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Richard Swinburne
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 31, No. 3. (Sep., 1980), pp. 255-272.
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Wed Jun 6 07:58:06 2007
Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 31 (1980),255-272 Printed in Great Britain
I n recent years philosophical writing about space and time has been
permeated with a distinction between matters of fact and matters of
convention. This distinction was due to Riemann and PoincarC but was
developed and popularised by Reichenbach and Griinbaum. Certain
claims of science are said to be truly factual and others to be merely
conventional. Similar kinds of distinction are of course to be found in
philosophical writing about many other issues. I n general philosophy of
science there is the distinction between observable entities and properties,
and theoretical entities and properties; and nowadays in philosophical
writing about language some writers wish to distinguish sharply between
such factual matters as which noises a subject uttered at a certain time
and such matters of theory as what he meant by what he said. My main
concern here is with space and time, but we need to be aware of the wider
background.
A matter is factual if it is expressed by a factual statement. A factual
statement is one which, if true, would state a fact. Something is a fact,
I suppose, for these writers, if it truly or really holds, if it is an objective
feature of the world. If a factual statement is true, its negation is false;
and conversely. By contrast, something is a matter of convention, in the
terminology of these writers, if the statement which expresses it is not
factual; and so if it is as near to the truth as its apparent negation (i.e. the
statement which by its verbal form is the negation of the original statement,
and would be its negation if the original statement were factual. If a state-
ment is not factual and so not really making a claim, it cannot properly
have a negation.) Let us call such a statement a conventional statement.
A conventional statement may form a useful part of science but it does
not have a truth-value on its 0wn.l I n conjunction with some other
statement it may form a statement with a truth-value-indeed the same
*An earlier version of this paper was read at a meeting of the British Society for the
Philosophy of Science in May 1979.I am most grateful to those who produced valuable
criticisms of it on that occasion and on similar occasions.
Thus Reichenbach ([1958],p. 19)claims that in deciding on the criteria for congruence,
we are making 'an arbitrary decision that is neither true nor false'.
256 Richard Swinburne
truth-value as the conjunction, of its negation with a different statement.
The two provide alternative ways of representing the same facts.
The above seems to me the central claim which the writers cited wish to
make about the statements about space and time which I shall shortly list,
normally by calling them 'matters of convention'. Sometimes the writers
say that alternative theories on these matters are 'co-legitimate alternatives',
or 'factually co-legitimate', or, with respect to different measures of
spatial and temporal intervals, that they can be adopted 'with equal factual
legitimacy', i.e. that in this sense space or time are 'alternatively
metrizable'.' I n his later writings Adolf Grunbaum has developed more
specialised senses of 'conventional' and etymologically similar terms-e.g.
he wants to say that measurements of congruence are 'convention-laden'
if and only if there is no intrinsic metric to space (i.e. if there are no
spatial atoms of finite volume). But as Grunbaum also seems to use the
other phrases quoted above and similar phrases to make the points which
the other writers make, we can list him as holding that the claims which
I shall discuss are matters of convention in their sense.
A very simple example will illustrate the distinction which the con-
ventionalist has in mind. 'There are four men in this room' is a factual
statement: but 'there are x men in this room' is only a conventional
statement. By itself the latter has no more truth to it than 'there are 2x
men in this room'. But the former constitutes a factual statement when
conjoined to 'and x = 4', indeed the same factual statement as the
statement made when the latter is conjoined to 'and x = 2'. (In formal
logic the conjoining would involve the variable of the second statement
being governed by the quantifier of the first statement.)
I do not dispute the utility of this distinction. My concern in this paper
is with the statements which the writers concerned claim to be conventional
and with the criteria which they are using in order to classify them. I list
six issues, central in the philosophy of space and time, which the writers
concerned have claimed to be matters of convention:
(I) Whether a body, such as the Earth, is really in motion (as opposed to,
e.g. whether it is moving relative to the Sun, which is a matter of fact).
(2) What is the metrical geometry of a region of space-e.g. whether the
interior angles of a rectilinear triangle in physical space sum to 180".
(3) Whether the distance between two points A and B is or is not the
same distance as that between two different points C and D (when
C and D do not both lie between A and B); i.e. whether AB is
congruent with CD.
For these phrases see (e.g.) Griinbaum [1970],p. 580.
Conventionalism About Space and Time 257
(4) Whether the temporal interval between two instants of time t, and t, is
the same as that between two instants t , and t , (when t , and t , do not
both lie between t, and t,).
( 5 ) What is the topology of space-e.g. whether a certain line in space
returns to its starting point or only to a point which looks like its
starting point; and so whether or not space is finite.
(6) Whether two events E, and E * at different places are simultaneous
(when E, and E* are not in fact connectible by a signal-viz. when
you cannot send a signal from the place of E, at the time of E, to
arrive at the place of E" before or at the same time as the occurrence
of E*, or conversely).
The grounds which the conventionalists give for holding ( I ) . . . (6) to
be matters of convention are of course very loosely, that no one can
actually observe whether things are as ( I ) . . . (6) claim; that so long as
one is prepared to make alternative hypotheses about other unobservable
matters (which one can do without the danger of being shown mistaken
by observations) one can maintain which position one likes on the issues;
and that there is no unknown factual truth here, because the only such
truths are those which are 'in principle' checkable. The conventionalist
is thus a verificationist who holds that a statement is a factual statement
only if it is in some way verifiable or falsifiable by observation. What I wish
to do in this paper is, first, to point out that there are different
verificationist theses which have different consequences from each other
about which of ( I ) . . . (6) are matters of convention; secondly, to show
that only the stronger verificationist theses prove any of them to be matters
of convention; and thirdly to comment briefly that the stronger verification-
ist theses are intuitively not nearly as plausible as the weaker ones.
Although conventionalists put forward verificationist arguments for their
positions, they seldom distinguish clearly between different possible
verificationist theses. Out of many different verificationist theses which
could be maintained, I select four typical ones in decreasing order of
strength (a thesis being stronger in so far as it pronounces fewer statements
to be factual, i.e. rules out more statements from being factual):
Quine [1975] has suggested a test of a non-verificationist kind for determining whether
two theories which predict the same observations are logically equivalent. T h e test,
roughly, is that two theories are logically equivalent if we can get the one from the
other by substituting predicates throughout. T h u s our present theory of physics and
chemistry is logically equivalent to one obtained from that theory by replacing all
occurrences in it of 'electron' by 'molecule', and all occurrences of 'molecule' by
'electron'. However, as Quine states, this test is concerned only with predicates which
(p. 319) 'do not figure essentially in any observation sentences'. But theories normally
contain a large number of terms which do occur in observation sentences-e.g.
'contains', 'is composed of', 'particle', 'wave' and in our examples 'distance', 'length',
'moves' and 'at rest'. Whether these terms occur 'essentially' raises a host of difficulties
which are no easier to solve than our original difficulties. Quine has no doubt provided
a sufficient condition for logical equivalence, but it is in no way obvious that he has
provided a useful test, let alone that he has provided a necessary condition for logical
equivalence. He admits that in practice there are great difficulties in applying his test.
T h e real difficulty is that theories use terms with extra-theoretical meaning (as they
must, if they are to be informative) and it is far from clear to what the use of these
terms commits a speaker.
Conventionalism About Space and Time 269
spelling-out goes on, it may clearly click that the Universes differ or that
they are the same. That may seem feeble, but is not all argument an
attempt to settle something questionable by appealing to something more
obvious? This is merely a case of that. It might be thought that the logical
equivalence of the two Universes (and so the conventionality of (3)) could
be proved by showing that the affirmation of existence of a Universe of
one kind and the denial of the existence of any Universe of the other kind
generated a contradiction. And indeed so it could. But I cannot see how
to prove that there is a contradiction until you have proved by some other
method (e.g. my feeble spelling out) that there is no difference between
the two Universes. For myself, I can only find that this attempt to spell
nut a difference between alternative theories in this field fails, and that
I cannot make any sense of the supposed distinction between distance
and what would be measured by actual rods.
(5) on the other hand I find different. There does seem to me to be
a clear difference between a non-Euclidean universe (N,) and a Universe
with Euclidean geometry in which all effects are replicated (El). I can
try to make this clear to someone who does not see the difference by
spelling out what is involved in the latter. I ask him to consider another
Euclidean universe of nested spheres (E,) in which effects on Sphere I are
replicated in almost every detail in Spheres 5, 9, 13 etc., but not quite. Such
a universe would be entirely different in character from the non-Euclidean
universe Nl in which you reach Sphere I again by passing from Sphere I
through spheres 2, 3 and 4. But the universe El in which effects were
perfectly replicated would only be very slightly different from E,. So El
could not be the same as Nl. In this way I try to draw a contrast between
Euclidean and non-Euclidean universes. Others may not accept that
I have succeeded in making a contrast, but in that case all that can be
done is to go on drawing out the differences and similarities until it does
click that the universes are the same or different. Whether or not there
are real distinctions to be made between different kinds of relevant
Universe, and so whether ( z ) , (3), (4) and (5) are matters of convention
is something which can only be shown by detailed spelling-out of what
the alternatives amount to-and the process may not immediately lead
everyone to the right conclusion. The arguments here may be correct
without being immediately persuasive.
(I) is in a different position from (z), (3), (4) and (5) in that not merely
can criteria [A] and [B] be deployed to show it to be a matter of con-
vention, but criterion [C]clearly can as well. For it follows from the Special
Theory of Relativity, as from Newtonian mechanics, that there will be no
observable phenomena which are more plausibly explained by supposing
270 Richard Swinburne
that a body is at rest relative to an absolute rest frame than by supposing
that it is in uniform motion relative to that frame. This is because Special
Theory plus the theory that a body B is in motion relative to an absolute rest
frame predicts exactly the same consequences as Special Theory plus the
theory that B is at rest relative to that frame, and neither conjunction of
theories is simpler than the other. Hence, even if we can talk of an absolute
rest frame and so of absolute rest and motion, the two theories that B is in
absolute motion and that B is at rest absolutely will be equally well
confirmed or disconfirmed by all factual claims which it is physically
possible to observe to hold,l and hence by criterion [C] they are the same
theory.
However, it is logically possible that there be observable phenomena
incompatible with Special Theory which are most plausibly explained by
a rival physics It could be that M plus the theory that B was in
absolute uniform motion yielded different observable consequences from
the consequences predicted by M plus the theory that B was at rest
absolutely; that these latter consequences were observed, and that the
only way to save the theory that B was in absolute motion was by making
M into a more complex theory M'. (M plus the theory that B was absolutely
at rest) might predict all the observations which it was logically possible
to make, as did (M' plus the theory that B was in absolute motion). Yet
because M was simpler than M', one might claim that the observations
confirmed the former conjunction more than the latter, and so that these
were not logically equivalent (and so that ( I ) was not a matter of con-
vention). But this argument already assumes what it seeks to prove-that
the conjunctions of theories are different-for otherwise no evidence
would confirm one against the other. We are back with the same difficulty
as with (2), (3), (4) and ( 5 ) . It remains the case that there is no knock-
down proof that the rival theories are the same, even if you adopt
the weakest verificationist criterion. Again the only way to settle
things is to spell out in detail what it would be like for each of the
conjunctions to hold, and see if they obviously describe different states
of affairs. For myself I now find it difficult to see that they do-whatever
the M or M', for I cannot make scnse of the suggested contrast between
the alternatives 'B is at rest absolutely' and 'B is in uniform absolute
motion', unless these are added to physical theories which give content
to the 'absolute'. I cannot understand what is meant by saying that
something is moving, unless it is implied or stated relative to what it is
' A similar conclusion also holds if we consider not Special Theory, but the modern
cosmology of the Robertson-Walker line element. See Swinburne [1968], p. 59 f.
See Swinburne [rg68], p. 65 f. for a development of such a physics.
Conventionalism About Space and Time 271
moving. Certainly there may be a substance such as the aether filling all
space, and thus a difference between bodies which move relative to the
aether and bodies which do not. But the moment such a substance is
given as the relatum of motion, the question can be asked whether it is
moving absolutely or not; and its absolute motion cannot be just motion
relative to something in space. (For if it were, we could raise the question
about the motion of that something.) And even if space itself is a substance
in some sense, I just cannot understand the differences between a body
which moves relative to it and a body which does not. But this may be
simply the result of a lack of philosophical insight on my part, and maybe
more detailed spelling out of the hypothesis would reveal to me the
difference. I do not wish to deny that there is a difference between uniform
motion relative to an inertial frame, and acceleration relative to an inertial
frame. Nor that (if the laws of nature were different) there could be, for
all F and F' when F' is in motion relative to F, an observable difference
between the laws governing the behaviour of bodies when in motion
relative to F and the laws governing their behaviour when in motion
relative to F'. I am merely denying that an explanation of this difference
in terms of F being at rest 'absolutely' describes a state of affairs intelligible
without a physical theory about 'absolute motion' to give meaning to this
otherwise empty notion.
The main point of this paper was not however to solve the problems
of whether ( I ) , (z), (3), (4), ( 5 ) and (6) are matters of convention. It was
rather to point out that if you attempt to solve them as conventionalists
always have done by an appeal to verficationist criteria you would need
some implausibly strong criteria to show any of them to be matters of
convention; that weaker verificationist criteria show (6) not to be a matter
of convention, but do not settle matters for (I), (z), (3), (4) and ( 5 ) ; and
that the only way to settle the status of these is by the non-verificationist
method of careful spelling-out of alternatives, which does not allow things
to be settled by quick knock-down arguments.
University of Keele
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272 Richard Swinburne
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