Conventionalism about Space and Time

Richard Swinburne

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 31, No. 3. (Sep., 1980), pp. 255-272.

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Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 31 (1980),255-272 Printed in Great Britain

Conventionalism About Space and Time *

by R I C H A R D S W I N B U R N E

I n recent years philosophical writing about space and time has been
permeated with a distinction between matters of fact and matters of
convention. This distinction was due to Riemann and PoincarC but was
developed and popularised by Reichenbach and Griinbaum. Certain
claims of science are said to be truly factual and others to be merely
conventional. Similar kinds of distinction are of course to be found in
philosophical writing about many other issues. I n general philosophy of
science there is the distinction between observable entities and properties,
and theoretical entities and properties; and nowadays in philosophical
writing about language some writers wish to distinguish sharply between
such factual matters as which noises a subject uttered at a certain time
and such matters of theory as what he meant by what he said. My main
concern here is with space and time, but we need to be aware of the wider
background.
A matter is factual if it is expressed by a factual statement. A factual
statement is one which, if true, would state a fact. Something is a fact,
I suppose, for these writers, if it truly or really holds, if it is an objective
feature of the world. If a factual statement is true, its negation is false;
and conversely. By contrast, something is a matter of convention, in the
terminology of these writers, if the statement which expresses it is not
factual; and so if it is as near to the truth as its apparent negation (i.e. the
statement which by its verbal form is the negation of the original statement,
and would be its negation if the original statement were factual. If a state-
ment is not factual and so not really making a claim, it cannot properly
have a negation.) Let us call such a statement a conventional statement.
A conventional statement may form a useful part of science but it does
not have a truth-value on its 0wn.l I n conjunction with some other
statement it may form a statement with a truth-value-indeed the same

*An earlier version of this paper was read at a meeting of the British Society for the
Philosophy of Science in May 1979.I am most grateful to those who produced valuable
criticisms of it on that occasion and on similar occasions.
Thus Reichenbach ([1958],p. 19)claims that in deciding on the criteria for congruence,
we are making 'an arbitrary decision that is neither true nor false'.
256 Richard Swinburne
truth-value as the conjunction, of its negation with a different statement.
The two provide alternative ways of representing the same facts.
The above seems to me the central claim which the writers cited wish to
make about the statements about space and time which I shall shortly list,
normally by calling them 'matters of convention'. Sometimes the writers
say that alternative theories on these matters are 'co-legitimate alternatives',
or 'factually co-legitimate', or, with respect to different measures of
spatial and temporal intervals, that they can be adopted 'with equal factual
legitimacy', i.e. that in this sense space or time are 'alternatively
metrizable'.' I n his later writings Adolf Grunbaum has developed more
specialised senses of 'conventional' and etymologically similar terms-e.g.
he wants to say that measurements of congruence are 'convention-laden'
if and only if there is no intrinsic metric to space (i.e. if there are no
spatial atoms of finite volume). But as Grunbaum also seems to use the
other phrases quoted above and similar phrases to make the points which
the other writers make, we can list him as holding that the claims which
I shall discuss are matters of convention in their sense.
A very simple example will illustrate the distinction which the con-
ventionalist has in mind. 'There are four men in this room' is a factual
statement: but 'there are x men in this room' is only a conventional
statement. By itself the latter has no more truth to it than 'there are 2x
men in this room'. But the former constitutes a factual statement when
conjoined to 'and x = 4', indeed the same factual statement as the
statement made when the latter is conjoined to 'and x = 2'. (In formal
logic the conjoining would involve the variable of the second statement
being governed by the quantifier of the first statement.)
I do not dispute the utility of this distinction. My concern in this paper
is with the statements which the writers concerned claim to be conventional
and with the criteria which they are using in order to classify them. I list
six issues, central in the philosophy of space and time, which the writers
concerned have claimed to be matters of convention:
(I) Whether a body, such as the Earth, is really in motion (as opposed to,
e.g. whether it is moving relative to the Sun, which is a matter of fact).
(2) What is the metrical geometry of a region of space-e.g. whether the
interior angles of a rectilinear triangle in physical space sum to 180".
(3) Whether the distance between two points A and B is or is not the
same distance as that between two different points C and D (when
C and D do not both lie between A and B); i.e. whether AB is
congruent with CD.
For these phrases see (e.g.) Griinbaum [1970],p. 580.
 Conventionalism About Space and Time 257
(4) Whether the temporal interval between two instants of time t, and t, is
the same as that between two instants t , and t , (when t , and t , do not
both lie between t, and t,).
( 5 ) What is the topology of space-e.g. whether a certain line in space
returns to its starting point or only to a point which looks like its
starting point; and so whether or not space is finite.
(6) Whether two events E, and E * at different places are simultaneous
(when E, and E* are not in fact connectible by a signal-viz. when
you cannot send a signal from the place of E, at the time of E, to
arrive at the place of E" before or at the same time as the occurrence
of E*, or conversely).
The grounds which the conventionalists give for holding ( I ) . . . (6) to
be matters of convention are of course very loosely, that no one can
actually observe whether things are as ( I ) . . . (6) claim; that so long as
one is prepared to make alternative hypotheses about other unobservable
matters (which one can do without the danger of being shown mistaken
by observations) one can maintain which position one likes on the issues;
and that there is no unknown factual truth here, because the only such
truths are those which are 'in principle' checkable. The conventionalist
is thus a verificationist who holds that a statement is a factual statement
only if it is in some way verifiable or falsifiable by observation. What I wish
to do in this paper is, first, to point out that there are different
verificationist theses which have different consequences from each other
about which of ( I ) . . . (6) are matters of convention; secondly, to show
that only the stronger verificationist theses prove any of them to be matters
of convention; and thirdly to comment briefly that the stronger verification-
ist theses are intuitively not nearly as plausible as the weaker ones.
Although conventionalists put forward verificationist arguments for their
positions, they seldom distinguish clearly between different possible
verificationist theses. Out of many different verificationist theses which
could be maintained, I select four typical ones in decreasing order of
strength (a thesis being stronger in so far as it pronounces fewer statements
to be factual, i.e. rules out more statements from being factual):

[A] A statement is factual if and only if it entails claims which it is

physically possible to observe to hold.
[B] A statement is factual if and only if it entails claims which it is
logically possible to observe to hold.
[C] A statement is factual if and only if it could be confirmed or dis-
confirmed by claims which it is physically possible to observe to hold.
258 Richard Swinburne
[Dl A statement is factual if and only if it could be confirmed or dis-
confirmed by claims which it is logically possible to observe to hold.

As in all these theses a statement's being a 'factual' statement is tied to

the notion of something being 'observable', there will be a continuum of
statements from clearly factual statements to clearly non-factual statements.
This is because there is a whole continuum of entities and properties from
the clearly observable to the clearly non-observable-according to whether
'observing', 'in a microscope', 'in an electron-microscope', 'in a cloud
chamber' etc. are recognised as observing. However, the kind of contrast
which the writers cited wish to make seems to remain whether or not
'observing' via these various devices counts as observing.
T h e different verificationist theses suggest different criteria for logical
equivalence :
[A] Two statements are logically equivalent if and only if they entail the
same claims which it is physically possible to observe to hold. (They
are then logically equivalent to the conjunction of these claims.)
[B] Two statements are logically equivalent if and only if they entail the
same claims about what it is logically possible to observe to hold.
(They are then logically equivalent to the conjunction of these claims.)
[C] Two statements are logically equivalent if and only if they would be
equally well confirmed or disconfirmed by all claims, which it is
physically possible to observe to hold.
[Dl Two statements are logically equivalent if and only if they would be
equally well confirmed or disconfirmed by all claims which it is
logically possible to observe to hold.
Let me bring out the differences between these different verificationist
criteria. Let S entail that in circumstances C,, F,; and that in circumstances
C,, F,. Let Sf entail that in circumstances C,, F,; and that in circumstances
C,, Fi. Suppose that these are all the claims which it is logically possible
to observe to hold; that F2and Fi are incompatible; that C, are circum-
stances which it is physically possible should occur; and that C, are
circumstances which it is not physically possible should occur. Then
according to [A] S and S' are logically equivalent to each other and t o
the claim that in circumstances C,, F,. According to [B] S and S' are
not logically equivalent because they make different claims about what
would be observed in circumstances which it is not physically possible t o
realise. [C], like [A], holds that the only observational evidence relevant
to determining the factual content of a statement is evidence which it is
physically possible to observe to hold. But an advocate of [C] may hold
 Conventionalism About Space and Time 259
that while two statements S and Sf entail exactly the same observational
consequences which it is physically possible to observe to hold-that in
circumstances C,,E,--(and that no other evidence of observation is
relevant), that evidence may nevertheless confirm one statement more
than the other. This may be because one statement is simpler than the other
(in postulating fewer entities, forces etc., interacting in a mathematically
simple way), and thus provides a simpler explanation of the evidence; and
simplicity is evidence of truth. In that case [C] holds that S a n d S' are not
logically equivalent. [Dl holds that even if the only observational evidence
relevant to determining the logical relations of the statements were the same,
e.g. if F, and F; were the same, the two statements would still not be logi-
cally equivalent if there were any observable evidence (including evidence
which it is not physically possible to obtain) which if it were obtained would
confirm one statement rather than the other-e.g. on grounds of simplicity.
Put loosely, [Dl says-two statements are logically equivalent if and only
if there are no conceivable circumstances in which there could be any
grounds for asserting the one rather than the other.
Clearly [A], is a stronger criterion for logical equivalence than is [B], and
also stronger than is [C], and both [B] and [C] are stronger than [Dl;
a criterion being stronger in so far as it pronounces more pairs of statements
to be logically equivalent to each other.
His criterion of logical equivalence gives the conventionalist an easy
method of proving a statement to be merely conventional. If one statement
S is a conjunction of two statements T and Q, and a statement S',
logically equivalent to S, is a conjunction of two statements T' and Q'
when T is by its verbal form an apparent contrary of T' and Q of Q', then
it is a matter of convention whether T or T' (Q or Q'). This is because
if S is 'true', so is S', and conversely, and so then are both T and T'. If the
'truth' of T or T' were an objective fact, then it would rule out the 'truth'
of the other. Hence the 'truth' of T must be such as not to rule out the
'truth' of TI, i.e. must be a matter of convention. Put another way T and T'
must be incomplete statements, not statements which can be true by
themselves. In the earlier example 'there are 2x men in this room' is an
apparent contrary of 'there are x men in this room'. But in fact both
statements are incomplete, and this is revealed by the fact that when
another statement is added to each, the two conjunctions are logically
equivalent. The conventionalist then claims that any statement concerned
with ( I ) . . . (6) can always be combined with some other statement so as
to get a conjunction logically equivalent to another conjunction including
an apparent contrary of the original statement; from which it follows that
the latter must be a matter of convention.
260 Richard Swinburne
Let us now see how this works in practice by considering how con-
ventionalists argue for the conventionality of (6). They adduce the
apparent facts, enshrined in the Special Theory of Relativity that light
has a certain finite two-way velocity c (about 300,000 km/sec) relative to
all inertial frames, and that no signal can travel faster than light. Now
consider two points pl and p, on an inertial frame F. A light signal is
sent from pl at time t, to p, where it arrives at t*, and is immediately
reflected back to p, at which it arrives at t,. Let El be the event of its
emission, E* of its reflection, and E, of it arriving back at p,. Since no
signal can travel faster than light, E2 and E* are not connectible by a signal.
Hence the argument goes, the hypothesis that E * occurs after E,, the

hypothesis that E* is simultaneous with E,, and the hypothesis that EX

occurs before E, are all compatible with the observable facts. The first
hypothesis combined with the hypothesis that the one-way velocity of
light from p1 to p, is < c (and > c in the opposite direction); and the
second hypothesis combined with the hypothesis that the one-way velocity
in both directions is c both make the same prediction about when the
signal will arrive back at p,. And a similar point applies to the third
hypothesis. Further observable consequences-e.g. about readings on
clocks moved from pl to p,-follow if we add hypotheses about how clocks
are affected by transport (e.g. in having their rate speeded up or retarded).
With different additional hypotheses added to each we can get all the
same consequences which it is physically possible to observe from each
of the original hypotheses. Hence, by verificationist principle [A], the
alternative conjunctions are logically equivalent, since they hold in the
same physically possible worlds. However, the component hypotheses
about the temporal relations of E, and E* such as that E, is simultaneous
with E*, are apparently contrary to one another. But they have no
consequences which are physically possible to observe, by themselves.
They are therefore mere matters of convention.
Not merely this; but it may plausibly be urged, the alternative con-
junctions of hypotheses would be equally well confirmed or disconfirmed
by all factual claims which it is physically possible to observe to hold.
 Conventionalism About Space and Time 261
It might seem that the hypothesis that E, is simultaneous with E" plus the
hypothesis that light has the same one-way velocity in both directions, is
simpler than its rivals, for it alone of the conjunctions of hypotheses which
predict the observable facts postulates that light has the same one-way
velocity in both directions. It might be urged that this simpler conjunction
is, qua simpler, better confirmed by the evidence which it predicts, than
its apparent rivals. If we said that E X was earlier than E,, we would have
to say that the velocity of light varied with its direction, and that is a more
complicated supposition. However, all these velocities are velocities
relative to F. Light has the same two-way velocity relative to all inertial
frames. And if we say that EXis earlier than E,, then although the velocity
of light from p, to p, will then be different in the two directions relative
to F, there will be an inertial frame moving with some uniform velocity
relative to F relative to which light will have the same one-way velocity
in both directions. So, generally any hypothesis about how (within the
limits set by signal-connectibility) E" is simultaneous with, later than, or
earlier than E, can be conjoined with a hypothesis of equal velocities in
both directions relative to some inertial frame, to predict the observed
evidence which I have set out. And, the argument goes on, there are no
considerations of simplicity which lead us to prefer one inertial frame to
any other, by which to measure velocities, for all inertial frames are on a
par-for when velocities are measured relative to any inertial frame the
laws of nature take their same simplest form. So each total conjunction
is equally well confirmed by the stated evidence, and it is not physically
possible to obtain more evidence to enable a choice to be made between
them. Similar arguments would show that given the predictions of The
Special Theory of Relativity, each total conjunction would be equally
well confirmed or disconfirmed by other evidence. Hence by criterion [C],
as well as by criterion [A], the component hypotheses about the temporal
relations of E, and E" are mere matters of convention. This was the kind
of consideration underlying Einstein's affirmation of the 'relativity of
simultaneity' :
So we see that we cannot attach any absolute signification to the concept of
simultaneity, but that two events which, viewed from a system of coordinates,
are simultaneous, can no longer be looked upon as simultaneous events when
envisaged from a system which is in motion relatively to that system.l
And so Einstein and the textbooks of Special Relativity suggest that we
should think of E, and E X as 'simultaneous in F' and 'not simultaneous in
F1,and 'absolutely' neither 'simultaneous', nor 'non-simultaneous'.
Einstein [1905],p. 42 f.
S
262 Richard Swinburne
So given that there are no more relevant observable facts than those
predicted by the Special Theory of Relativity, the various claims about
simultaneity turn out to be matters of convention by criterion [C] also.
However, our universe is not one in which Special Relativity holds in
a pure form on the cosmological scale; and cosmology may provide good
scientific grounds for preferring one inertial frame of reference to another
relative to which to measure velocities (i.e. the laws of cosmology may
take a simpler form relative to one inertial frame than relative to others).
I have myself argued elsewhere1 that there are such grounds; and that
the frame by which velocities ought to be measured is the frame which
has the mean motion of the galactic cluster in its neighbourhood.
Yet if we ignore this point, we can admit that criterion [C] as well as
criterion [A] makes (6) a matter of convention. Clearly however, there
are always facts which it is logically possible to observe which would
refute any of the alternative hypotheses about the temporal relations of
E, and E". For it is at best a physical truth, enshrined in Special Relativity,
that no signal can travel faster than light; and it is logically possible that
one might be discovered which could so travel. It might then prove
possible to refute the hypothesis that E* was earlier than E, by finding
a signal which left p, at the time of E, and arrived at p, at the time of E*.
And similarly for the other rival hypotheses. So [B], and a fortiori [Dl, do
not declare ( 5 ) to be a matter of convention. Why should we adopt
[A] or [C]? Why should not we say instead that there is a truth there-that
E, is simultaneous with E*, or that it is later than E", or that it is earlier
than E"; and although (probably) it is not physically possible to discover
what the truth is, or to have any evidence favouring one of the rival
hypotheses over others, it is no matter of convention what the truth is.
Salmon claims that Reichenbach held that 'statements have the same
meaning if it is physically impossible to get evidence to discriminate
between them-i.e. to confirm the one and disconfirm the other'., Salmon
follows him in suggesting that we should judge a convention to be
'non-trivial' if it arises out of a physical rather than a logical impossibility
of verification. But why should the physical impossibility of obtaining
evidence to choose between two hypotheses show that they are not really

See Swinburne [1968], chapter I I .

Salmon [1969], p. 61. For Reichenbach's most developed view on this matter see
Reichenbach [1g53]. While indeed he here (p. 97) "advocates a definition of meaning
in terms of the physical possibility of verification", he makes the odd claim that
"meaning is a matter of definition" and so that alternative (but in his view less useful)
definitions of meaning, e.g. in terms of the logical possibility of verification, can be
given. This has the strange consequence that it is a matter of convention whether
something is a matter of convention or a matter of fact.
 Conventionalism About Space and Time 263
in conflict. The grounds which the old-style logical positivist (outside the
philosophy of science context) gave for tying meaning to possibility of
verification concerned meaning being concerned with what we could
conceive ourselves observing, i.e. the logical possibility of observing. The
stronger criteria have the consequence that physics in showing what is
physically impossible, shows that statements which looked as if they were
not logically equivalent, really are. But how can a physical discovery show
that sentences do or do not have some meaning or logical relation? Surely
it is a linguistic, not a physical matter (not something to be discovered
by connecting two wires in a laboratory), what a sentence means or what
its logical relations are.
If we do go along with the stronger criteria in this case, we have to say
the kind of thing which Einstein said in the quotation given above; and
if we adopt criterion [A] we have also to say that the factual meaning of a
total conjunction of hypotheses of this kind just is the conjunction of its
observable consequences, e.g. it is a statement about signal connecability
and so forth. But intuitively statements about simultaneity are statements
which may or may not be established by sending signals, but they concern
something else. I t seems to be very central in our thought about time that
if t, is between t, and t, and E* occurred between t, and t,, then either
E* occurred before t, or it occurred after t, or it occured at t,. There
seems no good reason for not sticking by this way of thinking and saying
that all that Special Relativity shows is that nature contains more secrets
(viz. about simultaneity) than man can ever discover.
I turn now to (2), (3) and (4). I shall discuss only (3), but it will readily
appear that exactly the same points can be made with respect to (2) and (4).
(2) and (3) are closely connected. If (2) is a matter of convention, so is (3)
(for a different metrical geometry entails different measurements of
distance, although the converse does not hold). (4) is concerned with the
claim about time analogous to that made by (3) about space. Now it looks
as if not merely criterion [A], but criterion [B] as well, declare these to
be matters of convention. For consider two geometrical theories of
congruence (such as (3) is concerned with), one that CD is congruent with
A B (i.e. CD = AB) and the other that CD is congruent with 2AB. I find
a wooden rod, one end of which coincides with A when the other coincides
with B. I then move one end to C, and holding it there, make the other
end coincide with D. Both theories remain compatible with the facts.
For we can add to each a further theoretical component-to theory one,
that the rod and all other measuring devices are unaffected by transport,
and to theory two that the rod and all other measuring devices are doubled
in size by transport. Only from such total (geometrical plus physical)
264 Richard Swinburne
theories do predictions arise. Any geometrical theory G about congruence
between different distances (subject to the restriction in (3)) can be
combined with a physical theory P so as to yield all the same consequences
which it is logically ~ossible to observe, as an apparently contrary
geometrical theory G' with an apparently contrary physical theory P'.
Hence by [A] and [B] (G plus P ) is logically equivalent to (GI plus P');
and so G by itself and G' by itself are matters of convention.
T h e first difficulty here is that one of the (geometrical plus physical)
theories may be not merely incompatible with observations but internally
incoherent. For Griinbaum the meaning of 'congruent' (i.e. 'of the same
length') is simply that of a 'spatial equality . . . predicate' determined by
'the axioms of congruence' (i.e. axioms which state the logical relations
which hold between different statements about length)'; and also by the
constraint that two rods which coincide at a place are congruent at that
place.2 However, it seems plausible to suppose that as they are ordinarily
used the meaning of such terms is fixed not merely by their logical
relations and the rules for applying them to coincident bodies but also
by other standard cases of their correct application, e.g. that a wooden ruler
moved from one side of my room to the other, which preserves congruence
relations with other standard measuring rods (and so is not distorted by
differential influences, i.e. influences such as heat which expand rods of
different material to different degrees) is said to remain approximately
'of the same length'. I n general, one may say, making a similar point about
(4), the meaning of talk about the 'length' of temporal and spatial
'intervals' is given in part by these standard cases of correct application
of such talk. And if that is so, claims that ordinary mundane objects
which preserve congruence relations among themselves suddenly double
in length when moved short distances seem incoherent; since they seem
to violate the criteria for correct application of such terms.3 Hence any
physical theory which embodied such claims would be internally in-
coherent. If that is right, the fact that all standard measuring devices
which coincide with A B coincide with CD would entail the fact that AB is
approximately congruent with CD (and so AB # 2CD). In reply
Griinbaum may claim that he is using 'congruent' in the 'modern scientific
sense' in which the logical relations (plus rules for applying them to
coincident bodies) alone determine meaning. But then we may reply that
the initially interesting conventionalist claim (3) is no longer as interesting

' Griinbaum [1964], p. 27.

This constraint is implicit in all his writing, although he does not spell it out explicitly
in the cited passage.
3 I argue this in my [1968], pp. 95 ff., and also in my [1970].
 Conventionalism About Space and Time 265
as it at first seemed to be. Alternatively a conventionalist may reply that
his claim concerns large distances in space, where paradigm cases do not
dictate correct answers. Let us so understand him, and let us sec what
more can be said about his claim in response to this defence.
Criteria [ A ] and [B] both pronounce the two conjunctions of geometrical
and physical theories logically equivalent. Whatever observable the one
conjunction entails, the other entails; and this is not merely a physical
but a logical truth. I t is not merely physically impossible but logically
impossible to check by conclusive observations whether all rods and other
measuring devices moved to some distant region double in size. But
criteria [C] and [Dl give no clear answer as to whether the two theories
are logically equivalent. I t might seem quite obvious to the anti-
conventionalist that the two theories differ in simplicity (the universal
expansion theory being highly ad hoc and so complex)'; and that as
simplicity is evidence of truth, the simpler theory is better confirmed by
evidence. But even granted that in this kind of case, simplicity is evidence
of truth, the argument begs the question by assuming that there are here
two different theories which differ in simplicity. Maybe the difference of
simplicity is only a difference in respect of two formulations of the same
theory and if so, simplicity would not be evidence of truth. (If Heisenberg's
matrix mechanics is just another way of formulating Quantum Theory to
Schrodinger's wave mechanics, then even if Heisenberg's mechanics is
more complex than Schrodinger's that does not show that it is less likely
to be true.)
The conventionalist who uses either of criteria [C] and [Dl to justify
his position typically also begs the question. He admits that often when
the same set of observations is predicted by two rival theories, the
observations may make one theory more probable than the other. If they
both predict the observations with equal accuracy, one may be simpler
than the other and for that reason more likely to be true. Compatible with
any finite number of data, there will be an infinite number of theories
agreeing in their predictions of the data so far, but differing in their
predictions for the future. Of these we judge the simpler theory and its
predictions more likely to be true. This well worn point2 was admitted in
a limited way even by Reichenbach. But Reichenbach distinguished
between 'inductive' and 'descriptive' simplicity. He admitted simplicity
as a criterion of choice between theories which agreed in their predictions
' I assume here that there is no background physical theory with which the hypothesis
of universal expansion fits better than does its rival. If there was a relevant background
physical theory, it is the simplicity of it plus any new hypothesis which is relevant,
not the simplicity of a new hypothesis on its own.
"ee (e.g.) Jeffreys [1g73], pp. 61-4.
266 Richard Swinburne
of observations made so far but differed in their predictions of subsequent
observations (e.g. different theories about the paths on which a planet
was moving, equally compatible with the positions so far observed). This
kind of simplicity he called 'inductive simplicity'. But when there was
no difference between two theories in the observations which they
predicted, yet one was simpler (in the observable entities, properties,
relations etc. which it postulated) the difference between them was, he
said, a matter of 'descriptive simplicity'. (z), (3) and (4) are certainly on
that definition cases of difference of descriptive simplicity. Then,
Reichenbach claimed, inductive simplicity is, descriptive simplicity is not,
evidence of truth. But why suppose that? Reichenbach did suppose that
because he held that being equivalent in respect of observable facts was
the same as being equivalent in respects of all facts1 But that is an
assumption which begs all the questions; it is in fact criterion [B] (or
perhaps [A]).
So, if we appeal to weaker verificationist criteria, we do not seem to
be able to solve the issue of whether (z), (3) and (4) are matters of
convention. Criteria [A] and [B] will solve the issue. We have seen no
good grounds for adopting criterion [A]. What of criterion [B]? [B] has
a simple doctrine-a theory is logically equivalent to the conjunction of
its consequences which it is logically possible to observe.
This does not seem at first sight very plausible. (a) 'all swans are white'
seems not to be logically equivalent to (a') 'all swans so far observed and
to be observed in future are white'. (b)
. .
'material bodies continue to exist
when unobserved', seems to be saying something contrary to (b') 'material
bodies exist only when observed', even if we add to each such auxiliary
hypotheses that their observable consequences are the same. Likewise
(c) 'a volume of carbon dioxide consists at all times of a large finite number
of molecules, each of which consists of one atom of carbon and two
atoms of oxygen', seems to be saying something contrary to (c') 'However
small a quantity of carbon dioxide you distinguish, it consists of quali-
tatively identical matter, but it changes its nature when it enters into
chemical interaction or interaction with some measuring apparatus', even
when appropriate auxiliary hypotheses are added.
I conclude that the stronger verificationist criteria are not at first sight
very plausible, and that the weaker ones will not allow us to settle whether
(2)' (3) and (4) are matters of convention. ( 5 ) is in just the same situation
as (2)' (3) and (4). Reichenbach illustrates his claim that ( 5 ) is a matter
'See Reichenbach [1g38]. He writes (p. 374), 'There are cases in which the simplicity
of a theory is nothing but a matter of taste or of economy. These are cases in which
the theories compared are logically equivalent, i.e. correspond in all observable facts'.
 Conventionalism About Space and Time 267
of convention by his famous story of the spheres.' He imagines a world
in which a man finds himself on a huge spherical surface, on which is
situated his study. Having explored it all over, he finds a trapdoor in it
and discovers another sphere below it, completely enclosed by thc first
sphere. He explores this second sphere thoroughly, and then penetrates
it to find a third sphere. Eventually he comes to a fifth sphere which
measurements with his rod reveal to be of the same size as the first sphere
and on which he finds the geography in all respects qualitatively similar
to that of the first sphere. He even finds a room qualitatively similar to
the study which he left behind. T o ascertain whether this room is his
study, he writes a message, locks it in a drawer, passes back through the
spheres to the first sphere and finds a qualitatively similar message in his
study drawer. Are the two studies and so the two spheres numerically
identical or merely qualitatively similar? If they are numerically identical,
then space has a non-Euclidean topology. But if they are different, space
may be Euclidean; and in that case there is causal action at a distance
and all goings-on on sphere I are replicated on sphere 5 (and sphere
9, 13, and so on ad injinitum). According to Reichenbach, N (the claim
that space has a certain non-Euclidean topology) plus P (some claim
about the behaviour of bodies, including the claim that to some extent
bodies preserve their appearance and that goings-on are not replicated) is
logically equivalent to E (the claim that space has a Euclidean topology)
plus G (some claim about the behaviour of bodies, including the claim
that goings-on are replicated). Hence N by itself or E by itself are mere
matters of convention. Reichenbach's story is meant to illustrate the
general thesis that you can make any claim you like about the topology
of physical space, so long as you are prepared also to make claims about
strange physical forces complicating effects.
Now, as with congruence claims, it does seem not merely physically,
but logically impossible to make observations entailed by one of such
conjunctions of geometrical and physical theories and not by the other.
So not merely criterion [A] but criterion [B] declares (N and P ) to be
logically equivalent to ( E and G), and so N and E by themselves to be
matters of convention. However, the hypothesis of replication looks
complex, and it is natural to urge that, qua simpler, ( N and P ) is more
likely to be true than ( E and G); and so that the evidence of observation
which both conjunctions entail confirms the former more than the latter,
and so the criterion [C] declares them not to be logically equivalent.
More generally, it may seem that there will always be physically possible

' Op. cit. section 1 2 .

268 Richard Swinburne
observations such that if you are to save some geometrical hypothesis in
the face of them, you need so to complicate your physics that it becomes
implausible. It looks as if criterion [C], and so a fortiori criterion [Dl,
declare (5) not to be a matter of convention. But an opponent may always
urge that this is begging the question by assuming that conjunctions such
as (N and P) and (E and G) are different theories; for simplicity is only
a criterion of choice between theories which are not logically equivalent.
The implausibility of criteria [A] and [B] as criteria of logical equiva-
lence, and the fact that criterion [C], and a fortiori criterion [Dl are of
little use, suggests that verificationist criteria are of no use for settling
whether statements are logically equivalent, and so settling whether (z), (3),
(4) and (5) are matters of convention. I do not know of any other general
principle which will settle the issues quickly.' All that can be done,
I suggest, is to spell out in detail how a Universe in which one
conjunction of theories held would differ from a Universe in which
an alternative conjunction of theories held; and thereby show that really
the two Universes are the same or that really they are different. Thus, one
example of a Universe in which one conjunction of theories of type (3)
held would be a Universe in which the distances between galaxies at a
given cosmic time increase as you get further away from the Earth but
there are physical forces at work which expand rods to a similar amount,
and increase all two-way signal velocities also so that this is not noticed.
One can continue spelling out the nature of these forces, and how actual
distance differs from measured distance. By contrast a Universe in which
the other conjunction of theories holds would be a Universe in which the
distances between galaxies are at a given cosmic time approximately the
same, measuring rods are not subject to expanding forces etc. As the

Quine [1975] has suggested a test of a non-verificationist kind for determining whether
two theories which predict the same observations are logically equivalent. T h e test,
roughly, is that two theories are logically equivalent if we can get the one from the
other by substituting predicates throughout. T h u s our present theory of physics and
chemistry is logically equivalent to one obtained from that theory by replacing all
occurrences in it of 'electron' by 'molecule', and all occurrences of 'molecule' by
'electron'. However, as Quine states, this test is concerned only with predicates which
(p. 319) 'do not figure essentially in any observation sentences'. But theories normally
contain a large number of terms which do occur in observation sentences-e.g.
'contains', 'is composed of', 'particle', 'wave' and in our examples 'distance', 'length',
'moves' and 'at rest'. Whether these terms occur 'essentially' raises a host of difficulties
which are no easier to solve than our original difficulties. Quine has no doubt provided
a sufficient condition for logical equivalence, but it is in no way obvious that he has
provided a useful test, let alone that he has provided a necessary condition for logical
equivalence. He admits that in practice there are great difficulties in applying his test.
T h e real difficulty is that theories use terms with extra-theoretical meaning (as they
must, if they are to be informative) and it is far from clear to what the use of these
terms commits a speaker.
 Conventionalism About Space and Time 269
spelling-out goes on, it may clearly click that the Universes differ or that
they are the same. That may seem feeble, but is not all argument an
attempt to settle something questionable by appealing to something more
obvious? This is merely a case of that. It might be thought that the logical
equivalence of the two Universes (and so the conventionality of (3)) could
be proved by showing that the affirmation of existence of a Universe of
one kind and the denial of the existence of any Universe of the other kind
generated a contradiction. And indeed so it could. But I cannot see how
to prove that there is a contradiction until you have proved by some other
method (e.g. my feeble spelling out) that there is no difference between
the two Universes. For myself, I can only find that this attempt to spell
nut a difference between alternative theories in this field fails, and that
I cannot make any sense of the supposed distinction between distance
and what would be measured by actual rods.
(5) on the other hand I find different. There does seem to me to be
a clear difference between a non-Euclidean universe (N,) and a Universe
with Euclidean geometry in which all effects are replicated (El). I can
try to make this clear to someone who does not see the difference by
spelling out what is involved in the latter. I ask him to consider another
Euclidean universe of nested spheres (E,) in which effects on Sphere I are
replicated in almost every detail in Spheres 5, 9, 13 etc., but not quite. Such
a universe would be entirely different in character from the non-Euclidean
universe Nl in which you reach Sphere I again by passing from Sphere I
through spheres 2, 3 and 4. But the universe El in which effects were
perfectly replicated would only be very slightly different from E,. So El
could not be the same as Nl. In this way I try to draw a contrast between
Euclidean and non-Euclidean universes. Others may not accept that
I have succeeded in making a contrast, but in that case all that can be
done is to go on drawing out the differences and similarities until it does
click that the universes are the same or different. Whether or not there
are real distinctions to be made between different kinds of relevant
Universe, and so whether ( z ) , (3), (4) and (5) are matters of convention
is something which can only be shown by detailed spelling-out of what
the alternatives amount to-and the process may not immediately lead
everyone to the right conclusion. The arguments here may be correct
without being immediately persuasive.
(I) is in a different position from (z), (3), (4) and (5) in that not merely
can criteria [A] and [B] be deployed to show it to be a matter of con-
vention, but criterion [C]clearly can as well. For it follows from the Special
Theory of Relativity, as from Newtonian mechanics, that there will be no
observable phenomena which are more plausibly explained by supposing
270 Richard Swinburne
that a body is at rest relative to an absolute rest frame than by supposing
that it is in uniform motion relative to that frame. This is because Special
Theory plus the theory that a body B is in motion relative to an absolute rest
frame predicts exactly the same consequences as Special Theory plus the
theory that B is at rest relative to that frame, and neither conjunction of
theories is simpler than the other. Hence, even if we can talk of an absolute
rest frame and so of absolute rest and motion, the two theories that B is in
absolute motion and that B is at rest absolutely will be equally well
confirmed or disconfirmed by all factual claims which it is physically
possible to observe to hold,l and hence by criterion [C] they are the same
theory.
However, it is logically possible that there be observable phenomena
incompatible with Special Theory which are most plausibly explained by
a rival physics It could be that M plus the theory that B was in
absolute uniform motion yielded different observable consequences from
the consequences predicted by M plus the theory that B was at rest
absolutely; that these latter consequences were observed, and that the
only way to save the theory that B was in absolute motion was by making
M into a more complex theory M'. (M plus the theory that B was absolutely
at rest) might predict all the observations which it was logically possible
to make, as did (M' plus the theory that B was in absolute motion). Yet
because M was simpler than M', one might claim that the observations
confirmed the former conjunction more than the latter, and so that these
were not logically equivalent (and so that ( I ) was not a matter of con-
vention). But this argument already assumes what it seeks to prove-that
the conjunctions of theories are different-for otherwise no evidence
would confirm one against the other. We are back with the same difficulty
as with (2), (3), (4) and ( 5 ) . It remains the case that there is no knock-
down proof that the rival theories are the same, even if you adopt
the weakest verificationist criterion. Again the only way to settle
things is to spell out in detail what it would be like for each of the
conjunctions to hold, and see if they obviously describe different states
of affairs. For myself I now find it difficult to see that they do-whatever
the M or M', for I cannot make scnse of the suggested contrast between
the alternatives 'B is at rest absolutely' and 'B is in uniform absolute
motion', unless these are added to physical theories which give content
to the 'absolute'. I cannot understand what is meant by saying that
something is moving, unless it is implied or stated relative to what it is
' A similar conclusion also holds if we consider not Special Theory, but the modern
cosmology of the Robertson-Walker line element. See Swinburne [1968], p. 59 f.
See Swinburne [rg68], p. 65 f. for a development of such a physics.
 Conventionalism About Space and Time 271
moving. Certainly there may be a substance such as the aether filling all
space, and thus a difference between bodies which move relative to the
aether and bodies which do not. But the moment such a substance is
given as the relatum of motion, the question can be asked whether it is
moving absolutely or not; and its absolute motion cannot be just motion
relative to something in space. (For if it were, we could raise the question
about the motion of that something.) And even if space itself is a substance
in some sense, I just cannot understand the differences between a body
which moves relative to it and a body which does not. But this may be
simply the result of a lack of philosophical insight on my part, and maybe
more detailed spelling out of the hypothesis would reveal to me the
difference. I do not wish to deny that there is a difference between uniform
motion relative to an inertial frame, and acceleration relative to an inertial
frame. Nor that (if the laws of nature were different) there could be, for
all F and F' when F' is in motion relative to F, an observable difference
between the laws governing the behaviour of bodies when in motion
relative to F and the laws governing their behaviour when in motion
relative to F'. I am merely denying that an explanation of this difference
in terms of F being at rest 'absolutely' describes a state of affairs intelligible
without a physical theory about 'absolute motion' to give meaning to this
otherwise empty notion.
The main point of this paper was not however to solve the problems
of whether ( I ) , (z), (3), (4), ( 5 ) and (6) are matters of convention. It was
rather to point out that if you attempt to solve them as conventionalists
always have done by an appeal to verficationist criteria you would need
some implausibly strong criteria to show any of them to be matters of
convention; that weaker verificationist criteria show (6) not to be a matter
of convention, but do not settle matters for (I), (z), (3), (4) and ( 5 ) ; and
that the only way to settle the status of these is by the non-verificationist
method of careful spelling-out of alternatives, which does not allow things
to be settled by quick knock-down arguments.
University of Keele

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