Rosales vs.
Rosales is called to succession by law because of his blood
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu the question raised is whether the
widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit
from the latter, her mother-in-law. In the course of the
intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated
June 16, 1972 declaring the following individuals the legal
heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective share
of the estate — Fortunato T. Rosales (husband) 1/4;
Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox Rosales,
1/4; and Antonio Rosales (son), 1/4. This declaration was
reiterated by the trial court in its Order dated February 4,
1975. These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales
insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as
the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of
the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her
mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox
Rosales.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for our
resolution. First — is a widow (surviving spouse) an
intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second — are the
Orders of the trial court which excluded the widow from
getting a share of the estate in question final as against the
said widow? Our answer to the first question is in the
negative. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2)
groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right, and
those who inherit by the right of representation. 1
Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided
for in the Civil Code, 2 or by the right of representation
provided for in Article 981 of the same law. There is no
provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow
(surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-
law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which
entitles her to inherit from her mother-in-law either by her
own right or by the right of representation. The provisions
of the Code which relate to the order of intestate
succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with
meticulous exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent,
with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an
intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our
observation. If the legislature intended to make the
surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent -in- law, it
would have so provided in the Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the
deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse
(widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not
apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving
spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of
the parent-in- law. By the same token, the provision of
Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said
Article confirms that the estate contemplated therein is the
estate of the deceased spouse.
The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate estate
proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V.
Rosales, the mother-in-law of the petitioner. It is from the
estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales
draws a share of the inheritance by the right of
representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales
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relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio
Rosales (the person represented) who predeceased his
grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father
would have succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same
right of representation as she has no filiation by blood with
her mother-in-law. Petitioner however contends that at the
time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had
an inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra
Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may, said right of
her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is
their son Macikequerox Rosales who succeeded from Petra
Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed
from his deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
On the basis of the foregoing observations and
conclusions, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the
second question posed by the petitioner. Accordingly, it is
our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving
spouse is not an intestate heir of his or her parent-in-law.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.
ROSALES vs ROSALES
Facts:
Irenea Rosales, wife of Carterio Rosales insisted on getting
a share from the estate in her capacity as surviving spouse
from the estate of her mother-in-law.
Issue:
Whether or not a daughter-in-law is entitled to the estate of
a her parent-in-law in her capacity as the surviving spouse
of a son who predeceased his mother;
Ruling:
Classification of intestate succession: intestate successors
re classified into two:
1. Those who inherit by their own right;
2. Those who inherit by right of representation (Art.
981)
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a
a widow is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law;
Art. 887 (961) refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in
which case the surviving spouse is a compulsory heir;
Surviving spouse is a third party in the estate of a parent-i-
law;
The basis for right of representation is blood relationship;
Inchoate right is extinguished by death of an heir;
3. Order of the share in the intestate succession

Art. 962. In every inheritance, the relatives nearest in

degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of
representation when it properly takes place;

Relatives in the same degree shall inherit equal shares,

subject to the provisions of Article 1006

· With respect to relatives of the full blood and half

blood,

· And or Article 987, paragraph 2, concerning

division between the paternal and maternal lines;

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DIZON-RIVERA VS. ESTELA DIZON
Facts:
On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a
widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by
seven compulsory heirs, to wit, six legitimate children
named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon,
Marina Dizon (herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon
and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named
Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of
Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the said
decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except
Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the oppositors-
appellants.
The deceased testatrix left a last will executed on February
2, 1960 and written in the Pampango dialect. Named
beneficiaries in her will were the above-named
compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate
grandchildren, namely Pablo Rivera, Jr., Gilbert D. Garcia,
Cayetano Dizon, Francisco Rivera, Agripina Ayson, Jolly
Jimenez and Laureano Tiambon.
In her will, the testatrix divided, distributed and disposed
of all her properties appraised at P1,801,960.00 (except
two small parcels of land appraised at P5,849.60,
household furniture valued at P2,500.00, a bank deposit in
the sum of P409.95 and ten shares of Pampanga Sugar
Development Company valued at P350.00) among her
above- named heirs. The lower court, after hearing,
sustained and approved the executrix' project of partition,
ruling that "(A)rticles 906 and 907 of the New Civil Code
specifically provide that when the legitime is impaired or
prejudiced, the same shall be completed and satisfied.
While it is true that this process has been followed and
adhered to in the two projects of partition, it is observed
that the executrix and the oppositors differ in respect to the
source from which the portion or portions shall be taken in
order to fully restore the impaired legitime. The
proposition of the oppositors, if upheld, will substantially
result in a distribution of intestacy, which is in
controversion of Article 791 of the New Civil Code"
adding that "the testatrix has chosen to favor certain heirs
in her will for reasons of her own, cannot be doubted. This
is legally permissible within the limitation of the law
Issue:
Whether use of the words "I bequeath" in her assignment
or distribution of her real properties to the respective heirs
are in the nature of devises of real property
Ruling:
For the adjudications and assignments in the
testatrix' will of specific properties to specific heirs cannot
be considered all devises, for it clearly appear from the
whole context of the will and the disposition by the
testatrix of her whole estate (save for some small
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properties of little value already noted at the beginning of
this opinion) that her clear intention was to partition her
whole estate through her will. The repeated use of the
words "I bequeath" in her testamentary dispositions
acquire no legal significance, such as to convert the same
into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half
disposable portion of the estate. Furthermore, the testatrix'
intent that her testamentary dispositions were by way of
adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere
devisees, and that said dispositions were therefore on
account of the respective legitimes of the compulsory heirs
is expressly borne out in the fourth paragraph of her will,
immediately following her testamentary adjudications in
the third paragraph in this wise: "FOURTH: I likewise
command that in case any of those I named as my heirs in
this testament any of them shall die before I do, his forced
heirs under the law enforced at the time of my death shall
inherit the properties I bequeath to said deceased."
The testamentary dispositions of the testatrix, being
dispositions in favor of compulsory heirs, do not have to
be taken only from the free portion of the estate, as
contended, for the second paragraph of Article 842 of the
Civil Code precisely provides that "One who has
compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he
does not contravene the provisions of this Code with
regard to the legitime of said heirs." And even going by
oppositors' own theory of bequests, the second paragraph
of Article 912 Civil Code covers precisely the case of the
executrix-appellee, who admittedly was favored by the
testatrix with the large bulk of her estate in providing that
"The devisee who is entitled to a legitime may retain the
entire property, provided its value does not exceed that of
the disposable portion and of the share pertaining to him as
legitime." For "diversity of apportionment is the usual
reason for making a testament; otherwise, the decedent
might as well die intestate." Fundamentally, of course, the
dispositions by the testatrix constituted a partition by will,
which by mandate of Article 1080 of the Civil Code and of
the other cited codal provisions upholding the primacy of
the testator's last will and testament, have to be respected
insofar as they do not prejudice the legitime of the other
compulsory heirs.
Adjudication:
ACCORDINGLY, the orders appealed from are
hereby affirmed.
DIZON – RIVERA VS DIZON
· Testatrix was survived by 7 compulsory heirs and 7
other legitimate grandchildren;
· The supposed legitime of each of the seven
compulsory heirs amounted to P129,362.11.
· Marina and Tomas received more than their legitime
thus Marina and Tomas adjudicated to the other heirs their
legitime completed by the giving of cash.

· Oppositors contend that the estate first be divided

into half. The supposed devises bequeathed be
proportionately reduced while the other half be divided as
1/7 each to represent as legitimes.

Issue:

Whether or not devises bequeathed by the testatrix already

constitute as legitimes.

Held:

· ART. 906. Any compulsory heir to whom the

testator has left by any title less than the legitime
belonging to him may demand that the same be fully
satisfied.

· ART. 907. Testamentary dispositions that impair

or diminish the legitime of the compulsory heirs shall be
reduced on petition of the same, insofar as they may be
inofficious or excessive.

· This was properly complied with in the executrix-

appellee's project of partition, wherein the five oppositors-
appellants were adjudicated the properties respectively
distributed and assigned to them by the testatrix in her
will, and the differential to complete their respective
legitimes of P129,362.11 each were taken from the cash
and/or properties of the executrix-appellee, Marina, and
their co-oppositor-appellant, Tomas, who admittedly were
favored by the testatrix and received in the partition by
will more than their respective legitimes.

· Oppositors' proposal would amount substantially to

a distribution by intestacy and pro tanto nullify the
testatrix' will, contrary to Article 791 of the Civil Code. It
would further run counter to the provisions of Article 1091
of the Civil Code that "(A) partition legally made confers
upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property
adjudicated to him."

· A partition legally made confers upon each heir the

exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him'
(Article 1091, New Civil Code), from the death of her
ancestors, subject to rights and obligations of the latter,
and, she cannot be deprived of her rights thereto except by
the methods provided for by law (Arts. 657, 659, and 661,
Civil Code).

· The repeated use of the words "I bequeath" in her

testamentary dispositions acquire no legal significance,
such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely
from the free one-half disposable portion of the estate.

4|Page
De Roma v. CA
FACTS:
1. Candelaria de Roma had two legally adopted daughters,
Buhay de Roma and Rosalinda de Roma. She died
intestate on April 30, 1971, and administration
proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance
of Laguna by the private respondent as guardian of
Rosalinda. Buhay was appointed administratrix and in due
time filed an inventory of the estate. This was opposed by
Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties earlier
donated by Candelaria to Buhay, and the fruits thereof, had
not been included.1
2. The properties in question consisted of seven parcels of
coconut land worth P10,297.50.2 There is no dispute
regarding their evaluation; what the parties cannot agree
upon is whether these lands are subject to collation. The
private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably
to Article 1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part,
citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate
because the decedent prohibited such collation and the
donation was not officious.
The two articles provide as follows:
Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with
other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the
estate any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent during the lifetime of the latter, by way
of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it
may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Article 1062. Collation shall not take place among
compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly
provided, or if the donor should repudiate the inheritance,
unless the donation should be reduced as inofficious.
3. The trial court resolved the issue in favor of the
petitioner. The donation did not impair the legitimes of the
two adopted daughters and such donation was imputed to
the free portion of Candelaria’s estate. The CA reversed
the decision holding that the deed of donation contained no
express prohibition to collate as an exception to Art. 1962.
It ordered the collation and the equal division of the net
estate of the decedent, including the donated property
between Buhay and Rosalinda.
4. The deed of donation stated:
“ipinagkakaloob at inililipat sa nabanggit na
BUHAY DE ROMA, sa kanyang mga kahalili at
tagapagmana, sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli, ang lahat ng mga lagay ng lupa na
sinasabi sa itaas, sa ilalim ng kasunduan na ngayon pa ay
siya na ang nagmamay-aring tunay ng mga lupang ito at
kanya nang maaring ipalipat ang mga hoja declaratoria ng
mga lupang ito sa kanyang pangalan, datapwa't
samantalang ako ay nabubuhay, ay ako rin ang
makikinabang sa mga mapuputi at mamomosesion sa mga
nasabing lupa;
IKATLO. Na pinagtibay ko na ako ay marami pang ibang
mga pag-aari sa sapat pang aking ikabuhay at sa
pagbibigay kong ito ay hindi masisira ang legitimate ng
mga tao na dapat magmana sa akin, sapagkat ang mga
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lupang sinasabi sa itaas ay bahagui ng aking kabuhayan na
ako ay may layang ipamigay kahit na kaninong tao na
kung tawagin ay Libre Disposicion.”
ISSUE: WON there was an express prohibition to collate
HELD: No express prohibition to collate.
1. The intention to exempt from collation should be
expressed plainly and equivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Art. 1962. Anything less than
such express prohibition will not suffice under the clear
language of Art. 1062. The suggestion that there was an
implied prohibition because the properties donated were
imputable to the free portion of the decedent’s estate
merits little consideration. Imputation is not the question
here, nor is it claimed that the disputed donation is
officious.
2. The fact that a donation is irrevocable does not
necessarily exempt the subject thereof from the collation
required under Art. 1061. We surmise that We agree with
the respondent court that there is nothing in the above
provisions expressly prohibiting the collation of the
donated properties. As the said court correctly observed,
the phrase "sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli" merely described the donation as
"irrevocable" and should not be construed as an express
prohibition against collation.6 The fact that a donation is
irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the subject thereof
from the collation required under Article 1061.
3. We surmise from the use of such terms as "legitime"
and "free portion" in the deed of donation that it was
prepared by a lawyer, and we may also presume he
understood the legal consequences of the donation being
made. It is reasonable to suppose, given the precise
language of the document, that he would have included
therein an express prohibition to collate if that had been
the donor's intention.
4. The intention to exempt from collation should be
expressed plainly and unequivocally as an exception to the
general rule announced in Article 1062. Absent such a
clear indication of that intention, we apply not the
exception but the rule, which is categorical enough.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is
AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.
DE ROMA VS CA
FACTS:
· Testatrix has 2 legally adopted daughters, Buhay
and Rosalinda.
· Testatrix died intestate and Buhay was appointed
administratrix.
· Rosalinda opposed on the ground that certain
properties donated by Testatrix to Buhay were not
collated.
· Buhay claimed that under Art. 1062, such properties
were not subject to collation if the donor should have so
expressly provided.
· Lower court ruled in favor of Buhay since donation
expressly prohibited collation, and such can be
accommodated without impairing the legitimes and to be
imputed on the free portion;
· CA reversed decision;

Held:

· Nothing in the above provisions expressly prohibit

collation;
· The phrase “sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na
mababawing muli…” merely described the donation as
irrevocable;
· The fact that such donation was irrevocable does not
exempt it from being subject to collation;

6|Page
LOCSIN VS CA 206 SCRA 383 Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may
not invoke:
· Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament
instituting his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir Art. 750. The donation may comprehend all the present
of all his properties. The spouses being childless, had property of the donor or part thereof, provided he reserves,
agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have in full ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for the
died should revert to their respective sides of the family, support of himself, and of all relatives who, at the time of
i.e., Mariano's properties would go to his "Locsin the acceptance of the donation, are by law entitled to be
relatives" (i.e., brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces), supported by the donor. Without such reservation, the
and those of Catalina to her "Jaucian relatives." donation shall be reduced on petition of any person
· Don Mariano relied on Doña Catalina to carry out affected. (634a)
the terms of their compact, hence, nine (9) years after his
death, Doña Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation
or assignment, Don Mariano's as well as her own,
properties to their respective nephews and nieces. She
made the sales and donation of properties which she had
received from her husband's estate, to his Locsin nephews
and nieces.
· In 1989, or six (6) years after Doña Catalina's
demise, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who had
already received their legacies and hereditary shares from
her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court of
Legaspi City to recover the properties which she had
conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that
the conveyances were inofficious, without consideration,
and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession.
Those who were closest to Doña Catalina did not join the
action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the nephews and nieces of Doña Catalina J.

Vda. de Locsin, are entitled to inherit the properties which
she had already disposed of more than ten (10) years
before her death.

HELD:

· They are not entitled since those properties did not

form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., "the property and
transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of
(the decedent's) death and those which have accrued
thereto since the opening of the succession."
· The rights to a person's succession are transmitted
from the moment of his death, and do not vest in his heirs
until such time.
· Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or
conveyed to other persons during her lifetime no longer
formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which
her heirs may lay claim. Had she died intestate, only the
property that remained in her estate at the time of her death
devolved to her legal heirs;
· Even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as
donations, the right arising under certain circumstances to
impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a
decedent's gifts inter vivos does not inure to the
respondents since neither they nor the donees are
compulsory (or forced) heirs.
· Said respondents are not her compulsory heirs, and
it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were
no legitimes that could conceivably be impaired by any
transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the
respondents had was an expectancy that in nowise
restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate
subject only to the limitation set forth in Art. 750, Civil

7|Page
Manongsong v. Estimo

Petitioner Milagros Manongsong, joined by her husband,

filed an action for partition of a parcel of land located in
San Jose Street, Manuyo Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Petitioner
claimed that Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of the
property by inheritance, more specifically as the heir of her
father, Vicente Lopez. According to petitioner, Agatona
Guevarra was the original owner of the said property and
that upon her death, her children inherited the property.
Each of the children, including Vicente Lopez, the father
of petitioner, inherited from her one-fifth interest in the
property. Respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and
Felomena Jumaquio Estimo (Jumaquio sisters), daughters
of Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio, opposed petitioners' claim
and contended that Justina Navarro, the mother of Agatona
Guevarra, sold the property to the latter's daughter
Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio. Both parties presented tax
declarations and the testimonies of witnesses. However,
the Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized
KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA dated 11 October
1957 between Justina Navarro, vendor, and Enriqueta
Lopez-Jumaquio, vendee, which controverted petitioners'
claim of co-ownership. After trial on the merits, the trial
court ruled in favor of the petitioners. It held that the
Kasulatan was void because the property conveyed was
conjugal at the time it was sold to Enriqueta Lopez
Jumaquio. Hence, the compulsory heirs of Guevarra
cannot be deprived of their legitimes. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the trial
court and affirmed the validity of the Kasulatan.

The Court did not agree with the trial court. It found no
basis for applying the presumption in favor of the conjugal
partnership. There was no evidence presented to establish
that Navarro acquired the property during her marriage.
According to the Court proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. On the
contrary, the Tax Declaration showed that, as far back as
in 1949, the property was declared solely in Navarro's
name. This tends to support the argument that the property
was not conjugal.

There was also no basis, for the trial court's declaration

that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the
compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. When
the disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no
diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of
values. Thus, since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence
of greater weight which petitioners failed to refute by
clear and convincing evidence, the Court held that
petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that the property belonged to Guevarra's
estate. There was, therefore, no legal basis for
petitioners' complaint for partition of the property.

8|Page