, but control over the
ARMM since the latter could suspend ARMM
officials and replace them. They claimed that the
President had no factual basis for declaring a state
of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan
Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical
violent incidents occurred. The deployment of
troops and the taking over of the ARMM constitutes
an invalid exercise of the Presidents emergency
powers. Petitioners asked that Proclamation 1946
as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared
unconstitutional and that respondents DILG
Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from
implementing them.
1. Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273
and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy under
Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, and Section 1,
Article V of the Expanded ARMM Organic Act;
2. Whether or not President Arroyo invalidly
exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP
and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
City; and
3. Whether or not the President had factual bases
for her actions.
congressional authority to exercise the
same.
 Three. The Presidents call on the armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from
the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution, which provides. SECTION 18.
The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. x x x
o Progress reports also indicated that there
was movement in these places of both
high-powered firearms and armed men
sympathetic to the two clans (Ampatuan
vs. Mangudadatu). Thus, to pacify the
peoples fears and stabilize the situation,
the President had to take preventive
action. She called out the armed forces to
control the proliferation of loose firearms
and dismantle the armed groups that
continuously threatened the peace and
security in the affected places.
o Since petitioners are not able to
demonstrate that the proclamation of state
of emergency in the subject places and the
calling out of the armed forces to prevent
or suppress lawless violence there have
clearly no factual bases, the Court must
respect the President’s actions.

We dismiss the petition.

 One. Violation of the principle of local autonomy
o The DILG Secretary did not take over
control of the powers of the ARMM. After
law enforcement agents took respondent
Governor of ARMM into custody for
alleged complicity in the Maguindanao
massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor,
petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed
the vacated post pursuant to the rule on
succession found in Article VII, Section 12,
of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor
Adiong named the then Speaker of the
ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner
Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-
Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did
not take over the administration or
operations of the ARMM.
 Two. Petitioners contend that the President
unlawfully exercised emergency powers when she
ordered the deployment of AFP and PNP personnel
[16]
in the places mentioned in the proclamation. But
such deployment is not by itself an exercise of
emergency powers as understood under Section 23
(2), Article VI of the Constitution.
o The President did not proclaim a national
emergency, only a state of emergency in
the three places mentioned. And she did
not act pursuant to any law enacted by
Congress that authorized her to exercise
extraordinary powers. The calling out of
the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence in such places is a power
that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a

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