PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. FELINO D.

ABALOS
G.R. No. L-29039, 28 November 1969

FACTS:

This is a special civil action for Certiorari and Mandamus with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, to annul an order of Hon. Felino D. Abalos (Abalos, for brevity) as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Sulu, directing that the testimony of a rebuttal witness for the
prosecution in Criminal Case no. 3158 of said court be stricken from the records. Soon after
the filing of the petition herein, the Supreme Court (SC for brevity) issued a temporary
restraining order directing the continuation of the trial of the said case be suspended until
further notice.

When Criminal Case no. 3158 was called for trial, the prosecution introduced evidence tending
to show that defendants Mohammad Ussam Dambong (Mohammad for short), Jikiri Dambong,
Amiril Habissi, and Ahmad Intoman allegedly committed on 6 Feb 1961 the crimes of double
murder and multiple frustrated murder by firing at and killed Maoludain Habissi and Abdulhadi
Maoludain as well as shot and wounded the other persons named in the information. The
defense thereafter presented its own evidence in the course of which Mohammad testified that
the casualties and injured persons adverted to resulted from shots fired , not by him but, by
Abdulhadil Habissi because as a police sergeant in the performance , Mohammad had merely
fired into the air, to stop a fight between 2 groups of persons, to one of which the victim
belonged. The defense having, thereafter, completed the introduction of its evidence on 24
April 1968, the prosecution called Majid Andi (Majid for short) as rebuttal witness.

After the preliminary question propounded on Majid, the defense objected to further questions
upon the ground that the former appeared to have witnessed the occurrence and that his
testimony should have been introduced when the prosecution presented its evidence in chief.
Respondent Judge sustained the objection but, later reconsidered his resolution, as the
prosecution explained that it had discovered Majid sometime after the introduction of its
evidence in chief and that the testimony of said witness would merely rebut that of
Mohammad’s. Thereupon, the prosecution resumed the examination of Majid, who said that he
was present when the shooting involved in the case took place; and that Maoludani Habissi
and Abdulhadi Maoludani were shot by defendant not by Abdulkadil Habissi; and that the latter
was not even at the scene of the occurrence. The prosecution then asked Majid whether
Mohammad was in the courtroom over the objection of the defense on ground that it was
improper for a rebuttal which should have been asked during the presentation by the
prosecution of its evidence in chief. Respondent Judge sustained the objection and ordered
the testimony of Majid stricken from the record as improper for rebuttal.
The prosecution having announced that Majid would be its last witness and it would appeal
from the resolution of the court as soon as copy thereof had been furnished him, respondent
Judge directed that the testimony of Majid “be discarded from the records on the ground that it
was nothing but answers to questions not proper in rebuttal” and adding thereby that “from the
observation of this court, the witness in rebuttal should have been presented as a witness in
the presentation of the evidence in chief of the prosecution “ and the court declared that the
case be deemed submitted for decision on 15 May 1968 unless the parties sought permission
to the memorandum on or before said date.

Hence, the prosecution filed the original action for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory injunction against respondent Judge and Mohammad. In his answer, Abalos
reiterated his views during the trial as well as in the resolution and the order complained of.
On the other hand, Mohammad filed his answer defending the position taken by Abalos.
However, the SC held that both positions were utterly untenable.

ISSUE:

Whether Abalos erred in ordering the testimony of Majid stricken from the records.

HELD:

The information alleged that defendant Mohammad had fired at and killed and wounded
persons named therein. Naturally, the evidence for the prosecution had to prove that
Mohammad had committed these acts. On the other hand, Mohammad was entitled to
establish the contrary – that he did not kill and would said persons. He, however, went further,
to which he was entitled, and testified that it was Abdulkadil Habissi who did those acts. It was
a new matter not covered directly by the evidence of the prosecution. Nonetheless, the
prosecution was entitled, however, as a matter of strict legal right, to introduce positive
evidence to the effect that Mohammad committed those acts – instead of relying at mere
inference from its evidence in chief. In fact, it was to the best interest of the trial court, in the
discharge of its duty to find the truth, to receive said rebuttal evidence for the prosecution. For
such failure on the part of the prosecution to introduce it on rebuttal could have been regarded
as a weakness in the evidence and could prove that the crimes charged in the information had
not been committed by Mohammad.

In directing therefore that the testimony of Majid be stricken from the records and not allowing
him to identify the person who committed the crime as charged, Abalos had committed a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The SC had emphasized that trial
courts have ample discretion to determine whether the parties should be allowed to introduce
evidence in rebuttal. Moreover, its resolution on this matter is interlocutory in nature and will
not generally be reviewed except on appeal taken a decision rendered on the merits. Judicial
discretion though unlimited, needs to be exercised reasonably with a view to promoting the
ends of justice, one of which is to ascertain the truth. This practice, the SC said, had added
importance as regard the evidence for the prosecution in criminal cases, for, once the accused
has been acquitted, there is no means to secure a review by appeal, no matter how erroneous
the action of the lower court may have been.

In effect, the SC had ruled to annul the order complained of and Abalos was accordingly
directed to receive the testimony of Majid as well as to allow him to identify the person/s who
caused the deaths and injuries involved in the case.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMILIANO DURANAN
G.R. No. 134074-75, 16 January 2001

FACTS:

The complaining witness (AAA for short) was 25 years old at the time of the incidents in
question and was considered as retarded who finished up to 6 th grade only. She was
unemployed and simply did some household chores for the family. Duranan, on the other
hand lived with AAA’s family in the same apartment where he rented a room which he shared
with several other people.

The first rape took place in the afternoon of 7 Mar 1994. AAA was standing by the door of her
grandfather’s house when Duranan suddenly placed his arms on her neck and dragged her
inside the common bathroom. AAA said Duranan kissed her and then removed her shorts and
underwear as he held her hands with his other hand. She did not cry for help because
Duranan threatened her that he would get angry if she did. She claimed that Duranan was able
to rape her while standing up and despite her resistance. After the incident, AAA was sent out
of the bathroom and she went directly home. The second incident occurred in the early
morning of 8Mar1994, according to AAA. She said she was cleaning the premises of her family
residence when Duranan pulled her from her house and took her to his room. According to
AAA, Duranan asked his brother, who was then cooking, to leave the room. Afterwhich,
Duranan laid her on the floor and raped her. AAA said she forced to submit to the lust of
Duranan because of his threats. After the incident, Duranan sent her letters professing love for
her, telling her how beautiful she was. AAA said she tore up the letters after reading them.

On 12 Mar 1994, Duranan asked AAA to let him use the bathroom and after permission was
given, Duranan grabbed AAA by the hand, pulled her inside the bathroom and started kissing
her on the lips and necj after closing the door behind them. He only stopped molesting her he
heard somebody coming. BBB (mother of AAA) testified that she saw her daughter leave the
bathroom quickly followed by Duranan. She noticed that AAA’s lower lip was bruised. When
she confronted her daughter about it, AAA revealed for the first time what had happened to
her.

Medical examination at the Camp Crame revealed that AAA lost her virginity within the last 5
days due to the possibility of intercourse. Duranan denied the possibility of rape in both
instances and contended that the complaints were filed against him because AAA’s family
wanted to evict him and his housemates from their house.

Based on the evidence of both parties, the trail court rendered a decision on 22april 1998
finding Duranan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 2 counts of rape.

ISSUES: 1) Did the trail court gravely erred in holding that AAA is deprived of reason despite
absence of testimony by a competent medical expert to this effect and despite strong evidence
on the records to the contrary? (2) Did trial court gravely erred in alternatively holding the guilt
of Duranan in raping AAA thru force and intimidation?
Duranan contended that the mental age of AAA was not proven hence, he could not be
convicted of rape under Art. 335 (2) of the Revised Penal Code for it is essential in the
prosecution of rape case with a mental retardate as victim that a psychiatric evaluation of the
complainant’s mental age is under 12 years of age. The SC held that it is competent for the
ordinary witness to give his opinion as to the sanity or mental condition of a person provided
the witness had sufficient opportunity to observe the speech, manner, habits and conduct of
the person in question, especially a mother testifying about her own child. Also, the trial court
found in dealing with AAA that she was mentally deficient and which such findings of facts
should not be disturbed since the trial court is in the best position to determine such findings of
facts. Moreover, Duranan cited the medico-legal report describing AAA as coherent and
contended that it was an evaluation of the mental condition of AAA. The SC , however, held
that such contention of Duranan was totally without legal basis. The medico-legal report
categorically stated that the purpose of the medical exam is limited to determining whether the
complainant had been sexually abused which is to determine her physical and not her mental
state.

On the alternative, Duranan argued that indeed AAA could not be a competent witness if she is
retarded. But the SC cited Rule 130 (20) of the Revised Rules of Court that “any person who
can perceive and make known his/her perception is qualified to be a witness” and this fact was
clearly demonstrated by AAA thru her testimonies. The SC continued in holding that any
objection to the competency of a complainant to testify should have been raised by the
defense at the outset and not for the first time on appeal. Again, Duranan argued that the
absence of injury sustained by AAA negated the presence of any force and intimidation but the
SC resoundingly held that said contention of Duranan is without merit for the presence or
absence of injuries is not essential in proving rape; what is essential is proof that sexual
intercourse with a woman was accomplished without her consent which in the case at bar, the
absence of consent was shown by the fact that complainant is a mental retarded vulnerable to
intimidation. The degree of force or intimidation required for the act to constitute rape is relative
and must be viewed in the light of the complainant’s perception at the time of the commission
of the offense. What is vital is that such force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose that accused had in mind. In the case at bar, due to the complainant’s mental
retardation, the force or intimidation required is not very great since it does not take much to
force a child into submission.

The mental retardation of AAA was proven by the testimony of her mother, the trial court’s
observations during the trial of her demeanors, behaviors and intelligence while the fact of
sexual intercourse was proven by the medico-legal certificate. In addition, the intimidation in
the case at bar was constituted by the threats that accused made to AAA not to mention the
force employed by Duranan in placing his arms on AAA’s neck and holding her hands while
undressing her.

The SC affirmed conviction of guilt of Duranan beyond reasonable doubt with modification of
increasing the award of P50,000 civil indemnity to P100,000 in favor of AAA in addition to the
order for Duranan to pay AAA the sum of P100,000 for moral damages.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MELLY SARAP and ROGER AMAR
G.R. No. 132165, 26 March 2003

FACTS:

The information charged Melly of sale of prohibited drug committed on or about in the
afternoon of 4Mar1996 in Brgy. Poblacion, municipality of Banga, province of Aklan by selling,
delivering, distributing and transporting prohibited drugs consisting of 900 grams of marijuana
leaves or indian hemp to the intended buyers Joysie Duran, Jonalyn Duran and Pepe
Casabuena who were apprehended 2 days ago by the police authorities, and for which said
drugs were confiscated from the possession and control of the accused. Melly pleaded not
guilty when arraigned on 25Mar1996 and thereafter trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented a narration of events beginning from the raid on the house of
Conrado Ricaforte in Rizal St., Poblacion Banga, Aklan conducted by SPO4 Gelacio Guarino
(Guarino for brevity), Chief of Police of Banga, Aklan, together with PO2 Jhanny Navida on the
strength of a search warrant relative to the reported sale of marijuana by the occupants (sisters
Josie and Jonalyn Duran and Pepe Csabuena) of said house who were apprehended for illegal
possession of marijuana and were later detained at the Banga Police Station. In the course of
their investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly from Capiz and one Roger were the
suppliers of marijuana and that they will be back on 4mar1996.

On 4Mar1996, Janet Iguiz, caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte (Conrado for short)
informed Guarino that there were 2 strangers looking for the Duran sisters. Accordingly,
Guarino and Navida recorded the report in the police blotter and proceeded to the house of
Conrado which is more or less 300 meters away from the police station. When they arrived
there, Guarino saw a woman, who turned-out to be Melly, walking in the alley near the house.
Melly saw Guarino and Navida in police uniform and immediately threw away her black
canvass bag, which her companion Roger Amar picked-up. Guarino blocked Melly’s path and
grabbed from her the green plastic bag she was holding which on inspection, said plastic bag
was found to contain 2 blocks of marijuana fruiting tops. Almost at the same time, Navida
pursued Amar and arrested him .

The marijuana confiscated from Melly was brought to Iloilo headquarters for laboratory
examination upon which it was confirmed that the substance was indeed marijuana.
Consequently, the above-quoted information was filed against Melly and Amar. Melly denied
the accusation against her and narrated that she delivered dried fish to her sister Suzanne
Ricablanca, afterwhich she went to the comfort room of the dress shop fronting Banga Public
Market to relieve herself. On her way to the dress shop, she met Amar and entrusted to him
her black bag. Thereafter, a woman approached and told her that there were policemen
waiting for her outside. The policemen forced her to board a jeep and brought her to the office
of Guarino at the Municipal Hall. Melly asserted that the policemen did not get any marijuana
from her . Her testimony was corroborated by her co-accused Amar, her sister Suzanne
Ricablanca and Leonardo Broca, a pedicab driver.
On 2Oct 1997, the trial court rendered its decision finding Melly guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of RA 6425, as amended, and sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P500,000 without subsidiary imprisonment, in case
of insolvency. On the other hand, accused Amar was acquitted.

ISSUES: (1) That the trial court erred in not holding the warrantless search and arrest illegal;
(2) That the trial court erred in not considering the defense of alibi as a ground of the acquittal
of Melly in spite of the weakness of the prosecution evidence which is insufficient to overcome
the presumption of innocence in her favor; (3) That the trial court erred in not appreciating as a
ground for her acquittal, the defense that the transparent plastic bag was not possessed nor
owned by her, despite positive and convincing proof adduced in support thereof; (4) That the
court erred in not acquitting Melly on ground of reasonable doubt.

In convicting Melly, the trial court held that: (1) the police officers were presumed to have
regularly performed their duties and (2) the positive testimonies of the prosecution witness
have more weight compared to Melly’s negative testimony. The trial court relied heavily on the
testimony of Guarino that due to the urgency of the matter, they proceeded immediately to the
house of Conrado to pursue Melly and Amar. It concluded that their warrantless arrest was
lawful considering that Melly had committed or was actually committing a crime when arrested.
It ruled that the search incident to the said arrest was sanctioned under the Rules and
evidence obtained therefrom is admissible. But the SC could not be convinced by such
reasoning. The case of Melly, the SC said, did not fall squarely under the exception to the rule
when effecting a valid arrest without a warrant as she was merely walking in the alley near the
house of Conrado. She could not be said then to be committing a crime nor was she about to
commit one nor had she just committed a crime.

The Banga Police could have secured a search warrant when Jonalyn Duran disclosed during
the investigation that a certain Melly of Capiz and Roger Amar would be back on 4Mar1996.
The persons intended to be searched had been particularized, the thing to be seized specified
and the time was also sufficiently ascertained to be 4Mar1996, although t was uncertain
whether Melly would arrive. Despite all these, the police only acted when the caretaker of the
house of Conrado informed them that there were strangers looking for sisters Jonalyn and
Joysie Duran. Hence, they can never then dispense with the requirement of search warrant on
the basis of the urgency of effecting it considering that they had 24 hours to do so. The
apprehending officers had prior knowledge of Melly’s alleged activities. Verily, there was no
excuse for them not to secure the search warrant. Hence, the Banga Police did not effect a
lawful warrantless search and seizure since Melly was not lawfully arrested. The law requires
that the search must be incidental to a lawful arrestin order that the search itself may likewise
be considered legal.

The testimony of Guarino negated the conclusion of the trial court that the marijuana fruiting
tops were inadvertently discovered as they were not apparent or in plain view as shown by the
fact that Guarino still had to grab Melly’s bag to ascertain its cobtents. Without the illegally
seized prohibited drug, Melly’s conviction can not stand. There was simply no sufficient
evidence to convince her conviction. That the search disclosed marijuana fruiting tops in
Melly’s possession and thus confirmed the police officers’ initial information and suspicion, did
not cure its patent illegality. An illegal search cn not be undertaken and then an arrest effected
on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.

All told, the guilt of Melly was not proven beyond reasonable doubt measured by the required
moral certainty of conviction. The evidence presented by the prosecution was not enough to
overcome the presumption of innocence as constitutionally ordained. Indeed, it would be better
to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one
innocent man for a crime he did not commit.

The decision of the Regional Trial Court of kalibo, Aklan, Branch 7, finding Melly guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Sec. 4 of RA 6425, was ordered reversed and set
aside thereby acquitted Melly of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.