Journal of Public Administration Research And Theory, 2016, 677–692

doi:10.1093/jopart/muv047
Article
Advance Access publication March 1, 2016

Article

A Systems Theory Approach to Innovation

Implementation: Why Organizational Location
Matters
Tima T. Moldogaziev,* William G. Resh†
*University of Georgia; †University of Southern California

Address correspondence to the author at timatm@uga.edu

Abstract
In this study, we evaluate the “success” of adopted innovations in public organizations as a func-
tion of the relative source of innovation vis-à-vis the organizational environment. We argue that the
source of innovation will be varyingly associated with subsequent perceptions of implementation
success depending on locational characteristics of the source and the innovation’s outcome locus.
Neither “top-down” nor “bottom-up” arguments of implementation offer a complete picture of
perceived implementation success of public sector innovations. Rather, in addition to the vertical
perspective (“top-down versus bottom-up”) of implementation success, it is the relative proximity
the source has to the related process or result that matters, which is represented by a horizontal
perspective (organization’s core versus organizational boundary or external environment). Our
empirical results offer evidence that this expected configuration of relationships, consisting of
both vertical and horizontal perspectives simultaneously, indeed exists in the public sector.

Introduction is adopted, internal organizational perspectives regard-

This research is concerned with the location of the
source of innovation vis-à-vis the locus of the inno-
vation’s impact in the organizational environment. We
believe that the locus of the source of any given innova-
tion and the locus of its impact, as well as the distance
between the two in the organizational environment,
are essential to innovation’s perceived success. Such
an explicit recognition of the relative distance of the
innovation’s source to its intended outcome will permit
policy makers to recognize ex ante where in the organ-
izational environment implementation difficulties are
likely to arise. We propose that, when an innovation
We would like to express our gratitude to Professor Richard Walker
of City University of Hong Kong, panel participants at the Public
Management Research Association’s 2013 conference in Madison,
Wisconsin, as well as the three anonymous reviewers for providing
their expert feedback on earlier drafts of the article. Any remaining
shortcomings, however, are our own.
ing its effectiveness are shaped based on the locational
interaction of an intended outcome of interest and
sources behind the adopted innovation. Empirical evi-
dence is limited on the issue of innovation sources (and
barriers) within environments of public agencies and
the subsequent success of implementation. Our work
sheds light on this set of organizational phenomena by
examining the distal covariates (vertical and horizon-
tal) of perceived success of innovation implementation.
Organizational management literature suggests that
the choice to innovate is a function of characteristics
of the innovation (Damanpour and Schneider 2008;
Frendreis 1978; Rogers 1983; Walker 2006), institutional
characteristics (Choi and Chang 2009; Damanpour
1991; Downs and Mohr 1979; Jun and Weare 2011;
Walker, Avellaneda, and Berry 2011), resource avail-
ability and fiscal health (Berry 1994; Fernandez and
Wise 2010; Salge 2011), quality of management (Borins

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678 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
2001a; Damanpour and Schneider 2008; Fernandez and
Wise 2010), individual orientations, expectations, and
needs within an organization (Angle 1989; Baer 2012;
Choi et  al. 2011; Choi and Moon 2013; Damanpour
1991; Klein and Sorra 1996), and external environments
(Dryzek and Tucker 2008; Maranto and Wolf 2013;
Marcus and Weber 1989; Walker 2008; Wu, Ma, and
Yang 2013; also all authors above). However, Boyne
et al. (2005) remind that public organizations may often
be required to adopt innovations (the source of innova-
tions is externally located) without any relative choice in
the matter; or the adopters of innovations may observe
intended and unintended outcomes of innovations
in some contexts without really understanding their
important covariates and whether such “borrowed”
innovations are likely to behave similarly in other con-
texts (Behn 2008). In such circumstances, success of
the innovation may largely be dependent on whether
it is properly administered by various actors within the
organization. At the same time, success may also be
dependent on where in the organizational environment
the innovation is intended to have an impact. It is also
possible that the decision to initiate the innovation may
sometimes be weakly related to its actual utilization by
organizational actors (Baer 2012; Klein and Sorra 1996).
As a consequence, locations of the innovation’s source
and its impact in the organizational environment, as well
as the relative distance between the two, are important
considerations in determining the innovation’s relative
implementation success.
While research is scarce on how “innovation charac-
teristics and innovation adoption” are related (as argued
in Damanpour and Schneider’s (2008) review of the lit-
erature), research examining the relative perceptions of
success in implementation of innovations after they are
initiated is even rarer (but see Baer 2012; Rogers 1983).
Following Borins (2000, 499), we are interested in how
“recent inventions that have been in operation long
enough to show results” are likely to bear out positive
evaluations by organizational members. We recognize
that not all innovations are likely to succeed postini-
tiation (numerous studies support this recognition, e.g.,
Baer 2012; Klein and Sorra 1996; Rogers 1983), and
that perceptions of successful implementation will vary
among organizational actors (Choi et al. 2011).
We test our hypothesized associations on a sample
of Australian national public servants who reported
innovation implementation in their work group in the
last 12 months. This is a large subsample of the 2011
Australian survey for the State of the Service Report
(SOSR) to the national parliament. A  unique battery
of questions on innovations allows us to study the
relationships between the loci of innovation sources
and effects vis-à-vis the organization and the perceived
success of their implementation. The three outcomes
of interest are classified according to their loci vis-à-
vis the organization—extrinsic internal processes and
results, extrinsic external processes and results, and
intrinsic processes and results.1
We contribute to the extant scholarship on innova-
tion adoption and implementation in that we offer evi-
dence that actors who introduce innovations may find
better success in implementation of some innovations
over others based on their proximity to the operational
locus of the innovation. Briefly, our findings show that
sources of innovation distant from the organization’s
technical core both vertically and horizontally, such as
industry stakeholders or other agencies, are perceived to
find success with extrinsic external processes and results
but not with extrinsic internal processes and results. At
the same time, sources of innovations that are external,
such as contractors and consultants, but pulled to the
organization’s technical core in their capacity to partici-
pate in service delivery, are perceived to find success with
extrinsic internal processes and results, but not extrinsic
external processes and results. Innovations stemming
from the organization’s technical core, such as individual
employees or their workgroups, are perceived to be the
most significant factors for innovation implementation
in all areas, be it extrinsic internal, extrinsic external,
or intrinsic processes and results. Intrinsic processes and
results appear to be associated with innovations from
the organization’s technical core but also other agencies.
Our evidence also suggests that top-down sources of
innovations, whether within or outside organizational
boundaries, such as senior leadership (internal/adminis-
trative core) or government ministers (boundary/exter-
nal environments), are perceived to be either detrimental
or ineffectual for extrinsic internal, extrinsic external, or
intrinsic processes and outcomes.
Innovation Origins and Organizational Location
Innovation adoption is a process that includes two
major phases, according to Damanpour and Schneider
(2008): initiation and implementation (497). Rogers
(1983) further divides initiation to agenda setting and
matching subphases, while implementation consists
of redefining/restructuring, clarifying, and routinizing
subphases (pp. 362–5). Implementation focuses on the
“postadoption decision activities” of the process—that
is, “when it has been actually put in use in the adopt-
ing organization” (Damanpour and Schneider 2008,
497)—the part that involves “all of the events, actions,
and decisions involved in putting an innovation into
use” (Rogers 1983, 363). Systems theory approaches
1 Please refer to the sections on outcome and explanatory variables for
details of survey item classifications of the location for the effects of
implemented innovations and loci of innovation origins. We provide an
extensive discussion of these concepts in the next section.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
to organizational analysis suggest that these decision
activities should be related to how the origin of the
innovation is oriented to the intended process or result
that defines that innovation. For instance, Daft (1978)
states that process and structural innovations will more
likely originate from the top managerial ranks because
top managers are more “tuned to new developments
that apply to these problems” (195), whereas lower-
level managers and employees will be oriented to more
narrow technical problems. Thus, if the innovation ori-
gin’s perspective is not proximate to the locus of the
innovation’s impact, where the innovator(s) can prop-
erly understand potential obstacles or opportunities
for implementation success, then that success may be
relatively muted compared to innovations that origi-
nate from better situated organizational perspectives.
The individual characteristics of the “innovator”
introducing an innovation to an organization have
long been argued to be a critical factor in innovation
adoption (e.g., Peters and Waterman 1982). This per-
spective focuses on the actions and traits of individual
organizational members. However, without a consid-
eration of the “social system in which the adoption
occurs” (Jun and Weare 2011, 497), researchers risk
losing critical contextual elements that drive innova-
tion adoption. This includes the innovation’s organiza-
tional locus and the associated risk of failure inherent
to that locus (Osbourne and Brown 2011). Innovation
scholarship from mainstream management studies has
predominantly been influenced by both open systems
theory and structural contingency theory, where the
interrelation of the organization and its environment
are emphasized (Slappendel 1996).
Innovations From the Top or From the Bottom?
Varyingly, everyone within the formal hierarchical
structure of an organization can be representative of
the technical core of the organization, or “the admin-
istrative unit…within which the pricing and allocation
of labor is governed by a set of administrative rules and
procedures’ rather than market forces… characterized
by a cluster of jobs that are hierarchically structured
into one or more job ladders representing a progression
of knowledge or skills” (Scott 2003, 193). The techni-
cal core of the organization is the personnel and tech-
nologies that are expressly developed to carry out the
main functions of the organization (i.e., transforming
inputs to outputs) (Scott 2003). The technical core has
been conceptualized as distinct from the organization’s
“administrative core”—that is, the top management
tiers of the organization—by Daft (1978) and others
(e.g., Damanpour 1991). Using school organizations
as an example, Daft argues that innovation emanates
from either core; and that how tightly (loosely) coupled
the two cores are to one another depends on the level
679
of professionalization within the technical core of the
organization. The more professionalized the employee
ranks, the more loosely coupled this technical core
will be to the administrative core. When the employee
ranks are less professionalized, the administrative core
will be more tightly coupled to the technical core.
In terms of organizational hierarchy, a generally
accepted premise is that executives perform more stra-
tegic functions such as setting strategic direction, allo-
cating resources, and communicating organizational
goals (Dirks and Skarlicki 2004, 31). Management
is thought to have a “big picture” perspective of the
organization and will be uniquely situated to pro-
pose innovations that address structural and proce-
dural arrangements that accommodate environmental
changes to which the organization must adapt (Daft
1978). The classic model of rational strategic deter-
mination, however, is “far from capturing the entire
innovative process taking place locally” (Andersen
2008). Middle managers and frontline staff in many
public organizations collectively make decisions in
implementation that directly affect overall levels of
organizational performance (Lipsky 1980). Moreover,
as Marcus and Weber (1989) argue, “Conflict between
different levels in the organization can occur as new
managers who come on board because of crisis impose
ideas on staff who are reluctant to depart from the sta-
tus quo” (537). Conversely, those managers who seek
to change the status quo may do so without adequate
feedback from the organizational members with the
institutional competence necessary to identify poten-
tial obstacles to implementation success.
Innovations From the Inside or the Outside?
Organizational members from the technical core of pub-
lic organizations inherently communicate and transact
with other organizations and institutions within their
environment (e.g., O’Toole and Meier 1999). At times,
organizational actors from ostensibly both the admin-
istrative and technical cores are pulled far enough into
external transactional relationships that they may no
longer be oriented closely enough with the organization
to understand how either administrative or technical
solutions are related to one another or how they can be
implemented appropriately to the context of the loca-
tion where implementation occurs (Scott 2003). Other
times, external actors may be co-opted or integrated
into the technical core of the organization through
relational or economic transactions based on resource
dependency or social capital (Andersen 2008; Maranto
2005; Perry and Rainey 1988). Thus, research on inno-
vations cannot simply focus on the technical core or the
organization alone but must incorporate an open sys-
tems approach that recognizes the importance of insti-
tutional context and “the networks and interactions of
680
public services” (Osbourne and Brown 2011). At the
same time, the perspectives of organizational actors
and their subsequent evaluations of success are (at least
in part) shaped by their organizational, professional,
and personal orientations, and how those respective
orientations are congruent with the origins of any given
innovation or the location of the intended policy out-
comes in the organizational environment.
Combining Vertical and Horizontal Dimensions of
Organizational Location
In Figure  1, we develop a schematic that reasonably
departs from the top-down versus bottom-up contin-
uum of vertical organizational transactions by empha-
sizing a horizontal dimension, where actors who are
not connected to the technical core functions of an
organization are essentially on the periphery of that
technical core (Scott 2003). Taking this systems theory
approach, we argue that practically no organization’s
boundaries are completely fixed and follow Osbourne
and Brown’s (2011) contention that research on public
sector innovations must accommodate “the importance
of an open systems and institutional understanding of
the sources of innovation” (1343).
The figure is presented with gradient shades of
grey to represent proximal actors’ position vis-à-
vis the technical core of the organization within the
larger organizational environment. In this heuristic,
the technical core of the organizational environment is
represented by the dark grey areas of the figure, lying
predominantly within the “organizational” pole of the
horizontal dimension. External actors to the organiza-
tion fall along the horizontal continuum from partner
to stakeholder. As the gradient shades imply, however,
we use these terms only for the purposes of heuristi-
cally parsing this horizontal distance from the inter-
nal operations of the organization. One can assume
that contractors, for instance, are likely to be more
tightly joined to the technical core of an organization
Figure 1.  Heuristic of Distal Organizational Perspective
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
than clientele or stakeholders (Isett and Provan 2005),
though this may vary by organization and the nature
of its interaction with its environment.
Both horizontally and vertically, the location of
peripheral actors falls along a distal dimension in rela-
tion to the concept of technical core. An organization
can certainly employ members who do not perform
tasks related to its core functions, and therefore these
organizational members can be considered peripheral
actors. At the same time, more diagonally peripheral
actors—such as politicians—may become less periph-
eral and more fully incorporated with greater control
over managerial action (Scott 2003, 197). Following
Thompson (1967), we make the assumption that any
organization’s frontline workers and middle manag-
ers are more representative of the technical core of the
organization. Other actors within an organizational
environment, we argue, vary along a two-dimensional
continuum of vertical and horizontal proximity to this
technical core. In terms of verticality, we suggest that
various actors are understood to be endowed with more
or less power (encompassed by various terms such as
hierarchy, prestige, “votes, wealth, and propensity of the
group to mobilize for action”) (Schneider and Ingram
1993, 335). The dimension of verticality has been the
predominant focus of implementation and innovation
studies (e.g., Borins 2000; deLeon and deLeon 2002;
Klein and Sorra 1996; O’Toole 1986; Sabatier 1986),
while the horizontal dimension less so (e.g., Marcus
and Weber 1989; Nasi et  al. 2015; Postema, Groen,
and Krabbendam 2012). Our systems theory approach
merges the two perspectives and examines organiza-
tional location (i.e., proximity to the technical core) by
both vertical and horizontal dimensions.
The Location of Innovation’s Origin Versus the
Location of Outcomes
The notion of organizational location becomes impor-
tant in the study of innovations (Baldock and Evers
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
1991; Ferlie, Challis, and Davies 1989). Political
actors, such as ministers and appointees, are likely to
induce innovations targeting results along organiza-
tional boundaries or external environments using rules
and directives from a higher verticality, yet external,
perspective (e.g., Borins 2000; Marcus and Weber
1989). At the same time, senior agency leaders have
been found to be less likely than middle managers and
lower-level employees to be the source of successful
innovations (Borins 2000). This does not mean that,
when introduced, top-down innovations always ignore
the technical core of the organization at the expense of
addressing an externally perceived crisis. Rather, it may
be that an organization attempts to seal the technical
core from environmental disturbances to the extent
possible (Scott 2003; Thompson 1967), and distal
actors, both along the vertical and horizontal dimen-
sions, become disadvantaged in their capacity to bring
about change within the technical core of the organi-
zation. Such an expectation is consistent with Daft’s
(1978) notion that leadership is more oriented to the
“administrative” core of the organization.
Others argue that most environmental change is
“emergent, enacted, and interwoven with the [organiza-
tion’s] action itself” (Lynn 2005, 44). Thus, employees’
interaction with their external environment is constant
and direct, and “buffers” are too decentralized and
inconsistent across most modern organizations to pro-
vide adequate conceptual explanation (Zimmerman
1993; Zimmerman and Hurst 1992). Despite this
rather salient debate on the impact of buffering based
on organizational structure, location, and perspective,
very little empirical work that captures these relation-
ships exists (see Lynn 2005, for an excellent review
and conceptual argument). Nonetheless, as employees
from the technical core engage in interactions with
actors from organization’s boundary or external envi-
ronments, the proximity of different external actors
and institutions to the technical core should still vary
according to their vertical and hierarchical loci.
To this end, the most interesting are the paths
toward innovation outcomes that potentially develop
as a result of the innovation’s origin. Jun and Weare
(2011) examine the goal characteristics of various
innovations in terms of locational orientation (i.e.,
“internal” versus “external”), where the level of obser-
vation is the municipality. Borins (2000) finds that
actors within the technical core are more likely to find
success (since “success” is a given in the innovation
award samples he employs) in response to internal
problems and have a positive correlation with support
from “immediate supervisors and a negative correla-
tion with support from the president or governor, the
legislature, business lobbies, and the general public”
(503). Meanwhile, innovations initiated by higher-level
681
officials had relatively better support from the more
peripheral actors of the organizational environment
compared to the actors from the technical core.2
Extrinsic Versus Intrinsic Results and Processes
Continuing the logic of systems theory, the outcomes
of innovations (both intended and unintended) may be
varyingly located vis-à-vis the organizational environ-
ment. The proximity of sources of innovations to the
loci of these outcomes of innovations is likely to have
a vital determination of whether the effects of inno-
vations are perceived significant. Therefore, we expect
that the locus of the source of the innovation will be
positively associated with the locus of the innova-
tion’s pursued process or result. For instance, organi-
zational members of the technical core will be better
equipped to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportu-
nities, and threats to implementing a given innova-
tion if that innovation changes processes and results
within that locus of the organizational environment.
However, the changes can either be extrinsically or
intrinsically related to individuals’ jobs—whereas the
extrinsic effect of an organizational process or result
drives individuals’ behavior from outside their intrinsic
motivations.
Intrinsic results and processes have to do with the
less tangible benefits of innovations such as self-fulfill-
ment, empowerment, and job satisfaction (Brief and
Aldag 1977). Whereas, extrinsic results and processes
have to do with driving behavior by “factors or events
whose delivery is dependent on a source outside of
the immediate task” (Brief and Aldag 1977, 496) that
can be located in relatively internal (e.g., adminis-
trative procedures) or external (e.g., client service,
cross-agency collaboration) loci of the organizational
environment. Given these locational characteristics,
we have classified extrinsic outcomes of innovations
to internal versus external loci based on their prox-
imity to the organizational core. Intrinsic outcomes
of innovations, however, will be internal to individual
employees and lack an external equivalent. In Table 1,
2 For an interesting perspective on innovation implementation, see
de Vries, Bekkers, and Tummers (2014). In their meta-analysis of the
implementation scholarship, the authors classify main outcomes of
implemented innovations and find that approximately only 60% of the
studies in their sample (of 163 studies) ever reported any substantive
results (whether positive or negative) for implemented innovations
(24). Very rarely, it appears from this review, empirical studies concern
themselves with how the locational characteristics of innovation
processes or results vary—such as external processes or results such
as involving citizens, gaining customer satisfaction, involving private
parties versus internal aspects such as improving safety or procedural
fairness concerns. However, a report by Nasi et al. (2015) distinguishes
between “outer” and “inner” contexts for sources and barriers of
innovations and offers very timely evidence on social innovations from
six European Union countries.
682 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4

Table 1.  Effects on Processes and Results by Organizational Location

Extrinsic Intrinsic

Internal External

Cost of performing work Client service Job satisfaction

Administrative procedures Cross-agency collaboration Self-fulfillment
Workplace changes Client access to information Employee Empowerment
Personnel reform Performance reporting

we provide delineated examples for the three concep-
tual distinctions, which we apply to our classification
of loci of innovation outcomes.
Expected Relationships
In the following paragraphs, we briefly outline our
expectations for the relationships between the various
innovation sources and the loci of intended processes
or results that they address. First, we argue that indi-
viduals and workgroups closest to the core, mission-
oriented tasks of the organization, have the highest
impact on organizational outcomes (Lipsky 1980).
Borins (2000, 2001b, 2001c), for example, identifies
that innovations initiated by frontline employees or
middle managers in government service delivery are
the most frequent (as opposed to politicians or agency
heads).
However, initiation does not imply “to carry out,
accomplish, fulfill, produce, complete” (i.e., implemen-
tation) (Pressman and Wildavsky 1984, xxi; also Boyne
et  al. 2005; Rogers 1983). Nonetheless, the “more
incremental processes of problem solving” that derive
from the technical core of the organization should
more likely assure a long-term continuity of purpose
and institutionalization of an innovation (Andersen
2008, 54). Moreover, as Klein and Sorra (1996) argue
“implementation failure occurs when, despite [the
decision to adopt an innovation], employees use the
innovation less frequently, or less assiduously than
required for the potential benefits of the innovation to
be realized” (1055). When the source of the innovation
is the individual employee and/or her/his work team,
commitment to the innovation and implementation is
likely to be higher. Therefore, we expect that:
Hypothesis 1 (H1).  Sources of innovations
stemming from the organizational perspective
with low-to-medium verticality have a significant
and positive association with extrinsic internal
(IRP), extrinsic external (ERP), and intrinsic
(INT) processes and results.
We take into account that contractors and consult-
ants often take on a role within, or complementary to,
the technical core in which they are “vested with the
daily responsibilities of making things work (and often
across organizations boundaries)” (Bogason 2000,
1; as cited in Andersen 2008, 55). In addition, litera-
ture on service contracting suggests that, quite often,
changes in cost schedules, organizational and service
delivery processes, and work structures are the most
widely cited reasons for public-private partnerships
(Brudney et  al. 2004; Fernandez, Smith, and Wenger
2006). Therefore, we expect that:
Sources of innovations stemming from
H2. 
partner sources closest to service delivery,
i.e., of low verticality (such as contractors/
consultants), have a significant and positive
association with extrinsic internal (IRP)
processes and results (i.e., cost of doing
work, administrative procedures, where
work is done). The association weakens
as the partner source is of medium-to-high
verticality (i.e., further removed from ser-
vice delivery).
Furthermore, due to their location in the organiza-
tional environment vis-à-vis the technical core, we
expect that:
H3. 
Sources of innovations stemming from
stakeholder sources across all dimensions
of verticality (such as industry stakehold-
ers and the general public) have a signifi-
cant and positive association with extrinsic
external (ERP) processes and results (i.e.,
client or service user satisfaction, cross-
agency collaboration, client or user access
to information).
At the same time, as the focus of stakeholder sources
of innovations would most likely be concerned with
external outcomes (Borins 2001a, 2001b; Scott
2003; see also Osbourne and Brown 2011), we
expect that:
H4. 
Sources of innovations stemming from
stakeholder sources across all dimensions
of verticality (such as industry stakehold-
ers and the general public) have a minimal
to nonexistent association with extrinsic
internal (IRP) and intrinsic (INT) pro-
cesses and results.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
Examining the adoption of e-government innovations,
Jun and Weare (2011) argue that public organizations
embedded in US municipal contexts “endeavor to ful-
fill institutional expectations by adopting practices
employed by peer organizations” (512). We follow
Deci and Ryan (2002) and argue that such motiva-
tions of “relatedness” are distally linked to intrinsic
processes or results that foster engagement, improved
performance, continuity of purpose, and ingenuity
(10). Here, we posit a two-tailed hypothesis because
there is a substantial literature in both public choice
theories of bureaucracy and in studies of governmental
contracting that postulate a purely transactional rela-
tionship between a contractor and its principal (the
public agency) for producing external processes and
results, and potentially having little to do with intrin-
sic processes and results. These contractual theories of
organization are premised on assumptions of distrust
between principals and agents rather than the possibil-
ity of establishing trust, which is a critical antecedent
to various intrinsic motivations within organizational
settings (Barnard 1968; Bertelli and Smith 2010; Dirks
and Skarlicki 2004). Consequently, we expect that:
H5. 
Sources of innovations stemming from
partner sources with low-to-medium ver-
ticality (such as other agencies and con-
tractors/consultants) have a significant
association (positive or negative) with
intrinsic (INT) processes and results (i.e.,
evaluation of quality of one’s work and job
satisfaction – feel-good factors) (two-tailed
hypothesis).
Simultaneously, other agencies and contractors may
serve as important sources of innovations that are rel-
evant for interagency collaboration and coproduction
or service quality, which are externally oriented pro-
cesses and results. Therefore, we expect that:
H6. 
Sources of innovations stemming from
partner sources with low-to-medium ver-
ticality have a significant and positive
association with extrinsic external (ERP)
processes and results (i.e., client services
and interagency cooperation).
Borins (2001a, 2001b, 2001c) has reported that for
innovations to be successful, they must be supported
by organization’s leaders. In a similar domain, Manz
et  al. (1989) state that leadership is important in the
innovation process—“Leaders, and often multiple
leaders, helped sensitive and fragile innovations at
various stages of development and implementation”
(614). Importantly, innovations that originate from
top officials may be independent of and complemen-
tary to other ongoing policies that cultivate conditions
683
and climates for innovations within the organization.
Actual top-down innovations may signal to employees
the potential outcome preferences and resource alloca-
tion choices within an organization, which may improve
the odds of successful innovation implementation.
However, as Osbourne and Brown (2011) sum-
marize, there is a conflict of interests as to what the
innovations must target. According to them, the top-
down locus of innovation is primarily about efficiency,
whereas the concern from bottom-up is primarily
about effectiveness. Therefore, controlling for other
factors, the public sector workforce may be at odds
with top-down innovations, which potentially could
have an inverse (or neutral at best) effect on success-
ful implementation of top-down innovations. Finally,
in terms of a link between external processes and
results with innovations from senior leaders, there is
an additional layer of nuance where organizational
sources with high verticality may not necessarily target
improvements in cross-agency collaboration, which
is an important component of external processes and
results. Instead, ambitious “climbers,” “zealots,” “con-
servers,” and “advocates” may be engaged in turf wars
or resource maximization struggles (Downs 1967;
Niskanen 1975). More likely, however, they are con-
cerned with the exigencies of their positions. Given
the emphasis on responsive competence at the high-
est strata of public bureaucracies (Moe 1989), “career
public servants may not be rewarded for successful
innovation and will likely be punished for unsuccess-
ful innovation” (Borins 2000, 500). Therefore, we
state that:
Sources of innovations stemming from
H7. 
organizational sources with high vertical-
ity (such as senior leaders) have a signifi-
cant association (positive or negative) with
extrinsic internal (IRP), extrinsic external
(ERP), and intrinsic (INT) processes and
results (two tailed hypothesis).
Similar to senior organizational leadership, govern-
ment ministers and appointees serve an important role
in shaping policy choices within government agencies.
However, government ministers or political appointees
are located closer to organizational boundaries (and
their role is best described by an open systems orien-
tation as discussed in Osbourne and Brown 2011);
though, in Westminster models of government, the two
may be somewhat blurred. Still, we believe that innova-
tions from political leadership would more accurately
fit the top-down approach of innovation adoption.
Thus, we expect that:
H8. 
Sources of innovations stemming from
partner sources with high verticality (such
684 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
as elected officials or Ministers) have a
significant association (positive or nega-
tive) with extrinsic internal (IRP), extrinsic
external (ERP), and intrinsic (INT) pro-
cesses and results (two tailed hypothesis).
Data and Methods
Our data come from the Australian Public Service (APS)
State of the Service Employee Survey (SSES) under-
taken in 20113 on behalf of the APS Commission.4
The target of the survey is the central government of
the Commonwealth of Australia and does not include
state/territory or local government public servants. The
dataset consists of more than 10,000 observations on a
range of questions, including a unique set of innovation
related questions that are the focus of this study.5 For
the purposes of this study, we do not need the entirety
of observations in the 2011 SSES. Given our research
question of the association between the sources of the
innovation and subsequent implementation success,
we examine only the subsample of respondents that
report innovation implementation in their respective
workgroups during the past 12 months. In other words,
individual respondents must give a positive answer to
the following item in the questionnaire to be selected
to our study sample—“In the last 12 months, has your
work group implemented any innovations?” Almost
48% (or 4,903 respondents) in the 2011 returned sam-
ple reported that their workgroup has implemented
innovations, and this is the sample that we start from.
From this focus sample of 4,903, additional observa-
tions have been dropped due to missing values in our
outcome, explanatory, and control variables, which are
described in detail below.6
3 See Supplementary Appendix 1 for details on quality of data.
4 Section 44 of the Public Service Act 1999 stipulates that the APS
Commission must produce a State of the Service Report (SOSR)
annually for the Australian Parliament. A  detailed description of the
survey, technical, and relevant statistical reports are available on the
webpage of the Australian Public Service (APS) Commission at http://
www.apsc.gov.au/about-the-apsc/parliamentary/state-of-the-service
(accessed November 19, 2015).
5 This survey was administered on a stratified sample of over 17,326
APS employees from the total population of 165,906 Australian public
servants (in agencies of at least 100 employees), which is slightly over
10% of the entire national public workforce in the country. The survey
yielded a response rate of 59%, or 10,222 completed surveys. Details
of the 2011 survey are available at http://www.apsc.gov.au/about-the-
apsc/parliamentary/state-of-the-service/employee-survey-results
(accessed November 19, 2015).
6 We have compared the means and SDs for our variables of interest
in the missing sample and the sample we are using in our analyses
for those respondents that reported implementing innovations in their
workgroup. Using a standard test of differences of means, we find that
the two samples do not have statistically significant differences along
individual, workgroup, or organizational characteristics. The results of
the means-test analyses are available from the authors upon request.
Outcomes of Interest: Loci of Innovation Outcomes
The outcomes of interest, as already described in the
previous sections, are classified to extrinsic internal
(IRP) and external (ERP) processes and results as well
as intrinsic (INT) processes and results when innovation
implementation is reported. We empirically examine the
covariates of these three outcome loci of interest. We
build scales (see items and statistics in Supplementary
Appendix 2) for each of our three outcomes of inter-
est based on the loci in the organizational environment
and extract their first varimax rotated factor scores,
produced by a regression method using the respective
indicators employed from the survey.7 We find that the
questionnaire items used for the three outcome scales
load on a single eigenvalue rather well in all three cases.
The first measure (IPR) reflects extrinsic processes
and results that are internal to the organization. These
internal processes and results are the cost of doing
one’s work, administrative procedures, and workplace
(where the work is done). We dropped 812 observa-
tions from the initial subsample of 4,903 observations
due to missing values in the three questions we use for
this scale. IPR has a range between −1.34 and 2.78, as
reported in Table  2 for descriptive statistics. The sec-
ond outcome measure reflects extrinsic processes and
results that are external to the organization. External
processes and results (EPR) are client or service user
satisfaction, cross-agency collaboration, and client or
user access to information. We dropped further 943
observations due to missing values in these measures.
EPR has a range of −1.21 to 3.20. Finally, the third
outcome measure reflects intrinsic processes and results
(INT) within a job setting. INT is related to the quality
of one’s work and one’s job satisfaction. Due to missing
values in these two survey items, we have dropped fur-
ther 77 observations. INT has a range of −1.04 to 2.65.
Explanatory Variables: Innovation Sources
We assess the associations of innovation sources with
the three sets of outcomes of interest. The sources of
innovations stem from three horizontal perspectives—
organizational, such as agency’s senior leadership or
self or members of one’s workgroup; partner, such as
government ministers, other agencies, or contractors
and consultants; and stakeholder, such as industry
stakeholders or members of the public. Thus, we have
a horizontal spectrum for sources of innovations, with
perspectives ranging from internal sources, partners
(and co-producers), and external sources.
7 Varimax rotation standardizes the orthogonally rotated scores by
scaling each predicted factor score by its reliability measure and
maximizes the variance of the squared loadings within factors. As
such, this rotation finds the best linear combination that describes the
indicators in all three of our outcome variables in a multidimensional
setting.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4 685

Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics, N = 1,892

Variables Mean SD Min. Max.

Outcome variables
  IPR 0.01 0.78 −2.78 1.34
  EPR 0.01 0.84 −3.20 1.21
  INT 0.04 0.77 −2.65 1.04
Explanatory variables
  Sources of innovations
   Agency’s senior leadership (“very/somewhat important” = 1; else = 0) 0.74 0.44 0.00 1.00
   Government ministers (“very/somewhat important” = 1; else = 0) 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
   Industry stakeholders (“very/somewhat important” = 1; else = 0) 0.61 0.49 0.00 1.00
   Other agencies (“very/somewhat important” = 1; else = 0) 0.56 0.50 0.00 1.00
   Self or members of work group (“very/somewhat important” = 1; else = 0) 0.94 0.24 0.00 1.00
   Contractors or consultants (“very/somewhat important” = 1; else = 0) 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00
   Members of the public (“very/somewhat important” = 1; else = 0) 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Control variables: barriers to innovations
  Barriers to innovations (“yes” = 1; else = 0) 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00
  Barriers to innovations (count of sources for barriers) 1.95 1.87 0.00 8.00
Control variables: innovations variables
  Individual innovative behavior (“SA” = 1; “SD” = 5) 1.67 0.59 1.00 5.00
  Support for new ideas (“SA” = 1; “SD” = 5) 2.09 0.85 1.00 5.00
  Know who needs to hear ideas (“SA” = 1; “SD” = 5) 2.22 0.82 1.00 5.00
  Processes for evaluating ideas (“SA” = 1; “SD” = 5) 2.74 0.96 1.00 5.00
  Climate for innovations −0.21 0.91 −2.71 2.07
Other controls
  Access to training and skills −0.01 0.90 −2.59 1.57
  Workgroup climate 0.00 0.90 −3.87 1.46
  Red tape (“SA” = 1; “SD” = 5) 2.20 0.91 1.00 5.00
  Agency size (“Small” = 1; “Large” = 3) 2.74 0.49 1.00 3.00
  Agency location (“Capital” = 1; else = 0) 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
  Status (“APS” = 1; “EL” = 2; “SES” = 3) 1.38 0.56 1.00 3.00
  Tenure (“1–5 years” = 1; “5–10 years” = 2; “10–20 years” = 3; “>20 years” = 4) 2.34 1.13 1.00 4.00
  Education (“>HS” = 1; else = 0) 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00

Source: AUS 2011 SSES, APS Commission.

Note: Outcome variables IPR, EPR, and INT are measured using a reverse scale: “large positive effect” = 1 to “large negative effect” = 5. In
the original survey, items for climate for innovations, access to training and skills, and workgroup climate are measured using a reverse scale:
“strongly agree” (SA) = 1 to “strongly disagree” (SD) = 5. During scale construction, we have inverted the reverse scales to facilitate ease of inter-
pretation of our empirical results (such that we now have “strongly agree” = 5 through “strongly disagree” = 1). For additional details of survey
data quality, questionnaire items in scales and their construct statistics, please see Supplementary Appendices 1 and 2. HS, higher secondary.

We can also rank the sources of innovations by ver-
tical location, or by ‘levels’ of ostensible power vested
with these various perspectives. These relative ranks
follow the vertical pattern, where along the organiza-
tional perspective, agency’s senior leaders are located
vis-à-vis employees and workgroups; along the partner
perspective, government ministers are located vis-à-vis
other commonwealth agencies and contractors and
consultants; and along the stakeholder perspective,
industry stakeholders are located vis-à-vis members of
the public. These three vertical power configurations
are ordered from more power to less power vested with
the above-listed sources of innovations. We have seven
sources of innovations that we cross-ordered along
these horizontal perspectives and their vertical relative
power positions. These variables are binary measures,
where the sources that are coded as very important or
somewhat important for innovations are coded as one.
In the final data-filtering step, we must drop further
1,179 observations due to missing or uninformative
responses to the questions regarding the sources of
innovations. This last filter gives us our final sample
(N = 1,892) for the study of covariates of perceived suc-
cess in innovation implementation. In this final sample,
an individual employee or his/her members of work
group are identified as important sources of innova-
tions in 94% of cases, while agency senior leadership
and industry stakeholders are next, each with 74%
and 61%. Other agencies and government ministers
are reported as important sources of adopted innova-
tions by 56% and 50% of the respondents, with mem-
bers of the public and consultants/contractors reported
686 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
as important sources of innovations only in 43% and
39% of cases, respectively.
Control Variables
Previous research identified a set of organizational
and individual-level measures that have been impor-
tant for innovation adoption and implementation.
Piening (2011) argues that barriers to innovations
(e.g., lack of support from employees) may interfere
with implementation of new policies and processes.
It is also plausible to expect that when barriers to
implementation are present, the effects of innovations
on relevant organizational processes and results may
fall short of desired levels (e.g., Klein and Sorra 1996;
Postema, Groen, and Krabbendam 2012; Rogers
1983). Moreover, if there are multiple sources of bar-
riers for implementing innovations, it may become
hard to attain any positive effects for initiated innova-
tions. About 67% of respondents reported that they
have observed barriers to innovation implementation
in their workplace.
Research on managerial support for innovations
(Damanpour and Schneider 2008), mechanisms for
innovation generation and evaluation (Berman and
Kim 2010; Damanpour and Schneider 2008; Lonti and
Verma 2003; Walker, Damanpour, and Devece 2011),
and autonomy, rewards, and resources (Andersen
2008; Fernandez and Wise 2010; Damanpour 1991;
Salge 2011; Walker 2008) shows that conditions and
climate for innovations (as summarized in Klein and
Sorra 1996; or culture of innovations as stated in
Osbourne and Brown 2011) are important determi-
nants for innovation adoption and effective imple-
mentation. Furthermore, other organizational factors
such as human resource management support and
practices for improving work and performance (Salge
2011), quality of management (Borins 2001a, 2001b,
2001c), better workforce integration and manage-
ment (Walker 2008; Walker, Damanpour, and Devece
2011), and access to training and skills (Fernandez and
Moldogaziev 2013a, 2013b) have also been found to
shape innovativeness, innovation adoption, and imple-
mentation. Given the findings in the extant literature,
we account for innovative behaviors and individual
evaluations of access to the process of generating new
ideas. We include items reflecting whether a respondent
is looking for better ways of doing things, whether s/he
receives support when suggesting new ideas, whether
the respondent knows who needs to hear the new idea
so that it is properly evaluated, and an assessment of
whether there are established processes in place for
evaluating new ideas. These conditions for seeking
innovative solutions and generating innovative ideas
could potentially be conducive to the success of ongo-
ing implementation of innovations.
We further assess whether workplace climate for
innovations is related to our outcome variables. We
construct the measure of workplace climate using seven
items from the survey (see Supplementary Appendix 2).
These items reflect whether one’s workplace encour-
ages innovations and is prepared to test them, whether
one’s workplace celebrates and shares its innovations,
and whether there is autonomy, resources and rewards
available in one’s workplace for innovations. The scale
is constructed using the same varimax rotation method
that is reported in the outcome variable section above.
Principal factor analysis results show that there is a
one-factor solution in this seven-item scale of work-
place climate for innovations.
We also control for variables that measure work-
place and workgroup related factors, agency charac-
teristics, and individual respondent characteristics.
Two scales—one related to access to training and
skills and another related to work group climate—
provide workplace and workgroup-specific informa-
tion (see Supplementary Appendix 2); in each case,
the items again load on a single factor. Organizational
factors such as size, location, or formalization and
rules are consistently found to be significant covari-
ates of innovation adoption and implementation
both in the public and private sectors (Damanpour
1991; Damanpour and Schneider 2008; Downs and
Mohr 1979; Jun and Weare 2011; Maranto and Wolf
2013; Walker 2006, 2008; Walker, Avellaneda, and
Berry 2011). Thus, we control for agency size—small,
medium, or large—and agency location—capital ver-
sus regions. For rules-related obstacles within one’s
work environment, we control for individual assess-
ments of whether organizational red tape affects pro-
ductivity in the workplace.
Finally, there are three control variables that are
individual specific in our models. We control for sta-
tus, tenure, and education. Previous empirical evidence
demonstrates that experience and professionalism as
measured by education, tenure, and organizational
status are significant covariates of innovations within
organizations (Damanpour 1991). Senior Executive
Service (SES) is about 4% in the final sample, while
Executive Level (EL) and APS represent about 30%
and 66%, respectively. Therefore, about two-third of
the respondents are in the APS.8 Tenure is measured
using four ordered categories—1–5 years, 5–10 years,
10–20  years, and more than 20  years. On average,
respondents in the sample have spent 5–10 years in the
Australian central government at the time of the survey.
8 According to the technical note of the survey, about 69% of the national
(central) government employees are classified as part of the APS (from
APS1 to APS6); about 27% are classified as El (EL1 and EL2); and about
2% are classified as SES (from SES1 to SES3).
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
For education, we have a measure of whether one has
completed more than high school education. We find
over 52% respondents in the survey have degrees
beyond high school. Finally, all models include survey
weights. The technical notes for the Senior Executive
Survey Report (SESR) indicate that the weights account
for status level, agency, agency size, and agency location.
Statistical Methods
Considering the continuous nature of our outcome
variables and their statistical properties, we conduct
ordinary least squares regressions. In Model 1, we
examine the associations of our explanatory and con-
trol measures with extrinsic internal processes and
results (IPR). In Model 2, we focus on extrinsic exter-
nal processes and results (EPR) and their covariates.
The last regression in Model 3 is for the covariates of
intrinsic processes and results (INT). Consequently,
the three equations for the effects of innovation can be
stated as a function of sources of innovation, barriers
to innovation, conditions and climate for innovations,
workplace and workgroup controls, and individual-
specific variables.9 Complete regression and test-of-fit
results are provided in Table 3.
Perceived effects of innovation  =  f(sources of
innovation, barriers to innovation, conditions or
climate for innovations, workplace and work-
group controls, individual-specific controls, error
term)
Empirical Results
We find, in Model 1, that the perceived success of inno-
vations tied to extrinsic internal processes and results
(IPR) is significantly greater when the source of inno-
vations is an individual employee or member of one’s
workgroup (β  =  0.544; p < .001). All held constant,
when innovations originate from this lower verticality-
organizational perspective, the associated levels of IPR
appear to be about 0.699 SDs greater (y-standardized
9 None of the variables in the regression models are highly correlated
with each other. Only three variables (measuring conditions and
climate for innovations) are correlated at above 0.50 and all three
have correlations of less than 0.60. Our post hoc tests for potential
multicollinearity in the estimation models show that the value inflated
factors (VIFs) are not greater than 2.10 at any time (hence, none of
1/VIF are below 0.10). We have also tested whether the assumption
of homoskedasticity holds in our models. Having found signs of
heteroskedasticity, we chose to conduct our regressions using
robust SEs. Finally, our test-of-fit statistics show that the final models
are superior to base models not containing our explanatory variables.
Postestimation Ramsey’s RESET tests provide evidence that the
models are correctly and fully specified as none of the F-statistics
are significant. We have omitted the pre- and post hoc test statistics
from the paper due to reasons of brevity.
687
coefficient).10 We also discover that IPR covary signifi-
cantly, albeit at lesser magnitude of the association,
with sources of innovations initiating from contrac-
tors and consultants (β  =  0.078; p  =  .032). Evidence
suggests that, on average, when innovations originate
from this lower verticality-partner perspective, the
associated levels of IPR are about 0.101 SDs greater.
We further find that innovations fashioned by agen-
cies’ senior leadership are perceived to be inversely
associated with the levels of IPR (β = −0.111; p = .010).
Other variables constant, when innovations originate
from this higher verticality-organizational perspective,
the associated levels of IPR appear to be reduced by
about 0.143 SDs. Lastly, none of the remaining sources
of innovations in Model 1 reach statistical significance.
Furthermore, our results from Model 2 suggest that
the perceived levels of extrinsic external processes and
results (EPR) are again the greatest when the source of
innovations is an individual employee or member of
one’s workgroup (β = 0.558; p < .001). All other vari-
ables constant, when innovations originate from this
lower verticality-organizational perspective, the asso-
ciated levels of EPR are found to be about 0.668 SDs
greater. The second greatest magnitude of the associa-
tion is related to sources of innovations starting from
other government agencies (β = 0.211; p < .001). The
results suggest that, on average, when innovations
originate from this mid-range verticality-partner per-
spective, the associated levels of EPR are about 0.253
SDs greater. The third largest positive magnitude of
the association is observed between EPR and sources
of innovations starting from stakeholder industries
(β = 0.089; p = .023). All held constant, when innova-
tions originate from this higher verticality-stakeholder
perspective, the associated levels of EPR appear to be
about 0.107 SDs greater. The findings also suggest that
innovations produced by agencies’ senior leadership
are inversely associated with EPR, all else under con-
trol (β  =  −0.118; p  =  .009). Thus, when innovations
originate from this higher verticality-organizational
perspective, the associated levels of EPR appear to be
lower by about 0.142 SDs. We find no evidence that
the remaining sources of innovations in Model 2 are
significantly related to EPR.
Last but not least, we find in Model 3 that the per-
ceived levels of intrinsic processes and results (INT)
are largest when the source of innovations is an indi-
vidual employee or member of one’s workgroup
(β  =  0.639; p < .001). All constant, when innova-
tions originate from this lower power-organizational
10 For purposes of comparing effect magnitudes, the y-standardized
coefficients are obtained for each explanatory variable in the
 x 1 ´ β x1 u i .
following manner: Outcomei = β 0 + i + ... +
Soutcome Soutcome Soutcome Soutcome
688 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4

Table 3.  OLS Regression and Model Fit Statistics for the Covariates of Innovation Success in Three Outcomes of
Interest

Model 1: Model 2: Model 3:

Variables Extrinsic (IPR) Extrinsic (EPR) Intrinsic (INT)

Sources of innovations
  Agency’s senior leadership −0.11*** (−2.54) −0.12*** (−2.58) −0.11*** (−2.74)
  Government ministers 0.01 (0.21) 0.005 (0.12) 0.016 (0.41)
  Industry stakeholders 0.04 (1.06) 0.09** (2.23) 0.044 (1.30)
  Other agencies 0.01 (0.19) 0.21*** (5.15) 0.10*** (2.88)
  Self or members of work group 0.53*** (5.22) 0.55*** (5.97) 0.63*** (6.76)
  Contractors or consultants 0.09** (2.40) 0.010 (0.26) −0.009 (−0.25)
  Members of the public −0.002 (−0.05) 0.042 (1.01) −0.018 (−0.51)
Barriers to innovations −0.032 (−0.88) 0.012 (0.31) 0.0014 (0.04)
Individual innovative behavior 0.11*** (3.63) 0.15*** (4.84) 0.18*** (6.52)
Support for new ideas 0.018 (0.66) 0.025 (0.85) 0.028 (1.06)
Know who needs to hear ideas 0.07** (2.33) 0.06* (1.91) 0.07*** (2.69)
Processes for evaluating ideas 0.049* (1.93) −0.0029 (−0.11) 0.035 (1.49)
Climate for innovations 0.18*** (6.16) 0.19*** (6.01) 0.20*** (7.45)
Access to training and skills 0.004 (0.20) −0.004 (−0.20) −0.008 (−0.40)
Workgroup climate −0.011 (−0.59) 0.016 (0.79) 0.005 (0.29)
Red tape −0.033* (−1.80) 0.0003 (0.02) −0.024 (−1.41)
Agency size 0.080** (2.04) 0.054 (1.31) 0.081** (2.12)
Agency location 0.042 (1.19) −0.011 (−0.29) 0.045 (1.33)
Status −0.013 (−0.36) −0.076* (−2.03) −0.015 (−0.49)
Tenure −0.009 (−0.60) 0.004 (0.26) −0.0023 (−0.16)
Education −0.026 (−0.74) −0.009 (−0.24) −0.019 (−0.58)
Constant 0.181 (0.96) −0.049 (−0.25) 0.200 (1.16)
Bayesian information criterion 4,215 4,504 4,007
Log-likelihood −2,021 −2,165 −1,917
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.160 0.231

Note: OLS, ordinary least square.

Level of significance: *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01. All regression models also include survey weights as a control measure (omitted from
the table for brevity). A summary of hypothesized associations and statistical evidence is presented in Supplementary Appendix 3.

perspective, the associated levels of INT are likely to
be about 0.836 SDs greater. We also learn that the lev-
els of INT are significantly associated with sources of
innovations initiating from other government agencies
(β = 0.105; p = .003). Again, all else held constant, we
find that innovations originating from this mid-range
power-partner perspective are associated with levels
of INT that are about 0.138 SDs greater. As was the
case with previous two outcome variables, we find that
innovations championed by agencies’ senior leader-
ship are negatively associated with the levels of INT
(β  =  −0.115; p  =  .005). All other measures constant,
when innovations originate from this higher vertical-
ity-organizational perspective, the levels of INT are
found to be lower by about 0.150 SDs. The remain-
ing sources of innovations in Model 3 do not appear
to have statistically significant associations with INT.
Supplementary Appendix 3 summarizes statistical
results in Models 1, 2, and 3 and whether they support
the formal hypotheses in the study.
Among control measures, positive conditions/
climates for innovations are perceived to have the
greatest positive association with each of the three
outcomes of interest that we study. A  unit improve-
ment in climate for innovations appears to result in a
0.18–0.20 unit improvement across extrinsic internal,
extrinsic external, and intrinsic processes and results
(all results significant at p < .001). Another con-
trol variable, that measures the levels of individual
innovative behavior, appears to be positively related
to all three outcomes of interest. A  unit increase in
this measure (since it is a five-choice question, a unit
increase in this Likert scale is akin to a 1 SD increase
along the range of this explanatory variable) is associ-
ated with a 0.11, 0.16, and 0.19 unit increase in IPR,
EPR, and INT. Thus, employees with robust inno-
vative behaviors are more likely to perceive greater
levels of success in innovation implementation (all
results are significant at p < .001). Finally, knowing
who needs to hear about one’s new ideas, we find, is
significant at conventional levels in Models 1 and 3
(coefficients of 0.7 and 0.8), and marginally signifi-
cant in Model 2 (a coefficient of 0.6). None of the
remaining variables are found to be important in
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
more than one outcome area for perceived successful
implementation of innovations.
Discussion and Conclusions
The data we employ in this study include both effective
and ineffective results of innovation implementation.
We examined whether significant impact is perceived
to exist for extrinsic internal, extrinsic external, and
intrinsic results and processes when innovations are
implemented. This, we believe, differentiates us from
the “best practice” research that may potentially suf-
fer from selectivity concerns (see discussions in Borins
2000, 2008; Kelman 2008). Nonetheless, our findings
are in congruence with extant literature on some key
aspects of innovation adoption and implementation
from the perspective of verticality of organizational
power and sources of innovations. Moreover, we pro-
pose a heuristic of distal organizational arrangements
that adds a horizontal perspective to a vertical one as a
more complete system of associations between the loci
of sources of innovations and the loci of innovation
results and processes in relation to the organization’s
technical core.
How Organizational Location Matters
We find empirical evidence that innovation sources are
perceived to be varyingly associated with subsequent
implementation success. In addition, we find that
implementation success varies by the loci of results
and processes of innovations vis-à-vis the technical
core. In other words, it appears that perceived success
in innovation implementation is a function of the inter-
play between the source of the innovation and the final
result or process, all of which is oriented toward differ-
ent dimensions of the organization’s environment and
its stakeholders. The core findings of the study are rel-
evant to all public sector organizations, as well as the
scholars of organizational management, in a broader
definition of the field.
From the Bottom (and Outside) Up
Importantly, perceived success of all innovations in our
analysis—be it extrinsic internal or extrinsic external
or intrinsic—is found to be predominantly dependent
on bottom-up organizational sources of innovations.
Hence, innovations may have a “local” sense to them
as reported in Borins (2000, 2008) and successful
innovations may indeed involve a myriad of tinkering
with smaller-scale adjustments by public servants in
the technical core of the organization as described by
Pollitt and Bouckaert (1991). Furthermore, for extrin-
sic internal results and processes, in addition to indi-
vidual employees and members of their workgroup,
perceived effects of innovation implementation appear
to be associated significantly with contractors and
689
consultants. These loci of innovations are both from
lower verticality perspectives of the organizational and
partner dimensions in terms of horizontal location.
At the same time, the perceived success of extrinsic
external results and processes appear to be associ-
ated, in addition to effects of individual employees and
members of their workgroup, with other agencies and
industry stakeholders. These loci represent medium
verticality partner and high verticality stakeholder per-
spectives of innovation sources. Lastly, the perceived
success of intrinsic results and processes, in addition
to individual employees and members of their work-
group, seems to be tied to innovations originating from
other agencies, which is represented by a medium ver-
ticality partner perspective of innovation source.
In addition, we find that that not all sources of
innovations are perceived to affect the success of inno-
vations. Government ministers and members of the
public are not statistically significant in any of the
models. Does it mean that innovation implementation
is fully shielded from these high verticality partner and
low verticality stakeholder perspectives of innovation
source? While the noneffect of members of the public
was expected for extrinsic internal and intrinsic results
and processes, future research must further investigate
the lack of significance for extrinsic external results
and processes.
From the Top (and Outside) Down
Perhaps the more intriguing finding is that high verti-
cality organizational locus of innovations (i.e., senior
executives or administrative core) is perceived to be
inversely associated with successful innovations. This is
another piece of evidence that supports prior findings
in the literature that bottom-up innovations may have
broad reaching consequences whereas the top-down
innovations may be largely ineffective. Even within the
organization, where organizational members are located
in relation to the technical core, the bottom-up versus
top-down dynamics will vary across organizational, cul-
tural, and constitutional contexts. In the US subnational
public sector labor market, for instance, agency leaders
who advance diagonally from one agency to another
have been found to be more likely to initiate innovation
adoptions than agency leaders who have moved up verti-
cally through the internal organizational ranks (Teodoro
2009). The relative “success” of these innovations and
whether they are perceived as such by an array of organi-
zational actors, however, remains empirically unresolved.
In Australia, the establishment of a SES was ostensi-
bly viewed as a success in relation to its Western coun-
terparts (Durant 2003; Ingraham 1997, 330). Yet, after
New Public Management reforms in the 1980s and
1990s that aimed at greater political control, ministers
accumulated superior influences over their departments’
690 Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
resources (Mascarenhas 1990). Procedural changes in
appointments for senior executives were intended to
increase their political responsiveness, as the manage-
rialist argument of neutral competence was rejected
for the realization that “senior bureaucrats do manage,
but they do much more than that; their ‘outputs’ are
no less political and policy-related than those of poli-
ticians” (Uhr 1987, 21). Senior leadership selections
are increasingly made for both patronage and policy
(Halligan 2003), and seldom are patronage and policy
wholly separable considerations. Proponents of these
changes argue that they have been largely success-
ful: “The sky did not fall in when public servants no
longer had lifetime tenure in their jobs; politicization
did not lead to corruption; most privatization did not
lead to lower levels of service and higher costs; there
was no diminution of the political contest” (Hughes
2012, 188). However, to imply that these actors are
now more readily skilled at recognizing “big picture”
problems of the organization and more adept at ensur-
ing the implementation success of innovations may still
remain a problematic notion in the public sector.
As recent research on Australian SES by Matthews,
Ryan, and Williams (2011) finds (and research on the
behavior of US career executives attests [e.g., Golden
2000]), the relative responsiveness to external envi-
ronments can range from maladaptive to adaptive
and from passive to active. In the passive maladap-
tive response, they may adopt superficially fashionable
innovations “without questioning whether the latest
management fad will help them to meet the challenges
that confront their organizations” (Matthews, Ryan,
and Williams 2011, 350). This type of response was
less likely by executives who “expressed a strong sense
of relatedness to their organizations” (355). So, while
executive or senior leadership in public bureaucracies
may vary in the extent to which they are tied to the
technical core of the organization, they may also be
generally pulled into the external environments. At the
same time, leadership in public bureaucracies may mat-
ter the most for successful implementation of adopted
innovations through crafting better climates for inno-
vations and allowing the employees greater discretion
to be creative. Our evidence implies that while bottom-
up dynamics are successful, top-down dynamics may
be revealing themselves through better conditions and
climates for innovations in a work environment. We
encourage future research to address this issue in more
detail for a more definitive answer.
Potential Weaknesses and Strengths of the Study
While the empirics provide some interesting substan-
tiation and insight to a theory of organizational loca-
tion in terms of perceived innovation success, there
are several potential weaknesses that we would like to
acknowledge about this study. First, we are unable to
differentiate the implemented innovations in our data
sample by types and characteristics of innovations.
Extant literature suggests that types and characteristics
matter significantly for decisions to adopt innovations.
While in light of robust model selection statistics, we
are confident in our results; we, nevertheless, encour-
age colleagues to build on our study and assess whether
particular innovation types and characteristics matter
for effective implementation of innovations, control-
ling for the loci of innovation sources and intended
results and processes. Second, in addition to innova-
tion types, we are optimistic but also cautious about
generalizability of our findings. Australia is a parlia-
mentary democracy with a healthy fusion between
the legislative and executive branches of power. In
other contexts, such as the United States, senior lead-
ership and members of the US Congress may be dis-
tinctly proximate to the organization’s technical core.
We invite future studies to test our heuristic of distal
organizational perspectives in locations other than
Australia as well as at levels other than the national
government. Despite these limitations, we believe our
findings can speak directly to practitioners in that we
provide rather strong evidence that the locational char-
acteristics of a given policy/innovation are important
to its perceived success by different organizational
actors—depending, in part, on the locational perspec-
tive of the policy’s source vis-à-vis the organizational
environment. Thus, based on our findings, managers
may be better able to identify where implementation
problems might surface based on the relative proxim-
ity of the source to the intended result or process.
Moreover, our work also contributes to tradi-
tional policy implementation research by taking a
more microanalytic approach. We recognize the loci
of policy origin and where the policy is implemented,
as well as the extrinsic versus intrinsic nature of the
policy’s outcomes. By integrating systems theoretic
propositions and introducing a horizontal dimension
to top-down versus bottom-up debates in policy imple-
mentation research, we propose an expanded picture
of how internal organizational perspectives are shaped
based on the locational interactions of source, policy,
and actors. Importantly, our work focuses on the per-
ceptions of organizational actors within an organiza-
tional environment. Thus, what may be perceived as
a success within an organization does not necessarily
equate to a policy’s general success. We cannot make
any such definitive assumptions from the data we use.
However, we believe that evidence of how these per-
ceptions are formed, due to factors both within and
outside the organization’s technical core, is enlighten-
ing to both policy implementation research and inno-
vation management research.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 2016, Vol. 26, No. 4
Supplementary Material
Supplementary material is available at https://sites.
google.com/site/tmoldogaziev/resources.
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