THINKING THROUGH GENDER AND SCIENCE WORKSHOP

Queen’s University Belfast

25 October 2006

Monstrous Inventions: The Ethics and Trauma of Scientific Discovery

Sara Ramshaw
Queen’s University Belfast
School of Law

In an attempt to link research I am currently engaged in on Derrida, jazz

improvisation and law with the subject of this workshop, namely gender and science, this

paper explores the limits and possibilities of scientific discovery in relation to gender

through the figure of the “monster”.

The metaphor of the “monster” was brought into feminist science and technology

studies through the work of Donna Haraway (Lykke 5) and both Rosi Braidotti, the guest

speaker from last night, and Margrit Shildrik, the organiser of this workshop, have

written on the subject of monstrosity. Although I do not want to simplify or reduce the
1
differences between their theoretical approaches, in the interests of time, I wish to

simply focus on how, for both these feminists, the monster signifies hybridity and

heterogeneity. It is “neither wholly self nor wholly other” (Shildrick Embodying 3);

1
In her article, “Signs of Wonder and Traces of Doubt” (1996), for example, Braidotti “traces genealogies
of discourses on monsters in the premodern science of teratology, which linked monsters to mothers
through the issue of biological reproduction and the role of maternal imagination in monstrous births”
(Lykke 1996: 8). She explores the “racialization of the monstrous body” (Braidotti “Signs” 145) and
demonstrates how the persistence of “racial and racist overtones in teratological discourses” (149) intersect
with the “continuous emphasis on controlling and disciplining the woman’s body” (149).
For Shildrick, as is explained in her book, Embodying the Monster: Encounters with the
Vulnerable Self (2002), the monster cannot be “fully containable within the binary structure of the western
logos” (Shildrick Embodying 1). Instead, the monstrous “signal[s] a transformation of the relation between
self and other such that the encounter with the strange is not a discrete event but the constant condition of
becoming” (1). In her work, Shildrick “contest[s] the binary that opposes the monstrous to the normal” (3)
and proposes a “new form of ethics that answers more fully to the multiplicity of embodied difference” (3),
thereby “undo[ing] the singular category of the monster” (3).
“neither a total stranger nor completely familiar” (Braidotti “Signs” 141). It “exists in an
2
in-between zone” (141), solely as “paradox” (141) or aporia.

It is here that feminist science studies most clearly overlaps with my own interest
3
in deconstructive theory. In his interview “Passages – from Traumatism to Promise”

(1992), Derrida similarly envisions the “monster” as hybrid and aporetic. The monster, to

quote Derrida, is “a composite figure of heterogeneous organisms that are grafted onto

each other. This graft, the hybridization, this composition that puts heterogeneous bodies

together may be called a monster” (Derrida “Passages” 385). For Derrida, however,

“[t]he monster is also that which appears for the first time and, consequently, is not yet

recognized. A monster is a species for which we do not yet have a name” (386). It is this

aspect of the monstrous that I want to concentrate on today. According to Derrida, the

monster “shows itself” (386, emphasis in original), which is the etymological meaning of

monster, “in something that is not yet shown and that therefore looks like a hallucination,

it strikes the eye, it frightens precisely because no anticipation had prepared one to

identify this figure” (386). However, “as soon as one perceives a monster in a monster,

one begins to domesticate it, one begins […] to compare it to the norms, to analyze it,

consequently to master whatever could be terrifying in this figure of the monster” (386).

2
For more on the figure of the “monster” in feminist science studies, see Rosi Braidotti, “Mothers,
Monsters, and Machines” (1994), Margrit Shildrik, “This Body Which Is Not One: Dealing with
Differences” (1999), Margrit Shildrik, “Maternal Imagination: Reconceiving First Impressions” (2000), and
Marie-Hélène Huet, Monstrous Imagination (1993).
3
The caution is now customary when positing a methodological orientation that is deconstructive in nature.
Not only was Derrida extremely suspicious of the title “deconstruction” (Critchley 27), to call it a
“framework”, “method”, “theory” or even a “reading” shamefully belittles the complexities of
deconstructive thought (Beardsworth xv). Borrowing from Jacqueline Rose: “it would be a grave error to
describe [deconstruction] as system or school of thought because it has seized schools and systems by their
very nerve endings, leaving nothing as it was before” (Cixous and Derrida 1). One may be obliged to
employ such words when describing deconstruction, but the spectre of this warning necessarily haunts each
use.

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Put more simply, “at the moment the monster is named as a monster, it is tamed” (Smith

2). Thus, irregardless of the monstrosity, “from the moment [it] enter[s] into culture, the

movement of acculturation, precisely, of domestication, of normalization has already

begun” (Derrida “Passages” 386). The purely monstrous is thus, for Derrida, an

impossibility. Instead, the monster exists as aporia, crouching in the shadows between the

radically other and the wholly same. It “shows itself” (386) only through the “repeat[ition

of] the traumatism that is the perception of the monster” (386) and it is in this repetition

that its promise lies.

Bringing Derrida’s reasoning to bear on the topic of gender and science one finds

that scientific discovery, similar to Derrida’s monster, must, by definition, show

something that has not yet been shown; it must offer the wholly new and the heretofore

undiscovered. It must be an “event without precedent” (Derrida “Psyche” 43), a “unique

situation” (60), constituted by its “singularity” (28). However, in order to appreciate the

discovery in the scientific discovery, such must be captured within a “system of

conventions” (28, emphasis in original) that will ensure its position more generally in

culture and society (28). The scientific discovery, in other words, can only be analysed or

understood through pre-existing or prevailing laws of language and science.

It is therefore a paradox or “aporia” (Derrida “Force” 244) that scientific

discovery “is constituted by its originality […] and yet wholly dependent on recognition

and legitimation (and therefore subject to codes and laws)” (Attridge “Psyche” 310). The

aporetic nature of scientific discovery rests on the fact that “true” discovery would “show

itself” only “in terms of an entirely open responsiveness to the other” (Fitzpatrick

“Access” 3), which would of course be impossible. As an “inaugural event” (Derrida

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“Psyche” 28), a “first time ever” (28), the scientific discovery must also be “a last time”

(29; see also Derrida “Shibboleth” 2). It must be singular, complete and containable. To

be so “totally present” (Birmingham 131), however, would make it “not the same”

(Fitzpatrick Modernism 43) and “completely different to us” (43). If this were the case we

would “be deprived of all relation with it” (Nancy 60) and could not know it as scientific

discovery.

Equally, however, if science as a “systematic and formulated knowledge” (OERD

1297) was completely void of discovery or “perfectly stilled” (Fitzpatrick “Access” 9), to

borrow from legal theorist Peter Fitzpatrick in another context, it would cease to be

science. Instead of being a vibrant, ever-changing “pursuit” (OERD 1297) of “truth” and

understanding it would instead become “predictable, calculable, and programmable”

(Derrida “Passages” 387). If science remained forever the same, there would be no need

for science and a science “that would not be monstrous would not be a [science]”

(Derrida “Passages” 387).

The relation between scientific discovery and science can thus be likened to the

“problematic relation between the singular and the general” (Attridge “Before the Law”

181) or the “antinomy between the general and the particular” (Belay 125). In his

deconstruction of “absolute singularity” (Derrida Deconstruction Engaged 90), Derrida

reveals that the “singularity” of scientific discovery can only be understood as “original

repetition” (Birmingham 131), as “iterability” (Derrida “Psyche” 51), in which the

“instituting act” (Birmingham 131) only gains meaning through “the repetition of an

origin with which it cannot coincide, since it is of the very essence of the origin to be

pure anteriority” (131). The “singular, creative event” (131) is accordingly “marked by

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the lack of self-presence” (131) and it is this “repetition” (Derrida “Psyche” 51), this

“repeat[ed] […] traumatism that is the perception of the monster” (Derrida “Passages”

386), which makes science possible in the first place.

The repetition of the monstrous trauma is thereby necessary in order to provide

“some subsisting relation and thence some commonality” (Fitzpatrick Modernism 59)

between the singularity of scientific discovery and the generality of science. Science

cannot subsist without an “opening onto all that lies beyond” (59), which is scientific

discovery – just as discovery or invention requires “some” determinacy in order to endure

as a “contained, distinct” (59) entity. It is therefore “the necessity yet impossibility”

(Fitzpatrick “In the End” 464) of both pure universality (science) and pure singularity

(discovery), which “iteratively impel[s]” (464) both science and scientific discovery “into

existence” (464). The “originary repetition” (Beardsworth 32) of the monstrous trauma of

discovery becomes its law (35) and without such science would not be possible.

In this next section of my paper, I would like to move on to explore the

“[n]ecessity” (Derrida Paper Machine 87) or the promise of the impossibility of scientific

discovery. While discovery “of some inaugurality” (Derrida Monolingualism 66) may be

“the impossible itself” (66), read deconstructively, this impossibility is “not the opposite

of the possible” (Beardsworth 26, emphasis in original). Instead, impossibility “supports”

(Derrida Paper Machine 91) and “releases the possible” (Beardsworth 26, emphasis in
4
original). Derrida is thus “not against the impossible” (Caputo 20), not against

4
In order to understand this point, one must understand the deconstructive “concepts” of the “trace” and
“différance”:
(1) Trace – According to Derrida, “every element of the system only gets its identity in its
difference from other elements” (Bennington “Derridabase” 74). Thus, “every element is
in this way marked by all those it is not: it thus bears the trace of all those other elements.

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discovery. It is actually deconstruction’s “passion for the impossible” (Caputo 20), which

brings us closer to the ethical, which propels us to set “a place at the table for the tout

autre [wholly other], which is the impossible [itself]” (20). Deconstruction, and, I would

add, scientific discovery, thus “loses nothing from admitting that it is impossible”

(Derrida “Psyche” 36). It is instead “possibility” that hinders and constrains – for

possibility contains “the danger of becoming an available set of rule-governed

procedures, methods, [and] accessible approaches” (36). It contains the danger, if you

will, of becoming fully determined, inert and static law – which as noted previously is

equally impossible. It is thus the impossibility of scientific discovery, which brings “hope

and possibility” (Fischlin and Heble 11) to science. For it is the attempt at discovery,

“necessarily failing,” (Bennington “Double Tounging” 8), which “leaves a trace or a

mark that can be seen as a promise of such an inaugurality” (8, emphasis in original). In

its failure, discovery survives.

The promise or ethics of scientific discovery consequently lies in the tripartite

relation between singularity, invention and alterity (Attridge Singularity 2). The singular

event of discovery, in other words, is “not just inventive, it is called by the other”

(Bernasconi 118) and each attempt at invention is an opening towards the singular other.

[…] No element is anywhere present (nor simply absent), there are only traces” (74-75).
In other words, “in every ‘element’ all that is ‘present’ is the other, ‘absent’ element,
which must, for language to be possible, present this alterity as alterity” (75, emphasis in
original).
(2) Différance – Derrida takes “a certain revenge” (Bennington “Derridabase” 71) on
speech through his “invention” (71) of the “witticism” (70, 71) différance, which inserts
an “a” in place of the “e” in order to capture the “dual movement” (Smith 44) of
difference and deferral (Attridge and Baldwin). Vengeance is unleashed in the fact that
the difference between the two words is “only marked in writing” (Bennington
“Derridabase” 70-71) (both différance and différence are pronounced the same way in
French), obliging speech “to take its own written trace as its reference” (71) if it wants to
“say this difference” (71, emphasis added).

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This opening is important for it is in such that “there is a chance of something happening”

(Bennington “Derridabase” 15). Openness to the other thus becomes an “openness to

transformation” (Cornell 166) within science, within society. And it is the “spectre of the

other who haunts the selfsame” (Shildrick Embodying 5), to quote Shildrick, which

“ensures that change is not only possible but perhaps inevitable” (5). Therein lies the

promise of the monstrous trauma of discovery: “endless revolution” (Derrida “Last

Interview” 8) and hope of reform, “otherwise determined” (8).

What does all this mean for feminist science studies or for those of us interested in

gender and science? Read deconstructively, we see that scientific discovery cannot but
5
operate within the phallogocentric, and thus patriarchal, structures of science and

society. As with the “metaphysical complicity” (Derrida “Structure” 355) of

deconstruction, scientific discovery can not renounce its complicity with

phallogocentrism “without also giving up the critique we are directing against this

complicity” (355). Complicity, in other words, brings us into a relation, or creates a

6
violent “partnership” (OERD 296), with phallogocentrism, which thereby enables us to

challenge such (as we are doing today).

Scientific innovation is accordingly constrained by its violent complicity with

phallogocentrism. And it is the necessity of this complicity, which oft leads to charges of

“destruction and negativity” (Shildrick Embodying 129) being laid against

5
Phallogocentrism, a neologism coined by Derrida, signifies the organisation of human thought into “dual,
hierarchical oppositions” (Cixous “Sorties” 64) in which logocentrism (i.e., the “consistent privileging of
the Logos, the Word, as a metaphysical presence” (Moi 191, fn4)) “colludes with” (103) phallocentrism
(i.e., the privileging of “the phallus as the symbol or source of power” (191, fn5)) “in an effort to oppress
and silence women” (103).
6
“Complicity” is defined in the Oxford English Reference Dictionary (OERD) as “partnership in a crime or
wrongdoing” (OERD 296).

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deconstruction. The falsity and unfairness of these charges, however, is made acutely

obvious upon a closer examination of the aporetic positioning of scientific discovery.

Derrida “insists over and over” (Grosz 239) that, instead of being viewed as critique or

destruction, deconstruction is better understood as “a mode of affirmation, indeed as a

mode of double affirmation” (239), a “yes, yes” (Derrida “Ulysses” 257, emphasis in

original) or “Oui, oui” (257). This double affirmation both affirms the selfsame, the “I am

here” (Attridge “Ulysses” 254), while simultaneously reaching out and engaging with the

other, with alterity. This engagement with alterity is necessary and arises from the

‘impossibility of remaining wholly within the [same]’ (Simon Critchley, qtd. in Chung-

Hsiung 28). Thus, it is this dual affirmation that propels the possibility of ethics. It

glances towards the monstrous discovery, a discovery that, whilst impossible, propels

science towards the less violent invention. Whereas phallogocentrism tries to deny the

violence of the opposition between Self and Other (Chung-Hsiung 24) and “nourishes the

desire for a ‘truth’ that would be free of violence, deconstruction teaches us to own up to

our complicity in the suffering we cannot help but produce” (Fleming 420) and to

understand that there is no such thing as non-violence in a phallogocentric system; our

only ethical choice is that of “the lesser violence within an economy of violence” (Derrida

“Violence” 400, fn21, emphasis in original).

To conclude, any deconstructive reading of scientific discovery, which is

concerned with the issue of gender, must, to quote Elisabeth Grosz, be “committed to

both an affirmation, a saying-yes to patriarchy (the gesture of phallogocentrism), and an

affirmation of feminism, an affirmation of the overcoming of patriarchy” (Grosz 239,

emphasis in original). Although many feminists would prefer to “simply and

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resoundingly say no to patriarchy” (239), the “inherited nature of feminist discourse”

(239) means that we are constitutively immersed “in the very systems from which we

seek to distance, and against which we seek to position, ourselves” (239). Thus, the

Derridean double affirmative alerts feminism to “the danger of repeating and being

unable to recognize the very implications it believes it has repudiated” (239). Feminist

science studies accordingly needs deconstruction, needs Derrida, in order to challenge its

(necessary) “complicity with the very forces feminists have commonly identified as

outside of, and other to, as different from feminism itself” (240). For it is only by

acknowledging this complicity that we can direct our critique against it (Derrida

“Structure” 355). “The task”, then, to quote Shildrick once again, “is not to destroy the

foundations of the logos so much as to open them up to take account of all that has

hitherto been excluded or disavowed” (Shildrick Embodying 121). The task, in other

words, is to help prepare us to welcome “the monstrous to-come” (Bennington

“Derridabase” 316), which is a coming that never arrives, but which promises

nevertheless “gradual and necessary transformation” (Derrida “Nietzsche” 241) within

Western science and society. At once an impossibility and a coming, the monstrous

invention thus promises the possibility of a science that “pursu[es]” (OERD 1297)

“according to the ‘lesser violence’” (Beardsworth xiv) and it is in this less violent pursuit

that the promise of science, in relation to gender, lies.

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